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published in
Studies in Philosophy and Education
1997

document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Link to publication in VU Research Portal

Rational Passions and Intellectual Virtues. A Conceptual Analysis

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ABSTRACT: Intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, clarity, intellectual honesty and the willingness to participate in rational discussions, are conceived as important aims of education. In this paper an attempt is made to clarify the specific nature of intellectual virtues. Firstly, the intellectual virtues are systematically compared with moral virtues. The upshot is that considering a trait of character to be an intellectual virtue implies assuming that such a trait can be derived from, or is a specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. Secondly, several (possible) misconceptions of intellectual virtues are avoided by making the required distinctions. For example, it is argued that our concept of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness.

I. INTRODUCTION AND FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM

It is beyond doubt that 'In praise of the cognitive emotions' (1977) is one of the most creative and pioneering publications of Israel Scheffler. As the title indicates, in this paper the view is defended that various emotions serve the aims of cognition. Scheffler is explicitly not suggesting that emotions can be reduced to cognitions, nor that cognitions can be reduced to emotions. Neither does he want to deny that our emotions can have a derailing or disrupting influence on our reasoning, judging and deciding. His main aim is to contest the stereotypical emotion-cognition dichotomy. Our emotional life and our cognitive endeavors are no hostile worlds apart. On the contrary, certain emotions are integral and sustaining components of processes of rational judgment and decision making.

To make this thesis plausible, Scheffler gives an illuminating description of the various roles of emotion in cognition. Among other things, he draws our attention to the indispensible function of the so-called *rational passions* (cf. pp. 4–5). As examples of such passions he mentions a love of truth, a contempt for lying, a concern for accuracy in observation and inference, a disgust at evasion, admiration of theoretical achievements and respect for the considered arguments of others. Together these emotions constitute, as R.S. Peters once wrote, "the passionate side of the life of reason" (1970, p. 68).

Rational passions, if conceived as dispositional emotions, are in fact traits of character. In his article Scheffler uses the term 'rational character', but normally the traits at issue are called *intellectual virtues*. That such virtues are identical with rational passions, is already shown by their appellations. Often used names of intellectual virtues, which include 'an abhorrence of irrelevance', 'a concern

for consistency', 'respect for evidence' and 'a devotion to truth', are clear indications of rational passions. In other designations of intellectual virtues, like 'open-mindedness', 'intellectual honesty', 'thoroughness' and 'clarity', the reference to rational passions is less pronounced. Yet these virtues are unmistakably also composed of such emotions. Open-mindedness, for example, can hardly be conceived without an aversion of prejudice, a commitment to tolerance regarding rival opinions, and a repugnance towards ignoring critical objections. And how can someone be a bearer of the intellectual virtue of clarity without having a heart-felt aversion towards woolly or obscure language?

With reference to the relevant passages of Scheffler's paper, we shall give a more elaborate description of the specific nature of rational passions or intellectual virtues. First, in section II, we will try to elucidate in what respects intellectual virtues should be distinguished from moral virtues. This comparative analysis, we hope, will make clear what we mean when we call a trait of character an intellectual virtue. After that, in section III, we will strive to deepen our insight into the nature of intellectual virtues by eliminating several (possible) misunderstandings. For example, we shall argue that our concept of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness, as well as maintain that certain virtues of will power are often mistakenly regarded as intellectual virtues.

Our analysis is not meant to be a purely theoretical undertaking, but an attempt to shed light on an important aim of education. According to a student of Scheffler, the philosopher Harvey Siegel, critical thinking is a fundamental educational ideal that is composed of two basic aspects, viz. the reason assessment component and the critical spirit component (cf. 1988, pp. 32–42). The former component roughly consists in the ability to assess reasons according to appropriate principles, that is the ability to determine to what extent the reasons offered do really justify certain beliefs, claims or actions. The critical thinker, however, is not only able to assess reasons properly, he is also disposed or inclined to do so. Siegel connects this second component, the critical attitude, with the rational passions. Indeed, according to him these passions "constitute and instantiate the critical attitude" (p. 40). If this account of critical thinking cuts any ice, our analysis of intellectual virtues can be understood as an elucidation of an essential component of an often praised educational ideal.

II. INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL VIRTUES

Scheffler draws a distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. He uses the terms 'rational character' and 'intellectual conscience' with reference to the former group of virtues, whereas he reserves the terms 'moral character' and 'moral conscience' for the latter group. Other authors, however, in particular Karl Popper (cf. 1981/82), R.F Dearden (cf. 1984) and Anthony Quinton (cf. 1987), are inclined to consider intellectual virtues as moral virtues. To be sure, they do not deny that the group of intellectual virtues has certain distinctive fea-

tures. But in their view this only means that this group of virtues should be understood as a specific subclass *within* a larger class of moral virtues.

In this conception tenable? Are intellectual virtues actually moral virtues? Or can we indicate certain criteria on the basis of which these two groups of virtues should be distinguished? To begin with, there is a certain similarity between both groups of character traits. Both moral and intellectual virtues correspond with certain *rules* (norms, criteria, principles). The moral virtue of honesty for example, correlates with the rule that forbids us to steal or to cheat. And the moral virtue of impartiality or formal justice corresponds with the principle that prohibits us from treating equals unequally and unequals equally. In the same way we can lay down for every intellectual virtue one or more corresponding rules. Open-mindedness, for example, correlates with the duty to examine rival views as objectively as possible, to be open to criticism, and to seriously assess the force of counter-arguments. Or take the virtue of intellectual honesty. This trait, too, is connected to rules, amongst which the duty not to cover up our private doubts about our views, to admit frankly our errors in reasoning, and not to smuggle away unwelcome evidence.

However, the relationship between moral and intellectual virtues goes beyond this formal correspondence with certain rules. Distinctive of the bearer of these virtues is that such a person has *internalized* the rules in question. Perhaps we can even state that acquiring moral and intellectual virtues on the one hand, and internalizing the corresponding rules on the other, boils down to the same thing. These processes of internalization involve the development of emotions, like certain feelings of respect and admiration, love and concern, repugnance and contempt. These emotions motivate the person intrinsically to observe and uphold the rules at issue. And precisely such activating emotions are the constituents of both moral and intellectual virtues.

Obviously we cannot conclude on the basis of these points of similarity that intellectual virtues should be regarded as (a subclass of) moral virtues. However, the described relationship enables us to understand the outline of the argument of authors like Dearden and Quinton. It goes without saying that the corresponding rules of moral virtues are typical *moral* rules. For the sake of convenience, we will call the rules that correspond to intellectual virtues *rational* rules. Now, what the authors mentioned argue is that rational rules are in fact genuine moral (or ethical) rules. From which it is then concluded that the corresponding traits of character are genuine moral virtues.

But what precisely are the arguments of Dearden and Quinton for this view?[1] And can their arguments stand the test of criticism? The first argument that we will discuss is put forward by Dearden (1984, pp. 105–106). We are, he argues, normally inclined to connect moral rules exlusively with the sphere of action, with what we do in the world. Yet it is undeniable that there are also certain normative requirements for what goes on in our minds, in particular for the proper formation of beliefs. Examples of such requirements are the rule that prescribes us to give due weight to relevant evidence, the rule that forbids us to take a biased view towards new theories, or the rule that requires us to revise our

beliefs in the light of sound counter-arguments. And it is striking that the language of these normative requirements is the *same* as the language of ordinary ethics. With regard to both our actions and our cognitive activities, we speak in terms of duties, obligations, and even, correlatively, of rights. According to Dearden, this linguistic resemblance is a good reason to consider the normative requirements for the formation of beliefs as moral rules. Together these norms constitute a genuine ethics, and not an ordinary ethics of action but an ethics of *belief.*

We agree with Dearden that certain rules are applicable to the formation and maintenance of our beliefs and convictions. Earlier we called such normative requirements 'rational rules'. We can also agree with the indicated resemblance between these norms and moral rules. In the description of examples of rational rules given above, we have ourselves used the term 'duty' several times. Still, we do not think that this linguistic resemblance is a convincing reason for considering rational rules to be moral rules or, consequently, for regarding intellectual virtues as moral virtues. Take for example the rules of a game. These rules, too, can be expressed in terms of duties, obligations and corresponding rights. Nevertheless, no one is inclined to regard such rules as moral. We could possibly maintain that the participants of the game are morally obliged to observe the rules of that game. And in a similar way it is perhaps our moral duty to observe rational rules in the formation of our beliefs. But the fact, if it is one, that such moral 'meta'-duties regarding the observance of certain rules obtain, does not turn these rules into moral rules.

Dearden's second argument is also a kind of argument by analogy (1984, pp. 105–109, 119). Observing rational rules, like complying with moral rules, has certain effects on character. Teaching children to stick to rational rules, in particular by habituation, is not simply a matter of transmitting accurate information, but involves *ipso facto* the cultivation of traits of character. According to Dearden, this resemblance is also a good reason to regard the normative requirements for the formation of beliefs as moral or ethical rules. And because of this he typifies the effects of observing such rules as "a development of moral character." (p. 119).

We think that Dearden rightly points to the similar effects of the systematic observance of rational and moral rules. We ourselves argued above that the internalization of both groups of rules can be conceived as the development and establishment of traits of character. However, in our opinion this resemblance is not a convincing reason for incorporating rational rules into the class of moral rules. Again, a comparison with another type of rules can illustrate our objection. The observance of rules of etiquette, too, has possible effects on character. Teaching such rules consists in the cultivation of a specific trait of character, that could be called the virtue of mannerliness. Yet the rules of etiquette are not moral rules, even though there can be good moral reasons to observe the proper forms under certain circumstances. Therefore, we cannot infer from the resemblance in question that the virtue of mannerliness is in fact a moral virtue.

A final argument for regarding rational rules as moral rules refers to the effects of our beliefs and convictions on the lives of others. Both Dearden (1984, pp. 104–105) and Quinton (1987, pp. 38–41) put forward this argument. But because the line of reasoning of the latter is more elaborated, we will concentrate on his paper.

What Quinton tries to make plausible is "the general correctness of the assumption that my defective beliefs are harmful to others" (p. 14). In support of this thesis, he produces two arguments. Firstly, he argues that our actions which are based on false or unreasonable beliefs, can be directly disadvantageous to others. This holds in particular for our actions that are intended to promote the interests of our fellow man. If such actions are inspired by incorrect or unjustified beliefs, there is a considerable chance that we will do more harm than good. Quinton's second argument is both more important and more complex. Normally we will benefit from having true beliefs. For if we rely on false beliefs about the outcomes of our actions, we will usually not achieve the ends we have in view. According to Quinton, we can infer from this that on the whole the expression of our false beliefs will be indirectly disadvantageous to others. Under normal circumstances other persons will be inclined to accept our communicated beliefs, in particular when we speak with trusted authority. And if those others subsequently base their actions on such false beliefs, they also run the risk of not getting what they want or value.

Because of this twofold connection between our beliefs and the welfare of others, Quinton holds the view that it is morally desirable to have true or justified beliefs. And in order to form such beliefs, the best thing we can do is to observe the rational rules. For Quinton this is the central reason to regard these rules as moral rules. Because of the fact that the observance of rational rules is all in all in the interest of other people, together those rules constitute an ethics. And not an ethics in a metaphorical or figurative sense, but in the literal meaning of that term.

In our opinion, Quinton's thesis that in general our defective beliefs are harmful to others is plausible, in particular when we take into account all his subtle qualifications and reservations. And the fact that the interests of others are at stake is certainly an important moral reason for observing rational rules in the formation of our beliefs. But the conclusion that is drawn form this, namely that such rules are genuine moral rules, can hardly be maintained. Let us once again make a comparison with another type of rule, in this case traffic rules. The general observance of such rules undoubtedly serves the interests of all road users. Because these interests are at stake, we have a moral duty to comply with traffic rules. But this does not imply that such rules are themselves moral rules. On the contrary, it is counter-intuitive to regard traffic rules as a subclass of moral rules.

In short, Quinton and Dearden have convinced us that the observance of rational rules, and consequently also the cultivation of the corresponding virtues, deserves our moral concern. But their arguments for the thesis that rational rules are actually moral rules, and that therefore the intellectual virtues should be con-

ceived as moral virtues, are less convincing. However, the fact that the arguments produced are unsound obviously does not entail that the thesis defended is untenable. So the question arises: are Dearden and Quinton correct concerning the thesis itself?

In a certain respect this question should be answered in the affirmative. As we have seen, intellectual virtue-names refer to certain traits of character. And it is not at all odd or implausible to regard many of those traits, for instance open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, tolerance against rival views, intellectual modesty and intellectual fairness, as moral virtues too. In other words, it would be a mistake to consider the traits that are normally designated by intellectual virtue-names to be a separate class, completely distinct from the group of traits that can be regarded as moral virtues. The former group of traits is, at least for the most part,[2] a subclass of the latter group. In this respect many intellectual virtues are indeed genuine moral virtues. And the same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for the corresponding rules. The rules that correspond with intellectual virtues can mostly also be conceived as genuine moral rules.

The problem is, however, that up to now we have not found a good argument for this view. At least the arguments of Dearden and Quinton have not convinced us of the correctness of the thesis that intellectual virtues are in fact moral virtues. Yet in our opinion such a reason can be given. And this argument we find, paradoxically enough, by defending the thesis that in *another* respect intellectual virtues are *not* moral virtues. What respect is this?

The distinction between intellectual and moral virtues can not be clarified by concentrating on the traits of character referred to, but only by shifting our attention to the *designation* of these traits. For calling a trait of character an intellectual virtue is quite different from calling a trait of character a moral virtue. Or, to put it more precisely, the semantic rules for using the expressions 'intellectual virtue' and 'moral virtue' are not the same.[3] This difference in designation is not easy to clarify, but we hope that our guess will hit the mark.

In every systematically elaborated ethics of virtue particular traits of character are considered cardinal virtues. Characteristic of such virtues is that they cannot be derived from one another, whereas all the other virtues can be derived from or shown to be forms of them. The rules that correspond with cardinal virtues are known as basic or fundamental principles. Such principles also cannot be derived from one another. But it is possible to derive the rules that correspond with the remaining virtues from those basic principles.

Making use of these classical distinctions, we want to defend the view that the group of intellectual virtues is based on and unified by the cardinal virtue of *concern and respect for truth*. The fundamental principle that corresponds to this virtue is, roughly speaking, the abstract principle that urges us to investigate as well as possible whether our non-trivial beliefs are true or well-justified. The group of moral virtues is, in our opinion, also sustained and united by one cardinal virtue, in this case the complex virtue of *concern and respect for persons*. This virtue, too, corresponds with a basic principle, namely the compounded principle that exhorts us to promote the well-being of others and to respect their intrinsic dignity.

If this analysis is on the right track, we can elucidate in what respect intellectual virtues are different from moral virtues. If we designate a trait of character as an intellectual virtue, we indicate that this quality can be drived from, or is a specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. If we designate a trait of character as a moral virtue on the other hand, we assume that this quality is based on, or is a form of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for persons. In this, we think, lies the distinction we are looking for: by using the expressions 'intellectual virtue' or 'moral virtue', we place the relevant trait of character in a different *context of justification*, in such a manner that we consider that trait a specification of a different cardinal virtue. In the same way the distinction between the corresponding rules can be explained. By designating a rule as a rational one, this rule is conceived as derived from, or as a specific form of, the basic principle that corresponds with the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. And if we designate a rule as a moral one, we connect this rule in a similar manner with the fundamental principle that correlates with the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for persons.

At the same time the revealed distinction enables us to explain that in a certain respect intellectual virtues are actually moral virtues too. Traits of character that we designate as intellectual virtues, can often also be regarded as specifications of the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for persons. Take for example tolerance towards rival views. This trait of character is rightly considered an intellectual virtue. For such a trait can easily be derived from, or understood as a specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. If we really want our beliefs to be true or well-justified, we should be tolerant towards views that challenge our beliefs. At the same time, however, we can justify this form of tolerance by appealing to the belief that it is better to get someone to do something by reason than by force. And this is clearly a moral consideration that is based on the fundamental principle of respect for persons.[4] In this respect an intellectual virtue can be a genuine moral virtue.

What insights into the nature of intellectual virtues are generated by our comparative analysis? We argued that the corresponding rules of intellectual virtues are derived from the basic principle that relates to the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. As such, rational rules specify what is involved in investigating as well as possible whether our non-trivial bliefs are true or well-justified. To put it differently, the observance of rational rules fosters the proper formation of beliefs. Intellectual virtues are passions that motivate us to observe and respect such rules. Therefore, practising these virtues will increase the chance[5] that our opinion-forming practices result in beliefs that are true or at least well-justified. This is precisely the *raison d'être* of intellectual virtues.

III. POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS

Our view concerning the nature of intellectual virtues can be made more compelling by eliminating three (possible) misunderstandings. Characteristic of the

misconceptions that we will discuss is the entanglement of issues that should be carefully distinguished.

In the first place there is the risk of confusing our *concept* of an intellectual virtue with a normative *conception* of intellectual virtuousness. By comparing intellectual virtues with moral virtues, we have tried to explicate, so to speak, the content of the relevant concept. In performing this comparative analysis, we have mentioned examples of intellectual virtues, like open-mindedness, clarity, precision, intellectual honesty and thoroughness. By making use of these examples, our conceptual analysis is at the same time indicative of our normative conception of intellectual virtuousness. And so it is easy, but nevertheless a mistake, to regard such a conception as part of the content of the concept under consideration.

To illustrate this point, let us assume that we want to analyse another concept, for instance our concept of a right. Then our question is: what do we mean when we say that *P* has a right to *x*? In our answer we refer to the fact that *P* in such a case is able to claim *x* and, what's more, that this claim is legitimate or justified. Both these characteristics are as it were part of the content of the concept of a right. But when we indicate *which* claims of *P* we think are justified, or to *what* in our view *P* has a legitimate claim, we are presenting a normative conception of rights. In a similar way we can clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue by showing that such traits are specifications of concern and respect for truth and, moreover, that they are constituted by passions which motivate us to observe rational rules. But as soon as we indicate *which* traits according to us can be derived from concern and respect for truth, or *which* rules we have to observe in order to put ourselves in the best position for generating true beliefs, then we are defending a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness.[6]

This distinction makes it possible that some will agree with our analysis of the concept of an intellectual virtue, but in spite of that hold a different normative conception of intellectual virtuousness. For example, suppose that someone is influenced by the ideas of the German philosophers of life (cf. Bollnow, 1958) and takes the view that life is mysterious, obscure and ambivalent. This outlook on life induces him to doubt whether clarity and precision are actually intellectual virtues, but not because he rejects our conceptual analysis. He, too, acknowledges that intellectual virtues are traits of character which, if put into practice, increase the chance of forming true or well-justified beliefs. He only denies that clarity and precision will increase this chance, since he believes that analytical distinctions, unambiguous concepts and perspicuous arguments are more likely to hamper than to further real insight into life. Or suppose that someone, after reading the works of Thomas S. Kuhn, questions the value of open-mindedness and intellectual modesty. Kuhn taught him that scientists, despite relevant criticism and undermining evidence, often stubbornly stick to pioneering theories which are vindicated in the end. From that he concludes that bias and intellectual vanity should be considered valuable qualities. Such a person defends a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness which is clearly at variance with our view. Nevertheless, it is possible that he gives his unqualified assent to our explanation of the underlying concept. In short, criti-

cism of our examples of intellectual virtues is one thing, criticism of our analysis of the concept is quite another thing.

A second misunderstanding that must be avoided consists in confusing rational rules with criteria for the assessment of reasons. Siegel, as we have seen, makes a distinction between two aspects of critical thinking, the reason assessment component and the critical spirit component. He typifies the former as "the ability to assess reasons and their warranting force" (1988, p. 35). According to Siegel, the critical thinker is able to evaluate the epistemic force of reasons properly, that is to determine whether the reasons for certain claims are good or bad, relevant or irrelevant, true or false, strong or weak, important or trivial, convincing or dubious. Such an assessment is governed by certain standards or principles, which we could call *epistemic* criteria. Under this heading not only the general rules of formal and informal logic can be subsumed, but also the principles that are constitutive of different forms of thinking, for example the criteria that determine what counts as a good reason in a scientific, moral or aesthetic discourse.

As argued earlier, rational rules should be conceived as specifications of the basic principle that urges us to investigate as well as possible whether our non-trivial beliefs are true or well-justified. Such an inquiry roughly consists in the critical assessment of the epistemic force of the reasons for our beliefs. And because in reason assessment an appeal is made to epistemic principles, there is the risk of identifying such criteria with rational rules. That misunderstanding has to be avoided. Rational rules should be distinguished carefully from epistemic criteria, though a close relationship between these two types of rules is undeniable.

The observance of the rules that correspond with intellectual virtues, as we have seen, fosters the proper formation of beliefs. In fact this means that following rational rules increases the chance that reasons are assessed properly, according to appropriate epistemic criteria. Take for example the intellectual virtue of the willingness to participate in discussions. This virtue corresponds to the rule that encourages us to take part in rational debates and to submit our beliefs to a critical public. It goes without saying that this rational rule can not itself be conceived as an epistemic principle. But at the same time it is also plain that the observance of this rule increases the chance that our understanding of the epistemic force of our reasons will be more profound or that our assessment will be based on appropriate epistemic criteria. Or take the virtue of intellectual fairness. The corresponding rule obliges us to do justice to the views and arguments of others. This rational rule, too, is not itself an epistemic principle. But if we observe this rule, we will apply the relevant epistemic criteria impartially, with the result that the chance of improper reason assessment decreases.

The distinction between rational rules and epistemic criteria enables us to shed some light on the problem of the so-called generalizability of critical thinking (cf. McPeck, 1990). Some authors are of the opinion that critical thinking should be interpreted in terms of skills that are applicable to all disciplines or domains of inquiry. They refer in particular to the skills required to test argu-

ments against the rules of applied logic, both formal and informal. Other authors, however, contest the value and even the possibility of such general or subject-neutral skills. They defend the view that critical thinking is composed of patterns of reasoning that vary from field to field. In particular they refer to the different forms of knowledge and understanding, which are supposed to have their own peculiar standards or principles.

Siegel (cf. 1991) has rightly pointed out that this discussion is concentrated on the reason assessment component. To put it in our words: the central issue is whether the epistemic criteria are subject-neutral or subject-specific. The question, however, whether the other component, the critical spirit, is generalizable, has been by and large ignored. And once this question is raised, the answer is, according to Siegel, fairly obvious: "The critical spirit is *fully* generalizable" (1991, p. 26). We think that Siegel is quite right about this point. The critical spirit is composed of intellectual virtues. And no matter how we think about epistemic criteria, the rules that correspond with these virtues are not limited to any field of inquiry whatsoever. Depending on the content of our beliefs, the epistemic criteria may vary. But the rational rules are invariably applicable.

Finally, we want to discuss a third misunderstanding. It is not unusual to regard traits like courage, patience, self-control, perseverance and even temperance as intellectual virtues too (cf. Dearden, 1984, pp. 106, 119; Degenhardt, 1986, p. 111; Quinton, 1987, pp. 49, 51). In our view, however, this classification is rather unfortunate. We prefer to include the listed traits in a separate class, which is generally labelled the virtues of *will power*. Then the question arises: what exactly is the difference between this group of virtues on the one hand, and the traits that are rightly considered intellectual virtues on the other?

The answer to this question can be found by first making explicit the differences between the virtues of will power and typical *moral* virtues. These two groups of traits should also be conceived as separate classes. This is shown by the very fact that the bearer of the virtues of will power by definition has a *strong* character, but, unlike the bearer of moral virtues, not necessarily has a *good* character. Perseverance, industriousness, iron self-control and resolution in the face of hardship, are all too often qualities of brute dictators and cunning criminals. But it can hardly be maintained that such persons have a good character.

That the bearer of the virtues of will power is not necessarily a morally good person, can be explained in the following way. As already stated, moral virtues correspond with moral rules. The virtue of fidelity, for example, corresponds with the moral rule that prescribes us to keep our promises. And the virtue of forgivingness is connected to the moral rule that encourages us to renounce revenge. Therefore, practising these virtues is by definition in accordance with moral rules. And since such rules lay down which behavior is morally right or desirable, practising these virtues consists in performing actions that meet these moral qualifications (in any case *prima facie*).

The virtues of will power, however, lack this logical connection with moral rules. For what are the duties, obligations or rules of supererogation that are inextricably connected to such virtues as persistence, patience or self-control?

There are none. Hence, practising these virtues does not have to be in accordance with moral rules. And because of this, exercising the virtues of will power does not necessarily consists in performing actions that are morally right or desirable (not even *prima facie*). A dictator, for example, will show perseverance in pursuing his immoral goals. And a criminal has to exercise patience in order to make a big haul.

Now, if we compare the virtues of will power with intellectual virtues, we can reveal similar differences. Just as the bearer of the virtues of will power does not have by definition a good character, the character of such a person is not necessarily intellectually virtuous either. On the contrary, someone may have a strong character and at the same time be completely *un*virtuous from an intellectual viewpoint. A paradigmatic example is the doctrinal or dogmatic person (cf. Spiecker, 1991a, pp. 17–20; 1991b, pp. 97–98, 102–106). The character of such a person is composed of a number of intellectual vices, like closed-mindedness, intellectual intolerance and prejudice. Nevertheless, he can be remarkably strong-willed, not only in the public domain of action but also in the more cognitive sphere. For example, it can be expected that he will defend his doctrines with great tenacity, dispute rival beliefs with striking perseverance, and keep his creeping doubts about his own convictions effectively under control.

The fact that having the virtues of will power does not automatically make someone intellectually virtuous, can also be explained by appealing to corresponding rules. Virtues of will power are not only lacking corresponding moral rules, they are also logically unconnected to rational rules. In this respect they are essentially different from intellectual virtues. Unlike intellectual virtues, the virtues of will power are not composed of passions that motivate us to observe rational rules. Consequently, practising the virtues of will power, as was shown by the example of the doctrinal person, can be in flat contradiction with rational rules.

That traits like perseverance, steadfastness, courage and self-control should not be considered intellectual virtues, does not alter the fact that these traits play an important and even indispensable part in the proper assessment of the epistemic force of reasons. The building blocks of intellectual virtues, the rational passions, can come into conflict with powerful counter-inclinations. Think, for example, of our tendency to avoid threatening discussions, our aversion to the uncomfortable state of doubt, our fear of being confronted with unpleasant truths, our disinclination for exacting thinking, our passion for certainty, and our disposition to join the prevailing view. What these inclinations have in common is that they hamper the proper formation of our beliefs. As Dearden rightly observes, they are "typical human proclivities for going wrong in various ways in forming beliefs" (1984, p. 103). To resist or withstand such disrupting counter-inclinations, the virtues of will power are vital.[7] Nevertheless, they are not rightly regarded as intellectual virtues.

It was not our intention to criticize Scheffler's view concerning the various roles of emotion in cognition. On the contrary, the only thing we tried to do was to develop further his brief but basic account of the rational passions. First we

explained that rational passions are actually intellectual virtues or, perhaps better, that intellectual virtues are composed of rational passions. Then we tried to elucidate the specific nature of intellectual virtues by (a) making a comparison with moral virtues and (b) eliminating three obvious misunderstandings. Our analysis of intellectual virtues, however, is not only meant to be an elaboration of a small piece of Scheffler's work, it should also be regarded as an explication of the passions that pervade his entire oeuvre.

NOTES

[1] Popper, too, defends the view that (particular) rational rules are genuine moral rules: "The principles that are constitutive of every rational discussion are *ethical* principles in the literal sense of the word" (1981/82, p. 148). In this paper, however, clear arguments for this view are lacking. Therefore, we will restrict ourselves to the publications of Dearden and Quinton.

[2] The question is whether *all* traits of character that are regarded as intellectual virtues can also be conceived as moral virtues. What should we think, for example, of clarity, precision and thoroughness? In our opinion, such qualities are rightly considered intellectual virtues. But intuitively we are doubtful whether these traits can be regarded as moral virtues as well.

[3] Compare in this respect the well-known distinction of Gottlob Frege between sense and reference. The terms 'the evening star' and 'the morning star' refer to the same object, namely the planet Venus. But the sense (or meaning) of these terms is not the same. In other words, the distinction between the morning star and the evening star is not located in the object referred to, but in the respective designations of the object (or, as Frege would call it, in 'the modes of presentation').

[4] Intellectual virtues are often justified in terms of respect for persons. See, for example, Popper (1963, pp. 232–240), who connects the attitude of reasonableness with a "basically equalitarian and humanitarian outlook", and Siegel (1988, pp. 55–57), who defends the educational ideal of critical thinking by appealing to the "Kantian principle of respect for persons".

[5] William Hare (1983, p. 31) rightly observes that the closed-minded person may hold or acquire true beliefs, whereas the open-minded person may reject true beliefs or form opinions which are false. Practising the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness only increases the *chance* of forming beliefs that are true (or well-justified).

[6] In particular when words with an evaluative or prescriptive meaning are examined ('virtue', 'justice', 'moral' etc.), there is the risk of confusing concepts and conceptions. A conceptual analysis is often carried out by making explicit the rules for the correct use of the corresponding word. The use of evaluative words, however, is not only guided by rules that determine which concept is expressed, but also by rules that are tied up with normative conceptions. In such cases it is often tempting, but nevertheless mistaken, to conceive the later rules as part of the concept under consideration (cf. Steutel, 1991, pp. 86–89).

[7] Elsewhere (cf. Steutel, 1988, pp. 106–111; 1992, pp. 72–81) we have explained that resisting or overcoming counter-inclinations consists in applying all sorts of techniques of self-intervention. The skills to apply such techniques in the appropriate circumstances, are central components of the virtues of will power. In other words: contrary to virtues of will power, intellectual virtues are composed of rational passions, whereas virtues of will power, contrary to intellectual virtues, are made up of self-intervention skills.

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