

# VU Research Portal

## Opinionated Family Migration Policies?

Sondergaard, J.

2016

### **document version**

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication in VU Research Portal](#)

### **citation for published version (APA)**

Sondergaard, J. (2016). *Opinionated Family Migration Policies? Public opinion and resistance to EU harmonization of family reunification policies in Europe*. Uitgeverij BoxPress.

### **General rights**

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?

### **Take down policy**

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

### **E-mail address:**

[vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl](mailto:vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl)

---

# Study I

## **MIPi: A new index developed with implicative scaling for comparing family reunification policies in 27 European countries<sup>1</sup>**

---

*‘Since 2007, little changed for non-EU families reuniting in Europe...’*  
(Huddleston, Niessen, Chaoimh, & White, 2011: 14)

*‘Thus, the [Family Reunification] Directive contributed to building legitimacy for a restrictive turn that resembled a “race to the bottom.”*  
(Block & Bonjour, 2013: 215)

---

<sup>1</sup> With thanks to the comments from the research group *Interuniversitaire Werkgroep Sociale Ongelijkheid en Levensloop* for their comments on an earlier draft on 5 February 2014 in Utrecht, NL. A previous version of this paper was also presented on 14 August 2014 at the 17th Nordic Migration Research Conference ‘Flows, Places and Boundaries, migratory challenges and new agendas’ held 13-15 August 2014 in Copenhagen, DK. A version of this paper written with Harry Ganzeboom was submitted to *Comparative European Politics* on 22 April 2015 and is currently under review.

### Summary

This study develops a new index for measuring family reunification policies across 27 European countries. Using an implicative scaling model, policy indicators are selected from the Migrant Integration Policy Index database [MIPEX] to create a measurement instrument that is truly unidimensional and sensitive to actual policy changes. The study shows that the new MIPi index is more consistent with expectations about family migration policy developments in European Union [EU] countries from 2007 to 2010 than the existing MIPex policy index. In particular, the new MIPi index shows that there has been a general trend toward more restrictiveness, singling out Denmark and the Netherlands as leaders in this ‘race to the bottom’. The results also indicate that the variation in policies between countries has actually increased, despite the efforts to harmonize at the EU level.

### Introduction

Recently, there have been numerous changes in family migration policies for third-country nationals across the European Union [EU]. To track these policy changes, quantitative indices have been developed for policymakers and researchers alike to compare policies across countries. The Migrant Integration Policy Index [MIPex] is calculated based on the most comprehensive existing database of these measurements [MIPEX] and is the index most widely used (Huddleston et al., 2011). A simple search using Google Scholar,<sup>1</sup> shows that references to ‘MIPEX’ increase from 12 in 2007 to 281 references in 2012. Between 2007 and 2013 it yields a total of 994 references to MIPEX. Comparing this to two of the indices discussed by Helbling (2013) in his study of the existing integration and citizenship policy indices, in this same time period, only 52 references are found to the Index of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) created originally in 2005 (Koopmans et al., 2012) and 19 references to the civic integration index (CIVIX) (Goodman, 2010).

The debates about the validity of different indices (Helbling, 2013; Koopmans et al., 2012) culminated in a special issue on the topic in 2013 in *Comparative European Politics* (Helbling & Vink, 2013). These debates mostly rely on correlations between indices to show that they measure the same phenomenon (Helbling, 2013; Koopmans et al., 2012), but such a method cannot show the superiority of one index over another, merely the similarity of these indices. This study argues instead to first identify the trends that the index is supposed to measure and compare the indices alongside the insights that an overview of trends provides.

This study asks: what is the best way to quantitatively measure differences in family

---

<sup>1</sup> <http://scholar.google.nl>, accessed 20 October 2014 and 22 April 2015.

migration policies for non-EU citizens across EU countries over time? It argues for a new use of the Migrant Integration Policy Index database [MIPEX] on family reunification, and specifically for the use of implicative scaling, as a technique to select and combine policy indicators in a valid unidimensional scale. To evaluate the quality of the old and new measurements of family migration policy indices, the study compares the existing index, MIPex, and the newly constructed implicative scale, the MIPi, with the general trends in family reunification policies identified by other scholars. These overall trends are: a ‘race to the bottom’ (Block & Bonjour, 2013:215), the race being led by ‘European hardliners’ Denmark and the Netherlands (Groenendijk, 2011; Joppke, 2008; Reeskens, 2010) and a general divergence of family migration policies (Koopmans et al., 2012).

### **Trends in family migration policies in Europe**

In most countries, there are different policies regulating family reunifications for nationals and immigrants, often with a distinction between immigrants who are EU nationals versus those who are third-country nationals (i.e. non-EU citizens) (Strik et al., 2013). This paper deals only with the variety of policies regulating family reunification for non-EU citizens/third-country nationals. The changes in family migration policies for this group have been influenced by recent attempts at harmonization at EU level. The harmonization of European migration policies was initiated by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The harmonization of family reunification for third-country nationals policies began soon after, being based on the Conclusions of the European Council in Tampere in 1999 (Kraler, 2010). At the time of the European Council in Tampere, family reunification was seen as a way to facilitate the integration of migrants. The idea was therefore to model the family reunification rights for third-country nationals after the liberal rights granted to mobile EU citizens as consolidated in the Free Movement Directive 2004/38/EC (Kraler, 2010). But by the time the negotiations of the first EU Directive on family reunification for third-country nationals had reached their final stage, the perspective on family reunification had changed dramatically; the wide-spread perception of governments now appeared to be that family reunification for migrants *hindered* migrants’ integration (Kraler, 2010; Strik et al., 2013). In the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC, some member states therefore argued for stricter entry conditions for third-country nationals than for mobile EU citizens. When the Directive came into effect in 2005, it was a merely an ‘instrument of minimum harmonization’ (Boeles et al., 2009: 182). Its stated objective remained to facilitate family reunification, but the Directive has left member states much discretion about the rights granted to third-country nationals to family reunification in the form of numerous derogation clauses (i.e. ‘may’ clauses) (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Boeles et al., 2009; Niessen, 2009).

There are many examples of this ‘minimum harmonization’ in the final Directive. Article 4 of Directive 2003/86 states that a sponsor’s spouse and minor children are eligible for family reunification, but that member states are free to set conditions for all other family members such as parents, children above the age of majority, and unmarried partners. Additionally, Article 4(5) of the Directive states that member states may set an age limit of sponsors and migrant spouses up to the age of 21 and in Article 7(1)(c) that member states may require a stable income. The many ‘may’ clauses in the Directive indicate the ample discretion provided to member states. These include Article 7(2), whereby member states are permitted to require third-country nationals to comply with integration measures. The basic trends in the harmonization of family reunification policies identified in the literature are threefold, namely a ‘**race to the bottom**’, ‘**European hardliners**’ Denmark and the Netherlands leading this race, and a general **divergence** of family migration policies.

Some European countries seem to have recently embarked on, what previous authors have called, a ‘**race to the bottom**’ (Block & Bonjour, 2013:215) where countries seek to implement more and more restrictive family migration policies (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Strik et al., 2013). These restrictions in family migration include, but are not limited to, raising the age requirement for family reunification, raising the income requirement, instituting pre-departure integration measures and limiting family reunification to the nuclear family (Strik et al., 2013) (see further elaboration below for selected countries). Strik et al. (2013:59) point out that the shift towards more restrictiveness is not happening in every single country (notably it does not include Portugal), but on average, family migration policies have become more restrictive.

The race to the bottom, as at 2010, was suggested by previous studies to be led by Denmark and the Netherlands, and sometimes Austria and/or Germany are on this list. Joppke (2008:23) called Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria the “**European hardliners**”, as these are the countries where anti-immigrant parties have taken part in shaping legislation. In conducting a cluster analysis of the first wave of the MIPEX data, Reeskens (2010) identified AT, CH, DK, NL, LV, CY, EL, UK, FR, NL, NO<sup>2</sup> as having restrictive family reunification regimes.

Among these, Denmark established itself as a hardliner early on, with restrictions on family reunification beginning already in the 1990s. In Denmark, the automatic right

---

2 All country codes used for European countries are in line with Eurostat guidelines on country abbreviations, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country\\_codes](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country_codes), accessed 22/04/1 July 2015. Countries included: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK).

to family reunification established in 1983 was abandoned in 1992, by making the family migrant dependent on a sponsor having a family income (Kraler, 2010). The age requirement in Denmark for family reunification was set at 24 years old from 1 July 2002 (Kofman, 2004) and at the time of this study, Denmark still had the highest age requirement for sponsors in any country in the EU (Huddleston et al., 2011). Additionally, Denmark's restrictiveness can also be seen in the form of the country's 'attachment requirement' (*tilknytningskravet*) which requires family migrants to prove that their 'attachment to Denmark' is greater than their 'attachment to other countries' (Schmidt, 2011). Further restrictions on family reunification were instituted in 2010 in the form of pre-departure measures (see below).

From 2005 onwards, EU countries began looking to another model of restrictiveness than Denmark, namely the Netherlands (more about the Netherlands in the next paragraph). This was because from 2005, most EU countries, including the Netherlands, were bound by the new Family Reunification Directive, whereas Denmark, along with the United Kingdom and Ireland, had opted out of Article IV of the Amsterdam Treaty and were therefore not bound by this Directive (Guiraudon, 2001; Kostakopoulou, 2000; Strik et al., 2013). This meant that most EU countries could no longer follow the Danish model and set harsher restrictions than those allowed by the Directive, including exceeding the maximum age limit of 21 set by the Directive, which Denmark has done.

The Netherlands acted as a hardliner already in the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive, this country being instrumental in ensuring that the Directive left member states sufficient discretion to institute their own harsher criteria for family reunification (Block & Bonjour, 2013). During these negotiations, it was the Netherlands, with support from Austria and Germany, that ensured the insertion of the clause that countries *may* introduce integration measures (Bonjour & Vink, 2013; Groenendijk, 2011). The Netherlands was the first to institute pre-departure integration measures to restrict entry (*basisexamen inburgering in het buitenland*), thus paving the way across the EU for the implementation of restrictive pre-departure measures for family migrants, discussed further below. Some of the other restrictive measures in the Netherlands were recalled in 2010, when the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled against the Netherlands in the *Chakroun* case (Case C-578/08). The Court ruled that the Dutch income requirement of 120% of the minimum wage was not in line with the Family Reunification Directive, after which the Dutch government reluctantly lowered it to the previous requirement of 100% (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Kulu-Glasgow & Leerkes, 2013). Finally, the lack of strict EU harmonization has also meant that family migration policies have **diverged**, becoming increasingly different from each other (Koopmans et al., 2012). There are several reasons for this divergence of family migration policies despite EU harmonization. Firstly, some countries have opted out of the immigration cooperation

(UK, DK and IE), meaning that although these countries are not completely outside the decision-making process (Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Naurin & Lindahl, 2010; Selck & Kuipers, 2005), and their policies may therefore be broadly in line with harmonization standards (Strik et al., 2013), policies are unlikely to be the same as in other EU countries. Secondly, while Europeanization is supposed to bring policies of the EU member states closer together through the top-down influence of the European institutions (Joppke, 2007), the Family Reunification Directive contains a number of derogation clauses and there are no comprehensive rules for identical policies. Thirdly, previous authors have suggested that Europeanization can also happen through the horizontal transfer of information between national policymakers observing each other's policies (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Strik et al., 2013). The idea that national policymakers may find inspiration in each other's policies suggests that different policies can be dispersed to different countries. This is in line with Radaelli's (2005) 'diffusion without convergence' argument, suggesting that although policies may spread, identical policies will not be implemented in all countries.

There *is* evidence to suggest that similar family migration policies have spread across the EU. An example is the pre-departure measures, allowed by the derogation clause in Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive. Pre-departure measures refer to integration tests/courses that a family migrant has to take before being allowed to join a family member in the country of destination. These measures started in the Netherlands, as mentioned above, before spreading to Germany, France, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Austria (Bonjour, 2012; Groenendijk, 2011). In the Netherlands, such pre-departure integration measures were first imposed in 2006. To be granted entry and stay, spouses/partners and family migrants between 16 and 65 years old who come to join a parent or child in the Netherlands, were now required to take a computer-based A1 language test (before January 2011, A1-minus level) as well as a test of knowledge about Dutch society (Bonjour, 2012). In Germany, such pre-departure measures came into force in 2007. Spouses/partners must pass an A1 language test to gain entry and stay in Germany. Since January 2008, France has required spouses/partners as well as family migrants between 16 and 65 years old who come to join a parent or child to participate in an evaluation of language abilities at A1-minus level and a test on the knowledge of the values of the French Republic. In France, these tests are not a requirement for entry, instead each family migrant who does not pass the tests must sign a contract that s/he will attend the free language/civic values courses provided by the government. In Denmark, the pre-departure policy came into force in 2010. For partners/spouses to gain entry and stay, migrants are granted a temporary visa to Denmark to take an A1-minus language test and a test of knowledge about Danish society (Bonjour, 2012). Also in 2010, the British government instituted pre-departure measures for spouses and partners to be granted entry and stay

(Bonjour, 2012; Groenendijk, 2011). Most recently in 2011, Austria instituted a pre-departure language test ‘at the lowest level’ without further specification, for ‘family members’ more broadly (Bonjour, 2012:3).

Although these pre-departure measures appear very similar, they have only been instituted in the few countries mentioned above. Indeed, previous authors maintain that there remains a large difference in countries’ immigration policies (Jacobs & Rea, 2007; Meuleman & Reeskens, 2008). In fact, previous authors suggest that policies may even be diverging. Hooghe and Reeskens (2009) show divergence of such policies, including family migration policies. These authors join Huddleston and Borang (2009) in suggesting that the lack of convergence in family migration policies may be related to the lack of *strict* EU harmonization of family migration policies. In one of the few quantitative studies of these policies over time, Koopmans et al. (2012) include developments in marriage migration policies between 1980 and 2008 in ten Western-European countries. This study shows that despite EU influences such as the Family Reunification Directive, marriage migration policies went from being very similar in 1980 to *diverging* more at every time point until 2008 (when the study ended). In other words, while a convergence of policies could be expected when an EU Directive comes into force, convergence cannot be expected when a Directive gives member states too much discretion. In this case, countries will selectively look to each other for inspiration about policies and some policies will diffuse across *some* countries, resulting in a divergence of policies. A way to establish whether there is a divergence/convergence of policies is through the use of a cross-country quantitative index.

### **Existing family migration policy database and index: MIPEX and MIPex**

Quantitative indices are desirable for comparing migration policies across countries and over time because of the impossibility of comparing the wealth of qualitative information on policies across large numbers of countries. An index using a straightforward methodology is preferable, because it makes comparative data accessible for audiences, such as most policymakers and many researchers, who are unspecialized in quantitative methodology. There are lively debates about the appropriate methodologies to construct such indices, for example which policy outputs to include (immigration, integration, citizenship) and/or policy outcomes (naturalization rates, rejection rates) (Helbling, 2011, 2013; Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, & Zobel, 2013; Koopmans, 2013; Koopmans et al., 2012; Michalowski & van Oers, 2012; Reichel, 2011), but the **Migrant Integration Policy Index** [MIPex] appears to be most comprehensive and widely used index to date. The MIPex index is constructed from the MIPEX database created by the Migration Policy Group [MPG], a non-profit Brussels-based European organization, with the



## Study I

Barcelona Centre for International Affairs [CIDOB]<sup>3</sup> and contains 148 indicators measuring national policies on integration for migrants, including family reunification policies.<sup>4</sup> Note that we distinguish here between the MIPex policy index and the MIPEX database from which it was constructed.

The MIPex/MIPEX project is a collaboration between these two European organizations, being advised by 27 national-level organizations (e.g. think-tanks and NGOs). Data are collected in every country from informants who are researchers or practitioners in migration law, education, and anti-discrimination. These informants score policies based on publicly available data. Their judgments are then anonymously peer-reviewed by a second informant or national expert. The informants write comments on all of their evaluations and, unlike with other indices, these comments are freely available (Migration Policy Group, 2011), along with the raw data. While the use of experts has been criticized for being too subjective (Bjerre, Helbling, Römer, & Zobel, 2014), this multiple-staged peer review attempts to avoid that subjectivity. Unlike other expert surveys, all the data and notes are also made publicly available, meaning that the results can be further reviewed.

To complete the information for all policy indicators, the informants are given three response categories. The scores indicate the *level of permissiveness*. The three options are coded 0, 50 or 100 respectively. A score of 100 means that the policy in a country meets the highest level of permissiveness or openness of migration policies. These levels are benchmarked against the highest standards set by EU Directives or Council of Europe Conventions (Huddleston, 2011; Niessen, 2009). Where there are no standards set by a Directive, policies are measured against European-wide policy recommendations. A score of 50 means that a country is half-way to the highest standard of permissiveness and a score of 0 means that the policy is furthest from the highest standard *or* that there is no policy on that indicator in a country if the absence of that policy indicates restrictiveness.<sup>5</sup> As expressed by Niessen (2009: 10), ‘the MIPEX assesses whether domestic and European policy changes have the outcome of leveling up or leveling down the rights and responsibilities of non-EU citizens in each Member State...’. An example of this scoring is given here regarding the policy on the right to an autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching the age of majority (policy 24a in Table 1.A1). For this policy, the most permissive category (100) gives this right automatically. The half-way category (50) grants this right only on limited grounds or under certain conditions (e.g. a fixed period of residence), while the most restrictive category (0) does not grant this right.

---

3 Previously with the British Council.

4 Data accessed 20 February 2013 via <http://www.MIPEX.eu/>.

5 Since the MIPEX is a normative index of “best” *integration* measurements, for family reunification, the indicators on this policy strand are created within the discourse of reunification being beneficial for integration, though this is debatable.

For most indicators, an absence of a policy would indicate a more restrictive policy approach, e.g. no policy on admitting dependent adult children would mean that no adult children are allowed as part of family reunification. But for some family reunification indicators, an absence of a policy can in fact mean a more inclusive policy approach, for example the absence of pre-departure requirements and upon-arrival requirements for family migrants in fact represents a more permissive policy approach (i.e. score 100).<sup>6</sup> The informants were instructed to leave some such policies ‘blank’, but to ensure that all policy indicators were included in the analyses, these policy indicators were here coded as ‘100’ instead.<sup>7</sup> For the pre-departure policies (items 22a2-22a8), this meant coding 26 of the 27 countries as 100 in 2007—as only the Netherlands had pre-departure measures at this point. In 2010, it only involved recoding blanks for 20 countries. This practice means that policies can be looked at in more detail, but also avoids the ‘hiding’ of country differences, which is the outcome of the procedure used in the existing database.

After a pilot study of a smaller number of policies in 2004, the first complete MIPEX database was collected for policies in 2007 in EU-25, Canada, Norway and Switzerland. For the 2010 data, the database was expanded to include Australia, Bulgaria, Japan, Romania and the USA, bringing the total number of countries to 33. The 2007 data include data on six policy strands: labor market mobility, family reunification, political participation, long term residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination. The 2010 data include an additional policy strand: integration in education. These six/seven policy strands are further refined by dimensions. In the family reunification policy strand, there are 37 indicators grouped in four dimensions: eligibility, conditions for acquisition of residence status, security of residence status, and rights associated with residence status. Summary reports for each data round are freely available (Geddes & Niessen, 2006; Huddleston et al., 2011; Niessen, Huddleston, Citron, Geddes, & Jacobs, 2007). The MIPEX indicators for family reunification policies are listed in Table 1.A1 in the Appendix.

6 This was the case for 22a2 Level of language requirement, 22a3 Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad, 22a4 Pre-departure requirement exemptions, 22a5 Conductor of pre-departure requirement, 22a6 Cost of pre-departure requirement, 22a7 Support to pass pre-departure requirement, 22a8 Cost of support, 22b3 Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory, 22b4 Language/integration requirement exemptions, 22b5 Conductor of language/integration requirement, 22b6 Cost of language/integration requirement, 22b7 Support to pass language/integration requirement, 22b8 Cost of support.

7 The replacement coding includes recoding all “blanks” to “100”, to indicate more inclusive policies in this area. This is done for all of these indicators, including for example coding the indicator for “support for language courses abroad” as “100”, although Sweden has no language courses abroad. Coding these policies as “100” is simply another way of showing these countries’ permissiveness, while enabling a more complete country comparison. These policy indicators are named sub-questions under the policy dimensions of the first and second question of dimension 2.2 (i.e. 22a1, 22a2... and 22b1, 22b1...).

The MPG and partners have done an invaluable service of collecting detailed information on migration policies across time and countries and freely offering the use of these data. The collated MIPEx database is often not distinguished from the migration integration policy index, the MIPex that is computed from the data. Note again, that this thesis makes the explicit distinction between the database MIPEx, and the index MIPex, because the stepwise aggregation approach used for computing the index seems questionable and should be re-considered. The MIPex calculation uses the means of the ‘composite policy dimensions’. For example, with family reunification policies in the Netherlands in 2007, the average scores for the four dimensions mentioned above are (with 100 being the most permissive): eligibility – 45; acquisition conditions – 42; security of status – 50; rights associated with status – 100. The average of these means is then calculated, representing the overall score for permissiveness of family reunification policies. In 2007 the Netherlands scores 59 on the family reunification policy strand  $[(45+42+50+100)/4]$ , ranking it 14 out of the 28 countries, which is completely out of line with observed trends suggesting the Netherlands is a European hardliner. Canada had the highest, most permissive score (89) and Ireland the lowest (36), most restrictive score. See the MIPex country scores on the family reunification policy strand for the 27 European countries with repeated measurements in Table 1.1.

### *MIPex and recent trends in family migration policies*

Ruedin (2011), examining the reliability of the various MIPEx policy strands, questions the unidimensionality and thereby validity of the family reunification items. The validity of the MIPex can be externally assessed by looking at the index in relation to expected trends as identified above.<sup>8</sup> In particular, does the index reveal the three trends found in previous studies: a race to the bottom; the European hardliners being Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Germany; and a divergence of policies?

First, when looking at the change in means for the MIPex on family reunification policies, there is no evidence of the suggested ‘race to the bottom’ as Table 1.2 illustrates through the small (positive!) change in means from 2007 to 2010 (+0.045). This explains why the creators of the index conclude that little has changed for non-EU migrants regarding family reunification (see quote at the beginning of the paper). Secondly, if there is a race to the bottom, this does not appear to be led by the suspected European hardliners. As seen in Table 1.1, Denmark and Austria are ranked among the five most restrictive countries, but the Netherlands and Germany are in the middle of the table. Lastly, there is no conclusive evidence of divergence, with a +0.258 difference in standard deviations

---

<sup>8</sup> Unless otherwise specified, the MIPex referred to here is the index for family reunification policies, rather than the overall MIPex.

**Table 1.1. A comparison of MIPex versus MIPi country rankings on family migration policies. Countries are ranked from most to least restrictive. Countries found in previous studies to have the most restrictive family migration policies are highlighted in bold.**

2007				2010			
MIPexfam		MIPifam		MIPexfam		MIPifam	
IE	35.833	<b>NL</b>	29.545	IE	33.750	<b>NL</b>	27.273
<b>DK</b>	36.845	<b>AT</b>	56.818	<b>DK</b>	36.994	<b>DK</b>	38.636
CY	39.167	CH	56.818	CY	39.167	<b>DE</b>	52.273
CH	39.792	<b>DK</b>	61.364	CH	39.792	FR	54.545
<b>AT</b>	43.333	FR	63.636	<b>AT</b>	40.833	<b>AT</b>	56.818
LV	46.250	<b>DE</b>	68.182	LV	46.250	CH	56.818
EL	47.083	CY	72.727	MT	48.125	NO	70.455
MT	50.208	NO	72.727	EL	49.167	CY	72.727
FR	52.798	EL	77.273	FR	51.607	EL	77.273
SK	52.917	IE	77.273	SK	52.917	IE	77.273
LU	53.333	UK	77.273	UK	53.750	UK	77.273
UK	56.250	LV	79.545	<b>NL</b>	57.649	LV	79.545
HU	56.458	MT	79.545	LT	58.958	MT	79.545
LT	58.958	SK	84.091	<b>DE</b>	60.179	LU	84.091
<b>NL</b>	59.315	FI	86.364	HU	60.625	SK	84.091
<b>DE</b>	62.113	HU	86.364	EE	64.792	FI	86.364
EE	64.792	EE	88.636	CZ	66.458	HU	86.364
CZ	66.458	LT	88.636	LU	66.667	EE	88.636
PO	67.083	LU	88.636	PO	67.083	LT	88.636
FI	69.792	BE	90.909	NO	67.500	BE	90.909
BE	70.417	CZ	90.909	BE	68.333	CZ	90.909
NO	72.083	SI	90.909	FI	69.792	SI	90.909
SI	74.792	ES	93.182	IT	73.542	ES	93.182
ES	76.250	IT	93.182	SI	74.792	IT	93.182
IT	77.708	PO	93.182	SE	84.375	PO	93.182
PT	88.542	PT	95.455	ES	84.583	SE	95.455
SE	88.542	SE	97.727	PT	90.625	PT	97.727

Note: All codes used for European countries are in line with Eurostat guidelines on country abbreviations, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country\\_codes](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country_codes), accessed 22 April 2015. Countries included: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK)

## Study I

of the MIPex. Similarly, for only EU countries, the difference is +0.405 and for countries bound by the Family Reunification Directive, the difference is only +0.203. In sum, the family reunification index calculated by the publishers of the MIPEX, referred to here as MIPex, does not support any of the expected trends.

This study proposes that this disconnect with trends discussed in previous studies may be due to the way the MIPEX indicators of family reunification policies have been amalgamated into the MIPex. This study proposes an alternative method, implicative scaling, to improve the use of the data and increase the likelihood that they will show the trends suggested by previous studies.

### Implicative scaling

There are several reasons to suggest that the methodology used by the publishers of the MIPEX data in calculating their MIPex-index is the reason why the index does not show the expected trends. Firstly, it appears that *all* the indicators in the policy questionnaire were uncritically included in the index, without first assessing whether they could be combined in a single index without inconsistencies. Instead of indiscriminately including all policy indicators, a procedure should be used to assess the usefulness of including each item for distinguishing between countries. Second, it is unclear how the

**Table 1.2. Comparing the means and standard deviations of the MIPex scale and MIPi scale. Only repeated countries are included. Means and standard deviations are also listed only for EU countries (i.e. not CH and NO) and only those bound by the Family Reunification Directive (i.e. not CH, DK, NO, IE and UK).**

	All European countries included at both time points (N=28)		All EU countries included at both time points (N=25)		Only countries bound by the Family Reunification Directive (N= 22)	
	MIPex	MIPi	MIPex	MIPi	MIPex	MIPi
2007 Mean	59.523	79.293	59.810	80.455	62.105	81.612
2010 Mean	59.567	77.189	60.041	78.273	62.570	80.165
Difference (2010-2007)	0.045	-2.104	0.232	-2.182	0.465	-1.446
t-value	0.061	-2.004**	0.307	-1.927**	0.552	-1.722
2007 Standard Deviation	14.879	15.496	14.729	15.358	13.760	15.807
2010 Standard Deviation	15.136	18.220	15.134	18.418	13.963	17.579
Difference (2010-2007)	0.258	2.724	0.405	3.060	0.203	1.772

\*\* p<0.05, one-tailed

policies were divided into dimensions within the policy strands and indeed whether these data were first examined for multidimensionality. It appears that policies were amalgamated into dimensions without paying attention to the logical and empirical relationships that exist among indicators.<sup>9</sup> This is problematic, also because these dimensions were used for the stepwise aggregation of the MIPex. This implies weighing of policies, which is influenced by the number of items in each sub-dimension, giving greater weight to items in sub-dimensions with a smaller number of items (Bjerre et al., 2014). Any such aggregation should be clearly discussed and justified (Bjerre et al., 2014; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002), but in the case of MIPex, it has not been justified anywhere.<sup>10</sup> This paper proposes that analyses of family reunification policies need to use the MIPEX in a better way than has previously been done. Previously, Ruedin (2011) has questioned the use of the MIPEX family reunification measurements. He used factor analysis to question the unidimensionality of MIPex. Factor analysis is unfortunately not appropriate for these data, however, due to the discrete nature and often skewed distributions of MIPEX policy indicators. These two features of the data mean that modern item response models should be applied instead. This study thus proposes the use of implicative scaling to examine the dimensionality of the indicators and the usefulness of including *each* policy indicator in a unidimensional scale. Implicative scaling is mentioned by Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 23) as a method to test whether items are unidimensional, when developing democracy indices. At the end of his study, Ruedin (2011: 19) suggests this scaling approach specifically for family reunification policies. If items are tested for unidimensionality and only selected if they sufficiently represent the single underlying dimension, this also avoids the potential over/under emphasis of items in sub-dimensions of the MIPEX mentioned above.

Implicative relationships are fairly typical for phenomena that develop over time, such as immigration restrictions. Such data are interrelated by logical *implication* (or: necessary condition). In other words, imposing a policy of further restrictiveness would *imply* that more permissive policies become irrelevant, because a new policy incorporates the old restrictions. Models for these types of data are known as scalogram, cumulative scaling or guttman scales, after Guttman (1944). These scales have been used particularly in

9 Additionally, some policy indicators were also inexplicably aggregated by the MIPex creators. For the eligibility dimension within the family reunification policy strand, two indicators are grouped into “family reunion eligibility conditions” namely: “eligibility for ordinary legal residents” and “documents taken into account to be eligible for family reunion”. Two other indicators are grouped under “eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses”, namely: “eligibility for stable long term relationships or registered partnerships” and “age limits for sponsors and spouses”. These four indicators are used separately here, namely 21a1 and 21a2 (i.e. sub-questions of the first question in dimension 2.1) and 21b1 and 21 b2 (i.e. sub-questions of the second question in dimension 2.1).

10 Correspondence with the Migrant Policy Group on 23 and 25 October 2013 also did not clarify the reasons behind these choices.

## Study I

educational testing but also in attitudinal research. For example, Mokken (1971) applies this method in political attitude research. Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 23) mention it in relation to developing democracy indices. The technique is referred to here as ‘implicative scaling’ to emphasize the *implicational relationships* between policies discussed above which the scale implies. An accessible introduction is provided by Van Schuur (2011).

A formal procedure for implicative scaling concentrates on the degree to which logical inconsistencies arise in empirical data. Loevinger (1948) defined the statistic H (for homogeneity) that expresses the observed count of such inconsistencies in a normalized way. Loevinger H coefficient calculates the errors for each pair of items as follows:  $H_{ij} = 1 - [\text{Observed } N_{ij}(1, 0)] / [\text{Expected } N_{ij}(1, 0)]$ . The expected value  $N_{ij}$  is calculated assuming that the items are independent, i.e. do not have an underlying dimension in common. Whether an item fits the scale is determined by testing whether the observed errors arise significantly less than expected under statistical independence, expressed in a z-statistic. A good scale should have high Loevinger H coefficients for all pairs of items, similar to factor loadings in a common factor analysis. When aggregated over items, H is similar to estimating the reliability of a scale using internal consistency, e.g. Cronbach’s  $\alpha$ . The cut-off values used to judge the homogeneity of a scale are as follows: > 0.30 indicates a useful scale; > 0.40 indicates a medium-strong scale; and > 0.50 indicates a strong scale (Engelhard, 2008; Van Schuur, 2011).

Table 1.3 shows a simplified version of a calculation of the Loevinger H coefficient for data from 2007 and 2010 on policies 23b and 24a. Policy 24a (on the right to an autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching the age of majority) is the more permissive of the two, i.e. this policy is more widely implemented across countries. Policy 23b (on the grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status) is the less permissive of the two, i.e. countries are more widely *restrictive* on this policy. For the countries and the policies to fit a unidimensional scale, countries should *not* be restrictive on a widely permissive policy (i.e. 0 on policy 24a), while being permissive on a widely restrictive policy (i.e. 50 or 100 on policy 23b). This means that the logical inconsistency (or ‘error cell’) of those countries that do not follow the expected scale pattern is at the top right of Table 1.3. In this case, two countries in three instances (Ireland in 2007 and 2010 and Luxembourg in 2007) do not follow the implicative pattern: both countries have permissive policies on eligibility for dependent adults, while having restrictive grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status. If the two policies were independent, we would expect 7.24 countries in the error cell ( $N_{ij} = (23 \cdot 17) / 54$ ). For three instances in the error cell, a Loevinger’s  $H = 1 - (3 / 7.2) = 0.59$  is well above the minimum criteria mentioned above.

The **loevh** routine in Stata calculates Loevinger H coefficients for all pairs of items,

**Table 1.3. Cross-tabulation of frequencies of the more permissive policy 23b with the more restrictive policy 24a in 2007 and 2010 data. Highlighted cell is the 'error' cell**

		Policy 23b – Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or renewing status		
		50 or 100	0	Total
Policy 24a – Rights to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	50 or 100	20 (AT07, AT10, CH10, CY07, CY10, CZ07, DK07, DK10, FI07, FI10, LT10, LT07, LU10, MT07, MT10, NL10, SK07, SK10, UK07, UK10)	3 (IE07, IE10, LU07)	23
	0	17 (CZ07, CZ10, DE07, DE10, EL07, EL10, FR07, FR10, HU07, HU10, LV07, LV10, NL07, NO07, NO10, SI07, SI10)	14 (BE07, BE10, EE07, EE10, ES07, ES10, IT07, IT10, PO07, PO10, PT07, PT10, SE07, SE10)	31
	Total	37	17	54

indicating how well each item fits the common scale.<sup>11</sup> This procedure was done here on all policies both for 2007 and 2010, including European countries with repeated measurements (N=27).<sup>12</sup> Backward elimination was used to remove policies that do not fit the common scale (i.e. those with low Loewinger H coefficients). This was repeated until all Loewinger H coefficients exceeded 0.30.<sup>13</sup> This process resulted in the exclusion of 15 of the 37 policies<sup>14</sup> that do not fit the common scale, according to the method,

11 The **m.sp.ado** routine also written for Stata, based on Mokken (1971), automatically divides indicators into scales, but the step-by-step approach used here allows for maintaining control over the procedure.

12 AT, BE, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, NO, PO, PT, SE, SI, SK, UK

13 Note that 24a has a borderline H coefficient of .263, but this item is left in to ensure that all subtopics are included in the scale and because the scale is strong with its inclusion.

14 List of policy indicators excluded, in order of removal:

22a2 Level of language requirement for family member abroad

24b Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional violence

23c Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law)

21b1 Eligibility for stable long term relationships or registered partnerships

24e Access to employment and self-employment

23d Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal

24f Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing

21a1 Eligibility for ordinary legal residents

24d Access to education and training for adult family members

22e Maximum length of application procedure

22c Accommodation requirement

21b2 Age limits for sponsors and spouses

22f Costs of application and/or issue of status

24c Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor

21a2 Documents taken into account to be eligible for family reunion



## Study I

because: they do not measure the same phenomenon, are irrelevant for distinguishing between countries, or contain measurement error. Note that the final selection still includes items from all the original MIPEX subcategories: 2.1 eligibility, 2.2 conditions for acquisition of status, 2.3 security of status and 2.4 rights associated with status. The overall fit of the scale containing the remaining 22 policies is 0.528, which indicates a strong scale (Van Schuur, 2011). The items are shown in Table 1.4 ranked by H (homogeneity) coefficients—the z-statistic and the p-values indicate that all H coefficients are significantly different from 0, in other words, significantly correlated with the rest of the items (Van Schuur, 2011).

The policy indicators are also shown in Tables 1.A2 and 1.A3 in the Appendix, ordered by the ‘popularity’ of policy indicators. The term ‘popularity’ stems from attitudinal research, where attitudes are ranked by how ‘popular’ (or: widespread) they are. In this application, a ‘popular’ policy would be one where permissiveness is widespread.

The selected policy items are thus listed in Table 1.A3 for 2007 from the most ‘popular’ policy, ‘22a4 Pre-departure requirement exemptions’ to the least ‘popular’ policy, ‘23b Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status’.

The un-weighted average of the 22 selected policies is taken as the **Migrant Integration Policy implicative scale** on the permissiveness of family reunification policies or: MIPi. Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between scores in 2007 and 2010 to illustrate the country rankings and where countries have changed over this time period. Table 1.1 shows the rankings of the countries for this scale compared to the MIPex. Note, that some countries having the same overall MIPi score does not mean that they have identical scores on all policies. For example, Poland and Spain both score 93.182 in 2007, but in Spain this stems from scoring ‘50’ on policy indicators 21c, 22d and 24a, while Poland scores ‘50’ on 21d, 24a and 21e. The scaling procedure considers these combinations as equivalent in permissiveness.

### Validation results

The quality of the MIPex versus the MIPi scales on the permissiveness of family reunification policies are compared to the three trends found in previous studies—the race to the bottom, the European hardliners, and divergence of policies.<sup>15</sup>

---

15 Another way of establishing construct validity is showing that the MIPi is closely related to criterion variables. This is done elsewhere (Søndergaard, 2015). An additional test of the measurement quality of the MIPi versus the MIPEX would be to compare the measurements over time in a simplex model similar to the procedure in other studies (Søndergaard, 2014b; Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013), but this can only be done with three data points.

**Table 1.4. Family migration policies in the MIPi scale, ranked by H coefficient, N= 54. See details of coding of policies in Appendix Table 1.A1.**

#	Policy indicator	Loevinger H	Z-statistic	H0: H <sub>j</sub> <=0 p-value
22b1	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	0.748	15.591	0.000
22b3	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	0.721	15.931	0.000
22a4	Exemptions of pre-departure requirement	0.684	12.589	0.000
22a3	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad	0.650	12.752	0.000
22a5	Conductor of pre-departure requirement	0.650	12.752	0.000
22a1	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad	0.643	13.132	0.000
22a6	Cost of pre-departure requirement	0.638	12.489	0.000
23b	Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status	0.616	8.047	0.000
22a7	Support to pass pre-departure requirement	0.602	11.081	0.000
22a8	Cost of support for family member abroad	0.601	10.801	0.000
22b2	Level of language requirement after arrival on territory	0.567	12.234	0.000
22b7	Support to pass language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	0.538	10.751	0.000
22b8	Cost of support after arrival on territory	0.486	10.263	0.000
22b5	Conductor of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	0.463	9.642	0.000
21c	Eligibility of minor children	0.460	10.249	0.000
22b6	Cost of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	0.457	9.505	0.000
21e	Eligibility of dependent adult children	0.455	8.109	0.000
21d	Eligibility of dependent relatives in the ascending line	0.445	8.231	0.000
23a	Duration of validity of permit	0.434	9.151	0.000
22b4	Exemptions of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	0.368	6.773	0.000
22d	Economic resources requirement	0.304	6.158	0.000
24a	Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	0.263	4.655	0.000
Scale		0.528	32.511	0.000

## Study I




Figure 1.1. Relationship between MIPi scores in 2007 and 2010, correlation 0.960

### *Race to the bottom*

According to the overall expected trends outlined above, countries appear to be competing for the most restrictive family migration policies. As shown in Table 1.2, the MIPex shows a slightly more *permissive* trend for policies (+.045), while the MIPi scale shows the expected negative trend, with the means changing by -2.104 between the two time points. It should be noted that because the means for the two scales are slightly different, their absolute numbers cannot be compared, only the *differences* in the means between time points can be compared. Paired-samples t-tests showed that while the MIPex change is not significant ( $t= 0.061$ ,  $p= 0.476$ , one-tailed), the MIPi change is significant ( $t= -2.004$ ,  $p< 0.05$ , one-tailed).

The harmonization of family reunification policies may have resulted in a different ‘race’ for EU countries than for non-EU countries (i.e. not CH and NO). The MIPi results in Table 1.2 show that even though the EU countries have become significantly more restrictive between the two time periods ( $t=-1.927$ ,  $p< 0.05$ , one-tailed), the means are slightly higher in EU countries than in non-EU countries (e.g. MIPifam 2007 for all countries: 79.293 versus 80.455 for just EU countries). This suggests a small liberalizing influence of the EU,

regardless of whether countries are bound by the Family Reunification Directive. Although the Directive only binds a group of countries to minimum standards, it may influence the permissiveness of policies; a better test of the possible influence is to look just at the countries bound by the Directive. The results in Table 1.2 of both the MIPex and the MIPi scales show slightly more permissive policies for the Directive-bound countries: e.g. for MIPi 2007: 79.293 in all countries versus 81.612 in countries bound by the Directive. The changes in these means for Directive-bound countries from 2007 to 2010 also show a more positive trend in these countries: MIPex: +.203 and MIPi: +1.772. These results support the idea that despite the Directive allowing much discretion for countries, there may be a difference between the countries bound by the Directive and those that are not. The countries bound by the Directive appear to be on a slower race to the bottom and a paired-sample t-test of the MIPi shows that there is no significant move toward the bottom for the countries bound by the Directive ( $t = -1.722$ ,  $p = 0.05$ , one-tailed).

### *European hardliners*

Where the MIPex did not clearly single out the European hardliners identified in the literature except for Denmark, Table 1.1 shows that using the MIPi scale, the suspected countries appear. The most restrictive countries listed here are NL, AT, CH, DK, FR, DE, CY, NO, EL, IE and UK, very similar to those identified by Reeskens (2010) as having restrictive family reunification regimes (AT, CH, DK, NL, LV, CY, EL, UK, FR, NL, NO). For the MIPi family reunification policy scale, Denmark is again shown as one of the hardliners, but additionally Germany and Austria are listed as being restrictive and the Netherlands turns out to be the most restrictive country for both time points, in line with expectations from outlined trends. These differences in the rankings of countries between the two scales can be seen in the correlations between the scales, shown in Table 1.5. For both scales, the correlations between time points is very high (MIPex: 0.969, MIPi: 0.960), indicating that the ranking of countries remains fairly stable between time points. But the correlations *between* the scales clearly show that there are differences in rankings. The MIPex rankings and the MIPi scale correlate by 0.569 in 2007 and 0.601 in 2010. Note that such correlations are used by previous studies to show that scales are measuring the same phenomenon, without examining where the differences in country rankings are and comparing them to expected trends in policy developments. The differences in rankings appear to be especially at the more restrictive end of policies, with the MIPi scale allotting a different ranking for the expected European hardliners. For both scales, the same countries are consistently permissive, namely Sweden and Portugal, countries which are also shown in other studies to have open family migration policies, e.g. Strik et al. (2013) for Portugal and Borevi (2014) for Sweden.

**Table 1.5. Correlations between the MIPex scale on family reunification policies and the MIPi scale in 2007 and 2010.**

	MIPexfam 2007	MIPexfam 2010	MIPifam2007	MIPifam 2010
MIPexfam 2007	1			
MIPexfam 2010	0.969	1		
MIPifam 2007	0.569	0.617	1	
MIPifam 2010	0.560	0.601	0.960	1

### Divergence

Whereas the MIPex showed hardly any change from 2007 to 2010 in the restrictiveness of policies, the MIPi scale presents a very different picture. The MIPi scale shows divergence between countries over time, in line with the findings of expected trends discussed above. As seen in Table 1.2, for the MIPi scale, the standard deviation increases by +2.724 from 15.496 in 2007 to 18.220 in 2010. These results support previous studies that have shown divergence of policies using other data than the MIPex.

Similar to the examination of the means, the standard deviations were also examined separately for EU countries and separately for those bound by the Family Reunification Directive. As indicated in Table 1.3, for the 25 EU countries, the MIPi shows a divergence of policies (+3.060) in fact greater than for all countries together. But it also shows substantially less divergence for the 22 countries bound by the Directive (+1.772). Unfortunately, for our case of the two dependent samples, we have not found a formal test of the significance of the change in variance. But we can conclude from the size of the standard deviations that while the MIPex scale does not provide overwhelming evidence for the divergence hypothesis, regardless of whether countries are in the EU or bound by the Directive, the MIPi shows a clearer indication of divergence. Both scales show slightly *less* divergence for the countries bound by the Directive, but there is no indication of convergence of policies, despite the seemingly overall (small) positive influence of the EU and the Directive.

### Conclusions and discussion

This study explores improvements to quantitative cross-country comparisons of family migration policies. It suggests a range of improvements to the use of the extensive MIPex data, particularly in the form of implicative scaling, resulting in a short and certified unidimensional index MIPi. The study tests two scales, MIPex and MIPi, against each other by comparing the index results to existing studies on family migration policies. The results show that the MIPi scale on the permissiveness of family reunification policies, yields results similar to the expected trends in policy developments from 2007 and 2010,

whereas the MIPex index calculated by the publishers of the MIPEX data does not. The results of the MIPi scale show firstly that there is indeed a race to the bottom on family migration policies from 2007 to 2010. Secondly, it shows that this race toward restrictiveness is led by the European hardliner countries, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Germany. These results are not found with the scale calculated by the publishers of MIPEX. Lastly, there is evidence to support a divergence of policies, despite most countries being bound by the Family Reunification Directive, which is in line with other cross-country quantitative studies on family migration and with the 'diffusion without convergence theory' by Radaelli (2005). This study therefore concludes that the MIPi scale is a more adequate instrument to represent changes in family reunification policies across EU and non-EU countries than the MIPex.

Overall, the results suggest the need for more thorough evaluation of the quality of the comparative family migration policy measurements currently available. The study explores another method for establishing the validity of a measurement than correlating it with other indices. This is done by comparing results to an overview of previous study findings, thereby integrating the insights from case studies into the study. It should be noted that this study does not look at the *outcome* of these family migration policies nor how these policies are applied in different countries. This could be a useful extension to this study. A second improvement to the study could be to examine further whether family migration policies follow just one line of policy development policies, as implied by the implicative scaling model, or whether there is a different implicative logic with different types of policies. A third improvement could be made with the latest MIPEX data.<sup>16</sup> This new data would enable us to see more clearly whether the trends described here are continuing and to examine the *recent* developments in the differences between countries bound by Directive 2003/83, and those not bound by the Directive, e.g. recent increased restrictiveness in the UK after 2010. Lastly, to further test the findings of this study, implicative scaling could be applied to the other policy strands in the MIPEX to see whether the implicative scaling approach also better represents changes in policy strands such as anti-discrimination or naturalization policies. This could all be usefully explored in future studies.

---

16 Unfortunately, these data were released too late to be included in the analysis of this study, but could be useful for future studies. Data release date: 30 June 2015. See press release: <http://www.mipex.eu/changes-government-and-far-right-emergence-hard-times-integration-policies>, accessed 15 July 2015.

## Appendix

Table 1.A1. Family reunification policies in the MIPEX policy evaluation table

Policy number**	Policy	Option 3 - 100	Option 2 - 50	Option 1 - 0
2.1 ELIGIBILITY				
21a1	Eligibility for ordinary legal residents	≤ 1 year of legal residence and/or holding a residence permit for ≤ 1 year (please specify)	> 1 year of legal residence and/or holding a permit for > 1 year (please specify)	≥ 2 years of legal residence and/or holding a permit for ≥ 2 years (please specify)
21a2	Documents taken into account to be eligible for family reunion	Any residence permit	Certain residence permits excluded	Permanent residence permit
21b1	Eligibility for partners other than spouses: a. Stable long-term relationship, b. Registered partnership	Both	Only one or only for some types of partners (ex. homosexuals) (please specify)	Neither. Only spouses.
21b2	Age limits for sponsors and spouses	≤ Age of majority in country (18 years)	> 18 ≤ 21 years with exemptions (please specify age)	> 21 years OR > 18 years without exemptions (please specify age)
21c	Eligibility for minor children (<18 years), a. Minor children, b. Adopted children, c. Children for whom custody is shared	All three	Only a and b	a and b but with limitations (please specify)
21d	Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line	Allowed	Certain conditions (other than dependency) apply	Not allowed
21e	Eligibility for dependent adult children	Allowed	Certain conditions (other than dependency) apply	Not allowed

2.2. CONDITIONS FOR ACQUISITION OF STATUS					
22a1	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad (if no measure, leave blank)	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/ information (please specify which)	Requirement to take a language course	Requirement includes language test/ assessment	
22a2	Level of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted). 1. These levels come from the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). If national data is not directly translated into CEFR levels, an approximation can be made from the CEFR's global scales: <a href="http://www.coe.int/T/DG4/Portfolio/?L=E&amp;M=/main_pages/levels.html">http://www.coe.int/T/DG4/Portfolio/?L=E&amp;M=/main_pages/levels.html</a>	A1 or less set as standard	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard OR no standards, based on administrative discretion. (please specify which)	
22a3	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad, ex. not language, but social/cultural (if no measure, leave blank)	None OR voluntary information/ course (please specify)	Requirement to take an integration course	Requirement to pass an integration test/ assessment	
22a4	Pre-departure requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank), a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications, b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability	Both of these (please specify)	One of these please specify	Neither of these	
22a5	Conductor of pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank), a. Language or education specialists, b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)	a and b, ex. language or education institutes (please name)	a but not b, ex. citizenship/ integration unit in government (please name)	Neither a nor b, ex. police, foreign service, general consultant (please name)	
22a6	Cost of pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank)	No or nominal costs (please specify amount)	Normal costs (please specify amount) ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs (please specify amount)	



22a7	Support to pass pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank), a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide, b. Assessment based on publicly available course	a and b	a or b	Neither a nor b
22a8	Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)	No or nominal costs (please specify amount)	Normal costs (please specify amount) ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs (please specify amount)
22b1	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory (if no measure, leave blank), Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/information (please specify which)	Requirement to take a language course	Requirement includes language test/assessment
22b2	Level of language requirement, (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted), Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments. 1. These levels come from the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). If national data is not directly translated into CEFR levels, an approximation can be made from the CEFR's global scales: <a href="http://www.coe.int/T/DG4/Portfolio/?L=E&amp;M=/main_pages/levels.html">http://www.coe.int/T/DG4/Portfolio/?L=E&amp;M=/main_pages/levels.html</a>	A1 or less set as standard	A2 set as standard	B1 or higher set as standard OR no standards, based on administrative discretion. (please specify)
22b3	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory ex. not language, but social/cultural	No Requirement OR Voluntary course/information (please specify which)	Requirement to take an integration course	Requirement includes integration test/assessment
22b4	Language/integration requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank), a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications, b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability	Both of these (please specify)	One of these (please specify)	Neither of these

22b5	Conductor of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank), a. Language or education specialists, b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)	a and b, ex. language or education institutes (please name)	a but not b, ex. integration unit in government (please name)	Neither a nor b, ex. police, foreign service, general consultant (please name)
22b6	Cost of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)	No or nominal costs (please specify amount)	Normal costs (please specify amount) ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs (please specify amount)
22b7	Support to language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank), a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide, b. Assessment based on publicly available course	a and b	a or b	Neither a nor b
22b8	Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)	No or nominal costs (please specify amount)	Normal costs (please specify amount) ex. If provided by state, same as regular administrative fees. If provided by private sector, same as market price in countries	Higher costs (please specify amount)
22c	Accommodation requirement	None	Appropriate accommodation meeting the general health and safety standards	Further requirements (please specify)

22d	Economic resources requirement	None or at/below level of social assistance and no income is excluded (please specify)	Higher than social assistance but source is not linked with employment (please specify)	Linked to employment/ no social assistance
22e	Maximum length of application procedure	≤ 6 months defined by law (please specify)	> 6 months but the maximum is defined by law (please specify)	No regulation on maximum length
22f	Costs of application and/or issue of status	None	Same as regular administrative fees and duties in the country (please specify amounts for each)	Higher costs (please specify amounts for each)
<b>2.3 SECURITY OF STATUS</b>				
23a	Duration of validity of permit	Equal to sponsor's residence permit and renewable	Not equal to sponsor's residence permit but ≥ 1 year renewable permit	< 1 year renewable permit or new application necessary
23b	Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status: a. Actual and serious threat to public policy or national security, b. Proven fraud in the acquisition of permit (inexistent relationship or misleading information). c. Break-up of family relationship (before three years) d. Original conditions are no longer satisfied (ex. unemployment or economic resources)	No other than a-b	Grounds include c	All grounds and others than those included on the list, such as d and others
23c	Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law) : a. Solidity of sponsor's family relationship b. Duration of sponsor's residence in MS c. Existing links with country of origin d. Physical or emotional violence	All elements	Elements include any of these (or other) but not all	No elements
23d	Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal, a. reasoned decision b. right to appeal c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court	All rights	At least a and b	One or both of a and b are not guaranteed

2.4 RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH STATUS					
24a	Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	After ≤ 3 years	After > 3 ≤ 5 years	After > 5 years or upon certain conditions (e.g. normal procedure for permanent residence)	None
24b	Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional violence	Yes automatically	Yes but only on limited grounds or under certain conditions (ex. fixed period of prior residence or marriage)	None	None
24c	Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor	After ≤ 3 years	After > 3 years or upon certain conditions (e.g. normal procedure for permanent residence)	None	None
24d	Access to education and training for adult family members	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	None	None
24e	Access to employment and self-employment	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	None	None
24f	Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing	In the same way as the sponsor	Other conditions apply	None	None

**\*\* Note** This table is a reproduction of the information on policies and dimensions on the MIPEX data spreadsheet found on their website, except for the policy numbering. The numbering of the MIPEX policies in this study follows that of the four dimensions mentioned by the publishers of the MIPEX data, but does not follow the policy numbering in the data. For example, eligibility of minor children is grouped by the MIPEX publishers under category 2.1 “eligibility”. This policy is numbered here as 21c, representing the third question in category 2.1. This makes it easier to interpret than the MIPEX numbering in the raw data (19).

Table 1.A2. Family migration policy indicators included in the 2007 MIPi scale, ranked by country and policy indicator means

COU	22a4	22a7	22a4	22a1	22a3	22a5	22a6	22a8	22a7	22b5	22b6	22b8	22b2	22b3	22b1	21c	23a	22d	21d	24a	21e	23b	
Item	Pre-departure requirement exemptions	Support to pass pre-departure requirement	Language/integration requirement exemptions after arrival on territory	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad	Conductor of pre-departure requirement	Cost of pre-departure requirement	Cost of support for family member abroad	Support to pass language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	Conductor of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	Cost of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	Cost of support after arrival on territory	Level of language requirement after arrival on territory	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	Eligibility for minor children	Duration of validity of permit	Economic resources requirement	Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line	Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	Eligibility for dependent adult children	Grounds for rejecting or refusing to renew status	
NL	50	50	100	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	0	0	50	0	0	0	50	50	100	50	50	0	29.545
AT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	50	50	0	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	56.818
CH	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	56.818
DK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	50	0	50	0	50	0	0	0	0	61.364
FR	100	100	50	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	100	50	50	50	0	0	50	0	0	0	63.636
DE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	0	50	50	50	0	50	50	50	50	0	68.182
CY	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	72.727
NO	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	0	0	100	50	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	0	72.727
EL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	77.273
IE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	0	50	77.273
UK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	77.273
LV	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	50	50	50	0	0	79.545
MT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	0	79.545
SK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	0	84.091
HU	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	50	50	0	86.364
FI	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	50	0	86.364
LU	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	100	88.636
EE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	50	50	88.636
EE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	50	50	88.636
CZ	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	0	88.636
LT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	88.636
BE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	90.909
SI	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	90.909
IT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	90.909
IT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	93.182
PO	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	93.182
ES	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	93.182
PT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	95.455
SE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	97.272
	98.148	98.148	98.148	96.296	96.296	96.296	96.296	96.296	96.296	94.444	87.037	87.037	85.185	83.333	79.630	74.074	72.222	53.704	48.148	42.593	40.741	24.074	

Table 1.A3. Family migration policy indicators included in the 2010 MIPi scale, ranked by country and policy indicator means

COU	22a4	22a7	22a4	22a7	22b5	22a8	22a3	22a5	22a6	22b6	22a1	22b8	22b2	22b3	22b1	21c	23a	22d	21d	21e	24a	23b		
Item	Pre-departure requirement exemptions	Support to pass pre-departure requirement	Language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	Support to pass language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	Conductor of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	Cost of support for family member abroad	Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad	Conductor of pre-departure requirement	Cost of pre-departure requirement	Cost of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory	Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad	Cost of support after arrival on territory	Level of language requirement after arrival on territory	Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory	Eligibility for minor children	Duration of validity of permit	Economic resources requirement	Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line	Eligibility for dependent adult children	Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority	Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status		
NL	50	50	100	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	0	0	0	50	100	50	50	0	0	27.273	
DK	50	100	50	100	100	100	0	0	0	100	0	100	0	0	0	50	50	50	0	0	0	0	38.636	
DE	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	100	0	100	0	50	0	0	0	50	50	50	50	50	50	0	52.273	
FR	100	50	50	50	50	100	50	100	100	100	50	100	100	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	54.545	
AT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	50	0	0	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	56.818	
CH	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	0	0	0	50	0	0	0	0	0	56.818	
NO	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	100	100	0	100	0	100	50	50	100	50	50	50	100	0	0	70.455	
CY	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	72.727	
EL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	0	0	50	0	0	77.273	
UK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	50	0	0	0	0	77.273	
IE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	50	0	77.273	
LV	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	50	50	0	50	0	79.545	
MT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	0	0	0	0	79.545	
SK	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	50	0	0	84.091	
LU	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	0	0	0	84.091	
HU	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	50	50	0	86.364	
FI	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	0	0	86.364	
LT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	100	0	0	88.636	
EE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	50	50	0	88.636	
CZ	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	50	0	90.909	
SI	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	100	100	0	90.909	
BE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0	50	100	50	90.909	
IT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	100	100	93.182	
PO	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100	100	93.182	
ES	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	50	100	100	100	100	93.182	
SE	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	100	100	100	50	95.455	
PT	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	50	97.272	
	96.296	96.296	96.296	96.296	96.296	94.444	92.593	90.741	88.889	88.889	87.037	87.037	85.185	79.630	77.778	75.926	74.074	53.704	44.444	40.741	40.741	20.370		

