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# Study III

## **Moving Apart? The influence of the EU on public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes in Europe between 2002 and 2012<sup>1</sup>**

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*‘These aspects gain importance in light of the recent debates in Europe about an optimal plan for harmonizing various immigration policies at the country level, although these proposed policies are feasible only as long as the national publics agree with what is being offered to them.’*  
(Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010: 323-324)

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<sup>1</sup> Thanks go to the research group *Interuniversitaire Werkgroep Sociale Ongelijkheid en Levensloop* for their comments on an earlier draft, 30 September 2014 in Utrecht. A previous version of this paper was presented on 29 August 2014 at the 11th IMISCOE Annual Conference ‘Immigration, Social Cohesion and Social Innovation’ held 27-29 August 2014 in Madrid.

### Summary

This study examines how trends in public opinion about immigration and immigrants are influenced by EU membership, using data from the European Social Survey for 34 European countries (2002-2012). By combining cross-sectional and dynamic information, the study shows that EU membership positively influences both public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes. Regarding public support for immigration, the study shows that attitudes are diverging between countries, and although there is significantly less divergence in EU countries, there is no indication of convergence. For pro-immigrant attitudes, there is also no evidence of convergence in EU countries; *divergence* is only found for non-EU countries. Overall, the results do not suggest that EU membership has led to a convergence of immigration/immigrant attitudes.

### Introduction

In a 2000 Eurobarometer survey, 43% of EU citizens favored EU harmonization of immigration policies (Luedtke, 2005: 95) or, in other words, believed that the EU should solve ‘the migration problem’ (Beutin et al., 2007: 390). But there is great variation in these opinions across member states. In 2000, the percentage of people believing that immigration policies should be harmonized ranged from 15% in Finland to 70% in the Netherlands (Luedtke, 2005: 95).

Since the start of European cooperation, the EU has been key in the regulation of *internal* migration (i.e. the movement of EU citizens between member states, or second-country nationals). Recent recodification of these regulations includes Directive 2004/38/EC on the free movement of people, which ensures generous rights to family reunification for all mobile EU citizens. The EU has only entered the policy area of immigration of non-EU citizens (i.e. third-country nationals), not related to mobile EU citizens, in the last 25 years, because the harmonization of immigration policies became viewed as necessary within this development of an internally free market with shared external borders. Essentially, the *internal* free movement meant that the *immigration* ‘space’ in the EU had become a shared ‘space’ (Givens & Luedtke, 2004: 146). In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht identified immigration as an area of ‘common interest’ (Urth, 2005: 163), and in 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam officially moved immigration within Community competences (Kostakopoulou, 2000). This harmonization of immigration policies for third-country nationals not related to mobile EU citizens has, however, been met with strong political, as well as public opposition (Givens & Luedtke, 2004). The public opposition has increasingly become of interest to EU institutions and EU scholars due to the increased focus on the transparency of the institutions and the suggestion that divergent public opinion may be related to the difficulties encountered in the harmonization of EU immigration policies (Luedtke, 2005).

Previous authors have linked public opposition to the EU harmonization of immigration policies for third-country nationals not just to the views about EU harmonization mentioned in the first paragraph, but also to persistently divergent opinions on immigration across the member states (Luedtke, 2005). Although there are differences in the methodology used by previous studies (cf. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010), overall, research has generally found low levels of support for *increased* immigration across countries (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Facchini & Mayda, 2008; Freeman, 1995; Mayda, 2004; McLaren, 2001; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Simon & Lynch, 1999; Simon & Sikich, 2007). Previous studies also suggest that there is no consistent trend across countries with all attitudes becoming either more positive or more negative. Rather, there is some indication that attitudes are becoming more negative in some countries, while in others, they are becoming more positive (Card et al., 2005; Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009). This variation in attitudinal developments across countries is made even more complex, because as pointed out by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), there is a difference in the development of opinions toward *immigration* (i.e. whether more or fewer people should be let in) versus opinions toward *immigrants* (i.e. how immigrants who are already 'here' should be treated). In their review of the studies conducted on migration attitudes using multinational surveys, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) argue that scholars should separate these different types of attitudes as they reflect very different notions. They suggest that the validity of the results of studies merging these immigration and immigrant attitudes is questionable (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010: 313). Interestingly, this attitudinal distinction reflects the policy distinction made by Hammar (1985) between immigration and immigrant policies. The present study builds on this previous work and examines the distinction between immigration and immigrants when studying attitudinal trends in Europe and shows that it is indeed useful to separate the two. Most studies of immigration/immigrant attitudes focus on explaining changes in attitudes by individual characteristics such as age or by contextual differences such as the actual inflow of migrants (cf. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010), rather than testing differences in overall country trends in attitudes. Further, previous studies have not looked at whether country trends are affected by supranational influences, such as the EU. As in previous work (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013),<sup>1</sup> this study examines macro-level trends in public opinion and relates these to EU membership. It could be expected that the harmonization of policies is related to developments in attitudes: where policies become more similar across countries, so too should attitudes. To the best of our knowledge, there is only limited empirical evidence of immigration/immigrant attitudes converging in the enlarged EU. Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet (2009: 360) mention in passing that

1 See Study II of this thesis for a version of this study.

attitudes toward immigration have *not* converged in 17 European countries (EU15 + CH and NO) and Malchow-Møller, Munch, Schroll and Skaksen (2009) suggest that several EU15 countries are diverging from the average views in the EU. These authors do not, however, test directly whether these attitudes are becoming more similar within the EU, i.e. testing convergence, nor do they compare these trends to non-EU countries or distinguish between public support for immigration versus pro-immigrant attitudes. This study asks: what has been the influence of EU membership on the divergence/convergence of immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes between 2002 and 2012?

To answer this research question, the paper first outlines the changes in immigration and immigrant policies across the EU, explaining briefly to what extent policies have become more similar in the EU in the specified time period. This outline does not imply that public opinion is related directly to policy decisions at EU level, but rather this discussion of harmonization is meant to illustrate the similarity of immigration policies compared to immigrant policies. This policy background information is then used to derive different hypotheses for attitudes toward immigration versus attitudes toward immigrants. This study then empirically examines whether these two types of attitudes have developed in EU countries compared to non-EU countries by using a statistical model that explicitly tests for divergence/convergence.

#### **EU harmonization of immigration and immigrant policies**

In 1985, Thomas Hammar was the first to distinguish between policies regulating immigration and immigrant policies (Westfall, 2012). He defined immigration regulation policies as ‘the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens’ (Hammar, 1985: 52), while an immigrant policy ‘refers to the conditions provided to resident immigrants ...’ (Hammar, 1985: 53). Simply stated, immigration policies are directed at people who are not yet ‘here’, while immigrant policies are directed at people who are already ‘here’. There have been several studies on the relationship between these two types of policies, showing possible tensions and trade-offs. Ruhs and Martin (2008), in particular, show that countries with open/permissive immigration policies tend to have closed/exclusive immigrant policies, while countries with closed/restrictive immigration policies tend to have more open/inclusive immigrant policies. The difference between these two types of policies can also be seen in the different history of the EU harmonization of these policies.

The EU harmonization of immigration and immigrant policies for third-country nationals began in the 1990s and the European competences in immigration, integration and citizenship have since increased (Huddleston, 2008). In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht first opened up for cooperation in the field of immigration, but a watershed moment came in 1997, when the Treaty of Amsterdam moved immigration issues from the Third to the

First Pillar of the Treaty of the European Union. This meant that these policies would no longer be subject to intergovernmental decision-making, but rather be under direct EU competence, similar to other policies in the Community pillar, such as those for mobile EU citizens (Dinan, 2005). In effect, the Treaty linked EU citizens' freedom of movement to the immigration of third-country nationals. With the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs Directorate General, the European Commission was given competences in the fields of external border controls and visas, asylum and the rights of third country nationals, and could now introduce proposals on these issues, subject to Council unanimity (Geddes, 2000; Kostakopoulou, 2000; Urth, 2005). Before this time, any intergovernmental cooperation on immigration that there was, had been negotiated behind closed doors, lacking democratic accountability (Guiraudon, 2001; Kostakopoulou, 2000).

Although there has been some debate about the *results* of harmonization, many authors argue that the EU is an emblem of economic globalization and transnational discourse on human rights (cf. Luedtke, 2005) and the *intended* direction of EU harmonization would therefore be toward more openness of immigration and immigrant policies. This approach has previously been referred to as the 'globalist' perspective, contrary to the 'state-centric' approach, which argues that EU influence results in fewer rights for immigrants (cf. Luedtke, 2005). A clear example of the globalist approach of increasing rights for immigrants through the harmonization of immigrant policies is Directive 2000/43/EC on Racial Equality. This 2000 Directive prohibits all forms of discrimination, including all forms of discrimination based on race, e.g. in employment (Guiraudon, 2001). Another example of the expansion of rights is the harmonization of family reunification policies for third-country nationals. This is one area of migration policy that can be considered *both* an immigrant policy—regulating the rights of already present migrants' ability to be reunited with their families, and an immigration policy—regulating the entry of new (family) immigrants. The main objective of Directive 2003/86/EC on Family Reunification was to *facilitate* family reunification for non-EU citizens, modeling their rights to those of mobile EU citizens (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Boeles et al., 2009; Niessen, 2009). This objective can be seen for example in the fourth preamble to the Directive: 'Family reunification is a necessary way of making family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third country nationals in the member states, which also serves to promote economic and social cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty' (Council of the European Union, 2003). This support for family reunification for third-country nationals is clearly in line with a globalist perspective of the EU. Overall, with this perspective, EU harmonization would result in similarly *open* immigration and immigrant policies across member states. The fact that the end result of the Family Reunification Directive differed significantly from its original objective, brings to light the difficulties that may arise in the

harmonization process. In the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive, some member states argued for stricter conditions for third-country nationals than for mobile EU citizens, to the extent that when the Directive came into effect in 2005, it was a merely an ‘instrument of minimum harmonization’ (Boeles et al., 2009: 182). The Directive’s main purpose is still to facilitate family reunification, but the final version leaves member states much discretion about the rights they grant third-country nationals to family reunification. For example, member states maintained the right to demand family migrants to comply with language and economic requirements (Block & Bonjour, 2013: 206; Boeles et al., 2009; Niessen, 2009). Consequently, there are still large differences in family reunification policies across EU member states.

The extent of the difficulties encountered in harmonization have been shown by previous authors to differ between immigrant and immigration policies. A study by Givens and Luedtke (2004) includes the differences in the attempts to harmonize immigration and immigrant policies. The authors do a systematic analysis and present an exhaustive typology of policies. Givens and Luedtke (2004: 155) conclude from this analysis that the harmonization of policies regulating the conditions of immigrants has been met with fewer difficulties than the harmonization of immigration control policies. Givens and Luedtke (2004: 159) define immigration control policies as external border controls, visas, free movement of third country nationals, and asylum. Despite these being policy issues within the First Pillar of the Amsterdam Treaty and the EU institutions therefore have extensive powers to develop policies, the authors show the resistance to the harmonization of these policies and the resulting partial harmonization of immigration policies. The authors define integration issues as anti-discrimination policies and internal border controls and free movement and residence rights for second country nationals.<sup>2</sup> Using these definitions, the authors show that many anti-discrimination policies in areas such as employment and education have been harmonized, thereby expanding the rights of immigrants across the EU (e.g. COM(1999)566 proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin), whereas immigration policies are more often not accepted by the Council (e.g. COM(2002)71 on residence permits issued to victims of trafficking who cooperate with the authorities).

There are few hypotheses for why there is a difference in the resistance to the harmonization of immigrant versus immigration policies. It may be because immigration control policies have greater political salience and national politicians want to maximize on the political

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<sup>2</sup> The authors thus do not include regulations on other issues that may also be included as integration policies such as naturalization, and political or cultural rights for immigrants. These issues still remain within the remit of the nation state. The authors also only include the Family Reunification Directive as an immigration control issue, whereas the Directive could also be framed as an integration issue, as outlined above.

capital that it provides (Givens & Luedtke, 2004). Because national politicians can capitalize on these instances of high political salience, they will block EU harmonization to protect national sovereignty (Givens & Luedtke, 2004: 150). Another hypothesis for why immigration policies are more difficult to harmonize than immigrant policies towards more openness, is that it is harder for governments to deny rights to an already present population (Westfall, 2012). As explained by Westfall (2012: 27), ‘it is difficult to remove rights from a visible and physically present population with obvious needs...’. Member states are therefore less likely to resist EU harmonization toward the inclusive *immigrant* policies posited by ‘globalists’. At the same time, there can be more resistance to open *immigration* policies, as it is easier for governments to argue legislating restrictively against an absent population (Westfall, 2012).

Whether whole or partial, the harmonization of immigration and immigrant policies has not resulted in either immigration or immigrant policies becoming the same across *all* of the EU. This is not just because of the ‘minimum harmonization’ referred to above, allowing countries to have different policies, while still complying with Directives such as the Family Reunification Directive. It is also because only very few EU directives and regulations on immigration/immigrants adopted since 2002, apply to all EU member states. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom have opt-out possibilities, which they use in different combinations (Carmel & Paul, 2013). These countries opted out of Article IV of the Amsterdam Treaty and are therefore not automatically bound by the EU’s harmonization of immigration policies. While several studies have shown that opt-out countries do not lose their bargaining power in EU policymaking (Kaeding & Selck, 2005; Naurin & Lindahl, 2010; Selck & Kuipers, 2005), it can be expected that policies on immigration are not as similar in these countries as in those bound by these Directives.

### **The EU and divergence of public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes**

This study refers to public opinion as ‘attitudes’, defined in line with other authors, as individuals’ preferences in specific situations (Lück, 2005). Survey questions measuring attitudes toward immigration include questions such as the following from the European Social Survey [ESS]: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for the [COUNTRY’S] economy that people come to live here from other countries?’ Previous studies have focused on explaining the origins of these types of attitudes with individual-level predictors such as education or age, or contextual determinants such as the size of the immigrant group (cf. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010), while studies looking at the possible influence of law and policy are rare.

Normative theories on the influence of law and institutions suggest that laws not only influence conduct and beliefs through sanctions, but can also exert this influence just because they convey a consensus about a topic (Albiston et al., 2011). Law-making can



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be based on an actual consensus of public opinion or can be driven by a small elite, but if the legal system is legitimate, then a law will be *perceived* as expressing a consensus. In line with social-psychological hypotheses, a majority opinion conveyed by laws will influence individual beliefs because attitudes will change toward the perceived consensus to avoid cognitive dissonance (Albiston et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2008). Previous studies have indeed shown that attitudes often change to allow for norms and behaviors to be consistent with institutions and policies (Albiston et al., 2011; Bilz & Nadler, 2013; Francois, 2008). The 'globalist' theoretical perspective of the EU suggests a liberalizing influence. It suggests that EU membership would result in more open policies across the member states and therefore more open attitudes. This positive influence of EU membership has previously been demonstrated in the new Eastern European members states, where EU-entry reduced support for the radical right through membership reducing anxiety about the countries' economic transition (Bustikova, 2014: 15). This paper looks at the possible influence of the EU on attitudes toward accepting newcomers, or: public support for immigration. It also looks at attitudes regarding the treatment of the already-present immigrant population, or: pro-immigrant attitudes. These attitudes will be examined, taking into account the proposed greater harmonization of immigrant policies versus immigration policies. The study expects a greater convergence of pro-immigrant attitudes and less convergence of public support for immigration, because immigrant policies are proposed to be more harmonized than immigration policies. This will be explored further by looking additionally at countries bound by EU immigration cooperation, assuming these countries will show even greater convergence of policies. This study will also test the implication of 'globalist' theory that the influence of the EU is toward greater acceptance of immigration and immigrants.

The above expectations can be summarized in the following hypotheses:

- H1. Public support for immigration and pro-immigration attitudes will be more positive in EU countries than in non-EU countries.
- H2. Between 2002 and 2012, pro-immigrant attitudes will have converged more than public support for immigration in EU countries
- H3. Public support for immigration and pro-immigration attitudes will have converged more in countries that are part of the EU immigration cooperation, than in countries that have opted out.

### Data and methodology

The data used here on public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes are from the European Social Survey [ESS] and cover developments in public opinion between 2002 and 2012. ESS is fielded every two years. Over the six survey waves, the number of participating countries totals 34, but ranges from 22 in 2002 to 27 in 2008,

with approximately 280,000 respondents across all waves. Unlike other studies (e.g. Meuleman et al., 2009), not just the attitudes of the majority of the population are included here, but rather all residents included in the survey. Some studies exclude the small number of immigrants participating in the surveys because they are often trying to explain the origins of these attitudes at the individual level. In contrast, this study looks at overall trends in attitudes across an entire population, examining possible influences of law and policies and therefore includes all respondents. The ESS data provide an excellent opportunity for studying the influence of the EU, as the survey includes respondents from nine countries before and after accession to the EU, as well as older EU countries and a wide range of non-EU countries in Europe. This combination of a cross-sectional comparison of EU countries with non-EU countries, its longitudinal design comparing countries before and after accession, enables a difference-in-differences approach (Ashenfelter & Card, 1986) allowing a test of the influence of EU membership on attitudes.

The standard survey includes six items on immigration and immigrants, all coded in the direction of greater support, (ESS, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012):

1. Allow many/few immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as majority  
0 'Allow none' 1 'Allow a few' 2 'Allow some' 3 'Allow many to come and live here'
2. Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority  
0 'Allow none' 1 'Allow a few' 2 'Allow some' 3 'Allow many to come and live here'
3. Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe  
0 'Allow none' 1 'Allow a few' 2 'Allow some' 3 'Allow many to come and live here'
4. Immigration bad or good for country's economy.  
0 'Bad for the economy' 10 'Good for the economy'
5. Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants.  
0 'Undermined' 10 'Enriched'.
6. Immigrants make country worse or better place to live.  
0 'Worse' 10 'Better'.

These items are designed for cross-country comparison, explicitly with the intention of being understood in the same way across countries. As mentioned above, it is important to make the theoretical distinction between attitudes toward immigration versus immigrants. The first three questions are suggested by previous studies to measure public support for *immigration* (Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, & Schmidt, 2008) or the rejection of further immigration (Meuleman & Billiet, 2012; Meuleman et al., 2009). These questions (items 1-3 above) have been shown to differ from items 4-6, which previous authors have referred to as attitudes toward *immigrants* (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010), (ethnic) threat perceptions (Coenders, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2003; Meuleman & Billiet, 2012; Schneider, 2008), or the consequences of immigration (Card et al., 2005; Sides

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& Citrin, 2007). According to Ceobanu and Escandell (2010: 313), opinions about immigrants and immigration should be studied separately because they reflect different notions, 'one as reactions toward people and the other as reactions about the phenomenon of immigration'. Though question 4 mentions 'immigration' (rather than 'immigrants'), the phrasing of the question does refer specifically to the economic impact of immigrants already within the country's borders, rather than those who are yet to come and could therefore be expected to belong to the immigrant category. Additionally, all three 'immigrant' questions address aspects that are part of Banting and Kymlicka's (2013) index of multicultural policies. For example, 'funding of ethnic group organization to *support cultural activities*', an item in this multiculturalism index (Banting & Kymlicka, 2013:7, emphasis added), is closely related to item 5 expressing whether cultural life is enriched by immigrants.

Principal axis factoring with oblimin rotation was run on the six items, using values standardized by country and time point to control their possible confounding influences. This analysis clearly showed a two-factor structure, with a correlation of 0.673 between the two factors. The rotated sum of squared loadings was 2.987 for factor 1 and 2.856 for factor 2, suggesting that both dimensions are almost equally strongly represented in the set of items. The results of the factor analysis as shown in Table 3.1 are in line with the suggestion by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), namely making a distinction between the first three items on immigration and the last three items on attitudes toward immigrants. The first three questions will be referred to here as 'support for immigration', and the latter three as 'pro-immigrant attitudes'. The results indicate that question 4 unmistakably loads on the 'pro-immigrant' factor despite the possible ambiguous wording. The three standardized items on immigration form a single scale with high internal reliability (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.874$ ), as do the three items on pro-immigrant attitudes (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.836$ ) which would not increase had any of the items been excluded. Previous authors have examined the metric and scalar invariance of the support for immigration items and have found that these attitudes are well-measured and that the means can be compared across countries and time (Meuleman et al., 2009). The support for immigration scale averaging the first three items, ranges from 0 to 3, has a mean of 1.599, and a standard deviation of 0.328. The second un-weighted mean scale on pro-immigrant attitudes created of the last three items, ranges from 0 to 10, has a mean of 5.102, and a standard deviation of 0.907. These means are shown in Table 3.2, differentiated by time and countries, ranked from most to least positive toward immigration/immigrants. The two scales are calculated using an available case method for persons with missing information. The number of missing values for the two scales was very low, 2.7% for support for immigration and 2.1% for attitudes toward immigrants, so using a complete-case strategy should not influence the results.

**Table 3.1. Pattern matrix of two-factor structure from principal axis factoring, with oblimin rotation\***

	Factor loadings	
	Support for immigration	Pro-immigrant
2. Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	0.974	
3. Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	0.798	
1. Allow many/few immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as majority	0.734	
6. Immigrants make country worse or better place to live		0.844
5. Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants		0.804
4. Immigration bad or good for country's economy		0.726
<i>Cronbach's α</i>	0.874	0.836

\*Items are standardized by country and time point. Correlation between the two factors is .673.

Country-means of the two scales were first simply examined across the six time periods. The overall means and standard deviations in the bottom row of Table 3.2 refer only to the sixteen countries included at all six ESS time points (BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, NL, NO, PO, PT, SE, SI, UK).<sup>3</sup> The means show that support for immigration is slightly increasing over this time period (from 1.609 to 1.654), as are pro-immigrant attitudes (from 5.210 to 5.417). Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between support for immigration in 2002 and 2012 and the relationship between pro-immigrant attitudes in 2002 and 2012, to illustrate the changes in countries over the studied time period. The countries' rankings remain relatively stable, however, as demonstrated by the high correlations between the scale means over time in Table 3.3.

The correlations in the country mean rankings imply great consistency in these scales: the correlations between time points are high and the same countries display more positive attitudes, e.g. Sweden, while other countries consistently display more negative attitudes, e.g. Hungary. The standard deviations in Table 3.2 nevertheless show that these means do change in an important way, namely as an increase in the differences between countries. The standard deviations give the first indication of divergence in both public support for immigration (from 0.221 to 0.282) and pro-immigrant attitudes (from 0.501 to 0.593). These findings are in line with previous studies such as Meuleman et al. (2009: 360)

3 All country codes are in line with Eurostat guidelines on country abbreviations: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics\\_explained/index.php/Glossary:Countrycodes](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Countrycodes), accessed 1 July 2015. Countries included: Albania (AL), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99 (XK), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Russia (RU), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), Turkey (TR), Ukraine (UA), United Kingdom (UK).

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which state that ‘one can hardly speak of a universal shift toward a climate that is more supportive of immigration, as the evolution of attitudes varies greatly across countries’. This variation in attitudinal shifts across countries has, however, not been tested directly in previous studies of immigration/immigrant attitudes. These attitudinal shifts can be seen to some extent with the standard deviations listed in the table above, but this approach has several limitations. Firstly, only repeated countries can be included in a comparison of standard deviations, and secondly, it is not possible to *test* directly with a p-value of one coefficient whether the variation is increasing or decreasing. This can only be done with an explicit model for the development of attitudes with powerful testing of divergence/convergence in EU versus non-EU countries.

To enable the examination of attitudinal development patterns across countries, the data were aggregated by country, time point, education, gender, and age (e.g. Group 1: Austria-2002-low education-male-old). This aggregation was done to make a more efficient analysis of country trends, while still allowing for the use of education, gender, and age as control variables. This method could also be used for individual-level data in a multi-level structure, but is developed here for clarity in an aggregated dataset with countries as fixed effects. Separate regression analyses using SPSS 21 were conducted on the aggregated data file for the two dependent variables: support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes. In all analyses, the data were weighted by the inverse of the squared standard error of the means of the two dependent variables; a common procedure in meta-analysis (Sanchez-Meca & Marín-Martínez, 1998; Snijders & Bosker, 1999).


In this dataset, the six biennial survey *time* points were coded so that 0 is at the center of the data, i.e. -2.5=2002, -1.5=2004, -0.5=2006, 0.5=2008, 1.5=2010, 2.5=2012. The *EU* membership variable was coded as a 0/1 variable, where 1 indicated EU membership at that time point. CH, HR, IL, IS, NO, RU, TR, UA, XK and AL were thus coded as 0 at all six time points, while AT, BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE and UK were coded as 1 at every time point. CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, PO, SK and SI have 1 at four out of six data points (as the countries joined the EU in May 2004), while BG only has a 1 at half of the data points (Bulgaria only joined in 2007). Gender, age, and education are included as control variables. Gender is coded as female=1 (male=0). *Age* is included as a dichotomous variable with younger=1 (older=0), split at the mean (younger<48). For education, the ESS fully harmonized variables on the highest level of education (*edulv1a*, *edulv1b*) were used and recoded into three levels (0=low, 1=middle, 2=high). The few cases with missing values in the individual-level dataset on the independent variables (3071 cases or 1.1% for education, 1397 cases or 0.5% for age and 292 cases or 0.1% for gender) were listwise deleted before aggregation.

**Table 3.2. Support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes means, ranked at each time point by most to least positive attitudes. The means and the standard deviations are only for the 16 countries included in all waves.**

	Pro-immigrant attitudes																						
	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010		2012		2004		2006		2008		2010		2012		
SE	2.116	SE	2.115	SE	2.176	SE	2.215	SE	2.245	IS	2.197	LU	6.571	SE	5.987	SE	6.110	SE	6.216	SE	6.523	IS	6.375
CH	1.852	UA	1.904	PO	1.928	PO	1.953	PO	1.939	SE	2.185	SE	6.231	LU	5.914	FI	6.013	CH	6.083	CH	5.882	FI	6.314
IE	1.781	CH	1.816	IE	1.805	NO	1.853	NO	1.854	DE	1.962	FI	5.942	FI	5.840	PO	5.985	CH	5.992	PO	5.871	FI	6.067
IT	1.748	IE	1.777	UA	1.800	BG	1.821	NO	1.838	IE	1.911	CH	5.842	IE	5.781	IE	5.883	PO	5.947	FI	5.799	PO	6.054
NO	1.735	NO	1.752	NO	1.788	DE	1.813	DK	1.765	PO	1.909	AT	5.362	CH	5.647	CH	5.757	DK	5.678	DK	5.706	NO	5.893
DE	1.689	SK	1.741	CH	1.763	CH	1.799	CH	1.761	IT	1.781	DE	5.358	ES	5.521	DK	5.756	NO	5.662	NO	5.595	CH	5.859
IL	1.681	PO	1.738	SK	1.739	DK	1.727	DE	1.755	CH	1.764	NO	5.349	PO	5.451	BG	5.611	NL	5.552	NL	5.544	AL	5.821
DK	1.650	ES	1.655	DK	1.713	HR	1.713	HR	1.720	DK	1.751	DK	5.346	DK	5.284	NL	5.465	IE	5.437	BG	5.340	DE	5.743
PO	1.642	DK	1.630	BG	1.695	UA	1.712	HR	1.684	ES	1.703	PO	5.308	NO	5.284	NL	5.442	DE	5.432	DE	5.246	NL	5.633
ES	1.611	IT	1.607	BE	1.634	BE	1.692	SI	1.661	BG	1.697	IE	5.291	NL	5.088	ES	5.041	BG	5.380	BE	4.903	ES	5.581
BE	1.590	AT	1.592	SI	1.562	NL	1.680	NL	1.637	LT	1.696	ES	5.269	DE	4.932	BE	5.041	BG	5.380	BE	4.899	IE	5.214
SI	1.583	SI	1.566	DE	1.550	IE	1.653	BE	1.567	AL	1.688	NL	5.175	AT	4.849	SK	4.965	ES	5.235	IE	4.899	IE	5.214
NL	1.578	UK	1.541	FR	1.516	SI	1.638	FR	1.560	UA	1.680	IL	5.072	BE	4.828	DE	4.946	BE	5.184	HR	4.835	BG	5.181
FR	1.522	NL	1.539	AT	1.514	SK	1.623	ES	1.537	SI	1.657	IT	5.042	UA	4.793	AT	4.765	FR	5.005	FR	4.834	LT	5.164
LU	1.511	BE	1.539	NL	1.506	FR	1.576	RU	1.512	NL	1.640	FR	4.925	FR	4.736	FR	4.756	PT	4.944	EE	4.734	IT	5.076
AT	1.495	DE	1.536	ES	1.500	FI	1.543	IE	1.483	BE	1.636	BE	4.894	UK	4.701	PT	4.704	EE	4.728	PT	4.666	EE	5.067
FI	1.477	FR	1.509	FI	1.460	IL	1.505	EE	1.465	FR	1.625	PT	4.727	SK	4.657	SI	4.632	HR	4.719	IL	4.657	BE	5.024
CZ	1.463	LU	1.509	UK	1.447	UK	1.476	SK	1.457	IE	1.554	UK	4.694	SI	4.597	UK	4.552	SI	4.657	UK	4.639	SI	4.905
PT	1.258	CZ	1.328	EE	1.335	ES	1.387	UK	1.411	EE	1.481	CZ	4.397	EE	4.328	UA	4.488	UK	4.635	SI	4.444	IL	4.783
HU	1.160	EE	1.255	PT	1.135	EE	1.366	FI	1.381	XK	1.426	HU	4.363	CZ	4.289	CY	4.035	CY	4.446	SK	4.433	UK	4.678
EL	1.031	PT	1.147	CY	1.060	CY	1.292	PT	1.239	SK	1.397	EL	3.544	PT	4.272	HU	4.020	UA	4.376	UA	4.372	HU	4.663
BG		EL	1.086	HU	1.036	CZ	1.264	CZ	1.226	UK	1.375	BG		HU	4.214	RU	3.415	CZ	4.291	CZ	4.028	UA	4.640
CY		HU	1.067	CZ		PT	1.206	HU	1.207	IL	1.331	CY		TR	3.721	CZ		HU	4.125	CY	3.816	PT	4.441
EE		TR	1.016	EL		HU	1.173	CY	1.073	CY	1.328	EE		EL	3.700	EL		TR	3.809	RU	3.717	SK	4.356
HR		BG		HR		EL	1.058	EL	1.038	CZ	1.209	HR		BG		HR		RU	3.752	EL	3.040	XK	4.271
LT		CY		IT		TR	1.009	AT		HU	1.141	LT		CY		IT		EL	3.392	AT		CZ	4.171
SK		HR		LT		IT		IT		PT	1.114	SK		HR		LT		AT		IT		RU	3.592
RU		LT		LU		IT		LT		CY	0.878	RU		TR		LU		IT		LT		CY	3.191
TR		IL		IL		LT		LU		AT		TR		IL		IL		LT		LT		LU	
UA		RU		TR		LU		TR		EL		UA		RU		TR		LU		TR		TR	EL
XK		XK		XK		XK		XK		HR		XK		XK		XK		XK		XK		XK	HR
IS		IS		IS		IS		IS		LU		IS		IS		IS		IS		IS		IS	LU
AL		AL		AL		AL		AL		TR		AL		AL		AL		AL		AL		AL	TR
Mean	1.609	Mean	1.586	Mean	1.595	Mean	1.649	Mean	1.624	Mean	1.654	Mean	5.210	Mean	5.139	Mean	5.285	Mean	5.362	Mean	5.272	Mean	5.417
SD	0.221	SD	0.248	SD	0.279	SD	0.265	SD	0.264	SD	0.282	SD	0.501	SD	0.553	SD	0.630	SD	0.585	SD	0.607	SD	0.593

Study III

a. SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION, correlation: 0.875



b. PRO-IMMIGRANT ATTITUDES, correlation: 0.888




Figure 3.1. Relationship between support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes in 2002 and 2012.

**Table 3.3. Correlations between mean attitudes across the 16 repeated countries over six time points, pro-immigrant attitudes above the diagonal and support for immigration below the diagonal**

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
2002		0.907	0.878	0.937	0.917	0.888
2004	0.972		0.945	0.871	0.823	0.845
2006	0.935	0.961		0.943	0.862	0.855
2008	0.891	0.871	0.938		0.930	0.904
2010	0.867	0.859	0.900	0.952		0.941
2012	0.875	0.855	0.874	0.927	0.945	

To investigate the divergence/convergence of attitudes over time, a ‘dissimilarity constraint’ was created using a method similar to stereotyped regression analysis (Anderson, 1984). In a preparatory step for this procedure, a separate regression analysis was run for each of the two dependent variables:

$$y = B + B_1 * \text{time} + B_{4-37} * \text{country} \quad (\text{Model 0})$$

In this model, **time** refers to the centered time variable described above and **country** to 33 dummy variables representing the 34 countries. The expected values of this model are used to create two constraints (referred to hereafter as ‘**dissimilarity**’) representing how different countries were expected to be at the center of the data for the two dependent variables. To examine the divergence/convergence of attitudes in countries over time, the dissimilarity constraints are interacted with time and other independent variables:

$$y = B_0 + B_1 * \text{time} + B_{4-37} * \text{dissimilarity} + B_{39} * \text{dissimilarity} * \text{time} \quad (\text{Model 1})$$

$$+ B_2 * \text{EU} \quad (\text{Model 2})$$

$$+ B_3 * \text{EU} * \text{time} + B_{38} * \text{dissimilarity} * \text{EU} + B_{40} * \text{dissimilarity} * \text{time} * \text{EU} \quad (\text{Model 3})$$

The numbering of the coefficients in these models follows the specification in Table 3.4. All models include country dummies as main effects and therefore all other country effects are held constant and the main effect of dissimilarity vanishes. This method implies that the models can control for alternative explanations for the developments in immigration/immigrant attitudes across countries, such as the stock of immigrants or economic conditions. All models also include the three control variables: education, age and gender ( $B_{41-43}$  \*controls).

The interaction term **dissimilarity\*time** causes the expected values of the model to follow a regular bundle of country-level regression lines, as shown in Charts 3.1-3.4. The model prevents the regression lines from crossing within the time range of the data, enabling an overall test of whether the lines are moving closer together (i.e. converging) or further apart (i.e. diverging) over time. A negative interaction **dissimilarity\*time** indicates convergence (i.e. smaller differences between countries over time), while a positive interaction term indicates divergence (i.e. greater differences between countries over time).



### Study III

As outlined in the Model formulas above, the analyses were conducted in three steps using the aggregated dataset. Model 1 provides a general test for divergence/convergence over time. Model 2 examines the influence of EU membership. Model 3 tests the possible influence of EU membership on attitudinal trends by including EU membership as a binary indicator interacted with the dissimilarity constraint, with **time** and with **dissimilarity\*time** (i.e. between-country divergence/convergence).

### Results

Model 1 examines whether there has been general divergence/convergence over time of attitudes over all countries. The results for Model 1 in Table 3.4 show that overall, public support for immigration has not become significantly more negative or more positive over time ( $B_1 = 0.000$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ), but that there is significant country divergence in support for immigration ( $B_{39} = 0.047$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). These results confirm the impression from the standard deviations, namely that overall, countries are becoming more different from each other in their support for immigration. The results further show that pro-immigrant attitudes have not changed uniformly in this time period ( $B_1 = 0.005$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ). Also, similar to the above results and indications from the standard deviations, country differences in pro-immigrant attitudes are increasing, i.e. diverging ( $B_{39} = 0.057$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). The results of the control variables shown in Model 1 of Table 3.4 indicate that the dependent variables are valid measures that can be explained to a great extent by group characteristics in a predictable way. For example, highly educated and younger people show greater support for immigration (Coenders et al., 2003). Previous studies have found differing results for the influence of gender and the results of the present study are in line with those that find no significant effect of gender (Coenders et al., 2003; Ward & Masgoret, 2008).

The results of the first part of the analysis show that there is general divergence across countries in both types of attitudes. The second part of the analysis looks at whether attitudes may be influenced by EU membership. The results for Model 2 in Table 3.4 indicate that EU membership is positively related to support for immigration ( $B_2 = 0.064$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) as well as to pro-immigrant attitudes ( $B_2 = 0.176$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), meaning that in EU countries, people are more positive toward immigration and more pro-immigrant. There is still general divergence in support for immigration ( $B_{39} = 0.052$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and pro-immigrant attitudes ( $B_{39} = 0.064$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), even when controlling for EU membership.

The final analyses examine the differences in attitudinal developments due to EU membership, comparing the results for the two types of attitudes. Thus, in Model 3, EU membership is added, in interaction with time, in interaction with the dissimilarity term, and in interaction with **dissimilarity\*time** (i.e. country divergence/convergence).

Table 3.4. Models predicting support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes.


	Support for immigration			Pro-immigrant attitudes		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
B <sub>0</sub>	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
(Constant)	1.449 *** (0.014)	1.384 *** (0.022)	1.316 *** (0.026)	4.838 *** (0.036)	4.662 *** (0.057)	4.532 *** (0.073)
B <sub>1</sub>	Time	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.036 *** (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.013)
B <sub>2</sub>	EU	0.064 (0.017)	0.132 *** (0.019)		0.176 *** (0.044)	0.198 *** (0.048)
B <sub>3</sub>	*Time		0.040 *** (0.006)			-0.010 (0.014)
B <sub>4-37</sub>	Dissimilarity	a	a	a	a	a
B <sub>38</sub>	*EU		0.004 (0.076)			0.237 ** (0.076)
B <sub>39</sub>	*Time	0.047 *** (0.007)	0.052 *** (0.007)	0.143 *** (0.025)	0.057 *** (0.007)	0.053 ** (0.018)
B <sub>40</sub>	*EU*Time		-0.106 *** (0.026)			0.002 (0.020)
B <sub>41</sub>	Female	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.059 *** (0.016)	-0.059 *** (0.016)
B <sub>42</sub>	Younger	0.153 *** (0.007)	0.153 *** (0.006)	0.153 *** (0.006)	0.243 *** (0.017)	0.244 *** (0.017)
B <sub>43</sub>	High educ	0.182 *** (0.004)	0.182 *** (0.004)	0.181 *** (0.004)	0.580 *** (0.011)	0.581 *** (0.011)
Adjusted R2 (df)	0.843 (38)	0.844 (39)	0.848 (42)	0.856 (38)	0.857 (39)	0.858 (42)

a. the main effect of dissimilarity vanishes because of the effects of country dummy variables (not shown). \*\* p< 0.001, \* p< 0.05

### Study III

To illustrate this three-level interaction model's implications, Charts 3.1-3.4 compare the results of this model for countries that have consistently been in the EU throughout this time period, including the opt-out countries (AT, BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK) with those that have not joined the EU in this period (AL, CH, HR, IS, IL, NO, RU, TR, UA, XK). The bold lines in these charts indicate the predicted means within these two groups of countries. Country labels have been removed from these charts to show the overall trends more clearly over time. Note that the attitudes are measured on different scales and therefore cannot be compared directly across the charts. Note also, that the final model results are of course partly driven by the nine countries that joined the EU during this period, but visual comparisons with these countries are less obvious and they are therefore excluded.

The four charts illustrate firstly that the level of support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes is slightly higher in EU countries than in non-EU countries (comparing Charts 3.1 and 3.2 with Charts 3.3 and 3.4). The specifics of this difference are found in Table 3.4 (Model 3), showing greater support for immigration in EU countries ( $B_2 = 0.132$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and more pro-immigrant attitudes ( $B_2 = 0.198$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). This result thus supports *H1: public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes are indeed more positive in EU countries than in non-EU countries*.



**Charts 3.1-3.4. Model implications from Model 3 for support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes in EU member states (AT, BE, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, NL, PT, SE, UK) and non-EU member states (AL, CH, HR, IL, IS, NO, RU, TR, UA, XK). Country labels have been omitted to better illustrate time trends.**

Table 3.4 further shows that for support for immigration, the positive effect of being in the EU is increasing over time ( $B_3 = 0.040$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), but this is not the case for pro-immigrant attitudes ( $B_3 = -0.013$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ). This difference is hard to see in the charts, but Charts 3.1 and 3.3 do include the small negative effect of time on support for immigration, while Charts 3.2 and 3.4 show no main effect of time on pro-immigrant attitudes. This is also shown in the results in Table 3.4 (Model 3), where over time, overall support for immigration is decreasing by  $B_1 = -0.036$ ,  $p < 0.001$ , but pro-immigrant attitudes have not increased or decreased significantly ( $B_1 = 0.006$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ). Table 3.4 further shows that EU countries are not more similar in their support for immigration than non-EU countries ( $B_{38} = 0.004$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ) and pro-immigrant attitudes are more dissimilar in EU-countries than in non-EU countries ( $B_{38} = 0.237$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) at the center of the data.

As for divergence/convergence, the results show that in non-EU countries, support for immigration is diverging in this time period ( $B_{39} = 0.143$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Chart 3.3 shows this divergence in non-EU countries. For EU countries, support for immigration is diverging less, but still significantly diverging ( $B_{39} + B_{40}$ ,  $p < 0.001 = 0.143 - 0.106 = 0.037$ ). Chart 3.1 shows this divergence of support for immigration in the constant-EU countries. Pro-immigrant attitudes are also found to be diverging in non-EU countries ( $B_{39} = 0.053$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), but are *not* found to be diverging in EU countries ( $B_{39} + B_{40} = 0.053 + 0.002 = 0.055$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ). Chart 3.2 shows the lack of divergence of pro-immigrant attitudes in EU countries, while Chart 3.4 shows the small divergence of pro-immigrant attitudes in non-EU countries. All these results suggest *some* support for H2 because support for immigration is diverging in the EU, while pro-immigrant attitudes in the EU are not. But because pro-immigrant attitudes have not converged, H2 cannot be confirmed: *in EU countries between 2002 and 2012, pro-immigrant attitudes have not converged more than public support for immigration.*

To examine the possible influence of opting out of EU's immigration cooperation (H3), the final analyses were repeated, taking into account the special position of DK, UK and IE. Without these countries, the influence of EU membership decreases slightly in both analyses, but the divergence/convergence results do not change. It was expected that excluding the opt-out countries would show *greater* convergence of attitudes within the EU countries cooperating on immigration, but this is not the case. Including the opt-out countries as non-EU countries reduces the influence of the EU on support for immigration, but increases the influence of the EU on pro-immigrant attitudes. There is also less divergence in EU countries and more divergence in non-EU countries for support for immigration. The divergence/convergence results for pro-immigrant attitudes do not differ depending on the opt-out specification. This lack of clear differences between the opt-out countries and the rest could indicate that policies and attitudes in opt-out

### Study III

countries are influenced by being a part of the decision-making process, despite not being bound by the Directives. There is thus no support for *H3: public support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes do not appear to have converged more in countries that are part of the EU immigration cooperation, than the countries that have opted out.*

All analyses were also repeated without the countries only present in one wave (IS, AL and XK). Because the model is developed specifically for looking at changes in countries over time, removing these countries should not affect the results. Indeed, removing these countries does not significantly change the results. The pro-immigrant analysis was also repeated without the apparent outliers (TR, SE and IS) and the results remained the same.

### Conclusion and discussion

As mentioned in the opening quote, the EU's plans for harmonization 'are feasible only as long as the national publics agree with what is being offered to them' (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010:324). This study asked what the influence of EU membership is on the divergence/convergence of immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes between 2002 and 2012. The study expected a positive influence of the EU and also that pro-immigrant attitudes would be more similar than support for immigration across countries.

The results of the study firstly show a difference in the development of pro-immigrant attitudes and support for immigration. This finding supports previous studies that suggest a substantial difference between these two types of public opinion and thus supports the appeal to researchers to study these two attitudes separately (cf. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010). The results secondly indicate that respondents in EU countries generally showed more support for immigration and more pro-immigrant attitudes than in non-EU European countries. This supports the 'globalist' theories that suggest the EU's positive influence, which is found to be increasing over time for support for immigration. Despite the EU's positive influence, attitudes *within* EU countries were not found to have become more similar. The results show important differences between pro-immigrant attitudes and support for immigration, as expected. Firstly, public support for immigration is found to be diverging. This divergence of immigration attitudes is interesting, as a convergence of attitudes about immigration could be expected because the EU has wide competences to develop policies on immigration control issues. But these diverging immigration attitudes support Givens and Luedtke (2004), who claim there is resistance to the EU harmonization of immigration policies. Secondly, the results of this study show that pro-immigrant attitudes are not diverging. This also supports Givens and Luedtke (2004) and Westfall (2012), who claim less resistance to the harmonization of integration policies and that this is demonstrated by these policies being similarly permissive across countries. The fact that attitudes toward immigrants were not found to be *converging* may be rooted

in the ideas of Givens and Luedtke (2004) only being related to certain integration issues and not others, and many integration issues are still completely within the competences of the nation states. To be able to clarify these results, the direct relationship between specific policies and attitudes must be tested.

Few differences were found in the analyses, depending on the specifications of the three countries that have opted out of the EU's immigration cooperation. Greater similarities in attitudes within the EU were not found without these countries. This may be an indication of the weak harmonization of the immigration policies or that the opt-out countries are still indirectly influenced by EU decisions. Clarification would require further research.

This study took the first steps toward studying the influence of the EU on the divergence/convergence of support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes, but several extensions can be made. One extension would be to further explore the complicated relationship between support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes. This relationship requires a separate study, for as expressed by Simon and Lynch (1999: 465), 'the desire to restrict immigration is not consistently closely related with negative attitudes toward migrants more generally'. This is beyond the scope of this study, but could form a part of future studies. Additionally, this study cannot determine exactly what it is about EU membership that influences these attitudes. In-depth studies could explore if attitudes change in anticipation or as a result of EU membership. Another extension could be to examine the convergence/divergence of attitudes within each European country, e.g. across social groups, and the method developed here could be used for this purpose. A final possible extension could be a direct measurement of immigrants and immigrant policies in countries as they develop over time.

