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The Carrot and the Stick: Affective Commitment and Acceptance Anxiety as Motives for Discretionary Group Efforts by Respected and Disrespected Group Members

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Previous research has demonstrated that intragroup respect can strengthen people’s commitment to the group and encourage them to exert themselves on behalf of it. In the present research, the authors argue that similar behavior can ensue from self-focused concerns when group members are disrespected. Experiment 1 (N = 174) confirms that high respect as well as low respect motivates people to increase their actual discretionary efforts on behalf of the group. These findings were replicated and extended in Experiment 2 (N = 138), where it was established that enhanced efforts only emerge when people consider the way they are evaluated by others as diagnostic for their position in the group. In addition, it is demonstrated that whereas the efforts of respected people were primarily motivated by affective commitment to the group (group-focused concerns), the behavior of disrespected people was driven by anxiety about their acceptance into the group (self-focused concerns).

Keywords: respect; disrespect; discretionary group efforts; affective commitment; acceptance anxiety

Discretionary group efforts are indispensable for the smooth functioning and success of collaborative task-groups. But what makes people exert themselves on behalf of the group? In this article, we examine two discrete motives that can enhance individual effort on discretionary group tasks. In addition to a group-focused motive where people engage in discretionary group efforts due to their commitment to the group, we propose that similar behavior can ensue from a self-focused motive, based on concerns about individual acceptance into the group. Both motives can lead people to engage in similar discretionary group efforts. With the present research, we aim to demonstrate that the emergence of group-focused motives versus self-focused motives, and the ensuing effort people display on behalf of the group, depends on whether they feel respected or disrespected as group members.

Recent theory and research examining what causes group members to exert themselves on behalf of a group has established the importance of intragroup respect. Intragroup respect is defined as the perceived value of the self for the group (H. J. Smith, Tyler, & Huo, 2003), which can be conveyed either by intragroup interactions or by evaluative judgments from other group members (Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; Ellemers, Doosje, & Spears, 2004; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Simon & Stürmer, 2003; Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2005; Tyler & Lind, 1992). The perception that one is respected by other group members enhances people’s commitment to the group and increases their willingness to invest in the group (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2005). Hitherto, research has mainly focused on establishing how the affordance of respect can increase commitment to the group and evoke group-directed effort in this way.

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(Branscombe et al., 2002; Simon & Stürmer, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). For example, De Cremer (2002, 2003) demonstrated that the perception of being respected as a group member positively influenced people’s feelings of belongingness and that these feelings mediated people’s contributions to an experimentally created public goods dilemma. Similar findings were reported by Simon and Stürmer (2003). They showed that respectful treatment enhanced people’s identification with the collective, which in turn increased their willingness to engage in group-serving behavior.

In addition to this group-directed process, we propose an alternative mechanism, which can evoke outwardly similar behavioral displays. On the basis of previous theory and research on intragroup respect, one would argue that when respect is not forthcoming, this should elicit psychological disengagement from the group. The resulting lack of group commitment would imply the absence of a group-focused motive, resulting in a reluctance to exert oneself on behalf of the group. However, we posit that when people do not receive respect from other group members, different motives come into play; that is, for disrespected group members, more self-focused concerns are activated that nonetheless can result in similar group-promoting efforts. In doing this, we extend previous theory and research on the effects of social exclusion and peripheral or marginal group membership (Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2002; cf. Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995).

The literature on social exclusion, in which the need to belong is considered a basic human motive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), posits that those who are socially excluded experience a lack of belongingness, which elicits feelings of anxiety and distress (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Williams, 2001). As a result, people who feel their sense of belongingness is in jeopardy should be highly motivated to display those behaviors that will gain them social acceptance (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000; Williams & Sommer, 1997). Consistent with this reasoning, it was demonstrated that group members who perceived their position within the group as marginal or peripheral displayed ingroup favoring biases when there was a strategic benefit to do so, that is, when their responses were public and when they anticipated moving to a more central position in the group (Jetten et al., 2002; Noel et al., 1995).

We extend this previous work by arguing that the uncertainty as to whether one is fully included and accepted as a group member primarily elicits a concern with the self, not the group; that is, research by E. R. Smith, Murphy, and Coats (1999) suggests that when group members experience a lack of acceptance into the group, this challenges their private self-esteem. Accordingly, even when there is no strategic advantage to do so (e.g., because one’s behavior cannot be monitored by other group members, cf. Barreto & Ellemers, 2000, or when there is no scope for position improvement) people may feel compelled to affirm their private self-conception as a worthy individual (see also Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Steele, 1988). Preliminary support for this reasoning was obtained in research by Branscombe et al. (2002), who found that when people experienced a lack of respect from other group members, they were willing to work for the group when this might benefit their personal image.

In sum, we argue that intragroup respect conveys that one is being valued and included by others in the group. In turn, this causes people to feel committed to the group and enhances their willingness to exert themselves on behalf of the group (group commitment motive; Tyler & Blader, 2000). However, because disrespect makes people feel devalued and rejected, this is likely to induce feelings of anxiety and distress about their acceptance by other group members (acceptance anxiety motive). We propose that the self-focused motives thus activated induce attempts to enhance one’s private self-view of worthiness as a group member. In other words, we hypothesize that in the absence of group-focused concerns, the anxiety about one’s acceptance by other group members—elicited by the experience of disrespect—can motivate people to exert themselves on behalf of the group because of self-focused concerns (Branscombe et al., 2002; Steele, 1988); that is, we propose that both the carrot and the stick represent relevant behavioral motives in a group context. In addition to the social rewards people can receive from the group (the carrot), the possibility of social sanctions (the stick) also can operate as a motive to display group-favoring efforts.

THE CURRENT RESEARCH

In the present contribution, we focus on the emergence of discretionary efforts as our central dependent variable because such efforts are considered voluntary and consequently more motivationally driven than group task behavior (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). Our central prediction is that both the perception of being highly respected and the perception of being disrespected can enhance people’s behavioral efforts on behalf of the group. We compare the responses of highly respected and disrespected group members to those of group members who have received average respect. In line with our reasoning, the affordance of average respect implies no particular challenge for group members because this is unlikely to evoke strong group-focused concerns or self-focused concerns. Accordingly, under conditions of average respect, we expect group
members to demonstrate the base-rate behavior that is shown when neither group commitment nor acceptance anxiety motives operate to enhance displays of discretionary group efforts. In Experiment 1, we focus on demonstrating that highly respected as well as disrespected group members can show increased behavioral efforts on behalf of the group. In Experiment 2, we go one step further to demonstrate that similar discretionary group efforts are driven by different motivational concerns in the case of highly respected versus disrespected group members. In addition, in Experiment 2, we will examine whether these findings are caused by positive versus negative evaluative judgments per se or only emerge when group members consider the evaluations they receive as diagnostic for their position in the group, as would be in line with theoretical conceptualizations of intragroup respect (H. J. Smith et al., 2003).

EXPERIMENT 1

In this research, we chose to manipulate respect based on self-reported behavioral episodes (Branscombe et al., 2002; Ellemers, Doosje, et al., 2004). Because the current research focuses not only on the effects of high respect or average respect but also on the effects of disrespect, we used two dimensions of group-relevant behavior to induce this state. That is, in a task-group setting, we manipulated the respect participants received from fellow ingroup members for self-reported previous individual achievements and the respect they received for self-reported previous cooperation (Sleebos, Ellemers, & De Gilder, in press). We used two behavioral dimensions to enhance the face validity of this manipulation and make it less likely that self-defense strategies and coping mechanisms would cause people to discount the negative self-relevant information they received (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001).

To examine group commitment as a motive to display actual discretionary efforts, we assessed affective commitment to the group, which is considered an indicator of psychological engagement with the group. Notably, it has been shown that the construct of affective commitment predicts the desire to maintain membership in the group as well as the willingness to invest in outcomes that are important for the group (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Van den Heuvel, 1998; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). Thus, in line with previous research (see Tyler & Blader, 2003, for an overview), we predict that higher levels of respect will result in more affective commitment, a greater desire to maintain membership in the group, and more discretionary group efforts. To assess the operation of self-focused concerns, we asked participants to indicate the extent to which they experienced anxiety about their acceptance by others in the group, which is conveyed through feelings of being unworthy as a group member, and worries about one’s acceptance by the other ingroup members (E. R. Smith et al., 1999). Whereas disrespect is predicted to reduce affective commitment and should increase the desire to leave the group, we hypothesize that disrespect also induces acceptance anxiety and for this reason can result in increased displays of effort on the discretionary group task.

Method

PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN

One-hundred seventy-four students of Leiden University (M age = 21.5 years) voluntarily participated in this experiment, for which they were paid 4.5 Euros. Participants (61 men, 113 women) were randomly assigned and proportionally distributed across conditions of a 3 (respect for individual achievements: high/average/low) × 3 (respect for cooperation: high/average/low) between-subjects experimental design.

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE: INTRODUCTION AND COVER STORY

Students at Leiden University were invited to the laboratory to participate in a study on how people work in task-groups. Participants (eight per session) were seated in separate cubicles containing a computer with a monitor and a keyboard; participants were told that they could communicate with each other by means of the computer network. The computers were used to provide all instructions, ask questions, and collect participants’ responses. The cover story explained that this was an investigation into team collaboration in financial/administrative organizations. A bogus personality test followed, which allegedly allowed the experimenter to divide the participants that were present into two four-person teams who shared the same problem-solving style (Branscombe et al., 2002). In reality, all participants were told that they were allocated to the team of holistic-focused problem solvers; they received preprogrammed information to simulate the alleged responses of other members of their task-group.

RESPECT MANIPULATIONS

Next, each participant was asked to provide some personal information by typing a brief summary statement on the computer, ostensibly for the purpose of getting to know each other better (cf. Branscombe et al., 2002; Ellemers, Doosje, et al., 2004). Specifically, participants were asked to relate one example of a successful individual achievement that they were proud of and one example of an unsuccessful individual achievement that they were ashamed of. In a similar vein, they were asked to reveal one successful cooperative act of which they were proud and one unsuccessful cooperative act of which they were ashamed (Sleebos et al., in press). Subse-
quently, participants were asked to evaluate their fellow ingroup members on a 9-point scale (1 = little respect, 9 = great respect) based on the behavioral descriptions they had ostensibly provided. In reality, all participants received standardized, preprogrammed feedback containing behavioral episodes that had been rated equally positive (e.g., “At work, somebody had a stroke and I applied first aid”) or equally negative (e.g., “I failed my driving license test three times in a row”) in a pilot study (Sleebos et al., in press). Participants were led to believe that in a similar vein, their fellow ingroup members were evaluating them based on their behavioral descriptions. Participants could not evaluate themselves. Respect in terms of both individual achievements and cooperation was manipulated by informing participants about the way they had supposedly been evaluated by other ingroup members based on the behavioral descriptions they had provided. In the case of low respect for individual achievements, they were informed that, on average, other ingroup members had rated their performance lower (4.3) than the neutral point (6) and that their score was lower than judgments received by other ingroup members (which were stated to be 6, 5.3, and 6.7, respectively). In the average respect for individual achievements condition, participants were informed that, on average, other ingroup members had rated their performance (6) equal to the neutral point (6) and that their respect score was in accordance with the judgments received by other ingroup members (which were stated to be 6, 5.3, and 6.7, respectively). In the high respect for individual achievements condition, participants were led to believe that their score (7.7) was above the neutral point and higher than the evaluations of fellow ingroup members (which were stated to be 6, 5.3, and 6.7, respectively). High respect for cooperation (7.7), average respect for cooperation (6), and low respect for cooperation (4.3) were manipulated with similar instructions (fellow ingroup members’ evaluations were stated to be 6, 5, and 7, respectively, to avoid suspicion about the veridical nature of these scores).

MANIPULATION CHECKS AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with a series of statements on 9-point Likert-type scales (1 = not at all, 9 = very much), starting with the manipulation checks.

Manipulation checks. To assess perceived respect for individual achievements and for cooperation, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought that their fellow group members respected them for their individual achievements and the extent to which they thought their fellow group members respected them for their ways of cooperation.

Affective commitment. Affective commitment (α = .73) was measured with three items, adapted from Ellemers et al. (1998). These items focused on the affective commitment participants felt to their task-group, with statements such as, “I feel at home among my fellow group members in my task-group.”

Anxiety about acceptance into the group. The extent to which people felt that they were unworthy as a group member and experienced worries and concerns regarding acceptance by other ingroup members was measured with three items (α = .93) adapted from the Social Group Attachment Scale (E. R. Smith et al., 1999). Although this scale was initially developed to assess group attachment as a personality trait that develops in early childhood (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998; E. R. Smith et al., 1999), we argue that throughout the lifespan, acceptance anxiety may be evoked in specific situations, where it can influence people’s attitudes and behavior. We selected three items that had the highest factor loadings in previous research with this scale and adapted these to specifically refer to the experimental task teams to which participants had been assigned in our study. Thus, the scale we used assessed any doubts participants might have about being seen as a fully accepted group member, containing items such as, “I worry that my group does not really accept me.”

Discretionary group efforts. After completion of these questions, participants were invited to work on a (group-serving) discretionary group task to measure actual effortful behavior. Before starting with the discretionary effort task, it was emphasized that this task was completely voluntary and participants were allowed to stop at any time they wanted. It was explicitly announced that individual scores on this task would not be reported, and because each participant worked on a computer terminal in a separate cubicle, their input into this task would remain anonymous. The discretionary effort task was presented as “a simplified version of the additional work employees in financial/administrative organizations tend to do.” Participants were instructed that it would be possible to do extra work for the group, and it was emphasized that their efforts on this task were only meant to serve the group. The discretionary effort task consisted of entering as many three-digit numbers (e.g., 112, 211, 222, etc.) as possible within 3 minutes. Greater effort on this task was indicated by a higher amount of numbers entered. The normality plot of the discretionary effort measure was inspected but no deviant scores were found. Upon completion of this discretionary effort task, demographic variables were asked and participants were told that the experiment had finished. Participants were paid and fully debriefed.
Turnover intentions. We measured turnover intentions (α = .88) with four items adapted from the scale developed by Mobley (1977). This measure was used as an additional indicator of psychological disengagement from the group. Items assessed participants’ desire to leave the task-group, for example, “If I had an alternative, I would leave this task-group.”

Results

Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of the respect manipulation was examined by a 3 (respect for individual achievements) × 3 (respect for cooperation) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). This only revealed the intended effects. In the high respect for individual achievements condition, participants reported having received more respect for their individual achievements (M = 7.42, SD = 1.07) than did participants in the average respect for individual achievements condition (M = 5.72, SD = 1.37), who in turn reported having received more respect than did participants in the low respect for individual achievements condition (M = 3.11, SD = 1.24). F(2, 165) = 180.25, p < .001, η² = .69. A Tukey (HSD) test for pairwise comparisons between groups revealed that the means of all three conditions were significantly different at p < .001. Likewise, in the high respect for cooperation condition, participants indicated they had received more respect for cooperation (M = 7.32, SD = 1.33) than did participants in the average respect for cooperation condition (M = 5.84, SD = 1.01), who in turn reported having received more respect than did participants in the low respect for cooperation condition, respectively (M = 3.39, SD = 1.55). F(2, 165) = 135.61, p < .001, η² = .62. Again, a Tukey (HSD) test revealed significant differences at p < .001 between all three respect for cooperation conditions. No crossover effects were found.

Unless otherwise indicated, all of the following measures were analyzed with a 3 (respect for individual achievements) × 3 (respect for cooperation) analysis of variance (ANOVA).

Affective commitment. The measure for affective commitment revealed significant main effects of the respect manipulations (see Table 1). After receiving more respect for individual achievements, participants reported stronger feelings of affective commitment with the task group, F(2, 165) = 5.88, p < .01, η² = .07. Similar effects were found for respect for cooperation. More respect for cooperation resulted in stronger feelings of affective commitment, F(2, 165) = 5.81, p < .01, η² = .07. Both of these effects are in line with our predictions.

Anxiety about acceptance into the group. The measure of anxiety about acceptance by others in the group yielded two significant main effects (see Table 1). Low respect for individual achievements induced greater acceptance anxiety than did average respect for individual achievements and high respect for individual achievements, F(2, 165) = 10.08, p < .001, η² = .11. Likewise, low respect for cooperation resulted in significantly greater acceptance anxiety than did high respect for cooperation, F(2, 165) = 5.97, p < .01, η² = .07. In addition, an interaction between respect for individual achievements and respect for cooperation was found, F(4, 165) = 3.04, p < .05, η² = .07. Further examination of this interaction with analyses of simple main effects revealed that participants in the average respect for individual achievements condition, F(2, 165) = 2.60, p = .08, η² = .03, and the low respect for individual achievements condition, F(2, 165) = 5.50, p < .01, η² = .06, showed more acceptance anxiety because they had received less respect for cooperation. Furthermore, participants in the average respect for cooperation condition, F(2, 165) = 5.07, p < .01, η² = .06, as well as the low respect for cooperation condition, F(2, 165) = 3.58, p < .05, η² = .04, showed more acceptance anxiety because they had received less respect for individual achievements. Across the board, as people received less (cumulative) respect, they reported higher levels of acceptance anxiety (see Table 2), which is in line with our predictions.

Table: Means and Standard Deviations of Affective Commitment, Acceptance Anxiety, and Turnover Intentions as a Function of Respect for Individual Achievements and as a Function of Respect for Cooperation (Experiment 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respect for individual achievements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective commitment</td>
<td>6.540a</td>
<td>6.200a,b</td>
<td>5.700b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance anxiety</td>
<td>2.880b</td>
<td>3.560b</td>
<td>4.430a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover intentions</td>
<td>2.300b</td>
<td>3.030a,b</td>
<td>3.630a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respect for cooperation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective commitment</td>
<td>6.590a</td>
<td>6.060a,b</td>
<td>5.770b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance anxiety</td>
<td>2.980b</td>
<td>3.740a,b</td>
<td>4.160a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover intentions</td>
<td>2.450b</td>
<td>3.150a,b</td>
<td>3.360a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Higher values indicate a higher rating on the dependent variable in question. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in a Tukey (HSD) test for pairwise comparisons between groups.
Means and Standard Deviations of Acceptance Anxiety as a Function of Respect for Individual Achievements and Respect for Cooperation (Experiment 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respect for Individual Achievements</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect for cooperation</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.35b</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>2.95b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.68b</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>5.44a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3.61b</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>4.22a,b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Higher values indicate greater anxiety about acceptance by others in the group. Means in the same row or column that do not share subscripts differ at \( p < .05 \) in a Tukey (HSD) test for pairwise comparisons between groups. No significant or marginal significant main effect was found in the high respect for individual achievements condition or in the high respect for cooperation condition.

Means and Standard Deviations of Discretionary Group Efforts as a Function of Respect for Individual Achievements and Respect for Cooperation (Experiment 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respect for Individual Achievements</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respect for cooperation</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>51.90a</td>
<td>10.87</td>
<td>53.95a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>56.16a</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>56.37a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>56.53a</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>54.24a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Higher values indicate greater discretionary group efforts. Means in the same row or column that do not share subscripts differ at \( p < .05 \) in a Tukey (HSD) test for pairwise comparisons between groups. Significant main effects were found only in the average respect for individual achievements condition (column) and average respect for cooperation condition (row).

Discussion

Overall, the results of Experiment 1 are in line with our reasoning. Participants who had received high respect for either individual achievements or cooperation reported stronger feelings of affective commitment to the group compared to participants who had received low respect on one of these behavioral dimensions. This linear trend is consistent with previous research on the effects of perceived respect and corroborates our predictions regarding affective commitment with the group (Brancombe et al., 2002; Ellemers, Doosje, et al., 2004; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Simon & Stürmer, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In addition, extending previous research, participants who had received low respect for individual achievements or cooperation reported greater anxiety about their acceptance by others in the group. This is consistent with our reasoning that disrespect elicits self-focused concerns, as is apparent from the doubts people express about their worthiness as an ingroup member and the worries and concern they experience regarding their acceptance by the group. Finally, as predicted, linear trends on turnover intentions, which were found for both dimensions of respect, indicate that in the low respect conditions, participants expressed a greater desire to leave the group than did participants who had received high respect, confirming the notion that disrespect induces psychological disengagement from the group (Sleebos et al., in press).
Focusing on the main contribution of the first study, the results of Experiment 1 showed clear evidence of the predicted emergence of enhanced engagement in discretionary group efforts under conditions of respect as well as disrespect compared to group members who had received average respect for both individual achievements and cooperation. We also found support for our reasoning that different motives are elicited by the affordance of high versus low respect. That is, as predicted and in line with previous research, high respect enhanced participants’ affective commitment to the group. By contrast, whereas a lack of respect from other group members depressed feelings of commitment to the group and increased the desire to leave the group, this manipulation also induced anxiety about acceptance by others in the group.

Although these observations with respect to the different measures we used are all in line with our reasoning, in this first study we could not establish direct evidence (e.g., in terms of correlations between the dependent variables) that the different motivational states induced by respect and disrespect predict individual displays of discretionary group efforts. We think this may at least in part be due to the fact that we used two separate dimensions to induce different levels of respect. Although this procedure was successful in that participants found the manipulations credible and responded in the predicted way, retrospectively we think that this also may have confused participants because they were confronted with inconsistent information (e.g., high respect for individual achievements and low respect for cooperation), which may simultaneously have activated contradictory behavioral motives. Thus, we conducted a second study that avoids this complication, with the aim of obtaining more conclusive evidence that respected people show enhanced discretionary group efforts because of their affective commitment to the group, whereas disrespected people engage in behavioral efforts because of their anxiety about acceptance into the group.

**EXPERIMENT 2**

Our main objective in the second study was threefold. First, we wanted to replicate the curvilinear effect on discretionary group efforts as found in Experiment 1 (i.e., increased discretionary group efforts due to high as well as low respect compared to average respect). Second, we aimed to demonstrate that the two proposed motives cause people to engage in discretionary group efforts. That is, we wanted to find more conclusive evidence that the group commitment motive causes increased discretionary effort when respected, whereas the acceptance anxiety motive enhances displays of discretionary effort when disrespected. Third, we wished to establish more unequivocally that the evaluative judgments participants received from other ingroup members affected the emergence of discretionary group efforts because these conveyed the respect that participants perceived to have in the group. That is, if our theoretical reasoning is valid, the effects we observed should not be caused by the valence of the judgments per se (e.g., because of mood effects) but should only occur when these judgments are seen as diagnostic for the position of the self in the group.

In Experiment 1, we manipulated respect on two different dimensions. Because these showed parallel effects, we decided to simplify the respect manipulation. In Experiment 2, we therefore combined the ratings about individual achievements and cooperation into a single overall judgment that intended to convey the respect participants had received from their fellow ingroup members. In this way, we maintained the notion that these judgments were based on two different dimensions that are relevant to one’s functioning in the group, thus making it more difficult for participants to discount this information. However, this time, the information pertaining to these two dimensions allegedly had already been aggregated to manipulate intragroup respect at three levels: high, average, or low. With this manipulation, we aimed to replicate the behavioral effects we observed in Experiment 1 in support of our main prediction that discretionary group efforts should increase under conditions of high respect as well as low respect, compared to the average respect condition. In addition, we hoped to obtain more direct support for our secondary hypothesis that when people think they are respected, enhanced feelings of affective commitment cause them to engage in discretionary group efforts, whereas those who feel disrespected increase their discretionary efforts because of the acceptance anxiety they experience.

Finally, in Experiment 2, we attempted to obtain more specific support that the observed effects indeed pertain to the theoretical construct of intragroup respect. Respect is conceptualized as the perceived value of the self for the group. Hence, when people are afforded high or low respect, this informs them about the perceived position of the self in the group (H. J. Smith et al., 2003). In line with this conceptualization, the predicted effects of respect should only emerge when the evaluative judgments participants receive are seen as diagnostic for their position in the group (cf. Ellemers, Doosje, et al., 2004). In other words, from a theoretical point of view it is important to establish that the behavioral effects we observed do not simply emerge due to mood effects, for instance, because participants are encouraged by positive evaluations or challenged by negative evaluations from others (cf. Simon & Stürmer,
2003). Instead, we should be able to show that the predicted behavioral effects only emerge when the positive or negative evaluations participants receive can be seen as diagnostic for their position in the group. By contrast, when these evaluations are seen as simply conveying incidental judgments from others without holding specific predictive value about the position of the self in the group (H. J. Smith et al., 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992) there should be no particular reason for participants to increase their behavioral efforts on the discretionary group task.

Method

PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN

One hundred and thirty-eight students of Leiden University (M age = 19.2 years) voluntarily participated in this experiment. They were paid 4.5 Euros. Participants (30 men, 108 women) were randomly assigned and proportionally distributed across conditions of a 3 (overall respect: high/average/low) × 2 (diagnosticity of evaluations: diagnostic/nondiagnostic) between-subjects experimental design.

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE: INTRODUCTION AND COVER STORY

In Experiment 2, we used the same introduction, cover story, and respect manipulations as in Experiment 1, except that this time the judgments about individual achievements and cooperation were combined into a single overall evaluation. That is, participants were told that the evaluations they had received from the other ingroup members on these two behavioral dimensions were averaged into one overall score. In the case of low respect (for individual achievements and cooperation), participants were led to believe that their overall score (4.3) was below the neutral point (6.0) and that their score was comparable to judgments received by other ingroup members (which were stated to be 6.1, 5.5, and 6.4, respectively). Average respect (for individual achievements and cooperation) was conveyed by informing participants that other ingroup members had rated their behavioral descriptions nearly equal (6.1) to the neutral point (6.0) and that their score was comparable to judgments received by other ingroup members (which were stated to be 6.1, 5.5, and 6.4, respectively). Participants who received high respect (for individual achievements and cooperation) were informed that, on average, other ingroup members had rated their behavioral descriptions higher (7.7) than the neutral point (6.0) and that their score was higher than judgments received by other ingroup members (which were stated to be 6.1, 5.5, and 6.4, respectively).

DIAGNOSTICITY OF EVALUATIONS

After having received this overall rating (which was allegedly based on the behavioral descriptions participants had provided), we manipulated the diagnosticity of these evaluations for the position of the self in the group (diagnostic vs. nondiagnostic). In the diagnostic condition, participants were told that these evaluative ratings expressed the respect they received from other ingroup members and were unlikely to change during the study. Furthermore, participants were informed that during the study, there would be no opportunity to adjust their evaluations of one another. By contrast, in the nondiagnostic condition, participants were told that the ratings they had received only conveyed a first impression, which might easily change during the study when group members got to know each other better. In addition, they were informed that during the study it would be possible to adjust their evaluations of one another.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Manipulation checks. All questions were answered on 9-point scales (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). Manipulation checks for respect for individual achievements and respect for cooperation were identical to the ones used in Experiment 1. In addition, one item was added (“Overall, to what extent do you think your fellow group members respect you”) to get an indication of the perceived overall level of respect. To check the manipulation of diagnosticity of respect, participants were asked how likely it was that the image their fellow group members had of them would change and whether they felt they had an opportunity to change the image their fellow group members had of them. Affective commitment (α = .70), anxiety about acceptance by others in the group (α = .89), and turnover intentions (α = .93) were assessed with the same questions that were used in Experiment 1.

Discretionary group efforts. Then, as was the case in Experiment 1, participants were invited to work on a discretionary group task to assess their actual behavioral effort. The normality plot of the discretionary effort measure was inspected but no deviant scores were found. Upon completion of this discretionary effort task, demographic variables were asked and participants were told that the study had finished. Participants were paid and fully debriefed.

Results

Manipulation checks. Subjecting the manipulation checks for respect to a 3 (overall respect) × 2 (diagnosticity of evaluations) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed the following effects. Participants in the high respect condition reported having received more respect for individual achievements (M =
Means and Standard Deviations of Affective Commitment, Acceptance Anxiety, and Turnover Intentions as a Function of Respect (Experiment 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respect</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affective commitment</td>
<td>M: 7.01 (SD: 1.22)</td>
<td>M: 6.84 (SD: 1.18)</td>
<td>M: 5.63 (SD: 1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance anxiety</td>
<td>M: 2.60 (SD: 1.32)</td>
<td>M: 3.18 (SD: 1.51)</td>
<td>M: 5.27 (SD: 1.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover intentions</td>
<td>M: 1.66 (SD: 1.32)</td>
<td>M: 2.28 (SD: 1.51)</td>
<td>M: 3.36 (SD: 2.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Higher values indicate a higher rating on the dependent variable. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in a Tukey (HSD) test for pairwise comparisons between groups.

7.36, SD = .74) than did participants in the average respect condition (M = 5.74, SD = 1.06) and the low respect condition (M = 3.64, SD = 1.32), F(2, 132) = 139.40, p < .001, η² = .68. Participants in the high respect condition also indicated that they felt more respected for cooperation (M = 7.36, SD = .85) than did participants in the average respect condition (M = 5.78, SD = 1.09) and the low respect condition (M = 3.62, SD = 1.70), F(2, 132) = 109.93, p < .001, η² = .61. Finally, participants in the high respect condition indicated that they felt more respected overall (M = 7.09, SD = 1.57) than did participants in the average respect condition (M = 6.13, SD = 1.24) and low respect condition (M = 3.22, SD = 1.38), F(2, 132) = 93.41, p < .001, η² = .59. For each of these three manipulation checks, pairwise comparisons between groups (Tukey HSD) revealed significant differences at p < .001 between the high, average, and low respect conditions.

The manipulation checks for diagnosticity of evaluations also were subjected to a 3 (respect) × 2 (diagnosticity of evaluations) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). This also showed the intended effects. Participants in the diagnostic condition indicated they would be less able to change the image other ingroup members held of them (M = 5.86, SD = 1.91) than would participants in the nondiagnostic condition (M = 6.98, SD = 1.18), F(1, 132) = 16.95, p < .001, η² = .11. Likewise, participants in the diagnostic condition felt they would have less opportunity to change the evaluations they had received from their fellow ingroup members (M = 4.75, SD = 2.04) than would participants in the nondiagnostic condition (M = 6.14, SD = 1.23), F(1, 132) = 25.27, p < .001, η² = .16.

Unless otherwise indicated, the following measures were analyzed with a 3 (respect) × 2 (diagnosticity of evaluations) analysis of variance (ANOVA).

Affective commitment. The affective commitment scale yielded the predicted main effect of respect. Participants in the high respect condition as well as the average respect condition reported more affective commitment than did participants in the low respect condition, F(2, 132) = 17.92, p < .001, η² = .21 (see Table 4).

Anxiety about acceptance into the group. As predicted, the measure for acceptance anxiety revealed a significant main effect of respect. Participants who had received low respect indicated more anxiety about acceptance by others in the group than did those who had received average respect or high respect, F(2, 132) = 36.33, p < .001, η² = .36 (see Table 4).

Turnover intentions. The analysis of variance on turnover intentions revealed a main effect of respect. Participants in the low respect condition reported higher turnover intentions than did those in the high respect condition and the average respect condition, F(2, 132) = 13.06, p < .001, η² = .17 (see Table 4).

Discretionary group efforts. For the amount of behavioral effort participants exerted on the discretionary group task, a significant interaction effect of overall respect and diagnosticity of evaluations was found, F(2, 132) = 6.59, p < .01, η² = .09 (see Table 5). In line with our predictions, analysis of simple main effects revealed that the effect of respect only had a significant impact on the behavior of participants in the diagnostic condition, F(2, 132) = 6.41, p < .01, η² = .09. When comparing the means of the high respect, average respect, and low respect cells within the diagnostic condition with a Tukey (HSD) test, a significant difference was found between the average respect condition and the low respect condition, p < .05. In addition, a marginally significant difference, p = .08, was found between the average respect condition and the high respect condition (less conservative post hoc tests such as the Least Significant Difference test do show a significant difference). Within the nondiagnostic condition, as predicted, no reliable differences in discretionary group efforts were found as a result of our respect manipulations, F(2, 132) = 2.24, p = .11, η² = .03.

Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations of Discretionary Group Efforts as a Function of Respect and Diagnosticity of Evaluations (Experiment 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnositic</td>
<td>M: 55.46 (SD: 1.51)</td>
<td>M: 48.57 (SD: 1.22)</td>
<td>M: 60.69 (SD: 1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondiagnostic</td>
<td>M: 49.41 (SD: 1.32)</td>
<td>M: 56.61 (SD: 1.51)</td>
<td>M: 52.78 (SD: 1.89)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Simple main effect analyses on discretionary group efforts show significant results only in the “diagnostic” condition. Higher values indicate greater discretionary group efforts. In each row, means that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05 in a Tukey (HSD) test for pairwise comparisons between groups.
Group commitment versus acceptance anxiety as a motive for behavioral effort. In both the high respect condition and the average respect condition, participants showed enhanced levels of affective commitment compared to participants in the low respect condition (see Table 4). To confirm our predictions that when people are respected, engagement in discretionary group efforts depends on feelings of affective commitment, we subjected affective commitment, anxiety about acceptance into the group, and discretionary group efforts to linear regression analyses. Linear regression analyses in the high respect condition and the average respect condition showed the following results: After having received high or average respect, when both affective commitment and acceptance anxiety were entered into the equation, only affective commitment, $R^2 = .08$, $\beta = .25$, $t(2, 90) = 2.48$, $p < .05$, emerged as a significant predictor of discretionary group effort, whereas acceptance anxiety showed no significant relation to the behavioral effort measure, $R^2 = .01$, $\beta = .12$, $t(2, 90) = 1.22$, $p = .23$ (see Figure 1).

As for participants in the low respect condition, they reported more feelings of anxiety about acceptance by others in the group than did participants in both the high respect condition and the average respect condition (see Table 4). To further examine our prediction that when people are disrespected, displays of discretionary group efforts will emerge because of increased levels of anxiety about acceptance by others in the group, we subjected affective commitment, acceptance anxiety, and discretionary group efforts to linear regression analyses. For participants who had received low respect, when both affective commitment and acceptance anxiety were entered into the equation, this time instead of affective commitment, $R^2 = .00$, $\beta = .02$, $t(2, 42) = .15$, $p = .89$, only acceptance anxiety, $R^2 = .09$, $\beta = .31$, $t(2, 42) = 2.03$, $p < .05$, emerged as a significant predictor of discretionary group effort (see Figure 1). Thus, these additional analyses provide further evidence for our reasoning that whereas respected people engage in discretionary group efforts because of their affective commitment to the group, disrespected people engage in similar group supportive behavior because of their anxiety about acceptance of the self into the group.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The results of this second study corroborate our predictions and extend the results of our first study. Participants who had received high or average respect in response to their behavioral descriptions reported more affective commitment to the group than did participants who had received low respect, indicating the operation of group-focused concerns (Branscombe et al., 2002). By contrast, the affordance of disrespect elicited more self-focused concerns. That is, participants who had received low respect reported greater anxiety about the acceptance of the self into the group and indicated more psychological disengagement from the group as expressed in their desire to leave.

Furthermore, in this second study we not only replicated the finding that, compared to average respect, high respect as well as low respect can result in increased displays of discretionary group effort but also demonstrated that the same behavior can be activated by two different motives. That is, whereas respected participants exerted more effort on the discretionary group task as they felt more committed to the task-group, disrespected group members increased their behavioral effort on the group task because they experienced anxiety about being accepted by others in the group. This confirms the validity of our argument that group-focused concerns as well as self-focused concerns can motivate group members to display similar (apparently group-focused) behavior.

Finally, the experimental design we used in Experiment 2 allowed us to be more confident that the behavioral effects we observed can be ascribed to the perception of differential intragroup respect. That is, because we compared the effects of diagnostic versus nondiagnostic evaluations, we were able to exclude the possibility that the mere fact that participants received positive versus negative evaluations caused these effects. Instead, the predicted behavioral effects only emerged when the evaluative judgments participants had received could be seen as diagnostic for their position in the group (cf. Ellemers et al., 2004; Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, & McKimmie, 2003; Jetten et al., 2002; Noel et al., 1995). In the nondiagnostic condition, where the
judgments participants received held no particular predictive value for their position in the group, these judgments did not affect the effort participants displayed on the discretionary group task.

We think that the present research opens up new directions in theory and research on intragroup dynamics. We demonstrated that group-focused concerns (the carrot: group commitment) as well as self-focused concerns (the stick: acceptance anxiety) can elicit behavioral efforts that benefit the group. Of importance, in contrast to previous research on marginal group membership (Jetten et al., 2002; Jetten et al., 2003; Noel et al., 1995), this was done in a task setting where there was no strategic advantage for participants to exert oneself on behalf of the group. That is, in our research, individual efforts were not visible to the group, representing conditions that are conducive to social loafing (cf. Harkins, 1987). Under such individual anonymity, the increased behavioral efforts displayed by highly respected group members can still be explained from the fact that they were committed to the group (Jehn & Shah, 1997; Karau & Williams, 1993). Furthermore, the respect they received from their fellow ingroup members possibly made them feel responsible for obtaining a good collective outcome (cf. social compensation; Williams & Karau, 1991; Williams, Karau, & Bourgeois, 1993).

However, we also observed that disrespected group members increased their discretionary efforts on a task (a) where it would have been easy for them to loaf, (b) without being committed to the group, and (c) when there was no reason to think that the group would depend on them for obtaining a good outcome. We think this finding offers the most novel contribution to the literature in this area. Furthermore, with the task context that we used, we were able to show that where self-focused concerns played a role, the resulting behavior could not help to prove one’s worth to other group members. Instead, the anxiety about one’s acceptance into the group caused people to behave in ways that may help maintain their sense of self-worth. It is in this sense that we feel our research offers a truly novel and different perspective on the importance of intragroup respect for the well-being of individual group members and the functioning of the group.

In addition to the theoretical significance of this research, we think it also has important applied implications, for instance, to understand and predict effortful behavior in organizational contexts. That is, to the extent that theory and research on work motivation have explicitly considered group-based motives (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004), these have mainly focused on the possibility that individual commitment to the organization and its goals can induce individuals to work at organizational goals. The present research suggests that the same behavior may occur for fundamentally different reasons, namely, because people feel disrespected and experience anxiety about their acceptance in the work-team or organization. An important implication thus is that managers cannot simply infer that all is well when workers display efforts that benefit the organization because those who are primarily driven by acceptance anxiety will tend to psychologically disengage from the organization and may prefer to leave.

REFERENCES


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