Summary

Predestination and Preaching in Genevan Theology from Calvin to Pictet

Older research held that the Reformed doctrine of predestination had become a central dogma in theology, dominating all other doctrines. However, recent research on Reformed orthodoxy has concluded that predestination was not the central dogma it was thought to be, for it did not affect the method of theology. The question whether and to what extent this doctrine was important for the content of Reformed theology remained unanswered. The aim of this study is to investigate what the influence of the doctrine of predestination was on the ideas and the practice of preaching in Genevan theology from John Calvin to Benedict Pictet. Genevan theology was chosen for two reasons. First of all, the influence of the Genevan Academy on Reformed churches all over Europe had been very great. Second, from the time of Calvin on, Genevan theologians were forced to think about the relation between predestination and preaching. This relation was chosen as the subject for this study since the conclusion has been drawn at various times that the Reformed doctrine of predestination made a sincere call to salvation of everyone who hears the Gospel impossible.

Chapter 1 presents the state of the question and explains why Genevan theology is appropriate for researching the relation between predestination and preaching. The method is explained in the last section. To see what the Genevan theologians thought about predestination and preaching, it is not sufficient to study their doctrine of predestination and their sermons. We also need to explore their thinking on several other subjects. The relation between predestination and the atonement is important because the answer to the question whether or not Christ died for all people might be decisive for the way predestination affects the administration of the atonement, i.e., the preaching of the Gospel. The covenant and the church are important subjects since the Gospel was preached, at least in Geneva, to the covenant community gathered in the church. It is also necessary to distinguish between the purpose of God and the purpose of the preacher: they might have different purposes with the same invitation of the Gospel. Moreover, to see if and how the doctrine of predestination affects a theologian’s view on preaching the Gospel, one
should investigate his theoretical or doctrinal ideas on how the Gospel ought to be preached, to whom the promises are addressed, and how a believer can be sure of his “calling and election.” Finally, one needs to understand how a theologian or preacher accounted for different responses to the preaching of the Gospel.

Chapter 2 explores John Calvin on this issue. Criticism by Pighius, Bolsec, and Georgius forced Calvin to reflect on the question how invitations and exhortations could be useful if God has already decreed who would believe and who would not. Calvin’s thinking on the covenant proves to be of great importance in understanding the complex relation between predestination and preaching. On the one hand, predestination is an unchangeable, eternal decree of God with respect to salvation and damnation. Salvation is unconditionally decreed for the elect alone, and this can be regarded as a static fact. On the other hand, preaching is an act in time, aimed at the conversion of or change in sinners. So preaching and its aim are not static. In Calvin’s theology, the covenant stands between the preaching of the Gospel and the eternal decree. The covenant is established with believers and their children and consists of more than the elect. Outside of the covenant are those who do not hear the Gospel nor receive the sacraments. God reveals his grace and promises salvation to those inside the circle of the covenant who keep the conditions of the covenant, with faith and repentance as the primary conditions. So, the execution of God’s unconditional decree of salvation is by means of a conditional covenant with an equally conditional promise of salvation. This leaves the reprobate without excuse since they willfully reject the conditions, and the elect are saved because God effectuates faith and repentance in them by his Spirit. God is serious in calling even the reprobate since he does not promise them salvation unconditionally. Faith and repentance are the conditions whereas all people are exhorted to believe and repent.

With respect to the assurance of salvation, Calvin first points to Christ, for assurance is gained by faith in him. Election must serve to strengthen this assurance, seeing that faith does not arise from men but from God’s immutable decree. Calvin ascribes the response to preaching to God: God grants faith and repentance to the elect. Calvin is ambivalent about the reprobate. On the one hand, he vehemently denies that his doctrine of predestination makes God the author of sin and unbelief, but, on the other hand, he does state that reprobation was a cause of sin and unbelief.

Predestination should be preached, according to Calvin. In his sermons, he discusses this doctrine almost only when the text compels him
to do so. This was also the case with other doctrines or subjects. For instance, Christ is hardly mentioned in the series of sermons on Micah, where Calvin found no basis in the text for mentioning him.

Chapter 3 presents the thinking of Theodore Beza and the developments in his ideas. Beza's development as a systematic theologian was ignited by the Bolsec controversy on predestination. Although his first theological tract, the *Summa totius christianismi*, is devoted to predestination, the conclusion of earlier research that Beza's theology was a predestinarian system is unfounded. Even the claim that this work is an example of scholastic theology is not true, given that characteristic scholastic elements are absent. Beza was even averse to the use of reason in theology in this time. He began to use reason and scholastic instruments in his refutation of Castellio, due to the influence of Peter Martyr Vermigli. It seems that reading Vermigli was decisive in Beza's adoption of scholastic theology.

Beza's doctrine of predestination is, in general, the same as Calvin's, but there are differences on some details. Characteristic of Beza is his use of Bullinger's distinction between the eternal purpose (*propositum*) to elect and to reprobate on the one hand and the acts of election and reprobation themselves (*electio/reprobatio ipsa*) in time on the other. Beza's thinking underwent some development with respect to the relation between reprobation and unbelief. If the younger Beza stated with Calvin the notion that God was a cause of sin, though not the author of sin (ca. 1551), these ideas began to change when he answered Castellio (1558), a change that culminated in a short comment in his *Cours* (1564-65) that God's decree is not a cause, but ordains causes. Beza also changed his views of the cause of God's hatred. In the *Brevis explicatio* he states that God hated freely, without cause but in later works nuances this to state that God freely, without cause, predestined some people to righteous hatred because of sin.

Beza's most obvious deviation from Calvin concerns his ideas on the extent of the atonement. If Calvin, despite some critical remarks, never rejected the notion that Christ died sufficiently for all, Beza seems to have always restricted the extent of the atonement to the elect, except in his *Theses* (1586), on which he collaborated with Fayus. Beza was very explicit in his remarks at the Montbéliard Colloquy in 1588 when he denied that Christ died for all, either sufficiently or efficiently.

Other developments can be seen in Beza's notion about Christ as subordinated to the decree and in the relation between election and the covenant. Although Beza's thinking on this relation is difficult to trace, it seems that Beza moved towards the view that only the elect are members
of the covenant. Finally, Beza’s notion that a believer can be assured of salvation by recognizing faith and sanctification within himself differs from Calvin’s view here.

Despite these differences between Calvin and Beza, however, they did not differ on the immediate relation between predestination and the call. Predestination did not prevent them from calling all who heard their sermons to repentance and faith. The Gospel was preached to all, even if God only intended salvation for the elect. Faith in Christ was demanded as a condition for actual salvation, and this faith was given by God to his elect. Like Calvin, Beza uses the concept of conditionality but less explicitly. I argue that there is more continuity between the theologies of Calvin and Beza than discontinuity. Most of the differences between Beza and Calvin are a development of the same basic ideas, rather than a departure from basic ideas.

Beza’s sermons are consistent with and cohere with his systematic theology. Predestination is neither dominant nor absent in the sermons studied. He usually mentions it only when the text gives occasion to do so, and he usually introduces the doctrine of election to comfort his congregation and sometimes to make them humble. Beza rarely gives a more doctrinal treatment of election in a sermon. He addresses his congregation in a way similar to Calvin. Beza’s view of faith as a condition stressed the necessity of personal faith to be saved. The greatest difference between Calvin’s sermons and those of Beza is that Beza does not use phrases such as Christ died for all or for the world, as Calvin did. But it is not likely that his congregation noticed this difference since Beza addressed them in the first-person plural. Hence, the development in Beza’s thinking on the atonement had no practical consequences for those who heard him preach. Predestination and the call were closely related. The external call belongs to the implementation in time of God’s eternal decree. Nevertheless, it is not dominated by predestination, neither in its address nor in its content. The external call to eternal life is addressed to all who hear it, and its content is the complete message of Scripture, of which predestination is only a part.

Chapter 4 deals with the ideas of the Genevan delegates to the Synod of Dordt. Tronchin and Diodati were both students of Beza. They did not leave behind any systematic works or any sermons, so their thinking must be inferred primarily from their judgment of the articles submitted by the Remonstrants. On election as the source of all grace and salvation, there is no difference between the two delegates at Dordt and their predecessors in Geneva, nor with the Canons. There are some differences on
other points, however. They do not mention Beza’s distinction between the purpose to elect or reprobate on the one hand and election and reprobation itself on the other and seem to have applied Beza’s theses on election and reprobation (in time) to the eternal decree of predestination. This is the most important shift between Beza and his successors with respect to predestination. Related to this shift is the move from Beza’s supralapsarianism to the infralapsarianism of his students. With respect to the extent of the atonement, Diodati and Tronchin follow Beza and maintain that Christ died with the intention to save only the elect. The Canons did not use the exact classic formula on the extent of the atonement either, avoiding the suggestion that God or Christ intended to save all people, despite the fact that many delegates had no objections to the classic formula nor questioned its orthodoxy.

As far as predestination is concerned there is great harmony and continuity between Beza, the Genevan delegates, and the Canons of Dordt. There is also agreement and continuity between Beza and his successors on the extent of the atonement but less agreement with – let alone influence on – many other Reformed theologians. In the landscape of early 17th-century Reformed theology, Geneva did not take an extreme position. Rather, Genevan theology took a middle position between strict supralapsarian positions and the forerunners of hypothetical universalism.

Chapter 5 looks at the views of Francis Turretin who was more detailed and technical than his predecessors. The growing influence of the teachings of Saumur in Geneva led him to reject them in both the Formula and in his Institutes, but whether this affected only the amount of words spent on them or also their quality or content as well is uncertain. His Institutes presents the different doctrines in their mutual relationships, a development often forced by the criticism of their opponents. That predestination became intertwined in many Reformed doctrines was not the result of it being an inner principle or central dogma of Reformed theology but the result of ongoing criticism of the Reformed doctrine of predestination by Romanists, Socinians, Lutherans, Remonstrants, and Amyraldists. Nevertheless, Turretin’s theology is not a predestinarian system. The doctrine of predestination was related to other doctrines but does not swallow them up. Even when Turretin asserts that the essence of the covenant was made with the elect only, it remains a true bilateral covenant with serious conditions and promises. The nature of the covenant was not affected by predestination. And even when Turretin asserts that, in the external call of the Gospel, God only intends the salvation of the elect, it is still a serious call to all who hear the Gospel.
Turretin agrees with Calvin, Beza, and the delegates to Dordt on the *praedestinatio gemina* as an unchangeable and eternal decree of God. Scholastic distinctions between kinds of necessity and causality enable him to explain that God is not the cause of sin or unbelief, even if sin and unbelief are included in his decree. There is continuity with Beza here, and with Calvin in the same way that there is continuity between Calvin and Beza. With respect to the order of the decrees, Turretin is a firm defender of what is called infralapsarianism, although he did not call himself an infralapsarian. His definition of infralapsarianism is more in line with what is now commonly called postredemptionism, while he called his own position ‘inlapsarism’. In this choice, he deviated from Beza and chose the line of Tronchin and Diodati.

The doctrine of the covenant is an important element in Turretin’s theology. Various subjects come together and are intertwined with each other in this doctrine, such as God’s decrees (predestination), soteriology (the atonement, the call), and ecclesiology. According to Turretin, the covenant is essentially established with elect believers. But the covenant is administered to more people than true believers. Turretin traces the covenant of grace back to an eternal pact between God the Father and God the Son. This was absent or at least undeveloped in the theology of his Genevan predecessors. According to Turretin, the covenant of grace was in essence unconditional, since the fulfillment of the conditions in the elect is part of the promises of the covenant. Only the administration of the covenant is conditional, not its essence. Turretin’s doctrine of the church agrees with his doctrine of the covenant. The visible church consists of various people, in accord with the administration of the covenant, but the invisible church consists of the elect believers only, in accord with the essence of the covenant.

Like the later Beza, Turretin held that redemption in Christ was particular, i.e., that Christ died with the intention to save the elect only, even if the value of his sacrifice was great enough to save the whole world. Nevertheless, Turretin could use the classic formula that Christ had died sufficiently for the whole world since he understood this phrase as referring to the worth of Christ’s death. This seems to be a new interpretation of the classic formula rather than its classic interpretation.

Faith is connected to election because faith is a gift of God given to the elect. Predestination had some influence on Turretin’s views of the object of faith. He denies that the object of faith was “Christ died for me,” as Calvin had said. Since Christ intended his sacrifice for the elect only, according to Turretin, not everyone can be urged to believe that Christ died for him. Predestination influenced his view of the object of faith by
means of the doctrine of the atonement in the same way that predestina-
tion affected Turretin’s view of the nature of faith. If not all can be urged
to believe that Christ has died for them, how can the assurance of salva-
tion be essential to faith? Turretin had a difficult job in showing how this
is consistent. He manages to do so by distinguishing several acts within
the act of faith and saying those who do not believe at this time are
exhorted to perform the first acts (knowledge, assent, and fleeing to
Christ), but only then to the last act, viz. the reflexive act of assurance.

Turretin agrees with his predecessors that only the elect will, by God’s
grace, give a positive response to preaching. Like Calvin, he solves the
problem of God’s sincerity in calling the reprobate to salvation via the
concept of conditionality: God calls all who hear the Gospel, elect and
reprobate, to faith and repentance and thus to salvation. This condition-
ality does not stand in the way of exhortations and the invitation to
believe, but supports them. The promises of salvation are unconditional
for the members of the covenant since God effectuates the condition in
them. But they are offered to the whole congregation and to whoever
hears the Gospel, in a conditional way, i.e., whoever repents and believes,
will be saved. Although there is a difference with Calvin on the extent
of the covenant, Turretin and Calvin do agree on the practice of applying
the promises. The condition is not meritorious, but it is a hypothetical
condition or cause according to God’s ordination. Like Calvin, Turretin
stresses the necessity of the knowledge of one’s own misery. It appears
that he did not regard it as a condition prior to one being called to believe
but a knowledge accompanying or flowing from the first acts of faith.
God brings about faith and repentance in his elect; the purpose of preach-
ing is their salvation. God will not bring about this faith and repentance
in the reprobate,; the purpose of preaching for them is to render them
inexcusable. But there is not one message for the elect and a different one
for the reprobate. Despite knowing that there is a decree of predestina-
tion, a preacher does not know who is elect and who is reprobate. He is
obliged to strive for the salvation of all who hear him preach.

Turretin’s sermons are consistent with and cohere with his doctrinal
views. He preached predestination and related themes almost the same way
he had taught them. Turretin’s message was the explanation of the text, but
he approached it in a more systematic-theological way than an exegetical
one. This might have been caused by or a cause for abandoning the lectio
continua; the least we can say is these two changes coincided. One conse-
quence of this was that a text was more often related to doctrinal subjects.
Turretin usually addressed his congregation as elect believers, in the
first-person plural, as Calvin and Beza did, or as “brothers,” but not always.
Even if Turretin addresses the subject of predestination more often than Calvin and Beza did, his sermons were not dominated by this doctrine. He extends the call of the Gospel to all who heard him, elect of reprobate, godly or ungodly. Yet while Calvin and Beza addressed the congregation as “we,” when a text spoke to the godly or to the ungodly with respect to the promises or the warnings of the Bible, Turretin restricts the use of “we” to the godly and the promises. As with Calvin and Beza, an answer to the question whether or not predestination influenced the theory and practice of the call of the Gospel in preaching should be nuanced. Predestination and vocation were closely related in Turretin’s theology. The call belongs to the execution in time of God’s eternal decree. The call is election in time and election is the eternal call. Nevertheless, the external call is not dominated by predestination, neither in its address nor in its content.

Chapter 6 presents the views of Benedict Pictet. After Francis Turretin’s death, the theological climate in Geneva changed in favor of a moderate and enlightened orthodoxy. The Canons of Dordt and the Formula Con- sensus were abrogated, and Francis’s son Jean-Alphonse almost ignored the doctrine of predestination. Pictet, who himself defended these writings, had to find his way in this changing climate. His statement that he wrote his Theologia Christiana as a didactic addition to Turretin’s Institutes makes it difficult to evaluate the differences between the two, for it is not always clear whether differences in their works really reflect differences in their views. There is a difference with respect to the technical level of the two works. Pictet’s Theologia Christiana is less technical and less detailed. But Pictet was a defender of Reformed theology as propagated by his predecessors insofar as it concerns the content of theology.

Pictet intertwined predestination less explicitly with other doctrines, but at several points he clearly agrees with Turretin or presupposes Turretin’s position. The quantitative ambivalence in dealing with predestination in relation to other doctrines corresponds to Pictet’s ambivalence in relation to the value of the doctrine of predestination and related doctrines. On the one hand, he defended the Formula Consensus, which did not tolerate Salmurian theology, while, on the other hand, he himself wrote a book in which he pleaded for tolerance of Lutheran theology, even if Lutherans held ideas that were rejected in the Formula Consensus. This ambivalence is best explained by the hypothesis that he accepted the doctrine as formulated in the Canons of Dordt and in the Formula Con- sensus as true and as the best expression of the biblical teaching on this matter but did not deem this doctrine to be so fundamental as to prevent
union with Lutherans. Pictet worked and preached in a time in which Genevan orthodoxy was declining. Most of his colleagues were less orthodox than he was. Pictet himself held to the old doctrines concerning predestination, while his colleagues were more indifferent. He did not have the support to argue against the majority of his colleagues. Regarding the content of Pictet's doctrine of predestination, there is no difference between Turretin and himself. Yet it is paradoxical that this unity in doctrine was accompanied by a very different estimation of the value and importance of the doctrine. It had been fundamental to Turretin, but not to Pictet.

Pictet does not devote a separate book to the doctrine of the covenant in his *Theologia*. Looking at all his remarks on this subject as a whole, he again turns out to agree with Turretin, though at first sight, his *Theologia* gives another impression. Just as with the doctrine of predestination, complete agreement concerning the content of the doctrine of the covenant is accompanied by a different estimation of its value and importance. With respect to the church, Pictet was more explicit in relating it to the doctrine of election. Only the elect believers are true members of the church.

With respect to the doctrine of the atonement, there is a similar pattern to that found in his treatment of the doctrine of the covenant: It turns out again that Pictet agrees with Turretin, although his *Theologia* gives another impression. Pictet does not devote a separate chapter to the issue of the extent of the atonement. He does not explicitly state that Christ died for the elect but for “humankind.” His view of the doctrine of particular redemption can only be inferred from remarks on Christ’s intercession as having the same extent as his sacrifice, viz. those who are given to Christ by the Father. Again, it seems that Pictet agrees with Turretin on the content of this doctrine but gives it a different place in the hierarchy of doctrines.

Faith is connected to election because God gives the elect the ability to believe. Pictet agrees with Turretin that “Christ died for me” is the not object of faith, but argues that one can believe that Christ died for him only after one has detected the first acts of faith within him, and not immediately. This presupposes particular redemption, but Pictet does not mention this. Concerning the nature of faith, Pictet even argues that the assurance that Christ died for me is not part of the essence of faith.

There is no conscious reflection on the question of predestination and the general call of the Gospel in Pictet’s works and no section on conditionality. Again, looking at data from several chapters, it turns out that Pictet agrees with Turretin on this subject. He does not stress the necessity of
knowing one’s misery, as his predecessors had done, although he does mention it.

The historical context was important for the way Pictet dealt with the doctrine of predestination. In agreement himself with the staunch Reformed doctrines of Turretin, he had to cooperate with more moderate colleagues who did not preach or teach predestination. Pictet’s theology is ambivalent, and as such it is an example of Reformed theology between strict orthodoxy and enlightened orthodoxy.

Pictet’s sermons are consistent with his theology of predestination, the church, and the call. When he does mention predestination in his sermons, he maintains the Genevan doctrine of his predecessors. A conditional structure is less apparent in Pictet’s sermons, just as it was in his theology. The person of Christ as the object of faith is given a larger place than in the sermons of his predecessors. Pictet also appears to be more eager to preach the Gospel to all people, even to the heathen.

Pictet addresses the congregation in a way similar to Calvin, who addressed both the promises and warnings of the Bible to the whole congregation. Pictet was very critical of his congregation. Although comments on the (great) number of hypocrites and unbelievers within the congregation were usual in Geneva, they appear more frequently in Pictet’s sermons than in the sermons of his predecessors. Although he usually addresses them as believers, he was convinced that only a small number of those who heard him were actually true believers. Pictet also addresses a new group among his hearers: those who said they would like to believe the Gospel.

As in the chapters on Calvin, Beza and Turretin, we can again conclude that, though predestination and the call are closely related in Pictet’s theology, the doctrine does not dominate his sermons or his ideas on the external call. Pictet showed himself even more eager than his predecessors to have the Gospel preached to all nations, including the heathen, and, more than his predecessors’, his sermons do address Christ as the object of faith.

Chapter 7 presents our synthesis and conclusions. Although there were several developments, in general, one can conclude that there is continuity in the ideas concerning predestination and preaching from Calvin to Pictet. All the theologians investigated here hold to a *predestinatio gemina* as well as an indiscriminate exhortation to repentance and faith in Christ and thus to salvation. All agree that predestination should be preached. Predestination does not have a central place in Genevan systematic theology nor in Genevan sermons, but the Genevan theologians were not silent on this doctrine either.
Differences with respect to the relation between reprobation and unbelief and that between predestination and the atonement might be regarded as further developments of a basic idea. There are real differences on the relation between election and the covenant, the order of the decrees, and the definition of the faith people are called to.

The influence of predestination on preaching is sometimes mutual. That there is a relation between predestination and preaching in Genevan theology from Calvin to Pictet is undeniable. But this relation emerged in different forms at different levels. At the doctrinal level, eternal predestination precedes the call and its effects. The external call is a means for the execution of election and reprobation. For Calvin, however, the experience with the external call was one of the reasons that inspired the development of his ideas on predestination. Also for his successors, the relation between predestination and the external call was not unidirectional. That predestination precedes the call seems to imply a higher status for predestination in Genevan Reformed theology or even that it dominates the calling. But preaching cannot be reduced to being nothing more than an execution of the decree of predestination.

Over the course of time, the relationship between doctrinal loci was examined, hence also the relation between predestination and other doctrines. This concerned the reciprocal relation between doctrines and not the subordination of some doctrines to others. That predestination, due to this development, appears in more loci than before is not a convincing argument for the domination or centrality of predestination, for other doctrines also appear in more loci than before. With respect to the church, this development meant that election was linked to the invisible church of true believers. The latter concept was not a result of the doctrine of election. With respect to the covenant, this resulted in the conclusion by Beza, Turretin, and Pictet that it was established with true believers or the invisible church, in contrast to Calvin who held that it was established with all who belonged to the visible church. That the covenant was restricted by Beza and his successors to true believers, who are elect, does not necessarily mean that predestination became the dominant doctrine. When the relation between election and covenant changed in Genevan theology, the relation between election and the church remained the same, which in effect means that the practice remained the same. The distinction among various circles remained the same, only the names given to the various circles regarding the covenant changed.

With respect to the external call, Genevan theologians were urged by their critics to reflect on the calling of the reprobate and on the question how God can seriously call them to salvation when he had decreed to
deny them salvation. Calvin and Turretin used the concept of conditionality to unravel this knot. God does not promise salvation to everybody but only to those who believe, and he delights in those who obey his command to believe in Christ and to repent. In this way, they could maintain both a general call to salvation for all who hear the preaching of the Gospel and the view of eternal predestination and sovereign grace as the only causes of salvation. Beza, the Canons of Dordt, and Pictet do not explicitly relate the concept of conditionality to the question of the call to the reprobate, but the concept itself is discernable in their works.

When it comes to the content of preaching or the external call, Genevan preachers from Calvin to Pictet agree that predestination should not dominate. The content of Scripture should be the content of sermons, and predestination and other doctrines are treated in their sermons as well insofar as the text gave occasion to mention or explain them. The external call was not restricted to the elect, for the preacher does not know who the elect are. They all agree on their duty to work for the salvation of all who hear them. The promise of salvation is restricted to believers, but nobody was excluded from the invitation to believe with the promise of salvation attached.

Historical developments were important in some periods. Calvin’s view of predestination was formed and articulated more extensively due to the attacks of opponents outside (Pighius) and in Geneva (Bolsec) and due to his work with Scripture (his commentary on Romans). But there are no real turning points in his development in which he abandons some ideas for others; rather, he elaborates on former ideas. We can see a development in Beza in which he actually changed his mind and developed a more scholastic method of theology. This is related to the question whether or not reprobation can be called a cause of sin and unbelief, a question that Calvin and the younger Beza affirmed. Due to the attacks on this statement by Castellio and due to his reading of Vermigli, Beza abandoned the idea that God is the cause of sin and at the same time adopted a more scholastic approach. The controversy in The Netherlands between Arminians and Gomarists was an occasion for further reflection in the early 17th century, especially for the Genevan delegates Diodati and Tronchin. The rise of Amyraldism was such an occasion for Turretin, and the knowledge of and indifference toward other religions was such for Pictet.

Briefly summarized, an overarching conclusion of this study is that predestination and the external call were inseparably connected in Genevan theology from Calvin to Pictet, but the doctrine of predestination neither dominated the content nor restricted the address of the external call.