CHAPTER 3

Theorizing the changing character of EU military operations

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have reviewed the notion of Normative Power that is central to the discussion about the EU as an international security actor. It has shown that several studies implicitly or explicitly engage in an assessment of the EU’s “normative” foreign policy identity by an assessment of the EU’s military operations. The different conclusions that are drawn suggest that there may be variation among the EU’s military operations. Moreover, the different assessments of the same military operation point out the need for a common set of indicators that is able to capture the different dimensions of the EU’s “normative” foreign policy identity.

These findings suggest that to come to any discriminatory assessment of the CSDP, greater analytical precision on both accounts is needed. On the one hand, rather than looking at the CSDP as a whole, it is desirable to unpack it and to look more closely at the different military operations, to assess whether they come closer to a realist or normative power profile. Even if it has been maintained that the military missions would do irreparable harm to the EU’s “normative” identity (Manners 2006a/b), there is so far no conclusive empirical evidence on how they have actually affected the character of the EU as an international security actor. To advance this debate, this chapter sets out to do three things.

First, the chapter aims to conceptualize the outcome of interest: the character of the EU’s military operations as reflecting of the EU’s foreign policy identity. It builds upon the three dimensions that I identified for assessing the EU’s character as a security actor in the previous chapter: justification, policy embeddedness and authorization. While these dimensions are not exhaustive, they do capture essential procedural and substantive aspects of a normative power. Moreover, they lend themselves for an empirical analysis of the EU’s normative power as a security actor.

Second, the chapter provides a theoretical framework for assessing the nature of the EU as a security actor. Since the launch of a military operation is the product of a decision-making process that involves a great number of actors (both Member States and EU institutions), the EU cannot be treated as a unitary actor. To grasp the interaction between the different actors involved, the framework I propose draws on the advocacy coalition approach (ACF) developed by Paul Sabatier (1988; 1998). Drawing on some key issues of contention, I submit that there are four main advocacy coalitions that can be identified in CSDP: Global Power EU, Euro-Atlanticists, Human Security Europe and the Bystanders.

Third, while the advocacy coalition framework allows me to decipher the political dynamics involved, as a final step the chapter specifies the underlying mechanisms of the changing character of the EU’s military operations (as we will see in chapter 4). For this purpose, the notions of policy change that are already inherent in ACF are embedded in the wider institutionalist literature on mechanisms of policy change.

3.2 Conceptualizing the character of EU military operations

To assess the character of EU military operations, I identify three salient dimensions of the debate on the EU’s use of military force (see section 2.2.2). The first one focuses on the grounds on which operations are justified, i.e. for what purposes are military operations launched (Section 3.2.1)? The second dimension concerns the policy-embeddedness of the operation, i.e. (how) is the use of military means coordinated with the employment of other foreign policy instruments (Section 3.2.2)? The third dimension refers to the political authorization of the use of military force, i.e. is UN-authorization a necessary or sufficient condition for the launch of
of EU military operations (Section 3.2.3)? Taken together these dimensions yield four ideal-typical characterizations of military operations that reflect a wider foreign policy identity (Section 3.2.4).

3.2.1 Justification: purpose and targets
The first dimension to assess the character of EU military operations relates to the logic of justification, i.e. the purpose and kinds of reasons that serve to justify the deployment of a military operation. This is a key issue that distinguishes the proponents of Normative Power Europe from a realist understanding of the international identity of the EU.

Following Lerch and Schwellnus (2006), I distinguish between a utility-based and a value-based justification. A utility-based justification indicates that a military operation aims to serve narrowly defined material interests of the EU member states, like economic interests (i.e. protecting trade routes) and geopolitical security (e.g. toppling unfriendly regimes). This is the kind of arguments that one would expect if the EU were to operate as a realist actor in international politics. In contrast, a value-based justification would imply that operations are motivated by the aim to protect civilians, which generally involves bringing stability and the promotion of the administration of human rights and the rule of law. Such considerations would be fully in line with the human security-oriented understanding of Normative Power Europe.26 Specific objectives aimed at protecting individuals include the creation and protection of safe havens, the protection of convoys delivering humanitarian assistance, disarmament and demobilization, providing a secure environment for elections, or for the return of refugees and displaced persons (Glasius and Kaldor 2006: 12).

This distinction puts the empirical focus on the objectives that are publicly communicated as motivating the initiation of a military mission. Such an approach assumes that the ways in which these objectives are phrased and the way in which the military operation is justified are not “just words”, even if it does not necessarily take the formally expressed objectives of the operations to comprehensively reflect the motivations of the actors involved. Norms exert causal power by enabling and restraining appropriate policy options (Geis and Müller 2013. See also: Sjursen 2002; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Orbie 2009). As such, cheap talk is not without consequences (Schörnig, Müller and Geis 2013). At the same time such statements should not be taken at “face value.” Hence, an assessment of formal statement of purpose should always be embedded within a broader analysis that includes more elements to assess the character of military operations.

Obviously, in practice, the stated objectives of military operations may well contain both utility-based and value-based considerations (Aggestam 2008; Raik 2012). Still, it is possible to separate these arguments analytically. In particular, we can evaluate whether “human security” concerns are also promoted in cases where they conflict with specific material interests of the EU or have to give way to them (Börzel and Risse 2009). From a value-based perspective, utility-based considerations need not necessarily be absent altogether. However, they should not overrule normative concerns when the two collide.

3.2.2 Policy embeddedness: institutional, discursive and financial
The second dimension of the character of military operations regards their relationship with other EU foreign policy instruments, in short their policy embeddedness. Policy embeddedness can be defined as the extent to which an EU military operation fits with the EU’s overall foreign policy involvement with a particular country. In addition to the deployment of military operations, such involvement may for instance include the following instruments: economic instruments (i.e. trade agreements and development aid) and diplomatic instruments (i.e. political dialogues, high-level visits, making peace proposals, sending cease-fire monitors and offering EU membership) (cf. Smith 2008: 62/63).

In general terms, the issue of policy embeddedness has undeniably been receiving increasing attention in EU security circles. In particular, there has been much talk about what has been called the EU’s “comprehensive approach” to external conflict and crises, which aims to ensure maximal consistency and complementarity in the EU’s engagement with countries and regions elsewhere in the world (e.g. COM/HR 2013). In the wake of this policy debate there is also an emerging literature on the way that the EU’s military operations are related to other foreign policy instruments. Notable examples are Koutrakos’ (2013) legal analysis of CSDP and the study by Orbie and Del Biondo (2015) on Chad.

High policy embeddedness means that the EU military operation is complementary to, and in support of, the EU’s overall foreign policy involvement with the country concerned. Low policy embeddedness indicates a military operation that is dominant, crowding out other EU foreign policy instruments. It refers to a situation of (institutional) prioritization of military structures and means (Manners 2006a: 189). For example, a situation in which the European Commission is asked to adjust its programmes to be in line with the goals of the military operations is seen as evidence of low policy embeddedness. In contrast, a situation in which an EU Special Representative is mandated to coordinate and give political guidance to the EU’s foreign policy as a whole in the particular country concerned, including the

26 On the relationship between human security and Normative Power, see section 2.3.1.
military operation, indicates a higher level of policy-embeddedness. To the extent that EU military operations are indeed effectively embedded in a broader foreign policy strategy, this gives credence to the position of “comprehensive NPE.” In contrast, if the military operations are rather organized in isolation or even crowd out other non-military policy means this rather feeds into a more realist understanding of the EU as an international actor.

In operational terms, we seek to establish policy embeddedness in three domains, which we assume to point in the same direction, i.e. they form a factor. First, the institutional embeddedness concerns the formal organisation of the military operation. This relates to the way the relations between Commission-instruments, civilian CSDP and the military operation are defined. Also the strength of the EU Special Representative, representing “civilian control” on the ground, vis-à-vis the Operation Commander serves as an indicator for higher policy embeddedness.27 In contrast, references that the Commission (which is in charge of development programmes and humanitarian aid) or a civilian CSDP-mission has to follow, or contribute to, the military operation indicate a low institutional embeddedness.

Second, the discursive embeddedness of the military operation captures the way the operation is presented. Statements that the military operation is at the centre of the EU’s foreign policy involvement score low on discursive embeddedness. In contrast, references that emphasize the complementarity of a military operation and the importance to deal with the “root causes” of conflict score high on discursive embeddedness. Finally, references to an overarching strategy which locate the military operation within a broader framework are taken as positive evidence of discursive embeddedness.

Third, financial embeddedness of the military operation considers the costs of the military operation and whether and how they affect the available non-military budgets. Essentially, when the military operation leads to a crowding out of other EU foreign policy instruments and the resources available for them, this points to a militarization of the EU’s engagement. Yet, this indicator comes with two caveats. First, formally the budget for military operations is outside the EU’s foreign policy budget. As such, it cannot be embedded in a literal sense. However, when no explicit provision is made, EU budgets may well be subject to indirect militarization. EU development aid may, for instance, be pressed to be spend more on security related policy areas than on what would be its priorities if it were motivated solely by considerations of development. Concretely, money from the Instrument for Stability does not come at the cost of the general development fund, while the African Peace Facility (APF) does (Del Biondo et al. 2013). Thus increases in the APF budget may point at a process of militarization. Second, this indicator certainly does not involve a simple comparison of the military budget with the spending on non-military instruments. Compared to a military operation, many non-military programmes (e.g. certain democracy programmes and/or supporting initiatives from civil society) do not demand large budgets in the first place. Nevertheless, as a complement to the two previous indicators, the total sums that are spend and, even more so, changes in non-military spending may provide useful clues on the extent to which EU military operations are invasive of, or complementary to, other EU foreign policy instruments.

3.2.3 Political authorization of the military operation
The third dimension to assess the character of military operations is the external political authorization by the UN. UN-authorization is deemed crucial to prevent that countries themselves act as arbiters. As such, the UN acts as a “gatekeeper” for legitimate interventions (Coleman 2007). Moreover, the UNSC is taken to be the best proxy for universal legal principles that transcend a self-interested intervention of a particular (group of) states (Farer 2003). Hence, UNSC-authorization is central to the external and internal justification of a military intervention (Coleman 2007). Once it has been secured, it raises the bar to oppose military intervention in both the country of intervention as well as among critical domestic forces in the countries willing to intervene.

The discussion about UN-authorization has to be understood against the backdrop of a more fundamental debate about legitimacy and legality (see Armstrong et al. 2005; Falk et al. 2012; Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003). Ideally a military intervention is both legitimate and legal. However, the two may point in different directions - while an illegal intervention may be legitimate, a legal operation may be illegitimate. An example of the former is the Kosovo-intervention (1999) which, though lacking a mandate, was nevertheless seen as legitimate by the International Independent Commission on Kosovo (IICK 2000).28 At the same time, the UN has often been criticized for its failure to act (e.g. Barnett 2003; Buchanan and Keohane 2011; Critchlow 2008). This critique...

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27 EUSR’s have been present in most countries in which the EU became militarily involved. The only “exception” to this is Chad/CAR. Yet, there has been an EUSR for Sudan. Since EUFOR Chad clearly related to the conflict in Sudan, and is even referred to in the documents on as EUFOR Chad/CAR (Council of the European Union 2007b), the role of the EUSR for Sudan will be taken into account when assessing institutional embeddedness in this case. In the case of EUTM Mali, the EUSR for the Sahel is considered. For EUNAVFOR Med and EUFOR/EUMAM RCA there is no relevant EUSR.

28 Permanent UNSC-members Russia and China opposed this military intervention. Moreover, in academic circles, the intervention was fiercely criticized by Chomsky (1999). The resolution from Russia (with Belarus and India) to condemn the NATO-intervention did not receive sufficient support. Only China, Namibia, and Russia voted in favour; the other 12 UNSC members voted against (with no abstentions).
refers to the fact that the UNSC is not free from power politics (see Hurrell 2005); there are violent situations in which there are legitimate reasons for intervening, which lack UN-authorization because they are blocked by (one of) the veto powers. In short, both the presence and absence of a UNSC-mandate are not self-evident.

Building upon Matlary (2004; 2006) we can distinguish between three positions concerning the absence and presence of a UN mandate. First, a mandate is neither necessary nor sufficient for a military intervention, and neither is the absence of a mandate for refraining from action. This is a power based, instrumental view of UN-authorization. Second, a procedural, legalistic view of UN-authorization sees UN-authorization as necessary (though not sufficient), i.e. no military action without UN-authorization. Moreover, there is no duty to act once there is a UN mandate. So, the absence of a mandate is sufficient for non-action (though not necessary). Third, from a human security perspective, which fits with a NPE-identity, a UN mandate that upholds the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) entails a duty to act. In this view R2P is not optional or an entitlement that can be enacted selectively. This prioritization of human security also means that it does not categorically exclude the legitimacy of military action in the absence of UN-authorization. Though UN-authorization is highly valued (this needs emphasis), the legitimacy of military interventions is not restricted to UN-authorization – a key distinction with the previous position.

### 3.2.4 A typology of military operations

The three dimensions discussed above allow us to develop a typology of EU military operations that can be connected to the main international power identities and does justice to the internal tension in NPE concerning the use of military force.

The combination of the first two dimensions (justification and policy-embeddedness) yield a two-by-two typology of military operations. The third dimension, political authorization, fits neatly with this categorization, but does not allow us to distinguish between the two Normative Power-identities. On the justification dimension, the typology opposes operations that are primarily value-based to those in which utility-based considerations are dominant. In terms of policy-embeddedness, the three indicators are used to distinguish well-embedded military operations, from military operations that are not well embedded in the EU’s foreign policy.

Thus four types of operations can be distinguished, two of which can be regarded as relying on an understanding of the EU as a normative power and two others that rather suggest the EU to be a liberal power or a realist power.

### Table 3.1 Typology of the character of military operations

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<tr>
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<th>High policy-embeddedness</th>
<th>Low policy-embeddedness</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Value-based</strong> justification</td>
<td>Comprehensive NPE</td>
<td>Interventionist NPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utility-based</strong> justification</td>
<td>UN-authorization sufficient and quasi-necessary (neither necessary nor sufficient for inaction)</td>
<td>UN-authorization is neither necessary nor sufficient (same for inaction)</td>
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The notion of Normative Power was already introduced in the previous chapter. Central to the concept of Normative Power is “the ability to shape conceptions of what is normal” and “living by example” (Manners 2002: 239). Contrary to notions of power that focus on empirical capabilities, like economic and military power, normative power draws attention to a more subtle form of power, namely the power of ideas. The emphasis of normative power on the power of ideas suggests that the material structures and incentives resulting from an anarchical state system are not all-determining and that other factors than material incentives play a role in conditioning the actions of international actors. Hence, actors have a choice to act on the basis of certain normative principles, which is a different kind of motivation than material self-interest and economic incentives.

These general premises are shared across the Normative Power-school. However, there are differences concerning the compatibility of the use of military means with a normative power as they differ in their emphasis on means and ends. To some scholars military force may add to the EU’s normative power, allowing the EU to stand for its values (Stavridis 2001; Sjursen 2004; 2006; Börzel and Risse 2009; Juncos 2012a; Björkdahl 2012), while others claim that military instruments are invasive to the character of the EU’s foreign policy (Manners 2006a/b; Smith 2005).

I propose to distinguish between three positions within the Normative Power School: pacifist, interventionist and comprehensive NPE. As the Pacifist NPE position excludes any kind of military action as a matter of principle, it has lost its relevance for the EU now it systematically employs military missions. The main

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29 Another factor, beyond the scope of this dissertation, contributing to the UN’s failure to act is the (weak) ability to implement. As the case of Rwanda (1994) tragically shows, a mandate is not self-executing and requires troop contributions of the (member) states. Although the Council agreed upon a Chapter VII mandate and authorized 5,500 troops (UNDPI 1996: 282), Western countries were still unwilling to contribute, physically or monetarily (Melvern 2000: 198; UNDP 1996: 122).

30 A more rough distinction is made by Palm (2014) who labels the opposing positions “anti-military NPE” and “pro-military NPE.”
opposition within the NPE debate that remains is that between Interventionist NPE and Comprehensive NPE. While both positions justify operations in value-based terms and view UN mandates in line with human security as obligatory, they differ in their assessment of the way the military instrument relates to other foreign policy instruments. A Comprehensive NPE position would aspire EU military operations to be in line with, reinforcing and support, the EU’s general, longer-term objectives and policy involvement (i.e. high policy-embeddedness). In contrast, the Interventionist NPE position does not stake much on policy-embeddedness. As these missions are directly motivated by the desire to address the needs of people rather than protecting geopolitical interests, they are obviously located in the human security domain of a normative power. However, in their actual execution they are imperfect as they have an exclusive focus on the military aspect and take little account of non-military foreign policy instruments.

In contrast to the NPE types stand conceptions of EU military operations that are rather motivated in interests or utility-based terms. Drawing on more general International Relations theory, these “normal power” approaches (cf. Pardo 2011), can be distinguished as liberal power and realist power.

Realist approaches have been especially dominant for a long time in the domain of International Relations. From the neorealist viewpoint, the anarchic structure of international power simply leaves no actor (state or regional union) the option to pursue its foreign policy on self-disinterested, normative grounds (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Hence, from a neorealist perspective, the development of military capabilities enables the EU to pursue security-objects that previously were out of its reach because of the lack of proper military means (Hyde Price 2006, 2008; Rynning 2011a/b). While realists do not necessarily deny the role of norms in foreign policy, they claim that they are used purely in an instrumental way. Hence, the EU’s “normative” character was not a choice, but a weakness that has been justified out of necessity. Now the EU disposes of military means, it can actually develop itself as a Realist Power in international politics (De Wijk 2005). So, like any other actor, the EU’s foreign policy objectives remain eventually informed by its geo-political security concerns (Ibid.).

Military operations in line with Realist Power are based on a utility-based justification and score low on policy-embeddedness. This type of operation is diametrically opposed to the idea of Comprehensive NPE in not only legitimating the operation on the basis of geopolitical concerns, but also in putting the military operation at the center of its involvement. Such missions would be typical for a Realist Power and would also reflect the worst expectations that Pacifist NPE has of the militarization of the EU. Moreover, in terms of UN-authorization a realist power regards a UN mandate as an instrument of the powerful. UN-authorization is not logically incompatible with a realist security outlook, but states will not renounce on their military intentions because of international law (Krasner 1992: 48).

A different approach, though rooted in a similar conceptualization of actors as driven by self-interest, is Liberal Power Europe (LPE). In this conception the EU’s identity in external affairs is above all defined by its liberal market order (Rosamond 2014). A Liberal Power is primarily motivated by absolute economic gains rather than by relative, security-oriented gains or, indeed, by universal values. This preference does not only result from its economic power (see Damro 2012), but also from a risk-averseness concerning the use of military force (Haine 2009; Laidi 2010; Wagner 2015). Operations premised on casualty-avoidance and exit strategies rather than R2P-operations that focus on protecting the local population (Haine 2009) fit well with a Liberal Power. Hence, Liberal Power operations are utility-based, but nevertheless high on policy-embeddedness. Such missions are explicitly justified to serve specific EU interests, like protecting trade routes and fighting terrorists. At the same time, however, the military instrument is one instrument among others to pursue these interests, and hence coordination with other foreign policy instruments is high. Finally, it has a legalistic take on the role of UN-authorization. Resulting from its risk-averseness, a Liberal Power would require a UN mandate, but not necessarily push for one and neither take it as an obligation to act.

Thus, these four conceptions of an international power reflect different combinations and underlying logics of the three empirical dimensions. These dimensions that capture key features, substantial and procedural, of the EU’s character as international security actor, can be applied to chart the character of the EU’s military operations. In the anticipation of the findings of the comparative analysis of these EU’s military operations in Chapter 4, I now first turn to the elaboration of an analytical framework that can be used to understand the changing character of the EU’s military operations over time.

31 Waltzian neorealist accounts assume that states are the primary international actors. As such, neorealism has difficulty in explaining EU-integration, especially in the area of security and defence, because it goes against the assumption that national states in an anarchical system cannot trust each other. Yet, with a direct relevance to the debate on NPE, Hyde-Price (2006) has proposed a modified form of neorealism which acknowledges the EU as an international actor that would basically adhere to the same action-logic as states.

32 A (neo-) classical realist understanding of CSDP focuses less on the systemic level, but sees CSDP as the outcome of “domestic European affairs” to cope with “inner weakness” (Rynning 2011a: 31/32). With its emphasis on “prudence” (neo-)classical realism shares with neorealism a strong skepticism of value-based justifications of the use of military force.
3.3 A public policy approach to EU foreign policy change

Despite the diverse range of approaches\(^{33}\), research on the EU’s foreign policy domain is more descriptive than analytical, usually lacking theory-building efforts that travel beyond single policies, cases or institutions (cf. Jorgensen 2015).\(^{34}\) Moreover, it has been preoccupied with how to characterize the EU’s foreign policy, rather than analyzing the patterns of contesting beliefs (cf. Kalland Aarstad 2015; Exadaktylos 2015) and assessing (changes in) the EU’s policies over time.\(^{35}\)

While International Relations-theories and Foreign Policy Analysis fit well with the substance of the CSDP, and as such are able to put the developments of CSDP in a wider context of security and foreign policies, they are relatively silent on foreign policy change. Focusing on the EU-element of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, classic EU-integration theories aim to explain the outcome of EU integration, i.e. they focus on the division of labour among the national and EU level. As such, EU-integration theories are less interested in substantive policy changes that do not necessarily impact on the extent of integration but rather reflect the kind of actor the EU is.

While EU foreign policy may have some unique features, conceptualizing it as “another” public policy opens new avenues for understanding the dynamics of change and continuity. To conceptualize the contestation over the EU’s military operations this dissertation proposes to adopt an advocacy coalition framework (ACF). Following Sabatier’s (1988; 1998) understanding of advocacy coalitions, these coalitions are taken to share a common belief system, i.e. a set of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them.

Initially, Sabatier’s developed his framework in the context of the US, focusing on the role of technical and scientific knowledge, and primarily applied it in the policy areas of environmental and energy policy. However, it has been broadened to include economic and social issues as taxation, public health, education etc. (Sabatier and Weible 2007; see also Weible et al. 2009; 2011). The increasing scope also led to significant revisions of the initial framework. For example, Sabatier’s understanding of policy change has broadened to include internal shocks and negotiated agreements next to external shocks and processes of learning (Sabatier and Weible 2007). While there has been some research on the EU using ACF\(^{36}\), the field of foreign policy has so far not been analysed from this perspective. This may result from the fact that traditionally, ACF is used for policy areas with an important role for technical and scientific knowledge. However, Sabatier (1998: 122) explicitly states that ACF should also work in policy areas dominated by normative and identity concerns, as long as there are “well defined coalitions driven by belief-driven conflict which resort to a wide variety of guidance instruments at multiple levels of government.” As such, insights from ACF seem promising for the field of foreign and security policy as well.

Since the EU’s decision-making process is extremely complex, there is a need for a way to structure the analysis, without reducing the complexity too much. To this end, the strategies often involve an exclusive focus on either the EU level institutions or the Big Three. In this dissertation, I propose to use advocacy coalitions as a heuristic device that is capable of including both Brussels-based institutions and a wide variety of Member States. Please note, however, that this use of ACF does not go as far as to test specific ACF-hypotheses.\(^{37}\)

The advocacy coalition approach bears some similarities with other well-known approaches that aim to capture the role of ideas in processes of policy change. A first example of such an alternative approach is policy paradigms, as introduced

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\(^{33}\) European foreign policy analysis is characterized by a great variety of theoretical approaches and conceptual lenses. It ranges from European integration theory (neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, Europeanization) to International Relations (IR - liberalism, realism, constructivism) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA – bureaucratic politics, role theory), normative theory and new institutionalist approaches (see Jorgensen 2015).

\(^{34}\) A notable exception is Bickerton (2011) who discusses the EU’s foreign policy and security and defence policy in terms of its internal functionality. Moreover, the edited volume by Kurowska and Breuer (2012) provides an important overview of, mainly IR-affiliated, explanatory approaches to the EU’s CSDP.

\(^{35}\) A notable exception in the domain of CFSP/CSDP is Smith (2004), who assesses the institutionalization of the EU’s foreign policy cooperation up till 2003. Another insightful example is Juncos (2013) who provides a longitudinal account of the EU’s involvement with Bosnia-Herzegovina from the early 1990’s onwards, focusing on the EU’s coherence and effectiveness.


\(^{37}\) An important deviation from ACF is that in this dissertation the conceptualization of advocacy coalitions is content-driven, i.e. a focus on the underlying ideas rather than their degree of actual coordination. This contrasts with ACF’s understanding of advocacy coalitions, which sees a “non-trivial degree of coordination” as a necessary requirement, i.e. the actors identify with each other, or at least know that they are fighting for the same cause. This is not to say that coordination does not feature at all in the way advocacy coalitions are used here, but it is considered as a resource (see section 3.4.3) rather than as a necessary requirement.
by Hall (1993) in the context of economic policymaking in Britain. However, Hall’s conception of ideas functions as an umbrella concept (Cairney and Weible 2015), whereas ACF is more specific about beliefs systems and ideas by distinguishing between three levels of ideas (see below). Moreover, in ACF individual actors have agency (given contextual constraints and opportunities), whereas in Hall’s concept of policy paradigms agency takes place at a collective level (Cairney and Weible 2015). This has implications for their different understandings of learning (see section 3.5.2).

Second, epistemic communities, as introduced by Haas (1992), have a similar shared belief system as conceptualized in ACF, i.e. common principled and causal beliefs. However, epistemic communities consist of narrower group of actors, namely knowledge-based experts. As such, they could be part of a wider advocacy coalition.

Third, Hajer’s (1997) notion of discourse coalitions emphasizes the importance of shared ideas over actual coordination, and the role of actors in advancing particular ideas, which fits well with the approach of this dissertation. In the area of CSDP, Rogers (2009) has used the notion of discourse coalitions in a loose way to argue that the EU’s Grand Strategy changed from a Civilian Power to a Global Power. However, key factors that distinguish ACF from discourse coalitions are that the latter is situated in the field of critical theory and implies a focus on the linguistics involved in the battle of ideas. ACF, in contrast, fits in a more “positivist” tradition, especially when combined with institutionalist literature on the mechanisms of change (see section 3.5).

Fourth, Björkdahl (2007) has defined norm advocacy as “a form of non-coercive persuasive argumentation.” This concept refers specifically to a strategy well-suited for small states and has a restrictive understanding of the way in which actors, or coalitions, may advance their ideas, ignoring the power politics that actors may display in advocating particular ideas and norms. However, it highlights the importance of non-coercive resources and mechanisms like institutional positions (e.g. Presidency), which is further discussed in section 3.4.5.

Recently, Barrette (2014) has applied the advocacy coalition framework to the area of CSDP. His study examines whether there is a relationship between the cooperation between CSDP-actors and their belief systems. By means of a social network analysis, including 70 actors from the Big Three and EU institutions, Barrette (2014) shows that concerning policy core beliefs (measured as being in favour/against an Operational Head Quarters (OHQ) or a European army), there is a relationship between the belief systems of CSDP actors and their cooperation behaviour. While he notes a strong influence of nationality, differences in belief systems also are dependent on functions (e.g. military vs. diplomats). Moreover, his analysis questions the importance of non-governmental actors in CSDP-advocacy coalitions (see also Mérand et al. 2009; 2011).

### 3.4 Advocacy coalitions in the Common Security and Defence Policy

Coalitions involve multiple actors who share a common belief system. In the case of the CSDP, the main actors are EU Member States and EU institutions. In Sabatier’s approach, belief systems are structured on three levels: a deep core, a policy core and secondary aspects (Sabatier 1988). Whereas deep core ideas refer to fundamental ontological beliefs (e.g. the importance of national sovereignty), secondary aspects are most specific and refer to instrumental decisions like the division of costs. In between these two levels are the policy core ideas which refer to fundamental policy positions on the basic strategies to achieve policy goals in line with the deep core beliefs. This includes the relative priority of policy-related values when they conflict (e.g. security vs. development), the basic choices concerning policy instruments (e.g. military vs. non-military instruments) and the distribution of authority among levels of government (e.g. preference for more intergovernmental or transnational arrangements) (Sabatier 1988). Whereas the deep core beliefs are very difficult to change (e.g. they may require external shocks like war), and the secondary aspects are derived from the core ideas, the core ideas are of main interest for assessing the change and continuity in EU foreign policy.

As these core beliefs are deeply engrained, coalitions are expected to be relatively stable in terms of membership. A country’s affiliation is not expected to change because of a simple change of government. This is not to say that the political colour of governments does not matter for a country’s foreign policy position, but rather that this is often more a matter of degree than a matter of kind. However, in a way somewhat akin to the strategic culture approach, a country’s value position may change due to specific experiences it has in its foreign engagement.

In contrast to more rational institutionalist approaches (Klein 2010; Dijkstra 2013) which focus on formal powers and assume that actors pursue material self-interests, an advocacy coalition approach is open to the inclusion of a variety of (non-state) actors and does not take the preferences of actors as given (Sabatier and Weible 2007).

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36 Concerning two other levels of the belief systems of actors (deep core beliefs and secondary aspects), Barrette (2014) does not find a relationship between cooperation and beliefs.
3.4.1 Global Power EU coalition

The Global Power EU coalition is the main promoter of the employment of military means by the EU. Members of this coalition attach great importance to the inclusion of the military instrument in the foreign policy toolbox. They are united in the belief that military operations are an indispensable instrument, for which European citizens should be willing to make a financial and human effort (Barros-Garcia 2007). Moreover, this coalition is ready to use the military instrument for a whole range of purposes, including more geostrategic and national interests. The crucial distinction with the Euro-Atlanticist group (below) is that the Global Power EU coalition strongly emphasizes the autonomous EU security identity, distinct from NATO.

The most prominent members of this coalition are France, High Representatives Solana (Meyer 2006) and Mogherini. For Solana, there is not a trade-off between values and interests (Barros-Garcia 2007). He aimed at a more “assertive Council [vis-à-vis the Commission] which believes security is prior to development” (Kurowska 2009: 534). This also applies to France’s posture: power considerations are synthesized with normative ones. Promoting France’s interest is portrayed as conducive to universal goals and values (Eckert 2013). Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg also fit with this group in light of their vocal support of the EU as a security actor, although their risk averseness makes them less ambitious (Arteaga 2013; Biscop 2013; Lorenz 2013).

In terms of resources this coalition is quite well endowed. It combines capabilities (of France) with a willingness to act. Moreover, with Solana the coalition also had an EU-actor who, as a former NATO Secretary General, had good access to a wide variety of actors, ranging from the EU Member States to the UN.

3.4.2 Euro-Atalanticist coalition

The Euro-Atlanticist coalition consists of actors that share the conviction that the military instrument performs an important role in foreign policy, primarily in the context of NATO. EU Member States that are at home with this coalition are: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia (Vennesson 2010; Biehl et al. 2013).

This coalition is led by the UK that is outspokenly critical of the military instrument in the EU context. Since the military performs an important function in the UK’s foreign policy role conception (Fey 2013), this rejection has nothing to do with the use of military force, but rather with a fear that it might reduce the importance of NATO. The UK perceives itself as a promoter of a liberal world order, for which military force is seen as an appropriate and necessary means (Ibid.). At the same time, the UK’s foreign policy strategic culture is characterized by pragmatism and a focus on short-term interests (Ibid.), with a tendency to a more realist line of argumentation (Geis, Müller and Schörnig 2013: 335). The UK is sceptical about the statement that the EU is a community of values that should use its means for the promotion of human rights and democracy promotion (Meyer 2013).

This coalition thus consists of actors that do have capabilities, but are rather hesitant to use them in the EU context, i.e. they are a kind of permanent inhibitors. However, because of their capabilities they remain of interest to the Global Power coalition.
3.4.3 Human Security coalition

In the Human Security coalition the use of military force is narrowly circumscribed, i.e. it is only legitimated for the protection of civilians. Members of this coalition prefer the use of non-military instruments and aim to embed the EU’s military operations within the EU’s broader foreign policy framework. However, when the members of this coalition are convinced that lives of innocent civilians are at stake, and the deployment of military force is the lesser evil, they are willing to take risks (i.e. deploy their troops) in defence of those values. This coalition prefers the EU over NATO and puts great emphasis on the UN as an indispensable source of legitimacy (Wunderlich 2013). As such, this coalition’s support for EU military action is enhanced when it is undertaken upon the explicit request of the UN to do so.

EU Member States that fit this coalition are “the neutrals” (Ireland, Finland, Sweden), with a leading role for Sweden, which conceives of itself as the “world’s conscience” and “moral superpower” (Wunderlich 2013: 277; see also Ruffa 2013).39 Additionally, the European Parliament is part of this coalition. Although lacking any formal powers in CSDP, it has developed a “distinct” foreign policy identity with an emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion (Zanon 2005).40

In terms of its capabilities this advocacy coalition does not have the most to offer. Moreover, their emphasis on human rights standards makes them somewhat slow to act. However, when a particular operation meets its standards, actors in this coalition are willing to contribute, and as such they may have more influence in establishing the particular character of operations than might be expected based on their capabilities.

Table 3.2 Advocacy coalitions in CSDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Preference</th>
<th>Policy-embeddedness</th>
<th>Purpose/Justification¹</th>
<th>Prominent actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Power EU</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Military instrument is important</td>
<td>Utility-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>EU (UN)</td>
<td>Military instrument is complementary/subordinate</td>
<td>Value-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Atlanticist</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Military instrument is important</td>
<td>Utility-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bystanders²</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Military instrument is subordinate</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ In line with the discussion of “justification” in section 3.2.1, I distinguish between “value-based” and “utility-based” justifications. Please note, those in favour of protecting geostrategic/national/economic interests are not necessarily against operations for the sake of protecting human security concerns, but they also allow for a broader use of the military instrument. In contrast, those in favour of a value-based justification are dismissive of a broader use of the military instrument.

² Though both the Human Security coalition and the Bystanders are skeptical of the use of military force, the logic behind this differs. The former is willing to contribute militarily if it is for the “good” sake and has a sound legal base, while the latter’s skepticism is based on a variety of more instrumental reasons (e.g. risk-averse).

3.4.4 Bystanders

The key characteristic of the, least cohesive, Bystander coalition is the unwillingness to take substantial risks to defend European values by the use of force. The reluctance to do so has different reasons, ranging from a strongly developed security culture of risk avoidance (Germany, Geis 2013), a strong focus on domestic defence (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Slovenia, Biehl et al. 2013), to a fear of being institutionally sidelined (European Commission). The Bystanders are no driving force behind CSDP operations, and their support has to be sought time and again.

Typical proponents of this advocacy coalition are Germany and the European Commission. In Germany’s foreign policy role conception explicit “realist” language is avoided, and a value-oriented foreign policy in terms of goals, means, and policy style is advocated (Geis 2013). Because of the "anti-militarist attitude" of
its population, resulting from its particular history, it is not keen on acting by force to support its value-based foreign policy (Geis 2013). While Germany generally belongs to the federalist-minded EU members, i.e. pro-EU integration, regarding a military CSDP it has been less of an enthusiastic promoter. This has not only to do with its strong reluctance to the use of military force in general, but also with its balancing act of not wanting to prioritize either NATO or the EU. Hence, Algieri et al (2006) conclude that although Germany participates in CSDP, it is not a strong supporter. In turn, the European Commission “inhabits the world of Civilian Power Europe” and aims at containing the militarization of EU policies, and to dilute any use of military capacity into broader objectives linked to poverty and development (Kurowska 2008: 30; see also Portela 2007 on Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner).

In terms of resources this coalition operates as an important counterweight to the “Global Power Europe” group. It also consists of both important Member States and EU actors. Yet, their strength rather derives from other than military capabilities.

3.4.5 Resources & Constraints
As ACF suggests, the success of each of the four advocacy coalitions in putting its mark on CSDP is eventually determined by the resources they command and the (institutional) constraints they face. Resources vary by coalition. I distinguish between material, institutional and discursive resources. Material capabilities refer to the military capabilities of coalitions of states, but also to the non-military capabilities (e.g. aid, trade, dialogue) they can supply. Institutional resources derive from the position one holds in the decision-making process (like the power of the EU Presidency, pre-Lisbon) and other agenda-setting powers. Finally, discursive resources refer to the skills of framing and diplomatic tactics. Moreover, the extent to which coalitions actually coordinate, i.e. the density of the different coalitions, may also be a factor that influences the degree of to which they are effective.

While resources are located at the level of the coalitions, (institutional) constraints are the same for the whole policy field. Nevertheless, their impact on particular coalitions may differ. I distinguish between three main constraints in the area of CSDP: changing threat perceptions, decision-making structures, austerity measures. Changing threat perceptions, resulting from a changing position of Russia and the US, will affect the coalitions in different ways. The idea of the US’ “pivot to the Pacific” may for instance provide incentives for a greater ability of the EU to act in the military realm; strengthening the position of “Global Europe” against the “Euro-Atlanticists.” The decision-making structure is of influence as well. The unanimity requirement in CSDP prevents that coalitions with big member states have an advantage over those who involve mostly smaller states. As such it gives leverage to “smaller” coalitions/coalitions that differ from the status quo position, as they are needed anyway. Moreover, coalitions that aim at changing the status quo are more likely to benefit from open decision-making, a dynamic environment and uncertainty. In contrast, coalitions in favor of the status quo can be expected to be more reactive. Defense cuts resulting from austerity measures by governments may prevent a “military built-up at a level that would turn the EU collectively into a superpower” (Meyer 2011: 681). This most affects the coalitions with greater military ambitions, i.e. the Global Power Europe. At the same time, the economic crisis may also increase the incentives to realize efficiencies through international cooperation, pooling, and role specialization, particularly but not only for the smaller European countries.

3.5 Mechanisms of Policy Change
The advocacy coalition approach suggests three distinct pathways of policy change: either the dominant coalition is replaced, or there is a win-win situation in which all major coalitions agree that a policy change is necessary, or there is a negotiated agreement (Sabatier and Weible 2007; Sabatier 1998).

For the purpose of applying ACF to decision-making in EU foreign policy, I build upon the work of Daniel Thomas (2011) to elaborate the underlying mechanisms of these pathways as hard bargaining, learning and cooperative bargaining, respectively.41 Additionally, I add the mechanism of institutional entrapment (Thomas 2011; cf. Schimmelfennig 2001) to account for the constraints on policy change. While these mechanisms correspond to different institutionalist theories, they are discussed at the level of the mechanisms. As such, I do not aim at a comprehensive discussion of different institutionalist approaches at large (see Peters 2012). Each of these four mechanisms is explained and discussed below, which allows me to develop the different ways in which changes in the EU’s military missions can be related to different theoretical positions. What is more, eventually, these different mechanisms suggest different hypotheses as to the nature of change in CSDP and the conditions under which it takes place.

41 Thomas (2011) includes another sociological institutionalist mechanism, which is not included in this analysis: “normative suasion”, which is close to institutional learning; rather than that actors change their position due to being exposed to information, they do so due to being exposed to normative arguments.
The relation between EU Member States and the EU institutions can essentially be studies in terms of principal-agent models (see Klein 2010; Dijkstra 2013).

In short, from the focus on power of these approaches, we can derive that EU foreign policy making is the result of a process of hard bargaining in which the power resources of a coalition determine its success. As a consequence, whatever policy change occurs is the result of a changing balance of power between different member states, or principal (EU Member States) and agent (EU institutions).

3.5.2 Learning

In contrast, sociological institutionalism and constructivist research highlight the dynamic nature of preferences. In this view, one of the key mechanisms that is able to account for policy changes as a result of changing preferences is institutional learning. This position thus challenges the conflict-oriented theories discussed above (Bennett and Howlett 1992). Levy’s (1994) well-known account of learning in foreign policy emphasizes that learning is about a change of beliefs as a result of experience.

There are different understandings of learning (see Bennett and Howlett 1992). Central to these differences are two key dimensions: who is learning (subject) and what is being learned (object). Concerning the subject, a distinction can be made in terms of whether the scope of a learning process is limited to an individual actor or whether it applies to a whole advocacy coalition, or even applies across multiple coalitions. Regarding the object of learning, there is a limited degree of learning when it is restricted to procedures and organizational changes. In contrast, the most fundamental form of learning involves ideational learning, which results in changing objectives and goals (a paradigm shift). Forms of learning in between these two extremes can be regarded as instrumental learning, i.e. learning about policy instruments and their application. Hence, an ideational learning process across coalitions is the most comprehensive form of learning, while an individual actor learning about procedural and organizational issues is a very limited degree of learning (see Figure 3.1).
and consensus rather than on changes in the “content” of EU foreign policy. Hence, the underlying conflicting ideas on CSDP operations (i.e. the relationship between the military instrument and other EU foreign policy instruments and its justification) and the EU’s development as an international security actor are depoliticized.\(^4^4\)

Compared to the other mechanisms that are discussed in this chapter, institutional learning stands out for expecting a change in ideas of the actors to explain policy change. It expects that with increasing common experiences the divergent ideas of actors will converge. It highlights the role of professional expertise and epistemic communities. Moreover, since knowledge and information (building blocks for learning) are also a resource (see Bennett and Howlett, 1992), in line with Sabatier, learning is conceptualized here as taking place within the existing balance of power relations.

In this dissertation, I distinguish between cross- and within-case learning and between cross- and within-coalition learning. It serves as a continuum from a limited degree of learning (i.e. within-coalition learning) to a high degree of learning (i.e. cross-case and cross-coalition learning).

### 3.5.3 Cooperative bargaining

In between the two “extremes” of hard bargaining and institutional learning, Thomas (2011) introduces a normative institutionalist account of EU foreign policy. This position is thus opposed to, on the one hand, approaches of power politics (e.g. hard bargaining and veto threats) and, on the other hand, approaches that emphasize that convergence of preferences emerges out of learning, persuasion and socialization.\(^4^5\) In a normative institutionalist account, EU actors are conceptualized as “thinly-socialized actors” who are affected by substantive and procedural norms of the EU (Thomas 2011: 5).

From this perspective, the central mechanism that connects the diversity in actors’ preferences to the outcome in terms of the evolution of the EU’s military missions is cooperative bargaining. This cooperative bargaining is characterized by give-and-take and mutual compromises (Thomas 2011: 19). Such an understanding points at a situation in which the actors involved prefer a compromise over defending their preferences with a veto (threat). Divergent preferences have not disappeared, but

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\(^{4^4}\) In an article on the EEAS, Smith (2013) does pay attention to the ‘development’ (Commission) vs. ‘security’ (European External Action Service, including the EU Military Staff) clash, arguing that the EEAS institutionalized this division, rather than eliminating it. However, the emphasis on the institutional dimension underplays the substantive dimension of this struggle.

\(^{4^5}\) Cooperative bargaining bears similarities with socialization in the sense that in both cases actors identify with the policy-making process. However, whereas socialization is a rather top-down process in which individual actors adapt to the system, cooperative bargaining does not expect actors to change their ideas and preferences.

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Sabatier expects that learning primarily results at the level of organizational changes, rather than that it is able to lead to paradigm shifts. In the context of EU foreign policy, research on learning has primarily addressed this, limited, domain of organizational change.\(^4^3\) For example, Adebahr (2008) and Bossong (2013) have studied processes of organizational learning in the area of the EU Special Representatives and civilian missions. Also, Smith (2012) has developed an institutionalist account of the emergence and development of CSDP, with a particular emphasis on learning. Central to this institutional learning literature concerning CSDP is that the accumulation of operational experiences leads to a “deliberate, pro-active, transparent, collective/social, policy-relevant and progressive” process of reform (Smith 2012: 7). Similarly, Petrov (2010) focuses on experiential learning to account for the institutionalization of ESDP. Moreover, the role of epistemic communities and professional expertise is emphasized (Smith 2012; Faleg 2012).\(^4^3\) Notably, this literature tends to focus on institutional norms, like sharing information

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\(^4^2\) With the notable exception of Meyer (2006), who studied the normative change in the EU’s strategic culture preceding the launch of ESDP. He included mediatized crisis learning and institutional socialization as explanatory mechanisms.

\(^4^3\) Other research in the field of CSDP that highlights the role of epistemic communities is Cross (2013) who studied the role of the EU Military Committee in the CSDP decision-making process. However, she does not incorporate any longitudinal assessment of the EUM as an epistemic community.
they are softened by the consensus norm and the consultation reflex (Ibid.). This is in line with Sabatier’s (1998) “negotiated settlement.” In sum, cooperative bargaining concerns a decision-making process that is characterized by (continuing) different preferences, combined with the political will to go beyond the lowest common denominator. It refers to the situation in which no veto-threats are used but where preferences also remain divergent from each other.

3.5.4 Institutional entrapment
A final mechanism for institutional change that can be derived from the literature is entrapment. While Thomas (2011) includes entrapment as a mechanism of normative institutionalism, I argue that it fits better with a historical institutionalist approach. Just as cooperative bargaining, entrapment does not mean that the actors involved change their ideas. However, the distinctive element of entrapment is that it highlights the importance of previous commitments.

Entrapment was introduced as a concept by Schimmelfennig (2001), in the context of the EU’s eastern enlargement. His work focuses on rhetorical entrapment, i.e. how the framing of policy in terms of previous policies binds the actors to a norm consistent policy. In this dissertation I focus on institutional entrapment, i.e. how previous decisions constrain the options for change and development afterwards. As such, this mechanism bears strong resemblance with path-dependency. While path-dependency is a very broad concept that refers to the general notion that “history matters”, Pierson (200) advocates a particular understanding of path-dependency that highlights the increasing costs of change once a particular trajectory is chosen.

While entrapment may occur across cases, I expect this mechanism to be particularly strong concerning within-case dynamics. Although previous CSDP decisions may, for instance, constrain the options for the mandate of a new military operation, this mechanism is expected to be even stronger within a mission once its mandate has already been defined by a Council Decision. It will be more difficult to change a particular mandate with later extensions of the operation than when one starts from scratch with the launch of a new military operation.

46 While normative institutionalism has been criticized for being a subtype of sociological institutionalism (Risse 2011), on the level of mechanisms it does add to existing rational choice approaches, which emphasize power politics and the use of veto threats (i.e. hard bargaining), and sociological institutionalist accounts which expect a convergence of ideas based on common experiences (i.e. learning).

3.5.5 Indicators
Based on the discussion of different decision-making dynamics, and considering the subsequent empirical chapters, in this section I explicate what will count as evidence for each mechanism (see Table 3.4).

First, hard bargaining refers to a situation in which the character of an EU military operation reflects the power relationship among different coalitions. Changes in this character result from a change in the balance of power between different (advocacy) coalitions, following shifts in material resources and institutional factors. Empirical observations that are in line with hard bargaining refer to changes in the resources (material, institutional) of particular coalitions. Specifically, actors that change coalitions (i.e. changing actor constellations), the actual use (or threat) of a veto and the unilateral withdrawal of troops are taken as evidence for hard bargaining.

Table 3.4 Operationalization of the Mechanisms of CSDP Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hard bargaining (power resources of different coalitions)</th>
<th>Learning (common experience)</th>
<th>Cooperative bargaining (give-and-take)</th>
<th>Institutional entrapment (stuck-together)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes in actor constellations</td>
<td>Common assessment of</td>
<td>Expanding “the pie”</td>
<td>Including multiple decision points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual use of or threat of veto</td>
<td>Changes “on the ground” past experience</td>
<td>Acknowledgement of the preferences of others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral withdrawal of troops</td>
<td>Processes of lessons learned/evaluation and review</td>
<td>Positive identification with process</td>
<td>Justification based on previous policy commitments and choices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome: Highest common denominator or deadlock</td>
<td>Outcome: Convergence of policy positions</td>
<td>Outcome: Compromise beyond the lowest common denominator</td>
<td>Outcome: Norm consistent policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, when EU military operations change due to a learning process, we would expect explicit references to operational experiences to justify this change. Processes of lessons learned, evaluation and review as empirical observations for
learning need some qualification. They are evidence for institutionalized forms of learning and enhance the possibility for collective learning, but cannot be taken as decisive evidence for actual learning. Rather in this dissertation I focus on a (common) assessment of past experiences and changes “on the ground.” Moreover, justification of a particular change with reference to the advice of (military) experts is also taken as supporting the learning-mechanism. Finally, a key indicator is that some actors actually revise their ideas to align better with those of others.

Third, in the case of cooperative bargaining, the character of EU military operations is the result of a careful process of give and take. Evidence for cooperative bargaining is the combination of different preferences and the absence of veto threats. It refers to a positive identification with the decision-making process, i.e. a strong willingness to act together, while differences in belief systems are not erased. Specific empirical observations that fit with cooperative bargaining are the explicit acknowledgment of the preferences of other coalitions. Moreover, cooperative bargaining would become visible in a final outcome that includes different elements, for example secondary tasks, to satisfy the different coalitions (i.e. a strategy of “expanding the pie”).

Finally, institutional entrapment refers to the situation in which the character of EU military operations is the outcome of previous commitments and decisions on CSDP and/or the EU’s involvement with the country in question more broadly. As such, changes in the character of EU military operations are bound to remain within the boundaries of earlier decisions. Empirical observations in line with this mechanism are the phasing of the decision-making process and/or operational tasks, and the inclusion of moments of evaluation before a next decision can be taken. Also, the justification of change or continuity in terms of previous decisions and commitments can be taken as evidence for institutional entrapment. In its appearance, institutional entrapment may bear similarity with cooperative bargaining. However, in the case of the latter there is the idea of a positive sum-game, while institutional entrapment refers to a situation in which coalitions get stuck in the process and accept the outcome reluctantly.

For each mechanism the expectation is that it is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for policy change to occur. This means that I expect that each decision-making mechanism as such can bring about the outcome (i.e. changing character of EU military operations), but that they do not need to be present at every change that occurs.

Moreover, while the mechanisms do not logically exclude each other, analytically they are distinctive; they relate to different empirical observations and also have fundamentally different implications for the development of CSDP at large. For instance, clear evidence of a collective learning process signals a strengthening of a collective CSDP identity. At the key moments of change we expect that a particular mechanism stands out for driving that change. However, I do acknowledge that different mechanisms may relate to different dimensions of change. For example, while a change in justification may relate to power politics among coalitions, a more operational change in the level of policy-embeddedness of an operation may be driven by a process of cooperative bargaining.

Both for historical and analytical reasons hard bargaining claims primacy over the other hypotheses in the sense that the literature tends to assume CSDP to be driven initially by the power constellation among the member states. Also, it makes sense to put the burden of proof on those mechanisms that expect actors to change their ideas.

### 3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have, first, unpacked the key dimensions to assess the outcome of interest, i.e. the character of EU military operations. Building upon the NPE-literature, as discussed in chapter 2, I developed and operationalized the following three key dimensions: justification, policy-embeddedness and political authorization. Moreover, in connection these dimensions allow us to distinguish between four security actor identities: comprehensive NPE, interventionist NPE, Liberal Power and Realist power.

While research on EU foreign policy is dominated by International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis, public policy approaches open up new avenues of studying the mechanisms of change and continuity. In particular, ACF offers a way of evaluating mechanisms that represent different research paradigms: hard bargaining vs. institutional learning vs. cooperative bargaining vs. entrapment. Moreover, this approach allows for the inclusion of a variety of actors and does not position the EU Member States against EU institutions, but rather focuses on coalitions that share particular fundamental beliefs.

I have distinguished between four coalitions that differ on a number of dimensions. The driving force behind the EU’s use of military force comes from Global Power EU. While having a similar attitude towards the use of military force, the Euro-Atlanticists are hesitant in doing so in an EU context. The Human Security coalition stands out for having an explicit value-based justification of the use of military force. Finally, the Bystander coalition is a rather diverse group of actors, which share a reluctance of using force in generally.

In the subsequent four empirical chapters I, first, give a complete overview of the EU’s military operations (Chapter 4). In addition to providing some background
characteristics, I assess the character of the EU’s military operations along the first two dimensions that were discussed in section 3.2: justification and policy-embeddedness. This leads to a first characterization of the character of the EU’s international power and the way this character changed. In the chapters 5-7 the changing character of the EU’s security identity and its underlying dynamics is studied in depth. Chapter 5 and 6 assess the relative explanatory value of the different decision-making mechanisms to account for the character of EU military operations and subsequent changes in this character. In chapter 5, I examine EUFOR Althea from 2004 – 2015. This operation captures almost the full ESDP/CSDP-period. As such, insights into the decision-making dynamics of this case, with all its particularities, can tell us something about the broader development of the EU’s Security and Defence Policy. In chapter 6, I focus on EUNAVFOR Atalanta, which reflects the important changes in the character of EU military operations that are identified in chapter 4: an increasing emphasis on utility-based considerations and an increasing policy-embeddedness of the military operation in an overall political strategy. Moreover, I compare the decision-making mechanisms of Atalanta with the decision not to launch a third Congo-operation. Whereas chapter 5 starts with an elaborate discussion of the positions of the different coalitions concerning the launch of an EU military operation in Bosnia, chapter 6 follows the logic of the decision-making process in 2008, taking the advocacy coalitions as a heuristic device for understanding the underlying dynamics. Finally, chapter 7 picks up on the third dimension of characterizing EU military operations: political authorization. By means of a comparative analysis, with a particular focus on EUNAVFOR Sophia, this chapter assesses the role of UN-authorization in the internal EU-decision-making dynamic. The concluding chapter integrates the findings of these studies in an overall discussion of the character of the EU as a security actor and its driving mechanisms. It returns to the overarching question of the dissertation How has the character of the EU as a security actor evolved ever since it started to launch military operations?