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Palm, T.P.

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## CHAPTER 4

# The character of EU-military operations: justification and policy-embeddedness<sup>47</sup>

Co-authored with Ben Crum<sup>48</sup>

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the complete set of EU military operations so far (2003-2015) in terms of the two dimensions of justification and policy-embeddedness, as set out in section 3.2. This way we can assess in which direction the EU did evolve as an international security actor. *What is the cross-case development of the character of EU military operations?*

The prime empirical sources of this chapter are the Joint Actions or Joint Decisions as adopted by the Council of the European Union by which the operations have been launched. These documents are used to identify the key justifications adduced as well as the extent and the way in which the operation is related to

<sup>47</sup> Earlier drafts of the paper on which this chapter is based were presented at the 8<sup>th</sup> Pan-European Conference on International Relations (2013), EUIA (2014), 7<sup>th</sup> Pan-European Conference on the European Union (2014).

<sup>48</sup> This chapter is based upon on an article (to be submitted) that is co-authored by Ben Crum. This article also includes section 3.2. Trineke Palm collected the empirics and wrote a first full draft. Ben Crum contributed to the problem-statement and the streamlining of the overall argument.

other EU instruments and actors. In addition, I draw on expert interviews and some secondary literature.

The next section (4.2) introduces the EU's military operations and gives a sense of the variation in their basic characteristics: geographical location, size and military robustness. Subsequently I examine the EU's military operations in greater detail in terms of their justification and policy-embeddedness. To structure the analysis and capture the change in the two analytical dimensions, I distinguish between three phases. The first phase (2003-2005) consists of the EU's first three military operations: Concordia, Artemis and Althea (Section 4.3.1). The second phase (2006-2007) consists of EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad (section 4.3.2). The final phase covers the operations that have been launched since 2008: EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali, EUFOR/EUMAM RCA and EUNAVFOR Sophia (Section 4.3.3). In the concluding section I classify the different operations in terms of the two dimensions and argue that there has been an increase in utility-based justifications, combined with an increasing policy-embeddedness of the EU's military operations.

### 4.2 The diversity of EU military operations

There is considerable variation among the eleven military missions that the EU has launched so far (Table 4.1). Under Solana as High Representative six military operations were launched (2003-2009). In the subsequent four years (2010-2014) two training missions were launched, in Mali and Somalia, and a more robust military operation EUFOR RCA. It is argued that there was a drop in operations after Solana's departure, and that under Ashton CSDP has become less ambitious (Howorth 2011; Koutrakos 2013; interviews with members of the Politico-Military Group A, B 2013; Finnish diplomat 2013). Others point at the changing role of the Presidency, as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon that entered into force in 2009:

“You no longer have the situation that each incoming Presidency has the idea of: I want to launch a CSDP-mission. (...) There is no need to have a flagship of what was achieved in the 6-months Presidency” (EEAS-official A 2013).

Geographically, the EU's military operations are concentrated in the Western-Balkans and Sub-Sahara Africa. While operations in the former area take place within the context of potential EU membership, this prospect is absent in the case of the latter. Concerning the (common) financial costs, Althea and EUFOR Chad have

been by far the most expensive EU military operations. While the common costs of these operations exceed 100 million euro, there is a big gap with the others, i.e. the common costs for Atalanta are just below 30 million euro for the period 2012-2014. In terms of the number of military troops, Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the period 2004-2007) has been the EU's largest military operation by far. This operation started out with 7000 troops in 2004, of which after a series of stepwise reductions only 600 remained after 2012. Small military operations are Operation Concordia and the two EU training operations in Somalia and Mali with a number of troops below 500. In between these two poles are four intermediate-sized military operations: both Congo-operations, EUFOR Chad and the naval operation Atalanta.<sup>49</sup>

The robustness of military operations refers to the use of force. Low robustness refers to operations that have an explicit reference that limits, or even prohibits, the use of force. Thus, in the cases of EUTM Mali and EUTM Somalia, combat involvement has been explicitly excluded (Council of the European Union 2013, article 1.1; senior official Irish Ministry of Defence 2013).<sup>50</sup> Also, the scope of the mandate of Operation Concordia was limited, as the operation plan stated that the EU forces would not serve as a security buffer between any ethnic groups and that “the EU-led force will not deal with serious widespread incidents” (Council of the European Union 2003e).

49 With 6 frigates operation Atalanta consists of 1200 troops (EUMS 2009).

50 Specifically, to exclude the possibility of combat involvement means that there is no monitoring of troops once they are trained, i.e. trainers do not go on patrol with the trained troops. Moreover, as EUTM Somalia was not present in Somalia until recently, it was not possible to examine the performance of the trained soldiers, i.e. oversight was missing (cf. Ehrhart and Petretto 2012b).

Table 4.1 Background characteristics of EU military operations

Operation (Country)	Period	Regional location	Costs <sup>1</sup>	Size	Robustness
Concordia (fYROM)	2003	Western Balkans	Low, < 25 million	Small, < 500	Low
Artemis (Ituri province, DR Congo)	2003	Subsahara Africa	Low, < 25 million	Intermediate, 500-5000	High
EUFOR Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	2004 – now	Western Balkans	High, > 100 million	2004 – 2007: Large, > 5000 >2007: Intermediate, 500-5000	High
EUFOR RD Congo (DR Congo)	2006	Subsahara Africa	Low, < 25 million	Intermediate, 500-5000	Intermediate
EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Chad – Central African Republic)	2008-2009	Subsahara Africa	High, >100 million	Intermediate, 500-5000	Low/Intermediate
EU NAVFOR Atalanta (coast of Somalia)	2008 – now	Subsahara Africa	Intermediate, 25-100 million	Intermediate, 500-5000	High
EUTM Somalia (Training Mission, Uganda and Somalia)	2010 – now	Subsahara Africa	Low, < 25 million	Small, < 500	Low
EUTM Mali (Training Mission, Mali)	2013 – now	Subsahara Africa	Low, < 25 million	Small, < 500	Low
EUFOR RCA (Central African Republic)	2014-2015	Subsahara Africa	Intermediate (32 million)	Small/ Intermediate (600)	High
EUMAM RCA (Advisory Mission, Central African Republic)	2015- now	Subsahara Africa	Low	Small, <500	Low
EUNAVFOR Med	2015 - now	Mediterranean	Low	Intermediate	High (awaiting UN-VII resolution for phase 2b & 3)

<sup>1</sup> Costs figures are based on annual figures in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database: <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko>. These refer to “common costs”, which exclude the (bigger share of the) costs that are borne by individual contributing states (e.g. the costs of deploying personnel), and which thus only serve as a proxy for the total costs to distinguish the general financial size of the military operations.

Military operations that do not explicitly limit the use of force but did not involve actual combat either are scored as “intermediate.” EUFOR Chad was not to interfere in local clashes, but rather focused on the evacuation of humanitarian workers (Helly 2009). Indeed, soldiers were not authorized to provide security within the refugee camps (Peen-Rodt 2008; Irish Defence official 2013). EUFOR RD Congo was focused on ensuring the local peace at specific occasions rather than that it was to take on broader security challenges such as those in Artemis. Notably, EU member states strictly delineated the scope of operation of the troops. With most troops staying in Gabon rather than in Kinshasa, the operation has been criticized as being too reluctant (Merlingen 2012). However, High Representative Solana (2007a) defended this approach as it “simultaneously ensured a deterrent capacity and avoided an unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa.”

Military operations are classified as robust when the EU forces are explicitly allowed to use force and/or actually had to make use of their military force. With their emphasis on deterrence, operations Althea and Atalanta can be considered most robust (Council of the European Union 2008, art. 2; Council of the European Union 2004b). It has been argued that Althea is the “only real military operation that is left” (PMG-member B 2013). However, the extension of Atalanta’s mandate to include Somali land territory (Council of the European Union 2012, art. 1.2) indicates that this military operation also has a rather robust character (EEAS-official A 2013). Similarly, Ulriksen et al. (2004; cf. Norheim-Martinsen 2013) describe how during operation Artemis EU troops got involved in fights with several militia, even though they were initially reluctant for that to happen. Moreover, EUFOR RCA received a rather robust mandate, based on a Chapter VII-UN Resolution, to use “all necessary means” to protect civilians (Tardy 2014). Finally, concerning EUNAVFOR Med (Operation Sophia) the executive aspects of the operation (including non-compliant boarding of vessels) require a Chapter VII-UN Resolution (further discussed in chapter 7).

### 4.3 The EU’s military operations in practice

The subsequent analysis is structured in three phases. First, there is the starting phase which includes the first three missions that were launched in 2003/2004: Concordia, Artemis and Althea. The value-based justification of these operations is strongly underlined, while at the same time these initial operations display considerable variation in the extent to which they are embedded in a broader EU foreign policy strategy. In the second phase, which involves most notably EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad, value-based justification still features high while there is

a steadily increasing attempt to ensure that these operations are well-embedded in the broader EU foreign policy repertoire. Finally, with the launch of EUNAVFOR Atalanta in 2008, utility-based arguments appear in the justification of EU military operations. This also holds for EUTM Mali and EUNAVFOR Med. However, as EUTM Somalia and EUFOR/EUMAM RCA highlight, this does not rule out the launch of value-based operations.

#### 4.3.1 First missions: value-based and varying embeddedness

As the EU initiated its first military operations, they were justified in value-based terms. Typically, Operation Concordia (started in 2003) and Operation Althea (from 2004 onwards) were primarily motivated by the objective to ensure the implementation of the peace-agreements in FYR Macedonia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively.

*Objectives of Concordia:* The EU will lead a military presence to further contribute to a stable secure environment that allow the FYR Macedonia to implement the Ohrid FA (Council of the European Union 2003e).

*Objectives of EUFOR Althea:* The EU shall conduct a military operation in (...) BiH (...) to provide deterrence, continued compliance with the (...) General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH and to contribute to a safe and secure environment (...) required to achieve core tasks in the OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan and the SAP (Council of the European Union 2004b).

And as the EU for the first time employs military troops in sub-Sahara Africa in Operation Artemis (2003), it does so with the express aim of protecting civilians and refugees.

The EU will deploy an interim emergency force. This force will contribute to the stabilization of the security and humanitarian situation in Bunia, including (...) to the protection of the civilian population (...) (Council of the European Union 2003f).

At the same time, these initial missions are in varying degrees aligned with other foreign policy instruments. As it happens, the policy embeddedness of the very first mission, *Operation Concordia*, is relatively high. There was not much of an EU strategy towards FYR Macedonia before the internal ethno-political conflict got violent in 2001. However, when NATO stepped in with Operation Essential Harvest

to disarm ethnic Albanian groups, the EU emerged as a committed humanitarian and diplomatic mediator in its shadow. So once Operation Concordia took over from NATO in 2003, it was explicitly embedded within the EU's broader strategy (Council of the European Union 2003a).<sup>51</sup> Thus the second consideration in the Joint Action that launched Operation Concordia maintains:

the Union's contribution is based upon a broad approach with activities to address the whole range of rule of law aspects, including institution building programmes and police activities which should be mutually supportive and reinforcing. The activities of the Union, supported, *inter alia*, by the Community's institution building programmes under the CARDS Regulation, will contribute to the overall peace implementation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as to the achievements of the Union's overall policy in the region, notably the stabilisation and association process.

Furthermore, in specific regard of the relationship with the EU Special Representative, the Council Joint Action (Ibid.) states that there shall be close coordination "to ensure consistency of the military operation with the broader context of the EU activities in FYROM." In the Master Message (Council of the European Union 2003d) the military operation is said to "complement and support" the EU's already "deep[ly] engagement" with the country. The effective embeddedness of Operation Concordia is also reflected in the budgets involved. The total budget of the military operation (not more than 7 million euro) has been relatively limited in comparison to what FYROM received under the CARDS programme (approximately 50 million a year; European Commission 2001).

In contrast, in the case of *Operation Artemis* we find that the employment of the military instrument upsets all the other forms of EU engagement in the region. For sure, there was a longer-standing EU engagement with the Great Lakes region, including DR Congo. Since 1996 there had been a special envoy to the region and since 1999 the EU had formulated a "common position" to support the implementation of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement" (Council of the European Union 1999; 2001a; 2002a; 2003b). Also DR Congo was a beneficiary of the 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund, even though the 200 million Euro that it received may have been less than one might have expected on the basis of its population size (compare Burundi that received 115 million with a population that is almost eight times smaller) (Gegout 2005).

<sup>51</sup> Note, however, that there was much less attention for such policy-embeddedness with the follow-up civilian police mission in FYR Macedonia, Operation Proxima (see Palm 2014).

Once Operation Artemis started, considerable effort was made to ensure that all other EU foreign policy instruments were effectively made subservient to the military mission. Typically, in briefing the Council on the various options for the intervention in Congo, COREPER underlines the need to explore possible political, diplomatic, financial and economic elements *to support* the military operation (Council of the European Union 2003f). The Joint Action statement subsumed the Commission engagement in Congo to the military operation by declaring "the intention of the Commission to direct, where appropriate, its action towards achieving the objectives of this Joint Action" (Council of the European Union 2003c, article 14). Specific suggestions are done for Community avenues "in support of the Stabilisation Force", i.e. the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, and financial support to African partners participating in the peace keeping operation (Ibid.). Notably, at the time of the military operation, the Commission was involved in supporting NGOs in Bunia to build capacity in the local police. However, there was no direct contact with the military operation, i.e. the military operation was not linked to longer-term civilian peace building (Ulriksen et al. 2004).<sup>52</sup> With regard to the EUSR for the Great Lakes Region, the Joint Action calls for coordination "of the respective activities", while refusing a more strategic role for the EUSR as was the case in Operation Concordia.

These elements all indicate that the Operation Artemis was not just an "isolated military endeavour" (Norheim-Martinsen 2013) but that it was in fact quite invasive of other forms of EU involvement. The operation put the military engagement at the centre and expected all Community and Commission measures to support it rather than the other way around. This is also reflected in the financial developments. Operation Artemis led to the launch of the African Peace Facility (cf. Ulriksen et al. 2004). However, this facility was financed at the cost of the European Development Fund, which thus involves a militarization of development money. While Ulriksen et al. (2004: 522) and Gegout (2005) may be right in their assessment that this "strengthened the EU's focus", it is a focus in which the military instrument dominates.

While Operation Artemis then emerges as the mission in which the military element really took over, the record in the case of *Operation Althea* is more mixed, even if this mission had a clear deterrence-function and, at least initially, involved a large

<sup>52</sup> Petrov (2010) notes that a civil-military liaison officer was appointed by the French Force Commander. However, he also argues that the Commission was more supportive and proactive in the case of Artemis than it was with Concordia, because the Commission saw its presence and considerable investments in the country threatened. As such, the Commission's involvement emerged out of a negative evaluation of the military instrument.

number of troops.<sup>53</sup> Notably, in discursive terms the Operation concept presented Althea as a complementary military operation. The operation is referred to as *complementing* and *supporting* the measures taken by the EU in BiH, being part of the EU's "comprehensive policy." Moreover, the Operation Concept explicitly notes that it is "important to avoid the creation of a culture of dependence upon EUFOR" (Council of the European Union 2004a). In its report to the UN, the Council stresses as well that Althea is "strengthening the European Union's existing substantial engagement" and contributes "to the EU's political engagement, its assistance programmes and ongoing police and monitoring missions" (Council of the European Union 2005b). Similar to Operation Concordia, there is a call for close coordination with the EUSR "to ensure consistency of the EU military operation with the broader context of the EU activities in BiH" and the obligation to "take EUSR local political advice into account" (Council of the European Union 2004b). This leads Norheim-Martinsen (2013: 145) to conclude that Althea is "part of coordinated EU presence under the chairmanship and direction of the EUSR."

However, when we turn from the discursive to the institutional domain, documents indicate a clear hierarchy among the EU's foreign policy instruments in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Like in the case of Operation Artemis, we find affirmed "the intention of the Commission to direct, where appropriate, its action towards achieving the objectives of this Joint Action" (Council of the European Union 2004b, article 15; see also European Council 2004). In line with this, it is found that the function of the crises response coordination teams was limited to being a forum where the European Commission was "informed", rather than involved as an equal partner (Schroeder 2007:27). A similar logic emerges from the fact that Operation Althea took the upper hand over the civilian police mission that took place at the same time (see Merlingen 2012).<sup>54</sup> These issues indicate that in this case the military operation came to play a predominant role over other forms of EU policy involvement.

Dijkstra (2013) actually highlights several institutional battles between the EU High Representative and the member states. He shows that while EU High Representative Solana aimed to broaden the objectives of the military operation, they remained fixed on the "deterrence" function. Similarly, Solana attempted to

strengthen the role of the EUSR to ensure the civilian control over the military operation. Yet this met resistance from both the Member States, supported by the European Commission.

If the record of Operation Althea in terms of institutional policy-embeddedness is thus problematic, the financial picture is more balanced. Despite its size, the common costs of operation Althea in its first years are approximately equal to the EU's commitments under CARDS. The common costs for Althea in those years were 89,05 and 91,35 million euro respectively (SIPRI Database). Under CARDS, 72 million euro was committed in 2004 and 49,4 million in 2005. Up to another 50 million euro was spend in 2005 on Democratic Stability, Good Governance, Economic Development and Community development. EUPM, the OHR and EUSR together amounted to another 60 million euro (European Commission 2005). So, in terms of financial embeddedness the military operation does not dominate the EU's involvement.

Notably, within EU policy circles the contribution of the Operation Althea to the EU's overall commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina has become the object of an ongoing debate (Solana cabinet A & C 2013; PMG member A 2013). The difficulties in achieving sustainable stability and peace in the country are often taken to confirm the necessity of continuing the military operation. Others, however, have come to argue that the military operation has itself become a factor that inhibits political progress.

To sum up, the first three EU military missions all served clear value-based objectives: implementing peace-agreements and protecting civilians and refugees. At the same time, they display great variation in terms of policy-embeddedness. While Operation Concordia was marked by a high degree of policy-embeddedness, in the case of Operation Artemis we find that the military instrument came to dominate all other EU policy-involvement in DR Congo. In turn, Operation Althea has a more mixed record: while there was great attention for the embeddedness of the operation in the wider foreign policy involvement and also the financial commitments were rather well-balanced, military considerations came to be prioritized in its institutional organization.

#### 4.3.2 From 2006 onwards: Towards greater embeddedness

As the EU became more experienced with military missions, we see that the employment of the military instrument remains very much premised on value-based justifications. This is confirmed by the two operations that were launched in the mid-2000's, with EUFOR RD Congo (2006) serving the peaceful administration of

<sup>53</sup> Although reconfigurations of the mission in 2007 and 2012 led to significant reductions of the number of troops involved, they maintained its "robust" character as a peace-enforcement operation (Council of the European Union 2007b).

<sup>54</sup> This finding seems to contrast with the rhetoric of EU-reports to the UN on Operation Althea, which maintain that there is a "close relationship with EUPM" (Council of the European Union 2005a). Also, Gross (2007) argues that, because of EUPM's weakness, Althea had to fill in. In this understanding Althea provided necessary value added, rather than that it was invasive upon the civilian police mission.

democratic elections<sup>55</sup> and EUFOR Chad (2008/2009) seeking to protect refugees from spoilers.<sup>56</sup>

The EU shall conduct a military operation in the DRC in support of MONUC<sup>57</sup> during the election process (Council of the European Union 2006b).

*Objectives of EUFOR Tchad/RCA:* “to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid (...); to contribute to the protection of UN personnel, premises, installations and equipment (...)” (Council Secretariat 2009).

At the same time, these missions demonstrate an emerging EU routine in ensuring that the military effort is effectively coordinated with, and contained in, its broader foreign policy repertoire.

Actually, the Joint Action launching *EUFOR Congo* does not display too much concern with policy embeddedness as it is rather neutral on the relationship of the operation with the Commission’s non-military involvement. It merely refers to the need for consistency without privileging either of the two (Council of the European Union 2006b, article 11) and uses rather weak language to describe the relationship with the EUSR. In practice, however, *EUFOR Congo* was initiated in the context of a much broader EU involvement or, as German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Gernot Erler, put it, this military operation was about “safeguarding” previous “bigger investments” in Congo (in: Quille 2006: 12). For one, the operation followed up on earlier political agreements reached in Pretoria and Sun City in 2002 (Council of the European Union 2006a). What is more, military deployment was complementary to the already present civilian CSDP operations, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC Congo (Norheim-Martinsen 2013). Also financially, the relatively small size of the military operation did anything but overshadow the EU’s overall involvement in the DRC with Commission funding for poverty reduction and institution-building amounting to 750 million euro in the period 2003-2007 (Ibid.). Thus, the limited scope of the operation in the context of the much broader EU engagement with DR Congo by

55 Martinelli (2010) argues that *EUFOR RD Congo*’s mandate was not charged with the population, but with the decision-makers. However, he also notes that despite the limited mandate, an active approach was taken against sexual violence.

56 Spoilers are actors who “actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement” (Newman and Richmond 2006: 1).

57 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

2006 explains why one EEAS official (C, 2013) even goes as far as characterizing *EUFOR Congo* as “an example of the comprehensive approach *avant la lettre*.”

The case of *EUFOR Chad* is more ambiguous in terms of its policy-embeddedness, depending on how broadly one frames the issues at stake. Importantly, the scope of *EUFOR Chad* was designed to remain separate from the internal political crisis in Chad (Orbie and Del Biondo 2015; Styan 2012). Its mandate explicitly did not include an intervention in Chad’s internal affairs, despite the interconnectedness between the security situation and Chad’s political crisis. Furthermore, political neutrality was emphasized because of a fear that the operation would serve as a cover for France’s interests in the wider situation in Chad. The Council Joint Action for *EUFOR Chad* (Council of the European Union 2007b) needs to be read in light of this insistence to limit the scope of the operation. Thus this decision is less explicit on the institutional relationship between the different foreign policy instruments than in operations discussed above, stating that the Council and the Commission “shall ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and external activities of the Community” (Council of the European Union 2007b, article 11). Similarly, concerning the relationship with the EUSR for Sudan, the Joint Action notes that the Commander “had to take into account its political guidance.” However, the main focus was on *EUFOR Chad* and, though the Commission was involved, clearly driven by the Council (Wittebrood and Gadrey 2010).

If one stays within the narrow confines of its mandate, then *EUFOR Chad* can in fact be characterized as an example of a “truly comprehensive plan” (Dijkstra 2010: 399; see also Haine 2011), complementing “substantial European Commission assistance for the establishment of a UN police force, training of the Chadian police/gendarmerie and justice reforms” (cf. Haine 2011: 594). Even though there were signs that the *EUFOR* operation put some pressure on the Commission to align its programmes (Helly 2009; Orbie and Del Biondo 2015), in the end the fears of the humanitarian aid community did not materialize. The humanitarian aid budgets of the Commission continued to be based on a needs-based approach. What is more, the inclusion of security related expenditures in the development programme did not come at the detriment of the development instruments (Orbie and Del Biondo 2015). In effect, one can say that an informal division of labour between the security and development spheres of the EU emerged: while *EUFOR*’s activities concerned the East of Chad, the Commission Delegation focused more on the other parts of the country (Orbie and Del Biondo 2015). In sum, the scope of the operation was deliberately limited and hence contributed only slightly to the overall EU involvement in the conflict in Chad. Hence, the operation scores rather low on policy-embeddedness.

### 4.3.3 From 2008 onwards: The emergence of utility-based justification

The most recent operations, since 2008, include EUNAVFOR Atalanta (since 2008), EUTM Somalia (since 2010), EUTM Mali (since 2013), EUFOR RCA (2014/2015), EUMAM RCA (since 2015) and EUNAVFOR Med (since 2015). In the organisation of these missions we see a further reinforcement of the trend to ensure their proper embeddedness in a broader EU policy. This is also underpinned by the adoption of the notion of a “comprehensive approach” (COM/HR 2013; Koenig 2014; Norheim-Martinsen 2013). At the same time, however, we discern a notable shift in the justification of these more recent operations as they contain some distinct utility-based considerations. Specifically, the case of Atalanta features concerns about the protection of European trade interests besides the protection of the UN-World Food Programme. Similarly, the justification of EUTM Mali quite openly invokes threats to the EU’s own security. While the motivation for the earlier training mission in Somalia remains couched in human security terms, also this case has been criticized for failing to live up to universal principles (Ehrhart and Petretto 2012b). Moreover, EUNAVFOR Med prioritizes the EU’s border security over human security.

*EUNAVFOR Atalanta* is the EU’s first maritime operation. Clearly, the primary justification of the operation has been the need to secure the safe administration of the UN-World Food Programme (WFP). Still, from the start the accompanying interest that the EU maintains in escorting its own commercial ships has also been acknowledged.

The EU shall conduct a military operation (...) in order to contribute to: the protection of vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia (...); the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (...) (Council of the European Union 2008).

Indeed, when one considers the actual division of labour among frigates, it is clear that the latter considerations played a large role, i.e. one or two frigates are used for the protection of the WFP and AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia), while five or six other frigates are deployed to protect commercial vessels (see also Chapter 6). What is more, Merlingen (2012) highlights that in the same year that Atalanta was launched, the EU refused to intervene militarily in eastern DRC to alleviate the grave humanitarian situation there. So, the EU “choose” Atalanta over DRC, which suggests that the EU’s utility-based concerns have come to be of decisive importance while humanitarian issues are necessary but not sufficient to launch a military operation (see also Chapter 6).

The launch of EUNAVFOR Atalanta certainly had a big impact on what had, up till then, been a rather modest EU policy towards Somalia. In fact, the first Council Joint Action of Atalanta does not refer to any other EU foreign policy instruments (Council of the European Union 2008). However, in 2011 the EU developed a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (Council of the European Union 2011c), which featured prominently in the amended mandate of the operation in 2012 (Council of the European Union 2012a). The Strategic Framework clearly positioned the fight against piracy as *part of* a comprehensive approach.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, it acknowledged that the root causes of piracy cannot be solved by the military instrument. This led to a closer involvement of non-military instruments of the European Commission (e.g. the Instrument for Stability) Also, financially, after the military operation started, other activities were intensified. Thus, the 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) (2008-2013) released 412 million euro for Somalia, a huge increase compared to only 63 million euro in the period 2003-2007 (Ehrhart and Petretto 2012b; European Commission 2013).

Indeed, rather than crowding out former policy instruments, Atalanta emerges as an EU military operation that acted as a trigger for a broader EU involvement (PMG-member D 2013; former employee Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs 2014). Thus, while the military engagement initially very much put its imprint on the EU’s involvement with Somalia, the launch of the Strategic Framework seems to mark a shift from a “piracy first” to a “Somalia first” policy (for the distinction see Ehrhart and Petretto 2012b).

The subsequent launching of *EUTM Somalia* in 2010 fits very well in the broadened EU strategy and one may doubt whether this training mission would ever have been undertaken without the maritime operation paving the way. Indeed, the justification adduced for EUTM Somalia is very much in line with a “human security” perspective.

The EU shall conduct a military training mission (...) in order to contribute to strengthening the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving the Somali citizens; (...) a comprehensive and sustainable perspective for the development of the Somalia security sector (...) (Council of the European Union 2010a; 2011b).

Still, Ehrhart and Petretto (2012b) suggest that the EU may have become too closely involved in the conflict. They argue that the EU fails to adopt an even-

<sup>58</sup> Norheim-Martinsen’s (2013: 164) disagrees, arguing that it is “hard to escape the point that Atalanta restricts itself to treating only those symptoms that directly threaten European economic interests, while the factors causing the symptoms are left untreated.”

handed and inclusive approach in Somalia and that support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia has taken precedence over serving the general population.<sup>59</sup> Also they argue that the focus on the training mission “shifts the attention away from the main challenge: finding a political solution” (Ehrhart and Petretto 2012b: 281).

Notably, the Council Decision to launch EUTM Somalia explicitly refers to the training operation as being part of the comprehensive approach, and specifically notes that the High Representative has to ensure that the operation is consistent with the EU’s development programme; the EU Mission Commander is assisting the High Representative in this regard (Council of the European Union 2010a). Also given its modest scale (with common costs set at 11.6 million euro), the training mission is unlikely to dominate the Commission’s development effort. In all, then, there is little reason to doubt that EUTM Somalia has been well embedded in the wider EU policy strategy towards the Horn of Africa.

The aim of *EUTM Mali*, which was launched in 2013, has been formulated as “restoring Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups” (Council of the European Union 2013). While the focus is obviously first of all on Malian territory and its integrity, the threat that is referred to also concerns the EU’s own security.

The situation increases the threat to the safety of EU citizens in the Sahel (hostage-taking, attacks) as well as in Europe, notably through the influence of extremists and terrorists networks over the diasporas, training, and logistical support from Al Qaida affiliates in the north of Mali. It also threatens the EU’s strategic interests, including the security of energy supply and the fight against human and drugs trafficking (EEAS 2016b).

Interestingly, however, other EU actors have emphasized the human security aspects of EUTM Mali. Thus, Eva Joly, the chair of the Development Committee of the European Parliament, characterized the operation as “contributing to the long term reform of the Malian army and the democratic and civilian control” (European Parliament 2013).

Regardless of its justification, EUTM Mali is clearly embedded within a broader framework of EU activities, i.e. the Sahel Strategy (EEAS 2011).

<sup>59</sup> This critique is part of the overarching concern of Ehrhart and Petretto (2012b) that the EU’s insistence on a centralized (i.e. state-like) system of governance in Somalia hampers an effective peace process.

The mission in Mali would be an essential element in the Union’s comprehensive approach as elaborated in the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (Council of the European Union 2013).

Also, in terms of institutional embeddedness the Mission Commander “shall receive local political guidance from the Head of Union Delegation in Bamako in close coordination with the EU coordinator for Sahel” (Ibid.) Moreover, there is no question of financial crowding out by the military operation. The common costs of EUTM Mali are expected to be 12,3 million euro for 15 months. These are financed independently and also are rather small compared to the 245 million euro that Mali receives under the already existing country programme, the European Development Fund and the Instrument for Stability (IfS), to which another 50 million euro has been added as part of the Sahel Strategy (EEAS 2011).

*EUFOR RCA* aimed at providing a “safe and secure environment” in the capital of the Central African Republic, Bangui (Council of the European Union 2014a). It assumed responsibility for the international airport, which provided a refuge for tens of thousands of internally displaced persons and as entry point for humanitarian supplies (Törö 2015). Early 2015 the military operation was replaced by the EU military advisory mission *EUMAM RCA* to support preparations for security sector reform (Council of the European Union 2015b). Discursively the operation is embedded within the EU’s comprehensive approach:

As part of a comprehensive approach, it confirmed the Union’s willingness to examine the use of relevant instruments to contribute towards the efforts under way to stabilise the country, including under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in both its military and civilian dimensions (Council of the European Union 2014a).

Just as in the case of EUTM Mali, the commanders of the RCA-operations receive political guidance from the Head of the EU Delegation (in Bangui). In terms of financial embeddedness, the RCA receives 160 million euro under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF. Also, under the African Peace Facility the EU contributed financially (á 50 million euro) to the AU-operation in the Central African Republic (MISCA)(European Commission 2014). Moreover, the EU scaled up its humanitarian engagement (from 20 million in 2012 to 150 million in 2013/2014)(EEAS 2014). However, unlike the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, the Central African Republic (CAR) is not part of an overarching strategic framework. In short, the RCA-operations do not crowd out non-military efforts, but they neither are explicitly tailored towards an overall approach. As such they are in-between cases of policy-embeddedness.

*EUNAVFOR Med Sophia* aims to “identify, capture and dispose of vessels and assets used or suspected of being used by smugglers or traffickers” (Council of the European Union 2015a). This mandate suggests that state security is privileged over human security:<sup>60</sup>

The operation is not a search & rescue operation. In that case you would have had a very different operation, which facilitated migration flows. On the other hand, it all started with a concern about human lives. But from a military perspective it is a secondary task. The key task of the operation is: disrupt, deter and destroy (PMG-chair 2015).

In terms of institutional embeddedness, rather than having a backseat, the Commission took a leading role in starting the operation by presenting an action plan on migration, which prominently included the call for a “systematic effort to capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers” (European Commission, 2015). As a German diplomat (2015) put it: “You could say that EUNAVFOR Med was the first operation launched by the Commission.” Compared to EUNAVFOR Atalanta the operation is institutionally better embedded from the start. However, discursively it actually dominates the EU’s approach to tackling the issue of sea-crossing migrants. In short, military operations are increasingly integral parts of a broader EU foreign policy strategy, like the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa in the case of Atalanta and EUTM Somalia and the Sahel Strategy in the case of EUTM Mali. At the same time, in the period since 2008 we discern a distinct shift in the justification strategies employed for these operations as increasingly there are also utility-based considerations at play, EU trade interests in the Somali cases, EU security interests in the case of Mali and border security in the case of EUNAVFOR Med.

## 4.4 Discussion and conclusion

In this chapter we have assessed the claim of a shift in the EU’s character along two dimensions: the logic of justification and policy-embeddedness. In terms of the logic of justification we find that most EU military missions are value-based. Certainly in launching its initial missions the EU emphasized the humanitarian concerns that were at stake. Typically, such operations aimed to support the implementation of peace agreements and/or democratic elections. However, the military operations

<sup>60</sup> EUNAVFOR Sophia also raises questions about the role of UN-authorization in launching EU military operations (see Chapter 7).

EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Mali, and the recently launched EUNAVFOR Med Sophia entail a different justification with a stronger focus on border control, trade interests and fighting terrorism.

Secondly, we assessed the EU’s military operations in terms of their relation with other EU foreign policy instruments, i.e. their policy-embeddedness. In this respect, the initial missions yielded rather mixed performances with Operation Concordia being highly embedded, while the record was more mixed for Operation Althea, and Operation Artemis actually offered most evidence of EU military involvement overshadowing, and even crowding out, EU non-military instruments. As the scope of the subsequent missions, EUFOR Congo and EUFOR Chad, was severely limited, they did not do much harm to other forms of EU policy involvement but neither did they allow for any positive interaction. In contrast, the missions in Somalia and Mali are clearly embedded in a broader policy strategy and there is indeed evidence for them giving positive impulses to other forms of EU involvement. This assessment suggests that the EU is increasingly capable of embedding its military instruments within its overall foreign policy toolkit. Yet, it is subject to further research how this changing role of EU military operations has developed, and how it relates to the policy rhetoric on the “comprehensive approach”, a term that dominates the EU’s discourse to denote its “unique” approach in international affairs (Koenig 2014; Norheim-Martinsen 2013).

Another way to summarize the findings of this chapter is by presenting them in terms of the typology that was presented in Section 3.2.4 (Table 4.2). This clearly demonstrates that the majority of the EU operations has strong human security characteristics in their justification. They are aimed at value-based objectives like implementing peace-agreements, protecting of civilians and refugees and supporting elections. In the earlier years, we find some examples (Artemis, Althea and, in a way, EUFOR Chad) where the launching of a military operation actually involved some militarization of the overall EU policy involvement. Yet, at least some cases (most notably Concordia, EUFOR Congo, and EUTM Somalia) have come to approximate the ideals of “comprehensive” Normative Power Europe. Notably, however, while the tendency to embed EU military operations in a broader policy strategy has become ever more effective, the most recent missions tend to have a more utility based justification.

Thus, while we find no clear cases of “realist operations”, in which the EU’s foreign policy would become hostage to a military logic, we find examples of both invasive military operations (as claimed by Manners 2006a and Smith 2005) and of complementary military operations (in line with Sjørnsen 2006, and others). This finding is most problematic for the “pacifist” NPE camp as it shows that military power does not go against normative power *per se*. However, the recent emergence

Table 4.2 Classification of EU military operations (2003-2015)

	High Policy-embeddedness	Low Policy-embeddedness
<b>Value-based justification</b>	Concordia (2003)	Artemis (2003)
	EUFOR Congo (2005/2006)	Althea (>2004)
	EUTM Somalia (>2010)	EUFOR Chad (2008/2009)
	EUFOR RCA/EUMAM RCA (>2014)	
<b>Utility-based justification</b>	EUNAVFOR Atalanta (>2008)	
	EUTM Mali (>2013)	
	EUNAVFOR Med (> 2015)	

of utility-based justifications for EU military operations would support the claim that the EU's military operations lead to a "great power" mentality that puts its own interests first. Notably, however, military operations have at the same time been made complementary to the EU's overall foreign involvement, and as such, go beyond just fighting symptoms. This suggests that the EU has moved towards a Liberal Power identity in which utility-based considerations have become of greater importance for legitimizing the launch of military operations, but these are embedded in, and coordinated with, a broader range of policy instruments.

In sum, the comprehensive review of the EU's military operations suggests a distinct trend of the evolving character of the EU's international power. However, to certify these changes and to analyse the mechanism at work that drive these changes, a closer analysis is needed. To this end chapter 5 and 6 present an in-depth assessment of, respectively, EUFOR Althea and EUNAVFOR Atalanta. The former case study is a within-case analysis, covering almost the full operational CSDP-era, the latter enhances our insights into the underlying dynamics of the key cross-case changes that are identified in this chapter.