Summary in English

A Dynamic Courtship. The Salvation Army and the Welfare State in the Netherlands

The Salvation Army is a recognizable icon of social care all over the world. In the Netherlands the Army is well known for its charitable activities like giving shelter to the homeless and providing for other primary help like clothing, food or just a friendly face. Interwoven with this image is its faith-based character, for in its public display, the Army explicitly emphasizes that the Christian faith is what drives the Salvationist. In fact, in the Netherlands the Salvation Army is an acknowledged church.

This image of the Army as a faith-based charity is far from complete though, because the Salvation Army is also a sizable professional social service provider. The Army offers, on a daily basis, programs for the elderly, children, women, the homeless and young mothers; as well as day care programs, addiction programs, services to the armed forces, prisoners, youngsters, the unemployed, those in debts, the hungry and even programs to students. Apart from this, the Salvation Army provides for many other medical and health services, emergency disaster response, and educational programs. As a faith-based organization, the Salvation Army is embedded in the Dutch society as well as in the realms of social and medical care.

Throughout Dutch history, these social activities were traditionally provided for by church groups and other, often faith-based, organizations. However, after the era of secularization and political neutralization that occurred during the second half of the twentieth century, there are not many faith-based social service providers left in the Netherlands. The fact that the Salvation Army forms an exception to this development makes it an interesting organization for further analysis. Especially considered that 90% of the costs that the Army incurs on these social services are paid for by public money in the form of subsidies, grants, government contracts, contributions from collective health insurances and other social welfare legislation.

The Salvation Army does not operate in a political or social as it had to relate to the Dutch national government. Also, from the moment it opened its doors in Amsterdam in 1887, it had to participate in a field of social care that was already occupied by a myriad of smaller and larger organizations. Therefore the Army was always part of the Dutch civil society. Since the last decades of the nineteenth century, the national government began to show an increasing interest in alleviating social problems by means of social welfare legislation. This however, meant that the roles of both the government and civil society would be altered. With the increase in social legislation between 1890 and 1945, the prime responsibility for these issues slowly started to shift from the shoulders of civil society to the national and local governments. This process gained momentum after World War II when the contours of what would be called the ‘welfare state’ became visible, both internationally as well as in the Netherlands. Next to the Ministry of Social Affairs (1933), the Ministry of Social Work was established in 1952, and a safety net of social (welfare) legislation was laid out during these decades. The introduction of the Social Support Act in 1965 created income security for everyone in the Netherlands. This closing move by the Dutch welfare state however, also implied that civil society had lost its traditional prerogative of being ultimately responsible for poor relief, a position that is still a fact in present times.

This shift in the balance between the government and civil society with regard to the responsibility for social care shows that the Dutch state and civil society maintained a relationship in their mutual effort to battle social wrongs; a battle in which both actors were dependent on each other. While the government lacked the power to actually intervene in people’s private situations, civil society made use of governmental (financial and legislative) support in its effort to do precisely that. And so this relationship was based on a shared goal. On the other hand, as this study shows, both actors also demonstrated reluctance in this cooperation. Even though they were bound together by mutual dependency, this relation seems to have been interspersed with an alternating pattern of attraction and repulsion in which both actors had their own, variable, preconditions. To a certain extent this pattern bears a resemblance to that of a courtship dance - a relationship in which attraction and repulsion alternate within the social framework of interdependence. This metaphor also applies to the Salvation Army which has been more than just a witness to these developments. Being part of civil society, the Army has also actively taken part in the social policy system process as an actor. Therefore, studying this relationship sheds new light on how this system impacted the Dutch faith-based civil society with the Salvation Army operating on its frontline.

The central research questions in this study are as follows: What are the perceptible dynamics in the relation between the state and the Salvation Army in the Netherlands with regard to social policy between 1890 and 1990? What do these dynamics reveal about the developing Dutch welfare state and faith-based...
civil society and how did they affect the identity of the Salvation Army itself? These main questions are further subdivided into more empirical research questions with regard to the relationship between the government and the Army: What were the policy goals and underlying principles of the government and of the Salvation Army? And how did these goals function in the cooperation, dependency and distribution of power between both actors? Moreover, how did this cooperation influence the Salvation Army’s identity? This last question leads to more issues connected to the Salvation Army, of which the following are addressed: How was the Salvation Army able to maintain its faith-based identity within the force field of the changing governmental attitude towards such faith-based civil society organizations? What were the main issues in relation to the state that pressured the Salvation Army, and by what means did the Salvation Army attempt to control these external influences and to maintain its autonomy and identity?

These questions are addressed in this study by means of historical research. Primary and secondary sources are studied and interpreted in a historical-hermeneutical manner. In order to learn more about the Salvation Army, its archives in the Netherlands are analyzed and supplemented by interviews with keypersons from the Army. The historical description of the Dutch welfare policy is largely based on parliamentary records and further supplemented with secondary literature. The most significant concepts that are studied, like the welfare state, civil society, organizational identity, and the idea of the relationship between the government and the Salvation Army as a part of civil society, are framed in an international discursive academic context.

**Part I: The social policy system in the Netherlands**

In Part I the development is analyzed of what is framed as the ‘social policy system’. This system is based on a structural relationship between the government as the main policy provider, and civil society and the Dutch citizens as main policy implementers and clients. In a combined effort to tackle social problems, these actors have created a system in which public and private funds are structurally reallocated to social policy aims; aims that alter over time, according to social and political developments. The time span of this part of the study (1854-1990) is chosen because of the underlying theme of this narrative: the responsibility for care and the effects this has on the position of civil society in relation to the government.

Around 1900 the (merely local) governmental approach to social problems was mainly to support goals on concrete social issues, and only step into the picture when these had developed into situations beyond the scope of civil society organizations, as was the case with tuberculosis and infant mortality for example. This support was hardly structural, was offered on request of the organization that was to carry out the implementation and was based on supplementarism, for the organizations themselves had to pay for most of the costs incurred.

Soon after 1900 however, a change started to take shape. Both civil society and the national government increasingly sought the assistance of each other on various social issues. However, opposition to state control and the fear of losing autonomy from the side of civil society curbed the further structuralizing of this budding cooperation. Nevertheless, during the period 1910-1945 the contours of certain policy goals became visible. The quality of the social care was to be increased by professionalization of the organizations involved: skilled labor and accountability. Also, the intensifying process of pillarization had increased the number of care organizations and problems of manageability grew. So, with the intention of ‘harmonizing’ this fragmented and extensive group of organizations, the government encouraged them to unite into an umbrella organization, corresponding with their ideological pillars. With World War II approaching, two important social policy themes had become visible: quality and manageability. Additionally, the availability of governmental funding to social service organizations not only instigated a growth in the number of organizations, but more than once, the funding appeared to be of a more structural nature than was envisioned. This enhanced the structural character of the cooperation between the government and civil society. The ‘social policy system’ was born.

The post-war spirit of ‘reconstruction and renewal’ strengthened the co-alignment of the government and civil society, resulting in the establishment of the Ministry of Social Work in 1952. Also, between 1945 and 1965 important Dutch welfare legislation was adopted and implemented, and the Dutch welfare state was coming of age. The social policy theme of manageability, interpreted as harmonization and efficiency, was now legitimized by acknowledgment of the value of identity. This became clear in the government’s effort to involve the public with the construction of social policy by inviting its organizational representatives – civil society – at the policy table. Because of their identity, civil society organizations were regarded to be the pre-eminent structures to mobilize their grassroots and made them valued partner to the government in the social policy system. During the empowering 1960s however, the governmental view on identity as an organizing principle started to change. With the crumbling of the
ideological pillars, new ideologically ‘neutral’ organizations were created, in which the smaller former faith-based civil society organizations started to combine their forces. With this development a third important policy theme rose to the surface: social activation and participation. The development of the welfare state was accompanied by a growing emphasis of the government on participation and during the 1960s promotion of volunteer work became one of the policy lines that were adopted. Also the administrative approach of decentralization aimed at the increase of both participation and manageability and would remain a recurring theme throughout the twentieth century. National policy was to be decentralized to those governmental administrative levels (municipality, province) that were regarded to have more knowledge and understanding of the groups that were the subject of these policies. This development also meant that some of the power that the government possessed would be redistributed to the local level and civil society would have to recalibrate its position in this force field accordingly.

With regard to the policy theme of quality, the emphasis on professionalization of both personnel and the administration of the civil society organizations continued throughout these post-war decades. But as a result of the emancipatory vigor of the 1960s, the themes of professionalization and participation were also translated by a new theme: democratization and representation.

In 1974, Knelpuntennota (Bottleneck report) took stock of the government’s policy efforts on harmonization, quality and participation and the results were tough on civil society as well as on the government. In short, civil society was alleged to have turned into introspective organizations. Professionalization had reduced the importance of the volunteer, the role of identity had diminished and with it the representational function of civil society suffered much pressure. It seemed to have lost its added value and now its place in the social policy system was debatable. The characteristics of representation and identity that had earlier set civil society apart had now devaluated, and with the responsibility for social help in the hands of the government, it was only a matter of time before the government would intervene.

The Knelpuntennota had for the first time made explicit what was already widely felt: civil society had lost its added value of being a representative on the matter of identity. This observation formed a clear threat to its existence and so civil society organizations had to reinvent themselves, for which, interestingly, civil society received help from the government. In response to the situation sketched by the Knelpuntennota the government continued its decentralization effort in order to improve participation on the local level. Civil society itself would have to be restructured, but in order to do achieve success on this front the organizations themselves would have to be involved in the process. Civil society also was to continue on the road to harmonization and participation in terms of democratization and effectiveness, and possibilities for further democratic influence in civil society organizations would be studied. However, now that civil society organizations were no longer regarded as organizational exponents of their grassroots, they could function very well as support structures to further individual activation of what was left of their grassroots. This was combined with a revaluation of the volunteer from the side of the government. Even though the civil society organizations were no longer valued as identity organizations, the volunteer’s internal motivation was still based on this identity and this source of intrinsic commitment was still considered important by the government. In place of civil society organizations, individual citizens were now regarded as representatives of their individual identity. These organizations however, could be able to maintain their place in the social policy system by facilitating this ‘rehabilitation of the volunteer’ which was deemed by the government as essential for the quality of social services.

This development continued into the 1980s when policy goals like decentralization, democratization and volunteer commitment were emphasized to develop human potential. New however, was the idea that this was not to be facilitated by the central state, but on a local level. And not by civil society organizations as intermediary political institutions, but only as support structures for the individual development of their autonomous members. Volunteer work had now to be revalued for it was both a means of participation as well as a possible way for effective cost reduction. This new policy framework was phrased as ‘the responsible society’ by Minister of CRM, Brinkman (CDA): individual activation and self-responsibility by means of mantelzorg (taking care of one’s fellow), self-help, and volunteer work, became central elements in the welfare policy of these years. In order to implement these policies effectively, society itself would have to regain its responsibility for social problems, and this effort had to be supported more by the market than by the state. So the government had to keep its distance from the playing field. With the announcement of the retrenchment of the state and the lack of added value of these civil society organizations, individuals and society had regained their responsibility. Further financing of the umbrellas was now needless and many ceased to exist.

By 1990, the welfare policy system had seen different phases of development: commencement, coming of age, flowering, hampering, adjustment and fine-tuning. And now it seemed to enter a new phase of
change. Interesting however is that even though change seemed to have been the main force that shaped the structure and form of policy, three values were visible throughout this process: quality, manageability and participation. These values formed the base for welfare policy concepts that differed over time in dominance as well as with regard to their actual interpretations: professionalization, harmonization, shared responsibility, democratization, decentralization, volunteer work and activation. A central theme in the development of these policy concepts was the role of civil society as co-actors in the system. As long as ‘identity’ provided for an organizational principle, the government seemed to value civil society as a partner. But when this added value became less clear, civil society had to recalibrate its position in the welfare policy system, and even though the government provided for a possible new role, many faith-based civil society organizations united into large ‘neutral’ service providers, while others ceased to exist. What about the Salvation Army then? How did the Army position itself within this welfare policy system and how did it cope with the different force fields that were integrated into this system?

**Part II: The Salvation Army identity process**

In Part II, the development of the Salvation Army as an actor in this social policy field is described, starting with the Army’s establishment in the Netherlands in 1887 and continuing on till the Army’s most recent fundamental reorganization in 1990. During this period, three narrative lines are followed: how the Salvation Army became a part of the social policy system and how this influenced the Army’s identity; the consequences of this process on a legal level; and its consequences on the level of professionalization. These three developments converged during the 1980s, and provided for important and rather pressing reasons for the Army to consider a fundamental restructuring of its organization, which eventually took place in 1990. The Salvation Army’s identity was shaped along three developments: its position in the social policy system, its legal identity and its professionalization.

**The Salvation Army as part of the welfare policy system**

Although the English parent organization The Salvation Army started out as a religious community, founder William Booth decided in 1890 that the Army had to be more than a church. It could no longer close its eyes to the poignant social misery existent in the industrialized England of the late nineteenth-century. With the publication of *In Darkest England and The Way Out*, Booth introduced an additional goal to the preaching of the gospel: provision of social care where and when possible. Since then, the identity of the Army was based on a double mission: religious salvation and social care. This double mission set the path for the young division of the Army in the Netherlands (1887) to cooperate with the Dutch government. Therefore, over the period between 1887 and the end of World War II, the government and the Army increasingly realized that, to a large extent, they pursued similar goals, focusing on combating social problems. Soon after the introduction of the social mission in 1890 the Army in the Netherlands grew in size from 37 corps in 1890 to 48 in 1892. The Army’s social work also increased and in 1908, the Army spent an equal amount of money on its religious mission as it did on its social work. The initial cooperation of the Army with the government became visible through its rehabilitation work. Although, since the early years of the twentieth century, the government made grants available for this work on an occasional basis, the Probation Order of 1910 made way for a structural government support funding. Because of its decades-long experience with this form of care, the Army was also asked to participate in this arrangement, indicating that the government recognized that both actors pursued similar goals. Nevertheless, the Army showed some hesitation, because the acceptance of this invitation would bring other cherished values of the Army under pressure: autonomy and independence. The Army took plenty of time before it decided to finally enter into such cooperation, the decision being necessitated by the threat to the very livelihood of the organization - an argument also used by other rehabilitation organizations. During the economic crisis of the 1930s, it became obvious that the probation department of the Army had become quite dependent on these funds. However, instead of withdrawing, the Army decided to strengthen its own position. The Army had to be spared, it argued, because the work that it did saved the government thousands of guilders. And with this argument, the Army claimed that although the balance of power had changed in favor of the government, the relationship between the two actors was based on a certain degree of reciprocity. This argument of economic reciprocity legitimized the Army’s position - a strategy that fitted well in the time of economic downturn. But because the Army realized that its dependence on the government was greater than the other way round, it hastened to add that it was only a tool in the toolbox of the government, thereby presenting itself as being merely instrumental. These arguments of economic
reciprocity and instrumental supplementation remained important features of the relationship of the Army with the government.

After World War II the Army continued to expand as both its social activities and church grew, and its operating result doubled (as did the private donations). This was partly because the government increased its subsidy supply. But another important factor was that the Army itself was getting accustomed to its place within the social policy system, and also managed to locate new subsidy sources. Additionally, the Army reorganized parts of the organization based on the subsidy flows, which was a clear sign of the readiness of the Army to be flexible in order to ensure its own existence. At times however, the relationship between the government and the Army became tensed, but the relationship with the Army proved to be too valuable for the government municipality to risk, emphasizing the interdependence of both actors.

Between 1910 and 1980, the Army’s strategy of economic reciprocity and supplementation, legitimized the position of the Army in the social policy system, and the social mission of the Army became an important pillar of the organization and its identity. But during the 1970s and especially the 1980s, this legitimization as well as the convergence of objectives between the two actors, came under pressure as the harmonization efforts of the government were hardly felt, especially within the rehabilitation department of the Salvation Army. The government aimed for harmonization of the work field and for the Army, merger meant having to let go of its own rehabilitation work and disappearing into a larger and ‘neutral’ organization. This would prove to not be an option to the Salvation Army which strove for the preservation of its right of existence and autonomy. Thus this interdependency with the government had resulted in the development of the Army’s social services to such an extent that within the social policy system it pressured the other side of the Army’s coin: its identity. Once again the question presented itself: how to maintain its identity and at the same time show as much flexibility as possible in order to secure its income?

The legal identity of the Salvation Army

During most of its existence in the Netherlands, the Salvation Army has tried to give shape to its legal identity, especially with regard to its changing political and social context. This legal identity was mirrored on three levels: the Articles of Association; the phrasing of the Army’s mission statement therein; and the subsequent form of legal incorporation that the Army chose. The Army’s legal identity was closely related to its identity in a larger sense, as the underlying questions of this narrative show: What are we? What can we be? And what do we want to be? And to a certain extent, these questions in turn also relate to the balance of power between the government and the Salvation Army.

Before World War II the Salvation Army seemed to have maneuvered itself into an unclear legal position. With its Articles of Association of 1896 and 1931 it was incorporated as a foundation. But the Army was at times convinced that it was actually an “ecclesiastical foundation” – a legal form for foundations that were part of a denomination or a church. The international relation with its alma mater in the United Kingdom however, invoked another ambiguous image, for even though in fact the Dutch Salvation Army was British property, it clearly presented itself to be quite Dutch. Until World War II, the Army seemed to feel comfortable with this self-selected identity. But during the war, this changed with the liquidation of the Salvation Army in the Netherlands by the German oppressors, for the Articles of Association of 1931 clearly indicated that the Army was an English organization. In order to counterbalance this show of force from the oppressors, and to continue its activities, the Army re-established itself in 1941, but now as a church, and with a separate foundation for its remaining social activities. This flexibility in order to ensure its existence would have far-reaching consequences, as became clear when in 1945, once again by means of external intervention, the liquidation was annulled and the Army’s past legal form of foundation was restored based on the 1931 Articles. But by then the Army’s rank and file had learned to appreciate being a church to such an extent that it wanted to remain a church. Additionally, being a church could also shield the Salvation Army against possible new unwanted government interference. So next to its internal drive, the Army also wanted to remain a church in order to improve its position relative to the government on the power balance. On the other hand, the Army did not want to give up the legal form of the foundation, for this provided for a better legal framework for its financial relations with the government. And, quite in line with its pre-war preference for ambiguity, the Army chose both: based on the Articles of 1931 the Army was a foundation and based on its annulled recognition as a church (1941), it presented itself as a church. This new hybrid legal form was recorded in the new statutes of 1946, and with (hesitant) recognition by the Department of Justice in 1948, the Salvation Army was from then on actually a church-foundation. An identity that was partly formed under
the strong influence of governments, but which was also self-willed by the Army, for it perfectly fit the Army’s attitude of flexibility of being both a church and a social work organization, and also provided for an organizational framework that ensured financial certainty.

The Army had succeeded in dressing its religious core (church) in a secular robe (foundation) and creating a chameleonic identity that proved to serve its purpose well in the public sphere. How this secular robe worked in practice became clear in the parliamentary debates during the post-war decades. Often the Army became an example of either a religious organization with a significant supply of social services, or a regular social service provider with a religious identity. And it was even a test case during the debate on how to define a church. The Salvation Army was used as an example to explore the boundaries of possible legislation in this debate. But even when in parliament, the Salvation Army proved to be intangible. It seems to have been quite convenient to regard the Army mainly as a social service provider, for it was regarded as a valued partner in the social work area. So, the government intention of being flexible towards civil society, and in this case the Salvation Army, became quite visible in this instance. The co-alignment of goals might have induced certain goodwill with regard to the Army’s ambiguous identity.

Next to this external debate on the Army’s legal identity, within Army ranks as well, there began a debate on what the Army was, during the first half of the 1960s when Dutch Commander Palstra signaled that something had to change. Because the Dutch public and government finding out that they were actually supporting an English organization would probably have quite negative consequences on the finances. This indicated that the Army was searching to enhance the certainty of its existence, be it in a legal or financial form. However, it still took until the mid-1970s for the debate to actually heat up. In 1974 Commander Verwaal decided that the Army had to establish a separate foundation for some of its social activities (e.g. probation), presumably because of the subsidy stipulations that these parts had to deal with. Additionally Verwaal commissioned a group to rewrite the mission statement of the Army to establish a better balance between its social and religious missions. So, because of external pressure the Army once again showed rather large internal flexibility. This would however, result in a prolonged and sometimes heated internal debate in which two lines of argumentation revealed themselves. This was also incited by the introduction of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code in 1976 as it knocked away the legal pillar which till now had supported the Army’s ambiguous identity. The legal form of ecclesiastical foundation (as the Army had till now presented itself) was no longer valid and the Army was now confronted with a choice between becoming either a church or a foundation. This new legislation also revealed the weaker position of the Army in this power balance where it actually had little influence and therefore proved to be rather vulnerable with regard to its identity.

**Professionalization of the Salvation Army**

The modernization of the Salvation Army is closely related to the process of professionalization. Already long before World War II, professionalization was visible within the social work field itself, as educational institutes were already established since the end of the nineteenth century, aiming to provide for better quality social aid to the workers. For the Salvation Army the beginning of this process of professionalization became noticeable in the developing probation work. The rise in demand for probation work brought the government and the Army more on one line and the government spurred organizations like the Army to take on more work by offering growing financial support. Moreover, the increasing complexity of social problems, which was also felt in the probation work field, emphasized the need for professionalization. This created a culture of knowledge-sharing and debate within the Army’s probation organization, next to a qualitative improvement of its probation workers. With regard to accountability, the Salvation Army was already publishing its annual financial accounts before 1900, including a separate balance sheet for its social work activities.

From 1950 onwards however, the process of professionalization experienced a new development. The increase in social work activities and its growing differentiation and specialization resulted in various training programs that created professional experts. This development was not only supported by the government, but civil society organizations themselves also sustained the process as both actors wanted to improve the quality of the provided services. Moreover, these organizations often strove for governmental acknowledgment of their profession, thus also creating possibilities for structural finances.

With regard to the Army’s rehabilitation department, the Probation Code of 1947 stipulated that all personnel had to be approved by the Ministry of Justice. On another level, the introduction of the social casework method offered the Army a legitimization for its method of work based on an individual level with close proximity to the client. This social casework method however, also required the professional to dispose of any hidden agendas like proselytizing. Even more, speaking of any religious subject became a
sort of taboo. In its wake however, the popularity of social casework brought about a new emphasis on schooling and in 1964 the Ministry of Justice indicated education as being a compulsory prerequisite to the employment of probation officials. Just a year ago, the Army’s probation department had reorganized into separate organizational units and had therefore loosened its organizational ties with the corps. Was a breach in the two-sided coin of the Army’s identity starting to become visible?

Another effect of professionalization on the Army was that its work force changed. The amount of well-trained officers diminished compared to the new employee-recruits. On a managerial level as well, professionals were hired, and in the case of the Army’s rehabilitation department this was also done by the stipulation of the Ministry of Justice. So, on many levels the Army thought that its ideological core was slowly but surely being watered down by professionally-motivated personnel. In order to counteract this development, the Army tried to occupy all other key positions with its own people, except for in the probation department. In 1972 however, the probation department finally parted with its traditional core by dismissing its many volunteers.

During the 1960s and 1970s the probation work field and the Salvation Army probation department diverged increasingly in course. Because of the emphasis on harmonization, the probation work field started to merge into larger, general organizations (SRI in 1973, AVR in 1976) but the Salvation Army remained a faith-based probation organization on its own. The opposition towards governmental actions to merge smaller organizations into a larger umbrella organization went so far that it urged the Army to show its added value. On what basis could it claim retaining its right of existence? The Army’s answer was its unique identity. But then again the Army was confronted with the question: what did this identity consist of? On the other hand, the government had displayed that it valued ‘identity’ as a source of activating power. Nevertheless, by 1980, the divergence of goals between the government and the Salvation Army started to raise tensions that directly confronted the Army with the matter of identity. And this matter would have to be addressed sooner rather than later, for with the balance of power leaning towards the government, the Salvation Army was quite endangered in its existence.

During the 1970s and 1980s the role of the professional was thoroughly debated in the Netherlands. The increase in numbers of professionals was regarded to have created a separate group of workers within former volunteer organizations. This brought about two problems: for one, these professionals had seized some of the organizations’ powers at the cost of non-professionalized management, and on the other hand, the availability of professional help seemed to have created a demand of its own. Professionals were suspected of making clients dependent on their services, stripping them of their own initiative and sense of responsibility. And in its wake, these professionals were blamed for sidelining the volunteers that had traditionally formed the core of the organizational identity, as had happened within the Salvation Army probation department. Within the original constellation of the Salvation Army, it was the officer that personified the Army’s double mission. As what this study calls a ‘vocational volunteer’, the officer often worked both in the social work field and in the Army’s corps. In order to improve this work on both types of activities, internal schooling was provided for that prepared the officer ‘to win souls’.

On another level, professionalization developed into a call for democratic participation within civil society organizations. The public had to regain influence over their lives, and one of the forms in which this took place was to gain influence in the organizations they worked in or that worked for them. This resulted in a thoroughly revised Works Councils Act in 1971. In 1977 the committee-Van der Burg tried to support the effect of this Act by suggesting that the position of all stakeholders in these organizations, general public; employees; and clients, had to be strengthened. In the case of the Salvation Army, democratic participation was regarded to be quite at odds with its hierarchical management structure. Especially with regard to the declining number of (internal) officers in relation to the growing number of (external) employees. The possibility of democratic participation would imply the growth of external influence within the organization, and especially in the case of the church, this was unacceptable to the Army command. Even though democratic participation was already common practice to a certain extent within the probation department, the Army command contested the installment of works councils throughout the entire organization. It was convinced that the law did not apply to the Salvation Army since it was officially a church. However, the Dutch Council of State decided that the Works Councils Act did actually apply to the Army for it had more than 100 employees. Thus in this context, the fact that the Army was also a church was disregarded, and the Army was considered first and foremost a social work organization.

*Reorganization of identity*
During the 1980s the developments that are described above came together. The decentralization movement caused the Salvation Army to an increasing extent to do business at the local level. The Army itself however, found that municipalities were not always convinced of this cooperation, especially when the economic downturn left its mark on the public finances. In the Utrecht case, the proposed cutbacks threatened a number of Army activities with closure. In addition, the Army itself concluded that the Utrecht municipality preferred doing business with general organizations instead of with the obvious Christian Salvation Army. Even though this turned out not to be true, the tone was set: the identity of the Army was now openly problematic. In Amsterdam as well the identity of the Army was debated: To what extent were non-Christian clients or even homosexuals welcome in the Army? And should the government even be subsidizing a Christian social service? The Amsterdam municipality wanted to check the Army’s statutes in order to answer these questions, but according to the Army, these statutes were not sufficiently up-to-date. Another problem that Amsterdam confronted the Army with was its reorganization of the home care system. The city-wide approach would be constrained to separation into particular districts. For the Army this meant that it would lose much of its city-wide home care and thus the Army decided to appeal against it. The main argument that the Army used was that because of its 'identity' it was able to appeal to a particular audience. Additionally, due to its large proportion of volunteers, the Army would be able to provide for 24-hour accessibility. So now the Army tried to turn its problematic identity to its advantage, and with success because the Amsterdam municipality agreed with this position.

These arguments of autonomy and identity were also used in the Army’s efforts to rescue its rehabilitation work that was threatened by the waves of merger during the 1970s. In the early 1980s, however, this seemed to have been in vain as the Army was facing an increasingly compelling government approach. In 1984 a large-scale lobby was organized by the Salvation Army. The General (U.K.) wrote letters to the Dutch parliament and the Army explained its precarious situation to many Dutch (health)care organizations by sending them leaflets. On January 31, 1984 the Salvation Army rallied at the Binnenhof in The Hague. Among much display of flags, brass instruments and shiny buttons on uniforms, the Commander offered a petition to the Parliamentary Committee on Justice. This 'March at the Binnenhof' showed that the Army had remained committed to its rehabilitation organization, thus expressing its internal unity. However, it would not be much later that the Army faced decisions regarding the rehabilitation work, whereby the options were either to merge into a large, general organization; or cease to exist; or become a contractual partner of the government in the hope that the Army’s identity might be preserved. The Army chose the latter option, as this was the most likely way to continue its rehabilitation work while hoping to maintain its own identity. It did however change the status of the department into a proxy organization of the Dutch government.

This hardly meant that the debate on the Army’s identity was over. Quite the contrary, for during the 1980s the question of what exactly this identity contained became increasingly urgent. To find a contemporary answer, the Army Leadership decided to use the Army’s centenary in 1987 by organizing a symposium where representatives of the Army, along with people from various fields in which the Army was active (politicians, policymakers and academics) could reflect on the question together: to what extent does a Christian organization like the Salvation Army have a right to exist and how can identity affect such a faith-based social service provider? This formula proved successful. Though there were also critical comments on the combination of social work and religion, the overall conclusion of the day was that precisely because of its own identity, the Salvation Army was a relevant actor in the field of social work. It was even stated that this identity increased the motivation of the employees to an extent that many other organizations were left to envy.

Nevertheless, this was not the end of it, for the Gordian knot of the Army’s identity had still to be cut in a legal sense. The main question here, since the new Dutch Civil Code had knocked away the legal pillar supporting the Army’s ambiguous identity, was: what legal form did the most justice to the modern Salvation Army? The Army was forced to make a choice between becoming a church or a foundation. The two trains of thought within the Army ranks on this problem were based on the same legal documents. The Salvation Army’s legal advisor Houthoff and his adherents (amongst which were many of the Army executives) were of the opinion that the Salvation Army was legally a church and in order to protect this church from government influences, but at the same time remain eligible for government financing, the Army had to establish separate foundations for its social activities. The church would in this case remain a church. The other line of thought, represented by managers of the probation department of the Army: Hartjes and later also Fijn, stated that the Army was a foundation and that it had to legally alter nothing in order to maintain its position. It had never actually been an ecclesiastical foundation, but ‘just’ a foundation. Both the Army’s legal entities (church, 1948; foundation, 1949) were already incorporated, but
the Army had to present itself in the future more as a secular foundation instead of a religious foundation. In this way there was no legal alteration necessary, an alteration that would, in the opinion of Hartjes and Fijn, lead to a ‘splitting of the coin’ that William Booth had forged together in 1890.

When the Army command decided to go with the Houthoff argument: that the Army was and would remain a church, it led to enormous financial consequences, for the government was not allowed to subsidize a church as was confirmed in 1980 by the Ministry of Justice. This vulnerable position was once again emphasized three years later when the Central Archives for the Collection system (CAC) stated the same with regard to public collections. So, even though the Salvation Army actually wanted to be a church donning a secular robe – a position that was opposed internally – external demands brought about a different decision. In 1990 the Salvation Army had reorganized itself into five separate but connected legal entities: four foundations with their own corporate identity, and a church, based on the Articles of 1946.

**Part III: A dynamic courtship**

In this concluding section, the perspectives of the government and of the Salvation Army are brought together to analyze the main question of this study about the dynamic relationship between these two actors. In order to make a valuable assessment however, it is necessary to include the aftermath of the Army’s reorganization, and therefore a chapter is added at the end that takes into account the developments of the governmental welfare policy as well as the Army’s identity process during the post-reorganization period of 1990-2010.

The relationship between the Salvation Army and the Dutch government within the social policy system has yielded a dynamic that can be characterized as a system in which reciprocity and mutual dependence play important roles. To determine who has what influence, both internally and externally, the balance of power between the two actors is crucial. This balance of power is partly connected to the values that formed the base of the social policy during much of the twentieth century: quality, participation and manageability. The degree to which the actors were attracted to each other, was in part determined by the extent to which their goals co-aligned. Another element was the measure in which both actors were able to entice the other to demonstrate adequate flexibility, while their own position remained secure as far as possible. Additionally, the dynamic that has been analyzed in this study was not only at work between the Army and the government, but also within the Salvation Army itself.

The Army was focused on securing its right to exist as a faith-based social service provider, and to do so it constructed its identity on its dual mission, while it formed its organization according to the requirements of the time. During this process the Army used a number of arguments of which economic reciprocity and supplementation were a part. With regard to its legal identity, the Army was much more ambivalent. Its idea of donning a secular robe over its religious core offered much flexibility in the legal field while simultaneously supporting the view that the Army had on its identity. With regard to the theme of professionalization, the Army reacted quite fiercely. From the beginning the Army worked to develop the professional skills of its staff and its administrative processes, but at the same time it could not avoid the increase in external professionals in the organization. Any initial resistance within the Army towards professionalization increased when democratization seemed to put the core of the Army’s identity at stake and now, the Army defended its identity, just as it did during the period in which the probation work of the Army was threatened with annexation.

The two decades following the Army’s reorganization in 1990 showed that these external and internal developments had not ended. The free market system that was actively supported by the government during the 1990s and 2000s forced the Army to distinguish itself even more. Once again a (now)tested Army-argumentation was brought into position: its identity. In 2005 the Christian identity was even defined by the Army as an important competence through which the quality of the Army’s staff was guaranteed. The Dutch government also seemed to loosen up a bit with regard to faith-based civil society. The Social Support Act (WMO, 2007) made an explicit appeal to the entire Dutch civil society, including churches and religious organizations, to contribute to the social cohesion between the citizens and to stimulate individual participation. Yet, the instrumental nature of this appeal seemed to ignore all nuances that were related to civil society, for in the Explanatory Memorandum churches were placed at par with sport-clubs.

The Army continued to develop briskly during this decade. At least the Army’s social services did, because the church proved to have a much harder time. Revenues declined, as did the number of members. And after several attempts to revive the Army church, in 2009 a thorough revision of the Army’s strategy for the church was set in motion. The number of corps had to be reduced significantly, and they had to also create more relevance to their immediate environment. However, the implication that these corps could
call in the support of the Army’s Foundation of Welfare and Healthcare was not made very concrete. In some places though, collaboration between the local corps and the Foundation was actually established and seemed to bear fruit for both entities. But, as some within the Army ranks wonder: is the organizational structure actually that important to keep the driving force of its members alive - Salvationism? Isn’t the actual deed more important to express the spiritual message? Nevertheless, the organization, and the way the two missions are interwoven in its structure and people, will continue to play a major role in the near future. Though the breeding ground of Salvationism will have to be cultivated and nurtured. So, does the current organizational structure and culture provide for sufficient space, protection, heat and light? Answering this question is far beyond the skills of a historian.