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Inter-democratic Security Institutions and the Security Dilemma: EU and NATO relations with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. F.A. van der Duyn Schouten,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen
op woensdag 3 september 2014 om 11.45 uur
in de aula van de universiteit,
De Boelelaan 1105

door

Glenn Eric Andre Diesen

geboren te Oslo, Noorwegen
promotor: prof.dr. W.M. Wagner
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Abstract

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the EU and NATO have become the dominant security institutions in Europe. They have expanded their membership and the geographic scope of missions ostensibly undertaken to enhance security. Membership of these institutions is now predicated on liberal-democratic credentials. The puzzle is whether the “inter-democratic” quality of these security institutions contributes to improve or deteriorate security relations with Russia.

To examine this proposition, the expectations of two alternative theoretical schools or approaches relating to these institutions and their interactions with Russia are tested and compared. One of these, neoclassical realism, expects that a security dilemma will emerge between the EU and NATO on one side and Russia on the other. Unless or until a solution acceptable to all parties is found, for example, a more inclusive institutional arrangement, this security dilemma will intensify. The other theoretical school, liberal institutionalism, expects that any extant or potential security dilemma will be mitigated, implying that a mutually acceptable solution will be found.

These alternatives are applied to the EU and NATO specifically, by undertaking two case studies: the EU’s development of the CSDP; and NATO’s development of missile defence. The questions pursued include: does the “inter-democratic” quality of the EU and NATO provide stability and security as a positive-sum game or reflect an inability to move beyond zero-sum bloc-politics? Do the EU and NATO possess and employ mechanisms for unrestricted open dialogue with Russia or are they limited by ideological fundamentalism? Is Russia included or marginalised in EU/NATO dominated Europe? Do the EU and NATO view Russia as a common threat upon which they are dependent for internal cohesion?

The case studies uncover evidence that answer these questions in ways that strengthen one of the tested competing theoretical positions, while weakening the other. It is concluded that the CSDP and missile defence have aggravated a security dilemma with Russia and that neoclassical realist theory provides a more plausible explanation of the developments in European security since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the support of my wife Elena and the patience of my son, Konstantin, who put up with my long working hours. I would like to register particular gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Wolfgang Wagner at Amsterdam VU and Dr. Steve Wood at Macquarie University, who provided me with invaluable academic support and advice. The Department of Modern History, Politics and International Relations at Macquarie University and the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Amsterdam VU offered much scholarly support and ample teaching opportunities, assisting financially and intellectually. Confidentiality statements prevent me from providing names of officials interviewed, however, I would like to thank all the Russian, EU and NATO officials that made themselves available for interviews. Furthermore, the meetings with various Serbian, Bosnian and Moldovan officials provided me with valuable background information, perspectives and insights on Europe’s frozen conflicts.
Abbreviations

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
BG Battle Group
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina
BMDR Ballistic Missile Defence Review
BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSS Black Sea Synergy
CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
COPS Comité Politique et de Sécurité
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CSR Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organisation
EaP Eastern Partnership
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC European Community
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDA European Defence Agency
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
EUBAM European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUFOR European Union Force
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission</td>
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<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>EUPAT</td>
<td>European Union Police Advisory Team</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBI</td>
<td>Ground Based Interceptor</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPALS</td>
<td>Global Protection against Limited Strikes</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>International Civilian Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Bosnian Peace Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>ISG</td>
<td>International Steering Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDEC</td>
<td>Joint Data Exchange Center</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTS</td>
<td>Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000-2010</td>
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<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOD</td>
<td>Non-offensive Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>NATO-Russia Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PAA</td>
<td>Phased Adaptive Approach</td>
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<td>PACE</td>
<td>Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Peace Implementation Council</td>
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<td>PPC</td>
<td>Permanent Partnership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRACECA</td>
<td>Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Preface

This thesis explores the development of Europe’s security architecture following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of building Gorbachev’s “common European home” by strengthening institutions such as the OSCE, what occurred was an increase in EU and NATO membership and concurrent taking responsibility for security beyond their borders. The analytical and political puzzle that has emerged from this process was how Russia would fit into this format for European security. It is often contended that the EU and NATO constitute a “force for good”, transcending power competition and providing security and stability that also benefits Russia. An alternative perspective is that the EU and NATO reflect reluctance by the West to move beyond zero-sum bloc-politics, leading them to maintain structures and policies reminiscent of the Cold War.

As Russia recovers from the disastrous 1990s and “returns to Europe”, its role in European security is again of great relevance. Whatever institutional, legal or military-strategic initiatives emerge or evolve, they must be capable of accommodating the largest state on the continent. A continuing dominance of EU and NATO marginalises Russia. The topic is polarised not only in terms of perspectives on competing interests, it is also loaded with emotional rhetoric that often derives from variable conceptual and ideological assumptions about what “Europe” is or should be. A key criterion for this thesis therefore was to address specific and objective indicators to avoid or at least to reduce bias.

The security dilemma is an appropriate conceptual approach to assess the rise of the EU and NATO and their impact on security relations with Russia. Instead of discussing EU/NATO intentions and Russian perceptions, objective indicators are established in the thesis correspond to these variables, which are: the extent to which the EU and NATO pursue offensive zero-sum policies; the extent to which they are able and willing to recognise Russian security concerns; the extent to which they accommodate Russia in multilateral arrangements, and the extent to which threat perceptions of Russia are pre-determined.
“The secret of politics? Make a good treaty with Russia.”

“I have always found the word ‘Europe’ in the mouths of those politicians who wanted from other powers something they did not dare to demand in their own name.”

Otto von Bismarck
1. Introduction

This thesis explores a phenomenon evolving since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is the rise of the EU and NATO as inter-democratic security institutions and resulting effects on the security dilemma with Russia as a non-member state. The EU and NATO can be conceptualised as “inter-democratic security institutions” that share several common features. They stipulate that their post-Cold War mission is to advance security by promoting liberal democracy and European integration. Since the European and global political-strategic contexts were recast in 1989-92, their implicit claim to dominance in security affairs has affected power and norms. The organisation of power and the normative agenda has been transformed as these institutions have assumed responsibility for pan-European security.

The EU and NATO can be considered “inter-democratic” and “exclusive” because membership is conditioned by a state’s possession of acceptable liberal democratic credentials and adherence to related principles (Dembinski, Hasenclever and Wagner, 2004). The linking by these institutions of democratisation and security, whereby the former is presented as intrinsic to the latter, has created incentives for prospective members to carry out related reforms. The last two decades have, however, demonstrated a mutual disinterest to discuss a possible future membership for Russia and the conditions that this might entail.

The puzzle that this thesis addresses is whether liberal-democratic essentialism and an associated exclusivity of institutional membership result in benevolent policies which generate positive-sum pan-European security, including for the EU, NATO and Russia, or if they incite belligerent policies and a continuation of Cold War structures within which power competition is supported by bloc-politics and ideology. In concise form, the central question of this thesis is: does the behaviour of inter-democratic security institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union mitigate or aggravate a security dilemma with Russia as a non-member state?
1. Introduction

Interpreting the rise of inter-democratic security institutions

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, many scholars expected that NATO would either dissolve or diminish in relevance (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993; McCalla, 1996). Some predicted that the inclusive United Nations (UN) would become more effective and relevant. Others expected the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to have a more prominent role (Hyde-Price, 1992). However, over the past two decades NATO has expanded its membership and remit, including by engagement in out-of-area missions. The EU has also grown and begun developing itself as a security institution. Notwithstanding their own tensions, the EU and NATO have, often tacitly, asserted a right to regulate and where necessary enact responsibility for European and global security, overshadowing potential alternatives such as the UN and the OSCE. One consequence is that post-Soviet Russia is not accommodated as an equal but, rather, is relegated and to some extent ostracised. This inequality of representation in European security can be theorised to produce either cooperation or conflict. The EU and NATO could transcend power politics by providing positive-sum security through European integration and democratisation, or those same projects could inflame power politics by provoking competition with a marginalised Russia.

This thesis juxtaposes two opposing perspectives on the rise of inter-democratic security institutions and how that impacts on a security dilemma with Russia. One of these views contends that the EU and NATO constitute a common good, promoting positive-sum gain as a community of democracies that seek regional and transatlantic integration. Proponents of a positive-sum configuration tend to reflect a liberal worldview in which the nature of units or actors affects international anarchy. Some scholars argue that security institutions with greater maturity and liberal democratic credentials are less likely to become fortresses dependent on external threats for internal cohesion and, instead, become facilitators of broader regional or even global integration (Bellamy, 2004: 178). According to this view, the exclusivity of the EU and NATO is one factor that has enabled them to become a “force for good”.

2
1. Introduction

An opposing perspective proposes that security institutions take on state functions, implying that in an enduring competition for power they become militaristic, territory focused, and exclusionary. These institutions arrogate the traditional role of states and may elevate conflicts to another level. Booth and Wheeler label it the “Mitrany paradox”, whereby integration projects that attempt to develop new institutional superpowers depart from functional cooperation among extant actors and instead construct fewer, larger, and less compatible entities of power (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 188-189). The security architecture is expected to disintegrate as inclusive institutions that mitigate conflicts are replaced with exclusive institutions that become tools for power competition. Waltz has drawn comparisons between NATO’s actions after the Cold War and the offensive posture of earlier unconstrained victors which became expansionist and threatening while believing that they were “acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the world” (Waltz, 2000: 28).

These two perspectives do not differ in terms of recognising a genuine belief and desire by decision-makers to transcend power competition. They disagree on the feasibility of actually achieving that. The idea of a European security system led by inter-democratic security institutions can be conceptualised as an international aristocratic system with an intended universal benefit. The UN can also be conceptualised as an international aristocratic system due to the special privileges delegated to the great powers as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). There are differences between these two systems, however. Privileging sovereign inequality and leadership based on liberal democratic credentials rather than power can be regarded as encouraging a more just and cooperative international system because liberal democratic norms gain precedence and power competition is transcended. In contrast, if the assumption is that power competition cannot be transcended, inter-democratic security institutions can be theorised as revisionist powers advancing an international oligarchic system that maximises (their) relative power at the expense of security.
1. Introduction

The security dilemma between inter-democratic security institutions and Russia

The security dilemma is at the heart of security studies. It outlines the key puzzle or conundrum in an anarchic system, which is that states with defensive motivations inadvertently end up on conflict due to uncertainties about the intentions of the other. There are some disputes in the literature concerning the exact definition of the security dilemma. Jervis (1978: 170) defines it as the phenomenon where “one state’s gain in security often inadvertently threatens others”, prompting the “others” to accumulate power for defence. States tend to be fearful of the intentions of other states, but do not understand that other states may be fearful of them (Jervis, 1976: 75). Paradoxically, while both parties have defensive intentions and seek only to enhance their security, conflict may nonetheless ensue. Booth and Wheeler (2008) have however argued that this definition of the security dilemma is a common mistake in the literature. A dilemma suggests that there are two possibilities available which are both unfavourable and mutually exclusive. The security dilemma can therefore be defined as a “two-level strategic predicament”: the first level is to interpret the intentions and capabilities of the other as being either offensive or defensive, while the second level is to respond with either reassurance or deterrence (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 4-5). The result of the security dilemma, that two actors with defensive intentions and up in conflict is referred to as the “security paradox” (Booth and Wheeler, 2008).

While integration is usually considered a positive-sum game, it can become a zero-sum game for states excluded from an initiative, which instigates a security dilemma. Russia as the excluded state must first interpret whether the integration efforts contain Russia and thereby threaten its security. Second, Russia must respond by either reassuring the EU and NATO that it has benign intentions and does not need to be contained, or respond with deterrence by initiating counter-measures and/or reasserting its influence in Europe. ‘European integration’ can be considered a zero-sum geopolitical project since ‘Europe’ is united in international institutions that exclude Russia. Exclusive integration initiatives can de-couple a state from its neighbours and harm its security and prosperity. If Russia perceives itself to be threatened politically, economically or militarily by exclusive institutions that isolates
Russia by imposing a zero-sum ultimatum of belonging to ‘us’ or ‘them’, it will compete for influence in these states. The EU/NATO and Russia are motivated by the opportunities of having closer integration with the ‘shared neighbourhood’, as well as the threat of having these states join an exclusive bloc that may develop hostile policies towards them. Thus, the paradox is that while both sides may pursue integration efforts that are believed to be benign, a spiral of competing initiatives may commence.

The EU and NATO portray themselves as positive-sum actors that benefit non-member states due to their distinct ability to link security with the proliferation of liberal democratic norms and integration while reaching out to non-member states in multilateral partnerships. This vision of sustainable security may be undermined if Russia were to pursue unwarranted power interests. Russia perceives European security to be enhanced as a positive-sum game through the promotion of multilateralism and inclusive arrangements since security initiatives must be disengaged from power competition. However, the prospect of this idea of European security being operationalised is diluted by the refusal of the West to move beyond bloc-politics. This results in zero-sum policies and division because third states must choose between integrating with “us” or “them”.

Inter-democratic security institutions are unique within this framework because they instigate a security dilemma where one did previously not exist. A security dilemma assumes that both sides are status-quo powers responding to fear of the other, however, the enlargement and out-of-area security responsibilities sought by the EU and NATO after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was not motivated by fear. Instead, the rise of inter-democratic security institutions was an opportunity due to systemic pressures as Russia was unable to prevent it and because of the ideological conviction that Russian security would not be undermined. In other words, rather than being status-quo powers, inter-democratic security institutions can be defined as revisionist. Schweller (1996: 92, 99) defines status-quo powers as seeking “self-preservation and the protection of values they already possess”, while revisionist powers seek “non-security expansion”. The security dilemma was in the process of being mitigated following Gorbachev’s announcement in 1988 of unilateral
withdrawing 500,000 troops from Eastern Europe and due to the subsequent declaration of the Cold War being over in 1989 by Gorbachev and Bush. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had some negative effects on European security since it created an immediate and pressing skewed balance of power. The balance and compromise and between two rival status-quo powers attempting to manage the security dilemma fell apart due to the systemic incentives for Western powers to seek non-security expansion. Booth and Wheeler (2008: 9) introduced the terminology “security challenge” to describe conflict deriving from non-security expansion. This term denotes that the first level of a ‘strategic predicament’ – interpretation – has been determined to be a threat, and only the second – how to respond – remains. However, given that the Russia has recovered from the disastrous 1990s and is now responding to being marginalised in Europe, the security dilemma has become an appropriate concept to describe the relationship.

The effect of institutions and norms on the security dilemma

International security institutions can have either a favourable or an adverse impact on the security dilemma. If they can facilitate integration as a positive-sum game, insecurity, uncertainty and misunderstanding are reduced. International institutions can organise transparency, encourage compromise and coordination of policies, arrange collective security initiatives and establish common rules of behaviour. In other words, institutions can develop security with other states rather than against them (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 138). However, international institutions may also aggravate a security dilemma if the exclusivity of integration projects and alliance-building create zero-sum power competition. Incompatibility with the integration projects of excluded states may spiral into zero-sum bloc politics where competition for membership and influence in neighbouring states resembles Cold War struggles over spheres of influence. This can increase security fears and result in the direction of military resources against other states. A distinction should therefore be made between collective security institutions that are inclusive and seek security with other member states, and alliances that are exclusive and seek security against non-
members (Wallander and Keohane, 1999). However, there is also conceptual space for exclusive institutions promoting positive-sum security by developing alternative arrangements that benefit non-member states (Wallander and Keohane, 1999).

The elevated role of liberal democratic norms can also have a favourable or an adverse impact on the security dilemma. Democratic peace theory suggests that liberal democratic states and societies are very unlikely to go to war with each other. Realist theories attribute much less (if any) significance to norms, though some realist scholars recognise the concept of “ideological solidarity” as a secondary issue in alliance formation (Morgenthau, 2006; Walt, 1997: 168). Constructivism postulates socially constructed political identities shaped by common values and norms, which can encourage a benevolent security community. However, these main theoretical frameworks also theorise on liberal democratic norms aggravating the security dilemma. Liberalism has a tradition of both pacification and imperialism, an observation reflected in academic work on “democratic wars”. These are understood as wars initiated by democracies against non-democracies (Geis and Wagner, 2008). Although they do not prioritise ideology, some realists have suggested that it can affect the ability of states to act rationally according to the balance of power logic (Mearsheimer, 2009). Even a neorealist like Waltz (2000: 11) argues that “democracies promote war because they at times decide that the way to preserve peace is to defeat nondemocratic states and make them democratic”. Some constructivist scholars propose that the identity formation of “us” may involve constructing a negative political identity for the “other” (Diez, 2005; Diez, 2006). Booth and Wheeler (1987: 331) introduced the concept of “ideological fundamentalism” to account for the styling of actors as enemies based on an assigned (negative) political identity rather than their actual international behaviour. Ideological fundamentalism reduces the ability to recognise that one’s own policies and actions may constitute a threat to others, because one’s own political identity is held to be indisputably positive and dissociated from any threatening behaviour.
1. Introduction

1.1 Theoretical framework for assessing the security dilemma

Two theoretical frameworks on the nature of inter-democratic security institutions and their effect on the security dilemma with Russia are tested. Neoclassical realist theory is used to test the hypothesis that the EU and NATO aggravate the security dilemma due to a zero-sum approach to security with Russia. Liberal institutional theory is used to test the hypothesis that inter-democratic security institutions mitigate/transcend the security dilemma because of a positive-sum approach to security.

The first hypothesis is based on neoclassical realist theory. The EU and NATO are conceptualised as expansionist collective hegemonies with reduced rationality. The neoclassical realist assumptions draw upon compatible work of neorealists and classical realist theory, such as the work of John Herz (1950a) on “idealism internationalism and the security dilemma”. Foreign policy is structurally induced by the international distribution of power, while ideological support for collective hegemony impacts on decision-makers as an intervening variable. The rise of the EU and NATO as inter-democratic security institutions is a manifestation of the skewed balance of power, which resulted in expansionism due to the lack of constraints following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The objective is collective hegemony, defined as the shared control over a geographic area by a group of states. Collective hegemonies promote exclusive influence by imposing zero-sum structures that diminish Russia as an alternative locus of influence in Europe. While NATO is dominated to a great extent by the US leadership position, it can nonetheless also be considered a collective hegemony since the alliance members can all extract benefits from the collective influence over foreign territories on its periphery. The extent of rationality in realism is defined as the ability of decision-makers to maximise security by acting according to the balance of power logic. This means recognising systemic pressures resulting from the international distribution of power and responding with a foreign policy that maximises security rather than maximising power. This requires decision-makers to recognise that excessive power accumulation results in balancing and possible confrontation at the peril of security. Inter-democratic security institutions encourage adherence to an ideology, which equates power maximisation
1. Introduction

to security maximisation. Collective hegemony is believed to be a precondition for peace because it is underpinned by liberal democratic norms. The belief among decision-makers in the relevant institutions that power accumulation does not impact negatively on the security dilemma will result in policies of power maximisation at the expense of security.

The competing hypothesis is grounded in liberal institutional theory. Inter-democratic security institutions are considered to have a positive-sum approach by pursuing security through integration and democratisation. These assumptions have support from prominent scholars like Keohane (2002), who suggests that Russia will ultimately benefit from the EU/NATO format for European security. The promotion of democracy is believed to stabilise states to the benefit of Russia, while European integration is promoted as a positive-sum game and is incrementally also extended to Russia through various strategic partnerships (Wallander and Keohane, 1999). The benign internal characteristics of the democratic community can be externalised in foreign policy. With the proliferation of benign institutions, liberal democratic norms and interdependence, a more secure international system is expected to emerge, consonant with an expanded democratic “zone of peace”. Inter-democratic security institutions are depicted as European or possibly global integrators and socialisers. Benign and cooperative “means” consisting of persuasion and attraction are assisted by the “magnetic pull” of peace and prosperity. The “ends” constitute a more integrated international system and stronger liberal democratic norms. From this perspective, therefore, the rise of the EU and NATO is expected to mitigate/transcend any potential security dilemma with Russia.

Method: Evaluating variables that impact the security dilemma

The thesis limits itself to focusing solely on the impact of the EU and NATO on the security dilemma with Russia. This is an intricate task, as both sides contribute to the character and outcomes of the relationship. A study on inter-democratic security institutions may inadvertently become a study on Russian foreign policy or perceptions, which this thesis does not intend to be. Rather, the thesis analyses the
specific policies and behaviour of inter-democratic security institutions that, on face value, could affect the security dilemma. Simply measuring alterations in cooperation and conflict would fail to address the explicit role of inter-democratic security institutions. Even the relevance and validity of the security dilemma could be contested if only end results were assessed, since cooperation or conflict can also be attributed to Russian policies. Assessing variables that could contribute to the security dilemma provides a stronger methodological framework to examine the contributions of these inter-democratic security institutions to the security dilemma with Russia. Four key variables that are considered to have a pivotal impact on the security dilemma are assessed:

1) “Instruments of power” is a reference to the tools for power. These can be offensive and provocative or defensive and non-provocative. Developing non-offensive defence implies that the instruments for security maximise defensive functions and minimise offensive potential, thus permitting states to enhance their security without diminishing the security of others. The ability to distinguish between offensive and defensive instruments of power mitigates the security dilemma since the demonstration of defensive intentions and capabilities reduces insecurity in an anarchic system. Both proponents and critics have, however, focused attention on the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between offensive and defensive instruments of power (Van Evera, 1998; Tang, 2010). Nevertheless, instruments of power can be assessed independently from Russia since a defensive posture would contribute to mitigating the security dilemma irrespective of Russian policies.

2) “Security dilemma sensibility” denotes the extent to which the security dilemma is recognised. It is determined by the capacity and intention to consider the possibility that one’s own actions may cause fears for others and precipitate a response. Booth and Wheeler (2008: 7) define security dilemma sensibility as:

[A]n actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexities of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the
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role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear.

This ability or lack of it is an essential variable affecting the security dilemma as it logically precedes amending or introducing policies to mitigate it. Security dilemma sensibility can be explored independently from Russian policies since it does not imply accepting Russian arguments and perspectives as being reasonable, or the automatic alteration of policies to ease Russian concerns. Instead it signifies the ability and intention to consider the arguments in order to change policies if this enhances the security of the EU and NATO.

3) “Institutional inclusion” refers to the extent that the EU and NATO reach out to Russia as a non-member state by empowering it with a “voice opportunity” to express its security concerns and influence decision-making. Institutional inclusion is a pivotal variable affecting the security dilemma, as a common and mutually beneficial approach to security can be facilitated through it. Inclusion can disclose benign intentions and enable participants to adjust and coordinate their policies. Disputes can be resolved at an institutional level before escalating to conflict. Opportunity to express concerns and influence decision-making can clarify motivations and resolve potential responses. Institutional inclusion would involve some allowance of Russian influence over EU and NATO policies in return for influence over Russian policies. Exclusion is pre-determined if there is a categorical refusal to accept any Russian influence.

4) “Threat perception” refers to whether Russia is deemed a security threat and to what extent that is pre-determined by knowledge of Russian capabilities and/or as a requirement for internal cohesion. Threat perception impacts on interpretation and response. If Russia is a pre-determined threat due to its power and/or to maintain internal cohesion, then the options available to Russia to mitigate the security dilemma are few.
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1.2 Outline of the thesis

This thesis investigates how inter-democratic security institutions affect the security dilemma with Russia. A theoretical framework is defined and a method designed to assess variables that function as components of the security dilemma. Two case studies accumulate and apply empirical evidence. The first is of the EU’s development as a security institution, manifested or operationalised by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The second is NATO’s development of a European missile defence system.

Following this introduction, the second chapter reviews the relevant literature and identifies a gap which the thesis contributes to filling. A discussion of debates on inter-democratic security institutions and security studies is followed by attention to work on the EU and NATO more specifically. There is some consensus that exclusive inter-democratic security institutions are advanced at the expense of cooperation in inclusive security institutions, though a disparity exists about the effects on non-member states. Research on EU/NATO-Russia relations tends to emphasise Russian actions and the challenges they present to the EU and NATO. This is a curious omission since that the EU and NATO are the main actors shaping the contemporary European security system. In contrast, this thesis focuses on these inter-democratic security institutions and the effects their characteristics and policies have on the security dilemma with Russia.

The third chapter explains the theoretical framework. Two theories supporting two competing hypotheses are outlined that relate to the EU and NATO and their interactions with Russia. Neoclassical realism and liberal institutionalism are applied to analyse the nature and functioning of the EU and NATO in terms of their relations with Russia. Neoclassical realist theory is used to explore the hypothesis that inter-democratic security institutions are expansionist collective hegemonies that aggravate the security dilemma. Liberal institutional theory is used to test the hypothesis that the ascent of these institutions mitigates the security dilemma since their benign internal characteristics are externalised in a positive-sum foreign policy of democratisation and integration.
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The fourth chapter presents the method used to carry out the study. Rather than assessing the security dilemma as an end result, process-tracing is used to examine the policies and actions of inter-democratic security institutions and ascertain causal patterns. Two case studies are used to test the variables affecting the security dilemma. The first is the EU’s development as a security institution manifested in the CSDP. The second is NATO’s development of a missile defence system. Four variables are identified as impacting on the security dilemma: instruments of power; security dilemma sensibility; institutional inclusion; and threat perception. These variables are conceptualised and their analytical purpose established. They are then operationalised in the case-specific contexts, aiming to obtain measurable evidence.

The fifth chapter presents the findings of the first case study. As a unique security provider, the EU focuses predominantly on low-politics such as conflict management rather than territorial defence and war fighting. It is, however, steadily accumulating military capabilities and the CSDP embodies its development as a security actor. The “Europeanisation” of conflict resolution denotes that conflict resolution is coordinated with EU policies of integration and norm promotion. For EU elites, compatibility with these benign tools and objectives will contribute to demilitarisation, whilst lingering Russian security concerns can be mitigated through common institutional frameworks and partnerships. However, this conception does not incorporate the power competition provoked by an exclusive and zero-sum format for “European integration” and “democratisation” that is being used to advance the influence of an exclusive institution.

The CSDP comprises defensive and offensive components. As deployed in Europe, the CSDP becomes a coercive instrument to pursue EU objectives outlined in its enlargement and neighbourhood policies. These objectives are largely zero-sum and incompatible with UN objectives, since they represent an exclusive integration project that competes for influence with Russia. CSDP missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Moldova/Ukraine (EUBAM) and Georgia demonstrate the replacement of persuasion and attraction by coercive means. The ends are also not consistent with UN directions, undermining the EU’s self-perceived role as an agent of the UN.
The EU does not demonstrate the ability and/or intention to recognise that a security dilemma may derive from competing interests and integration efforts. By assigning a fixed understanding to the contested concept of “Europe”, all disputes with Russia are merged into a narrow and uncompromising narrative where “European integration” is contrasted with a Russian “sphere of influence”. A pluralist conception of Europe is rejected. This reduces the ability to debate possible contradictory notions of “European integration” and “democratisation”. Russian arguments about its economic, political, cultural, security and human ties to the common neighbourhood largely do not enter the EU’s discourse since there is a lack of conceptual space for legitimate independent Russian influence. Consequently, Russian fears about the EU using coercive means to divide Europe are characterised as part of a “zero-sum mentality”. Russia’s obstruction of the EU’s unilateral initiatives by promoting a Russian version of multilateralism is perceived as another example of the pursuit of zero-sum interests.

Institutional inclusion that actually empowers Russia is categorically rejected because it would impose constraints on the EU’s autonomy in the common neighbourhood. Instead Russia is demoted to a peripheral object of security and is engaged through bilateral arrangements. Compromises are rejected in favour of conditionality, implying one-sided policy adjustments. Russian proposals for harmonising integration efforts and security initiatives are rejected as an attempt to gain a “veto” in the common neighbourhood that is considered tantamount to accepting a Russian sphere of influence.

EU threat perceptions are to some extent pre-determined. Russia is considered an object of security, a problem to be resolved. This implies that Russia can either accept the role of an object of civilisational influence by the EU, or becoming a counter-civilisational force to be contained. Democratisation is linked to power since it is to be facilitated by the EU in an asymmetrical subject-object relationship. This is not acceptable to Russia as a large power with its own integration initiatives and interests in the common neighbourhood. Its demands to be treated as an equal are interpreted by the EU as a rejection of liberal democratic norms and European integration.
The sixth chapter presents the findings of the second case study: NATO’s development of a missile defence system and the ensuing effects on the security dilemma with Russia. This also constitutes a unique case study partly because of the indeterminate nature of decisions concerning the infrastructure and the possible extent of Russian inclusion. Missile defence enhances the offensive potential of the nuclear weapons of NATO members, especially the US, because it negates Russia’s capacity to retaliate. NATO contends that a limited missile defence system does not undermine Russian security, and any remaining concerns can be mitigated through transparency and Russian inclusion in the infrastructure and multilateral partnerships. However, the case study evidence indicates that missile defence develops strategic leverage against Russia and any inclusion of Russia that would constrain that leverage is rejected.

The missile defence system will become an increasingly offensive instrument of power. It has set a precedent for continuous upgrades that steadily undermines Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities. There are opportunities to tailor the infrastructure in ways that would minimise Russia’s exposure. This would present a more defensive posture. To this point, however, no intentions to reduce the offensive capability have been indicated. The maximisation of flexibility and rejection of any constraints correlates with a security strategy that pursues invulnerability and growing interventionist capabilities.

NATO displays a reduced security dilemma sensibility. Russian arguments do not inform its discourse in a constructive way since the point of departure in discussions is the opposing political identities and the need for institutional solidarity, which impedes political pluralism. Instead there is a tendency to use emotional rhetoric and Cold War analogies about Russia’s great power ambitions and internal deficiencies. Recognition of Russian security concerns is portrayed by some as undermining alliance solidarity and encouraging Russian “zero-sum mentality”. Russian fears about the incremental enhancement and future deployment of offensive capabilities are dismissed by emphasising the defensive capabilities announced so far. Russian concerns about missile defence further dividing Europe are depicted as Russia not coming to terms with its lost sphere of influence. Attempts to balance the unilateral
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missile defence deployment are portrayed as another reflection of Russia’s zero-sum interests which invalidates its advocacy for multilateralism.

Institutional inclusion is rejected by NATO if it entails any constraints on the autonomy of its missile defence. A format for “limited inclusion” is offered, whereby Russia can add its capabilities to NATO’s missile defence, but not have any influence over its infrastructure. The primary purpose for this inclusion is to prevent Russia from initiating counter-measures and to ease member states’ concerns about confrontations with Russia. The secondary purpose is to have Russian capabilities augment the effectiveness of the missile defence system against other threats like Iran. At its 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO members committed to constructing missile defence and offered Russia the prospect of inclusion. Reaching out to Russia had assuaged apprehensions among some European members. But the apparent rapprochement faded after the summit as NATO distanced itself from its former inclusive rhetoric and began immediately to construct its own missile defence system.

Although its ambit and functions have expanded, there is still an implicit consensus within NATO that Russia is a potential threat, against which NATO is viewed as an insurance policy. But the severity and permanence of the threat, and how to ameliorate or resolve it, is perceived very differently. For some Russia can be “civilised” and accept a subordinate role in the new European security system. For others it simply has to be contained. NATO has to mitigate internal disputes by reassuring Russia it is not considered a threat, while concurrently deterring Russia by constructing leverage as a hedge against possible conflicts. Differences among NATO members were narrowed when the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) reduced their anti-Russian rhetoric and Western European states covertly agreed to defence plans oriented against Russia. The US accommodated Western European concerns about overt identification of Russia as a threat, while reassuring the CEECs that the missile defence system could be directed against Russia.

The seventh and concluding chapter provides an analysis comparing the findings of the two case studies. These demonstrate commonalities that support a neoclassical realist interpretation that suggests the rise of inter-democratic security
Institutions has aggravated the security dilemma with Russia. The EU and NATO have demonstrated an offensive posture by introducing coercive means that support zero-sum objectives. They have shown a diminished security dilemma sensibility by limiting discussions to assigned opposing political identities rather than being open to competing arguments. They reject inclusion in multilateral arrangements if it reduces their autonomy. They also share the perception of Russia as a potential future threat, and define Russia as an object of security that can either accept a peripheral role and thereby be civilised or be contained as a counter-civilisational force.

In summary, the thesis argues that the lack of a post-Cold War political solution that accommodates an independent and fully recognised Russia in Europe does aggravate the security dilemma. The policies of the EU and NATO are best explained by neo-classical realist expectations about power competition. The infusion of an ideological element reduces the rationality of their decision-makers and security dilemma sensibility is diminished. Consequently, the power competition between the EU/NATO and Russia is intensifying and the ability to mitigate conflicts wanes. There is less room for compromise due to incompatible understandings of European integration, democratisation, multilateralism, and spheres of influence. Current trends suggest that the EU and NATO will continue to undermine Russian security, while Russian balancing will be viewed as pursuing zero-sum interests incompatible with European integration and liberal democratic norms.
1. Introduction
This chapter examines theoretical work on international security and international institutions in general, on the EU as a security actor, and on NATO. In the first instance, a consensus emerges that exclusive inter-democratic security institutions are promoted at the expense of collaboration in more inclusive institutions. However, a discrepancy in the literature is evident in terms of whether these exclusive institutions cause negative external effects. Among the conceptualisations of the EU as a security actor are many that highlight its “normative power”. Proponents of this view contend that the EU encourages benign behaviour, consistent with a generating of benevolent relations among its member states. A few scholars argue that this normative agenda may cause more belligerent behaviour because it undermines the balance of power or contributes to the “othering” of Russia. Others problematise whether the EU’s militarisation undermines or strengthens its ability to promote norms. There is also a wide range of inquiry on EU relations with various non-member states. With regard to NATO, following the disappearance of its then raison d'etre, the Soviet Union, there were many predictions that NATO would itself gradually dissolve. These predictions have partly been replaced by arguments for NATO transforming to a democracy promoter, and an accommodating and socialising institution. Others however, regard it as divisive. What is largely absent from the literature is a comprehensive study on how inter-democratic security institutions affect the security dilemma with Russia.

Inter-democratic security institutions and collective security

Literature on common security and security institutions tends to derive from two historical events: the establishment of a bipolar system after the Second World War; and the rise of inter-democratic security institutions following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The concept of security communities was introduced by Deutsch et.al. (1957) and developed further in the 1990s by Adler and Barnett (1998). Security communities pre-empt disputes between member states that are committed to peaceful
change (Deutsch, 1957: 5; Adler/Barnett, 1998: 30-34). This entails not only abstaining from waging war, but also refraining from war preparations. A security community does not need to be institutionalised, nor does it need to constitute a region where all interests correlate and therefore is devoid of conflict. A security regime is institutionalised, which Krasner (1983: 2) defines as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Acharya’s (1995) work on security communities suggests that it is unrealistic for South-East Asia to develop a ‘defence community’, however, this should be distinguished from a security community that establishes mechanisms for dispute settlement, transparency and arms control measures, and multilateral security consultations.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, academic interest in security institutions shifted notably to analysis of peaceful relations among democracies. “Inter-democratic security institutions” is a term emanating from research on the expansion of the liberal democratic project and associated conditionality requirements for membership. Democratic peace theory is a leading example that builds on the ideas of Kant as re-discovered by Doyle (1983). Academic interest in the peaceful relations between democracies has developed into a broader focus on the distinctiveness of democracies in what Owen (2004) labels the “democratic distinctiveness programme”. Inter-democratic institutions are seen as the “missing link” in explaining the lack of war among democracies (Hasenclever and Weiffen, 2006; Dembinski, Freistein and Weiffen, 2007). Lipson (2003) proposes that democracies are more capable of entering into credible commitments in institutional settings. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) demonstrate that democracies also display a greater tendency to join institutions. Hasenclever and Weiffen (2006) posit that both institutions and internal democratic characteristics increase the ability to create and abide by rules. Russett and Oneal (2001) suggest an interaction or “triangulation” between democracy, international organisations, and peace.

Debates on inter-democratic security institutions encompass the proposal for a “Concert of Democracies”. This argues that liberal democracies should unite in a common institution, empowering themselves to take decisions if the UN Security
Council is unable or unwilling to act. It constitutes a variation on the argument that democracies should form their own institutions. They would then be immunised from harmful interference by non-liberal democratic countries with veto power in the UN, and would more readily be able to assert legitimacy for the use of force (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006). Kagan (2008: 98) suggests that the world is increasingly polarised between democratic and authoritarian states, and democracies should “stick together”. Geis (2013), however, cautions against delegating privileged status to democratic regimes as it serves the purpose of dividing the world into first-class legitimate and second-class illegitimate states, a dichotomy which has to a great extent already been promoted on the basis of “democratic peace”.

A combination of democratic peace theory and the democratic distinctiveness program has evolved into “democratic exceptionalism” where liberal democracies claim certain privileges in the international system based on their democratic credentials, peaceful nature, and moral superiority (Geis and Wagner, 2008). Doyle (1986) refers to Reagan’s “crusade for freedom” and points out that liberal internationalism carries with it two legacies, pacification and imperialism, and highlights the challenge of preserving the first without yielding to the latter. Democratic peace theory proposes that democracies do not go to war against each other, though it is not claimed that they are more peaceful towards non-democracies. Geis, Brock and Müller (2007) suggest that democracy promotion may not demilitarise security, but rather militarise democracy promotion. Democratic peace theory is occasionally exploited by decision-makers to advance a political agenda, allowing them to obtain unwarranted privileges and gain legitimacy for the use of force (Ish-Shalom, 2006). Russett (2005) considers the employment of democracy promotion as a justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to be a perversion of democratic peace theory by decision-makers.

Hostile behaviour towards non-democracies is addressed in the literature on “democratic violence” or “democratic wars” (Geis and Wagner, 2008; Barkawi and Laffey, 1999; Jahn, 2005). Dembinski, Hasenclever and Wagner (2004) argue that inter-democratic security institutions may reduce democratic control over the use of force, and that the common democratic identity may increase the willingness to use
2. Contribution to the literature

Military force against autocratic states. Democracies break rules and norms arranged between democracies and non-democracies while engaging in “new” humanitarian wars (Müller, 2004). Distancing himself from the more idealist liberal scholars and institutionalism, Moravcsik (1994: 14) has suggested that political executives may impose an “ideological frame” that portrays security issues as a moral dichotomy. A division is then created between liberal democracies and other states, transferring questionable benefits to the first, providing legitimacy for the use of force, and enabling expedient use of the word “democracy” to serve national interests (Geis and Wagner, 2008). Imperial tendencies can therefore emerge as democracy is used to justify disregard for the consent and representation of states, and interference in their domestic affairs (Jahn, 2005: 177-178). In a contradictory way, democratic states tend to dismiss the violence perpetrated by them as “exceptional” and as a fading “pre-democratic relic” (Geis and Wagner, 2008).

Realists of various stripes differ in their assessment of the feasibility of collective security. Mearsheimer (1994) rejects the value of collective security by considering it as a form of institutionalism that neglects balance-of-power politics. In contrast, Kupchan and Kupchan (1995) posit that realist assumptions about power balancing is at the heart of collective security by punishing and balancing members that act as aggressors. Kupchan and Kupchan (1995) also argue that collective security from a realist perspective should incorporate domestic and ideational considerations as variables affecting behaviour. Realists argue that institutions do not contradict the basic principles of realism, since institutions and the willingness to cooperate are consequences of “states’ interests and the constraints imposed by the system” (Glaser, 1994:85; also Waltz 2000). Realists have increasingly included international institutions in their analyses, while remaining consistent with the basic assumptions about the international distribution of power imposing systemic constraints.

The European Union and the CSDP

The EU is a unique entity that has inspired a variety of conceptualisations about “what kind of power” it is (Sjursen, 2006a). Many years ago, Mitrany (1948; 1965)
contrasted functionalism with European federalism. Functionalism implies that *form follows function*, that is, integration should be issue-based in terms of having functional value. He argued that the European federalists start at the other end by a fascination with a “readily convenient formula” without addressing the functional issues and problems of uniting different states (Mitrany, 1965: 129). Functionality in terms of promoting democracy and constraints in international affairs is undermined since “a new union or association is not conceivable without some formal compact, whose main purpose is precisely to delimit the competence of the various organs”. In order to hold the federation together a key purpose would be to a “introduce the factor of fixity in the index of power”, thus any new federal project that attempts to develop a modern welfare society was expected to resemble the federal system of the USSR rather than the US Constitution (Mitrany, 1965: 130-131). Duchêne (1973) characterised the European Community (EC) as a “civilian power” due to its absence of coercive military power. Galtung (1973) predicted that the EC would evolve into an aggressive neo-imperial power. Nye (1990) coined the term “soft power”, which others, including McCormick (2006), later argued was a foundation for the EU to become a “European Superpower”. Fischer (2012) suggests that the more common narratives to explain the EU are the “enlargement/democracy narrative” as a model for prospective members to be emulated, the “geopolitical narrative” as a reference to balancing regional powers, and the “value empire narrative” as the EU seeks to project its power and influence beyond its borders. These perspectives demonstrate broad conceptual differences over whether the EU represents a “force for good” due to its positive-sum approach to security or a revival of zero-sum politics.

As the newly independent CEECs looked westwards, a debate about EU enlargement began and continued through the 1990s. The requirement for liberal democratic credentials as conditions of membership also contributed to a new discussion on the character of the EU. Manners (2002; 2006a) built on the civilian power concept by introducing the idea of “Normative Power Europe”. This suggested that the EU’s main power was to radiate liberal democratic norms. Other cognate terms such as “transformative power” (Grabbe, 2006) and “ethical power” (Aggestam, 2008) later appeared. Jones (2007) argued that the EU constituted a tool for power
maximisation because member states cooperate to enhance their global influence relative to other actors. Hyde-Price (2006: 227) proposed that the EU should be considered a “collective hegemony”. He also labelled it a “tragic actor”, arguing that policies directed by normative or ethical considerations would lead the EU to either a diminished relevance due to an inability to successfully pursue the interests of its members, or to engage in destructive moral crusades (Hyde-Price, 2008).

The mere debate about normative power has made the EU less aware of the power it competes for and accumulates to promote liberal democratic norms (Diez, 2005: 626). Youngs (2004) posits that the EU’s normative dynamics and strategic interests should not be treated as either intrinsically incompatible or mutually reinforcing. Wood’s (2011) “Pragmatic Power EUrope” refers to the pragmatism pursued by individual member states hindering the development of a coherent EU pragmatism.

Many scholars have drawn on imperial terminology to describe the EU and its behaviour. Diez (2005) and Haukkala (2008) conceptualise the EU as a “hegemonic” power incorporating both power and norms. For Cooper (2007), the EU was a “neo-liberal”, “cooperative”, “cosmopolitan” and “post-modern” empire. Waever (1997), Hettne and Soederbaum (2005), Zielonka (2006) and Sepos (2013) variously propose that the EU is “neo-medieval” or a “soft” imperialist entity. Others interpret the EU’s “humanitarian interventionism” as predominantly determined by geopolitical interests and therefore an expression of imperial tendencies (Gegout, 2009). Chandler (2006a) has characterised the EU as an “empire in denial” due to its reluctance to recognise its imperial policies in the Balkans. Conversely, for states and peoples not part of the EU, an inside/outside situation has incited tensions (Diez, 2005; Neumann, 1998). When states become members the material and societal borders with the EU are removed, however, new borders are erected or reinforced between the new members and the external states (Diez, Stetter and Albert, 2006).

The EU has developed as an elite project that has sought to centralise power. Democratic control of the CSDP is weak, which diminishes its legitimacy and affects relations with other states (Wagner, 2006; 2007). Sangiovanni (2003) argued against what she sees as a move towards a militarisation of the EU. Manners (2006b) argued
that it is necessary to look beyond a civilian power/military power dichotomy and instead analyse how military power is actually being used. However, Manners (2006a: 194) is critical of the “unreflexive militarisation” of the EU since it will affect how it is perceived by other powers. For Sjursen (2006b) the EU may become a hybrid military and normative power since it possesses the military tools to support its normative policies. Howorth (2010) argues that the debate on whether military power reduces the normative power of the EU is irrelevant since without military power the EU will not be able to exert influence in a multipolar world.

Since internal norm-focused policy processes tend to set the foundation for conceptualising the EU, a benign external impact of the CSDP is often assumed (Smith, 2006: 326). Irondelle, Bickerton and Menon (2011) note that the academic attention devoted to the CSDP is usually descriptive and/or provides prescriptions for developing effectiveness and performance in capabilities and interoperability. For example, an oft-cited analysis explores the “capabilities–expectations gap” (Hill 1993), but does not examine how security is affected by such capabilities. Forsberg (2007) has noted a “theoretical vacuum” and called for a more expansive research agenda for the CSDP. Some comparisons between the enlargement process and the EU’s role in conflict resolution have been made. The “Europeanisation” of conflict resolution is defined as the process of merging the task of conflict resolution with EU integration (Coppieters et.al, 2004), an approach also taken by Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006; 2008) and Tocci (2007). Nevertheless, a gap in the Western academic literature remains regarding the effect of the development of the CSDP on security relations with excluded European powers like Russia.

**NATO and its post-Cold War mission**

There is a saying in Brussels that there are more academics than practitioners working on EU policy. This is not the case with NATO, which receives less scholarly attention despite being the largest military alliance in the world. Much of that attention has shifted from predictions of NATO’s inevitable post-Cold War demise (Waltz, 1993; Mearsheimer, 1990; McCalla, 1996), to describing its survival and “transformation”.
NATO’s new purpose is now to consolidate liberal democratic norms among members and spread them to prospective members. While realists are still debating how to explain NATO’s developments, liberal-institutionalists and constructivists began questioning the relevance of realism due its inability to explain NATO’s perseverance (Wallander, 2000a; Williams and Neumann, 2000).

Declaring structural realism obsolete, Goldgeier and McFaul (1992) posit that the balance of power will no longer dominate the international system as states will no longer engage in balancing alliances. Instead, peace will be achieved by negotiation and compromise between “non-unitary actors”. This belief is central to NATO’s post-Cold War role as it encourages more stable and predictable states to join as members, and sees its expansion of a “zone of peace” as benefiting relations with states outside the institution. However, Waltz (2000), in contrast, considers NATO’s post-Cold War actions to be consistent with realist assumptions. Victories in great wars leave the balance of power skewed, resulting in unconstrained and offensive behaviour that produces future enemies. Mearsheimer’s concept of “offensive realism” (2001) proposes that those able to achieve hegemony will subsequently assert it.

NATO enlargement precipitated several points of discussion about its effect on European security. Unlike during the Cold War, NATO now aims to socialise states to liberal democratic norms, backed by accession conditionality (Gheciu, 2005; Thies, 2009). The Clinton administration promoted NATO enlargement as a “democratic enlargement” (Geis and Wagner, 2011). Reiter (2001) rejected this claim as false since the CEECs’ democratic choice was already made. He warned that enlargement only destabilises relations with Russia. Gibler and Sewell (2006) argue that the situation is more complicated. They propose that democracy is more likely to develop when there is an absence of a threat, while authoritarianism tends to develop when a state perceives itself to be under threat. NATO supported democratic development in the CEECs by providing a security guarantee against a possible revisionist Russia. Conversely, enlargement undermined democracy in Russia where the perception of increased threat resulted in rising military spending and the centralisation of power at the expense of democratic reforms (Gibler and Sewell, 2006).
Adler and Barnett (1998) have suggested that the peaceful and attractive nature of NATO would function as a “magnetic pull” for Russia by drawing it into a framework for cooperation. By focusing on pacifying inter-state relations, NATO has transcended the characteristics of an alliance dependent on an external enemy and no longer poses a threat to others. Instead, NATO has developed into a security management institution by becoming increasingly inclusive and more focused on managing risks (Wallander and Keohane, 1999). According to Pouliot (2007), an evolving partnership and confidence-building measures evinced that the characteristics of a security community were developing between the West and Russia.

Excluding Russia from an equal role and membership in NATO often becomes a discussion of whether to prioritise internal stability among members, or relations with Russia. Möller (2003) argued that NATO was mistaken in not accepting compatible values and instead capitalises on differences. By justifying Russian exclusion on its democratic deficit, NATO could claim a leadership role in Europe and make Russia responsible for its own exclusion. Mouritzen (2003) contested that view arguing that NATO is more effective if it is less dependent on consent from non-liberal democratic states. States with a democratic deficiency could degrade the depth of cooperation among members and legitimise authoritarianism. Mouritzen (2003) also suggested that the benefits from peaceful relations within NATO justify a few extra conditions for participation and membership. NATO can limit the policy options of less democratic non-member states, thus deterring traditional power politics while encouraging liberal democratic reform. Liberal scholars advocating a prominent role for NATO warn of dire consequences for peace and Russia’s potential democratisation if Russia is not eventually included in NATO structures (Russett and Oneal, 2001). Concerning NATO enlargement, Russett and Stam (1998) have argued that “whatever westerners may say, that kind of expansion is directed against at least a hypothetical danger from Russia”. Once Russia recovered, the authors continue, it was likely to devote more military resources to counter this expansion, resulting in “a severe security dilemma for both the East and the West” (Russett and Stam, 1998).

These analyses of NATO’s impact on relations with Russia are influenced by perceptions of how the Cold War ended. If it is presumed to have ended because the
Soviet Union voluntarily conceded its empire to create a common European home, then NATO has opportunistically taken over that sphere of influence and simply moved the line of division in Europe further east (Cohen, 2013; Matlock, 2010). If, however, the Cold War ended with the “defeat” and dissolution of the Soviet Union, then NATO enlargement is preventing Russia from re-establishing the sphere of influence formerly occupied by the Soviet Union. Deudney and Ikenberry (2009) argue that Moscow’s withdrawal from Germany and Eastern Europe has few historical precedents and implied an inclusive and new world order. By leaving, “the Soviet Union was signalling its confidence that the NATO allies would not exploit its newly exposed position” (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2009: 47). NATO enlargement, out-of-area missions and the development of missile defence may therefore have unravelled the post-Cold War settlement. Conversely, Sarotte (2010) argues that the US never committed to any such settlement since the role of NATO was to ensure its dominance in the new world order by preventing the emergence of any challengers. The proposition that there was ever an intention to integrate Russia in the West should be dismissed. The US saw even the OSCE as a potential rival to hegemony (Sarotte, 2011). Brzezinski (2009) interprets Russian post-Cold War attitudes and behaviour to be expressions of “resentment of the Soviet defeat in the Cold War”.

What is lacking in the literature is extensive research on how the rise of the EU and NATO may have contributed to the security dilemma with Russia. The originality of this thesis lies in its focus on the EU and NATO as “exclusive” inter-democratic security institutions that promote European integration and liberal democratic norms as an intrinsic part of security, and the case studies applied to test its claims. The security dilemma is at the heart of both realist and liberal theory: the former argues it can be managed; the latter that it can be transcended. “European integration” can be considered as zero-sum because it creates an inside/outside problem and incites competing projects. Alternatively, it can be seen as a benign positive-sum approach that mitigates tensions. The case studies used to test these competing expectations are (i) the EU as a security provider with the CSDP; and (ii) the development of missile defence as a NATO asset. Thereby this thesis makes a contribution to the field by addressing a gap in previous work on these institutions and the security dilemma.
3. Theoretical comparison

This chapter applies the precepts of two theoretical schools to the rise of inter-democratic security institutions and their effects on the security dilemma with Russia. These theories are selected due to their capacity to relate to the opposing hypotheses and the subject matter. The hypothesis that the EU and NATO aggravate the security dilemma is based on neoclassical realist theory and builds on assumptions in “Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma” by Herz (1950a). The contending hypothesis that the EU and NATO mitigate or transcend the security dilemma is founded on the assumptions of liberal institutionalism. Since neoclassical realism addresses less common topics of realism like institutions and ideology, the first section provides a more extensive discussion than the following section on liberal institutionalism.

A realist approach was deemed to be the dominant theory in the literature in terms of critiquing the role of the EU and NATO since the end of the Soviet Union. Realist scholars, such as Waltz, tend to predict that the rise of the EU and NATO will provoke conflicts with Russia. Neoclassical realism was selected as a branch of realism due to its capacity to address the role of ideas and institutions on decision-makers. Liberal institutionalism can be seen to be a dominant theory in terms of explaining the benevolent capacity of institutions and democracy. Since constructivism is often deemed to be ontology rather than a theory, it can add value to both neoclassical realism and liberal institutionalism, though with different understanding of the notion that reality is to some extent socially constructed. Sterling-Folker (2000: 97) argues that the differences and assumed competition between liberal institutionalism and constructivism have been exaggerated as they “depend on the same mechanisms of functional institutional efficiency in order to account for social change”. Neoclassical realism recognises that ideas can affect the perceived ‘reality’ of decision-makers, however, this impact is negative to the extent it obstructs them to maximise security by acting in accordance with the balance of power-logic.
3. Theoretical Comparison

3.1. Neoclassical realist theory

Neoclassical realist theory conceptualises inter-democratic security institutions as expansionist collective hegemonies with reduced rationality. Institutions and ideologies are products of power and the rise of the EU and NATO manifests the skewed distribution of power following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With the diminishing of the balance of power, unconstrained inter-democratic security institutions evolved as actors that advanced collective hegemony in Europe. Extreme imbalances in the international distribution of power are also seen to produce a geo-ideological paradigm, an ideology advocating that the survival of liberal norms essential for sustainable peace is dependent on the advancement of hegemony. In such instances ideology not only supports hegemonic ambitions, but it also reduces rationality. The realist understanding of “reduced rationality” is when states “ignore balance-of-power logic and act in non-strategic ways” and, as a result, “the system punishes them” (Mearsheimer, 2009: 242). Expanding inter-democratic security institutions have internalised the belief that they can transcend a balance of power logic, which results in power maximisation being equated to security maximisation.

In the following three sections, the first looks at neoclassical realist theory and outlines its place in and contribution to the broader theory of realism. Second, the effect on rationality of decision-makers by international institutions and ideology is assessed according to this theory. Third, a specific brand of neoclassical realism is developed to explain the rise of inter-democratic security institutions and their impact on the security dilemma with Russia.

1. Neoclassical realism

Neoclassical realism does not constitute a deviation or departure from either neorealism or classical realism, but instead builds upon core precepts and ideas from both. Neoclassical realists: “draw upon”
3. Theoretical Comparison

the rigor and theoretical insight of the neorealism (or structural realism) of Kenneth N. Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and others without sacrificing the practical insights about foreign policy and the complexity of statecraft found in the classical realism of Hans J. Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, Arnold Wolfers, and others (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, 2009: 4).

Neoclassical realism is consistent with the basic assumptions of neorealism. It recognises that the international distribution of power imposes systemic pressures that decision-makers must respond to strategically in order to maximise their security. However, while recognising the primacy of power generating systemic pressures, neoclassical realism suggests that these systemic incentives and constraints do not automatically translate into foreign policy because “systemic pressures are translated through unit-level intervening variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure” (Rose, 1998: 152).

“Systemic pressures” is a concept introduced by structural realism. It refers to the incentives and constraints imposed on states by the balance of power. Wars or the collapse of states can skew the balance of power, leaving one side unconstrained and in a position to expand their power at the expense of the security of others (Waltz, 2000). However, expansionism creates an incentive for others in the international system to balance. Mechanisms inherent in the system automatically return it to a balance of power: “The international equilibrium is broken; theory leads one to expect its restoration” (Waltz, 2000: 30).

Neoclassical realism extends upon the ideas of neorealism as it opens the “black box” by assessing decision-makers as an intervening variable between systemic pressures and foreign policy (Toje and Kunz, 2012: 5). Rationality is defined as the ability of decision-makers to act according to the balance of power logic, which implies recognising systemic pressures deriving from the international distribution of power and responding strategically to maximise security. This can be affected by domestic factors such as the extent of internal control and ability to mobilise power since power can be diminished by, for example, domestic rivalry. It is also affected by perceptions and misperceptions of adversaries, allies, and oneself. While recognising
3. Theoretical Comparison

the primacy of power, neoclassical realism also incorporates features of subjective and socio-psychological factors associated with classical realism (Baumann, Rittberger, and Wagner, 2001: 43). Neoclassical realism is consistent with the neorealist notion that peace is dependent on a balance of power and willingness to preserve the status quo, but it also acknowledges unit-level attributes that affect the ability to do so.

2. Questioning the “rational actor” assumption

Neoclassical realism addresses a gap and inconsistency in realism, the rational actor assumption. Several theorists nominally associated with other variants of the realist spectrum have demonstrated inconsistency in terms of states always acting rationally. Mearsheimer (2009, 242) argues that “Waltz’s decision to eschew the rational actor assumption is an important matter to which scholars have paid little attention”. Herz (1981: 189) drew attention to the role of decision-makers by arguing that the key weakness of realists lies in uncritically “considering those in charge of a nation’s foreign policy ‘rational actors’.”

Rationality means that states will act according to their own interest. In realist terms this implies acting according to the balance of power logic in order to maximise security (Mearsheimer, 2009: 242; Rose, 1998: 150; Rathbun, 2008: 305; Quinn, 2013; Reichwein, 2012). The systemic pressures created by the international distribution of power provide incentives for rationality. However, decision-makers do not always act on these pressures, at the peril of their own security.

Rational states are more capable of mitigating the security dilemma as they recognise that the system will punish excessive power accumulation. They will see it as in their interest to switch from advancing relative power when they are balanced against, and instead advance positive-sum security (Jervis, 1982). Waltz (1988: 161) similarly argues that “the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security”, and suggests that prudent (or rational) states only accumulate “appropriate amount of power” (Waltz, 1979:40). Status quo powers are defined as maximising security by
expanding their power only to the extent that it enhances security (Schweller, 1996). Less rational states are often revisionist since the reduced ability to recognise and respond to systemic pressures results in the continuing expansion of power. The security dilemma is therefore less manageable with less rational actors, as they attempt to maximise power instead of security, or weaken their own strategic position by not responding sufficiently to constrain other powers.

Questioning the rationality of states complements rather than contradicts neorealism. Waltz (1979: 202) specified that structural realism was not a foreign policy theory, but rather a theory on the limitations imposed by the international distribution of power in an anarchic system. While structural realism outlines the distribution of power and the resulting systemic pressures, it does not claim that states always act rationally according to balance of power logic and thereby maximise security. Instead, Waltz (1986: 330) and Mearsheimer (2009: 242) both argue that those who act according to these pressures will rise to the top, while failure to respond appropriately will undermine security.

Questioning of the rational actor model enables an exploration of the role of institutions and ideology, while remaining consistent with other core assumptions of realism. The basic assumption in neoclassical realism is that institutions and ideology can only have a positive effect on the security dilemma if it improves the ability of states to recognise and respond to the systemic pressures. In contrast, if institutions and ideology reduce the rationality of states, they will have adverse effects.

**International institutions**

With the increasingly prominent role of international institutions after the Cold War, realists have become more engaged in debates regarding their relevance. While offensive realists such as Mearsheimer consider international institutions to be of marginal importance, traditional and modified structural realists propose that international institutions can impact on international relations (Schweller and Priess, 1997). Realism is inherently state-centric, with the understanding of humans
interacting in groups and the state constituting the highest sovereign group in the contemporary system. Gilpin (1984) argues that the state system may not be constant since the highest sovereign commanding the loyalty of its subjects has evolved from tribes to empires to states. However, if the international system was to move beyond nation states “it will do so through age-old political processes and not as idealists would wish through a transcendence of politics itself” (Gilpin, 1984: 299).

The “age-old political process” of constructing a new sovereign or transferring sovereignty to an institution is dependent on power interests. Institutions reflect state interests and are therefore only as strong as states allow them to be. When it is no longer in the interest of states to preserve international institutions or alliances, autonomy and sovereignty are repatriated. States cooperate to advance relative gains or for positive-sum gain when there is a balance of power and they desire to maintain the status quo. While the common national interests of Western governments were previously to balance the Soviet bloc, after the collapse of the Soviet Union a key purpose has been to expand their collective influence in competition against larger states, in particular Russia. Realism can therefore adequately explain the rise and fall of international institutions.

Inclusive institutions reflecting the balance of power can facilitate cooperation between decision-makers of various states for the purpose of managing changes in the international distribution of power and mitigating the security dilemma. Institutions may resolve disputes at the institutional level before they escalate to military conflicts. However, inclusive institutions lose their significance if the balance of power is skewed, since states do not constrain themselves. Exclusive institutions promoting collective hegemony have the primary function of seeking relative gains against competing powers. In exclusive institutions, powerful states institutionalise their power over a weaker state, while collectively they both gain privileges by increasing power over a third state. Exclusive institutions have limited ability to absorb powerful states as members due to what Morgenthau (2006: 194) refers to as the distribution of power within alliances. Powerful states will align themselves with a weaker state against another powerful state, enhancing their own power as the weaker
Theoretical Comparison

state is more vulnerable and develops dependency. The competing strong state is weakened since its influence over the weak state is contained (Walt, 1985: 6).

Institutions can also reduce the ability to act strategically according to the balance of power. Exclusive institutions can replace a state’s right to make war with a duty to make war (Herz, 1942: 1046-1047). Furthermore, the stability provided by hegemony depends on constructing a common external threat in order for weaker states to voluntarily yield some sovereignty (Kindleberger, 1986). In this scenario, international institutions such as the EU and NATO will develop in opposition to some threat, real or otherwise.

Whether international security institutions aggravate or mitigate the security dilemma depends on the extent they reflect a balance of power. As modified structural realists acknowledge, when the discrepancy grows between an international institution and the actual distribution of power, the international system will destabilise and the prospect of conflict and war increases (Schweller and Priess, 1997). Exclusive institutions can often cause conflicts because they enable a group of states to pursue zero-sum gains over others, while inclusive institutions chiefly serve the purpose of constraining states from pursuing zero-sum gains against others. Inclusive institutions may strengthen when there is a balance of power and desire to maintain the status quo, as the primary interest of all becomes to peacefully manage alterations in the international distribution of power and resolve misunderstandings. Realism accredits the success of the United Nations to realist foundations as it reflects the balance of power by delegating privileges to the great powers that ensure their interest in preserving the system. In contrast, exclusive security institutions become instruments for states to compete for power. They are more aggressive when there is an imbalance of power due to reduced costs of opportunistic expansionism.

Norms and ideology

Ideologies and ideas can play an important role in how security dilemmas play out because they assist states to mobilise material power domestically to carry out foreign
policy. Neoclassical realism recognises some constructivist concepts in the social and ideational dimensions of politics, accepting that, in addition to material power, decision-makers may be affected by ideas, ideologies, and beliefs (Herz, 1981). The key distinction between neoclassical realism and constructivism is that neoclassical realism recognises the primacy of material power and rejects the proposal that these ideas exist independently of it. Ideologies proposing that power competition can be transcended if ideals of liberal peace are privileged actually augment hegemonic ambitions and reduce rationality. The “geo-ideological paradigm” stipulates that hegemonic aspirations tend to strengthen support and coexist with ideologies promising perpetual peace through the spread of norms (Pleshakov, 1994). Promoting universal norms is perceived to require hegemony in order for the ideal to become attractive to other states and to isolate challengers. Since ideologies and norms are reflections of power, expansionist powers tend to embrace norms promoting sovereign inequality, while status quo powers are inclined to support norms advocating sovereign equality. Either way, power underpins them.

Herz (1981: 187) proposes that the importance of perceptions and misperceptions of decision-makers implies that “image-making” or “diplomatic symbolism” constitutes a significant part of power politics. A major part of a foreign policy is to promote “a favourable image to allies, opponents, neutrals, and last but not least, one’s own domestic audience” (Herz, 1981: 187). Jervis (1976) also insists that decision-makers perceptions and misperceptions affect policies. Common ideology, culture, or political systems can strengthen internal cohesion in alliances through “ideological solidarity” (Morgenthau, 2006; Walt, 1997: 168). Exclusive security institutions dependent on external enemies therefore have incentives to promote misperceptions about the intentions of the other, and to portray them as being inferior, threatening, and the ideological opposite from “us”.

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1 The “geo-ideological paradigm” was initially used by Pleshakov (1994) to explain the Soviet Union’s shift from internationalism to a national cause, here it is used more broadly by also describing inter-democratic security institutions.
Ideology and normative framing can enhance decision-makers’ ability to respond more persuasively to opponents, as political identities can be assigned to allies and opponents in ways that unite and enable decision-makers to mobilise resources. However, this ideological inference can also undermine rationality due to a weakened ability to recognise the systemic pressures from the international distribution of power, since allies are perceived to be “just like us” while opponents are perceived as the exact opposite. Ideas and ideologies can therefore undermine security maximisation and cause conflict to the extent that they draw attention away from the primacy of power. Hyde-Price (2008: 29) suggests that EU policy directed by ethics (non-strategic) may distract attention from the balance of power logic and cause under- or over-balancing:

Either the EU will be left as a weak and ineffective actor unable to further the shared interests of its member states, or it will indulge in quixotic moral crusades - with the attendant risk of hubris leading to nemesis.

Cooperation for security maximisation is possible when there is a balance of power and rationality in decision-making. However, ideologies that link survival of norms to hegemony undermine these conditions. Decision-makers affected by ideological fundamentalism are less able to recognise a security dilemma since assigned political identities dominate considerations. The primacy of power in the international system is disregarded if one considers one’s own intentions to be inherently benevolent while viewing the others’ as belligerent. This condition is aggravated by ideology. Waltz (2000a: 11) questions the rationality of Western democracies in which “citizens of democratic states tend to think of their countries as good, aside from what they do, simply because they are democratic”. Similarly, “democratic states also tend to think of undemocratic states as bad, aside from what they do, simply because they are undemocratic” (Waltz, 2000: 11). These concerns resemble the warnings by classical realists like Carr, Morgenthau, Butterfield, and Kennan that ideology and norms that produce beliefs in the inherent goodness of one’s own political system can manifest as destructive “self-righteousness”, “moral crusades”, or “nationalist universalism” (Booth/Wheeler, 2008: 98).
3. Theoretical Comparison

3. Neoclassical realist theory and inter-democratic security institutions

The specific neoclassical realist theory outlined in this section is based on the work of the classical realist John Herz on the role of ideology and idealism in the security dilemma. The theory assumes a structurally induced foreign policy, with ideological support for hegemony that undermines the rationality of decision-makers as an intervening variable. Herz (1950a) suggests that ideology, including liberal democracy, may have disastrously adverse effects on the security dilemma by undermining the primacy of power, ironically in the ambitious attempt to transcend power competition. The argument is that while the liberal ideas advocate promotion of human freedoms, such idealism has often caused "extreme realist behaviour" in the face of the security dilemma as constraints were rejected due to the belief that power competition can be transcended. As a realist aspiring to spread norms of human freedom, Herz (1950a; 1951; 1981) proposed advancing a program of "realist liberalism" or "realistic idealism". This concept is based on the principle that decision-makers should commit to developing human freedoms, however, these efforts can only be successful if material power is recognised as the fundamental force in international relations.

Herz (1950a) conceptualises "idealist internationalism" as the attempt to spread norms of human freedom in the international system to overcome the "realism" and power competition in international relations. However, instead of transcending power competition, the advancement of norms depends on and is interlinked with the accumulation of power and hegemony. Power is required as a "means" to advance norms and also becomes the "ends" because hegemony is necessary to defend the norms. Linking hegemonic power and norms of human freedom eventually becomes a contradiction in terms due to the centralisation of power, and liberal norms end up yielding in favour of hegemony. Herz (1950a) argued that international idealism

Paradoxically, [has] its time of greatness when its ideals are unfulfilled, when it is in opposition to out-dated political systems and the tide of the times swells it toward victory. It degenerates as soon as it attains its final goal; and in victory it dies.
It is argued in this thesis that the rise of inter-democratic security institutions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union shares structural and idealist mechanisms with revolutionary French nationalism and Soviet communism. Herz (1950a) has argued that the French and Russian revolutions were idealist attempts to transcend realism in the international system by universalising forms of governance that claimed to foster a more harmonious relationship among states. However, linking such ideals to a unit competing for power and hegemony causes a return to national causes manifested by exclusion, expansionism, aggression and imperialism (Herz, 1950a).

The first stage of idealist internationalism is the conviction of one’s own benign and normative means and ends, which are believed to be capable of transforming the international system. The expectation after the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution and the liberal democratic bloc after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was a consensual and imminent acceptance of their universal ideals. These movements would transcend power competition and bring about a “totally and radically different situation” which would “separate … the present evil world from the brave new world of the future” (Herz, 1950a). The French Revolution embraced the idea that with the rise of sovereign nation-states the domestic advancement of human freedom would be externalised and manifested as a harmonious international system with free, equal, and self-determining nationalities. The Bolshevik revolution envisioned that with the rise of socialism the domestic advancement of human freedom in a classless society would be externalised and manifested as a harmonious and post-sovereign international system. Similarly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became common to expect that the rise of liberal democratic norms would be externalised and manifested in an increasingly post-sovereign and liberal democratic international system. This had similarities with the almost utopian Wilsonian expectations about the contributions of democracy to human progress. The teleology based on Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” also bore similarities to Georg Hegel’s view that the French Revolution was bringing about the “end of history”. Such expectations about human progress became a recurrent position in discussions and interpretations of Fukuyama’s (1989) essay on “the end of history”.
The second stage of idealist internationalism is the proposition that the presumed benign ends justify and morally compel offensive means. When the ideals were not adopted as expected and states did not align themselves behind the leaders of the ideals, sovereign equality was challenged and de-legitimized as the notion arose that the incumbents of the “old world” had to be defeated to give way to the new world. Constraints on projecting power were reduced, setting the conditions for pursuing perpetual war to achieve perpetual peace. Natural law was granted precedence over legal positivism, inviting conquest and hegemony by claiming responsibility for the freedom of other peoples. The French professed that the universal values of the revolution were to be imposed on humanity by force. Thus the French National Convention declared in 1792 that France would “come to the aid of all peoples who are seeking to recover their liberty” (Herz, 1950a). Similarly, the Bolsheviks declared in 1917 “the duty to render assistance, armed, if necessary, to the fighting proletariat of the other countries” (Herz, 1950a). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO and the EU began to shed the notion of security as being dependent on mutual constraints. They claimed the right and responsibility to defend liberal democratic norms and the freedom of other peoples through an increasingly militaristic and interventionist interpretation of human security. This reflected Wilson’s justification for a shift in the US posture from a passive beacon of democracy to be emulated, to taking on an active missionary duty where the military defeat of Germany would be the “war to end all wars” and make the world “safe for democracy”.

The third stage of idealist internationalism is the recognition of the necessity of power becoming an end in itself through the interlinking of power structures to the survival of the ideals. Hegemony reflected in internationally aristocratic structures come to be deemed necessary and indeed a responsibility in order to defend the ideals. The French, Soviets, and NATO/EU members consider themselves to be selflessly taking upon the burden of leading the rest of the world towards universal ideals, and
examine their actions as being driven by external demand. However, internationalism eventually becomes “subservient to a primarily ‘national’ cause, or rather, the maintenance of the regime of one specific ‘big power’” (Herz, 1950a). As the priority of power precedes norms, idealist hegemonies resist and confront competing power structures and reject normative pluralism as a challenge to hegemony. The term “Titoism” exemplifies the Soviet rejection and opposition of alternative communist power structures independent of the Soviet Union due to its “federalistic ideology”, suggesting that ideals must be preserved by power structures with centralised power (Herz, 1950a: 172). This resembles inter-democratic security institutions. The more “democratic” organisations are, the more the leadership will perceive it as their responsibility to assert their dominance to defend the norms from the control of the majority (Herz, 1950b: 165). Hurrell (2003: 42) similarly suggests that states advocating the virtues of democracy within states are the same who ignore proposals for democratising decision-making within international institutions. By linking democracy and Euro-Atlantic institutions, liberal democratic norms are thus presented as both a constitutional principle and an international hegemonic norm (Rosow, 2005). Consequently, conflict must ensue since “the security dilemma is at its most vicious when commitments, strategy, or technology dictate that the only route to security lies through expansion” (Jervis, 1978: 187).

The last stage of idealist internationalism is reduced security dilemma sensibility resulting from weakened rationality. Balancing initiatives by competing powers do not result in compromise to enhance mutual security, since they are perceived in Manichean terms as attempts to disrupt normative positive-sum policies in favour of realpolitik. Sustainable peace is sought through victory over balancing powers as the idealist “opposes all the natural forces and trends which are the direct or indirect consequence of the security and power dilemma” (Herz, 1950a: 178). Wilson evoking rhetoric of an evil German empire to mobilise support for the US entering the war had created a “Manichean trap”, as it became difficult to accept a compromise in a peace

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2 This resembles Waltz (1979) comparison of the US international democratisation mission with the colonial “white man’s burden” and “civilising mission”.

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treaty, and in addition it led to support for excessively punitive conditions for surrender (Junker, Hildebrand and Schroeder, 1995). Similarly, by considering the Cold War in as a struggle of good versus evil, there was little political willingness to accommodate Russia in a post-Cold War settlement. The resulting security dilemma is instead perceived to be caused by Russia’s failure to accept liberal democratic norms.

The security dilemma is less recognisable when the possibility that aggression and threats can originate from all people and actors is rejected. Liberal ideologies have a vulnerability to extremism and reduced rationality since they tend to “externalise evil”, which implies that the sources of conflicts and evil are found only in others. This undermines the notion that all people and actors need to be constrained and balanced, as the fundamental condition for peace in realist theory. Externalising evil becomes a natural process if man, and by extension democratic states, are assumed to be fundamentally good, while still recognising that conflicts are present. The sources of peace within human nature and states are usually attributed to one’s own characteristics, thus morally elevating oneself above the rest due to one’s own race, religion, values or form of government. This makes the individual or state susceptible to extremism since the difference between a utopian world that “we” represent and the current volatile world can be bridged by converting or civilising the other. If this fails the alternative becomes to either contain or exterminate them. As Aron observes:

Idealistic diplomacy slips too often into fanaticism; it divides states into good and evil, into peace-loving and bellicose. It envisions a permanent peace by the punishment of the latter and the triumph of the former. The idealist, believing he has broken with power politics exaggerates its crimes (cited in: Schweller and Priess, 1997: 11).

The rationality of the actor is thus diminished since it does not act strategically according to the balance of power logic. Instead of maximising security by reaching a compromise for absolute gain when balanced, inter-democratic security institutions pursue power maximisation in a winner-takes-all confrontation against adversaries.
3. Theoretical Comparison

3.2. Liberal institutional theory

The conceptualisation of inter-democratic security institutions as integrators and promoters of liberal democratic norms is rooted in liberal institutional theory. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the confrontation between two ideologies. This induced the EU and NATO to transform by taking a leading role in advancing security as a positive-sum game through the promotion of liberal democratic norms and Euro-Atlantic integration. International institutions and democracy create peace, thus inter-democratic security institutions are particularly capable of promoting security by preserving and enlarging the Kantian “zone of peace”. Inter-democratic security institutions constitute a “force for good” because they use non-provocative and defensive means for positive-sum security. A socialising role is enabled by their “magnetic pull” resulting from the prosperity and freedom of their member states. Interactions with non-members are institutionalised to facilitate a voice opportunity for non-violent dispute resolution and to build trust, while uncertainties are dispelled since the democratic and transparent nature of these institutions reveals benevolent intentions. These institutions transcend the requirement for an external threat and provide security with other states rather than against them. Hence, inter-democratic security institutions can mitigate or transcend the security dilemma with Russia.

1. Liberal institutional theory

Liberalism institutionalism assumes that peace is obstructed by failures to implement mechanisms that facilitate a natural aspiration among humans and states to seek peace (Keohane, 1984, 1989, 2002). The predominant perception is that conflicts originate from a lack of democratic institutions rather than a lack of power equilibrium (Williams, 2007: 74). Liberal democracies develop effective international institutions due to their robust rule of law, separation of powers and non-violent resolution of disputes (Ikenberry, 2001). Doyle (1983) drew on Kantian theory proposing that a global trend towards democracy can make wars become obsolete. The academic
3. Theoretical Comparison

debate has evolved into what Owen (2004) labels the “democratic distinctiveness research programme”. Democracies have a distinct ability to build and maintain effective institutions, based on mutual trust, common identities and a “we-feeling” (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 31; Dembinski, Hasenclever and Wagner, 2004; Lipson, 2003). Russett and Oneal (2001) propose that democracy, international institutions, and interdependence are mutually reinforcing and produce peace. Deutsch’s concept of a pluralistic security community was not restricted to liberal democracies, but the mutual responsiveness of such a community is more likely to develop among democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 31). Consequently, inter-democratic security institutions are more likely to create peaceful inter-state relations than more inclusive and heterogeneous organisations (Pevehouse and Russett, 2006).

2. Inter-democratic security institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union

Developing and institutionalising democracy through inter-democratic security institutions has become a key security strategy since the Cold War. From a liberal perspective, inter-democratic security institutions are ideal to provide security by defending pacifying norms. Liberal institutional theory provides answers to why some international institutions persisted after the Cold War (McCalla, 1996; Wallander and Keohane, 1997; Duffield, 1992). Liberal institutionalism differentiates itself from realism by explaining the ability of institutions to maintain their membership, a phenomenon labelled “institutional stickiness” (Powell, 1994).

NATO can be considered an inclusive security institution that incorporates former enemies and illiberal regimes like Germany and Italy, while cultivating and cementing democracy. It is in this sense that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO is claimed to have been able to “return to itself” by focusing on pacifying inter-state relations rather than balancing an external threat. This implies that NATO was never meant to be against an enemy and this was a mere historical distraction. NATO and the EU make a strong case for enlargement as a way if supporting a transition towards predictable liberal democracy and the elimination of division lines in Europe, which
ultimately benefits non-member states as well. Risse (1996) therefore portrays NATO enlargement as an extension of the Kantian pacific federation.

According to liberal institutionalists, NATO demonstrates a peaceful posture by committing itself in an agreement with Russia not to forward deploy permanent military forces on the territory of new member states, which “eliminates one of the core defining features of NATO’s Cold War military alliance practices” (Keohane, 2002: 107). For liberal scholars, NATO has thus transformed into a “security management institution” by accommodating non-members in strategic partnerships and managing risks rather than fighting enemies (Wallander and Keohane, 1999). Keohane (2002: 12) posits that “Russia is drawn more closely into NATO decision making” with “breathtaking speed”. It was therefore conceivable that a democratic Russia may become a member (Keohane, 2002: 90). In similar vein, the EU represents integration based on self-interests in a positive-sum game (Moravcsik, 1998). By transcending the characteristics of alliances dependent on external enemies, the EU and NATO should not pose a threat to other states. At most, NATO is depicted as limiting the policy options of less democratic non-member states in order to encourage liberal democratic reform and deter traditional power politics (Williams and Neumann, 2000).

3. Liberal institutionalism and the security dilemma

The security dilemma can be transcended by growing structural integration of the international system, facilitated by the promotion of liberal democratic principles and institutions. The security dilemma derives from uncertainties, which are caused by a shortage of reliable information concerning the intentions of adversaries. Keohane and Martin (1995) suggest that institutions and liberalism are ideal to promote transparency and predictability, which assist in overcoming uncertainties and therefore mitigate the security dilemma. Institutions increase cooperation and reduce conflicts by providing institutional arrangements and mechanisms for resolving disputes and developing interdependence (Keohane 1984; Weber 2000). A positive-sum game is thus created since these institutions “can provide information, reduce
transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity” (Keohane and Martin, 1995). While most scholarly work on inter-democratic security institutions focuses on the benevolent relations between members, attention is also devoted to non-members. The proposition tends to be that these institutions serve a socialising role, provide stability, and pull the periphery into constructive cooperation. In terms of the prisoners’ dilemma, liberal institutionalism suggests that the transparency of institutions reduces the incentives for cheating (Keohane, 1984; Martin, 1992).

However, this does not suggest that inter-democratic security institutions do not respond to conflicts and aggressive posturing in the international system. Moravcsik (1997) proposed the reformulation of liberalism as a *theory* rather than an ideology, as state preferences deriving from societal actors and state structures can also cause conflicts. A divergence between an ideal and actual foreign policy can be caused by the state preferences of others (Moravcsik, 1997). The liberal institutional assumptions about inter-democratic security institutions therefore expects that inter-democratic security institutions do not contribute to the security dilemma, but rather that they mitigate or even transcend the security dilemma.
4. Research Design

This thesis testing two competing hypotheses explores the growing role of inter-democratic security institutions in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing contributions they made to the security dilemma with Russia. The research design is important since a key objective is to introduce a theoretical framework for analysing contributions to a security dilemma by one side in a dyad. Most contemporary academic debates devoted to security relations between the EU/NATO and Russia tend to be descriptive rather than theory driven. Despite the similarities of the exclusive and ideological characteristics of both the EU and NATO, most scholars do not tend to conceptualise the EU and NATO collectively as inter-democratic security institutions. Also, despite the rise of the EU and NATO as the main actors shaping the European security architecture, the point of departure for most analyses tends to be the Russian challenge to the EU and NATO. The effect from the rise of inter-democratic security institutions on the security dilemma with Russia as a non-member state is an essential research area within European security, unless it is assumed that Russian foreign policy is shaped independently from this phenomenon. Russia constitutes a unique case as it is the largest European state and most likely to be the only state permanently excluded from full membership in both the EU and NATO. The thesis assesses how and why inter-democratic security institutions influence the variables that aggravate or mitigate the security dilemma.

This chapter first outlines the method for assessing the security dilemma. Second, the case selection and case portraits are presented. Third, the variables affecting the security dilemma are conceptualised and operationalised by clearly defining the variables and assigning observable indicators. Lastly, specific expectations for the outcome of the two case studies in terms of how the evidence corresponds with the indicators are outlined in relation to the two competing theories.
4. Research Design

4.1. Method

The Security Dilemma

The aim of the thesis is to establish how the rise of the EU and NATO as inter-democratic security institutions impact on variables that affect the security dilemma. Observing the security dilemma only as an end result may neglect the way a security dilemma is affected by both sides. In other words, a study on inter-democratic security institutions can inadvertently become a study on Russian perceptions and policies as a second independent variable. Focusing on variables or factors is a better way of assessing the contribution by inter-democratic security institutions to this dilemma. The selection, conceptualisation and operationalisation of these variables can be scrutinised individually.

The key variables affecting the security dilemma are identified as: 1) Instruments of power: the extent to which tools of power and influence are offensive or defensive; 2) Security dilemma sensibility: the ability and intent to recognise the security dilemma by considering the possibility that one’s own policies may create security fears among other actors, and that, as a result, their policies may be defensively motivated; 3) Institutional inclusion: the degree to which non-members are empowered with an effective voice opportunity to influence policies; 4) Threat perception: the extent to which a threat is identified and whether the threat perception is pre-determined by deriving from power and due to a dependency on an external threat for institutional cohesion.

Process-tracing to compare two competing theories

Process-tracing is a powerful method to test theories by identifying a causal chain between an independent and dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005: 206-207). Process-tracing assesses evidence of the existence of hypothesised causal mechanisms present in case studies and can develop “contingent generalizations about
the conditions under which these mechanisms, and conjunctions of different mechanisms, operate in particular ways in specified contexts” (George and Bennett, 2005: 129). Causal mechanisms are theorised entities or steps linking the independent and dependent variables. They are “independent stable factors that under certain conditions link causes to effects” (George and Bennett, 2005: 8). When mapping out the variables they can be divided into entities that are observable and measurable, while the action is the assumed function of the causal force between the different variables. Process-tracing is commonly used in liberal research studies to test the hypothesised variables. The method is considered less suitable for realist studies since realism tends to “black-box” decision-making (Rittberger and Wagner, 2001). Neoclassical realism, however, attempts to open the “black box” of foreign policy by introducing decision-makers as an intervening variable between the international distribution of power and foreign policy.

Theory testing involves deductive research, where defined theories are tested and compared by observing the extent to which expected indicators are present in variables that are identified by both theories to have causal effect. In deductive research, an abstract theory is translated into specific and observable variables that can be used to test the competing hypotheses (Beach and Pedersen, 2011). The variables must be conceptualised and operationalised in order to be tested. Conceptualising variables infers defining and formulating specific values to different concept, which permits us to systemise and organised these concepts within clear cognitive borders (Beach and Pedersen, 2011). The variables are then operationalised by constructing case-specific indicators that are both observable and measurable, in order to confirm or disconfirm the presence of the indicators in case the studies (Beach and Pedersen, 2011).

Process-tracing is the optimal method for this kind of theory-testing thesis as it allows the investigation of the changes in certain proxy variables related to the rise of inter-democratic security institutions that are attributed to have causal effect on the security dilemma. However, the use of process-tracing is to some extent unconventional as the variables are assessed individually, without tracing the relationship between these variables and the security dilemma. In this thesis the
independent variable is the rise of inter-democratic security institutions. The dependent variables are the proxy variables/factors expected to have further causal effect on the security dilemma. Because the two theories tested in this thesis have the same indicators and opposing expectations, disconfirming one theory can create increased confidence in the other. However, while these two theories are negatively correlated, there are other theories that can also explain the outcome.

Data collection

This thesis draws on insights gained from semi-structured interviews with Russian, EU, and NATO officials between November 2011 and January 2012. Experts and practitioners were selected by approaching the main delegations working in the relevant area. Face-to-face interviews for the CSDP case study were carried out at EU missions and at Russian embassies and the Russian delegation to the EU. Officials
and experts within the states of CSDP missions were also approached for background talks. These interviews and talks took place in Serbia, Bosnia (both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), and Moldova (including Transnistria). Face-to-face interviews for the NATO case study were arranged with the NATO delegation to Russia in Moscow, and with the Russian delegation to the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels.

Other data was obtained from major strategic documents and from speeches and statements by key representatives. Forums for European security debates such as the annual Munich Security Conference are the main sources for such speeches. The EU’s External Relations Commissioner was a major official source for the EU position. Benita Ferrero-Waldner held this post before the Lisbon Treaty merged the position with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In addition, EU Commissioners and member state politicians provided important perspectives. In the NATO case study, the Secretary-General offered many speeches and publications on NATO’s official position. As missile defence is a US-led project, US officials such as Ellen Tauscher, the US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, made several important contributions to outlining the US position on missile defence. It has also become common for Russian officials to publish articles in both Russian and foreign newspapers and journals, most of which are posted on the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Among the main contributors were the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov; Russian Presidents, Dimitri Medvedev and Vladimir Putin; and the Russian Ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov.

4.2. Case selection and case portraits

The case studies applied in this thesis are specific examples of a wider theoretical phenomenon, which enables cross-case comparative research. Systemic theory-testing research also supposes that some lessons can be exported. Ideally these lessons could be applied to other cases that include the same selection criteria: inter-democratic
security institutions pursuing enlargements; external governance; military interventions; democracy promotion; energy-security; and other areas of security.

A limitation on this thesis is the lack of previous examples for comparison. The development of the liberal-democratic community and inter-democratic security institutions in the Euro-Atlantic region constitutes a unique historical occurrence. This translates into a narrow selection of cases. The thesis and case studies are also very specific due to the focus on relations with Russia, which also has unique characteristics and holds a distinctive position in Europe. However, some lessons may be exportable, for example, to relations between the EU and Turkey. Turkey is a regional power with democratic deficiencies that may be too large to be included in the EU, while potentially becoming a challenger if excluded. As noted in the previous section on neoclassical realism, this specific theory on the rise of inter-democratic security institutions also exports lessons to an even broader context because it compares the rise of inter-democratic security institutions with nationalism following the French revolution and communism following the Bolshevik revolution. This suggests that a broader universe if cases may in fact exist for such a study.

Two cases were chosen: NATO’s development of missile defence and the EU’s development as a security institution through the CSDP. The criteria for case selection were the independent variable, the dependent variable, and scope criteria (Beach and Pedersen, 2011). The independent variable is the “rise of inter-democratic security institutions” and encompasses significant cases of increased security responsibility for the EU and NATO after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Scope criteria are those where both the inter-democratic security institutions and Russia claim they have security interests. The geographical location of Europe becomes a scope criterion given EU/NATO actions in Africa or South East Asia is of less strategic significance to Russia. To reduce the possibility of bias, the dependent variable demands cases where both theories have reasonable expectations and explanations.

Cases are categorised as “hard” and “easy” from the perspectives of both theories in order to avoid or at least reduce bias. If a hard case is chosen for realism then it should be complemented by a hard case for liberalism as well. An easy case that is
disproven is more discrediting to the theory than a hard case. While missile defence constitutes an easy case for realism due to the high-politics of nuclear weapons, the CSDP is more of a hard case since the limited scope and typically non-military nature of its mission reduces the focus on hard capabilities. For liberalism a weapons system like missile defence constitutes a hard case, while the CSDP is an easy case given it primarily sets goals for human rights, democratisation, state building and integration.

In order to assess the causal effect of the variables, a reference point must be established prior to the manifestation of the independent variable. Since the rise of inter-democratic security institutions is a process spanning two decades, a comparison can be made between two periods: their origin; and the present. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which became the Common Security and Defence Policy, emerged in 1999 and has continued to evolve. NATO’s “transformation” to an inter-democratic security institution also occurred in 1999 with its first enlargement and intervention in Kosovo. However the decision to make missile defence a NATO asset is more recent, only being decided and announced at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. Both cases thus provide the reference points required.

Case Portrait I: The CSDP and Russia

This CSDP case study limits its focus to the unique characteristics of the EU as an inter-democratic security institution expected to affect relations with Russia. Nuttall (2000), Howorth (2007; 2010), and Smith (2008) are among the more extensive studies of EU foreign policy. The EU is able to regulate an exclusivity of membership and determine the parameters of association agreements. Already in 1967, the then EC suspended its Association Agreement with Greece following the Obrist coup (Wagner, 2011: 102). The democratic criteria for membership were formalised when the CEECs became prospective members. The EU considered democratisation a precondition for stability in the region. It established specific liberal democratic criteria for membership in the “Copenhagen Criteria” at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, and augmented these criteria further at the Madrid European Council in 1995. States aspiring for membership or privileged partnership with the EU are
expected to adopt its Community *aquis*, the EU legal framework that also safeguards its values and norms. The condition for democratic credentials implies a certain exclusive nature for the EU.

Six months after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the member states of the Western European Union (WEU) met at a Council meeting in Germany where they agreed to develop military capabilities to deal with what became known as the Petersberg tasks. The EU’s decision to become a security institution had been taken at Maastricht where the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) was finalised in 1992. A revision of the Treaty was concluded in Amsterdam in 1997 and entered into force in 1999. The EU had clearly recognised the need to develop as a security actor for internal and external reasons. Internally, it recognised that developing military capabilities and becoming a security provider was required to deepen integration between its member states. Externally, the lack of ability to project military power became apparent during the Balkan crisis in the 1990s. The latter spurred the initiative to found the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the June 1999 Cologne European Council. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was born in Bosnia, while the ESDP/CSDP was born in Kosovo.

The European Community (EC) began as *economic-political* cooperation aimed at preventing conflicts between its member states through interdependence and integration. The development of the CSDP demonstrates a shift towards traditional security: a combination of civilian and military means is to be used to prevent or resolve conflicts in the territory of non-members. The CSDP is unique as it was not founded in response to direct military threats to the EU. The EU aspires to be a benign power and a force for good, and aims to promote security through values rather than zero-sum national interests. It presents the task ahead of it as “transformation and legacy management of cold war defence systems to meet today’s collective security challenges” (Quille, 2006: 6). While the EU is developing more military capabilities,

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3 The WEU was established by seven Western European states in the early years of the Cold War, though its functions were merged with Common Security and Defence Policy with the Lisbon Treaty.
they are not frequently deployed. Missions have been concentrated on the EU periphery, although the EU has been engaged in Africa and other regions. This thesis will focus solely on the European missions to abide by the scope criteria of focusing on regions where both the EU and Russia claim to have security interests.

The CSDP missions to date have been limited in scope and mainly non-military, but nonetheless numerous. The first military European mission was EUFOR Concordia in Macedonia in 2003, which was a military mission that replaced NATO. This was followed by the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) Proxima in 2004, and the European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in 2006. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) the civilian European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was deployed in 2003 and the European Union Military Operation (EUFOR Althea) in 2004. In Kosovo, the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) began in 2008. The civilian European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was established on the borders of Transnistria in collaboration with the Moldovan and Ukrainian governments in 2005. In Georgia, the EU launched a law reform mission, EUJUST Themis, from 2004-2005. A border-monitoring mission, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), followed the 2008 war in Georgia.

The extent to which the EU’s political component compares to the economic motivations for membership is not clear, though a consensus exists in recognising that the military component is of less importance for prospective members. NATO constitutes the main European security institution, and the EU has so far not sought to directly compete with it. Instead, it has taken a partner role and limited itself mostly to peacekeeping and peacemaking. Unlike NATO, the EU has a less hierarchical structure and lacks the clear leadership of one dominant state. This also affects its ability to act. The EU is still working on structural issues, with internal cohesion or a “common voice” being a key challenge. It can be argued that power is centralising in Germany as French declines and the UK moves towards the exit. However, France and the UK are permanent UNSC members and the still the EU’s two main military powers.
Case Portrait II: Missile Defence and Russia

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has strengthened its identity as an inter-democratic security institution and community of civilised and democratic states. Its old member states set liberal democratic accession criteria for membership, and the CEECs framed their membership aspirations in terms of transforming themselves into modern democratic states and “returning to Europe”. NATO’s conditionality for membership, predicated on some exclusiveness, has contributed to its democratic identity. This democratic identity has been researched from a variety of perspectives. Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander (1999) focused on the role of democracy in the transformation and continued existence of NATO. Gheciu (2005) ascribed a democratic identity to NATO due to its ability to socialise CEECs. Risse-Kappen (1995) argued that NATO has internally democratic structures and mechanisms since even weaker states can impact on decision-making, while Schimmelfennig (2003) analysed the role of democratic rhetoric in NATO enlargement. Sjursen (2004) questioned NATO’s identity as a Kantian democratic community because it does not have a democratic mandate and the absence of “sovereign equality” because disputes are not resolved by an impartial third party.

NATO has in recent years sought new security responsibilities, which includes the construction of missile defence. Missile defence illustrates the ambiguous relationship between offensive and defensive weapons. Missile defence can be used defensively against an attack, or enable nuclear weapons to be used offensively in a first-strike by intercepting what would remain of the second-strike capabilities of an opponent. During the Cold War, strategic stability was preserved by negating the incentive for first-strike by implying that second-strike capabilities would cause unacceptable if not comparable destruction. The non-offensive defence (NOD) argument in the 1980s suggested that it was possible to organise military infrastructure to maximise defensive capabilities while minimising offensive capabilities. The Soviet Union first supported the non-offensive defence concept in 1986-87, which then made NATO reconsider its former scepticism to the idea (Møller, 1995).
Ambitions for missile defence date back to 1946 when the US initiated two long-term studies into the possibility, projects Thumper and Wizard (Van Hook, 2002). In 1967 the US began developing the Sentinel ballistic missile defence system with nuclear-tipped interceptors. This plan was cancelled and restructured under the Safeguard system in 1969. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM-Treaty) was signed with the Soviet Union in 1972. This Treaty banned strategic missile defence systems on the understanding that they would upset the strategic balance.

The point of departure in modern missile defence started in 1983 with Reagan challenging the ABM-Treaty with the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), which aimed to defend the US from nuclear Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The Reagan administration repudiated the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the idea that nuclear weapons have no offensive value when the other’s second-strike capabilities are sufficient to ensure the complete destruction of the attacker. Instead, it was suggested that the US should have the ability to defend itself from an attack. The George Bush Senior administration launched the idea of global missile defence in 1991 with the “Global Protection against Limited Strikes” (GPALS) system, though without much support from its allies it did not move forward. The Clinton administration unsuccessfully sought support for a less ambitious missile defence system, and eventually cancelled the program.

Without support from most of its allies, the George W. Bush administration launched plans for a unilateral missile defence system based on bilateral agreements with Poland to station interceptive missiles and the Czech Republic for a radar system. Opposition to this plan arose not only from Russia, but also from Germany and other European states. The large opposition from the populations of the Czech Republic and Poland made the system especially unpopular. At the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008 it was suggested that the US missile defence system should be a part of the NATO Territorial Missile Defence system. The Bucharest Summit Declaration concluded that proliferation posed an increasing threat to NATO members, and also pledged to “strengthen NATO-Russian missile defence cooperation” (NATO, 2008). After the resetting of relations between the US and Russia, the Bush-era US missile defence system to Poland and Czech Republic was cancelled in 2009.
At the NATO summit in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009, NATO declared readiness to cooperate with Russia on missile defence matters and other military issues (NATO, 2009). In July 2009 the intention to develop missile defence cooperation was announced at an Obama-Medvedev meeting in Moscow (Kremlin, 2009). In February 2010, the Obama administration announced that a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) missile system was to be pursued by NATO. The infrastructure and principles were outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defence Review (BMDR) Report, which also stated the readiness to cooperate with Russia (US Department of Defence, 2010a).

At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the decision was made to build the PAA missile system, with an invitation extended to Russia to participate. The intention to cooperate was incorporated in the final documents of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) (NATO, 2010b). However, a clear format for missile defence and inclusion of Russia is yet to be clarified. President Medvedev (2011) responded that Russia would support an inclusive system that embraced Russia as an equal partner, while warning of an arms race if that partnership failed to materialise. As the missile defence infrastructure is not yet fully developed, there is much ambiguity regarding its final architecture, technological capabilities and the extent of Russia’s involvement. An optimistic prediction is that the system unites NATO and Russia by taking cooperation to a higher level. A more pessimistic prediction would be that it escalates tensions and takes relations to a new level of confrontation.

NATO can be considered a security institution with more centralised power due to US leadership. It is based on inter-state cooperation rather than supranationalism. While scholars disagree over the extent of US leadership, in terms of missile defence it is clear that the US is providing most if not all the technology and will be operating it. For example, the agreement with Romania clearly states that the missile base will be operated by US forces while Romania is included only in defence of the components located on Romanian soil. NATO and US missile defence capabilities and policies are therefore closely intertwined. Nevertheless, NATO is assessed as an inter-democratic security institution due to the possible influence by the other member states. This requires an exploration of whether the missile defence system is
principally a US or a NATO asset and how this should be differentiated. In other words, it must be determined to what extent NATO influences the missile defence system and whether this influence favourable or a disadvantage to security relations with Russia. Assessing missile defence as a NATO asset infers that the case study must compare NATO’s missile defence system with earlier proposals and attempts by the US to develop missile defence outside the NATO framework.

4.3. Conceptualising and operationalising variables affecting the security dilemma

In order to test the two competing theories with opposing expectations it is necessary to translate theoretical expectations into observable indicators which can be tested in case studies. The variables are first conceptualised and then operationalised. Conceptualisation entails outlining clear definitions and conceptual borders for each of the variables. Operationalisation infers establishing observable and measurable indicators, which can be studied in the case studies.

The first two variables addressed are instruments of power and security dilemma sensibility. The commonality between these two variables is that they should not be affected by Russian policies in the security dilemma. A defensive posture is ideal in order to mitigate the security dilemma, both in response to a perceived offensive or defensive Russian foreign policy. Similarly, the ability of the EU and NATO to recognise a security dilemma should not be affected by Russian policies. In contrast, the extent of institutional inclusion and threat perceptions are expected to be influenced by Russian policies in the security dilemma. These two variables must therefore be addressed differently in order to only explore the contributions of the EU and NATO to the security dilemma, irrespective of Russian policies. This is achieved by assessing the degree that inclusion and threat perceptions are pre-determined. This entails observing to what extent Russia is allowed to be included in accordance to conditions set by the EU and NATO. Similarly, threat perceptions can be assessed by
4. Research Design

the extent to which they are pre-determined due to Russian power rather than its policies and behaviour. For example, the EU and NATO contribute to aggravate the security dilemma if there is no format or conditions for Russia to have its influence institutionalised and no there is no conceptual space for legitimate influence that is not deemed to be a threat.

4.3.1. Conceptualising and operationalising instruments of power

Instruments of power are defined here as tools for decision-makers to influence other actors to do what they would otherwise not have done. Instruments of power can be assessed by their offensive or defensive posture. The traditional debate on offensive and defensive posture came to prominence in the late 1970s and initially focused on hard power in high-politics, though it has since also been employed to assess a broader range of armed conflicts (Jervis, 1978: 186). While traditionally a realist province, liberals and other non-realists have also engaged in the debate on offensive and defensive postures (Keohane and Martin, 1995).

Instruments of power as a policy tool are an ideal variable to explore given their impact on the security dilemma. The development of non-offensive defensive instruments of power mitigates the basic driver of the security dilemma, the predicament that one’s gain in security may inadvertently threaten the security of others. The extent of offensive posture, either intended or unintended, becomes the key indicator for threat appraisal by Russia. A posture that is offensive or undistinguishable from a defensive posture can be expected to create incentives for Russia to respond to the resulting uncertainty and insecurity by advancing and deploying military capabilities. A non-provocative defensive posture both reassures Russia and discourages it from possible opportunistic militarism.

Posture is not only a reference to whether the instruments of power are offensive or defensive, but also refers to the extent that the two can be distinguished. Most military capabilities have dual uses and whether a weapon is offensive or defensive depends upon the situation. Debates are therefore usually devoted to whether the two
different postures are distinguishable (Van Evera, 1999; Jervis, 1978: 202; Levy, 1984). The extent an offensive or defensive posture can be distinguished is questioned since, for example, even defensive weapons like air-defence were necessary for Egypt to launch an attack on Israel in 1973 (Shiping, 2010).

While the perceptions of an observer like Russia matters, NATO and the EU could aim to dispel fears by clearly distinguishing between offensive and defensive capabilities and strategies. The EU and NATO are different actors with different capabilities and strategies for projecting power, though they are nonetheless comparable as inter-democratic security institutions. Posture is assessed by distinct policy choices, thus this thesis excludes geographic proximity as an indicator of offence/defence posture since it does not tend to be a man-made construct and policy decision. It can be expected that rational status-quo powers seeking to mitigate the security dilemma would attempt to clearly exhibit a distinction between an offensive and defensive posture, to the extent it is possible.

Realists argue it is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons, while liberals have been more optimistic. The realist perspective on offence-defence balance theory proposes that offensive or defensive postures reflect the opportunities and constraints in the international system. Van Evera (1998) argued that offensive advantage or defensive deficiency makes wars more likely. With offensive advantage there is less incentive to negotiate, making a state more likely to pursue preventative wars and opportunistic expansion. A defensive deficiency also encourages aggressive behaviour like a first-strike for survival and “defensive expansion” (Van Evera, 1998). Liberalism tends to consider democracies to be more benign and international regimes to be especially capable of making a non-provocative and defensive posture distinguishable, as they can impose constraints on offensive state behaviour and thereby mitigate anarchy, produce mutual gains, and reduce uncertainty.

Neoclassical realist theory assumes a structurally induced foreign policy, with ideological support for hegemony. Both the EU and NATO as unconstrained powers following the collapse of the Soviet Union are expected to pursue more offensive
instruments of power to expand their collective hegemony in Europe. Liberal institutionalism theorises that inter-democratic security institutions seek a rule-based security architecture based on positive-sum game, and thus pursue non-provocative and defensive instruments of power.

**Operationalising instruments of power**

The offence/defence posture can be observed by both available/deployable means and desired/pursued ends (Maull, 1990). The posture of the means and ends can be assessed by exploring both 1) capabilities and 2) the strategy that informs how these capabilities are used and the objective they serve.

Capabilities reveal primarily the means available to pursue security. This tends to be a reference to hard military capabilities, though it also includes other means of influence such as economic and political power. Strategy indicates both means and ends. Strategy defines security as an end or objective, like “freedom from war”, “withstanding external aggression”, or “absence of threat to values”. The means can be used for coercion, persuasion or attraction (Dahl, 1957). The ends pursued indicate the extent to which the objective is to advance zero-sum security. A strategy furthermore outlines how its means are expected to achieve these objectives.

Because the instruments of power by the EU and NATO are vastly different, case specific operationalisation is outlined below:

**Operationalising the instruments of power in the CSDP case**

The CSDP’s instruments of power are used primarily for “conflict management” in external intrastate conflicts, such as peacekeeping and peacemaking. In contrast, the traditional use of military force for territorial defence in interstate wars and other areas of high-end security has been the responsibility of NATO. The posture of the EU is assessed in terms of whether its coercive tools intended for conflict management are used to compete for power. The offence/defence posture of the EU is
observed first by the capabilities developed, and second in terms of strategy. Strategy is deemed more important when exploring the posture of an actor mainly involved in conflict management. Academic debates on the offence/defence posture of peacekeepers have traditionally focused on both the means and the ends to assess, for example, the possible imperial posture of post-colonial peacekeeping in Africa (Sloan, 2006) and Russian peacekeeping in its near abroad (Shashenkov, 1994).

Capabilities for conflict management do not constitute a very strong or clear indicator on posture in relation to the CSDP as certain military capabilities are required to exercise some coercion in conflict resolution. Capabilities for conflict management can be assessed by the extent conflict management becomes militarised and relies disproportionately on coercive means, and whether the offensive/defensive posture is distinguishable by tailoring capabilities for limited intrastate conflict resolution as opposed to carrying out large-scale offensive operations.

An offensive strategy for conflict management is defined here as using coercive means intended and mandated for conflict resolution to pursue one’s own zero-sum ends at the expense of the UN. In contrast, a non-provocative defensive strategy implies a positive-sum approach and acting as an agent and partner of the UN by prioritising its objectives and adhering to its mandates. This definition is consistent with both the realist and liberal understanding of an offensive or defensive approach to conflict management. The realist understanding of an offensive conflict management entails pursuing zero-sum ends by benefitting one group in a conflict over the other, and/or seeking to enhance EU interests at the expense of Russian interests. The liberal understanding of offensive conflict management is whether the EU acts as an agent of the UN by abiding by its objects, by acting within the framework of its mandate and/or seeking compromise between the conflicting parties. Given conflict management entails temporarily diminishing the sovereignty of a state, adherence to the UN as the primary representative of international law is a suitable indicator for the liberal understanding of a non-provocative and defensive posture. These two theoretical foundations for assessing the posture of the EU have some common ground. Since the UN represents objectives for conflicts that have been made collectively with the broader international community, including Russia,
conflict management by the EU can be defined as zero-sum when objectives are pursued at the expense of the UN objectives.

There is support in the literature for defining the defensive posture of a peacekeeper or a peacemaker as an agent of the UN, as opposed to acting as an independent actor. Sjursen (2006b: 15) posits that to ensure norms are not instrumentally used to veil the pursuit of interests, a foreign policy must be committed to internationally agreed rules, most prominently represented by the UN Charter. Sjursen (2006b) further suggests that benign actors must adhere to the UN as the cornerstone of a law-based international order that is also supported by the European Security Strategy (ESS). Niemann and de Wekker (2010) and Manners (2008: 46) propose that determining whether the instruments of the EU and the pursued norms are a common good or in the EU’s own self-interests, depends on the extent that these norms are acknowledged by the UN. The debate on whether the accumulation of military capabilities by the EU undermines civilian power or normative power concepts suggests that the EU can still remain a normative/civilian power depending on the ends it serves (Manners, 2006a; Maull, 1990; Smith, 2005a; Duchêne, 1973; Diez, 2005; Penska and Mason, 2003; Jung, 2003). Realism also links abstaining from offensive zero-sum policies to adherence to the UN, due to the mechanisms of constraints in the UN system that prevent the pursuit of zero-sum initiatives.

**Operationalising instruments of power in the missile defence case**

The offence/defence debate is not only about assessing the extent to which an offensive posture exist, but also whether it is possible to distinguish between an offensive and defensive posture. To explore this even further, both the capacity and the willingness to make such a distinction is explored. An offensive missile defence system is defined as undermining the second-strike capabilities of established nuclear powers like Russia. A defensive/deterrent missile defence system is expected to defend against missile attacks from “rogue states” possibly seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. However, a defensive missile defence system may target Russia if it maintains the strategic balance by replacing the reliance on nuclear weapons. Missile
defence can enhance the offensive potential of nuclear weapons in a possible first-strike against Russia, by acquiring the capacity to intercept the second-strike capabilities surviving a US/NATO first-strike. Distinguishing between an offensive and defensive missile defence system depends on the extent to which NATO is able and willing to differentiate between targeting “rogue states” such as Iran in the South and large nuclear powers such as Russia in the East.

The offence/defence posture of the missile defence system is observed first by the extent to which missile defence capabilities discriminate between potential targets. Second, the strategy is assessed in terms of whether the US and NATO link missile defence to broader zero-sum interests and whether policies of escalation control and/or first-strike are cultivated.

Capabilities are a key observable indicator here. Defensive missile defence capabilities tailor the quantity, quality and location of interceptive missiles and radar systems to a specific target and/or direction of threats. This type of tailored missile defence can more easily be facilitated by a Tactical Missile Defence or Theatre Missile Defence, since they cover specific territories. A defensive and non-provocative missile defence system also reduces uncertainty by committing to treaties that regulate the development of missile defence. In contrast, offensive missile defence capabilities do not discriminate between Iran in the South and Russia in the East. This typically manifests itself as Strategic Missile Defence with flexibility, where the focus on defence of one’s own territory from any origin in the world implies that capabilities have less ability to discriminate between potential targets.

Strategy is a reference to the objectives that missile defence serve, how security is defined, and how this will be achieved. A defensive strategy suggests that the main purpose is to reduce the incentives for proliferation and to obtain protection from “rogue states”. A defensive strategy entails responding to emerging new threats from nuclear proliferation, while concurrently ensuring that the system does not become a tool for power competition that alters the strategic balance with existing nuclear powers. Offensive strategy implies that missile defence is linked to a broader geopolitical strategy of hegemony and invulnerability. An offensive strategy embraces
first-strike advantage as an insurance policy in case conflict intensifies and/or to enhance “escalation control” for political pressure. Escalation control or escalation dominance is a reference to the ability to increase military pressure and possibly employ a limited use of force, with the logic that the stakes can be continuously increased until the other side is compelled to capitulate (Snyder, 1961; Oelrich, 2005: 42). It is assumed that with first-strike capabilities, existing and future opponents would have to capitulate under pressure given the knowledge that the other could possibly launch a successful first-strike.

4.3.2. Conceptualising and operationalising security dilemma sensibility

Security dilemma sensibility is a key variable for examining relations with Russia. Recognising the security dilemma logically precedes amending or implementing policies to mitigate it. The ability and intention to interpret Russian security fears and motivations enables decision-makers to make adjustment in the inclusion and threat perception. A common denominator for both theories is the assumption that the prominent role of liberal democratic ideals impacts on decision-makers. Concepts such as democratic peace theory that propagate a peaceful and benign nature of liberal democracies have gained significant acceptance among decision-makers. Security dilemma sensibility does not imply accepting Russian security concerns as “justified” or automatically attempting to alleviate its concerns. It merely infers being able to recognise these concerns, and taking them into consideration to the extent that it improves the security of inter-democratic security institutions. It also entails considering and recognising Russian arguments for its motivations, not condoning or agreeing with Russian policies. In realist terms, Morgenthau (1945) followed a Weberian consequentialist ethics that suggested the incorporating the concerns of adversaries were consistent with national interests.

The liberal perspective is that inter-democratic security institutions have a heightened ability and intention to objectively interpret Russian security fears and
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subsequent policy motivations. Ability and intention are enhanced by the democratic mechanisms in member states and the inter-democratic security institutions for open, transparent and plural discussions on security. Liberal democratic norms are the common denominator where convergence and integration of policies among member states occur. Arguments and policies inconsistent with these norms are shamed, which assists in constructing a “community of values”.

A neoclassical realist perspective is that security dilemma sensibility may be reduced by ideological fundamentalism and institutional entanglement. The excessive focus on political identities diminishes the conceptual space for one’s own power interests as well as the defensive motivations of the other. From this perspective, normative rhetoric does not transcend power, but becomes a tool for power competition. Ideology is used to assign a fixed understanding with strong emotional connotations to contested concepts, in order to link power interests to liberal norms and thereby shame political opposition. The normative rhetoric can undermine the ability of decision-makers to recognise a security dilemma, or challenge their intention to acknowledge the security dilemma, since it is equated to abandoning key liberal democratic values. Institutional entanglement implies that dependency on an institution may compel a state to not act in accordance with the balance of power logic in the short to medium term, while in the long term institutions that do not serve security interests will fail.

What should be explored is how the prominence of these ideas affects decision-makers in regard to debating Russian security concerns. What Schimmelfennig (2001) labels as “rhetorical entrapment” occurs where decision-makers first make a rhetorical commitment to common norms and ideas, and then employ rhetorical arguments in which arguments and policies are framed as supporting these commitments, in order to shame and silence opposition. In this regard, Diez (1999) and Malcolm (1995) suggest that the EU narrows debates when it introduces “Euro-speak”, the development of fixed understandings to contested concepts such as “Europe”. This bears similarities to what Freedman (2006: 20-26, 90-91) refers to as “strategic narratives”, which are “compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn.”
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Operationalising security dilemma sensibility

Security dilemma sensibility is observed in terms of how inter-democratic security institutions through their institutional mechanisms and liberal democratic norms contribute to either increasing or diminishing the ability and intention to consider Russian security fears and policy motivations. The purpose is not to debate the strength or “accuracy” of Russian concerns and arguments, but to examine EU and NATO awareness of the security dilemma. First, Russian security concerns regarding these inter-democratic security institutions and whether Russian policies are motivated by these security concerns is explored. Second it is assessed to what extent the inter-democratic security institutions display the capacity and intention to consider that they might cause security concerns in Russia and that Russian policy may be responding to these security concerns.

4.3.3. Conceptualising and operationalising institutional inclusion

Institutional inclusion is defined here as the institutional empowerment of a state with a “voice opportunity” so that it can express its security concerns and interests in the hope of influencing the decision-making of an institution. In this case it refers to the ability of Russia to influence the decision-making of the inter-democratic security institutions. Institutional inclusion is an excellent variable for exploring the impact on the EU/NATO security dilemma with Russia. Shared institutions can facilitate a common approach to security and reduce uncertainty, suspicion, fear and misunderstanding. Inclusion can disclose benign intentions and capabilities, while allowing each side to adjust and coordinate their policies to enhance security.

The extent of institutional inclusion can be assessed by an “effective voice opportunity”. This is a common denominator for both theoretical frameworks. Manners (2009: 3) suggests that inclusion is based on the notion of joint ownership as a result of involvement or consultations with partners. This entails “‘other-empowering’ rather than replicating some of the self-empowering motivations”, the latter being the case if consultations are conditioned (Manners, 2010: 42). Similarly,
Bicchi (2006) clarifies that there is a fine line between “giving voice to” and “speaking for” others. Inclusion implies critically analysing the arguments of other states, which results in learning and the possibility of a change of behaviour when confronted with better arguments (Bicchi, 2006: 288-289).

While institutional inclusion has traditionally been a concept within organisational theory, Grieco (1996) introduces the institutional “voice opportunity” hypothesis within the framework of structural neorealism. Voice opportunity is conceptualised as “the level of policy influence partners have or might attain in the collaborative arrangement” (Grieco, 1996: 287). Effective voice opportunity denotes that not only does Russia have an institutional ability to express its views, but these views also “reliably have a material impact on the operations of the collaborative arrangement” (Grieco, 1996: 288). In other words, the voice opportunity can potentially influence decision-making. This hypothesis constitutes an “institutional balancing model”, where mechanisms exist that allow states to “counter pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions” (He, 2008: 492). Grieco (1996: 289) proposes that if the voice opportunity is not effective enough, states will first attempt to “change its rules and modes of operations” by promoting “a new institutional rule trajectory”. If this is unsuccessful, the “exit option” will be pursued. This represents the feasibility of a greater voice from alternative institutional frameworks, bilateralism (Grieco, 1996: 289) or, alternatively, military balancing. States can respond to security threats with institutional balancing before resorting to “hard balancing” outside the institutional framework.

Traditionally, most realists has not devoted much significance to international institutions as they are not believed to alter underlying preferences. However, as rational states typically seek to maximise security rather than power, a voice opportunity in institutions may have the purpose of institutionalising a “soft balancing” to mitigate the security dilemma. Disputes can be debated and resolved at the institutional level before being elevated to the “hard balancing” that escalates and militarises conflicts. Institutional inclusion allows decision-makers to familiarise themselves with the security concerns of other states and amend policies when confronted with institutional balancing, which reduces the attraction of the “exit
option”. States will be attracted by the prospect of mitigating the security dilemma by reducing fear (and increasing cooperation for successful joint action / common goals) as a positive-sum game.

Institutional inclusion can occur in planning, decision-making and implementation. Institutional inclusion in planning is the process of considering the needs and wishes by all parties, and matching these aspirations with a common approach. In other words, it denotes bridging knowledge with action. Effective voice opportunity in planning first entails influencing the definition or conceptualisation of security issues (knowledge) and identifying possible initiatives to strengthen this security (action). Baldwin stipulates that “conceptual clarification logically precedes the search for the necessary conditions of security, because the identification of such conditions presupposes a concept of security” (Baldwin, 1997: 8). Second, institutional inclusion in planning as “other-empowering” (Manners, 2010) implies multilateral institutions as opposed to bilateral ones, and that the voice opportunity and consultations are not conditional on alignment with the policies of inter-democratic security institutions.

Institutional inclusion in decision-making denotes the ability of Russia to voice concern and influence the decision-making process of inter-democratic security institutions. This involves first facilitating a voice opportunity through frequent high level meetings to exchange mutual security perspectives and preferences. Second, it entails that the voice opportunity is effective by critically assessing specific Russian proposals put forth.

Institutional inclusion in implementation signifies the process of putting policies into practice by implementing and managing the security initiatives. Those who interpret and implement laws and policies can be more powerful than those who draft them. Effective voice opportunity in implementation is important to ensure that the actor does not deviate from previous planning and decision-making due to altering circumstances, ambiguity, and/or of self-interest by strengthening one’s own political, military and economic influence. Inclusion in implementation supposes multilateral, legal and permanent institutional arrangements.
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The expectations outlined according to neoclassical realist assumptions suggest that the exclusion of Russia is unavoidable in order for inter-democratic security institutions to serve as collective hegemonies in Europe. The exclusion of Russia is a reflection of the skewed balance of power following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and is supported by the belief among decision-makers that liberal democratic norms can only survive by having an unchallenged leadership in Europe. In contrast, liberal institutional theory expects Russia to be included to the extent that it does not undermine security and liberal democratic norms. Russia ought to be included as a responsible stakeholder in an increasingly inclusive European security system.

Operationalising institutional inclusion

For the EU case study, inclusion refers to the extent Russia is empowered to influence conflict resolution in the common neighbourhood. Institutional inclusion can increase trust and dispel fears about the EU abusing its position of authority in conflict management to compete for power. Disputes can be resolved at the institutional level before escalating to conflict, understood as Russia blocking CSDP policies and introducing counter-initiatives. For the NATO case study, inclusion is a reference to the extent Russia may participate in missile defence. Inclusion of Russia can create mutual trust and reduce fears of the missile defence system possibly being used against Russia. Disputes can be resolved within institutions to prevent them from escalating into military confrontation, understood as Russia initiating counter-measures to combat the missile defence system. Both case studies observe inclusion in the planning, decision-making and implementation stage.

Russia’s inclusion at the planning stage refers first to its ability to influence a common definition of European security, subsequently defining the goals for conflict resolution and the parameters for missile defence. Second, it refers to the format for pursuing these security goals, with the extent of inclusion defined by whether the shared institutions are multilateral, permanent and not conditional on adherence to EU/NATO policies. Decision-making is evaluated by the frequency and level of consultations, and the mechanisms for considering Russian proposals and arguments.
Implementation is assessed by the extent that Russia’s participation is based on a multilateral, legal and permanent framework. For the EU it refers to participation in conflict management, while for NATO it suggests participation in the management and operation of missile defence.

4.3.4. Conceptualising and operationalising threat perceptions

Threat perception is a reference to whether Russia is perceived as a threat, and also whether this possible threat perception is pre-determined by being derived from Russia’s power and/or due to an EU/NATO dependency on external threats to maintain institutional unity. The security dilemma can be expected to increase if Russia is considered a threat that must be countered, irrespective of the validity of those threat perceptions. If Russia is considered a pre-determined threat due to its power and the institutions’ need for an external threat, Russia has less opportunity to alter these perceptions through a change in policy. Threat perception is therefore a key variable when assessing the security dilemma, as it demonstrates the interpretation of Russia motives. The security dilemma is a “two-level strategic predicament”, presenting first a level of interpretation and then a level of response. The first dilemma of interpreting Russia motivations involves assessing both the intentions and capabilities of Russia. This assessment affects the second dilemma of response by provoking either a reassurance or a deterrence response.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, military confrontation and mutual threat perceptions between the West and Russia have undeniably receded though understanding the reason for this is important in order to predict sustainability. Liberal institutional theory attributes this era of peace partly to a subordination of threat perception to conflict avoidance as the nature of states and their preferences became increasingly harmonised. States establish preventative mechanisms of conflict avoidance and conflict resolution. Neoclassical realist theory, however, interprets current circumstances as a twenty-year truce, where the unconstrained Euro-Atlantic community has gradually expanded its powers and security at the expense of Russian security. “Defensive expansionism” suggests that states expect conflicts in the future.
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In other words, the West is expanding in preparation for future conflicts with Russia, while Russia has increasingly seen more of its red lines breached. A truce postpones conflicts to the future, which is favourable if power is shifting in favour of inter-democratic security institutions.

Operationalising threat perceptions

Threat perception can be observed by the degree the EU/NATO and their member states identify Russia as a threat to security and/or disconfirm it as a threat. Threat perceptions may be pre-determined by Russian power and capabilities rather than being a consequence of belligerent Russian actions.

Since legitimate security threats may be caused by Russia’s policies, and the objective is to only observe the contributions by inter-democratic security institutions, the focus on ‘pre-determined’ threat perceptions is pivotal. A pre-determined threat perception does not entail observing the conceptual space for legitimate security concerns caused by possible belligerent policies from Russia. Such observations can be interpreted as Russian contributions to the security dilemma, which goes beyond the scope of this study. The focus is instead on the conceptual space for Russia not to be a threat. In other words, the difference between Russia being feared because of its power alone or policies can be explored by observing whether there is any conceptual space for legitimate Russian power and influence in Europe that would not make it a threat to the EU and NATO.

4.4. Expected outcomes for competing theories

The EU’s CSDP

Neoclassical realist theory defines the EU as an expansionist collective hegemony that becomes more coercive with the CSDP. The exclusive structures result in zero-
sum objectives, while ideological influences augment hegemonic ambitions and reduce security dilemma sensibility. The CSDP is therefore expected to adversely affect the four identified variables presumed to impact the security dilemma:

1) The EU’s instruments of power do not attempt to discriminate between an offensive or defensive posture. In other words, the EU’s conflict management does not discriminate between using them in pursuit of EU interests or in the service of the UN. The EU is expected to use conflict management to pursue the objective of integrating neighbouring states towards the EU, which does not coincide with UN objectives or the will of the conflicting parties. Furthermore, it becomes a zero-sum game since these integration efforts compete with Russian integration efforts. The CSDP has replaced attraction and persuasion with coercive power to compete for power, as conflict management is used to impose the EU’s conditions for integration.

2) The EU is expected to have a weakened security dilemma sensibility due to ideological fundamentalism. The excessive focus on dichotomous political identities reduces the ability to recognise a security dilemma, where the EU’s inherent positive-sum approach to security is contrasted with Russia’s zero-sum approach. By assigning a fixed meaning to “Europe”, EU policies of “European integration” are contrasted with a Russian “sphere of influence”.

3) The EU is expected to exclude Russia from an effective voice opportunity since empowering Russia to influence decision-making would constrain the EU. The EU’s ability to assert its collective hegemony in Europe therefore depends on maximising the EU’s autonomy and constraining Russian influence.

4) Russia is expected to be a pre-determined threat due to its capabilities and influence in the common neighbourhood. Any independent Russian influence beyond its borders would undermine the EU’s collective hegemony.

**Liberal institutional theory** conceives the EU as a community of democracies that transcends power competition by externalising its peaceful internal dynamics to its external environment. The EU is a status-quo power as it does not accumulate power
at the expense of security, but rather produces positive-sum security. The CSDP is expected to favourably affect variables that impact on the security dilemma:

1) The CSDP is expected to prioritise the EU’s unique soft power tools to resolve conflicts and provide sustainable peace as a common good. The Europeanisation of conflict resolution infers that the EU promotes integration and democracy both as a benign means and ends. More specifically, the EU is expected to replace coercion with persuasion and attraction as a means, while stabilising conflicts in accordance with internal law and the UN as an end.

2) The EU is expected to have high security dilemma sensibility due to the democratic mechanisms within member states and EU institutions to facilitate open and transparent discussions about Russian security concerns and the policies motivated by these possible concerns.

3) The EU is expected to empower Russia with an effective voice opportunity in shared institutions to the extent it is consistent with liberal democratic norms. The priority of the institutions is to build trust and resolve disputes.

4) The EU is not expected to depend on a common threat, and security concerns derive from ominous intentions rather than pre-determined by power and capabilities.

**NATO’s missile defence**

**Neoclassical realist theory** conceives NATO as an expansionist military alliance and collective hegemony that facilitates US power and leadership in Europe, which is militarised further with the development of a missile defence system. Collective hegemony is chiefly challenged and obstructed by Russia, with its nuclear forces constituting the ultimate balance to a more assertive posturing and ascendancy of the US/NATO in Europe. The missile defence system is expected to have adverse effects on the variables impacting the security dilemma:

1) The instruments of power are expected to be offensive by not discriminating between “rogue states” and Russia as potential targets. NATO is expected to enhance
its first-strike capabilities against Russia to undermine Russia’s ability to balance, and to use missile defence as a tool to expand and consolidate NATO’s exclusive influence in the common neighbourhood.

2) NATO is expected to have reduced security dilemma sensibility since political identities and institutional solidarity restricts political pluralism. NATO has a weakened ability to perceive its policies as zero-sum due to its democratic identity, while all Russian apprehension can be dismissed by its inherent zero-sum mentality and ambitions.

3) NATO is expected to exclude Russia from institutions and formats empowering it with an effective voice opportunity in the missile defence system, as this would imply accepting constraints. NATO’s collective hegemony in Europe is dependent on restricting Russian influence and maximising its own autonomy.

4) NATO and its member states are expected to either identify Russia as a threat or not to disconfirm it as a threat. Russia is a pre-determined threat due to its nuclear capabilities and since its power makes it a competition for influence in Europe.

Liberal institutional theory defines NATO as a community of democracies that transcends traditional power competition. NATO is considered a status-quo power by developing missile defence in response to nuclear proliferation to “rogue states” rather than one seeking military advantage against existing nuclear powers such as Russia. The missile defence is expected to have a positive effect on the variables contributing to the security dilemma:

1) Instruments of power are expected to be defensive and non-provocative by discriminating between “rogue states” and Russia as potential targets. NATO demonstrates an attempt to maximise security by defending itself from potential missile attack from “rogue states” and terrorists, while seeking to minimise the adverse effect on Russian security.

2) NATO is expected to have high security dilemma sensibility concerning possible Russian concerns about missile defence due to the open debates resulting from democratic mechanisms and structures within member states and NATO.
3) NATO is expected to include Russia in shared institutions and missile defence, and to provide Russia with an opportunity to influence decision-making and to participate in missile defence in order to dispel its concerns.

4) NATO does not perceive Russia as a threat. Security threats are not pre-determined since the alliance transcends dependency on an external threat for internal cohesion, and threat perceptions emanate from intentions rather than capabilities.
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5. Case Study I: CSDP and Russia

The CSDP case study limits itself to exploring the effect from the rise of the EU as a security institution on variables that are expected to impact the security dilemma. An introduction and case portrait on the CSDP case study is provided in Chapter 4.2. The EU’s role as a security institution is focused predominantly on conflict management. While most CSDP missions are civilian and law reforming, the EU also engages in military conflict management. The possible contribution to a security dilemma for a peacekeeper or peacemaker is the question of whether its position of authority is misused for power competition.

Peacekeepers and peacemakers temporarily limit the sovereignty of states in conflict regions by taking over what are traditionally state functions for the purpose of providing stability and peace to eventually augment sovereignty. The challenge of peacekeeping is to prevent the security provider from becoming part of the conflict by using its position of authority to accumulate zero-sum gains. During the Cold War, this was usually managed by delegating peacekeeping responsibilities to smaller neutral countries. The possible contribution to the security dilemma is that the EU may use or be perceived to use its position as a security provider to compete with Russia for influence in Europe.

The four key variables that are believed to impact the security dilemma are assessed in this chapter. First, the *instruments of power* variable signifies whether the CSDP increases reliance on coercive means to enhance its power in Europe. Second, *security dilemma sensibility* denotes the ability to recognise Russian security concerns and possible defensive motivations about the EU. Third, *institutional inclusion* is a reference to the extent that Russia is empowered with a voice opportunity to influence decision-making concerning conflict resolution in the common neighbourhood. Fourth, *threat perception* refers to the extent that Russia is identified as a threat and whether these possible threat perceptions are pre-determined by being derived from
5. Case Study I: CSDP and Russia

Russia’s capabilities/influence alone and the need for the EU to have an external foe for unity in foreign policy.

The argument will be that the CSDP aggravates the security dilemma with Russia since it is uses a coercive approach to promote “European integration”, which has become a geopolitical project due to the exclusive conception of “Europe”. The instruments of power are to a great extent offensive by using the CSDP to pursue zero-sum objectives with coercive means. The CSDP is used to pursue EU neighbourhood policies at the expense of UN objectives, while replacing attraction and persuasion with coercion. Security dilemma sensibility is reduced since the EU considers CSDP policies to be benign by supporting European integration and democratisation. However, any conceptual pluralism of the contested concept of “Europe” is rejected, which invalidates the core of Russia’s main arguments in terms of its security concerns. As a result, most disputes with Russia are perceived in terms of European integration conflicting with a Russian sphere of influence. Institutional inclusion is not designed to allow Russia to influence and impede the EU’s autonomy. Cooperation is not envisioned in terms of compromising over competing interests, but is instead envisioned as facilitating an opportunity for Russia to make unilateral concessions in order to align itself with EU policies. This culminates in a rejection of multilateralism. Threat perceptions indicate that Russia is perceived as a possible threat to be hedged against. Russia is assigned the role of an object of security, implying that it can either be civilised towards liberal democratic norms or be contained in the shared neighbourhood. Russia becomes a pre-determined threat because democratisation is linked to accepting an asymmetrical subject-object power relationship vis-à-vis the EU, which is not feasible for a large power like Russia with its own integration efforts in the shared neighbourhood.
5.1. *Instruments of power*

The EU is predominantly engaged in the low-end of violence with conflict management, which affects how the offence/defence posture is assessed. Exploring the posture of peacekeeping and peacemaking is less about the capabilities and more about the strategy directing how these “means” will be used and the “ends” they serve. A non-offensive EU is defined as an agent of the UN, which entails minimising the reliance on coercive means and pursuing ends consistent with UN objectives and international law. In contrast, an offensive EU can be expected to act as an independent actor in defiance of the UN by using coercive means intended for conflict resolution to pursue zero-sum interests at the expense of common UN objectives.

The EU is developing more military capabilities with growing flexibility and mobility, designed for large-scale conflicts. This correlates with an increasingly broader and militarised concept of human security. However, the development of these capabilities has not had a great impact on the EU’s posture to date since they have barely been deployed. This lack of use or “self-constraint” has, however, partly been caused by a lack of a “common voice” in foreign policy among member states, a situation that the EU is seeking to overcome through various initiatives.

The strategy pursued by the EU indicates an offensive posture due to the “Europeanisation” of conflict resolution, understood as merging the EU’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies with conflict resolution. The CSDP pursues ends that incorporate EU interests as outlined in its enlargement and neighbourhood policies, which often conflict with the objectives of the UN. The EU’s integration initiatives require the neighbourhood to make a choice between integrating with the EU or Russia, which, especially in the post-Soviet space, increases the divide between the conflicting parties and eliminates support by Russia in the UN. The EU has therefore replaced reliance on persuasion and attraction with coercion, as offensive means intended to fulfil UN objectives are instead used to achieve non-mandated EU interests. It is concluded that the EU does not make a distinction between an offensive and defensive posture since the EU’s own objectives are defined as positive-sum and
consistent with the *principles* of the UN objectives, while consistently pursuing EU objectives when they conflict with the UN.

### 5.1.1. Military capabilities: a disconnect between tasks and capacity

The initial launch of EU military capabilities indicated a non-provocative and defensive posture. Member states agreed on limited tasks in service of a modest and vague definition of humanitarianism, which created a demand for limited capabilities. However, a more militarised definition of human security has since evolved and the tasks to be pursued have continuously grown. These tasks have been accompanied by an incremental increase in interventionist military capabilities. Despite some lack of unity among member states and the resulting preference for ambiguity concerning the end-goals of the CSDP, capabilities are accumulated and less militarised missions are pursued. Attempts to gain consensus on clearly delineated responsibilities for the CSDP in its relation with international law have been postponed, resulting in difficulties in implementing mechanisms to deploy capabilities and use force. A multi-tier EU evolves in terms of foreign policy ambitions, which creates a gap between the ambitions of the EU leadership and the EU’s ability to use force. The EU is seeking to overcome internal constraints with more flexible and ad-hoc solutions like “coalition of the willing” arrangements.

With a focus on human security objectives, the WEU called for the development of the Petersberg tasks in 1992. These tasks were predominantly civilian and humanitarian, aimed at carrying out “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (WEU, 1992). In 1997, these tasks were incorporated into the EU in the Amsterdam Treaty. Humanitarianism has since become conceptualised in more offensive terms, evolving from evacuation and aid towards military interventionism and regime change. The European Security Strategy (ESS) calls for “preventive engagement” to deal with problems before they grow in scale (European Council, 2003). The ESS
further recognises that while threats cannot “be tackled by purely military means”, the EU nonetheless needs to “develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council, 2003).

The Lisbon Treaty expanded upon the Petersberg tasks by adding that they:

[S]hall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories (EU, 2007).

The wording “shall include” indicates that the EU has not limited itself to these responsibilities, but rather envisions an open-ended development and possibly flexible interpretations of responsibilities. The deliberate vagueness of the terminology “peace-making” can also be interpreted with flexibility, which delays resolving some sensitive issues where there is a lack of consent among member states. The Lisbon Treaty also cautiously began moving the EU towards territorial defence. Collective territorial defence was outlined in a solidarity clause and a mutual defence clause:

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (EU, 2007).

The Petersberg declaration called for the enhancement of military capabilities “to enable the deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air” (WEU, 1992). Following the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, a consensus strengthened among member states that autonomous military capabilities were required to intervene at the EU’s periphery. While the EU sought autonomy from NATO, it also recognised that it required NATO’s support to get the ESDP/CSDP off the ground. Its capabilities can be said to complement rather than undermine NATO. However, a dilemma has
emerged, since separate EU capabilities would create overlap, while shared capabilities may create a dependency on NATO (Hofmann, 2009).

The ESDP/CSDP was officially established at the Cologne Summit in June 1999. Decisions about capabilities followed six months later in December. The EU ambitiously committed itself to the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), the development of a large rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops for peacekeeping and peacemaking, to be deployed within 60 days for the duration of a year (European Council, 1999b). The size and structure of the HHG reflected the challenge of the time as the EU prepared itself for the transition of NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia to the EU. The EU’s first European missions in Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo indicated that the EU was seeking to take over the nation-building functions from NATO after the offensive stage of interventions and other combat operations were completed. In other words, it was implied that NATO would make “dinner” and the EU would do the “dishes” (Diez, 2005: 623). This partnership between the EU and NATO was further developed with the Berlin Plus Agreement of 2003, which enabled the EU to use NATO infrastructure such as the operations headquarters. This ensured a more effective launch of the CSDP while also easing concerns of member states concerned that the EU might undermine NATO. Consequently, the EU was equipped to take on Concordia in Macedonia and Althea in Bosnia (Mattelaer, 2010).

Early problems included deficiencies in capabilities and delays. The ambitious HHG was never completely accomplished (Menon, 2011). A revised Headline Goal 2010 was approved in 2004, which focused more on quality than quantity by developing flexible Battlegroups (BGs) of 1500 troops each (European Council, 2004). With two BGs on standby at any time and able to be deployed within 15 days, the EU can carry out two missions almost simultaneously. The BGs are designed to manage an entire mission independently or to be a rapid initial response preceding greater mobilisation in larger conflicts (European Council Secretariat, 2006).

Strategic ambiguity about future developments can be partly attributed to different objectives and visions of member states. A consensus has however begun to emerge within the EU that the CSDP should gain more autonomy without
compromising the benefits from the alliance with the US. Poland initially objected to the CSDP challenging the primacy of NATO, however, it has recently pushed hard for establishing an EU operational headquarters. This is because Poland desires an additional security guarantee in case the US reduces its military presence in Europe (O’Donnell, 2012). Attempts to establish a separate and independent operations headquarters for the CSDP have so far been blocked by the UK. The EU increased its focus on military capabilities by establishing the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 to develop and improve military capabilities, advance European Defence Research and Technology, promote armaments cooperation, and develop a technological and industrial base for the EU’s military. Acquiring military capabilities has also become an issue in Action Plans. For example, Ukraine’s Action Plan outlines continuing “consultations on the possible EU use of Ukraine’s long haul air transport capacities” (European Union, 2008a).

The EU is seeking further pooling of capabilities to increase overall military strength. A key challenge for the CSDP has been that its member states develop capabilities in isolation, undermining the benefits from “pooling and sharing” (Missiroli, 2013). The Lisbon Treaty introduced Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a new mechanism to develop capabilities more efficiently and improve the interoperability required for pooling resources (Biscop and Coelmont, 2011). The Lisbon Treaty explicitly advocates that the pooling of resources is not intended to allow member states to reduce their military spending and disarm. Article 42 suggests that “Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities.” A key problem of the CSDP is identified as the unwillingness to spend more (Menon, 2011). The British and French, who account for more than 40% of the EU’s military spending (Menon, 2011), are especially frustrated with the low military spending by other member states (O’Donnell, 2012).

Recent statements and policies indicate that EU capabilities continue to enhance “strategic mobility and military reach” (Missiroli, 2013: 5) for high-end violence in external deployments (Vlachos-Dengler, 2002). In 2003, the ESS set the aim “to transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces” (European Council, 2003). Similarly, the Project Europe 2030 report suggested in 2010 that the problem with
5. Case Study I: CSDP and Russia

European armed forces is that they “are still often based on territorial defence against a land invasion”. The report called for increasing investments in “rapid deployment forces, strategic air transport, helicopters, communications, military police” (Project Europe 2030, 2010). In November 2012, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain released a statement requesting upgrades on “high added-value capacities” in the area of “space, ballistic-missile defence, drones, air-to-air refuelling, airlift capacities, medical support to operations, software defined radio etc.” (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Naval capabilities being developed include large oceanic vessels with long endurance. These are not intended for defensive patrol, but rather for out-of-area military operations (Kluth and Pilegaard, 2011).

While developing more interventionist capabilities, there are difficulties in deploying these resources due to the lack of a coordinated foreign policy among member states. While states with independent foreign policies could collaborate on defensive and non-provocative military initiatives such as collective defence and UN-mandated peacekeeping, there are greater difficulties in achieving unity on interventionist policies. The Lisbon Treaty aimed to improve the ability of the CSDP to act by making the EU a more coherent and potentially a more effective global actor (Menon, 2011). The EU’s development of “constructive abstention” constitutes a structural change to overcome internal constraints on the use of force by eliminating the imperative for a common voice. Member states can abstain from voting so others may create “coalitions of the willing”. The EU is establishing more flexibility, as for example, with the proposed Weimar Battlegroup of 1700 men from France, Germany and Poland. Similarly, a group of seven consisting of France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain, have proposed to establish a “drone club” producing drone capabilities. However, the efforts to harmonise foreign policy and the ability to deploy rapidly has weakened the democratic control of the CSDP, which has adversely affected how it is perceived by other states (Wagner, 2006; 2007).

The EU leadership communicates ambitions for using more force in humanitarian and regime change missions. While the EU was divided and unable to act in Libya, EU President van Rompuy still claimed that the EU should take credit for the “success” in Libya after the “failure” of the UN to act (Rettman, 2011a). Commission
President Barroso linked humanitarianism directly to regime change by calling for the removal of Gaddafi (Rettman, 2011b), thus implicitly condoning the French and British use of the UN resolution to protect civilians to overthrow Gaddafi. Regime change became the main “humanitarian” policy as the EU’s expression of humanitarian concerns receded significantly after the killing of Gaddafi, despite the continuing perilous humanitarian situation. A similar proposal for regime change emerged for Syria, where humanitarian-focused policies were equated to regime change as the EU pledged it “supports the Syrian opposition” against the government due to “its struggle for freedom, dignity and democracy for the Syrian people” (European Council, 2012).

5.1.2. Strategy/policies

A security strategy instructs how military and non-military means will be used to resolve conflicts as an end. It is of great relevance to the posture in conflict management. For a peacekeeper and peacemaker, acting as an agent of the UN or as an independent self-empowered actor differentiates between a defensive and offensive posture. The EU envisions a defensive posture, assuming that linking its own enlargement and neighbourhood policies with conflict management will result in demilitarising conflict management. However, these assumptions do not materialise in its actual policies since the EU prioritises interests which do not always correlate with and frequently contradict UN objectives and international law. It is argued that the CSDP takes on an offensive posture by promoting EU interests as an end at the expense of UN objectives. Rather than replacing coercive means required for conflict management with attraction and persuasion provided by the EU “toolbox”, the EU replaces attraction and persuasion with coercive means to advance its own policies. It

4 NATO worked in concert with the rebels and became their de facto airforce, and after the war French and British companies were rewarded.
is therefore concluded that the CSDP introduces more coercive means to strengthen the EU’s “external governance”.

**The EU vision of security: liberal democratic norms and integration**

The EU outlines its vision for European security as a positive-sum game by relying predominantly on promoting liberal democratic norms and integration in a partnership with the UN. The Maastricht Treaty identified the objectives of the CFSP as “to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways”, “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union” and “to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (European Union, 1992). The Maastricht Treaty further specifies that these objectives can be met by “establishing systematic cooperation” and gradually implementing “joint actions in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common” (European Union, 1992). The ESS recognises that most “conflicts have been within rather than between states”, and the EU considers itself a transformative power by being the driving force for the development of “secure, stable and dynamic democracies” (European Council, 2003). State-building is considered a security strategy since “restoring good governance” resolves threats deriving from state failure, poor governance, and organised crime (European Council, 2003). Improving the security of the neighbourhood is also perceived to assist the security of member states since “violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability” (European Council, 2003). While integration and neighbourhood policies do not fall under the responsibility of the CSDP, they are nonetheless interconnected as they are “essentially about security” by enhancing internal security by improving security at the periphery (Averre, 2005: 177).

The EU’s format for conflict management can be conceptualised as the “Europeanisation” of conflict resolution. Coppieters (et al. 2004: 13) explains:
Europeanisation is defined as a process which is activated and encouraged by European institutions, primarily the EU, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the parties involved into European structures.

The EU bases much of its policies on a perceived mutually reinforcing link between integration, liberal democratic norms and conflict resolution. Indeed, the entire EU project is built on a conceptual link between EU integration and peace, which also applies to the conflict regions at the periphery. However, since European integration is limited to an EU-centrist vision, some scholars employ the term “EU-isation” (Wood and Quaisser, 2008; Flockhart, 2010a).

The Europeanisation of conflict resolution is believed to create more benign means and ends. The prospect of membership provides the neighbourhood with “an incentive for reform”, while eventual membership creates “a united and peaceful continent” (European Council, 2003). EU accession and economic incentives persuade and attract conflicting parties to compromise, thus reducing reliance on coercive means. By conditioning accession on the willingness of both sides in a conflict to negotiate and compromise, conflict can be resolved when the positive-sum gain of accession outweighs the zero-sum disputes between the conflicting sides. The “end” of eventual accession in a united and democratic Europe lays the foundations for a sustainable peace. The EU as another tier of governance can mitigate mutual fears, while European integration can develop post-national identities as a way of ensuring sustainable resolution of ethnic conflicts (Diez, Stetter, and Albert, 2006; Kearney, 2002; Delanty, 1996). However, these theoretical assumptions on the Europeanisation of conflict resolution do not address the lack of constraints on the EU in pursuing its own interests, or that its integration initiatives may have a zero-sum format that deviates from UN objectives.
Offensive means: “unjust” means for “just” ends

The EU has gradually empowered itself with offensive means that challenge the primacy of the UN for the purpose of creating what is considered to be a more just and moral international system as an end. The EU tends to perceive itself as more qualified to defend the “principles” of the UN. A more just international system is sought therefore by empowering the EU as a third party to make arbitrary decisions to respond to conflicts as “unique cases”, given that the law tends to favour order over justice. The EU recognises the importance of the UN for order and the necessity for “active and early support to UN-mandated or UN-led operations” as a “clear track for the progressive framing and deployment of EU security and defence policy and capabilities” (European Commission, 2003b). The Maastricht Treaty binds the EU “to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter” (European Union, 1992). However, the EU permits itself exemptions by not committing itself fully to the primacy of the UN by only vaguely binding itself to the principles of the UN and OSCE. France and the UK especially have attempted to keep the wording as vague as possible to keep the legal basis of the CSDP as flexible as possible (Bailes, 2008).

The EU to some extent presents itself as an alternative to the UN by proclaiming its responsibility to intervene and defend the principles of the UN Charter when the UN and the international community “fail” to act. The Feira Summit declaration stipulated that force “could be used both in response to request of a lead agency like the UN or the OSCE, or, where appropriate, in autonomous EU actions” (European Council, 2000a). Refusing to be constrained by the UN is based on the logic that Russia and China should not be able to prevent the EU from deploying its missions and exercising the use of force (Ortega, 2001). Marginalising the UN by rejecting Russia’s veto power in the UNSC undermines international law, making the EU a potential competitor of the UN.

This approach bears similarities to the EU’s relationship with the OSCE, as the EU supports OSCE principles, though it perceives itself more capable to achieve the
OSCE objectives. The multilateral OSCE is supported, while at the same time it is undermined by absorbing its responsibilities. The EU has taken over functions like reforming law enforcement bodies and technologies of border control, and fighting drug trafficking, organised crime, corruption and terrorism (Entin and Zagorsky, 2008: 27). The Secretary-General of the OSCE has argued that the OSCE can assist the EU to achieve its foreign policy objectives, but the EU’s unilateral approach has the adverse effect of “undermining the OSCE” (De Brichambaut, 2009).

EU security strategies and policies echo ideas from liberal theory suggesting that security is not achieved by constraining the EU to maintain the status quo of the contemporary international system. Rather, by enabling the EU to alter the international system through its conflict resolution capacity, security is enhanced. This constitutes a fundamental break with the structure of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which sought security by constraining Germany and France as members. However, in contrast to the Versailles Treaty, the controls benefited the Germans rather than oppressing them. The development of the EU has been characterised as a territorial-focused entity where security and peace is achieved by imposing constraints on the external environment and empowering itself through relative power and leverage to socialise neighbours. Mitrany (1966: 187) commented in the 1960s that this shift from constraint to empowerment was based on the assumption that the European Community would “suddenly be guided by sweet reasonableness and self-restraint”.

The normative position has equally changed fundamentally. Europe’s violent history is no longer a reason to constrain the EU from the use of force, but rather creates a responsibility for the EU to enable itself to prevent others from committing similar crimes. This entails a normative revision by proposing a switch from abolishing the use of force to sanctioning the use of force to bring peace to others. In Germany, the prevailing notion regarding Kosovo was that Germany had a responsibility to use force, even without a UN mandate, to “prevent genocide” in Kosovo (Wood, 2002). Some of Germany’s allies later shamed its lack of solidarity by abstaining from voting with them in favour of military action against Libya. Germany still demonstrates apprehension towards using military force, though Berlin
reiterates the same normative reasoning to increase its offensive military posture to demonstrate solidarity with its partners and out of moral necessity. Former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer suggested he had been raised on two principles: “never another war and never another Auschwitz”. The Kosovo crisis caused him to declare that “these two maxims came into conflict, and I had to give up the notion of never another war” (Sultan, 2013).

**Offensive ends: EU objectives in competition with the UN**

While presenting itself as a third party promoting compromise and mitigating conflicts as a positive-sum gain, the EU also has clear interests of its own. Europe is increasingly defined as the EU, while “European integration” consists of centralising power in Brussels. The issue of territorial authority and jurisdiction becomes an end in itself, especially in regions where the EU has competing integration initiatives with Russia. The CSDP is not focused solely on its added value to security, but is used by Brussels to extend its legal framework and powers over both its member states and states on its periphery. Preserving and advancing the EU is portrayed as a requirement for sustainable peace. President van Rompuy asserted that Euroscepticism could cause war as without the EU there would be a return to nationalism, and nationalism leads to war (Waterfield, 2010). Similarly, German Chancellor Merkel proclaimed that the outbreak of war in Europe cannot be ruled out if the EU project were to unravel as a consequence of the Euro’s disintegration (Pop, 2011). EU integration is therefore considered essential for peace and may compete with the UN and international law when these objectives do not correlate.

Irrespective of the genuinely benign intentions of basing international security on the advancement of liberal democratic norms and integration as a positive-sum game,

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5 Constructing a political Union was considered an important step and a key motivation for introducing the Euro, rather than the decision being motivated solely by the expected “added value” to the economy. Similarly, transferring competencies from member states to the EU is greatly motivated by developing a political Union, rather than being motivated solely by the belief in “added value” to good governance.
these values implicitly coexist with strategic interests since the EU is required to accumulate power to be successful in representing these values (Youngs, 2004; Diez, 2005: 614, 622). Developing the CSDP is recognised as an important step for deeper integration between member states, and it supports wider integration by having its periphery accept its external governance and/or conditions for accession. Youngs (2009: 895) argues that the EU favours a “hierarchical mode of democracy promotion when it benefits from strong bargaining power in its relations with third countries.” The EU’s quest to develop an international system that transcends power competition is dependent on the EU having a hegemonic position to constrain the “laws of the jungle” perceived to operate outside the EU (Cooper, 2007).

Thus, on one hand the EU is said to have developed military capabilities to respond to the humanitarian tragedies in the Western Balkans. On the other hand, the CSDP also has an inward-looking objective of developing the EU as an international actor. The CSDP is an essential component in the debate about a political union with the possible goal of federalising. Already in 1991, Germany and France stressed the important “aim of setting up a common European defence system in due course without which the construction of European Union would remain incomplete” (Europe Documents, 1991). Creating a common identity through common security was recognised in the Single European Act of 1986: “closer cooperation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters” (European Communities, 1986). On the Petersberg tasks, the Cologne European Council in 1999 declared that the development of the CSDP was a “step in the construction of the European Union” (European Council, 1999a). In some instances, the motivation to launch an operation has been to test CSDP procedures and capabilities (Biscop, 2011). Some scholars even suggest that the CSDP measures success more by its ability to deploy than by the mission outcomes (Menon, 2009).

The projection of military power as a source of the EU’s political power and influence is outlined in the ESS, which stipulates that “a European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight” (European Council, 2003). The key architect of the rejected EU
Constitution, former French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, suggested that “over the decades, the basis of the EU’s existence has changed. We’ve moved from seeking peace to seeking greatness” (Rettman, 2013a). Tony Blair reiterated that, arguing:

The rationale for Europe in the 21st century is stronger than it has ever been. It is essentially about power, not about peace anymore. We won’t fight each other if we don’t have Europe, but we will be weaker, less powerful, with less influence (Scheuermann, 2013).

Poland’s Foreign Minister Sikorski advocated strengthening the CSDP because “if the EU wants to become a superpower, and Poland supports this, then we must have the capability to exert influence in our neighbourhood... Sometimes we must use force to back our diplomacy” (Rettman, 2012). Correspondingly, the ‘Project Europe 2030 Report’ posits that “the EU cannot assume that the ‘rise of the rest’ will necessarily result in a win-win situation” and has now the choice of becoming “an assertive global actor or, alternatively, the Union and its Member States could slide into marginalisation, becoming an increasingly irrelevant western peninsula of the Asian continent” (Project Europe 2030, 2010).

The EU is developing security policies in areas involving obvious competing interests with non-member states like Russia, most notably with the emergence of “energy-security”. The ESS expresses concerns regarding “competition for natural resources”, and notes that “energy dependence is a special concern for Europe” (European Council, 2003). More consistency in terms of energy security is pursued by incorporating it in neighbourhood initiatives like Actions Plans, Association Agreements, the European Neighbourhood Policy and more prominently in the Eastern Partnership (EaP). There is increasing pressure by some EU member states and EU Commissioners to regard energy security as critical and to upgrade it from being an internal issue to taking a more prominent place in external security affairs, as expressed clearly in the Commission’s Energy Green Paper (European Commission, 2006a). The EU declares that its external energy policy should recognise “the geopolitical dimensions of energy-related security issues” and be “consistent with the
EU’s broader foreign policy objectives such as conflict prevention and resolution, non-proliferation and promoting human rights” (European Commission, 2006b).

The CSDP missions: means and ends

Ongoing CSDP missions in the common neighbourhood shared by the EU and Russia are those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova/Ukraine and Georgia. First, the “ends” in these missions are explored in terms of whether the EU objectives outlined in its enlargement and neighbourhood policies correlate with the UN objectives. Second, the “means” are explored by assessing to what extent CSDP missions minimise reliance on coercion and if the coercive means are authorised by the UN.

It is argued that CSDP missions provide the EU with more coercive tools to pursue its objectives outlined in its enlargement and neighbourhood policies. These objectives are promoted at the expense of UN objectives when they do not coincide, which consequently increases the reliance on a more coercive approach. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the EU has challenged the UN in terms of recognising which entity is the sovereign to augment as the most fundamental issue in nation-building. This results in the EU attempting to absorb the powers mandated by the UN for peacekeeping, in order to pursue policies undermining the UN objectives outlined in the mandates. In Moldova/Ukraine and Georgia, the EU has aligned itself with the legally representative governments and does not require authorisation from the UN. However, the breakaway regions in Moldova and Georgia favour integration and security cooperation with Russia, an aim which they would have to abandon in the EU’s format for “European integration”. The EU dissuades compromise between the conflicting parties if that entails accommodating Russia. Instead, the EU strives to ensure that the breakaway regions do not have enough power to prevent Moldova and Georgia from making a clear zero-sum geopolitical choice for “Europe”.
Ends and means in Bosnia

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH or Bosnia) the UN decided that the implementation of the Dayton Agreement of 1995 was the point of departure for promoting reconciliation between the peoples of Bosnia. The Dayton Agreement and the subsequent Bosnian constitution established a de-centralised Bosnian state with two autonomous entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) for the Bosniaks and Croats, and Republika Srpska (RS) for the Bosnian Serbs. This loose state structure constituted a compromise between the Bosniaks who fought for an independent and united Bosnia to secede from Yugoslavia, and the Bosnian Serbs who fought for Bosnia to either remain in Yugoslavia or, as a second option, for the Serbian regions of Bosnia to remain in Yugoslavia.⁶

EU objectives, as outlined in the enlargement policies and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), suggest that the aim is to deconstruct the autonomous entity system outlined in Dayton by revoking the autonomy of RS and centralising power in Sarajevo. The EU recognises that the entity arrangement mitigates the mutual fears between the ethnic groups as it “guarantee[s] the rights of each ethnic group” by delegating each entity with “blocking mechanisms protecting the ‘vital interests’ of BiH’s constituent peoples” (European Commission, 2003a). However, the EU considers these rights to obstruct EU integration:

In terms of European integration, however, it is important that partner countries are able to function properly; their various institutions must produce the results expected in a modern democratic country. The complexity of the existing Dayton order could hinder BiH performance (European Commission, 2003a).

The EU advocates that Bosnia’s eventual accession to the EU is a prerequisite for sustainable peace, implying that enlargement conditions and policies of centralising power at the state level supersede and replace UN objectives and international law.

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⁶ Bosnian demographics in 1996: Bosniaks 46.1%, Serbs 37.9%, Croats 14.6% (Census UNHCR, 1996).
This contradicts the Dayton Agreement and is rejected by RS, which unequivocally prioritises its autonomous entity rights above EU membership. Solana, the former EU High Representative of the CFSP, dismissed alternative solutions by stating that Bosnia could implement reforms to move towards the EU or face “ever-greater isolation, to missed economic opportunities, and to a political wilderness where it will be left behind by more ambitious and more far-sighted neighbours” (Solana, 2002). Equating reconciliation with creating a centralised state implies that the entity system was a transitional peace treaty as opposed to a compromise, which settled the underlying causes of the war and set the foundation for Bosnia’s constitution. An EU official asserted: “Dayton provided no vision for the future, it is time to close the post-war phase” (Author interview, 2011a). While the EU correctly recognises Dayton as a fragile system with many flaws, it has nonetheless become the main actor undermining this agreement and acts without the consent of either RS or the UN.

In terms of means, the EU has the authorisation to implement the Dayton Agreement, though it uses these powers to pursue its own policies that do not support and even contradict the Dayton Agreement. The EU obtains its powers from a mandate that authorises it to implement the de-centralised entity system. The EU has since striven to transfer these powers to itself and to use them to deconstruct the Dayton agreement by revoking the entity-system and centralising power.

The UN authorised the establishment of the Office of High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia. This is an ad-hoc international institution set up after the war in 1995 to oversee the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. In 1997 the added Bonn Powers greatly enhanced the powers of the OHR as it became authorised to enact laws and remove officials who undermine the Dayton Agreement. The extent of the OHR powers was articulated by the High Representative (HR) Westendorp (1997): “Annex 10 gives me the possibility to interpret my own authorities and powers”. He used these powers to dismiss the newly elected President of RS in March 1999. The reason

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7 The OHR is the executive arm of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), and the PIC Steering board consists of a wide array of states.
for his dismissal was the refusal to reappoint Milorad Dodik as the Prime Minister, which was favoured by the West (Carpenter, 1999).\textsuperscript{8} Westendorp also used his powers to impose a national flag on Bosnia which resembles the EU flag (Carpenter, 1999).

Consent, however, is not relinquished by the Dayton mandate, as the powers are intended to “facilitate the parties’ own efforts” to implement the Dayton peace agreement and establish two autonomous entities (US Department of State, 1995).

The EU’s policy has been to absorb the powers of the OHR by transitioning “from Dayton to Brussels” (Tirak, 2010). The first step towards transition was to develop a “double-hatted” position, which is a reference to placing a person in a position which serves two different institutions. In February 2002 the HR was also appointed as the EU Special Representative (EUSR) to Bosnia. The first HR to also hold the position of the EUSR, Lord Paddy Ashdown, set a record by removing 59 Bosnian officials from office in one single day (Tirak, 2010). Two later HRs, Miroslav Lajcak and Valentin Inzko, were tasked with “Europeanising” the OHR by arranging the transition of its powers to the EUSR (Rupnik, 2011: 56) to give the EU \textit{de facto} control over the international governance in Bosnia (Szewczyk, 2010: 7).

There are indications that some internal disagreements between member states and between EU institutions have emerged. The double-hatted HR/EUSR position was de-coupled in 2011 following an internal EU dispute between Germany and the UK, in which Germany prevailed with the argument that closing the OHR was necessary in order to strengthen local ownership as a condition for membership (Bassuener and Weber, 2013; Flessenkemper and Helly, 2013). The European Commission has encouraged dismantling the Bonn powers and returning sovereignty to Bosnia because the authoritarian powers of the OHR results in democratic deficit, which contradicts the spirit of the European project.\textsuperscript{9} However, the European Council

\textsuperscript{8} Dodik has in recent years also been denounced as a “nationalist”.
\textsuperscript{9} As reported in the International Commission on the Balkans, which was chaired by former Italian prime minister, Guiliano Amato: “If the EU does not devise a bold strategy for accession that could encompass all Balkan countries as new members within the next decade, then it will become mired instead as a neo-colonial power in places like Kosovo, Bosnia and even Macedonia. Such an anachronism would be hard to manage and would be in contradiction with the very nature of the
is eager to preserve it (Sebastian, 2008). In recent years, there has been more weariness and support for closing the OHR as it has lost much of its effectiveness.\textsuperscript{10} It is also argued that the OHR is counter-productive in achieving the EU objective of preparing Bosnia for EU membership, as its mere existence prevents Bosnia from joining the EU (Bassuener and Weber, 2013; Flessenkemper and Helly, 2013).

The return of sovereignty and the closure of the OHR are conditional on Bosnia adopting EU policies. The EU has declared that the OHR will not close until it can “ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a peaceful, viable state on course to European integration” as outlined in the EU’s Mission Implementation Plan (OHR, 2003). The more specific criteria for OHR closure are evidently not a part of and indeed contradict the Dayton agreement. They include preparing Bosnia for EU and NATO enlargement by strengthening governing institutions “especially at the state-level”, “establishing state-level civilian command and control over armed forces, reform the security sector, and pave the way for integration into the Euro-Atlantic framework”, and “tax reform, including the introduction of BiH-wide, EU-compatible VAT” (OHR, 2003). The OHR will not close until Bosnia is on an “irreversible course” to EU membership, and “the Council stresses that it will not be in a position to consider an application for membership by Bosnia and Herzegovina until the transition of the OHR to a reinforced EU presence has been decided” (European Council, 2009).

While the OHR and the Bonn powers were initially envisioned as short-term solutions, these powers have been extended indefinitely.

For some years the EU has been using the OHR powers obtained at Dayton to deconstruct the Dayton system and replace it with an EU-directed policy framework. The EU equates reconciliation with centralising power, while the notion of preserving national entities is associated with destructive nationalism. Flexible interpretation of the mandate suggests that the “spirit” of Dayton should be implemented instead of the

\textsuperscript{10} Also, RS consistently threatens to secede from Bosnia if its autonomy as guaranteed by the Dayton Agreement is not respected.
actual written legal document (Chandler, 2006b). Bosnia’s Constitutional Court announced in 2006 that dismissals of individuals by the OHR without a right of appeal constitutes a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, and noted that Bosnia’s obligation to respect OHR decisions does not sideline the Bosnian constitution. However, while the court requested the government of Bosnia to implement its ruling, the government was only empowered to do what the OHR would authorise (Le Gloannec and Rupnik, 2008: 59-60).

The EU has in recent years reduced direct interventions with the Bonn powers, and instead used the CSDP mission to gradually transfer competencies to Sarajevo. An EU official referred to it as “a step-by-step approach, where smaller structural changes are made” towards the overall goal of diminishing autonomy at the entity level (Author interview, 2011a). These reforms have been criticised for being aimed at centralising power and are therefore firmly opposed by RS. Chandler (2006a) suggests that the EU abuses its sovereignty-diminishing position by constructing state level customs administration and tax collection. Bender and Knaus (2007) argue that EU demands for police reforms in Bosnia, based on deliberate misinformation about organised crime, are thinly veiled attempt to centralise power by forcing RS to surrender a key lever of governmental power.11 While the EU and FBiH express concerns about the democratic deficit in the current system (Author interviews, 2011a; 2011b), most reform proposals are linked to centralising power.

**Ends and means in Kosovo**

In Kosovo, the UN outlines the reconciliation process between Serbia and Kosovo as based on UN Resolution 1244, which recognises the territorial integrity of Serbia and calls for negotiations on the status of Kosovo. As stipulated by UN Resolution 1244, the UN Security Council reaffirms “the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (UNSC, [11]

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11 For examples of deliberate misinformation by the EU on organised crime in Bosnia and its operational costs, see Bender and Knaus (2007).
UNSC Resolution 1244 also established an “interim” and “substantial autonomy” for Kosovo under international administration while “facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status” (UNSC, 1999).

EU policy on Kosovo indicates that its objective is to establish an independent and united Kosovo by ruling out a compromise for Serb-populated Northern Kosovo to remain within Serbia. While the CSDP officially is a neutral mission that does not take a stance on independence, 22 out of 27 EU member states have recognised independence since the EU endorsed its members to make their own decision. The inability to take a common position is not the fault of the 22 member states that unilaterally recognised Kosovo, rather the failure of the other 5 that did not. The European Parliament passed resolutions in February 2009 and July 2010 calling on all member states to recognise the independence of Kosovo (European Parliament, 2009; 2010). The codified demand for EU accession and conflict resolution is for Serbia and Kosovo to “normalise relations”. This is linked to the secession of a united Kosovo by having Serbia accept Kosovo developing state functions, joining international institutions and asserting its jurisdiction over the Serb-populated Northern Kosovo.

The EU’s point of departure was not Serbia’s territorial integrity for negotiating the status as stipulated by UN Resolution 1244, but rather that Kosovo should be independent unless the negotiations on autonomy were successful. The lack of progress on the status settlement of Kosovo was the main argument justifying the unilateral declaration of independence. EU Enlargement Commissioner Rehn (2007) remarked that “the UN has already been running Kosovo for eight years. The status quo is not sustainable”. The EU’s position on the difference between the independence of Kosovo and South Ossetia/Abkhazia is that in Kosovo the UN presence for several years has failed to determine Kosovo’s future status. The EU implicitly claims legitimacy as an alternative to the UN if the latter fails to resolve the conflict. Kosovo is viewed as a “European problem” given its geographical location and EU membership prospects (Noucheva, 2008: 51). Rehn (2007) has claimed regional monopoly for the EU in its “backyard” by asserting that:
If the UN Security Council fails to agree on a resolution, we risk chaos and instability in the Balkans. As in the early 1990s, it would be Europe that would have to pay the price. Not Russia, not the US.

Justification for the EU to act unilaterally if the UN fails is controversial because establishing itself as an alternative heightens the likelihood of UN failure, given that the incentives for compromise diminish. During the status negotiations, the US guaranteed independence for Kosovo if an agreement was not reached, effectively cancelling any incentive for Pristina to compromise and for the UN to be successful.

In terms of means, the EU obtains its authorisation from UN Resolution 1244, which it uses to pursue policies contradicting that UN mandate. The mandate established the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), tasked with the international management of Kosovo while guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Serbia. The EULEX mission was authorised on the condition of it remaining a pillar within UNMIK, which implies it is legally mandated by Resolution 1244 and therefore not authorised to support independence for Kosovo.

The EU, however, also adopted the Ahtisaari Plan as a parallel institutional framework that bypasses the UN. The Ahtisaari Plan recommended that Kosovo become an independent state, and established the International Civilian Representative (ICR) and the International Steering Group (ISG) as the final authority to implement a status settlement. Since the Ahtisaari Plan was never approved by the UNSC, UN Resolution 1244 still remains active. Nonetheless, the non-mandated ISG appoints and oversees the ICR, which bypasses the UNSC. The EU authorised and empowered itself by creating the double-hatted positions of the EUSR and ICR. Bearing similarities to Bosnia, the ICR/EUSR grants itself the right to annul decisions by authorities in Kosovo, enact laws, and to remove public officials who do not abide by the Ahtisaari Plan. The EU eventually decoupled the ICR/EUSR in 2011. Accusations of bias were directed against the double-hatted Peter Feith, appointed as both the ICR and EUSR. He was placed in the contradictory situation of simultaneously promoting Kosovo independence according to the Ahtisaari Plan and preserving Serbia’s territorial integrity according to UN Resolution 1244. A Serbian
official described the EU’s commitment to UNMIK as a dishonest effort to project the appearance of consent and adherence to international law (Author interview, 2011c).

The EU did not appeal to introduce a more liberal democratic regime in international law to justify its actions, but rather established a clause of exceptionalism. It has been implied that due to Serb repression of Albanians in Kosovo, Belgrade “lost” their right to sovereignty over Kosovo (Coppieters and Sakwa, 2003; ICG, 2007). However, the EU did not seek to create a precedent by evoking the normative argument that sovereignty and territorial integrity can be challenged when a government oppresses its own people. Sjursen (2006b, 248) argues that such a decision would have established a clearer humanitarian and normative approach. Instead, EU Commissioner Rehn (2007) claimed that “Kosovo does not set a precedent for frozen conflicts elsewhere; it is sui generis”, a “special” or a “unique” case.

**Ends and means in Moldova**

In Moldova, the UN objectives and international law are consistently reiterated in all international agreements, which guarantee its territorial integrity as the point of departure for reconciliation and unification between Moldova and Transnistria. Conflict resolution entails establishing a political solution for Moldova’s reunification and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria. The main area of dispute between the two parties is to agree upon the degree of autonomy for Transnistria in a unified state, which will affect Moldova’s ability to commit to international institutions. While Moldova has in the last years prioritised entering Euro-Atlantic structures, Transnistria resists integration projects promoted at the expense of its relations with Russia.

The EU strongly supports a unified Moldova with power centralised in Chisinau, which can then adhere to the EU’s external governance and eventually become a member state. The EU is aligned with international law by supporting the territorial integrity and unification of Moldova. However, rather than seeking a compromise
between the two parties, the EU opposes a political settlement for reconciliation that would result in Transnistria having significant autonomous entity rights since it could prevent future alignment with the EU and NATO. The Swedish-Polish document initiating the “Eastern Partnership” declares that sustainable conflict resolution is dependent on integration in Euro-Atlantic structures (Republic of Poland, 2008). Autonomy for Transnistria would undermine this objective, by empowering it to resist integration with the EU or NATO pursued at the expense of cooperation with Russia.

The EU has gone to great lengths to defend its policies by even sabotaging peace agreements put forward by Russia in 2003 and 2007, despite a compromise being reached between Moldova and Transnistria (Rettman, 2010). In 2003 Russia reached a compromise with the Kozak Memorandum, though without consulting international actors like the OSCE and the EU. The memorandum proposed the unification of Moldova under Russian peacekeepers for a period up to 20 years, while requiring Moldova to remain a neutral country and thereby preventing it from becoming a part of Romania, joining NATO and possibly becoming an EU member. The proposed constitution was a compromise where Transnistria had been pressured to abandon its demand for equality with Moldova, though granted enough power to obstruct decisions that jeopardised “vital interests” like neutrality (Vahl and Emerson, 2004). The EU and the US pressured Moldovan President Voronin to withdraw from the agreement the day before signing. Voronin announced that “the plan proposed by the Russian Federation is a response to a true compromise between the sides”, but recognised that in order to have close relations with Europe it was imperative that Moldova’s decision was supported by European institutions (Vahl and Emerson, 2004: 16). A US cable confirmed that Voronin “has no intention of signing any bilateral Kozak-II type understanding with the Russians as he believes any Transnistrian settlement must have broad international support” (Wikileaks, 2008a). The implicit understanding is that the EU and the US will not support a political solution that accommodates Russian influence and integration initiatives.

In terms of means, the CSDP mission has its authorisation from the governments of Moldova and Ukraine. Seeking to avoid compromise, the EU has introduced more coercive means to weaken the position of Transnistria to obtain more favourable
conditions for unification. Without access to Transnistria, the EU established the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) on its borders in cooperation with the government of Moldova and Ukraine. The mission proclaims to fight organised crime in order to stabilise the region as a positive-sum game. However, the International Crisis Group questioned the alleged extent of crime in Transnistria, reporting that “EUBAM’s findings suggest that Transnistria is not the arms and drugs trafficking black hole critics have long contended. It has found no evidence of organised arms smuggling and only minor drug trafficking” (ICG, 2006: 6). It was further reported that what counts as success among EU decision-makers for EUBAM appears to be the extent it can weaken the government in Transnistria rather than reduce crime (ICG, 2006). Some scholars have indicated that the EU’s travel ban on Transnistrian leaders have the “positive” effect of criminalising and delegitimising them as “bad guys” on the international stage, while the “negative” effect is to increase Transnistria’s dependency on Russia as a benefactor (Giumelli, 2011: 375).

**Ends and means in Georgia**

In Georgia, the UN encourages reconciliation between Georgia and the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with the aim being recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Conflict resolution entails developing a format for unification and withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. However, following the Russian intervention in August 2008, Russia unilaterally recognised the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Like in Moldova, the conflict in Georgia has a geopolitical component. The EU and NATO seek reconciliation between the conflicting parties, but will not accept a political solution that grants South Ossetia and Abkhazia autonomy, because this would obstruct Georgia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Russia appears determined to prevent this Russian-friendly region from being ruled by what it considers an anti-Russian regime supported by international institutions imposing a zero-sum geopolitical choice.

The EU and NATO have staunchly aligned themselves with Georgia since Saakashvili, who sought to scale back Georgia’s ties with Russia and instead integrate
with the West, came to power in 2003. The former EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby (2012), claimed the EU recognised it was “essential to develop a transatlantic vision for the South Caucasus”. The EU is “also motivated by the possibility of a NATO opening towards the region.” Since South Ossetia and Abkhazia look to Russia for security, the EU’s support for autonomous entity rights for these regions are ambiguous at best. The EU’s official position is for Russia to withdraw its peacekeepers and revoke its recognition of independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia has great significance in energy security because its geographical location allows supply and transit diversification away from Russia. The Nabucco and BTC pipelines pass through an “energy corridor” in Georgia and Azerbaijan, giving the EU access to resources in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia (Semneby, 2012).

In terms of means, like in Moldova, the EU has its authorisation from the government and is not in breach of international law or the UN. Unlike in Moldova, the EU does not have the ability to isolate and undermine the governments in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since they share a border with Russia. Attempts to isolate these break-away regions will only increase their dependency on Russia to the extent they become de-facto annexed. The policy has therefore been benign by seeking to open dialogue to reduce Russian influence, while maintaining a policy of non-recognition.

5.1.3. Conclusion

The capabilities and strategy of the CSDP demonstrate a shift towards an offensive posture. Current and planned military capabilities increasingly enable military interventions in large-scale conflicts, which correlate with a more militarised understanding of human security. However, most CSDP missions have been civilian, thus enhanced military capabilities have not greatly affected its posture. The internal constraint on the use of military power is however considered a flaw caused by difficulties in developing a common voice. The EU leadership has sought to overcome this weakness with ad-hoc arrangements and flexible “coalition of the willing” solutions.
The CSDP has introduced coercive tools designated for conflict management to pursue its enlargement and neighbourhood policies. The EU considers its objectives to complement UN objectives, or UN principles, while reducing its reliance on coercive means in conflict management. However, “European integration” as an objective involves power interests for the EU aimed at centralising power in Brussels through membership and external governance. The CSDP’s pursuit of these interests results in a revision of the mission objectives without the consent of either the conflicting parties or the UN. The EU positions itself as an independent actor and alternative to the UN, neglecting and distorting its mandates when politically expedient to do so.

The objectives of the CSDP reflect a broader development of EU integration, transitioning from being a means to an ends. The EU’s initiatives are not only assessed by their “added value” to security, but promoting EU leadership in Europe is perceived as an added value in itself. EU membership often becomes an obstruction to conflict resolution since external governance and accession criteria are added to the CSDP objectives. In Bosnia and Serbia this implies a unilateral revision of who is the sovereign as a fundamental issue in nation-building. In Moldova and Georgia the conflicts are complicated by the prospect of membership due to the zero-sum choice between integrating with the EU or Russia. Because the breakaway regions prioritise relations with Russia, the EU undermines compromise and instead relies on coercive means to achieve political solutions whereby states make a clear choice for Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The EU does not act as an agent of the UN by implementing its political solutions or striving to reach compromise, but rather attempts to change realities on the ground without the consent of the UN and/or both the conflicting parties. To some extent the EU acts independently of the UN and has become a participant in conflicts. Diplomacy and compromise is marginalised as the EU tends to align itself with one side. This alienates Russia in the UNSC which subsequently results in more restrictions on UN mandates. The room for compromise is reduced since the EU sets its own conditions, which undermines its role as a mediator. In Kosovo this is evident by its refusal to negotiate on the key issue of status settlement, while also rejecting the possibility of autonomy or secession for Northern Kosovo. In Bosnia, the EU
undermines the previously agreed compromise for a unified but de-centralised state. In both Moldova and Georgia, the EU implicitly rejects a political solution that would grant the breakaway regions autonomy to the extent that they can accommodate Russia, which blocks a “European perspective” or “transatlantic vision”. In Moldova the EU’s opposition to compromise went to the extreme of torpedoing a peace treaty where the two parties had compromized. In Georgia, its alignment with the Georgian government has discredited the EU as a mediator in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
5. Case Study I: CSDP and Russia

5.2. Security Dilemma Sensibility

Assessing security dilemma sensibility entails exploring the EU’s ability and intention to recognise and interpret Russian security concerns and consider the possibility that Russia has defensive policy motivations. First, Russian arguments regarding its security fears are explored and whether its policies are argued to be in response to these security concerns. Second, whether the EU recognises and considers these Russian perspectives and responses is assessed. Security dilemma sensibility does not imply accepting the Russian perspectives as “accurate”, nor does it entail “condoning” Russia’s response. Instead, it is a reference to the ability and intention of the EU to consider these concerns and the possibility that Russian policies are defensive. Similarly, security dilemma sensibility does not suppose that the EU will automatically alter its policies to alleviate Russian concerns, but rather that it will take them into account to the extent that this will maximise EU security.

It is argued that the genuine conviction and/or political necessity of the EU to portray itself as having an inherent positive-sum approach to security result in a reduced ability and intention to recognise a security dilemma. Russia is concerned about the EU promoting zero-sum policies when it compels the common neighbourhood to choose between either integrating with the EU or Russia, and uses the CSDP to impose the “European choice” when it lacks leverage. Russia has responded by obstructing the EU’s unilateral zero-sum initiatives and promoting multilateral alternatives to transcend the bloc-based system as the root of disputes.

The EU assigns a fixed value to the contested concept of “Europe” and therefore does not recognise competing integration initiatives. Disputes are viewed through a Manichean prism as “European integration” versus a “Russian sphere of influence”. Key concepts underpinning Russian concerns do not enter the discourse, since the EU tends to define zero-sum in terms of intentions and perception, and spheres of influence in terms of Russia denying sovereign states to join Western institutions. Concerns about zero-sum security structures are therefore dismissed by the EU as a misperception and evidence of Russia’s “Cold War mentality”. Since Russian power
interests and influence in the common neighbourhood are perceived to contradict liberal democratic norms, Russian power interests invalidate its normative arguments. There are well-founded reasons to critique Russian security concerns and be sceptical of Russian policies in the common neighbourhood. However, the EU’s lack of security dilemma sensibility is due to its absence of a conceptual space for a legitimate and benign independent Russian influence in the EU’s fixed and narrow concept of Europe.

**5.2.1 Russian security concerns regarding the CSDP**

The fundamental security concern of Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union has been the continuation of zero-sum bloc-politics caused by the failure to reach a political settlement that accommodates Russia. Gorbachev’s vision of a “common European home” failed because the West has not been willing to move beyond exclusive blocs. By linking political settlement to integration initiatives that are closed to Russia makes EU conflict resolution in the common neighbourhood vulnerable to power competition. The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 depicts conflicts as deriving from a Western preference for a “bloc-based approach to addressing international issues” that relies on “unilateral sanctions and other coercive measures” (Russian Federation, 2013). This results in a “blatant neglect of fundamental principles of international law”, undermining a constrained common security system that advances “indivisible security” (Russian Federation, 2013).

For a large part of the 1990s the EU was envisioned as the “good West” due to the potential for a more multilateral Europe, as opposed to NATO as the “bad West” by institutionalising militarised unilateralism (Monaghan, 2005; Danilov, 2005: 87). This assessment regarded the EU as a step towards a multipolar, internationally democratic, de-militarised and constrained international system by reducing NATO-
centrism. It was thus more capable of accommodating Russia. Both Yeltsin and Putin had initially believed that the EU, unlike NATO, would not undermine Russia’s own relations and integration efforts with its neighbours (Arbatov, 1993; 2004). The rise of the EU was perceived to harmonise with “the long-term national interests of Russia”, which is “the creation of an open system of Euro-Atlantic collective security, on a clear legal and treaty basis” and “transition in the international system from opposing blocs to principles of multivector diplomacy” (Russian Federation, 2009a). Russia therefore supported “strengthening the mechanisms of cooperation with the European Union by all possible means” (Russian Federation, 2009a).

Hopes about the EU promoting multilateralism and European integration are declining since the EU was perceived to gradually develop new zero-sum regional structures in which Russia’s role was not clearly defined, was frequently vilified and increasingly marginalised. EU unilateralism is perceived to undermine European integration and unification in favour of bloc-politics, while democratisation becomes superficial, inconsistent and instrumental to advance EU interests and leverage against Russia. The EU is seen to de-couple Russia from its neighbours and other European states. This de-coupling becomes more coercive with the CSDP. Rather than constrain and moderate NATO/US policies, the EU is increasingly perceived to complement, accommodate, and support them (Author interview, 2011d). This impression is reinforced by the correlating enlargements of the EU and NATO, and their division of labour. While NATO creates division in Europe through enlargements and the use of military power for “overthrowing legitimate authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting the civilian population” (Russian Federation, 2013), the EU is seen to empower favourable governments and undermine the unfavourable (Author interview, 2011d). While less threatening and significant in hard capabilities, concerns are mounting. The most alarming is that the CSDP

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12 Russia no longer deploys this argument as it proved counter-productive, portrayed as a desire to split Europe and the US.
13 Several Russian officials however made the point that while media tends to focus solely on the disagreements and disputes between the EU and Russia, there are also many areas of cooperation and progress being made on bilateral issues (Author interview, 2012a; 2012b).
destabilises the common neighbourhood by aligning itself with and empowering hostile anti-Russian nationalist regimes on Russia’s borders. The common goal is for their countries to make a zero-sum pro-West/anti-Russian choice in order to marginalise Russia in Europe.

**Conflict management as zero-sum: Russia “squeezed out” of Europe**

Russia is concerned that the EU attempts to replace its peacekeepers in order to diminish Russian influence and obstruct regional cooperation and integration efforts. Already in 1993, the Russian Security Concept warned of hegemonic ambitions as some states could try to “replace Russia in the countries of its traditional influence under the disguise of intermediary and peacekeeping efforts” (Russian Federation, 1993). Former Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev warned that “as soon as we leave these areas, the resulting vacuum will be immediately filled by other forces, possibly not always friendly and maybe even hostile to Russian interests” (Allison, 1994). The former Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and current Ambassador to the European Union, Vladimir Chizhov (2004a), suggested in a statement to the EU that “we are for a stable, peaceful Caucasus and against a revision of the strategic balance of forces in this region, and the more so the ‘squeezing out’ of Russia from there.” Similarly, contemporary Russian scholars such as Nikitin (2006) question whether there is a zero-sum logic where Russia is required to withdraw completely from the post-Soviet space before the EU can achieve results. Russia considers its fears of Western unilateralism in European conflicts to have been confirmed in the Balkan wars. The Russian Federation Military Doctrine of 2000 listed a key threat to its security as foreign attempts “to ignore (or infringe on) Russian Federation interests in resolving international security problems and to oppose strengthening [of the Russian Federation] as one of the influential centres of a multipolar world” (Russian Federation, 2000a). This was reiterated in the Russian Security Concepts of 2000 and 2009, which chiefly referred to NATO but also implies to a lesser extent the EU. Both were considered to be pursuing hegemonic ambitions thinly veiled as
humanitarianism with increasingly unilateral and aggressive interventionism (Russian Federation 2000b; 2009a).

Russia perceives itself as a “normal” great power with legitimate influence in its neighbourhood and wider Europe. Its security interests are therefore framed as coinciding with European integration and norms supporting human freedoms. Moscow regularly cites economic links, energy cooperation, shared history, common culture, and the millions of Russians who found themselves outside Russian borders when the Soviet Union collapsed to be sources for potential security cooperation and integration. In contrast, the EU’s use of liberal democratic rhetoric tends to be interpreted as Orwellian double-speak, where words can take on mutually exclusive meanings. “Integration” indicates de-coupling from Russia; “democratisation” denotes alignment and dependency on the EU with imposed management of internal processes through “external governance” (Putin, 2007); “humanitarianism” equates to regime change at the peril of civilian populations; and opposing “nationalism” suggests alignment with ethnic groups that support EU leadership and oppose Russia.

The links between Russia and its neighbours are perceived to be the natural target for those attempting to contain and marginalise Russia in Europe, typically a reference to anti-Russian nationalists and their supporters in the West. When former Soviet Republics became independent states and established or modified new national identities, Russia feared this would manifest itself as nationalist political platforms of “de-Russification”. This implies discrimination of ethnic Russians and Russian-leaning populations domestically, and confronting Russia internationally. The EU is perceived to support anti-Russian forces as European integration and democratisation is equated to “freeing” Russia’s neighbours from its influence (Author interview, 2011d). Lavrov (2008a) warned that “the line on tearing away its neighbours from Russia on the rails of creating national states of the 19th-century type promises all of Europe not postmodernist perspectives, but a return to the past with its destructive nationalism.” The Russian Military Doctrine of 2010 similarly warns against attempts by foreign powers to “destabilis[e] states and regions on Russian borders” (Russian Federation, 2010a). The implicit goal of isolating Russia in its own neighbourhood converts the post-Soviet space into a region for destructive “geopolitical games”
5. Case Study I: CSDP and Russia

(Lavrov, 2007b; 2008b). It is feared that the CSDP introduces more coercive means to punish governments that accommodate Russia, while bolstering and supporting anti-Russian governments that destabilise and polarise states which would otherwise have sought a more balanced approach by integrating with both the EU and Russia (Author interview, 2011d).

The precedent was seen to be set by the EU’s de-facto support for governments with “apartheid” policies in the Baltic States, a terminology used first by Yeltsin in reference to the discrimination against Russian-speakers by denying them citizenship and voting rights. The EU, spearheaded by CEECs, is accused of promoting European integration and democratisation on an anti-Russian platform in the post-Soviet space (Author interview, 2011d). The pro-EU governments in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova are seen to have a correlating anti-Russian component, which is reinforced by the EU’s zero-sum format for Europe. Russia’s discontent with the EU in Georgia focuses on its uncritical support for the Saakashvili administration and its neglect of Georgia’s intimidation and military aggression against South Ossetia, a very pro-Russian region. In Moldova, Russia has critiqued the EU’s alignment with nationalists against Transnistria with an “economic blockade” and vilification (Author interview, 2011d). In Ukraine, Russia was concerned that the EU aligned itself with nationalist groups in both 2004 to overturn an election and again in 2013/2014 that led to toppling of the democratically elected government. In both cases, this undermined a balanced government that was committed to integrate with both Russia and the West, which is required in order for Ukraine to remain united due to the deep divisions between its pro-Russian Eastern regions and its anti-Russian Western regions. EU support for political groups that would take Ukraine towards the West, which

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14 Despite EU calls on Estonia and Latvia to recognise citizenship for the Russian minorities constituting approximately 30% of their populations, the EU is also perceived to disregard if not be complicit in discrimination. The EU supported closing the OSCE missions in Latvia and Estonia despite not recognising Russian-speakers as citizens; the EU did not make citizenship for Russian-speakers an accession criterion; EU referendums were accepted without the participation of “non-citizens”; the European Parliament grants Latvia and Estonia votes for citizens that are not recognised; and the EU has not attempted to mitigate the situation by for example recognising Russian as an official EU language.
included neo-fascist groups, polarised Ukrainian society even further. Both in 2004 and in 2014, the new authorities pushed to ban the Russian language in certain spheres. The attempt to steer Ukraine away from Russia meant that the Eastern half of the country was left behind. Several of the Eastern regions responded to the coup by not recognising the new authorities in Kiev or follow its directives, while large parts of the military began to defect to the Eastern regions. This set the conditions for civil war. Russia feared that the possible use of force by Kiev against the Eastern regions would not be opposed by the EU and the US. Eventually, this could also lead to NATO accession and the eviction of Russia from its naval base in Crimea and replaced by NATO.

In the former Yugoslavia, the Western European states are considered to be the main culprits in the advance of biased policies against the Serbs as a key Russian ally in the region (Allison, 2006: 77). Since approximately half the Serbs in Kosovo have been ethnically cleansed since 1999, Russia applies the norms of human rights, self-determination, and territorial integrity to the problems in Northern Kosovo. Russia criticises the EU for disregarding the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Kosovo, and for contempt of international law and treaties on the international management of Kosovo and Bosnia. Lavrov (2007c) asserted that it “is a disgrace for Europe” that “Serbs are now the largest group of refugees on the continent”. Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the UN, similarly accuses the EU of neglecting to investigate the systematic ethnic cleansing of Serbs (UNSC, 2012a; 2012b). Lavrov (2007c) charges the EU with only implementing what it liked about UN Resolution 1244 in Kosovo, “while the rest was not”. Russia even opened its own probe into organ trafficking by Kosovo’s leadership since it does not expect a neutral investigation by EULEX. This was a response to the claim by ICTY chief-prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, that the EU suppressed investigation into human organ trafficking by the Kosovo leadership. This allegation was repeated in the Dick Marty Report, commissioned by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which found that EULEX “had always hesitated to aggravate the local leadership by prying too deeply” (PACE, 2010). In Bosnia, Russia has on several occasions criticised the EU for illegally misusing the OHR mandate to pursue its own interests, and depriving Bosnia of sovereignty and democracy by refusing to
close down the OHR (Szewczyk, 2010: 41; UNSC, 2012c). Zhukov, a Russian
delegate to the UN, warned that “inflating mandates to include unmandated
peacebuilding functions is counterproductive” and that “peacekeepers must strictly
abide by their mandates and not get dragged into internal political conflicts” by
providing “tacit support to one of the parties to a conflict” (UNSC, 2012d). The
Russian delegate also expressed concerns about bias and called for peacekeeping
mandates to be clear and “not leave any latitude for malleable or subjective
interpretation” (UNSC, 2012d).

**European integration as zero-sum: Political, economic and ideational division**

Linking conflict resolution to EU integration is problematic since EU integration does
not equate to, and to some extent, undermines Moscow’s definition of European
integration. While the EU is often considered to pursue positive-sum policies in that it
reduces political, economic and ideational borders within its territory, it hardens and
securitises its external borders (Diez, 2006; Diez, Stetter, and Albert, 2006;
DeBardeleben, 2005). Tassinari (2005) argues that an EU paradox is that what is
achieved on the inside freezes beyond EU borders: “social interaction is re-
securitised, and Europe returns to be a dynamic based on sovereignty, borders and
territory”, an “oasis to be protected”. These scholarly observations are reflected in
Russia’s disgruntlement with the EU’s neighbourhood policies, which are not seen to
soften borders, but to extend the EU’s unilateral external governance and de-couple
Russia from its neighbouring states. The EU is believed to undermine genuine
European integration by rejecting harmonisation of integration efforts towards the
common neighbourhood. As a result, “European integration” is perceived to split
Russia from its neighbours politically, economically and ideationally.

Politically, the EU’s integration schemes exclude the possibility of pursuing
integration concurrent with Russia. The EU’s proposed Association Agreement with
Ukraine in late 2013 would have facilitated free trade and committed Ukraine to
adopting large parts of the EU’s acquis. This implied that Ukraine could not join the
Russian-led Customs Union. While being ambiguous on this matter, the EU had
previously asserted that Armenia’s decision to join the Customs Union would prevent it from signing an Association Agreement. The Association Agreement with Ukraine also included military integration by committing it to “gradual convergence in the area of foreign and security policy, including the Common Security and Defence Policy” (European Union, 2013). This would not only disrupt Ukraine-Russian military cooperation, but was likely to bring Ukraine closer to NATO membership. Regarding the free movement of people, the EU promotes a strict external border regime with the Schengen Agreement, which reinforces, obstructs and/or reverses free transit between Russia and other European states. In contrast, Russia advocates more inclusive and integrated border management (Diez, Stetter, and Albert, 2006: 566). Reinforcing the border regime was especially detrimental in the Baltic as the Kaliningrad region of Russia is separated from the rest of the country. Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006) therefore argue that in the Baltic “the EU has turned into a main conflict party”. Putin (2007) similarly asserted that there are attempts to “impose new dividing lines” by erecting a new “virtual” Berlin Wall to keep Russia out of Europe.

Economically, the EU’s external governance does not take into account existing agreements and frameworks of trade and energy cooperation between the common neighbourhood and Russia (Zagorski, 2011). In terms of the proposed Association Agreement with Ukraine, the Ukrainian economy could be re-directed away from Russia. The possible illegal re-branding of EU goods as Ukrainian and re-exporting them to Russia causes legitimate concerns that would make it difficult to maintain free trade with Ukraine (Popescu, 2013). Zimmerman (2007) suggests the EU treats Russia differently from other neighbours to increase its competitiveness, since Russia constitutes an external power large enough to qualify as a competitor. Besides being a tool for economic recovery, trade and energy also constitute a tool for Russia to integrate with both Europe and its near abroad. Russia is concerned about the EU defining diversification of energy supply chiefly as reducing dependency on Russia as a supplier, while some member states even denounce Russian attempts to increase energy security by diversifying the transit routes.

A key concern is the EU’s unilateral energy regime promoted in the common neighbourhood. The so-called “Gazprom clause” in the Third Energy Package
demands that EU members and the common neighbourhood adhering to the EU’s external governance “unbundle” ownership of energy production and transit. This implies, as Russia frequently points out, the nationalising of energy infrastructure that has been financed and developed by Russia. A common EU-Russian approach towards the region is undermined by the EU’s push for full integration of Ukraine and Moldova into its own EU Energy Community. The CSDP has further escalated these concerns since energy is becoming increasingly politicised and securitised (Author interview, 2012a). Pressuring neighbouring states to implement the EU’s energy regime could be further intensified by the CSDP (Chizhov, 2012a). The pinnacle of concern was the perceived unwavering support and militarisation of a confrontational anti-Russian regime in Georgia in order to establish control over the “energy corridor” through Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Ideationally, the EU divides Russia from its neighbours by implicitly imposing a “civilizational choice” on the former Soviet Republics. Neumann (1999) suggests that aspiration for EU-integration promoted as a “return to Europe” implies the need to be more like “us” and less like Russia. In this vision of “Europe”, it has become increasingly common to consider Russia the only non-European European country (Trenin, 2004). While the EU is portrayed as “good”, the “other” is depicted as a deviant and an exact opposite (Diez, 2005; Diez, 2006). The EU’s political class is perceived to contribute to more anti-Russian elements in the European identity by politicising history. The shared historical narrative focusing on the collective defeat of fascism during the Second World War is being replaced by a narrative where the war is being blamed on both Germany and the Soviet Union (European Parliament, 2008a). The EU declaration that placed both authoritarian regimes in the same booth was claimed to be aimed at “rooting democracy more firmly and reinforcing peace and stability in our continent” (European Parliament, 2008a). However, it also entails criminalising Russia’s history and its liberation of Europe from fascism, as a key event in its national history and identity.

The “Europeaness” of the states in the common neighbourhood and their commitment to democracy is demonstrated by their conforming to this narrative, condemning their Soviet history and implicitly their historical relationship with
Russia. Former Soviet Republics seeking closer association with the EU signal their return to Europe by commemorating “Soviet occupation day” and establishing museums of “Soviet occupation”. This has a tendency to divide and further polarise populations that are split between identifying themselves with Russia and “Europe”. This historical narrative is also feared to become instrumental for nationalist governments to pursue domestic policies of “de-Russification” by depriving Russian minorities of rights, while pursuing confrontation with Russia internationally (Author interview, 2011d; Author interview, 2012a). In the case of the Baltic States, the portrayal of the Russian minority as descendants of invaders and occupiers justifies denying citizenship and voting rights to Russian-speakers. In Moldova, nationalist “de-Russification” policies which discriminated against Russian and pro-Russian minorities are perceived to have caused the military conflict in 1990 and subsequent de-facto secession of Transnistria (Author interview, 2012a). In Ukraine, the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian narrative could trigger a civil war and inadvertently support the narrative of fascist political groups.

**Democracy promotion as zero-sum: sovereignty absorbed by exclusive institutions**

Democracy promotion and humanitarianism managed by exclusive institutions seeking dominance in Europe are largely rejected because the resulting sovereign inequality becomes vulnerable to power competition. Russia does not attribute its apprehensions to a value-gap, as frequently professed by the EU. Rather it perceives democracy and liberal values to be corrupted and used instrumentally to advance the interests and power of exclusive security institutions. In other words, when the EU uses a demagogic hammer for power competition then every nail will be depicted as democracy and human rights. Lavrov (2007b) calls this “instruments as ‘democratship’”: “Let us be frank, the main criterion used to measure a nation’s level of democracy seems to be its readiness to follow in the footsteps of other countries’ policies.” Putin (2012a) asserted that human rights “undoubtedly” override state sovereignty. However, the idea that these rights should be “protected from
abroad and on a selective basis” rather than by the UN would result in “creating a moral and legal void in the practice of international relations”, and consequently these values descend to mere “demagogy” (Putin, 2012a).

Introducing a broad concept of human security which is enforced by an exclusive institution is believed to encourage arbitrary decision-making at the peril of both justice and order. Chizhov (2012a) accuses the EU of pursuing a “selective approach to implementation of human rights norms” while rational debates disappear because values are used to “pin labels” rather than “taking pains to look into specific problems”. Russian scholars denounce “democracy Messianism” as the insincere and selective use of democratic norms to enhance Western interests (Karaganov, 2006). Lukyanov (2009) proposes that democracy should not only be defended against authoritarian regimes, but also against states attempting to misuse democratic rhetoric for geopolitical gains.

The combination of the EU’s soft power and the CSDP to promote democracy and integration is viewed with great scepticism. Soft power instruments are depicted as being used “illegally” when foreign governments interfere in domestic affairs for the purpose of furthering their geopolitical interests (Putin, 2012a). Putin (2012a) has noted the threat of “pseudo-NGOs” being used as “civilised lobbyism” to “destabilise other countries”. The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 also refers to the:

[U]nwlawful use of ‘soft power’ and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilise theirpolitical situation, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad (Russian Federation, 2013).

Moscow’s apprehensions concerning “unlawful” soft power reached its pinnacle during the EU and US support for “colour revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine. Perceived as coup d’états, civil society and democracy were argued to be corrupted by politicised international non-governmental institutions (INGOs). The term “non-governmental” is seen as misleading as many of the NGO’s are almost completely
funded by foreign governments, staffed by people connected to the intelligence community of foreign governments, and in effect are serving foreign policy interests. Moscow perceives that domestic demands for democracy and fighting corruption have been high-jacked by foreign governments pushing a zero-sum geopolitical platform of anti-Russian and pro-EU/NATO alignment. It did not go unnoticed in Moscow that Ukrainian President Yushchenko named the European Parliament the “godparents” of the new Ukraine due to its support during the Orange Revolution that brought him to power (European Parliament, 2005b). Nor did it go unnoticed that immediately after the Rose Revolution and the Orange Revolution, CSDP missions were deployed to Georgia and Ukraine/Moldova (Author interview, 2011d). EU support for installing anti-Russian governments was seen to be followed by CSDP missions to cement the geopolitical revisions.

These concerns resurfaced in late 2013 and 2014, after Ukraine had rejected the Association Agreement, which was interpreted by Moscow as an ultimatum between integrating with either the West or Russia. EU officials challenged the legitimacy and authority of the Ukrainian government by travelling to Kiev to encourage protests and voice support for the opposition. When these protests descended into violent riots across Western Ukraine, the EU Council chief Van Romuy blamed the instability solely on the government, and Poland’s prime minister called for the EU to channel 3 million Euros to opposition groups and “the development of citizens’ movements” (Rettman, 2014). The EU eventually brokered a compromise where a coalition (unity) government would be formed. However, the opposition did not abide by the agreement and instead toppled the democratically elected government by unconstitutionally deposing the president. Instead of condemning the coup and calling for a return to the agreed coalition government, large numbers of EU and US officials

15 During the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Freedom House, which is funded by the US government and at the time headed by former CIA director James Woolsey, played a pivotal role. See Sussman and Krader (2008) for critical perspectives on the colour revolutions.
flew to Kiev to increase the legitimacy of the new government and sign the agreements that the democratically elected government would not sign.

5.2.2. Russian policies responding to fears of the CSDP

Russia depicts its policies to be defensive in that they are aimed at resisting unilateral zero-sum policies in a divided Europe while at the same time offering multilateral alternatives supporting European unification as the solution to the underlying problem. Russia does not have the means in terms of attraction, persuasion or coercion to out-compete the EU in a bloc-based system, nor does it outline such objectives. There is an attempt to walk a fine line between conflict and cooperation by attempting to balance unilateralism, though without going too far and consequently dissuading the EU from multilateral alternatives.

Balancing unilateralism in conflict management

The Russian military and peacekeepers are portrayed by Russia as being compelled to remain in conflict regions because the West refuses to support common peacekeeping initiatives and compromise on political solutions that accommodates all relationships. At the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, which called for elevating the role of the OSCE in European security, Russia committed itself to withdrawing its peacekeepers completely from Georgia and Moldova. However, with the diminishing potential role of the collective OSCE, due to parallel NATO and EU enlargements, the absence of multilateral alternatives led Russia to revise this withdrawal as it would merely be replaced by zero-sum initiatives (Author interview, 2011d). A Russian official suggested that Russia had to respond to “a completely new reality [that] has been created since”, where the rise of unilateral and often anti-Russian approaches made the withdrawal pledge impossible to fulfil (Author interview, 2011d). The strategy in the frozen conflicts has therefore been recognised as preserving the status quo (Mankoff, 2009: 245; Igumnova, 2011).
When the EU first expressed its intention to replace Russian peacekeepers in Moldova, Russia responded by swiftly pushing through a political solution which would ensure that Moldova remained a neutral state. In 2003 the Dutch Chairman of the OSCE, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, sent a paper to Russia and the other OSCE members proposing to replace the current peacekeeping force with an OSCE Peace Consolidation Force, which would be “outsourced” to the EU (Löwenhardt, 2004: 107). The EU would lead such a mission, though “it could be explored further whether the EU is willing to carry out a peace consolidation operation in co-operation with other interested parties” (Löwenhardt, 2004: 107). The EU Commission proposed to deploy “EU civil and crisis management capabilities” in Transnistria immediately after a political solution would be reached (European Commission, 2003c). The proposal to replace Russian peacekeepers and possibly isolate Russia in the region prompted the direct involvement of the Russian President, who, without OSCE or EU involvement, pushed through the Kozak Memorandum. This unification and constitution proposal stipulated that Moldova would unite but remain neutral by remaining outside exclusive military blocs such as NATO. After the EU and the US pushed President Voronin to withdraw from the unification agreement, Russia returned to status quo and cemented its position in Transnistria. Chizhov explained that “when the political dialogue [between Transnistria and Moldovan authorities] was under way, the trains were leaving with arms once every five days. When the whole negotiation collapsed, the trains almost halted” (Ferguson, 2005).

It can likewise be expected that Russia will not leave South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have a very favourable view of Russia, if, as a result, they will be forcefully suppressed by what is considered an anti-Russian regime supported by Western institutions aiming to isolate it in the region. Instead, the Russian intervention in Georgia brought further credence to the notion that a strong military presence was required in the absence of a functional inclusive security system. Both the EU and NATO had demonstrated that they would continue their support for Tbilisi and would not condemn or punish the Georgian military offensive against South Ossetia. Russian security guarantees had previously been de-facto extended to South Ossetia and Abkhazia by granting Russian citizenship to parts of the
5. Case Study I: CSDP and Russia

population. This security guarantee was made permanent by recognising them as independent states after the Russian military intervention.

Concerning the Balkans, Russia relies mostly on political power through the UNSC and economic power to prevent the EU from monopolising decision-making. The EU is seen to alter realities on the ground in order to present Russia with a *fait accompli*. In June 1999, Russia attempted to use military power to prevent the West from establishing exclusive influence in Kosovo. Russia sent troops to Pristina airport unannounced to establish an independent presence to ensure that Serbia’s territorial integrity would be preserved, given that Russia would not receive a peacekeeping sector independent of NATO (Rutland and Dubinsky, 2008: 265; Author interview, 2011d). These troops had to be withdrawn later and the painful lesson learned in Kosovo was that in the absence of an equal and common security arrangement operating on the ground, the West would not honour its commitments or international law. The conclusions from the same 1999 OSCE Summit had also reaffirmed the guarantee of Serbia’s territorial integrity. The EU consequently lost much legitimacy in Russia due to its conduct in the Balkans. This has resulted in an unwavering stance as, for example, in Transnistria (Samokhvalov, 2007).

The EU’s disregard of the oppression of Serbs in the Western Balkans and of Russian-speakers in the Baltic States has indicated that the Russian-friendly populations in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria would not be protected or represented without a robust Russian presence (Author interview, 2011d). The same logic appears to apply to the Eastern Ukrainian regions that do not recognise the legitimacy of the new government in Kiev, as the Russian Parliament authorised the president to use military force if the new authorities in Kiev use force against these regions. Russia has, however, not offered de-facto security guarantees to Kosovo Serbs and has rejected their request to be granted Russian citizenship. Russian resistance to the EU’s attempt to construct an independent Kosovo is not only motivated by support for Serbia, but also to prevent the marginalisation of Russia. The Russian ambassador to Serbia expressed “support” for Serbia by criticising its acceptance of the custom stamp agreement as a step towards its own dismemberment (B92, 2011a). However, as a peculiar self-reminder, Russia recognises that support
for Serbia’s territorial integrity has limits as “Russia cannot be more Serb than Serbs” (Author interview, 2012a; B92, 2012).

Balancing “European integration” politically, economically and ideationally

Exclusive zero-sum integration projects that are perceived to undermine Russia’s integration and cooperation with the same states are opposed by balancing unilateral initiatives and promoting multilateral alternatives.

Politically, Russia has in recent years stepped up its political integration efforts beyond the weak Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Russia promotes the Customs Union and the pending Eurasian Union to be operational in January 2015, as regional integration efforts that also serve the purpose of withstanding attempts by the EU to integrate Russia’s neighbours in zero-sum arrangements that undermine their relations with Russia.

Economically, Russia uses energy in its foreign policy to counter what is considered Western support for anti-Russian regimes. Russia had maintained Soviet-era energy subsidies for its neighbours, with the assumption that this would automatically result in improved relations. Following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine this policy was deemed a failure that had even resulted in “subsidising” anti-Russian regimes. Makarkin (2010) explains that Russia is “slowly departing from the policy of charity” based on the flawed premise that delivering discounted materials would result in improved economic ties and rehabilitated political consultation. The anti-Russian government of Yushchenko in Ukraine were forced to pay market prices and experienced a steep rise in energy costs, while the following post-Orange Revolution government of Yanukovich received energy subsidies in return for extending the lease of the naval base in Crimea. Offering subsidies has become the key incentive for states like Moldova and Ukraine to not implement the EU’s unilateral Association Agreements and its energy regime. Energy subsidies are also offered to members of the Customs Union and the pending Eurasian Union.
The Nord Stream pipeline that delivers gas directly from Russia to Germany disarms the ability of CEECs to “blackmail” Russia for subsidies by siphoning gas going to Western Europe, as was experienced during the Yushchenko administration in Ukraine. In the Western Balkans as well, Russia is accumulating soft power with the South Stream pipeline and buying up energy infrastructure ranging from refineries to actual gas stations. The Polish-led EU energy security talks with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine regarding the transport of energy from Central Asia to diversify away from Russia, received a swift response from Russia, which agreed with the Central Asian states to send Central Asian gas through Russian territory. Since some of these agreements had little if no economic gains for Russia, they can be deemed to be politically motivated and were indeed hailed as a victory in response to an energy offensive by the EU (Feklyunina, 2008: 141).16

Ideationally, Russia is increasingly aware of the consequences of its negative image abroad, especially in the West where it is portrayed as rejecting democracy and dominating its neighbours through force. Lavrov (2007c) has stated that Russia’s position is often obscured since “Russia is apparently not as skilful as the West when it comes to matters of communication”. Putin (2012b) expressed his concern that:

Russia’s image abroad is formed not by us and as a result it is often distorted and does not reflect the real situation in our country… Those who fire guns and launch air strikes here or there are the good guys, while those who warn of the need for restraint and dialogue are for some reason at fault. But our fault lies in our failure to adequately explain our position.

Russia is acting upon these concerns by seeking more ideational power. The government-funded English-language news organisation, Russia Today, has become one of the largest in the world and challenges what it perceives as a strong anti-

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16 In 2014, following sanctions by the US and EU aimed to harm the Russia economy, Moscow began to diversify away from dependency on the EU as energy consumers and away from dependency on the US dollar. The largest energy deal in history was signed between Russia and China in non-dollar denomination.
Russian bias in Western media.\textsuperscript{17} Moscow also funds NGOs that presents Russia’s position more favourably. Its historical role in the Second World War is defended from what is considered politicised historical revisionism. Medvedev advocated that Russia must oppose attempts to re-write and criminalise Russia’s history, and established a commission to “counter attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia” (Russian Federation, 2009b). Russia also seeks to reduce anti-Russian sentiments by pursuing reconciliation with Poland through initiatives like opening its Soviet archives and condemning the Katyn massacre as a crime by Stalin.\textsuperscript{18}

**Balancing “democratisation”: divorcing democracy from power competition**

Russia balances what it considers efforts to undermine the sovereignty of states for geopolitical gain, while promoting multilateral alternatives where democracy is detached from power competition. The main objective is to prevent democracy and human rights to be used to institutionalise asymmetrical relationships (Author interview, 2012a). Moscow publishes annual critical reports on democracy and human rights violations in the EU (Russian Federation, 2012b). Such initiatives are part of a broader endeavour to challenge the West’s monopoly on monitoring human rights, and thus undermine the selective and instrumental use of human rights.

The colour revolutions demonstrated that Russia was unable to prevent Western interference in election processes. Trenin (2005) asserts that “the main reason for the Kremlin’s blatant and clumsy interference in Ukraine’s 2004 presidential poll was not to install a puppet regime but to prevent the – allegedly anti-Russian – opposition candidate from winning.” In response to the Western “puppet regimes”, Moscow

\textsuperscript{17} Russia Today is the most watched media organ on YouTube and the second-most viewed foreign media service in the US after the BBC.

\textsuperscript{18} Condemning the massacre as a crime by Stalin rather than the Soviet Union is explained by asserting that Stalin also committed crimes against the Soviet people. This narrative serves the purpose of enabling Russia to denounce the crimes and seek reconciliation, while not supporting attempts to criminalise the shared history of the former Soviet Republics.
promoted the concept of “sovereign democracy” (Lukyanov, 2008), a key tenet being that democracy cannot develop without sovereignty since geopolitical interests are prioritised above good governance. Russia has responded domestically to what it considers Western manipulations of civil society by placing restrictions on foreign “NGOs” and passing a controversial law where NGOs with dubious funding from abroad could be charged as “foreign agents”.19

5.2.3. EU recognition of Russian security concerns

There is a lack of recognition of Russian security concerns about competing integration efforts and security initiatives in Europe since most disputes are framed as “European integration” and “democratisation” conflicting with Russian “spheres of influence”. Due to a lack of conceptual space for a legitimate independent role for Russia in Europe, there is an absence of conceptual distinction between “influence” and “sphere of influence”. The EU demands a certain degree of internal conformity by its decision-makers to this established narrative in order to retain political and professional credibility. Russian security concerns about centralising power in exclusive institutions at the peril of multipolarity resonates with realist assumptions about the world, suggesting that peace is dependent on a balance of power since the international separation of power imposes constraints on states. Considering Russian arguments in this environment is difficult since they are rooted in realist ideas about the world, and the EU tends to dismiss realism as “immoral”. Toje and Kunz (2012: 3) argue that the prevalence of constructivism and subsequent focus on “speech acts” in the EU has led to the belief that using realist analysis and debating national interest equate to legitimising and condoning realpolitik. Discussions are therefore limited to focusing on values and visions, while implicit underlying assumptions about power and competing interests remain unarticulated. Diez (2005: 626) suggests that discussions on whether the EU is a benign normative power demote analytical focus

19 Laws against foreign funding of political organisations are also present in countries like the US, initiated by the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).
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on “the power inherent in the representation” of the EU as a “normative power”. The EU’s benign objectives and accumulation of power appears in a double narrative, both as a “force for good” and requiring asymmetrical bilateral relations to ensure the EU’s leadership position (Nitoiu, 2011: 470; Haukkala, 2010: 162).

**EU policies: European integration and liberal democratic norms**

To a great extent the EU rejects a pluralist conception of “Europe”. This inhibits its ability to consider Russian arguments. Diez (1999) and Malcolm (1995) argue that while “Europe” is a contested concept and not a neutral reality, the EU has nevertheless introduced a fixed understanding of what Europe is. By referring to “Europe”, Emerson (2001) argues that “the EU has in its own possessive way given this all-embracing name to the debate about the future of just the EU, which is indeed suggestive of the present EU mind-set”. De Wilde (2007: 8) argues that EU-centrism is also pervasive in academia, where the EU “has monopolised and narrowed-down the horizon of the integration discourse to merely one end-game: a new pan-European state”. Equating the EU to Europe “does no justice” to countries like Russia that are also part of Europe as “integration becomes a state formation process in which the EU wants to do it all by itself” (De Wilde, 2007: 2, 8). While the UK tends to contest the fixed meaning of “Europe” as a federal project where power is centralised, Russia similarly opposes the concept of “Europe” as a centralisation of power in an exclusive bloc system that de-couples Russia from its neighbours. Since the EU to a great extent monopolises the concept of “European integration”, it can use powerful emotional rhetoric to delegitimise and shame alternative interpretations of the concept as a rejection of European integration itself.

Prescribing “European integration” as a tool and solution for European conflicts enables the EU to limit political pluralism by introducing “Euro-speak”, emotional rhetoric linked to a fixed understanding of Europe (Diez, 1999; Malcolm, 1995). Centralising decision-making and power in Brussels is typically referred to as “European integration”, “more Europe”, or “ever-closer Union”. Non-member states at the periphery adhering to EU’s external governance are confirming their “European
perspective”, making the “European choice”, and committing to “shared values”. Political opposition towards this conceptualisation of European integration is denounced as “populism”, “nationalism”, “Euro-phobia” and “anti-Europeanism”, which undermines the “common voice”, “solidarity” and the “European dream”. Schimmelfennig (2003: 208) posits that “in a community environment, politics is a struggle over legitimacy, and this struggle is fought out with rhetorical arguments”. This implies “rhetorical entrapment”, when an actor is pressed to interpret events in a certain established framework and as a result is not able to formulate a strategy to arrive at the desired outcome (Schimmelfennig, 2001).

The EU’s discourse on European integration tends to be limited to the first stage of the EU project that promoted the open borders, single market and commitment to liberal democratic norms that undeniably made the EU a pole of attraction. The identity deriving from the concept of “Normative Power Europe” resulted from conditioning EU accession on democratic reforms, which greatly harmonised the EU’s own image of being both a dominant and benign power. However, in retrospect, Manners (2006b: 168) recognised that his essay on Normative Power Europe was written in a “different era” to conceptualise what was good about the EU, and what “the EU should be (doing) in World politics” at the turn of the century. The second stage of the EU project is less debated. It introduces more power interests with the objective of centralising decision-making and power in Brussels, however transferring competencies to Brussels from both member states and neighbouring states through external governance has been pursued with neither much open debate nor consent. Critique of the centralisation of power in Brussels as the second stage is simply rebutted by defending the openness and democratisation achieved at the first stage.

Haukkala (2009) proposes that the legitimacy and authority of the CSDP has been enhanced by linking it to prospective EU enlargement and the defence of liberal democratic norms, so that the EU is framed as passively responding to the invitation by the peoples of Europe. While the early documents made a distinction between the “EU” and “Europe” (European Commission, 2003c), the later European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) document made no distinction between “EU policy” and “Europe’s policy” (European Commission, 2004a). The early “Wider Europe”
document indicated that enlargement meant that the EU was “drawing closer” to its new Eastern neighbours (European Commission, 2003c), while the later ENP document proposes that neighbours are “drawn closer to the EU as a result of enlargement” (European Commission, 2004a). The EU does not refer to pursuing its own interests, but rather stipulates it “has a duty” and responsibility to “its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism” (European Commission, 2003c). The EU must therefore “respond” to the aspirations of its neighbouring states seeking to exercise their “sovereign right” to pursue “European integration” and “democratisation”.

**Russian “zero-sum mentality”: dismissing observable indicators as perceptions**

The EU depicts Russian concerns about unilateral security institutions to be a misperception and evidence of Russia’s “zero-sum mentality”. Russian inability to recognise the EU as a positive-sum actor prevents Russia from transcending *Realpolitik*. Lo (2002: 114), for instance, suggests that relations with the West have been adversely impacted by the “zero-sum mentality and balance-of-power calculations” of the Russian political class. Considering Russia’s call for managing and mitigating zero-sum politics implies first accepting Russia’s perspectives, which challenge the fundamental assumption about the EU’s ability to transcend power competition. The key challenge for the EU is not giving into Russia’s misperceptions but rather convincing Russia that EU intentions are benign. Ferrero-Waldner asserted that “our challenge now is to try to reverse Russia’s drift to a bloc mentality” and overcome Russia’s “zero-sum attitude” (Lobjakas, 2005).

Denouncing Russian concerns that EU moves are zero-sum in their orientation as misperceptions implies that objective and observable zero-sum indicators are being neglected. To some degree, zero-sum policies can be verified in exclusive institutions, for example, when the EU’s integration initiatives prevent states from joining Russian-led integration initiatives, require states to end the free movement of people and free trade, and nullify existing legal treaties with Russia. Similarly, CSDP missions can be considered zero-sum when pursuing objectives that undermine
decisions made collectively with Russia in the UN. However, zero-sum is defined in terms of intentions and mentality, allowing the EU to assert that “by its very nature, the EU plays no zero-sum game” (European Commission, 2013a) and that it has “no zero-sum calculations” since Russia is intended to benefit (European Commission, 2013b). The European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy suggests that the ENP is not a zero-sum initiative since it is not intended or designed to weaken Russia’s influence (Lobjakas, 2005), though the EU recognises that Russian influence in its near abroad did contract as a result of its neighbours joining the ENP “and dream of EU Membership” (European Commission, 2007b). Stefan Füle, the EU commissioner for European enlargement and neighbourhood policy, contrasted zero-sum policies with unintentional legal constraints:

It is true that the Customs Union membership is not compatible with the DCFTAs which we have negotiated with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. This is not because of ideological differences; this is not about a clash of economic blocs, or a zero-sum game. This is due to legal impossibilities: for instance, you cannot at the same time lower your customs tariffs as per the DCFTA and increase them as a result of the Customs Union membership (European Commission, 2013c).

Zero-sum policies are also dismissed by the positive-sum game of European integration and democratisation. Serbia signing the Association Agreement was hailed as the right choice “between a European future and the nationalism of the past”, which reduced the danger of Serbia looking “towards Moscow rather than towards Brussels” (European Commission, 2008i).
Comparing Russian power with European integration and democracy

The EU tends to portray all relations with Russia through a binary lens of post-modern versus a 19th century power, West versus East, democratic against authoritarian (Klinke, 2012), which serves the purpose of recasting the Cold War divide where ‘our’ identity is shaped to a great extent by our opposition to Russia as a competing power. There is therefore little, if any, conceptual basis for comparing the EU and Russia as competing security providers and poles of integration. As an EU official unequivocally asserted: “Russia is not really considered a security provider in the Balkans, the EU however clearly is one” (Author interview, 2011a). The argument is frequently made that the EU and Russia are two fundamentally different actors in international relations (Freire, 2009, p. 73). Whereas the EU considers itself a security community prioritising predictability through consensus building (Wæver, 1998), Russia is perceived to favour state-centric high politics and remains dependent on military power for influence (Allison, 2006, p. 76). Rehn, the EU Commissioner for enlargement, explained their different nature as the source of tensions:

Russia is also trying to build a modern nation-state which relies on hard power. By contrast, the EU is a post-modern entity which wields a vast soft power of attractiveness, but which lacks strong sanctioning mechanisms. No wonder it is often hard to find common language (European Commission, 2008g).

In the post-Soviet space there is not much conceptual comparison of neighbourhood policies in terms of the EU’s ENP or EaP and Russia’s Near Abroad Policy. While the EU offers favourable trade agreements as a tool for creating “a ‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” (European Commission, 2003c: 4), it is not comparable to the Russian offer of an energy discount as a favourable trade agreement to its Near Abroad for a similar purpose. This lack of comparison has been exacerbated by assigning underlying assumptions to the different terminologies used. Conceptual similarities were previously implied by scholars who used the terminology “Near Abroad” to describe the EU’s neighbourhood policies prior to the development and articulation of the
“European neighbourhood policy” (Wæver, 1997; Christiansen, Petito, and Tonra, 2000; Emerson, 2001). However, EU documents tend to critically refer to the Russian concept of “Near Abroad” in quotation marks and equate this terminology to a sphere of influence (European Commission, 2009c: 134-137). The concepts of Near Abroad, sphere of interests and sphere of influence are bundled together, while suggesting in Cold War terminology that Russia’s “doctrine of ‘the near abroad’ harks back to the sphere of interest policy of the past” (European Commission, 2008f).

It is common to equate Russia’s self-proclaimed great power identity with zero-sum politics at the expense of liberal democratic norms. Russia’s normative arguments correlating with its power interests are rarely addressed. Rather, they are dismissed as insincere since they correlate with power interests. Popescu (2006) has critically warned against the deceptive nature of Russia’s increasing normative rhetoric of “freedom” and “democracy”, as Russia has learned to speak “the language of Western norms and is very flexible, but has very little to do with the values of democracy”. Ferrero-Waldner more cautiously asserted that “we have witnessed the emergence of a more assertive and generally also well-articulated Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the new independent states” (Lobjakas, 2005).

Recognition of the perceived Baltic-precedent is largely absent from the EU discourse. While Russia frames its concerns chiefly in normative terms of democratic and human rights violations, this has been interpreted as Russia bullying the Baltic States due to an imperial mentality. The EU, on the other hand, applies the principles of sovereignty, unity and solidarity with the Baltic States. At the EU-Russia Samara Summit following the Bronze statue incident, the EU supported the “sovereign” decision of the Estonian government and claimed that support for Estonia was based

20 It was also previously common for colonies to adopt the rhetoric of freedom against their colonial masters.
on principles of “solidarity”, and deemed Estonia’s internal problems to be the problem of “Europe”.

In Moldova, Russian normative concerns rarely enter the EU discourse and Russian influence is instead framed as support for a criminal regime in Transnistria. This is contrasted with EU policies of support for European integration, democratisation, unification, and the fight against organised crime (European Commission, 2005a). Labelling the region “the black hole of Europe” demonstrates a desire to conceptualise the region through a normative frame, where alleged crimes become the point of departure in all policy debates (Bobick, 2011: 242). Bobick (2011: 243) suggests that the general unfamiliarity with Transnistria has made it an entity easy to demonise. While Transnistria undoubtedly has a clear deficit of liberal democratic credentials, criminalising it and its Russian support neglects valid normative concerns. For example, this focus neglects the discrimination that occurred during the period of “de-Russification” which initially sparked the conflict, the ability of Moldova to remain neutral and not cede sovereignty by merging with Romania or joining NATO, or by not allowing Euro-Atlantic integration to be equated to severing relations with Russia. Irrespective of an apparent democratic deficit, more than 90% of the population in Transnistria voted for independence from Moldova in a 2006 referendum, and favoured the possibility of joining a union with Russia.

In Georgia, EU members do recognise Russian concerns regarding Western support for a government that seeks a Euro-Atlantic future and NATO membership, but there is not much recognition for the accompanying anti-Russian posture. While Russian fears are recognised, this recognition is not translated into empathy as these fears are considered to be based on the loss of an unwarranted Russian “sphere of influence”. The EU again frames its policies as support for democratisation, the “European perspective”, and confirming a commitment to Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Berg and Mölder, 2012). Russian normative arguments for human

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21 The “Bronze statue incident” is a reference to riots and disputes that broke out as a result of the removal of a memorial for the Soviet soldiers that died in Estonia during the Second World War.
rights and representation of the Russia-friendly South Ossetia and Abkhazia are rarely if ever considered since they correlate with Russian power and security interests. From the onset, the Rose Revolution was labelled a “democratic revolution”, despite Saakashvili running unopposed and winning over 96% of the votes. In the following years, the EU neglected the Georgian opposition’s warnings against severing ties with Russia and its critique of the EU for turning a blind eye to Saakashvili’s crackdown on political opposition and human rights abuses (Youngs, 2009: 897).

In Bosnia the EU views Russian concerns over the deconstruction of Republika Srpska (RS) as chiefly, if not solely, Moscow playing regional nationalist games and causing division in order to preserve regional influence. The EU discourse on conflict resolution propagates European integration and common norms such as preserving territorial integrity, opposing destructive nationalism, and supporting reconciliation by holding war criminals to account. While EU discussions frequently address the necessity to return sovereignty and democracy by closing the OHR, this is not recognised as a key normative position by Russia. Similarly, there is little recognition of Russian concerns regarding the selective application of norms and the way the selective condemnation of war crimes prevents reconciliation and stability.

In Serbia, Russia expresses security concerns in normative terms regarding the territorial integrity of Serbia, the human rights of Serbs in Northern Kosovo, and Western support for war criminals and fundamentalists in Pristina. However, Russia’s normative arguments largely do not enter the EU discourse since these arguments are aligned with power interests, which are depicted as destructive power politics which contradict European integration and liberal democratic norms. The dominant normative framework of the EU advocates “self-determination” in support of secession for Kosovo, and dismisses any debate on the partition of Northern Kosovo by supporting the development of a “multi-ethnic society” (European Commission, 2005b). Meanwhile the Serbs in Northern Kosovo are often dismissed as criminal groups since they develop parallel institutions to obstruct integration with Pristina (European Parliament, 2009).
On energy security, there is more critical debate on common and conflicting interests. Ferrero-Waldner argued “there’s much talk about our energy dependence on Russia, but it’s more accurate to talk of energy interdependence” (European Commission, 2009b). However, energy security is conceptualised mainly as weakening Russia’s position. Diversifying energy supply to enhance security is defined solely as diversifying away from Russia as a supplier, while Russian diversification away from transit countries is feared to strengthen Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe. The EU recognises the economic significance of energy for Russia as “energy products represent over 60% of Russia’s overall exports to the EU”, though Russia’s defence of its position or extraction of political power and influence from energy is not deemed legitimate (European Commission, 2007b). Some exceptions exist, however. Finnish Prime Minister Lipponen implied in 2000 that the West elevates the political significance of energy for Moscow by ignoring Russia when oil prices were low. Only when prices were high could it be observed that “people picked up the phone and talk about co-operation” (Browning, 2003: 60).

5.2.4. EU recognition of Russian policy motivations

The EU does not consider the possibility that Russian “obstructionism” in the common neighbourhood is directly in response to the unwillingness to share power in Europe and accept multipolarity. The concepts of unilateralism and multilateralism are defined differently from Russia’s conceptualists. As a “force for good” and representative of Europe, there is little conceptual space for considering the EU as a unilateral actor. Instead, Russian obstruction of the EU’s initiatives is perceived as unilateralism. Since Russia’s “uncooperative” stance towards unilateral CSDP approaches is perceived to be caused by unwarranted power ambitions, Russian policies are deemed to prevent rather than encourage multilateral approaches.

Russia’s reluctance to withdraw from Moldova and Georgia according to commitments made in 1999 was portrayed as a claim for a “sphere of influence” (European Commission, 2008c). The Russian intervention in Georgia was also
depicted as a continuation of a Russian policy of re-establishing “spheres of influence” (European Commission, 2008b: 2008c; 2008c). This label evades addressing the alterations in the European security architecture since 1999 and subsequent lack of common security institutions. In both Moldova and Georgia, the high priority of not antagonising Russia results in political initiatives that are depoliticised and avoid confrontation. However, easing pressure on Russia does not result from recognising legitimate Russian security concerns, but rather from concerns over a possible confrontation with Russia. In the Balkans, Russia is considered an “obstructionist” that uses Kosovo and Bosnia as tools for exerting influence in pursuit of “great-power status” and for pragmatic purposes like taking control of the energy infrastructure in Serbia. EU Commissioner Olli Rehn condemned Russia’s opposition to a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo as a Russian “threat of a unilateral veto”, which constitutes “selfish unilateralism” (B92, 2007). Ker-Lindsay (2011) suggests decision-makers either misunderstood Russia’s position, or deliberately ignored the warning signs: “Indeed, even after Putin’s tough warning over Kosovo in early 2007, there still appeared to be a general belief that Russia would not block the process”.

The narrative of Russia’s “energy weapon” has demonised Russian energy as a source of influence. It posits that after the pro-Western and democratic government came to power in Ukraine in 2004, Russia responded by cutting gas as a punishment aimed at maintaining its sphere of influence. This narrative neglects that it was the anti-Russian component of the Yushchenko government that Russia expressed concerns about rather than a pro-democratic or pro-Western stance, and that Russia responded by revoking Soviet-era energy subsidies rather than cutting the gas.22 The cut of gas supplies to Ukraine became the consequence of a trade dispute resulting from this event, as Ukraine refused to pay the significantly higher market prices and instead began siphoning gas from transit pipelines heading west. The EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson (2007) recognised the mutual fear and discontent

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22 Russia does not acknowledge the link as a punishment, though few analysts dispute it.
between the EU and Russia as “each suspects the other of double standards. Both believe the other is using the energy weapon as an instrument of politics. Neither thinks they enjoy the respect and goodwill from the other they are entitled to expect.” However, this recognition is not extended to the CFSP, as is evident from the castigating of Russian offers of energy rebates to friendly neighbours as an “energy-weapon” or “energy-blackmail”.

Russia’s offer of energy subsidies to Moldova and Ukraine in return for not implementing the EU’s external governance, especially the Third Energy Package, has been portrayed as Russia employing the energy weapon. EU Commissioner for Energy Günther Oettinger referred to Russian energy discounts as “pure blackmail” and urged the EU to take “a strong common approach” against Russia. In an irony seemingly lost on Oettinger, he threatened to isolate Moldova: “It is clear that whoever leaves the Energy Community indirectly leaves the partnership with the EU. It becomes the next Belarus” (Keating, 2012). The narrative of Russian “blackmail” to coerce a sphere of influence also applies to other issues, such as the Ukrainian suspension of the proposed Association Agreement in November 2013. The EU did not consider Russian pressure on Ukraine to be a balance of a zero-sum initiative. Instead, Chancellor Merkel suggested that Russia obstructed European integration due to a zero-sum “Cold War mentality” (Pop, 2013). The EU condemned Russia for “blackmail” and at the same time threatened Ukraine with bankruptcy by using its powers in the IMF to block aid (Rettman, 2013b).

Ideationally, Russia’s efforts to defend its Second World War legacy from being criminalised by the EU’s political class have been portrayed as a “glorification of Stalin” caused by nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Consequently, the EU has “demand[ed] that the authorities of the Russian Federation prohibit the glorification of Stalin” (European Parliament, 2005a). In an open letter to Obama, Central and Eastern European leaders portrayed Russia as a revisionist power for challenging “our claims to our own historical experiences” (Adamkus et.al., 2009).

Since the EU and Russia are considered to be completely different actors, there are difficulties in conceptualising and discussing defensively motivated policies as
legitimate. The EU recognises that the Orange Revolution possibly increased Russia’s motivation for institutionalising Russian influence in the post-Soviet space with the Russia-Belarus Union State, the Single Economic Space and the Customs Union (European Commission, 2007b). It also recognised that “the Kremlin is also getting into the game of ‘creating’ NGOs to counter the influence of Western-funded organisations” (European Commission, 2007b). However, these reactions have been considered the result of misperceptions by Russia, to which any alteration of EU policies would implicitly tantamount to appeasement of liberal democratic norms and abandonment of the “European perspective” held by states in the common neighbourhood. Since the Orange Revolution was depicted as a democratic revolution, the Russian response has been seen as aimed at defending its “sphere of influence” at the peril of democracy (European Commission, 2007b).

It is also recognised that Moscow’s disapproval of civil society is principally directed towards INGOs or foreign-funded domestic NGOs:

Experience has shown that civil society projects focussed on issues of everyday concern, in cooperation with regional government – for example in the interest of improvements in community services – tend to have the highest impact both in terms of improving services, and in involving local people in the democratic process. Efforts will need to be made, however, to reverse the tendency for a disproportionate amount of funding to be awarded to foreign as opposed to Russian civil society organisations (European Commission, 2007b).

The reason is for these experiences are, however, not considered in terms of Russian arguments challenging the non-governmental status of international NGOs that are aligned with the geopolitical objectives of foreign governments. The EU does not address Russian calls for distinguishing between civil society and NGOs, with the democratic deficit of the latter deemed to be especially significant in a divided Europe. Instead, Russia’s restrictions on NGOs are given a blanket condemnation and framed as an assault on civil society and democracy that constitutes a departure from “common values” and further drift towards authoritarianism.
5.2.5. Conclusion

It is argued that the EU discourse demonstrates a diminished ability to reason dispassionately about political and military matters. Emotional rhetoric linked to a fixed and uncompromising understanding of Europe severely limits the scope of analysis and discussion. Decision-makers are either unable to recognise alternative perspectives of “Europe” to understand Russian concerns or find it not politically expedient to do so since conformity to the established narrative is required to retain political and professional credibility. The EU is to some extent a paradox as an institution, embracing liberal democratic norms such as openness and transparency while also demonstrating illiberal traits, as the accompanying emotional rhetoric supporting these norms reduces political and moral plurality in the discourse. Debating the possibility of competing integration efforts and security initiatives becomes an almost impossible undertaking when two polarised and incompatible political identities are the point of departure in discussions.

Russia fears that the exclusive structures of the EU encourage the promotion of a zero-sum bloc-based Europe in which the common neighbourhood is compelled to choose between the EU and Russia. Such a system requires a unilateral approach and pressure at the expense of international law, and becomes more coercive with the CSDP. Russia has responded by balancing unilateralism and promoting multilateralism but the EU has a reduced ability and/or intention to consider these security concerns and responses. Disputes with Russia are portrayed almost exclusively as the EU’s “European integration” and “democratisation” conflicting with Russian “spheres of influence”. These contested concepts are not debated in terms of their underlying assumptions about power competition, but rather have the effect of forcing consent for EU policies as the prospect of compromise with Russia becomes equated to a betrayal of fundamental ideals. The EU makes the argument that even unilateral initiatives towards the common neighbourhood provide stability and prosperity and that this will eventually also be in the interest of Russia.

There are rational reasons to be critical of how Russia pursues its security interests in the common neighbourhood. Russia is a powerful state with a democratic
deficit surrounded by weak states that have, through history, had their sovereignty encroached on by Russia. The sovereignty of the post-Soviet states is potentially undermined by Russia’s claims to be the defender of millions of Russians now outside Russian borders. Conversely, the EU’s behaviour in the Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia raises concerns about its willingness to accommodate the security concerns of Russian-leaning populations. To do so implies accommodating Russia, which to some extent contradicts the “European perspective”. The EU does not discuss these issues in an open and coherent manner. It does not make it clear if there can be any legitimate Russian influence or integration effort in the political, economic, ideational, and security spheres that are not equated to imperial ambitions, and there is no deliberation over the possibility that the EU may undermine these integration efforts. The EU’s normative arguments are consistently contrasted with Russian power interests. Dismissing Russian concerns about zero-sum structures as an issue of perceptions and a “Cold War mentality” lacks a clear rationale since there are some objective indicators of zero-sum policies that can be debated. Consequently, there is a very narrow framework for interpreting the recovery of Europe’s largest state as a “normal great power” with a foreign policy and integration initiatives independent of the EU, due to the peripheral role it has been assigned as a reluctant adopter of norms due to “authoritarianism” and “great-power ambitions”.

5. Case Study I: CSDP and Russia
5. Case Study I: CSDP and Russia

5.3. Institutional inclusion

Institutional inclusion of Russia in the CSDP is defined as empowering Russia with a voice opportunity to influence conflict resolution in Europe. Inclusion can mitigate the security dilemma by alleviating fears that the EU may exploit its position as a peacekeeper and peacemaker to advance zero-sum interests and exclusive influence in Europe. A role for Russia supports the development of a common approach to conflicts and reduces the prospect of Russia pursuing opposing security initiatives.

The extent of institutional inclusion is assessed by exploring the extent to which the EU reaches out in the planning, decision-making, and implementation stages. First, institutional inclusion in the planning stage implies establishing a common concept of European security, and developing a common path towards security through multilateral institutions. Second, inclusion in decision-making is a reference to participating in meetings where decisions are made and for the EU to consider Russian proposals. Third, accommodating Russia in implementation refers to the extent conflict management missions can be carried out collectively in a multilateral treaty based framework.

The EU offers Russia a voice opportunity by facilitating common institutions, though not an effective voice opportunity since these institutions are not designed to empower Russia with influence on European conflict resolution. The EU attempts to increase its influence on Russian decision-making, but adamantly rejects any Russian influence that could limit its own autonomy. Inclusion does not entail mutual compromise to enhance common security, but instead to encourage unilateral adjustments by Russia in order to align itself with the EU. There are no attempts to develop a common concept of European security, which has resulted in opposing concepts. The EU seeks to include Russia to the extent it strengthens the EU-centric format of “concentric circles”, which consigns Russia to the role of a peripheral object. Russia seeks inclusion to constrain EU-centrism by facilitating “multipolar regionalism”, which recognises Russia as a pillar of European integration and a legitimate security actor. Parallel and competing multilateral and bilateral institutions
to facilitate cooperation are established. Bilateralism is favoured when competing objectives exist, which renders the multilateral formats superficial, temporary and incompetent. Inclusion in decision-making is characterised by increasingly frequent high-level meetings due to a mutual recognition that cooperation is required to resolve European conflicts. However, Russian proposals focusing on mutual recognition of interests in order to harmonise integration and security initiatives are categorically rejected. Common decisions are consistently obstructed as both the EU and Russia consider the other to be promoting “spheres of influence”, both being correct due to two mutually exclusive definitions of the concept. In terms of implementing CSDP missions, ad-hoc agreements allow for Russia to contribute under EU command with the explicit understanding that these agreements do not set a precedent and are not intended to constrain the EU’s autonomy.

5.3.1. Planning

Conceptualising security and strategy

A Russian voice opportunity at the conceptual stage of policy-making has largely been absent, culminating in two very different and conflicting concepts of European security. This creates contrasting expectations regarding what a Russian role in Europe entails and what voice opportunity should be designed to achieve. The EU has never clearly articulated a vision for a legitimate independent role for Russia in Europe, understood as influence beyond its borders in the service of Russian security interests. Russia is considered a peripheral object of European security that should bandwagon behind the EU, which is portrayed to pursue a positive-sum approach to European security. The Russian concept of European security envisions decentralising and constraining power. Russia is critical of empowering exclusive EU-centric structures that advance zero-sum bloc politics that inevitably instigate competing security interests. From this perspective, institutional inclusion should serve the purpose of constraining zero-sum approaches in the current system and harmonising competing security interests and integration initiatives.
The EU concept of European security and the purpose of a Russian voice opportunity

The EU’s concept of Europe is illustrated with its “concentric circles” model in which different layers of circles signify to what extent European countries have adopted liberal democratic norms and integrated into EU structures. The EU defines the concept of concentric circles as “a Europe made up of subsets of states which have achieved different levels of integration” (European Union, 2009). The new periphery after enlargement includes conflict regions in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, where security and integration have especially become interlinked. Wæver (2000) proposes that the primary objective of the EU is to keep its “core intact, ensuring there is one centre rather than several”, and secondly to ensure that the EU has the attractiveness to pull the periphery towards the core. The feasibility of the “concentric circles” concept is dependent on power and asymmetrical relations since the EU’s power fades the further it drifts from the core (Wæver, 1997: 66-68). Kaveshnikov (2003) suggests that “Russia - situated far from the ‘core’, outside the dividing lines, be they geographical, functional or imaginary - could not be integrated into a ‘Big Europe’ following the logic of ‘concentric circles’.” The EU’s External Relations Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner suggested: “Russia is a European country, but it’s a huge European country. And therefore, I don't think that Russia would be a member in the European Union one day” (RFERL, 2009).

The EU-centric concentric circles concept is not conceptualised as a pole of power, but a post-modern and post-sovereign community of common norms and laws. This community is expected to stabilise the conflict regions and the neighbours beyond the region. To employ liberal terminology, the EU continues to expand the Kantian zone of peace by integrating the states located at different circular layers. Russian security will also benefit from the Europeanisation of conflict resolution, as the EU perceives itself as a benevolent power and a “force for good” by providing material goods and security to Russia. Russia and other states at the periphery are to be drawn in and incorporated into an EU regime of external governance that addresses
common security concerns. It is within this format of concentric circles where a voice opportunity is offered to Russia. The concentric model implicitly presents Russia with the opportunity of either being an apprentice of the EU as a “force for good” or pursuing belligerent power interests by opposing EU leadership.

The EU’s early concept of security and the role of Russia were outlined in the “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia” (CSR) of 1999, which emphasised the importance of democracy and multilateralism in European security. However, the CSR was produced unilaterally without input by Russia, and constitutes an EU policy on Russia rather than a framework for EU-Russia relations (Haukkala, 2010). The CSR portrays Russia as an external object, reflecting the internal difficulties Russia faced in the 1990s. The CSR document is devoid of a joint framework for cooperation that also addresses Russian security interests, and portrays European integration almost exclusively as an EU project. The CSR has been referred to as “at once condescending and vapid” and the list of actions to be fulfilled by Russia “quite dizzying” (Lynch, 2003: 57). Democracy has fixed and universal characteristics with specific norms being transferrable from the EU to Russia. The EU depicts itself as having the responsibility to socialise Russia towards these norms by establishing standards, monitoring advancement, rewarding progress and punishing regression. Democratisation and integration is outlined as a single-process, inferring that integration between the EU and Russia depends upon Russia’s ability to abide by liberal democratic standards and other criteria decided by the EU. The EU rejects the development of shared and equal institutions with Russia to monitor common standards on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as the EU considers it a policy area within the jurisdiction of the member states (Zagorski, 2011b).

The Russian concept of European security and the purpose of a voice opportunity

The Russian concept of European security can be defined as “multipolar regionalism”, illustrated by great powers cooperating and harmonising both common and competing integration efforts and conflict resolution initiatives. Contrasting this vision of Europe with the EU’s concentric circles, it has also been illustrated as interdependent
“Olympic rings” (Medvedev, 2000). Similar to the EU’s call for a ring of friendly states, Russia stipulates in its Near Abroad Policy that Russia has privileged interests in the post-Soviet space that must be taken into account since security will be undermined if the common history, culture and human networks across the former Soviet space are neglected. Russia prioritises integration with its immediate neighbours in the post-Soviet space, and to a lesser extent, the former Yugoslav republics. The concentric circles concept is considered to be devoid of recognition for Russia as a pole of integration, and is a format for competition rather than harmonising integration efforts and subsequent security initiatives.

Instead of only employing its voice opportunity to find a place within the EU’s concentric circles, Russia seeks to change the “rule trajectory” by challenging the EU’s monopoly on conflict resolution and integration. A voice opportunity is sought to promote multilateralism, understood as harmonising de-centralised concentric circles by coordinating initiatives for conflict resolutions and integration efforts towards the common neighbourhood. Prozorov (2006: 43) defines “hierarchical inclusion” as a voice opportunity confined within the framework of participating and supporting EU interests and strategies. Russia instead seeks recognition as an independent actor with legitimate interests that do not always coincide with the EU (Prozorov, 2007). Chizhov (2012a) requests a cooperative framework that recognises that “Russia and the EU are not only partners, but also competitors”.

Harmonising integration entails preventing the “Europeanisation” of conflict resolution from de-coupling Russia from its neighbourhood. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (2008a) asked: “Why should a united Europe be built from a single center and not at several sites at once?” Moscow asserts that failure to harmonise integration efforts will “preserve the dividing line in Europe and move it ever closer to the Russian border” (Lavrov, 2008a). Russia opposes the notion that the EU should “assume the full responsibility and claim a monopoly in safeguarding security in Europe” as “Russia has a full right and expects to participate in European affairs as an equal partner” (Chizhov, 2004b). This role of Russia as an “equal among equals” is incompatible with Russia “constituting an object of ‘civilizational influence’ on the part of other states” (Chizhov, 2004b). Chizhov (2012b) later denounced EU attempts
to impose an “artificial dilemma” on the neighbourhood, arguing that “the very logic of such approach – ‘either towards the EU or towards Russia’ already bears the risk of creating new dividing lines.” Lavrov applied the same logic by suggesting that “We don’t see any conflict in the aspiration for closer integration with Europe and simultaneous integration with former Soviet republics. Contradiction here is nothing but artificial” (Denisov, 2011) Putin (2011) also argues that the result of this EU approach is that:

[S]ome of our neighbours explain their lack of interest in joining forward-looking integration projects in the post-Soviet space by saying that these projects contradict their pro-European stance. I believe that this is a false antithesis. We do not intend to cut ourselves off, nor do we plan to stand in opposition to anyone.

The concept of multilateralism is perceived to have been corrupted and a voice opportunity is sought to remedy this conceptual flaw:

[I]t is highly symptomatic that current differences with Russia are interpreted by many in the West as a need to simply bring Russia’s policies closer into line with those of the West. But we do not want to be ‘embraced’ in this way. We need to look for common solutions (Medvedev, 2008a).

Lavrov (2007b) posits that “the notion of ‘freedom of speech’, for example, which we apply to internal developments in every country, is necessary on the international scene as well.” In order to re-conceptualise what “Europe” means, Lavrov (2010) asserts:

It is necessary to analyse ‘family affairs’ in Europe, and reassess a lot of things, though not in terms of the euphoria and triumphalism of the early 90s, but on the basis of sober analysis of the real consequences of what occurred in the past twenty years.

Russia has responded to the unilateral CSR by devising its own “Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the
European Union 2000-2010” (MTS). The MTS confirms that Russia shares the objectives of democracy and multilateralism, yet is critical of the EU’s approach and portrays the CSR as unilateral and exclusive (Russian Federation, 1999). The MTS depicts Russia as the central gravitational force for integration in the former Soviet space, and that cooperation must have a basis in recognising Russia’s position as an independent and equal actor with its own foreign policy. Russia-EU integration and development of good governance is promoted as a dual process, since its democratic deficit should not become instrumental in the EU’s attempt to develop an asymmetrical and hierarchical relationship. Russia claims to develop “a democratic state based on the rule of law” without impeding the symmetry required to “establishing a reliable pan-European system of collective security” (Russian Federation, 1999).

Parallel bilateral and multilateral arrangements

The EU establishes parallel bilateral and multilateral institutions, while favouring the former to maximise autonomy. Bilateral formats increase the EU’s ability to “manage” its neighbouring states by increasing asymmetrical dependency and by addressing the unique challenges of individual neighbouring states. Multilateral formats organise relations between the states in the neighbourhood and prevent the emergence of competing formats. Bilateral and multilateral formats can range from being mutually complementary to contradictory. The EU envisions bilateralism as a step towards “effective multilateralism” (Gratius, 2010). However, there is little evidence or incentive for the EU to develop multilateral approaches with Russia as bilateral formats are perceived as more “effective” in terms of achieving EU objectives. Tassinari (2005) and Vahl (2005: 57) critically portray EU bilateralism as camouflaged unilateralism. The EU’s approach towards Russia and the common neighbourhood is mostly facilitated by bilateral arrangements like the ENP in the former Soviet space and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in the Western Balkans. The EU also uses EU-led multilateral arrangements such as the Northern Dimension and Black Sea Synergy (BSS) that are inclusive of Russia, and
the EaP which excludes Russia. Support for regionalism and multilateralism beyond EU-led institutions is largely absent and to some extent undermined. The most promising joint EU-Russian approach towards the common neighbourhood has so far been the “Common Spaces” agreement, though it is frequently undermined by parallel institutions and agreements.

**The Northern Dimension: a multilateral approach with Russia an object of security**

The Northern Dimension was the first multilateral security project where Russia was represented as an equal partner. The institution addressed soft security projects in the Baltic region such as borders, nuclear facilities security, health security, and environmental security, without zero-sum gain issues. The success of the Northern Dimension was to incorporate Russia as a full participant, while its limitation was to not elevate Russia beyond being an object of security. Browning (2003: 57) notes that Russia was still treated as a “problem to be solved” and the initiative was designed to develop Russia. The Northern Dimension, despite its successes, did not therefore have the foundation for evolution into a broader pan-European security system.

**The conflict between the ENP and the Common Spaces**

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed during the enlargement process with the stated purpose of “prevent[ing] the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours” (European Commission, 2004a). However, the ENP takes on a bilateral framework and deals with its neighbours as objects of security. Relations between the EU and its individual neighbouring states are institutionalised with Action Plans for the purpose of promoting “a ring of well governed countries” along the EU periphery (European Commission, 2004a). Karen Smith (2005b: 360) suggests that “bilateralism is clearly predominant over regionalism” in order to achieve the primary purpose of developing good neighbours that conform to EU standards and laws. This bilateral format maximises the EU’s autonomy and influence by centralising security planning in Brussels. Instead of
harmonising with Russian integration efforts and security initiatives, Russia is provided with the opportunity to bandwagon behind EU initiatives. Russia was invited to join, but rejected participation in the ENP format due to this bilateral format.

Moscow considered the ENP an unacceptable construct as Russia was not “just not another neighbour”, but also a pillar of integration with its own relations to these states that should not be dictated by Brussels. Russia suggested that the bilateral format produced rather than prevented new dividing lines, by undermining the required “collective efforts by all countries of the region” in favour of the EU imposing its dictates on the “underdeveloped peripheral states” (Chizhov, 2004c). The ENP was dismissed as a pre-established format based on the notion that there is only one pole of integration in Europe. Chizhov (2004c) implied that the ENP was a gravitational tool to draw states closer to Brussels and undermine regionalism in the former Soviet space, subsequently isolating Russia in Europe. Browning and Joenniemi (2008: 521, 534) use stronger wording by suggesting that the “ENP appears to be supporting an imperial geopolitical model” with “hierarchical structures that may undermine the possibilities for decentralising governance”. Russia’s refusal to participate in the ENP can be considered an attempt to alter the “rule trajectory”. This was successful to some extent, as the EU responded by indicating that it would increase Russian voice opportunity by proclaiming a strategic partnership and establishing the EU-Russia Common Spaces as an alternative to the ENP.

The Common Spaces adopted in 2005 was an achievement in terms of expressing a common ambition to develop a framework for dealing with common “External Security”. The EU was eager to incorporate Russia in its initiatives, while Russia sought recognition as a security actor that would be treated as an equal. For the EU, the common neighbourhood meant predominantly, if not exclusively its eastern periphery. These was little desire to seek greater accommodation of Russia in the Balkans where the EU seeks continued leadership in what it considers its own “backyard”. For its part, Russia has been careful not to reduce its leadership role in the former Soviet space and subsequently opposed the terminology “common neighbourhood” in favour of “regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders” (Kremlin, 2005). The Common Spaces has a high degree of joint ownership, but has
not resulted in a legal framework of institutionalised cooperation (Van Elsuwege, 2012). Emerson (2005) suggests that the section of crisis management was “disappointing” due to the vagueness of “dialogue and cooperation” aimed at resolving the European conflicts, while Forsberg (2004) proposes that the document only proves that a chance for a real partnership was missed. However, Haukkala (2010) remarks the Common Spaces is significant in terms of displaying mutual will and recognition for the necessity to cooperate.

The Common Spaces was, however, also a failure because it did not develop into a common approach to the shared neighbourhood. This failure can be attributed to the different emphasis and interpretation of the following paragraph in the “Common Space of External Security”:

The EU and Russia recognise that processes of regional cooperation and integration in which they participate and which are based on the sovereign decisions of States, play an important role in strengthening security and stability. They agree to actively promote them in a mutually beneficial manner, through close result-oriented EU-Russia collaboration and dialogue, thereby contributing effectively to creating a greater Europe without dividing lines and based on common values (Kremlin, 2005).

The EU has focused on the first sentence, arguing that it implies that Russia must recognise and accept the sovereign right for states in the common neighbourhood to pursue their “European perspective”. Russian emphasis is on the second sentence, arguing that “regional cooperation and integration” in the common neighbourhood must be coordinated with Russia and consequently promoted “in a mutually beneficial manner” (Chizhov, 2012b). Hence, an irreconcilable dispute has become evident. Russia will not undermine the sovereign right of states to join institutions as long as the EU commits itself to multilateralism and ensures that these institutions do not advance zero-sum gains. The EU perceives even its unilateral initiatives to provide a positive-sum gain and believes that committing itself to multilateralism by harmonising integration efforts with Russia equates to giving Russia a “veto” and sphere of influence.
The BSS and Common Spaces versus the EaP

The EU established the Black Sea Synergy (BSS), a multilateral format for cooperation that includes Russia. However, a multilateral format already existed in the region. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is a regional institution set up in 1992 by Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, for political and economic cooperation. The EU was invited to join, but decided not participate. Instead of being just another member in BSEC, the EU established the BSS to facilitate cooperation between the BSEC and the EU, as an initiative to engage states on both a bilateral and multilateral level. The EU recognises that “the fact that Russia and Turkey are its founding members is a decisive advantage and could substantially contribute to the success of Black Sea Synergy” (European Commission, 2007a). A reference was made to involve Russia and Turkey as equal partners, “which could, at a later stage, develop into a Union of the Black Sea” (European Parliament, 2008b). Russia supports the BSEC “as the only full-fledged platform for cooperation in the Black Sea region” (Russian Federation, 2012a), though gave its cautious consent to the BSS as a means of developing BSEC-EU cooperation (Japaridze et.al., 2010: 14). Russia’s backing can be ascribed to support for a multilateral format with some mutual limitations on autonomy, though Russia remains suspicious of the EU’s intentions as it increases influence in a region where Russia and Turkey enjoy the leadership roles.

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) was introduced less than two years after the BSS and has several parallel and overlapping functions. The EaP is a Polish-Swedish initiated institution aiming to augment the role of the EU on its eastern periphery by developing a framework for deeper bilateralism and more multilateralism than the ENP (EaP, 2008). While the EaP initiative explicitly addresses “energy security” and introduces a multilateral format, Russia as the largest energy supplier is the sole eastern neighbour that has been excluded. The EaP supports regional programs such as the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), which is a transport corridor through Eurasia that bypasses Russia. The EaP also supports INOGATE, an international energy co-operation program that includes all states of the former Soviet space, except Russia (European Commission, 2008a). While the EU does not
cooperate with any institutions in the post-Soviet space that includes Russia, the EaP proposes cooperation with the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development (European Commission, 2008a), which is a political organisation in the former Soviet space that is often labelled an anti-Russian organisation.\footnote{Member states: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Uzbekistan was a member, but withdrew.}

The exclusive EaP challenges the EU’s own BSS initiative by duplicating many of its core functions. The working document on the EaP does not mention the BSS as a potential framework, and instead suggests that “EaP will build on the declared will of partner countries to pursue alignment with the European Union and/or their aspiration for European integration, rather than on the regional aspect” (European Commission, 2008a). The EaP uses the leverage from asymmetrical power relations to pursue political association and economic integration, which receives significantly more funding than the BSS (Japaridze et.al., 2010).

The energy component of EaP also directly challenges the Common Spaces due to the Third Energy Package, which suggests that the EU and neighbouring states must “unbundle” by not allowing the same companies to own both production and transportation infrastructure. This energy package breaches both the agreement to coordinate approaches towards the Common Spaces and bilateral agreements between the EU and Russia. The third energy package is not retrospective by taking into account deals and arrangements that were made prior to its introduction, which constitutes a violation of the commitment in Article 34 of the EU-Russian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1997.

\textit{The limits of multilateralism: conceptually indistinguishable from Russian dominance}

There is no clearly shared concept of multilateralism. The EU tends to criticise Russia for engaging its member states individually instead of with the EU as an entity, while
the EU itself does not support or cooperate with other regional arrangements where Russia is a member, such as the CIS, the CSTO or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Inconsistency is apparent in terms of supporting regionalism with the exception of when it includes Russia. The ESS stipulates that “regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world” (European Council, 2003), and the Wider Europe document stipulates that “further regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration amongst the countries of the Southern Mediterranean will be strongly encouraged” (European Commission, 2003c). However, in terms of encouraging cooperation between Russia and the states in the Western post-Soviet space, the EU suggests only that it “might also be considered” (European Commission, 2003c). Smith (2005c) argues that while the EU is the foremost example of regional integration and the EU claims to support similar developments around the world, the resistance to doing so in its own neighbourhood is a paradox.

The EU has neither supported nor openly opposed integration attempts like the Russia-Belarus Union state, the Kazakhstan-Belarus-Russia Customs Union, or the planned Eurasian Union modelled after the EU. Officially aligning the EU with the US position could incite confrontation as Hillary Clinton suggested that the Custom Union and Eurasian Union constituted “a move to re-Sovietise the region”, thus “we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it” (Sheahan, 2012). The Russian proposal to create a “Single Economic Space” between Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia in 2004 had been widely criticised in the West as “imperial ambitions” (Gvosdev, 2008). Lavrov (2013a) noted that “some of our European partners are now inventing new dividing lines, begin trying to artificially divide integration projects into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘friendly’ and ‘alien’.” Gvosdev (2008) suggests that an agreement could perhaps have been reached with Russia, where Russia would not oppose expansion of Western institutions if the West similarly did not oppose and undermine Russian-led institutions. Russia remains apprehensive that the EU will undermine existing formats for integration, such as the CIS, CSTO, Caucasian Four (Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), BSEC, and Blackseafort (Chizhov, 2004a). This also applies to the Balkans which “has a strategic significance
for European stability” and therefore Russia is “by no means indifferent to what direction the efforts of our western partners will take in the area” (Chizhov, 2004a).

**The Meseberg opportunity**

A promising and more concrete prospect for a strategic partnership within conflict management was initiated through a bilateral dialogue between Germany and Russia, which resulted in the Meseberg Memorandum in June 2010. The Meseberg Memorandum proposed the establishment of an “EU-Russia Political and Security Policy Committee” at the ministerial level between EU’s High Representative and Russia’s Foreign Affairs Minister (Russian Federation, 2010b). The committee’s mandate would include “setting ground rules for joint civilian and military crisis management operations” and “working out recommendations on various conflicts and crisis situations, to the resolution of which the European Union and Russia may contribute within appropriate multilateral forums” (Socor, 2010). The flagship task that could possibly set a precedent for future collaboration was to collectively resolve the frozen conflict in Moldova as equal partners (Russian Federation, 2010b). The Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria would be replaced by a collective EU-Russian initiative, a compromise that would give the EU access to Transnistria and grant Russia influence in CSDP decision-making.

It is noteworthy that the Meseberg Memorandum was discussed bilaterally between Germany and Russia, and did not include other EU members prior to the announcement, despite an EU-Russia Summit being held less than a week before. Given that the Meseberg Memorandum was more or less shelved once it reached the EU, it is likely that Germany and Russia believed it would have a greater opportunity to succeed if a specific proposal was worked out prior to presenting the idea to the EU. Following the German-Russian proposal, France followed suit by joining the call for discussions with Russia. Then Poland, with historical concerns about covert European politics, toned down its public criticism of Russia and joined the so-called Weimar Triangle, which has proven to achieve very little. After reaching the EU, the Meseberg Memorandum did not progress further because conditions were added.
The EU conditioned the establishment of this shared institution on Russia first withdrawing from Transnistria as a demonstration of good faith. The common institution is envisioned as a “reward” for Russia’s compliance, rather than a tool to facilitate a compromise on mutual security interests. Since any Russian presence is considered part of the problem rather than part of a solution, the EU would no longer have an incentive to compromise with Russia if it withdrew as a precondition for starting the partnership. Such an institution could be expected to mainly have a symbolic function that recognises Russia as a well-performing object of security, rather accepting Russia as a subject and an equal.

**Conditioning consultations and involvement on alignment with policies**

Conditionality defines Russia’s role in Europe. Instead of security relations being founded on recognition of mutual security interests, Russia’s main task is to improve its domestic governance. The conditionality manifests itself in a hierarchical “subject-object” relationship where asymmetrical relations are essential. The EU does not tend to condition consultations and dialogue with Russia. However, cooperation is conditioned on recognising the EU as a “force for good”, which tacitly requires Russia to abandon demands concerning constraints on the EU. Conditioning Russia’s inclusion on accepting an EU-centric format for Europeanisation of conflict resolution implies that the responsibility for inclusion shifts to Russia. Russia’s exclusion from decision-making in international institutions and the EU’s promotion a “subject-object relationship” with Russia has caused Moscow to heighten its emphasis on sovereignty to defend its security interests. Prozorov (2007) suggests that the refusal to recognise “Russia as a legitimate political subject with its own interests that need not necessarily coincide with those of the EU brings forth a narrative of self-exclusion from European integration, grounded in the renewed reaffirmation of sovereignty”. In other words, sovereignty has become the key principle for security since sovereignty-diminishing powers are concentrated in an exclusive group of states competing against Russia for influence and integration in Europe.
Institutional inclusion is not a tool for cooperating with independent actors over competing interests for the purpose of compromising, amending, and coordinating policies for positive-sum gain. Institutional inclusion or exclusion has a pedagogic function of behaviour modification by “rewarding” or “punishing” Russia. The relationship between the EU and Russia is frequently conceptualised as a teacher-student relationship (Neumann, 1999: 107-109; Browning, 2003; Browning and Joenniemi, 2003; Haukkala, 2005; Gower and Timmins, 2009: 138; Zürn and Checkel, 2005: 1056; Sierra, 2011; Sergunin and Makarychev, 2012; Dimitrovova, 2012: 257). The EU pushes a single-process of integration and democratisation, as it considers shared values to be the required foundation for developing a relationship with Russia. In this relationship, the EU is a socialising agent working towards Russia internalising liberal democratic norms, which is expected to result in more benign international behaviour. The CSR infers that adherence to the EU’s pre-established standards of liberal democratic norms is a condition for Russia’s “return to Europe” (Haukkala, 2010:97-98; Maresceau, 2004: 188). Since most of the EU’s policies are framed as values and norms, institutional inclusion is a reward for conforming to EU policies, rather than a tool for resolving disputes and reaching compromise. The EU amending its own policies contradicts the student-pupil relationship. Instead of asymmetrical power relations being the source of disputes, it is frequently suggested that the EU requires more power in order to encourage one-sided adaptations (Haukkala, 2008). The teacher-student relationship is fiercely rejected by Russia as it contradicts the notion of a partnership among equals (Karaganov, 2007). The EU’s leadership in Europe becomes dependent on preventing Russia’s “graduation”, which creates incentives to portray Russia as undemocratic and ethically impugned.

5.3.2. Decision-making

Mutual recognition by the EU and Russia on the necessity to enhance cooperation and coordinate policies to resolve conflicts on the continent has resulted in a steady increase in high-level meetings. As the EU’s own institutions mature it becomes more capable of institutionalising a Russian voice opportunity. The EU focuses on
promoting “common values and norms” at Russia’s domestic level, while Russia seeks to divorce ideology from power in order to construct a common European security system. Common decision-making is obstructed as the EU and Russia accuse each other of pursuing spheres of influence. Both are to a great extent correct in their assessments since their competing visions of European security have culminated in two conflicting definitions of “spheres of influence”.

A growing voice opportunity in meetings and formalising agreements

The PCA of 1997 constituted the first establishment of a legal institutional framework for bilateral economic and political relations, leaving out security. It established EU-Russia Presidential Summits, which are held twice a year between the President of the Russian Federation and the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission. These meetings overshadow the annual summits with other strategic partners. The PCA also established Cooperation Council meetings at the ministerial level on an annual basis, and Cooperation Committee meetings of senior officials on a biannual basis. The PCA has however not been updated or replaced yet by the continuing deadlock of the pending “Comprehensive Agreement”.

The EU-Russia Summit in Paris in October 2000 resulted in the Joint Declaration on strengthening dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters in Europe, which set the foundation for bilateral security and defence dialogue to “examine mechanisms for contribution by the Russian Federation to the European Union's crisis management operations” (European Council, 2000b). The following year in March 2001, the Russian President was invited to participate and influence the agenda at the EU Council Summit in 2001, which demonstrated an exceptional voice opportunity for a non-member state. The October 2001 EU-Russia Summit resulted in a “Joint Declaration on stepping up dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters” (European Council, 2001a), which established monthly meetings between
Russia and the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), responsible for the CFSP and CSDP. The agenda is set by both sides in meetings held on a monthly basis between the PCS and Russia. The EU-Russia Summit of May 2002 resulted in Moscow dispatching a representative of the Russian Ministry of Defence to Brussels to discuss issues such as joint peacekeeping and conflict prevention.

The Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) was established after the Common Spaces, replacing the Cooperation Committees and intensifying cooperation. The PPC is the main institution for Russia-EU cooperation and covers a broad area of cooperation, including energy security. Since 2006, on the initiative of the Austrian Presidency, security dialogue has increased further with regular meetings between the Chief of The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces and the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (Russian Federation, n.d.). In 2009, the first meeting took place between the European Defence Agency and the Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical cooperation of the Russian Federation, which agreed to explore the feasibility of establishing working groups to discuss cooperation on modernisation and service of military hardware, and on research and technology. Agreements were also reached to further develop military cooperation between the EU and Russia. Other meetings include inter-parliamentary dialogue, sectoral dialogues, and participation by Russian representatives at CSDP Orientation Courses conducted by the European Defence College.

The more recent bilateral EU-Russian “Partnership for Modernisation” launched at the Summit in June 2010 has been a greater success. The compromise is nonetheless troubled by disagreement over the content of a strategic partnership in terms of whether technological and economic modernisation should be de-coupled from societal modernisation. The EU claims civil society should have a pivotal role in societal modernisation, while Russia is reluctant to disrupt the symmetry in the relationship by granting the EU power over its domestic affairs. An awkward compromise is articulated in a joint statement that suggests that the EU and Russia

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24 Also referred to as the Comité politique et de sécurité (COPS).
must address common challenges “based on democracy and the rule of law, both at
the national and international level” (European Council, 2010a). To some extent this
compromise becomes a contradiction in terms. The EU focus on democracy and the
rule of law at the national level infers asymmetrical relations due to the teacher-
student dynamic. Russian emphasis on an internationally democratic system based on
the rule of law denotes a more symmetrical relationship due to the implicit equality in
a common system which diminishes the subject-object dynamic.

The common denominator in Russian proposals is to introduce more multilateral
institutions with the argument that the existing institutions cause the erosion of the
European security architecture. Specific proposals include: developing a common
European Security Treaty that includes all states and security institutions operating in
Europe (Russian Federation, 2009c); a EU-Russian Union to facilitate free trade and
the free movement of people across the pan-European space; a “EU-Russia Political
and Security Policy Committee” for common peacekeeping (Russian Federation,
2010b); and a common “European energy complex” that sets rules to balance the
interests of energy consumers, producers and transit countries (Russian Federation,
n.d.). Concerning the crisis in Ukraine following the suspension of the EU’s
Association Agreement, Russia argued for trilateral EU-Ukrainian-Russian
arrangements to prevent Ukraine from being pushed into civil war. The basic logic
being that Ukraine’s stability depends on recognising that, geopolitically, it is two
different countries and it cannot remain united if it makes a choice between the West
and Russia. Ukraine and Russia therefore proposed a broader definition of European
integration that avoids a zero-sum format by developing a multilateral “trade
commission” to harmonise tariff levels and make integration efforts compatible
(Lynch, 2013).

The EU’s considerations and rejections of Russian proposals

The EU supports the principles of strengthening multilateralism and the rule of law on
international relations in Europe. However, it is critical of formats accommodating
Russian influence that would constrain the EU and NATO. The EU suggested that
Russian security concerns could be resolved within existing institutions, thus rejecting the key thesis of Russia that these institutions are the source of problems. The proposal for a new European Security Treaty was not rejected, but quietly ignored by offering positive feedback without engaging in in-depth discussions about the principles or proposing modifications. Arguments in support of the proposal were framed only in terms of influencing Russia rather than accepting Russia as an equal stakeholder in European security. It was “a chance for the EU to take a common stand, setting clear red lines including Russia’s commitments to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia” (European Commission, 2009b). The EU-Russian Union was politely deferred as Chancellor Merkel suggested “we support the idea of a free trade zone between the EU and Russia but I have to pour a bit of cold water on it” (Pop, 2009a). A common “European energy complex” was rejected, as Ferrero-Waldner asserted that the EU had its own energy charter and “the member states will not want to renegotiate everything” just because of Russia (RT, 2009). The offer of a multilateral alternative in Ukraine to end the crisis was also rejected by the EU. EU Commission President Barroso dismissed the proposal to form a trilateral EU-Russia-Ukraine “trade commission” to harmonise tariff levels and make integration efforts compatible, by equating multilateralism to the acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence: “We don’t need a trilateral agreement. The times of limited sovereignty are over in Europe” (Lynch, 2013).

The rejections of Russian proposals are rooted in different definitions of the concept “sphere of influence”. Russia defines a sphere of influence as exclusive influence, while the EU defines it as coerced influence. Russia aims to eradicate spheres of influence in Europe by harmonising integration efforts and security initiatives. This can only be achieved by first recognising mutual security interests in the common neighbourhood and second by abandoning policies that cultivate exclusive influence. In Moscow’s terminology, it seeks to replace “spheres of influence” with “spheres of interests”. The EU rejects harmonising integration and security initiatives as it is perceived to provide Russia with a “veto”, which allows Russia to constrain the common neighbourhood and reassert the EU definition of a sphere of influence. In other words, the EU does not perceive disputes to originate
from the EU imposing a format that compels the common neighbourhood to choose between “us” or “them”, but rather by Russia coercing states to prevent them from making their choice within this format.

“Spheres of interests”: recognising mutual interests in the common neighbourhood

Russia demands recognition for its “sphere of interests” or “sphere of privileged interests”, which constitute legitimate security interests in its near abroad. A sphere of interests is conceptualised differently from a sphere of influence, as the latter denotes an exclusive influence (Trenin, 2009). A sphere of interests does not suggest that Russia seeks exclusive influence, but rather that Russian influence and security interests must be recognised and incorporated rather than excluded. Due to the human, economic, political, historical, and security links between the states in the post-Soviet space, Russia believes that what occurs in Russia’s neighbourhood will inevitably affect Russian security and interests. Lavrov (2008a) asserted that “we cannot agree when attempts are being made to pass off the historically conditioned mutually privileged relations between the states in the former Soviet expanse as a ‘sphere of influence’”. Bearing similarities to the EU’s neighbourhood policy, Russia’s near abroad policy suggests that what occurs on its borders has a direct link with its internal development and security (Radchuk, 2011; Lavrov, 2008a).

The Balkans has less significance for Russian security and is not claimed to be an area of privileged interests. However, Russia opposes attempts to impose EU-centric structures in the region in order to make it an exclusive sphere of influence. Recognising legitimate Russian interests in its neighbourhood does not contradict the right of its neighbours to freely join international institutions, but rather it delegates responsibility to European security institutions to ensure that they do not demand exclusive influence. In other words, Russia will not obstruct its neighbours from joining EU-led initiatives and institutions, if these institutions are not designed to prevent the common neighbourhood from also cooperating and integrating with Russia. If the EU abandoned zero-sum formats that cultivate exclusive influence,
there would be no incentive for Russia to obstruct the expansion of Western security institutions, as Russia also renounces its right to exclusive influence.

**The Common Spaces: A point of departure for eliminating spheres of influence**

With recognition of mutual security interests, Russia proposes that a positive-sum security arrangement should be established based on the principles outlined in the Common Spaces. The Russian ambassador to the EU, Chizhov (2012c), stated that:

> The road map for the external security space stipulated that integration processes in various parts of Europe were complementary, so to present the former Soviet Union nations with an ‘us or them’ choice is inappropriate and unequivocally unfair to them.

Lavrov (2010) claims Russia does not seek an exclusive sphere of influence, and that the EU should also not do it by presenting the neighbourhood with “a false choice between the EU/NATO and Russia”. The aim is claimed to make the common region “free from any exclusive schemes in the most sensitive area – the military and political dimension of security” (Lavrov, 2010). Chizhov (2012b) expressed his astonishment that EU leaders were surprised by Russia escalating integration projects, “considering that Russia had been traditionally supporting harmonisation and mutually reinforcing development of integration processes unfolding in the Euro-Atlantic region and Eurasia”.

Lavrov argued that this position is extended to the former Yugoslav space, as “Serbia does not have to choose between East and West”, which “is an artificial juxtaposition, as according to the documents signed at the highest level between Russia and the EU, the European integration processes should be of mutual benefit to both Russia and the EU” (B92, 2011b). Lavrov (2008a) has critiqued EU unilateralism and the demand for exclusive influence as “our European partners constantly appealed to the Balkans being a ‘European problem’, insisting on the special, privileged interests of the European Union in the region – regardless of Serbia’s position.” Implementing coordinated security policies is obstructed by the
EU as it is “only ready to offer a scenario whereby the EU makes the decisions on the
conduct of peacekeeping operations while relegating Russia to observer status”
(Chizhov, 2005). Russia sees little hope for cooperation “unless we can agree on an
acceptable format for crisis management operations that takes into account the
interests of all participants” (Chizhov, 2005). Russia is seeking to have the proclaimed
benign intentions of the EU defined, quantified, and observed in legally binding
treaties as Russia “does not need more statements on friendly intentions which are not
followed up with actions” (Author interview, 2011d).

A key Russian requirement is to end unilateral initiatives that are established in
parallel and contradictory to multilateral initiatives. The EaP in particular is perceived
as a manifestation of EU unilateral tendencies and bears the brunt of much of Russia’s
discontent. Lavrov accuses the EaP of disregarding the Common Spaces agreement
that was meant “to avoid any collision between integration processes evolving under
the aegis of the EU and in the post-Soviet space” (Zagorski, 2011a: 49). The EU’s
adherence to the principle of “Europe without dividing lines” has been questioned by
Chizhov (2012b) as the EaP pushes “with its main mechanism of unilateral
adjustment of the whole set of national legislations to EU standards and regulations
without taking into account the already undertaken obligations existing within
integration unions”. Moscow attributes the betrayal of the principles of the Common
Spaces to be motivated by competition for hydrocarbons and the desire to isolate
Russia from its neighbours and Europe (Pop, 2009b). Medvedev stated: “We tried to
convince ourselves [that the EaP is harmless], but in the end we couldn’t. What
bothers us is that for some states this is seen as a partnership against Russia” (Benes,
2009). Lavrov suggests that “there are those who may wish to present the invited
participants [to the EaP Summit] with the choice: either you are with Russia, or with
the European Union” (Benes, 2009). Lavrov has called for conceptual clarity since
Russia is often “accused of having spheres of influence. But what is the EaP, if not an
attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence, including to Belarus?” (Pop, 2009b).
The EU defining spheres of influence in terms of coercive influence

Since the EU does not agree with the Russian claim that conflicts derive from exclusive institutions culminating in exclusive influence, the request for multilateralism tends to be dismissed as placing form over substance:

The EU should demonstrate its readiness to engage with the NIS [Newly Independent States] on the basis of its own strategic objectives, cooperating with Russia whenever possible. Experience has shown that when difficult matters arise, Russia often seeks to treat questions by setting up new negotiating mechanisms. The EU should make clear its willingness to engage with Russia on all complex issues of mutual interest but continue to give priority to substance over form, with a view to obtaining concrete results (European Commission, 2004b).

The EU does not define “spheres of influence” in terms of promoting structures for exclusive influence, but rather in terms of influence being projected through coercion. In other words, the EU does not address the issue of advancing zero-sum institutional structures on the common neighbourhood by compelling states to choose between “us” or “them”, but rather contrasts a sphere of exclusive influence with the sovereign right of states to choose alignment within these structures. Russia’s demand for the EU to recognise Russia’s “sphere of interests” is therefore commonly interpreted as equating to a sphere of influence. The EU rebukes Russian critique of the EaP as an attempt to establish a sphere of influence, by stating that the EU was only “responding to the demands of these countries” (Lungescu, 2009). The Swedish drafters of the EaP similarly defined this terminology as coercion rather than exclusive influence by suggesting that “the difference is that these countries themselves opted to join” (BarentsObserver, 2009). Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek rejected Russian concerns about “spheres of influence” due to free and sovereign choice: “These countries have decided to participate of their own free will, so I see a real difference there” (Benes, 2009). The Czech Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra argued: “They are our close Eastern neighbours and we have a vital interest in their stability and prosperity. This is an offer, not an EU projection of
The EaP being structurally anti-Russian was similarly dismissed by referring to the sovereignty of states rather than the structures of the EU: “is not at all an anti-Russian initiative. We are responding to a desire expressed throughout the countries in our Eastern neighbourhood who want to substantially deepen and widen their relations with the EU” (European Commission, 2009a).

The EU acknowledges that Russia responds positively to multilateralism, but does not link these lessons with Russia’s own arguments. Russian calls for multilateralism, equality and symmetry tend to be considered signs of the Russian leadership obsessing over great power status due to vanity and nostalgia for the Soviet Union. The EU therefore responds by granting Russia a higher status within the EU-centric formats. The EU’s Country Paper on Russia noted that Moscow responds more favourably to policy advice when “they are not seen to be imposed, but rather as responding clearly and flexibly to Russian policy concerns” (European Commission, 2007b). The EU also confirmed that “where Russia does feel itself to be a true partner, such as under the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, its commitment is evident, to the point of committing significant resources” (European Commission, 2007b). Without mentioning Russian preferences for joint ownership, the EU remarks that “Russian involvement in EU cross-border cooperation, neighbourhood and regional programmes under the New Neighbourhood Policy has been disappointing.” Perceiving Russian concerns to be about status, the EU ponders that “this may have been because Russia did not appreciate being treated on a par with smaller, neighbourhood states” (European Commission, 2007b). It was concluded that the EU “anticipated that the establishment of the Common Spaces, in recognition of the Strategic Partnership, may help overcome Russian hesitations” (European Commission, 2007b).
5.3.3. Implementation

The legal basis for permanent cooperative arrangements

The EU’s format for including Russia in carrying out missions is limited to ad-hoc arrangements. The Presidential Conclusions of the Helsinki Council in 1999 suggested that Russia “may be invited to take part in the EU-led operations” (European Council, 1999b), while the Feira European Council in 2000 “noted with satisfaction the cooperation achieved with Russia on international issues, notably regarding the Western Balkans” (European Council, 2000). It was also proposed at Feira that “all partner third states” can contribute. In 2001, the EU pledged to “inform Russia on developments in ESDP matters”, and Russia said it would “inform the EU on the development of its security and defence policy” (European Council, 2001b).

In 2003 Russia made its first contribution to the first EU civilian mission, the EUPM in BiH. In 2008, the EU and Russia came to an agreement to send a Russian Aviation Group to the EU’s EUFOR military mission in Chad. The contribution was made up of 120 troops/personnel and four transport helicopters. A more equal cooperation with the EU mission fighting piracy along the coast of Somali began at the end of 2008, in which the EU and Russia coordinate their actions, exchange information and provide mutual assistance in emergencies. This cooperation has been conducted on a strict ad-hoc basis. The EU letter accompanying the agreement between the EU and Russia regarding Russian contributions to the EU-led EUPM mission explicitly states: “I would also wish to declare that the acceptance by the European Union of the procedure set out in this letter does not constitute a precedent for any future agreements between the European Union and the Russian Federation” (European Union, 2003). In Chad the ad-hoc arrangement caused significant delays as the Russian helicopters were only deployed nine months after the first meeting, which made them available for only three months prior to the expiration of the EUFOR mandate (Quille, 2012).
5. Case Study I: CSDP and Russia

Compromise of balance between autonomy and influence

The EU seeks to maximise autonomy when carrying out missions. Possible Russian contributions to missions are limited to placing its forces under EU-command. EU forces will not serve under Russian command, and external contributions to CSDP missions does not equate to influencing decision-making or constraining EU autonomy. Autonomy is preserved by pursuing selective ad-hoc initiatives with the establishment of principles but without a clear doctrine: “the EU has opted for an approach of principled engagement: searching for opportunities to develop our relations with Russia where possible, but standing firm on our principles where necessary” (European Council, 2010b). The Maastricht Treaty outlined CFSP objectives as safeguarding the “independence and integrity of the Union”, while the Treaty on European Union stipulates “reinforcing the European identity and its independence” (European Union, 1992). Independence is seen as pivotal “in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world” (European Union, 1992). The most promising security cooperation has been done bilaterally, such as on human trafficking, nuclear safety, organised crime, environmental protection, and border control. Reliance on Russian strategic airlift has been dropped as the EU seeks more independence (Webber, 2001).

The agreement between the EU and Russia for Russian participation in EUPM in BiH explicitly safeguards EU autonomy, explaining that “the contribution of the Russian Federation to the EUPM is without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the Union” (European Union, 2003). It is further required that “national authorities shall transfer operational command (OPCOM) to the EUPM Head of Mission/Police Commissioner, who shall exercise that command through a hierarchical structure of command and control” (European Union, 2003). Similarly, the agreement for contribution in Chad states that “the contribution by the Russian Party to the EU operation shall be without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the European Union” (European Union, 2008b). The EU remains concerned about the conduct of the Russian army due to the way it fought in Chechnya and places
emphasis on the need for upgrading technological equipment and heightening transparency and civilian control of its armed forces.

For Russia the main obstacle to cooperation in EU missions is that the EU insists on always having Russian forces under EU command, but without reciprocity as the EU is reluctant to make the same commitment. Russia finds itself in a dilemma. It seeks to develop trust, which is a key motivation for contributing to EU missions. However, at the same time, it is not being able to participate in European conflicts as the EU has taken an opposing position on almost all conflicts. A Russian official explained that Russia participation in the Chad mission allowed the EU and Russia to cooperate and build trust (Author interview, 2012a), though without any mutual risks due to the lower strategic significance of the region. The EU’s refusal to create a common EU-Russia mission in Transnistria to replace a mission led by Russia demonstrated that the EU would not be willing to increase its influence if it involved accepting limitations on its autonomy.

5.3.4. Conclusion

The EU is faced with a dilemma in terms of accommodating Russia in Europe. Russian influence can be accommodated in a shared rule-based system, which implies institutionalising and legitimising Russia as the principal actor in parts of Europe due to its large and disproportionate power compared to its small and medium-sized neighbours. Alternatively, Russian influence can be limited by excluding it from shared institutions, though without influence in these institutions Russia will reject to be constrained by them and project its influence through competing initiatives. It is argued that the EU institutionalises a Russian voice opportunity by offering common institutional formats, political dialogue and participation in EU-led missions. However, an effective voice opportunity in terms of empowering Russia to influence conflict resolution in the common neighbourhood is largely absent. Institutional inclusion is not intended to facilitate Russian influence since this would constrain the EU. Instead of facilitating compromise over competing interests, agreeing on mutual
constraints and aligning policies, institutions are believed to have a value of their own by fostering trust, which would dispel calls for constraints on the EU.

Common planning is impeded by different conceptions of European security and subsequently irreconcilable institutional preferences for enhancing security. The EU views Russia as an object in its “concentric circles” concept of European integration. This is incompatible with Russia’s aim for a broader and more decentralised format for European integration. The EU does not commit to multilateral institutions when there are competing interests and integration initiatives. Instead, conditionality for cooperation reinforces a teacher-student and “subject-object” relationship that contradicts the notion of compromising over competing interests.

Common decision-making is supported by common recognition of the need to collectively resolve security problems, but it is constrained by mutual accusations of endeavouring to establish spheres of influence. The EU defines spheres of influence as using coercion to reduce sovereignty, and condemns Russia for obstructing its neighbours from joining Euro-Atlantic structures. Russia defines spheres of influence as exclusive influence, and deplores the EU for imposing zero-sum structures that compel the common neighbourhood to choose between the EU and Russia. Consequently, Russian proposals for harmonising integration efforts and conflict resolution to end the EU’s pursuit of a sphere of influence are rejected as institutionalising a Russian sphere of influence by granting Russia a veto over the sovereign decisions of its neighbours.

Implementation, understood as collectively carrying out conflict management, is obstructed by a reluctance to empower Russia with influence that can constrain the EU. Ad-hoc arrangements may be established where Russia can align itself under EU command, with the explicit understanding that they do not set a precedent and that Russian contributions should not influence decision-making. Russia cooperates in this format to build trust, though only in regions with low strategic significance outside Europe to avoid supporting a zero-sum outcome.
5.4. Threat perceptions

Threat perception is a reference to the degree Russia is identified and/or disconfirmed as a threat to security in the common neighbourhood, and whether these perceptions are pre-determined by assessing Russian capabilities/power alone and/or due to a dependency on external threats for internal cohesion. Threat perceptions demonstrate the interpretation of Russian capabilities and intentions, which is the first step of the second dilemma and is followed by the dilemma of responding with either reassurance or deterrence. The security dilemma is expected to be aggravated if Russia is a pre-identified threat.

The EU portrays peace and stability in the common neighbourhood to be dependent on Russia adopting liberal democratic norms since this will be externalised by a benign foreign policy. Russia is not openly defined as a threat, however threats to stability are solely external and Russia remains a key object of security. As an object of security, Russia is left with only two roles to choose from: either it can accept the role of an apprentice of the EU, to be civilised towards liberal democratic norms, or it can become a counter-civilisational force that must be contained. Both of these roles suggest that Russia cannot have a legitimate independent role in Europe. The EU’s conflicting objectives of civilising and containing Russia result in strategic ambiguity. In order to civilise Russia towards “our values” it cannot be alienated by being defined as a threat and openly contained. However, since Russia has not fully adopted liberal democratic norms its influence is seen as a source of instability that must be contained. EU documents do not confirm Russia to be a threat. However, Russia is not clearly disconfirmed as a threat either, to prevent it from being legitimised as a security provider. Russia is thus to a great extent a pre-determined threat, since democratic values are linked to an asymmetrical power relationship. This subject-object relationship is not acceptable for a large power as Russia with its own integration efforts. Without a legitimate independent role in Europe there is not much conceptual distinction in the EU between Russian influence and sphere of influence. The EU’s unity, purpose and identity are vested in the civilising mission of its
external environment. However, it is not clear whether the EU is dependent on Russia as an external threat for internal cohesion since it struggles to unite on a common position towards Moscow.

The external threat: instigating instability at the periphery

The EU considers itself as a peace project. Through democracy and shared institutions, it reflects the benevolence of human nature and by definition does not have any enemies. The EU consistently reiterates that it does not have any enemies, and the ESS cautiously does not use the word “enemy” (European Council, 2003). On the other hand, in a world where the EU is a benign actor and there are still conflicts, instability and conflicts are attributed to external actors. The possible destabilisation of the EU’s neighbourhood by such external actors is the main shared security threat addressed by the CSDP. This ultimately also affects the security of the EU. The ESS lists issues such as weak states, poor governance and international crime as key security threats (European Council, 2003). The EU’s own security is also at the heart of this security conception, reflected by phrases such as “either we export stability, or we import instability” (GIC, 1996), “the first line of defence will often be abroad” (European Council, 2003), and “Europeans can no longer feel secure when large parts of the world are insecure” (Kaldor, 2004). The EU thus externalises evil by portraying itself as embodying the goodness of human nature due to civilisational progress, which implies that conflicts and instability are assigned to external factors and actors.

The notion of “externalising evil” by perceiving that conflicts derive solely from others beyond EU borders does not necessarily imply that security is pursued against states at the periphery, but it does make them an object of security. Attempting to make the neighbourhood more like “us” by promoting democratisation and good governance infers that security will be pursued with states at the periphery rather than against them. Some scholars have claimed that the “other” of Europe is its own past rather than external threats, and the EU therefore seeks integration and democracy to prevent war (Wæver, 1998). However, the notion that all states have the potential for being a source of conflict is eroding since the EU is perceived to have demonstrated
itself as a successful civilisational project of human progress with its member states as evidence. The EU has therefore concluded that it has “a unique historic experience to offer” and the next step is to export “its model of society into the wider world” for the purpose of “liberating people from poverty, war, oppression and intolerance” (European Commission, 2000).

Russia as an object of security: the option of either civilising or containing

Russia remains an object of security, which implies that the EU has the policy option of civilising/converting Russia and/or containing/confronting it. During the Cold War, Russia was portrayed as needing to be contained since its rejection of liberal democratic values also made it a threat in military terms. When the Cold War came to an end, Western rhetoric concerning the Soviet Union and then Russia changed from containment to that of a civilising mission. Implicit in this understanding is the notion that if Russia proves not civilised by rejecting liberal democratic values, it must be contained. This leaves contemporary Russia in limbo: it has not yet fully adopted liberal democratic values, however, it may move towards this direction if it is not isolated and contained. These conflicting EU objectives must then be harmonised: Russia must maintain its position as an object of security, which reduces its role in Europe to developing its domestic governance under the supervision of the EU. The subsequent policy option for Russia is to either accept this role as an apprentice of the EU or become a counter-civilisational force to be contained.

A pre-determined threat: the relationship between power and values

The possible threats originating from Russia’s democratic deficit can be argued to either be dependent on Russia rejecting common values or alternatively, they are pre-determined since Russia constitutes a large power. The EU links commitment to liberal democratic norms to the acceptance of a hierarchical relation where Russia becomes an apprentice of the EU, which is not acceptable and perhaps not even
feasible for a large power like Russia with its own integration interests. A hierarchical relationship is defined as the EU maintaining its autonomy while gaining influence over Russian policies at the expense of Russian autonomy.

Russia’s demand to be an accepted as an equal and a subject of security is perceived as a rejection of both being an object to be civilised and it should therefore be contained. By claiming responsibility for its own democratisation, labelled “sovereign democracy”, the EU’s structures of integration and its self-ascribed role, purpose and identity as a socialising power are undermined. Browning (2003) links the EU’s socialising role with its own identity since “Russia once again is presented as an object around which the West can elucidate a civilisational mission and purpose”. To make Russia an object of security also implies that Gorbachev’s pursuit of glasnost (openness/transparency) and perestroika (restructuring) has to some extent been absorbed as a responsibility of the EU as it has assumed the right to manage and supervise Russia’s democratisation. The EU eliminates the conceptual distinction between liberal democratic norms and the hierarchical structure in which Russia becomes an apprentice, by interpreting Russia’s self-perception as a great power as a rejection of the values shared by civilised states.

**Democratic deficit perceived only as a rejection of liberal democratic norms**

The EU is pre-disposed to neglect the democratic deficit embedded in Russian society and instead consider the deficit primarily as a rejection of democracy by the Russian leadership. Recognising the democratic challenges within Russian society would imply that the Russian leadership has an independent role in resolving its internal problems, but this undermines the EU’s role as a socialising actor. Portraying the democratic deficit as deriving from the leadership rejecting or ignoring democratic principles heightens threat perceptions, since it assumes the state produces the threats. This also develops a revolutionary bias in the EU, since democracy is not promoted in collaboration with the state, but instead by supporting opposition and undermining the legitimacy of the government. For example, irregularities in the 2011 Duma elections and Russian Presidential elections in 2012 were condemned by the European
Parliament, which then challenged the democratic legitimacy of the state by calling for re-election. This neglected evidence of the gradual advancements that had been made by Russia towards democracy: Apart from being the freest election in Russian history, for the first time the United Russia party lost much power and became dependent on compromising with opposition parties. Moscow responded to the interference in its democratisation by reinforcing its concept of “sovereign democracy”. This entailed stricter control over foreign funded NGOs. This was then interpreted by the EU as a confirmation of the leadership’s responsibility for Russia descending into authoritarianism, further amplifying threat perceptions.

The EU’s narrative of Russia’s democratic challenges is to a great extent devoid of any analysis or recognition of the societal challenges inherited from the 1990s. The EU instead tends to attribute its tensions with Russia as being caused almost solely by the authoritarianism of the “Putin regime” (European Commission, 2008g). It has become axiomatic that de-democratisation began with Putin, implicitly if not explicitly attributed to self-serving ambitions and a nostalgia for the authoritarianism under the Soviet Union. The inability of the EU to form a clear policy of either accommodating or containing Russia in Europe has contributed to a situation where clear arguments are replaced with emotional rhetoric. Henry Kissinger (2014) argues “the demonisation of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.” Sibal (2014), the former Foreign Secretary of India, reprimanded politicians and media in the West for limiting all political analysis on Russia to a demonised image of Putin’s personal characteristic. While the extent of Putin’s commitments to developing democracy can be accredited a causal effect, the de-democratisation that occurred under Yeltsin and the rise of the oligarchs is absent from the EU’s narrative.25 Yeltsin’s administration had initially accepted the role as an object of civilisational influence, but began to reject it when it became evident that Russia would not be accommodated as an equal in Europe.

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25 While many oligarchs moved to the US and UK, as “political refugees”, Khodorkovsky was arrested, who was about to sell a major share of his oil empire to ExxonMobile and Chevron-Texaco (Tsygankov, 2009: 146).
The democratisation process in Russia has been complex both in terms of societal structures and the leadership. In broad terms, the democratisation process introduced during the Soviet-era under Gorbachev faced systemic problems. It began to deteriorate under Yeltsin as the privatisation became known as a “criminal revolution” gave rise to what is often referred to as the oligarchs. The power of the oligarchs throughout the 1990s included heavy corruption and control over politics, the media and businesses and threatened both democracy and the survival of the state (Sakwa, 2008b: 151-152). Putin announced that his main task was to liquidate the oligarchs as a class (Sakwa, 2008b: 143-144). However, seizing all their assets and re-distributing their wealth was deemed to be too extreme and perilously destabilising so Putin instead pursued a middle-road by offering “amnesty”, suggesting that the oligarchs could keep what was “stolen” in the 1990s on the condition that they withdrew their clout over politics and the media. Otherwise, they were to be prosecuted for their crimes from the 1990s. Power was also centred in Moscow to make the regions less vulnerable to the influence of the oligarchs. While the state strengthened and enabling democracy to be improved, the centralisation of power and arbitrary arrangements for prosecuting oligarchs provided Putin’s party, United Russia, with very undemocratic advantages vis-à-vis other political parties. The oligarchs opposing the Kremlin were held accountable for their crimes committed in the 1990s. However though the oligarchs supporting the government were accepted due to a dependency on business interests and since support for the government was not considered interference. Nevertheless, Putin was widely credited with ending the perilous conditions of the 1990s and as a result his popularity soared to levels unparalleled by other European state leaders. The influence of the oligarchs was curbed, much of the natural resources were brought back to the state, stability was restored, a middle class emerged, and within his first presidential term the number of Russians in poverty was reduced from 42 to 26 million (Edwards and Kemp, 2006). Russian critics of Putin deplore that he remained in power for a third term as it made Russia’s stability dependent on a strong leader rather than strong institutions, and since oligarchs continue to corrupt the political system.
The societal challenges to democratisation were not only influenced by the oligarchs but the main, if not the only, major nation-wide opposition to United Russia being the Communist Party. While United Russia is pro-Western in terms of seeking unification with the West as an equal, the Communist Party can be defined as largely anti-Western. While harbouring some extreme positions, the Communist Party is popular since it is credited with not involving itself with the oligarchs in the 1990s on an ideological basis. When the European Parliament called for re-elections in the 2011 Duma elections due to irregularities, it omitted that it was the Communist Party that mostly received fewer votes than had been predicted. The Russian democratisation process thus appears to have an unconventional path, as United Russia has assisted in creating opposition parties, which siphon off the protest votes that would otherwise go to the Communist Party. However, these parties tend to take on a life of their own and then oppose United Russia on various issues (Cohen, 2009).

The EU as an insurance policy: responding with reassurance and confrontation

The EU is careful not to alienate Russia by castigating it as an enemy, since the EU advocates that Russia should accept the role of its apprentice. However, this prevents the EU from recognising Russia as having a legitimate independent role. The EU therefore displays ambiguity in term of defining Russia’s role in Europe, since it is neither confirmed nor completely dismissed as a threat in terms of being an actor that either contributes to or undermines security in the common neighbourhood. This is also reflected in the dilemma of response, where the EU seeks to both reassure Russia that it is not a threat and simultaneously build leverage against Russia in the common neighbourhood. EU institutions can be considered to have developed as an “insurance policy” against future disputes with Russia in the common neighbourhood since the EU seeks cooperative relations with Russia by offering verbal and written reassurances, but seeks relative power to punish and contain Russian influence when disputes emerge.

Bilateral agreements and documents on EU-Russian relations stipulate that Russia is not considered a threat, though they do not recognise legitimate security interests
for Russia to justify its independent participation in conflict management. This ambiguous position can be explained by the EU’s desire to avoid difficult situations and at the same time maintain a Euro-centric vision of Europe. Despite Russia being deeply involved in most conflicts in the post-Soviet space and having influence in the former Yugoslav space, the EU does not clearly articulate its position and as a result Russia is hardly mentioned (Kratochvil, 2009). In the EU’s Action Plans for Georgia and Moldova for instance, there is almost no mention of Russia despite its dominant role in their secessionist regions, with policies that goes directly against EU policies. Similarly, the declaration of the inaugural EaP Prague Summit, which is aimed to bring stability to the region, did not mention Russia at all. In Moldova’s Action Plan the only reference to Russia is the pledge for the “EU to continue its efforts to ensure the fulfilment by Russia of the Istanbul commitments with regard to Moldova” (European Commission, 2005d), a reference to Russia’s commitments made in 1999 to withdraw from Transnistria. The EU does not recognise legitimacy for Russia’s continuing role in Transnistria nor condemn its presence as undermining peace. In the Georgian Action Plan, the EU similarly does not recognise the Russian peacekeepers as either a security provider or conflict instigator, but neutrally refers to Russia’s involvement to resolve the conflict in “EU-Russia political dialogue meetings” (European Commission, 2006c). While not overtly denouncing the legitimacy of Russian peacekeepers, the EU often cautiously and implicitly does so by referring to them in quotation marks as “peacekeepers” (European Commission, 2005c). In the EU’s Country Strategy Paper on Georgia some critique of Russia emerges, though it is framed as Georgian assertions rather than EU perspectives:

Georgia claims that the root cause for the deterioration of bilateral relations lies with Russian objections to Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Georgia blames Russia for providing economic and political support for the breakaway regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has called for replacing with an international presence the mostly Russian peacekeeping forces in conflict zones (European Commission, 2007c).
When disputes escalate, the EU indicates that the failure of Russia to “civilise” results in a need to contain Russian influence. While adamantly stating that the EaP is not an anti-Russian initiative, the EU indicated after Russia’s intervention in Georgia that the EaP would “save” the common neighbourhood from Russia. The extraordinary European Council meeting of 1 September 2008 drew a parallel between condemning Russia’s intervention in Georgia and the deepening of relations with the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood through the EaP and the BSS (European Council, 2008). The EU Commission portrays the EaP as a response to Russia’s ambitions for re-establishing sphere of influence:

Our eastern neighbours look to the EU to give them concrete support at a time when they feel vulnerable to a more assertive Russia. We have to answer those expectations, and we will shortly be making proposals for a new ‘Eastern Partnership’ (European Commission, 2008e).

The lack of conception of a benign and independent Russian influence in Europe

EU members are to a great extent divided in terms of how to perceive possible threats from Russia, though there is a shared concern over Russia’s democratic deficit and disputes in the common neighbourhood. It is well recognised and documented that the West and East are divided on Russia, with the latter having more experience with Russian domination and subsequently seek a tougher stance. Leonard and Popescu (2007) divide EU members into different categories concerning their relations with Russia, ranging from Greece and Cyprus as pro-Russian “Trojan Horses” to Poland and Lithuania as anti-Russian “New Cold Warriors” They remark that the EU is much more powerful than Russia, however, the EU’s weakness and inability to confront Russia derive from its lack of unity. Some shared concerns do however result in specific responses. For instance, the EU is constructing a common energy policy that is chiefly aimed at reducing Russian leverage, and there is common interest in reducing Russian influence at the EU’s periphery. A key motivation for accommodating the states at the periphery is to prevent them from falling into the Russian “sphere of influence”.

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Without recognition for a legitimate role in Europe independent of the EU, the conceptual difference between belligerent intentions and power/influence becomes obscured. Since security and conflict management are interlinked with “European integration”, any Russian influence that competes for influence becomes a challenge to security. As articulated by an EU official: “accommodating Russia is problematic as Serbia must to some extent choose between the EU and Russia” (Author interview, 2011a). Similarly, Russian energy interests in Serbia are juxtaposed with security as “the EU seeks energy security and is concerned about Russia purchasing the energy infrastructure” (Author interview, 2011a). With the implicit understanding that conflict management and integration is the responsibility of the EU, possible threats from Russia derive from its growing influence, expressed as an “assertive” or “resurgent” Russia (European Commission, 2008c; European Commission, 2013d). This is also evident by the absence of a clear conceptual distinction between influence and sphere of influence (European Commission, 2007b; 2008c; 2008d).

5.4.1. Conclusion

Threats for the EU are a reference to instability at its periphery. A deficiency of democracy and good governance is perceived to create instability and be externalised in a belligerent foreign policy. The EU does not see itself as having any enemies, though all threats are external and derive from the failure to become more like “us” by adopting liberal democratic norms. Russia is not defined as a threat, but due to its democratic deficit it is still an object of security, a problem to be resolved. As an object of security, the EU must civilise and/or contain Russia. The apprentice role delegated to Russia entails that these objectives must be balanced by both civilising and containing Russia. An ambiguous position therefore becomes evident. The attempt to civilise Russia infers that it should not be alienated by recognising it as a threat. Instead it should be reassured that it will not be contained. However, the EU does not recognise a legitimate independent role for Russia in Europe, because it has not fully adopted liberal democratic norms. EU documents demonstrate that officially it neither clearly confirms nor disconfirms Russia as a threat to peace and stability in
the common neighbourhood. Consequently, Russia is often simply not mentioned in
documents on the conflict regions, despite Russia’s strong involvement and
competing position in most European conflicts.

Threat perceptions are to some extent pre-determined since the acceptance of
common values is linked to power. Russian acceptance of its apprentice role entails
Russia recognising the EU’s leadership role in Europe. As a large power with its own
integration initiatives and with no membership prospects, Russia rejects the subject-
object relationship. This is interpreted by the EU as a rejection of democratic values.
Threat perceptions of Russia are then mobilised by a discourse that portrays Russia’s
democratic deficit as the result of a deliberate rejection of liberal democratic norms by
the Russian leadership, since recognising Russia’s societal problems suggests that
Russia could democratise on its own without the EU. Whether apprehensions about
Russia originate from its capabilities or intentions is indistinct as there is not much
conceptual space for a legitimate and benign independent Russian influence in
Europe.

It is difficult to assess to what extent the EU is dependent on Russia as an external
threat for internal cohesion in foreign policy as the EU is not united against Russia. It
does struggle to develop internal cohesion in its foreign policy however, unity is
found when collectively countering common concerns like the Russian “energy
weapon” and to “save” the common neighbourhood from Russian influence. This
suggests that the EU is more united in its foreign policy when Russia is in its
opposition.
5.5. Conclusion: Coercing ‘European integration’

The rise of the CSDP adversely affects variables linked to the security dilemma. In terms of capabilities, the EU is developing more offensive capabilities in correlation with an increasingly militarised and interventionist concept of human security. However, the military capabilities have not affected the CSDP’s posture to a great degree to date, due to the inability to deploy them. Strategy is greatly affected by the Europeanisation of conflict resolutions, the attempt to link conflict management with European integration. A complementary relationship is expected because the EU introduces more benign means, since the prospect of EU accession creates influence through attraction and persuasion. However, by also merging the objectives of EU integration and conflict management, the EU adds new objectives that can be considered zero-sum to the extent that they contradict the UN. The CSDP demonstrates an offensive posture by abandoning its role as an agent of the UN in favour of acting as an independent actor. Consequently, the CSDP missions demonstrate that the EU uses coercive means intended for conflict management to pursue its own incompatible neighbourhood policies.

It is argued that the EU has low security dilemma sensibility since the focus on political identities limits the ability and intention to consider the possibility that disputes derive from competing security interests. Russia is mostly concerned with EU unilateral bloc-politics causing zero-sum politics. The EU is perceived to present the neighbourhood with the ultimatum of choosing between the EU and Russia. This ultimatum becomes more coercive with the CSDP, as arbitrary and ad-hoc decisions are made to punish those favouring close relations with Russia while rewarding those aligning themselves with the EU. Russia responds by balancing unilateralism and promoting multilateralism. However, the EU has very limited conceptual room for considering either zero-sum EU power interests, as all its policies are framed as “European integration” and “democratisation”, or Russian security interests correlating with liberal democratic norms, as Russian interests are portrayed as promoting a “sphere of influence”. The EU tends to define zero-sum policies in terms
of intentions and perceptions, rather than engaging in debate over objective
definitions of zero-sum indicators. Russia’s “zero-sum mentality” is therefore deemed
to be the source of disputes. Russia’s obstruction of what are considered by the EU to
be positive-sum initiatives is interpreted as evidence for the inability to engage Russia
in more multilateral arrangements.

Institutional inclusion, understood as accommodating Russian influence,
contradicts the EU-centric vision of Europe. EU institutions are not designed to
facilitate compromise and coordinate mutually amended policies, but rather to allow
Russia to observe the EU’s benign intentions and align itself with EU policies.
Priority is given to autonomy, as the EU seeks to institutionalise relations with Russia
to the extent that it does not inhibit its autonomy. For every multilateral institution
developed with Russia, there is a parallel bilateral or exclusive institution with the
same functions that marginalises Russia’s ability to influence. Similarly, cooperation
is conditional on accepting an object-subject or teacher-student relationship where
unilateral concessions are made by Russia. Common decision-making is similarly
obstructed as both sides perceive the others format for cooperation to facilitate
spheres of influence, due to conflicting definitions of the terminology.

The EU’s threat perceptions of Russia’s are characterised by demoting Russia to an
object of security. This allows Russia to either accept the role of an apprentice to be
civilised or to be a counter-civilisational force to be contained. The EU does neither
clearly confirm Russia as a threat to the common neighbourhood nor disconfirmed by
recognising it as a legitimate security provider. Russia is to some degree a pre-
determined threat since its commitment to democratisation is linked to an
asymmetrical subject-object power relationship, which is not acceptable for a large
power as Russia. When disputes arise, the EU institutions often function as an
insurance policy against Russia that can contain Russian influence.
6. Case Study II: Missile Defence and Russia

This case study explores NATO’s development of missile defence in terms of variables expected to impact the security dilemma. A detailed case portrait of missile defence is provided in Chapter 4.2. The inquiry here is into whether that system aggravates the security dilemma. A missile defence system threatening Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities could prompt Russia to increase its nuclear capabilities, which could then be interpreted as a threat by NATO and possibly even result in re-configuring the missile defence against Russia.

The four key variables that are believed to impact the security dilemma are assessed in this chapter: First, the *instruments of power* variable denotes whether NATO’s missile defence system undermines Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities and is used to compete for power in Europe. Second, *security dilemma sensibility* signifies the ability to consider Russian arguments regarding missile defence and to acknowledge that its policies may be motivated by defence. Third, *institutional inclusion* is a reference to the extent Russia is empowered with a voice opportunity to influence decision-making concerning the infrastructure and management of the missile defence system. Fourth, *threat perception* explores whether Russia is a predetermined security concern due to its power, and the extent to which the NATO member states are able to unite on that basis.

The argument will be that NATO’s missile defence system aggravates the security dilemma with Russia. Missile defence components are incrementally enhanced in terms of quality, quantity and location, and NATO rejects any international treaties to regulate future development. While there are opportunities to differentiate between an offensive and defensive posture, there are no indication of efforts being pursued to clearly signal a defensive purpose. Security dilemma sensibility is low since Russian concerns about a zero-sum infrastructure are interpreted as a Russian zero-sum mentality and a demonstration of its belligerent intentions towards the common neighbourhood. NATO offers to include Russia in
order to enhance overall missile defence capabilities, to prevent Russia from initiating counter-measures and to assuage European member states concerned about aggravating Russia. However, Russia can only be included to the extent it does not constrain NATO’s autonomy or create reliance on Russia. This “limited inclusion” is rejected by Russia, since its motivation for inclusion is primarily to impose mutual constraints to ensure that the missile defence system cannot be used against Russia. Threat perceptions indicate that NATO is still conceived as an insurance policy against Russia. Disputes with Russia is sought to be resolved by pursuing a policy of both reassurance and deterrence. Disputes with Russia are attempted to be resolved through improved dialogue and trust-building, however, the US and NATO concurrently reassures CEECs with defence plans against Russia and that the missile defence system can be turned against Russia if conflicts escalate.
6.1. *Instruments of Power*

Missile defence as an instrument of power infers the ability to intercept missiles, which depends on the quantity, quality and location of interceptive missiles and radars. Assessing the offence/defence posture of NATO’s developing missile defence system is primarily an issue of the capabilities being developed, though to a lesser extent it also involves strategy. Capabilities are first assessed, which entails the extent missile defence capabilities undermine Russian nuclear retaliatory forces, and whether there are intentions and the ability to differentiate between an offensive and defensive posture by discriminating between “rogue states” and Russia. Second, the strategy and policies of NATO are assessed. This includes how security is defined and how military resources are instructed to achieve this definition of security.

Against a smaller state like Iran, a missile defence system can be considered defensive if it denies Iran the ability to attack or it can be considered to be offensive if it reduces the costs for the US/NATO to attack Iran by intercepting its retaliatory missiles. A missile defence system aimed against Russia can almost exclusively have an offensive design by absorbing Russia’s nuclear retaliatory forces after a first-strike eliminates most of its nuclear capabilities. Even an advanced missile defence system could not effectively defend against a Russian attack due to its large nuclear arsenal. A hypothetical defensive missile defence aimed against Russia suggest that the strategic balance is maintained as missile defence dimply replaces nuclear weapons. Missile defence may therefore replace nuclear weapons stationed in Europe as the guarantee of US security commitments to Europe. Distinguishing between an offensive and defensive posture towards Russia implies tailoring a missile defence architecture that limits its capabilities towards “rogue states” possibly acquiring nuclear weapons, while not upsetting the strategic balance with other large nuclear powers like Russia.

It is argued that NATO accumulates offensive capabilities with its missile defence system. NATO pursues continuous advancements to its missile defence system, which gradually undermines Russian retaliatory capabilities. NATO does not commit itself
to any limitations, and continuing upgrades are likely to follow as technology and funding becomes available. NATO has several opportunities to discriminate between Russia and “rogue states” as potential targets by adjusting the capabilities, quantity and location of its interceptive missiles as radars. However, no attempts to tailor the missile defence architecture accordingly or agree to any international treaties regulating development as flexibility have been made, and the rejection of any constraints is prioritised. In terms of strategy, NATO’s missile defence and its broader strategy demonstrate efforts to increase invulnerability as an end at the expense of a strategic balance, and to replace deterrence with offensive pre-emptive/preventive means. Missile defence is developed partly for the explicit purpose of enabling interventions by undermining retaliatory capabilities of adversaries. It is therefore concluded that missile defence is a continuation of NATO rejecting the non-offensive defence concept.

6.1.1. Military Capabilities

The effectiveness of missile defence depends on the ability to detect, track, intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles. Radars must be placed in a location which can detect the launch and the flight path of ballistic missiles, while interceptor missiles must then be able to reach, intercept and destroy the ballistic missiles. The effectiveness of missile defence is enhanced by the ability to target a missile early in its flight path before it has accumulated too much speed and is still flying low, and/or enhance the range and speed of interceptive missiles to intercept missiles later in their flight path. Interceptive missiles and radars are therefore assessed by their quality, quantity and location. A missile defence system can be categorised and divided into “Tactical Missile Defence” which intercepts short-range missiles, “Theatre Missile Defence” which intercepts medium-range missiles, and “Strategic Missile Defence” which intercepts long-range missiles. Tactical and Theatre Missile Defence are directed towards specific regions and targeting missiles in the early boost-phase when they fly slower and lower over enemy territory. Strategic Missile Defence is not necessarily directed towards a specific region as it aims to defend one’s own territory,
which requires faster and longer range interceptive missiles in order to intercept enemy missiles also later in their flight path (Wallander, 2000b).

**Incremental enhancements of capabilities**

While the NATO missile defence system has initially featured modest capabilities to be deployed immediately, the capabilities are set to be continuously enhanced to surpass the capabilities of the former system and with no established end-goal. The gradual enhancement is less vulnerable to political opposition than a large once-off deployment that instantly alters the strategic balance. This new plan resembles the so-called “spiral development” policy of the former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld. In May 2003, Rumsfeld (2003) argued that:

> Instead of taking a decade or more to develop someone's vision of a 'perfect' shield, we have instead decided to develop and put in place a rudimentary system by 2004 - one which should make us somewhat safer than we are now-and then build on that foundation with increasingly effective capabilities as the technologies mature. We intend to apply this 'spiral development' approach to a number of systems.

Missile defence is currently being developed and deployed through the so-called “Phased Adaptive Approach” (PAA), which outlines the plan to deploy radars and interceptive missiles at multiple sites on land and on mobile Aegis ships. It is more specifically referred to as the “European Phased Adaptive Approach” (EPAA) as it can supplement a broader system with components in the US and other parts of the world. It has been announced that these capabilities will gradually increase to correlate with both the increase in threats and the availability of technology. The EPAA initially consisted of four planned phases, though the last was cancelled in March 2013. Phase 1 was due in 2011, which planned for existing missile defence system components to be deployed for defence against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in southern Europe. This first phase included radar and SM-3 Block IA interceptive missiles deployed on Aegis ships. Phase 2 is due by 2015, and
upgrades capabilities with the more advanced SM-3 Block IB interceptor missiles with additional sensors. Though more effective, the SM-3 Block IB is also limited to target short- and medium range missiles. Interceptors will also be added to land sites in Romania. Phase 3 is due in 2018 and will significantly upgrade interceptive missiles with SM-3 Block IIA, which increases coverage by also being able to target intermediate-range missiles. New interceptive missiles will be placed on Aegis ships and on a second land-based site in Poland. Phase 4 was initially due in 2020 as a further upgrade to interceptive missiles with SM-3 Block IIB that could intercept long-range ICBMs (White House, 2011). However, this last phase was cancelled on the 15th March 2013.

The cancellation of Phase 4 of the missile defence system indicates that the currently announced system has less offensive potential than the previously announced format. Phase 4 of the EPAA constituted the greatest threat to Russia since it would have provided the capability to engage ICBMs. Some commentators suggest that the cancelation of Phase 4 should reassure Russia since it invalidates most of their security concerns (Pifer, 2013). However, it was a cancellation of announced deployments and is not claimed to be permanent. Future developments after Phase 3 have not been announced, though NATO and the US unequivocally reject that they would be limited to these three phases and refuse to set any limits on future capabilities. NATO has not excluded the possibility of reintroducing Phase 4 later, and similarly has not excluded a Phase 5, Phase 6, or Phase 7 in the future.

Since the spiral development model implies that this cancellation could be temporary, it is imperative to assess why it was done. The cancellation was not rooted in any recognition for the need to constrain missile defence development to prevent undermining Russian nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Washington implied that the cancellation of Phase 4 in Europe would be temporary by explaining that it was the result of investments being directed towards reinforcing missile defence in Alaska. In addition, the technology is still not yet developed and the interceptors are not available for deployment. A temporary cancellation could also be seen as reducing political opposition to the initial three phases. Washington has been adamant that considerations for Russian security were not the reason for cancellation, however,
such statements may be directed towards the domestic audience. In the US there is a tendency to portray concessions to Russia that mitigate its security concerns as “appeasing” Russia. Deudney and Ikenberry (2009: 58) suggest that the breakdown of the post-Cold War settlement with Russia has to some extent been caused by this US tendency of “thinking of any concession to Russia as ‘appeasement’.” In a political blunder where Obama was unaware that his microphone was still on, he attempted to reassure Medvedev regarding missile defence by stating: “This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility” (Goodman, 2012). However, the significance of the cancellation is dubious given the lack of confirmation that it is permanent and the absence of any legal guarantees regulating future deployments.

**EPAA as an upgrade of the Bush-era system**

NATO’s missile defence system constitutes a significant upgrade of capabilities compared to the formerly planned Bush-era system. The preceding European missile defence system of the second Bush administration consisted of 10 Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic. The planned interceptive missiles had advanced capabilities and could target long- and intermediate-range missiles. However, the planned GBIs in Poland were to be silo-based and therefore not mobile. This missile defence system was cancelled by the Obama administration and replaced by a new and more ambitious missile defence system within NATO. The NATO missile defence system upgraded the scheduled quantity of interceptive missiles from 10 to currently 500, and possibly thousands in the future. In terms of quality, the initial ability of these smaller interceptive missiles to intercept Russian ICBMs is lower, though future upgrades in technology can bridge this gap. Due to the smaller sized interceptive missiles, more flexibility is permitted. The location of missile defence components have been spread to more European countries and become ship-based, enabling new targets to be acquired with few adjustments.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates (2009) explained that the new EPAA system will organise faster deployment of a more reliable missile defence system, compared
to the former Bush-era missile defence plans. The Director of the US Missile Defence Agency, O’Reilly (2009), also confirmed that the new EPAA system will “provide a more powerful missile defence capability for NATO” compared with the Bush-era missile defence system as “we are strengthening it and delivering more capability sooner”. NATO’s interceptive missiles are progressively increasing in numbers and capabilities (speed and range), and does not reflect current or projected Iranian nuclear capabilities. Irrespective of Iran complying with the nuclear agreements reached in late November 2013, the missile defence system will nonetheless still be deployed according to plan (US Department of State, 2013).

The land-based locations do not demonstrate any intention to discriminate between Iran and Russia despite the existence of some opportunity to do so. That issue is further exacerbated by the flexibility of the mobile sea-based infrastructure. The offence/defence posture of capabilities is becoming less distinguishable as the quantity and quality of interceptive missiles gradually increases, while the location becomes increasingly flexible as they are mainly sea-based. The EPAA currently proposes that more than 500 interceptive missiles be placed on 43 ships and on land-based sites in Romania and Poland by 2018 (O’Rourke, 2011), a significant upgrade from the 10 planned in the Bush-era system. A port for Aegis ships in Spain and an early warning radar station in Turkey that enables surveillance ability all the way to the Urals are being constructed, which weakens Russia’s ability to conceal its mobile vehicles and defend its second-strike capabilities in European Russia. O’Reilly (2009) confirms that the NATO missile defence system is an improvement to the former due to the flexibility provided by the “ability to rapidly increase the number of interceptors at any launch site”.

The quality of these capabilities is also increasing as interceptive missiles will be exchanged with more capable models as the technology becomes available. Phase 1 and 2 deploys only Block I SM-3 interceptor missiles, which do not constitute a significant challenge to large nuclear powers with such a large territory like Russia. Phase 3 and the former Phase 4, however, introduce interceptive missiles with higher burnout velocity, with the Block II SM-3 being able to engage strategic missiles and ICBMs (Butt and Postol, 2011: 2; Trubnikov et.al., 2011). The US BMDR Report of
2010 suggests that the burn-out velocity introduced with Phase 3 is aimed at enabling the missile defence system to “detect and track large raid sizes of ballistic missiles over their entire trajectories from space” (US Department of Defence, 2010a). The reference to “large raid sizes” represents a clear departure from the anticipated smaller raid of Iranian or North Korean missiles (Butt and Postol, 2011). Consequently, American scientists have proposed that the radar systems deployed in Europe give the US capabilities to track Russian ICBMs very early in the “boost-phase” after launch and send interceptors against them (Butt and Postol, 2011).

The mobility introduced with the sea-based component of the missile defence system further reduces the ability to distinguish between an offensive and defensive posture. The flexibility gained from Aegis ships enables new targets to be acquired within a very short timeframe, by, for example, moving into positions in the northern seas and the Arctic where they could intercept Russian missiles. The Director of the US Missile Defence Agency, O’Reilly (2009), explained the benefit of flexibility with sea-based components as allowing the US to rapidly change targets “if the direction of the threat changes”. The ambiguity and uncertainty is even further increased as these Aegis ships have multiple purposes besides missile defence. This implies that they may position themselves in areas that are highly sensitive for Russia while having little purpose for defence from Iran. For example, Aegis ships with missile defence components have already entered the Black Sea during a piracy exercise. In the future Aegis ships may also enter the Arctic for rescue exercises or other purposes. A technical study by the think tank Federation of American Scientists confirms that the flexibility of the missile defence system allows it to easily reconfigure to target Russian retaliatory capabilities (Butt and Postol, 2011).

**Uncertainty about future developments**

Besides enhancing interceptive missiles capabilities with increasing speed and range, Butt and Postol (2011) suggest that the US may reconsider introducing nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles as they can destroy large clusters of missiles and therefore eliminate the decoys launched with the nuclear missiles. The key weakness of any
missile defence system is the ability to overwhelm the system with decoys. This is cited as a reason why Russia’s nuclear forces are not vulnerable. Decoys are cheap and easy to produce, and used to counter missile defence. However, the ease of producing decoys also applies to Iran and North Korea. Several US specialists, military officials and politicians have warned that those with capabilities to build missiles can easily build decoys (Walpole, 2000).

The political will to introduce nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles or an alternative incremental extension could gain increasing impetus if cheap decoys invalidate the relevance of an expensive missile defence system that has already been deployed. Former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld already proposed the possible use of nuclear-tipped interceptors, which had previously been rejected by Washington in the 1980s when it was technically problematic and faced intense political opposition (Crandall, 2003). Presenting a different perspective, Lieber and Press (2006: 52) suggest that the value of decoys in relations with Russia is usually overestimated as it is based on calculations of an attack by Russia with numbers that would overwhelm any missile defence system. However, in terms of the missile defence as an offensive system, an effective US first-strike would leave only a “tiny surviving arsenal” of nuclear weapons and decoys, thus “even a relatively modest or inefficient missile defence system might well be enough to protect against any retaliatory strikes” (Lieber and Press, 2006: 52).

Future deployments of missile defence components outside NATO territory can also serve political purposes as a de-facto enlargement of NATO, by creating tripwires translated into de-facto extended security guarantees. NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen proposed to start talks on establishing a missile defence site in Ukraine (Atlantic Council, 2011), while some US senators have similarly advocated placing missile defence components in Georgia (NTI, 2011). Cimbala (2012) considers “a NATO missile defence installation deployed to protect Tbilisi or Kiev, supported by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as a trip wire.” The prospect of missile defence components in Ukraine and Georgia would cause tension and alienate these states further from Russia if Moscow’s defensive measures entailed targeting missile defence components in these states in a potential future conflict.
Furthermore, since a large portion of their populations favours integration with Russia, the mere presence of NATO could destabilise these states and then activate the tripwire due to competing Russian/NATO conflict resolution initiatives. In an open letter to NATO, various experts and organisations working on nuclear security warned that extending “missile defence system to the very borders of Russia increase[s] the odds that any conventional military confrontation would quickly escalate into nuclear war” (NAPF, 2012).

NATO’s current missile defence components in Europe would mainly, if not only, affect the ability to intercept Russian missiles launched from European Russia. The effects on the rest of Russia would be marginal unless the geographical positioning alters. While Russia’s large territory has traditionally been pivotal in its defence by being able to absorb aggressors from the west from Napoleon to Hitler, the same logic applies to some extent to missile defence. O’Reilly (2009) proposes that besides Russia’s large numbers of missiles, the enormous geographical size of the country would be the greatest obstacle to target Russia’s nuclear forces. Arbatov (2012) has similarly agreed that deeper within Russian territory, beyond the Ural Mountains, Russia would not be exposed to NATO’s missile defence system. However, the unpredictable geographical spread of missile defence bases gives reason for both military and political concerns (Arbatov, 2012). Because Russia’s large territory continues to be a key factor in enhancing its defensive capabilities, the location of the missile defence system is important for its future development. While the currently announced missile defence components would not be able to successfully eliminate all of Russia’s retaliatory capabilities, it would be able to reduce them (Butt and Postol, 2011). Thus, the missile defence capabilities make a first-strike increasingly preferable to a second-strike. Butt and Postol (2011) therefore conclude that the significantly heightened offensive capabilities from missile defence gives Russia legitimate concerns as the Russian deterrent is gradually weakened.
Relationship between defensive and offensive capabilities

Conceiving missile defence as an offensive weapon assumes that the system would absorb the second-strike capabilities that survived a first strike. Thus, when assessing missile defence in the offence/defence debate it must be considered in relation to offensive weapons. Missile defence appears to be developed as an addition to rather than as replacement for nuclear weapons or other potential offensive capabilities. Missile defence replacing reliance on nuclear weapons can be considered to enhance non-offensive defence, while missile defence added to nuclear weapons constitutes an enhancement of overall capabilities. The US Quadrennial Defence Review Report of 2010 describes the development of a “new, tailored, regional deterrence architecture that combine[s] our forward presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defences), and continued commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent”, which will “make possible a reduced role for nuclear weapons in our national security strategy” (US Department of Defence, 2010c). Within NATO there are some who believe that missile defence could reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence (NATO, 2011). By extension it could also eventually reduce or completely remove US nuclear weapons from Europe instead of modernising the ageing arsenal, as US security commitments to Europe would instead be expressed by missile defence (Young, 2010; Flockhart, 2010b; Thränert, 2009a: 72).

However, this notion has been challenged and contradicted by the US, which stipulates that “missile defences are not a replacement for an offensive response capability, they are an added and critical dimension of contemporary deterrence” (White House, 2003). This was reiterated by a NATO document suggesting that missile defence would add to existing conventional and nuclear capabilities (NATO, 2011). Both NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review and its official declaration at the Chicago Summit in 2012 confirmed that “missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence, it cannot substitute for them” (NATO, 2012a; NATO, 2012b).
Increasing nuclear and conventional first-strike capabilities

Missile defence is developed parallel to offensive military capabilities with first-strike advantage, both conventional and nuclear weapons. A paper by RAND argues that the numbers and operating procedures of US nuclear weapons indicate a departure from mere deterrence and a move towards first-strike capabilities (Buchan, 2003). Scholars such as Lieber and Press (2006) even proposed in a controversial technical study that the US “stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy”, and “could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a nuclear first strike". In December 2001, the US Nuclear Posture Review presented the plan for a nuclear “triad”: first, an “offensive strike system (both nuclear and non-nuclear)” consisting of new and more usable offensive nuclear weapons such as small nuclear weapons for earth penetration; second, a “defensive” system which includes missile defence; and third, a modernised production infrastructure that will provide continuing heightened capabilities (US Department of Defence, 2001).

The Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 also emphasised the focus on precision strikes combined with increased intelligence on mobile targets. The US is enhancing its conventional capabilities with the development of its Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program, aiming to provide the ability to strike anywhere in the world within an hour. US nuclear disarmament is being pursued to some extent parallel with efforts to transfer first-strike capabilities to conventional weapons (Miasnikov, 2009). The large arsenals of conventional “precision-guided weapons” are acquiring the capability to destroy silo-based ICBMs (Miasnikov, 2009). The US has also been making advancements with the development of “hypersonic missiles”, which travel more than 5-times faster than the speed of sound and would be of great value in a first strike.

Nuclear weapons research continues with the aim of making them more “usable”. Such efforts include so-called “bunker busters”, which are designed to hit deep targets such as nuclear command centres. The question of aging nuclear weapons in Europe has also been answered with announcements that they will not be scrapped when expiring, but rather updated and modernised. The director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, Kristensen, explains that the
upgrades of US nuclear weapons in Europe include adding controllable tail fins, enabling them to be delivered by F35s with stealth characteristics (Borger, 2013). The US development of “a guided nuclear bomb” makes nuclear weapons more “usable” because they can strike closer to the target, which implies that a lower explosive yield can be used, thereby reducing the nuclear fallout (Borger, 2013). Kristensen further argues that the modernisation constitutes a “significant upgrade of the US nuclear capability in Europe”, which contradicts Obama’s speech in Prague 2009 and the Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 (Borger, 2013). The Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 pledged the US would not “provide for new military capabilities” (US Department of Defence, 2010b). The upgrade of nuclear weapons in Europe also contradicts NATO’s own Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (NATO, 2012a). Upgrading hundreds of US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe suggests that Russia is the only possible target.

The presence of Iran and North Korea, or even China, do not explain why hundreds of US nuclear weapons must be based at sea at all times to ensure their survival in a first strike, as indeed 60% of the submarine forces are at sea at any given time (Arbatov, 2011: 8). Oelrich (2005: 41) posits that the design of the US nuclear arsenal still looks as if it is aimed to disarm Russia in a first strike. Their readiness level and the thousands of nuclear missiles in reserve indicate that Russia is still setting the nuclear standards in the US (Oelrich, 2005). Arbatov (2011) suggests that the US development of conventional weapons also demonstrates first-strike capabilities against Russia. The US modification of its Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines and strategic bombers makes it possible to launch about 2,900 high-precision convention long range missiles: “Ohio-class submarines are designed to stay on patrol for long periods of time and remain undetectable even to advanced anti-submarine warfare systems, and heavy bombers are capable of penetrating advanced air defences. Rogue states and terrorists possess neither anti-submarine warfare nor serious air-defence systems” (Arbatov, 2011: 20-21).
6.1.2. Strategies and policies

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the US and NATO have steadily shifted from accepting vulnerability and relying on deterrence to seeking increasing invulnerability through offensive-defence and pre-emption. Effective missile defence constitutes a denial threat, which is a strategy distinctively different from the punishment threat of mutually assured destruction (Morgan, 2003; Payne, 2008). NATO has two stated missions, collective defence from attack by external states and non-Article 5 interventions to resolve conflicts. Missile defence has a function in both of these purposes, for territorial defence and reducing the risks associated with interventions. These purposes are interlinked since interventions can also pre-empt or prevent situations where there are threats to NATO territory. Rasmussen (2012a) asserts that “the defence of our borders often has to start beyond our borders”. This increases reliance on long-range mobility and offensive power given that “such forward defence often requires a global reach” (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006: 105).

In 2013, the Pentagon released the “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States”, which argued that “the new guidance requires the United States to maintain significant counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries”. The new guidance does not rely on a “counter-value” or “minimum deterrence” strategy. The recognition of a counterforce strategy rather than a countervalue strategy for nuclear weapons is of great significance as it implies pre-emption and first-strike. A counterforce strategy targets the military of an adversary with the aim of destroying its weapons before they can be launched, thus minimising or eliminating the capacity of the adversary to retaliate.

The US has shifted towards a strategy of security through superiority rather than balance. The 2002 US National Security Strategy stipulated that “our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States” (White House, 2002). The US Nuclear Posture Review does not specify that nuclear weapons would only be used for retaliation. They could possibly be used pre-emptively (Arbatov, 2011: 10). Hegemony as the foundation for security is also evident in policies
concerning the militarisation of space. The US seeks dominance by enhancing its space-based missile defence components, while denying its potential adversaries the same. The US National Space Policy stipulates that the US will “preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space”, and “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests” (White House, 2006).

Missile defence is cited to prevent nuclear proliferation, though it has also been developed to enable interventionist policies. Interventionist policies are severely restricted if opponents are equipped with nuclear weapons (Riecke, 1999: 267). The 2010 US BMD Review states that:

The United States, with the support of allies and partners, seeks to create an environment in which the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred, by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of such attacks, and thereby devaluing their ballistic missile arsenals (US Department of Defence, 2010a).

The demand for missile defence has developed along with the emerging interventionist policies of both NATO and the US. The post-Cold War use of missile defence began with the defence of deployed troops during the 1990/91 Gulf War. In an offensive operation, the US stationed Patriot missiles in defence of Iraqi Scud missiles. NATO began its discussion for Theatre Missile Defence for similar conflicts in 1999, at the time of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. However, NATO did not begin its missile defence development until 2005 (NATO, 2011). Similarly, missile defence components placed in Turkey in 2012 were a response to developments in Syria, which would be essential to enable the US to intervene. On March 26, 2004, 49 US generals and admirals signed an open letter to the US President questioning missile defence as a defensive weapon, given that no state would itself dare attack the US or allow terrorists to launch ICBMs from its territory given the destructive retaliation from the US, and warned that any WMD attack on the US would be the result of terrorists smuggling such weapons into the country rather than using ICBMs (Crowe et.al., 2004).
NATO’s decision to develop missile defence as a response to new threats from proliferation constitutes a breach of agreements addressing existing security issues with other nuclear powers that have not been replaced by new treaties. The missile defence system has led to the withdrawal of the ABM-Treaty and to some extent breaches of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), while rejecting arms treaties on weapons in space or other treaties to replace these arrangements. NATO already breaches both Article 1 and Article 2 of the NPT agreement by stationing US nuclear weapons on the soil of non-nuclear states.

6.1.3. Conclusion

The offensive posture of NATO’s missile defence capabilities has increased considerably in comparison to the preceding Bush-era missile defence plans in terms of quality, quantity, and locations. NATO is moving beyond tactical and theatre missile defence by developing a strategic missile defence system. There is some capacity to discriminate between Russia and Iran as targets, though there are no indications of intentions to make any efforts to do so. Some basic limitations could provide reassurances that Russia would not be a potential target, by for example prohibiting Aegis ships in the Black Sea, Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea, or Arctic. However, flexibility in future development is a key focus on the structure, with the rejection of any limitations on the range, speed, amount or location of interceptive missiles. The most offensive expectations have not yet materialised as Phase 4 of the missile defence system has been cancelled. However, the cancellation has not been attributed to the need for constraints to mitigate the effects on Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities, and the US and NATO do not claim it is a permanent cancellation. The development of missile defence capabilities does not replace offensive weapons, but rather occurs parallel to the development of nuclear and conventional weapons.

The strategies of the US and NATO indicate that security is defined as increasing invulnerability through military superiority rather than accepting mutual vulnerability in a strategic balance. Such a vision of security is pursued by enhancing counterforce
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capabilities and by eliminating retaliatory capabilities. This posture is supported by increasing interventionism, unconstrained missile defence and more usable nuclear weapons, suggesting that security is pursued through offensive-defence.
6.2. Security dilemma sensibility

Security dilemma sensibility is a reference to the ability and intention of NATO to objectively consider Russian security concerns and possible defensive motivation. This sensibility is an important variable since recognition of one’s own contribution to the security dilemma precedes amending or implementing policies to mitigate it. First, the Russian position is explored by outlining its stated security concerns and the extent to which it responds to these fears. Second, NATO’s speeches and statements are assessed to estimate to what extent NATO recognises Russian security concerns and considers the possibility that Russian policy may be a response to these concerns.

It is argued that Russia is mostly concerned about the precedent set by the unilateral deployment of a missile defence system without limitations delineated in an international treaty. This precedent is expected to be followed by a continuous, unconstrained and unpredictable modernisation of missile defence and other offensive capabilities, which will gradually undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrence and further divide Europe. Russia has responded with deterrence, both by denial and punishment, as it implements counter-measures to a unilateral missile defence system. A defensive posture is pursued to promote rather than discourage a multilateral alternative.

NATO portrays missile defence as a positive-sum game, irrespective of a unilateral architecture. The issue of a precedent causing future unpredictability is not addressed, and instead Russian concerns are dismissed by referring to announced deployments. Russia’s fears about NATO constructing an exclusive and zero-sum missile defence system is perceived to be a reflection of Russia’s zero-sum mentality, caused by domestic issues and unwarranted ambitions for power in Europe. By not distinguishing between unilateralism and multilateralism, NATO views Russia’s balance of its unilateral missile defence plans as evidence of a Russian rejection of cooperation and multilateralism. Hence, while NATO recognises the link between missile defence and Russian responses, it does not place itself in Russia’s shoes.
6.2.1. Russian Security Concerns regarding Missile Defence

Russia has consistently considered NATO to be the key security challenge following the collapse of the Soviet Union. NATO represents a continuation of zero-sum bloc-politics due to the enduring division of Europe, resulting in unconstrained unilateralism. Russia frequently warns against bloc-politics that result in a policy of “encirclement” or containment by surrounding Russia with US/NATO military infrastructure (Lavrov, 2007a; Putin, 2007). These Russian security concerns emanate from two key developments in NATO following the collapse of the Soviet Union: First, NATO is feared because it is no longer only a defensive alliance, but has also developed an offensive posture by engaging in unilateral non-mandated interventionism (Arbatov, et.al., 2010). Second, continuous enlargements ensure that the dominant security institution in Europe will be exclusive and thereby prevent the unification of Europe and the establishment of a “common European home”, since the common neighbourhood would be compelled to choose between NATO and Russia.

The NATO missile defence system is seen a continuation of this development and is therefore feared for the same two reasons. First, missile defence enhances NATO’s offensive capabilities by gradually undermining Russia’s nuclear deterrent. The gradual improvement of first-strike capabilities without any future limitations is viewed in the context of improvements in both offensive nuclear and conventional forces. These enhanced offensive capabilities may embolden the US/NATO and result in more belligerent policies towards Russia due to what is commonly referred to as escalation control or escalation dominance. Increasingly aggressive policies by the US/NATO could escalate tensions to the extent a first-strike against Russia would actually be considered. Second, a lesser but still significant concern is that missile defence will further concretise existing divisions in Europe by making European-Russian relations hostage to US-Russian relations, and possibly create new divisions by placing missile defence infrastructure outside NATO territory as a de-facto enlargement.
Nuclear weapons are at the heart of Russian security as the ultimate equaliser. Russia became more dependent on nuclear weapons following NATO enlargements that further reduced Russia’s ability to defend itself from NATO with conventional arms only. Under the Yeltsin administration, a first-use policy of nuclear weapons was authorised and the Russian Military Doctrine of 2010 continues to authorise first-use “when the very existence of the state is threatened” (Russian Federation, 2010a). The nuclear deterrent is considered “an important factor for the prevention of the outbreak of nuclear conflicts and conflicts that uses conventional assets” (Russian Federation, 2010a). Rogozin, the then Russian Ambassador to NATO, similarly asserted that nuclear weapons still remain “the basis and guarantee of our sovereignty and independence” (NRC, 2011). The pivotal role of the nuclear deterrent for Russia’s security and survival is possibly best explained by the peculiar fact that even the Russian Orthodox Church blesses command posts and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles (Tsypkin, 785).

Russia’s ongoing recovery from the disastrous 1990s and the current halt in NATO enlargements have reduced the excessive reliance on nuclear weapons, and the 2010 Military Doctrine portrays a reduced role for nuclear weapons (Arbatov, 2011). Missile defence undermining of Russia’s nuclear deterrent has, however, reignited fears and to a great extent united Russia’s entire political spectrum in opposition, creating similarities to NATO enlargement. Threats of large-scale nuclear or conventional war had regressed significantly, however, this is now reversing with the “creation and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability” (Russian Federation, 2010a). The Russian Military Doctrine of 2010 further warns against the “creation and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability and violating the established balance of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere” and also condemns “the militarisation of the outer space” (Russian Federation, 2010a).
The primary concern: a precedent for future modernisation and deployments

Russia is mostly concerned that the deployment of a missile defence system will set a precedent for unconstrained modernisation of capabilities, which will gradually erode Russia’s retaliatory capabilities (François, 2012; Lavrov, 2011a; Medvedev, 2008c; Author interview, 2012b). Russia fears the “spiral development” approach of Rumsfeld (2003), which advocates continuous advancement of missile defence as funding and technology becomes available. Russia demanded that the unilateral US withdrawal from the ABM-Treaty must be followed by new agreements that can regulate and set limitations on missile defence (Zyga, 2012). Any discussion on currently planned components becomes a mere distraction given the concern is the increasingly unpredictable future as the quantity, quality, and location of interceptive missiles and radars gradually increase and become more flexible without a ceiling or a “clear end-goal” (Author interview, 2012b). This point was made clear by Lavrov (2008c) during the Bush-era missile defence plans of 10 interceptive missiles in Poland, by warning that “most likely in the foreseeable future we will hear talk about the hundreds and even thousands of missile interceptors in various parts of the world, including Europe. Poland, it is only a ‘trial balloon’”.

Early proposals by the Clinton administration in the 1990s “to modify the ABM-Treaty in order to permit the proposed “limited” national missile defence” had also been opposed by Russia. This was not because the limited infrastructure would undermine strategic stability, but because it was seen as only being the start phase before it would “rapidly expand to a much more capable system” (Young, 2000: 10). Some commentators suggest that NATO’s current “limited” missile defence plans towards 2018 are merely “an interim step toward building a full-scale missile defence system to provide guaranteed protection of U.S. territory against any missile attack” (Pukhov, 2011). From this perspective, current limitations on announced deployments are caused by temporary limits on funding and technology, not to preserve strategic stability (Pukhov, 2011).
Russia perceives that the intention of missile defence is primarily to undermine Russia’s strategic defence as the equaliser mitigating the unfavourable military developments since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Vladimirov, 2011). General Makarov claimed “the development and deployment of missile defences is aimed against the Russian Federation” and “without question weakens our potential nuclear deterrent” (Weiss, 2011). President Medvedev (2011) claimed that “legislators in some countries openly state, the whole system is against Russia”. Former Chief of Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky warned that missile defence reflects the first-strike ambitions of the US:

They expect that their opponents will respond with up to 100 missiles, not with 1,500 or 2,000, they are dreaming of being able to intercept the whole bulk of a hundred missiles and make themselves invulnerable after their first strike (Interfax, 2013b).

Even if intentions are currently benign, the main criterion in threat assessments is capabilities. Lavrov (2011b) has questioned both the sincerity and the durability of NATO’s benign intentions, arguing that “good intentions are temporary while the military-technical potential is permanent”.

The capabilities in the first two phases of the EPAA system are not recognised as a threat. However, the introduction of Block II interceptors in Phase 3 and the currently cancelled Phase 4 are considered to undermine strategic stability (Lavrov, 2011a). While not arguing that Phase 3 and 4 would completely enable a successful first-strike, they “mean reaching a strategic level which directly infringes the efficiency of Russian nuclear deterrent forces” (Lavrov, 2011a). At the International Conference on Missile Defence in Moscow, Colonel-General Vladimir Gerasimov (2012) warned against the global nature of the US/NATO missile defence system. Interceptors in Poland and sea-based interceptors close to Russian borders would pose a threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrent (Gerasimov, 2012). At the same conference Colonel Evgeny Ilyin (2012) clarified that the key threats came from Aegis-ships in the Baltic Sea, Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea, and gave specific estimates on when the speed of missiles would become a threat. Ilyin (2012) asserts that Aegis ship-
based interceptors with a velocity of more than 5km/second in the northern seas would be “a real threat to the Russian deterrence capability.” Another key element of missile defence that causes concerns is the Romanian location, given that the interceptor missiles are placed only 500 kilometres from the Russian Black Sea fleet located in the Sevastopol naval base in Crimea. The military and political significance of interceptors in Poland are considered a confirmation of Russia being the main consideration in the architecture. Lavrov (2011b) critiqued the “powerful radar” being built in Turkey, which can “scan a significant part of Russia”. Russia critiqued the evolving uncertainties caused by the absence of limitations on the location of Aegis-ships, and drew attention to the specific incident of the US sending ships with BMD systems into the Black Sea for an anti-piracy exercise (Russian Federation, 2011a).

When assessing missile defence capabilities as a first-strike weapon, Russia insists that it must be considered in relation to the development of offensive weapons. Given the US is currently enhancing its first-strike capabilities with both nuclear and conventional weapons, the missile defence system becomes even more threatening (Author interview, 2012b). The missile “shield” is therefore linked with the counterforce “spear”, with the Russian Military Doctrine of 2010 warning about “the creation and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, and also the militarization of outer space and the deployment of strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems” (Russian Federation, 2010a). Advancements made in conventional deep-strike capabilities are perceived to enhance the US ability to carry out a more successful first-strike against Russia (Cimbala, 2012). Miasnikov (2009) notes that the increasing counterforce capabilities of US precision-guided weapons adds to the threat of a first-strike as they can neutralise land-based mobile ICBM launchers and modern ICBM silos. Regarding the US Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program, Arbatov (2011) asserts that:

Russians just cannot believe that such complicated and expensive systems are only meant to target terrorists, who can be dealt with by much cheaper and simpler weapons. The idea that America needs weapons with short
flight time to destroy reckless state leaders and terrorists looks ridiculous to most Russian experts.

Putin (2012c) asserted that these capabilities have been incorporated into Russia’s threat assessments: “As high-precision long-range conventional weapons become increasingly common, they will tend to become the means of achieving a decisive victory over an opponent, including in a global conflict”.

Enhanced first-strike capabilities are feared to result in the US and NATO believing they can afford to take a more confrontational stance to pressure Russia (Author interview, 2012b). This confirms Russia’s predominantly realist views that capabilities and power influence intentions and behaviour. General Makarov warned against “the creation of an illusion of inflicting a disarming strike with impunity” (RT, 2012a). Instead of NATO reducing its regional unilateralism, Russia sees “attempts to assign global functions to NATO military potential” (Russian Federation, 2010a). Key threats include the “extension of the alliance and its military infrastructure to Russian borders”, which supports “attempts to destabilise the situation in individual states and regions and to undermine strategic stability” (Russian Federation, 2010a). Blagov (2007) reiterates this point by postulating that “Washington's main goal is not to counter Iranian missile threats but to build a unilateral nuclear advantage in order to blackmail Russia.” Hynek (2010: 443) proposes that the higher missile defence effectiveness, the tougher the US stance would be towards “rogue states”. It would allow greater room for manoeuvre and more willingness to intervene (Hynek, 2010: 444). A more assertive incursion into regions on Russian borders is expected if US and NATO military commanders believe they have military superiority that can force Russia to stand down (Author interview, 2012b).

The secondary concern: dividing Europe and making Europe-Russia relations hostage to US-Russian relations

The second main concern of Russia is that missile defence divides Europe. Russia’s concept of a “divided Europe” refers to how the Cold War ended. Russia considers
the Cold War to have ended when both sides declared it to be over in December 1989 in Malta, one year after Gorbachev’s famous UN speech in December 1988 in which he announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men and pursue more freedom by withdrawing large portions of its troops from the territory of its Warsaw Pact allies. Russia considers itself betrayed as the US and NATO had reassured Russia it would not take advantage of this by expanding beyond a united Germany. This betrayal was of enormous significance since it cancelled the idea of building a “common European home” in favour of simply pushing the dividing lines of Europe further east.

The enduring disputes between the West and Russia are believed to be rooted in this betrayal, as Europe still has a security architecture where states must choose between “us” and “them”, and makes Russia’s relations with Europe dependent on the US (Medvedev, 2008c). Lavrov (2007d) argued that “any unilateral anti-missile projects would fundamentally alter the continent’s geo-strategic landscape”, and emphasised it is “unacceptable for anyone to use the continent as their own strategic territory”. A NATO-centric model serves the main purpose of containing Russia by preventing it from having a role in Europe (Mankoff, 2012: 342-343). Vladimirov, (2011) asserts that the decision to deploy missile defence is a political effort to cement the dominance of the alliance. These concerns reflect the early Russian arguments against NATO enlargement as being primarily an issue of abandoning the possibility of common security in favour of maintaining the power structure of a divided Europe (Diesen and Wood, 2012: 459).

Lavrov (2008c) suggests that US-led missile defence converts Europe “into a strategic U.S. territory. We would not want our relations with European countries to derive from our relationship with the United States, as was the case in the Cold War”. General Makarov similarly reiterates that “we cannot create the security situation in Europe depending on the Russian-US agreements as it were during the Cold War times” (RT, 2011). Sagan (1996) proposes that nuclear states use weapons for power projection outside their borders. When conflicts escalate, non-nuclear states will be de-facto annexed due to defence requirements. Russia concerns itself with the prospect that neighbouring states will participate in a US-led missile defence system
targeting Russia (Zyga, 2012). This would force Russia to either capitulate by accepting a diminishing strategic balance, or initiate counter-measures that would subsequently alienate and further decouple Russia from Europe.

NATO’s increasing unilateralism in Europe is perceived to correlate with the deconstruction of international law and treaties that provide predictability. Former Russian officials Arbatov, Dvorkin, Pikaev, and Oznobischev argue that Russia concerns itself with the “lack of distinct and reasonable alternatives to mutual nuclear deterrence as the basis of strategic relations between the nuclear powers that are not allies” (Arbatov, et.al., 2010). They further warned against the:

[D]egradation of the system of agreements and negotiations on disarmament (ABM Treaty, START I and START II, agreements on theatre missile defence (TMD) of 1997, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), etc.) during the years of Republican administration, as well as the persistent policy of denouncing disarmament as a security-building means (Arbatov, et.al., 2010).

Russia presents itself as being threatened by Western and NATO unilateralism, though it differentiates this stance from being anti-Western or anti-NATO. Russia does attempt to establish itself as an alternative to the West, but rather to be included in Europe as an autonomous and equal actor (Sakwa, 2008a). An awkward posture emerges as NATO is frequently referred to as the greatest threat to Russian security, while also suggesting that “Russia is a part of European culture” and NATO is a part of Europe. Thus “it is with difficulty that I imagine NATO as an enemy” (Putin, 2000). Advocating multilateralism and collective security, Russian Ambassador Botsan-Kharchenko avoids labelling NATO as an enemy but warns against unilateralism by stating Russia is not against NATO, but rather against NATO expansion (Becirevic, Curak, and Azinovic, 2010). The Russian Military Doctrine of 2010 attempts to explain that security risks were not caused by NATO as an inherent enemy, but rather the desire to assign NATO “global functions carried out in violation of the standards of international law” (Russian Federation, 2010a). These sentiments
were expressed by Kosachev, chairman of the Russian Duma’s International Affairs Committee, at the Munich Security Conference: “I believe the problem of NATO today is that NATO develops in reverse order – it tries to act globally more and more but continues to think locally…. As soon as NATO starts to reach beyond its borders this is no longer just an internal matter for NATO” (Reuters, 2010). In the Military Doctrine of 2010, a peculiar conceptual distinction is made by referring to NATO as a “military danger” rather than as a threat or an enemy (Russian Federation, 2010a).

6.2.2. Russian policies responding to fears of missile defence

Russia’s response to NATO’s missile defence requires moderation by deterring a unilateral missile defence system that enhances first-strike capabilities and divides Europe, while not being perceived as aggressive and thereby undermining multilateral alternatives. Russia attempts to signal a defensive posture by announcing predictable and correlating responses to the incremental development of a unilateral missile defence system by NATO. Russia aims to punish and deny attempts to undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrence. A multilateral alternative entails either including Russia and/or providing legal guarantees which place limitations on future modernisation of missile defence.

Dilemma of response

Due to the absence of common security institutions and international treaties that outline constraints on missile defence, Russia has a dilemma in terms of how to respond to NATO. It can either be a friend that has its security concerns ignored by accepting NATO’s unilateralism, or be an enemy that has its security concerns taken into account by announcing counter-measures. While the US pre-emptive doctrine and withdrawal of the ABM-Treaty increased concerns over a first-strike (Kassianova, 2005: 84), Russia muted its response since it saw an opportunity to increase trust and cooperation after 9/11. In retrospect, this cordial response may have motivated and emboldened the US and NATO to pursue more ambitious missile
defence plans (Author interview, 2011). A senior Russian official expressed Moscow’s frustration with the choice of either accepting an unconstrained NATO or airing its concerns about bloc-politics and being castigated as a neo-imperial power (Author interview, 2012b).

Russia attempts to communicate and gain recognition for its defensive posture that balances zero-sum structures. A multilateral approach is promoted as the solution to the perceived underlying problems in the NATO-Russia relationship. While increasing tension is expected as Russia balances NATO unilateralism, Lavrov (2010) proposes that “whatever the developments, we never slammed the door and always maintained an opportunity for a new beginning in our relations.”

To clearly signal predictability and defensive intentions, Medvedev (2011) suggested that responses will correlate “in accordance with the actual developments in events at each stage of the missile defence programme’s implementation.” Medvedev outlined a clear structured response to a unilateral NATO missile defence in a speech in November 2011, a five-step approach correlating with the gradual increase of NATO capabilities:

First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad on combat alert. Second, protective cover of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be reinforced as a priority measure under the programme to develop our air and space defences. Third, the new strategic ballistic missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be equipped with advanced missile defence penetration systems and new highly-effective warheads. Fourth, I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defence system data and guidance systems if need be… Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the US missile defence system in Europe (Medvedev, 2011).
Russia has sought recognition for its defensive posture by linking missile defence to offensive capabilities in the new START Treaty. Anatoly Antonov (2011), the Deputy Russian Defence Minister for International Military Cooperation and Head of the Russian delegation at the New START, asserts that “when the Americans signed the treaty with us, they recognised the importance of how strategic defensive weapons affect strategic offensive weapons.” The new START Treaty recognised the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons with provisions that would allow Russia to maintain its strategic nuclear capabilities by “development, testing, production, and deployment of new types and new kinds of strategic offensive arms that will have advantages for overcoming missile defence” (US Department of State 2010a). Antonov (2011) suggests that the START Treaty clearly recognises that “the more progress America makes in implementing its missile defence plans, the more problems Russia will have in ensuring its national security.” Lavrov (2011a) warned that “if our concerns are not taken into account, if no equitable joint work is achieved, then we will have to compensate for the emerging imbalance”. Warnings are frequently issued concerning an undesirable but expected arms race (Medvedev, 2010; Putin, 2007). Such a development is described as ‘regrettable’ and “that would not be our choice”, but rather a result of NATO actions (Lavrov, 2011a).

In October 2013, during the same week the US began construction of a missile defence site in Romania, Russia announced that it was sending additional S-300 missile defence systems to Belarus and would merge its missile defence capabilities with Kazakhstan. Russia also pursues further recognition for its security concerns by engaging its neighbouring states through joint statements condemning the missile defence system, with both the CSTO and the SCO. With the added weight of Chinese membership, the SCO announced in June 2011 that “the unilateral and unlimited growth of missile defence systems by any state or a group of states can cause damage to strategic stability and international security” (NATO, 2011).
Balancing unilateralism: deterrence by punishment and denial

Russia intends to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad as deterrence by both punishment and denial. Punishment implies that these counter-measures will reduce the security of NATO members. Denial infers that the Iskander missiles will have a military function by enabling a pre-emptive strike on missile defence components, thereby denying NATO first-strike capabilities. Retired Russian General Vladimir Dvorkin questioned the purpose of placing missiles in Kaliningrad as they could only be used pre-emptively against NATO’s missile defence or against NATO in a war, and he considered neither of the scenarios to be likely (Tsypkin, 2009: 794-795). Tsypkin (2009: 795) argued that the Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad may have become a tool for public diplomacy by placing a cost on NATO unilateralism, rather than having a technical purpose. Slocombe (2009: 55-56) also speculates that the purpose would be to appeal to European fears of the US provoking an arms race. In later years, however, an increasing number of senior Russian officials have suggested that a limited pre-emptive strike against missile defence components can prevent nuclear war, and that the Iskander missiles are “one possible way of incapacitating the European missile defence infrastructure” (Medvedev, 2011; RT, 2012a; Author interview, 2012b). It therefore appears that a pre-emptive strike policy against missile defence components during heightened tensions is under development.

Russia demonstrates what appear to be contradictory responses, caused by diverse objectives. The objectives are to warn against the threats to strategic stability, and to discourage “illusions” among US/NATO military planners that Russia can be coerced with missile defence. Russia consequently warns of robust military responses and possible pre-emptive strikes against missile defence components, though concurrently also announcing that missile defence can be overcome with inexpensive means.

Countering missile defence

Russia increases the quantity, quality and mobility of nuclear missiles in order to make itself less vulnerable to a first strike. Lebovic (2002: 463) posits that Russia’s
main weakness was its excessive reliance on fixed-site land-based missiles with multiple warheads, which makes its nuclear deterrent more vulnerable to a first-strike. The quality of its retaliatory capabilities is being improved by developing stealth capabilities on its ICBMs and advancing its decoys. The new Topol ICBM has features specifically designed to counter future US/NATO missile defence, and is frequently referred to as a missile defence penetrator (NATO, 2011; Litovkin, 2010).

Defending the location of its nuclear missiles is done by increasing their mobility with specialised vehicles, and increasing the amount of nuclear bombers and submarine-launched nuclear missiles. While Russia has reduced its overall nuclear arsenal, it has increased the number of submarines with nuclear capabilities, which are less vulnerable to a nuclear strike. In addition, the missile defence system can be targeted by electronic jamming of the missile defence system (Medvedev, 2008b). Russia’s nuclear missiles can be set on low-warning to enable faster nuclear launch, and decentralising its nuclear launch authorisation to reduce the significance of strikes against its nuclear command centres.

In 2007, in response to the missile defence plans, Russia resumed the long-range strategic bomber flights that had not been operational since the Cold War. In 2011, Russia announced it would almost double defence spending over a three year period from 1.5 trillion roubles in 2011 to 2.75 trillion roubles in 2014 (Nichol, 2011). Putin (2012c) asserted that Russia is “being pushed into action by the U.S. and NATO missile defence policies”, and outlined upgrades in capabilities since “we should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak”. Russia will restore its blue-water navy, equipped with “400 modern land and sea-based inter-continental ballistic missiles, 8 strategic ballistic missile submarines, about 20 multi-purpose submarines” (Putin, 2012c).

While Russia is reducing its nuclear arsenal, this may slow down or reverse in response to missile defence. Medvedev (2008b) announced that missile defence affects Russia’s ability to disarm: “we had planned to decommission three missile regiments of a missile division deployed in Kozelsk from combat readiness and to disband the division by 2010. I have decided to abstain from these plans. Nothing will
Medvedev (2011) later suggested that Russia will “reserve the right to disband”. Medvedev (2011) later suggested that Russia will “reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures” such as withdrawal from the New Start Treaty. A clause in the START Treaty permits Russia to withdraw if there is a deployment “of a missile defence system capable of significantly reducing the effectiveness of the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear force” and/or build-up of “strategic offensive arms” that “could pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation” (US Department of State 2010a).

More vague comments have been made regarding possibly withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned all ground launched missiles with intermediate range.26 Such systems provided lower rank officers with control over short range nuclear weapons to strike European targets. Withdrawing from this treaty would grant Russia greater flexibility to target European missile defence components and also serve the political purpose of imposing a cost on Europe for undermining Russian security. General Yury Baluyevsky proposed that “it is possible for a party to abandon the treaty [unilaterally] if it provides convincing evidence that it is necessary to do so... We have such evidence at present” (RIA Novosti, 2007). Withdrawing from the INF is mentioned as a possible response to missile defence and Putin has suggested the INF no longer serves Russian interests (Thränert, 2009b: 70-71; Blagov, 2007). However, there has been a lack of consistency and the INF Treaty was not mentioned in Medvedev’s speech concerning the response to NATO’s missile defence.

Promoting multilateralism, international law and “Greater Europe”

Russia aims to balance unilateralism to make multilateralism a more attractive option. This policy has been able to bring together most of the Russian political spectrum, which consists chiefly of those seeking integration and opposition to the West. In

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26 The INF Treaty between the US and the former Soviet Union, signed in 1987, eliminated nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometres
broad terms, two political groups emerged in Russia following the break-up of the
Soviet Union. These are typically referred to as the Westernisers and the Eurasianists
(Tsygankov, 2007). Many of the Westernisers initially accepted that Russia should
make unilateral concessions to join the West in order to create a common European
home, which to some extent reflects the ideas of conditionality in NATO’s
enlargement policies. The Eurasianists advocated that Russia is a distinctively
different civilisation and should reject, or even oppose, the West and its values. When
NATO expanded without including Russia, the Westernisers lost much of their
political platform, since it represented the abandonment of a “common European
home”. A broad consensus emerged that unilateral concessions had made Russia
weak, and the West exploited this by constructing a Europe where Russia no longer
belonged. Almost two decades later, there is still no credible political platform in
Russia to embrace the notion that NATO promotes a Europe “whole and free” and
that what is good for NATO is good for Russia. After the failures of Yeltsin’s Euro-
Atlantic integration, the “pro-Western” platform was redefined under Putin and then
Medvedev. They proclaim that Russia is intrinsically European by nature and its aims
are to unite with the West, however, only as equals.

At one end of the Russian political spectrum, the “radical Westerns” suggest that
Russia must accept the double standards of the West in international law as a reality.
At the other end the “radical Eurasianists” advocate that Russia should completely
disregard the international norms and shed constraints in the pursuit of its interests
(Mezhuyev, 2009). Medvedev’s proposal for a new European security architecture
was able to bring together people from both extremes. The proposal recognised that it
is in Russia’s interests to develop a predictable Greater Europe based on the rule of
law, while at the same time refusing to follow rules that were developed without
Russia and that the West itself did not adhere to (Mezhuyev, 2009).

6.2.3. NATO recognition of Russian security concerns

NATO portrays itself and the missile defence system almost solely in terms of
positive-sum intentions. States along Russia’s borders are argued to be socialised
towards becoming stable democracies, while missile defence discourages nuclear proliferation to “rogue states”. Instead of missile defence having zero-sum structures as the source of disputes, the problem is considered that Russia perceives it as zero-sum. Rather than recognising and encouraging Russian misperceptions by addressing zero-sum structures, NATO believes it must stand firm in order to invalidate misperceptions. Alliance solidarity diminishes political plurality as any deviation from the narrative of positive-sum game divides the alliance. NATO does not address Russia’s concerns about setting a precedent by deploying a unilateral missile defence system. Instead it refers to currently announced deployments. Russian concerns about missile defence dividing Europe is perceived as a claim for a “sphere of influence”.

**NATO’s positive-sum nature versus Russian zero-sum mentality**

The debates and arguments among NATO are based on the premise that Russia does not recognise NATO’s benign nature due to its zero-sum mentality. Criticism may be recognised in terms of NATO’s excesses, but NATO’s virtues and intentions are to a great extent beyond scrutiny.

NATO’s own political identity is linked closely to the liberal theory of democratic peace and the democratic distinctiveness program, both of which imply a stated commitment to open and plural debates on security. NATO uses strong emotional rhetoric linked to these ideas, which limits the scope of debates. For example, the Clinton administration conceptualised NATO’s enlargement as “democratic enlargement” (Geis and Wagner, 2008). This identity is reiterated by scholars due to NATO’s socialising powers (Gheciu, 2005; Thies, 2009). NATO’s role in European integration is to make Europe “whole and free”, which missile defence is also seen to promote. Cohen (2013) suggests that the general acceptance of “our peacefulness” has diminished domestic constraints on power as evident by the severely weakened disarmament movements and anti-war movements. Møller (1995) suggests that the end of the Cold War further weakened the attractiveness of the “non-offensive defence” concept in the West, as large scale war was no longer considered an imminent or probable threat. Futter (2013) similarly argues that the end of the Cold
War did not weaken the case for missile defence, but instead the idea became accepted and normalised, with the debate within the US switching from the virtues of missile defence to its infrastructure.

The possibility of inciting a security dilemma with zero-sum policies is disregarded by defining zero-sum in terms of intentions, a mindset or a perception resulting from the Cold War. NATO recognises that “leaders on both sides continue to express hope for a breakthrough and insist that Cold War mindsets are unacceptable” (NATO, 2011). Russia defines Cold War mentality as the inability to evolve beyond the exclusive institutions and bloc-politics that produce zero-sum security. In contrast, the US and NATO tend to define Cold War mentality in terms of Russia expressing security concerns about NATO due to its assumption of what is good for NATO will be bad for Russia. Russian aspirations for ending zero-sum structures therefore become evidence of its zero-sum mentality. US and NATO officials continuously dismiss criticism and defend missile defence by explaining that it is not “intended” to be zero-sum by affecting the strategic balance (Gates, 2010; US Department of State, 2010b). During the Bush-era missile defence plans, Bush similarly reassured that “we don’t believe in a zero-sum world” (US Department of State, 2007).

NATO’s definition of zero-sum as an intention or mentality contradicts with its own rationale for nuclear security, which consistently emphasise the imperative of strategic balance with Russia. The maintenance of a strategic balance with Russia indicates that there are objective indicators and measurements of zero-sum nuclear policies. The “Nuclear Employment Strategy” of the US emphasises the need for “strategic stability with Russia” five times in the nine-page document (US Department of Defense, 2013). The document suggests that:

Although the need for numerical parity between the two countries is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War, large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among US allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship (US Department of Defense, 2013).
The NATO Security Concept of 2010 also emphasises the importance of nuclear parity with Russia by declaring that arms control processes “take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons” (NATO, 2010a). NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture Review suggests that “NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area” (NATO, 2012a). The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review further suggests that “allies support and encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to continue their mutual efforts to promote strategic stability” and that “NATO would expect to see in the way of reciprocal Russian actions to allow for significant reductions in forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO” (NATO, 2012a). The US Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 likewise notes that “the United States must continue to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers – most notably Russia and China” (US Department of Defence, 2010b). The START Treaty negotiations also demonstrate a mutual emphasise on nuclear parity as both sides continue to place great emphasis on the capabilities of the other (Butt and Postol, 2011).

**Russia’s internal dynamics as the only source of opposition to NATO**

Russia’s expression of concerns over missile defence is almost exclusively attributed to internal issues, suggesting that external threats are announced to divert attention away from domestic problems and to boost military budgets. The NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen ignored decades of opposition to missile defence and Russian security documents when he suggested that the Russian presidential elections may have been the reason for the fierce opposition: “It’s a well-known fact that in democracies you have heated debates during electoral campaigns and, of course, I can't exclude the possibility that recent statements are also influenced by the electoral mood in Russia” (Rasmussen, 2011a).
The US Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul (2007) blamed Russia’s democratic deficit, arguing that if Russia was a democracy it would cooperate on missile defence instead of threatening those that do cooperate. He concluded that “the current leadership in Moscow doesn’t see themselves as joining the West. They don’t see Russia as part of the democratic community of states” (McFaul, 2007). Instead, Putin is believed to desire a return to a “bipolar world” (McFaul, 2007). Scholars tend to echo the idea that Russia’s statements on missile defence are motivated by regaining former superpower status. It is suggested that Russia aims to create a conflict with the US in order to make a grand posture on the global stage and advance an image of parity with the US (Cimbala, 2011: 356; Tsypkin, 2012). Thränert (2009b: 71) dismisses Russian security concerns by suggesting that “Putin seeks to portray himself as a great statesman who is not shy in confronting Western policies” and is thereby serving “an anti-Western paranoia”. Other commentators repudiate Russia’s missile defence position by postulating that a “nationalist vision of a resurgent Russian superpower is Putin’s most powerful political trump card” (Moravcsik, 2007).

Russian security concerns are perceived to be caused by Russia’s inability to recognise that NATO has “transformed” itself. Rasmussen (2010a) dismissed Russian security concerns by asserting that “Russia’s new military doctrine does not reflect the real world. It contains a very outdated notion about the nature and role of NATO.” In a more blunt comment, Rasmussen (2012b) stated in Munich that “you can't in any rational way think that NATO constitutes any threat against Russia - it's crazy”. Yost (2012) suggests that Russia expresses its positions “firmly and directly”, though observers nonetheless dismiss Russian statements by suggesting that “they don’t really believe that” and “they’re just saying that”. In summary, Russia’s arguments are “received, understood, and ignored” (Yost, 2012).

**Political plurality and empathy versus NATO solidarity**

Critical debates regarding Russian security concerns were more prominent among other NATO member states when the missile defence system was a project between
the US, Poland and the Czech Republic. While several NATO members positioned themselves as mediators between the US and Russia during the Bush-era missile defence system, the emphasis on “solidarity” increased once missile defence became a NATO project.

In 1999, US attempts to advance missile defence plans ran into fierce opposition, led by the French and then followed by Spain, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada (Rynning, 2005: 119). The French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine sent a letter to Albright arguing that missile defence would undermine nuclear deterrence. French President Chirac sent a letter to Clinton in which he warned that responding to proliferation with a potentially offensive weapon would be “detrimental to international stability as a whole and to certain objectives we have in common” (Graham, 2003: 157). The French President had argued that breaching the ABM-Treaty would “pave the way” for unlimited and unconstrained development with “even more ambitious systems” (Graham, 2003: 157). The US responded by intensifying dialogue with Russia as well, which was meant to both calm Russian fears and to appease Europeans concerned about damaging the international order by antagonising Russia (Rynning, 2005: 119).

For some, empathy for Russian security concerns is depicted as appeasement of Russia at the expense of alliance solidarity. While apprehensive concerning missile defence, France and Germany are committed to upholding the solidarity in NATO. Leaked cables from the US indicate that Norwegian opposition to missile defence was also overcome by framing it as an issue of solidarity. US Ambassador Whitney claimed that Norway had to “adjust to current realities” since it would have a “hard time defending its position if the issue shifts to one of alliance solidarity” (Wikileaks, 2008b). The US Ambassador reported that the US was pressuring the Norwegian government, political figures, journalists, and think tank researchers to overcome Norway’s firm opposition to missile defence, or at least “to a minimum counter Russian misstatements and distinguish Norway’s position from Russia’s to avoid damaging alliance solidarity” (Wikileaks, 2007a). It was argued that “thanks to our high-level visitors”, Norway had begun to “quietly continue work in NATO on missile defence and to publicly criticise Russia for provocative statements”
(Wikileaks, 2007b). Following the Norwegian U-turn on missile defence, it was declared in the Norwegian Parliament that “it is important for the political cohesion of the alliance not to let the opposition, perhaps especially from Russia, hinder progress and feasible solutions” (Stortinget, 2012).

From the Russian side, Antonov (2011) claimed that “our European colleagues often tell us that they are going to cooperate with the United States only if Russia’s concerns are resolved. But they prefer to say this to us only unofficially, in most cases”. The Russians also accuse NATO of placing itself above international law, as NATO’s breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by stationing nuclear weapons on the soil of non-nuclear states is not to be debated with Russia since it is considered an “internal affair” of the alliance (Interfax, 2013a).

Neglecting Russia’s first concern: focus on current and not future capabilities

The US and NATO focus on currently announced missile defence components, rather than addressing Russian concerns about the lack of an international legal regime to impose constraints on future deployments. During the Bush-era missile defence plans, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted that there were too few interceptors to upset the strategic balance between the United States and Russia. Rice dismissed Russian concerns because considering 10 interceptors in Eastern Europe as constituting a threat to Russia “is purely ludicrous and everybody knows it” (Reuters, 2007). Scholars and former US officials similarly echoed Washington’s rebuff of Russian concerns about 10 interceptors, since in order to undermine Russia’s retaliatory capabilities “Washington would need to deploy several hundred missile interceptors” (Thränert, 2009b: 70; see also Slocombe, 2009). At the 2012 International Conference on Missile Defence in Moscow, Assistant Secretary of Defence Madelyn Creedon (2012) did not address the issue of future advancements despite the number of planned interceptors having already been increased to 500.

It is advocated that Russia should not concern itself with future missile defence capabilities because they have not yet been developed and deployed. Future
deployments are not debated as Russia should wait and see what kind of system emerges before opposing it. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, stated: “the missile you’re talking about I know doesn’t exist yet” (Collina, 2011). It is also suggested that Russia should not concern itself given that future administrations might scrap the missile defence system and that the costs might prevent implementing the full potential of the system (Collina, 2011; Zyga, 2012). Previously, Slocombe (2002), the former Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, had urged more understanding for Russian concerns regarding future developments:

American advocates of limited missile defence should however acknowledge the more understandable Russian fear that once the US commits to a partial defence, it will inevitably proceed to technologies and scales of deployment that could conceivably put Russian retaliatory capability at risk.

Dismissing Russia’s second concern: a “divided Europe”

The US interpretation of the end of the Cold War suggests that NATO is eliminating rather than constructing dividing lines in Europe. Jack Matlock (2010), the last US ambassador to the Soviet Union, suggests that one of the greatest Cold War myths promoted by the US is that the Cold War ended with the collapse and defeat of the Soviet Union. Irrespective of counter-arguments concerning the end of the Cold War, the notion that Russia lost its sphere of influence in a defeat rather than abandoning it in pursuit of a “common European home” is very significant to post-Cold War policies (Matlock, 2010). From this perspective, accommodating Russian influence in its neighbourhood and Europe would be to tantamount to accepting that Russia re-establishes its sphere of influence and divide Europe. NATO is therefore not perceived to divide Europe by compelling states to choose between NATO and Russia, but rather it is seen to eliminate dividing lines and spheres of influence by uniting “Europe”. Condoleeza Rice (2008) explained the Cold War as a “zero-sum” conflict since “every state was to choose sides”. She contrasted this to the current situation in which “Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, the
Baltic states, Slovenia, Slovakia, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, are members of NATO and Europe. The Cold War is over” (US Department of State, 2008).

Recognising concerns about NATO dividing Europe contradicts its self-assigned political identity as building a Europe that is “whole and free” and providing stability and democracy on Russian borders. Instead, NATO contrasts its own “European integration” and alliance solidarity with a Russian “sphere of influence”. Friedman (2009) suggests that Russia was never worried about the Bush-era missile defence. Its opposition was instead motivated by apprehension about the US undermining Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions by extending additional security guarantees to Poland. Concerns over the permanent stationing of US troops and subsequent security guarantees are therefore portrayed as demonstrations of Russia’s neo-imperial ambitions for the region, and its inability to overcome the “humiliation” it suffered from losing the Cold War and seeing its former sphere of influence become NATO members (Cimbala, 2007; Slocombe, 2008; Rousseau, 2012). Missile defence is to ensure that this region never becomes part of Russia’s sphere of influence. Including Russia equates to giving Russia a ‘veto’ and restoring a Russian sphere of influence (Rousseau, 2010; Paraschiv, 2012).

**6.2.4. NATO recognition of Russian policy motivations**

NATO presents itself and missile defence as a positive-sum game, which reduces the relevance between unilateralism and multilateralism. Russia balancing unilateral NATO initiatives does not convince NATO to pursue a multilateral alternative to enhance mutual security, but is instead viewed as evidence that multilateralism is untenable. Slocombe (2009: 53) argues that a common perspective in the US is that Russia “is simply muscle-flexing” and “is not to be taken too seriously and certainly not to be encouraged by accommodation”. A senior European diplomat suggested that “the Russians are right on the substance of missile defence, but they have behaved so badly that they have lost the argument. We cannot be seen as giving them a veto on these types of issues” (Leonard and Popescu, 2007:16).
Russia’s warnings of targeting the missile defence components are labelled offensive and given explicit Cold War references. When Russia first warned in 2007 that it would target US missile defence components in Poland, it was rebuffed as an aggressor. Condoleezza Rice stated: “When you threaten Poland, you perhaps forget that this is not 1988”, while the NATO Secretary-General condemned Russia’s “pathetic rhetoric” (Gera and Scisloowska, 2008). In more recent time, Rasmussen (2011c) asserted: “What does NOT make sense, is for Russia to talk about spending billions of roubles on a new offensive system to target the West. This type of rhetoric is unnecessary. This type of thinking is out of date. This type of investment is a waste of money”. Russia’s threat to respond by placing Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad has been denounced by both scholars and politicians as “nuclear blackmail” (McCain, 2008; Bugajski, 2009: 73; Krauthammer, 2009; Spring and Bendikova, 2012).

Rasmussen (2011b) has posited an incompatibility between Russia balancing unilateralism with dialogue concerning multilateralism: “Such deployments would be reminiscent of the past and are inconsistent with the strategic relations NATO and Russia have agreed they seek and with the spirit of the dialogue”. Medvedev’s warning that NATO’s failure to cooperate by including Russian security concerns would require Moscow to implement counter-measures, was labelled by the NATO Secretary-General as a failure by Russia to live up to agreed cooperation: “I don’t think that such statements are in full accordance with what we decided a year ago in Lisbon when we clearly stated that we want to develop a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia” (Klimentiev, 2011).

The clause in the START Treaty which recognises the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons has not been an issue in the NATO discourse. However, Republicans in the US have opposed recognising the “interrelationship” between nuclear weapons and missile defence in the START Treaty given it could become a constraint on missile defence (Sheridan, 2010). Their opposition was however not based on a dispute of the notion that there is an “interrelationship”. Riqiang (2008: 61) argues the US is unconcerned with Russian withdrawal from START since Russia does not have the proper funding to increase its weapons. Given Russia’s aging nuclear arsenal, Russian interests are better served by reducing its
numbers as opposed to upgrading its vast arsenal. Other observers argue that some American and NATO officials believe that Russia is simply seeking an excuse to withdraw from the INF Treaty (Weitz, 2007; Spring, 2007).

Reports prior to the decision to make missile defence a NATO asset demonstrated more caution about adversely affecting nuclear disarmament in Russia. A report assessing the changes in Russian nuclear capabilities, requested by the European Parliament in 2007, recognised that Russia is reducing its nuclear capabilities by almost half, except for nuclear weapons that are more likely to survive a first-strike. The report outlined that from 2007 to 2020, Russia’s ICBMs would be drastically reduced from 1843 to 254, nuclear weapons on bombers would be only slightly reduced from 872 to 728, while submarine-launched ballistic missiles which are less vulnerable to a first-strike would increase from 624 to 744 (Quille, 2007: 7). The report recognised that “this assessment remains vague because it is unclear how Russia might react to the US missile defence plans in Europe” (Quille, 2007: 7). The report also stated that it is difficult to imagine a nuclear war with Russia, though “the more immediately deleterious consequence of such deployments is that Russia will persist with its ‘launch on warning’ nuclear posture”. It was also predicted that Russia “will be more reticent about reducing strategic warhead numbers further, and that it may well break out of the confines of other arms control treaties, thereby becoming less transparent about its capabilities” (Quille, 2007: 7).

6.2.5. Conclusion

It is argued that NATO has a reduced intention and/or capacity to objectively interpret Russian security concerns and policy motivations since political identities and institutional entanglement suppresses political pluralism. Theoretical assumptions about NATO’s ability to transcend power competition can reduce the ability of decision-makers to recognise that they may cause security concerns. Alternatively the intention to objectively interpret security concerns of Russia is undermined by shaming decision-makers deviating from the main narrative, thereby conditioning their political credibility. Liberal theories like democratic peace and broader
democratic distinctiveness provide powerful emotional rhetoric that reduces the ability to reason dispassionately and debate underlying assumptions about power.

Russia is concerned about the precedent set by developing an exclusive/unilateral missile defence system that is not constrained by any international legal regime. The main concern is not capabilities that are already announced, but rather the prospect of continuous future upgrades without a ceiling or regulations. The gradually improved first-strike capabilities are expected to produce a more belligerent posture towards Russia due to escalation control and make first-strike more likely when conflicts escalate as a result. Furthermore, missile defence is perceived to further divide Europe and make Russia’s relations with the rest of Europe dependent and hostage to Russia-US relations. Russia responds with a strategy of punishing and denying the benefits of unilateralism in order to push NATO back to negotiations within a multilateral framework where Russian security interests are also taken into account.

NATO restricts itself to a narrow conceptual narrative with the underlying assumptions that it takes a positive-sum approach to security irrespective of acting unilaterally. Russian opposition is equated to being anti-Western. NATO does not debate whether it produces a zero-sum missile defence infrastructure, as it defines zero-sum in terms of perceptions or a mentality. Consequently, Russian preoccupation with zero-sum policies implies misperceptions that reveal Russia’s world view and subsequent zero-sum objectives. Recognising Russian fears implies appeasing misguided, illegitimate, temporary distractions from domestic issues, and undemocratic status-seeking leadership. The imperative for solidarity within NATO limits political plurality and recognition for Russian security concerns. NATO dismisses the first Russian concern by focusing solely on hitherto announced deployments of capabilities. The second Russian concern about NATO dividing Europe is rejected as contradicting NATO’s basic virtue, and is scrutinised as a possible Russian claim for a sphere of influence.
6. Case Study II: Missile Defence and Russia

6.3. Institutional Inclusion

Institutional inclusion can mitigate the security dilemma by facilitating cooperation to enhance mutual security, build trust, and resolve disputes at an institutional level before they escalate to military confrontation. The extent to which Russia might be included in missile defence is currently under negotiations, which limits this study to assessing the current progress and barriers to inclusion. It is argued that inclusion of Russia is obstructed by irreconcilable differences due to contradictory conceptions of European security, resulting in Russia largely being excluded at the planning, decision-making, and implementation stage. Attempts have been made to institutionalise a Russian voice opportunity, but not an effective voice opportunity, as the institutions are not intended to empower Russia to influence decision-making.

Concerning planning, NATO considers the main purpose of inclusion to be to further enable missile defence as a positive-sum game, while Russia seeks inclusion to constrain the zero-sum potential of missile defence. NATO tends to treat multilateral institutional formats as temporary and transitional towards bilateral arrangements that enhance its autonomy, while Russia views bilateral arrangements as temporary and transitional towards more multilateral formats that increase constraints. NATO advocates conditionality on cooperation, while Russia considers conditionality to contradict a partnership based on mutual compromise.

Common decision-making is restricted by the reluctance to accept Russian influence on limiting NATO’s autonomy. Russian proposals are categorically rejected and do not set a point of departure for negotiations as modifications are not proposed. Russian influence in Europe is equated to undermining NATO and re-establishing spheres of influence. The implementation of missile defence is currently proceeding without Russian inclusion, given that NATO considers its missile defence infrastructure to be independent from and existing parallel to potential future inclusive projects.
6.3.1. Planning

Conceptual inclusion

A Russian voice opportunity at the conceptual stage has been absent, resulting in two contradictory visions regarding the purpose of inclusion. NATO envisions a missile defence system with decision-making centralised in Washington. Russia can be included to the extent it can *empower* missile defence to counter common threats. In order to maximise autonomy, Russian influence is restricted by “limited inclusion” or “selective cooperation”. The source of peace and stability does not derive from an international separation of powers and constraints, but rather from empowering NATO since it advances democracy and security.

Inclusion of Russia has the primary function of preventing Moscow from initiating counter-measures and easing the concerns of member states regarding possible confrontation with Russia. There is also a political and strategic imperative of building a platform for cooperation with Russia, as it can mitigate remaining tensions and potentially lead to increasing trust and cooperation. The secondary function of inclusion is to strengthen the missile defence infrastructure with Russian contributions. Russian could positively contribute to missile defence as it has radars in favourable geographical positions vis-à-vis Iran and shares borders with North Korea. The US has recognised that Russian radars can significantly enhance the effectiveness of early warning for its missile defence, with, for example, the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan (NATO, 2011).

Inclusion of Russia as a de-facto member state would undermine US power and hegemony in Europe that is believed to ensure democracy and peace. William Taft, the former US Ambassador to NATO, has pointed to a candid perspective in the US: “NATO will not be the NATO that brings in the United States to Europe in the way that it needs to if Russia is in it” (Taft, 1997). Risse-Kappen (1995) posits that the US is an “empire by consent”, and Straus (1997) considered it doubtful that Russia would bandwagon behind this “consensus culture”. Condoleezza Rice (2003) defended structures in Europe which centralised power in Washington due to the US ability to
defend common values: “Multipolarity is a theory of competing interests, and at its worst, competing values... Why would anyone who shares the values of freedom seek to put a check on those values?” In other words, the envisioned format for leadership is one where other states bandwagon behind the US rather than seeking to compromise.

NATO’s own legal framework is cited as the key reason for opposing limitations on NATO’s autonomy, which indicates a self-imposed limitation on cooperation by ruling out the possibility of reforms. A senior NATO official argued that NATO’s Article 5 restricts collective defence to be the sole responsibility of NATO member states (Author interview, 2011e). Rejection of collective security with Russia is articulated with statements like: “NATO cannot outsource to non-members collective defence obligations which bind its members” (Rasmussen, 2011d); NATO cannot “outsorce its security to Russia or give Russia a veto over the defence of NATO territory” (Vershbow, 2012); and “NATO will defend NATO, Russia will defend Russia” (Tauscher, 2011). US Secretary of State Clinton (2011) stated more directly that “no ally within NATO is going to give any other country outside the alliance, a veto over whether NATO protects itself by building a missile defence system, against the threats that we perceive are the most salient.” This entails opposition to even open discussions on possible limitations on quantity, technical capabilities and location of radars and interceptive missiles (Tauscher, 2011). Regarding the possibility of constraints, US Ambassador McFaul stressed that “we are going to accept no limitations on that whatsoever because the security of our people, of our allies, is the number-one top priority”, thus “we are going to build whatever missile defence system we need” (Markitan, 2012). Previously McFaul categorically rejected including Russian security interests in a compromise:

We're not going to reassure or give or trade anything with the Russians regarding NATO expansion or missile defense. Rather, our approach is different than that. We're going to define our national interests… And then we're going to see if there are ways that we can have Russia cooperate on those things that we define as our national interests (White House, 2009).
Russia’s contradictory purpose for inclusion

Russia envisions “full inclusion”, motivated by the objective to constrain missile defence development to prevent it from producing unfavourable zero-sum gains that undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Inclusion entails integrating Russia as a full participant and/or agreeing to a legal treaty that sets limitations on missile defence developments.

Russia conceptualises inclusion in terms of a vision rooted in realist ideas that suggests that European security is dependent on a balance of power in a multipolar system. Multipolarity is considered the ideal format to develop a more “internationally democratic” international system (Surkov, 2007; Lavrov, 2013b). This would stabilise international relations by providing a separation of power to ensure mutual constraints. The claim that NATO should have special privileges because it transcends power competition is considered deliberately deceitful at worst and dangerous wishful thinking at best (Author interview, 2011e). Lavrov (2007a) argued that “within the framework of its ‘transformation’, [NATO] has been consistently increasing the number of scenarios for the possible use of force”. Medvedev (2008c) suggested that it is necessary to “de-ideologise international politics and create a genuinely democratic world order”. This is believed to replace a proper discussion on inclusion. Russia wants “to have a serious conversation, not some slogans about peace, friendship, and love” (Anotonov, 2011: 5). International stability and the balance of power are ultimately preserved by nuclear parity as an equaliser to the uneven distribution of conventional capabilities. A senior Russian official expressed the “absurdity” of NATO rejecting the concept of nuclear parity and strategic stability to be given priority in cooperation, as the ABM-Treaty was devised for this sole purpose (Author interview, 2012b).

Russia also perceives great positive-sum gains in missile defence cooperation. The Russian Military Doctrine of 2010 recognises the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology as a key security concern (Russian Federation, 2010a). Zolotarev (2008) clarified that an inclusive missile defence system has a greater ability to prevent proliferation as nuclear weapons lose some of
their value, while having the capacity of maintaining stability among existing nuclear powers and developing trust and cooperation. Missile defence also presents an opportunity to reach a long-awaited post-Cold War political settlement that accommodates Russia in Europe. The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Lukashevich asserted that missile defence cooperation was the most practical approach towards developing a European security architecture where Russia is a full participant, thereby promoting “indivisible security” (Mankoff, 2012: 343). Lavrov (2010) similarly stated that “a counter-balance to ‘the NATO-centrism in Europe’ will help to establish a pan-European security system, in which non-NATO member states are allowed to play a larger role”, and that “there should be no exclusivity in our common area as regards the most sensitive sphere – the military-political dimension of security” (Lavrov, 2010).

Russia identifies missile defence as a crossroads in NATO-Russian relations, since full inclusion could end the confrontational zero-sum format of European security. Failure to include, however, is expected to elevate zero-sum security to new levels because, in the absence of institutional influence, Russia will balance and alleviate unfavourable zero-sum gains with hard power. Lavrov (2010) concluded that NATO’s rejection of moving beyond the existing system denotes that it prefers zero-sum gains “by clinging to its ‘privileged status’” at the expense of the positive-sum gains of resolving common security challenges, given that NATO “cannot do much inside and outside Europe without close interaction with other players”. Rogozin argued that:

Missile defence is primarily an ideological project, and not just missiles. If you are a participant in the system, you are inside the system, you are one of them. And if you are outside, then you are a stranger, and sooner or later this system can be turned against you (Chernenko, 2011).
Bilateral and temporary ad-hoc arrangements

Inclusion in planning has tended to initially be facilitated by weak and often transitional multilateral approaches, which then give way to parallel bilateral arrangements. Bilateral formats take on a 28+1 format that leaves little room for Russia to influence decisions since member states are unlikely to reopen critical discussions after a consensus between all member states has been reached. Because some member states are apprehensive about provoking Russia, there is an incentive to placate these states by reaching out to Russia with multilateral frameworks during the process of gaining internal consensus. However, once internal consensus and a common narrative among members have been reached, the multilateral formats regress towards bilateralism.

The initial format for cooperation between NATO and Russia took place in the multilateral North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) established in 1991, which was further institutionalised when it was replaced by the multilateral Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. The NACC/EAPC included non-members such as the former Warsaw Pact states, the former Soviet Republics, and the former Yugoslav Republics. It provided mechanisms for political dialogue and implemented confidence-building measures responding to the political uncertainties. Russia initially aspired for the NACC to be a stepping stone towards greater inclusion. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev (1992) stated at the first NACC meeting that cooperation was desired “not only at the political but also military level. Today we do not raise the problem of Russia’s accession to NATO but we are ready to look into this as a long-term political goal”. The NACC remained a parallel structure to NATO, and the actual decision-making took place within NATO. Some confusion regarding its function became evident during the Kosovo conflict as some partner countries, most relevantly Russia, believed that NATO’s obligation to consult its partners included a role in decision-making, which was rejected by NATO (Wallander, 2000a: 722). While constituting a multilateral forum for consultations, the implication for Russia was that NATO policies would first be worked out within NATO before being presented to the NACC as a fait accompli (Wallander, 2000a).
Confidence-building achieved through the multilateral NACC paved the way for establishing the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a bilateral format that became the key forum to deepen relations with individual non-members. The PfP had initially been presented as an alternative to enlargement, responding to Russian concerns about CEECs joining an exclusive bloc (Ibp, 1999: 63). The PfP promotes transparency and civilian control over the military, and it became the foundation for enabling joint military planning, training and peacekeeping. The PfP also altered the internal dimension of NATO by making members more willing to move beyond collective defence by developing a capacity for out-of-area missions (Wallander, 2000a). Following NATO’s airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs, Russia unsuccessfully requested a special status within the PfP to constrain NATO in order “to protect it from hostile acts by NATO” (Ibp, 1999: 61). The Russian delegation walked out on the PfP signing ceremony as it was unsuccessful in gaining this special status, though it signed 6 months later in June 1995 after realising that it could not negotiate a better offer (Ibp, 1999: 61). Russia supported and joined the PfP in coexistence with the NACC/EAPC chiefly because it provided a cooperative alternative to enlargement. However, for prospective members and NATO, the PfP facilitated the reconfiguration of their armed forces in line with NATO standards and became a stepping-stone towards membership. Podberezkin (1996) suggested that the PfP not only did not provide Russia with any security guarantees, but it divided Russia from its neighbours and served as a tool for advancing US military infrastructure and “fuelling the anti-Russian atmosphere in these parts”.

The “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” of 1997 (Founding Act) heightened bilateral cooperation between NATO and Russia, and a commitment was made to “build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security” (NATO, 1997). The treaty established new mechanisms and areas of cooperation, such as “possible cooperation in Theatre Missile Defence” (NATO, 1997). The Founding Act was largely a response to the fierce Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, which also created apprehension among European member states concerned about provoking Russia. Primakov stated
that instead of walking away from NATO in opposition to enlargement, he and Yeltsin eventually accepted the Founding Act in 1997 as it was the best deal they could get. The agreement did not have legal guarantees and lost much significance after enlargement.

Former Russian Prime Minister Primakov (2004) argues that the Founding Act was erroneously presented by the Americans to the Europeans as Russia consenting to enlargement, while insisting that all negotiations were to go through Washington. The Founding Act had provided reassurances that there would not be a “permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” in the new member states (NATO, 1997). However, as the Deputy Russian Defence Minister for International Military Cooperation and Head of the Russian delegation at the New START talks, Anatoly Antonov (2011), pointed out, NATO showed a lack of willingness to define “permanent” and “substantial”: “Why are they unwilling to resolve this straightforward matter and calm Russia’s fears, by producing a simple definition of what constitutes substantial combat forces?” The subsequent placement of US bases and missile defence components in the new members have left former Foreign Minister Primakov and some Russian officials to conclude that the agreement has been violated (RFERL, 2005; Author interview, 2012b; Makarov, 2011).

In 2002, cooperation was enhanced further with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which remains today the key institutions for cooperation. The NRC introduced a round-table discussion between member states and Russia that replaced the format of “19+1”, where Russia was consulted after the announcement of a pre-established position by NATO members. The NRC provided mechanisms for discussion and cooperation in a wide range of security issues. One of the first concrete and successful projects was the ongoing “Cooperative Airspace Initiative”, which counters threats in the pan-European airspace through the networking of military and civil air traffic control systems. This initiative counters terrorism as well as providing military transparency for trust and confidence-building. Whilst the NRC has had several successes in bilateral cooperation where there are no elements of zero-sum security, the inability to move forward on issues relating to the common neighbourhood has caused frustration with both sides. Some US officials have
criticised the NRC for constituting a “talking club”. Russia critiques the NRC for being “reduced to political declarations, not backed by any legal and practical implementation” and for its inability to free the neighbourhood from “the false choice between the EU/NATO and Russia” (Lavrov, 2010).

Russia is attempting to alter the rule trajectory by proposing alternative multilateral and legally-binding institutional formats to organise European security. Russia proposed to organise cooperation between NATO and the CSTO, as well as establishing a legally binding European Security Treaty which encompasses all states and security institutions operating in Europe.

Hillary Clinton castigated Russian-led institutions such as the Customs Union as attempts to “re-Sovietise the region”, which the US is determined to “slow down or prevent” (Sheahan, 2012). At one point NATO’s Secretary-General did establish contact with the head of the CSTO and considered a dialogue on the possibility of cooperation. However, the US intervened and rejected engagement with the CSTO as it would “increase Moscow’s influence over our Central Asian partners” and encourage “the same bloc-on-bloc dynamic that manifested during the Cold War” (Wikileaks, 2009a). Later, Secretary-General Rasmussen (2012a) confirmed that all cooperation would follow a bilateral format with members of institutions rather than the institutions. The US and NATO explicitly reject the new European Security Treaty proposal by Russia, as they claim that the current institutions and treaties are capable of meeting existing challenges (Clinton, 2010; RIA Novosti, 2010). There are, however, different views being expressed concerning accommodating Russia in Europe. It was proposed in 2010 in an open letter by former German officials that Russia should be invited to join NATO, (Rühe, et.al., 2010).

**Missile defence: from multilateralism to bilateralism**

The invitation to join missile defence cooperation followed the usual pattern of seemingly embracing multilateralism only to endorse bilateralism. The rhetoric suggested initially that a common system would be built collectively, but a transition
followed into a bilateral arrangement in which NATO consolidates internal agreements before presenting them to Russia.

A key objective for including Russia would be to ensure non-resistance to the project and preferably support for it (Arbatov, 2011: 24). Support would not only improve the effectiveness of missile defence, but also preclude Russia from implementing counter-measures, whilst strengthening the internal cohesion within NATO by allaying the concerns of some member states about antagonising Russia (Simonov, 2007). The NATO Secretary-General dismissed threats to Russia by claiming that “our invitation to cooperate on missile defence is proof of that” (Rasmussen, 2011c). Stephen Hadley, the then Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, asserted later that “if we could get the Russians to agree on BMD then even Sam Nunn and Carl Levin couldn't oppose it” (Futter, 2013: 40). A US Congressional Research Service report points out that “many observers believe that Russia’s pledge to participate removes a major stumbling block to the development of a European territorial missile defence program” (Hildreth and Ek, 2011). The Polish Foreign Minister claimed that Poland was concerned about “paying the price with worse relations with Russia” for stationing missile defence on their territory, though the US had reassured them that “we will fix it with the Russians, we will persuade them that this is no threat to them, don't worry” (Rogin, 2010). A senior Russian official claimed that missile defence is deployed without Russia and negotiations have chiefly served the purpose of portraying an illusion of inclusion to American allies and the international community (Author interview, 2012b).

There is a significant discrepancy in NATO’s rhetoric before and after the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, where missile defence was embraced by NATO members and Russia gave its support conditional on full inclusion. In March 2010, NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen described missile defence cooperation as something that “includes not just all countries of NATO, but Russia too” (Rasmussen, 2010b). He echoed Gorbachev’s rhetoric by calling for a common architecture that stretched “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” to create “one security roof, that we build together, that we support together, and that we operate together. One security roof that protects
us all” (Rasmussen, 2010b). Inclusion of Russia aimed to establish “a missile-defence system that not only defends the Euro-Atlantic community but that also brings it together” (Rasmussen, 2010b). Mutual vulnerability was recognised as a condition: “of course, there are many practical challenges. We would have to hook up our systems. Share intelligence assessments. And link sensitive technologies. But that’s precisely the point”, it would be “a concrete way to build trust and confidence in each other” (Rasmussen, 2010b). The inclusive rhetoric mirroring Russian aspirations was reiterated even more explicitly by NATO spokesperson Appathurai:

Instead of focusing on treaties or conferences we should have a real
european security architecture - one roof that includes the Russians, that
is built with the Russians, that is maintained with the Russians. As a result
they would be and feel part of the same security family, inside rather than
outside looking in and this would help to address Russian concerns about
walls being built with them on the outside (Gardham, 2010).

At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010 a consensus was reached within
NATO, and Russia declared it would support a missile defence system that fully
included Russia as an equal. NATO however refrained from any clear and/or
permanent commitments. The Lisbon Summit Declaration stipulated: “We reaffirm
the alliance’s readiness to explore the potential for linking the United States, NATO
and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time” (NATO, 2010b). Some
vagueness was evident with terms like “linking” and “appropriate time”.

After the Lisbon Summit the rhetoric became markedly less inclusive. NATO
insisted on two separate missile defence systems that could possibly exchange
information. The deployment of the missile defence system also began immediately
after the Lisbon Summit as a NATO project that would occur parallel to NATO-
Russian discussions on how Russia could possibly be included. To some extent this
has already invalidated the previous statements of “building it together”. NATO’s
position is summarised by US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller:
“NATO will protect NATO, and that is the bottom line as far as we are concerned”
(NATO, 2011).
6. Case Study II: Missile Defence and Russia

**Conditioning involvement on accepting an unconstrained NATO**

Institutional inclusion is conditioned on Russia’s “good behaviour”, which involves trusting NATO’s format and not initiating counter-measures. Since NATO set the parameters for missile defence and conditioned inclusion on accepting the established format, the *responsibility* for cooperation and developing relations *shifts* to Russia.

The relationship between NATO and partner states such as Russia has traditionally been conceived as a pedagogic “teacher-student” relationship, where one-sided adaptions are made by the student (Gheciu, 2005; Browning, 2003). Shared institutions are envisioned as a reward and their suspension becomes a form of “punishment” for bad behaviour. Implicit in such a relationship is the understanding that cooperation does not entail mutual compromise on competing interests, but rather it signifies a process for Russian behaviour modification. Political dialogue and consultations may not persist during policy disputes and heightened tensions during conflict, as suspending formal joint activities is useful for political pressure. This purpose of institutions can undermine their ability to serve as a tool for overcoming disputes. This became evident during Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008. NATO responded by suspending formal contact with Russia in the NRC. If missile defence transparency can be easily abandoned and used for political pressure by conditioning it on compliance, it would not be reliable when most needed.

NATO conditions cooperation on trust, which implicitly invalidates Russian demands for constraints. The NATO Secretary-General proposed that inclusion in missile defence must be preceded by Russia first making “a decision to view missile defence as an opportunity, rather than a threat” (Rasmussen, 2010b) as “the foundation for our cooperation must be confidence and trust” (Rasmussen, 2011c). Ellen Tauscher, the US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, also advocated that trust must precede cooperation: “Russia is constantly speaking about guarantees of ABM systems not targeting it, but we think we need to come to cooperation. We provide guarantees after we start cooperating” (RT, 2012a). Some elements of the US discourse portray Russia as having rejected NATO’s offer of inclusion: “If Russia
does not want to enter into a full-blown cooperative missile defence system, more tentative and exploratory ventures are also available to it” (Sestanovich, 2011).

Russia considers NATO’s demand for trust to be inconsistent. While demanding trust from Russia, NATO rejects multilateralism and “far-reaching cooperation on missile defence”, indicating a lack of trust in Russia (Antonov, 2011: 6). Antonov questions the opposition to cooperation on the basis that Eastern Europe cannot be asked to trust Russia with their security: “So are we friends, partners, and allies, or not? Are we still smiling at each other while holding a knife behind our back?” NATO’s demand for trust is portrayed as being simplistic: “If you want to join us, you are welcome to do that, even though you do not understand what exactly it is we are building. But if you refuse to join, that means that your policy is not constructive, that it is aggressive” (Antonov, 2011: 5-6). Medvedev (2011) declared that:

We will not agree to take part in a programme that in a short while, in some 6 to 8 years’ time could weaken our nuclear deterrent capability...
Our participation has to be a full-fledged exchange of information, or we won’t take part at all.

Antonov (2011) similarly declared that: “if we help someone to create a weapon, we need to be sure that this weapon will not be used against us”. Rogozin used more colourful phrasing: “The Russian bear sits in its lair, and the NATO huntsman comes over to his house and asks him to come hunt the rabbit…. Why do your rifles have the calibre to hunt the bear, not the rabbit?” (Reuters, 2011).

6.3.2. Decision-making

High-level meetings and protection of autonomy

Meetings between NATO and Russia have become increasingly institutionalised over the years and cover many issues of cooperation. Most progress has, however, been in areas without zero-sum interests. The ups and downs of NATO-Russian relations depend on when there are conflicting security interests. The development of common
decision-making to resolve differences has not been a focus since the issue of competing security interests have not addressed by NATO. Negotiations over common missile defence cooperation have consistently failed when it comes to maintaining strategic stability by imposing mutual constraints.

Two decades of developing a common approach without inhibiting autonomy

The early 1990s was the most promising era for increasing cooperation between NATO members and Russia. Cooperation peaked with Russia deploying 1600 troops to work with NATO as part of the Bosnian Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). However, Russia became disenchanted by what it perceived as an anti-Serb bias, and Russia subsequently withdrew after disputes regarding command roles and the inability to influence mission objectives. The first major collapse in relations occurred later in 1999 when, within a 2 week period, NATO expanded its membership despite fierce Russian opposition, and then intervened in Yugoslavia without a UN mandate.

Relations improved immediately after 9/11 as Moscow committed itself to a common approach with the US against terrorism. Russia has its own security problems with terrorism in the Northern Caucasus. Moscow consented to NATO intervention in Afghanistan and the establishment of US bases in former Soviet Republics in Central Asia to support this effort. Moscow declared a “new course” of reconciliation and alignment with the West, aiming to coordinate interests to end the zero-sum European structure where being pro-West automatically meant to be anti-Russian (Danilov, 2005).

However, the issue of common decision-making was not resolved and unilateral policies caused relations to plummet again. The US invaded Iraq; the bases in Central Asia appeared to be permanent; another NATO enlargement occurred; the US involved itself in the “Colour Revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine; and these revolutions were linked directly to further NATO enlargement. In 2008, relations declined even further due to the war in Georgia. NATO portrayed the war as a Russian attack on Georgia to punish its aspirations to integrate with the West. Russia depicted a Georgian attack on South Ossetia as instigated by the US/NATO, at best
the result of emboldening Saakashvili by providing uncritical support, and at worst pre-approved by the US.

In 2009, Washington took the initiative to improve or “reset” relations with Russia. The reset was accompanied by what appeared to be a compromise as the US cancelled the Bush-era missile defence and Russia supported UN sanctions against Iran. The war in Georgia prompted European apprehensions about conflicts with Russia, which effectively halted NATO enlargement in the post-Soviet space for the time being. The failure and fall of the Colour Revolutions, the Yushchenko government in Ukraine and the Saakashvili government in Georgia, removed other areas of contention. NATO and Russia found more common ground as Russia provided NATO’s ISAF mission with a supply line to Afghanistan. Cooperation also intensified in counter-terrorism, anti-narcotics operations, and counter-piracy.

Relations declined again in 2010. NATO began to unilaterally develop and deploy its missile defence system without any agreements with Russia, and Russia announced counter-measures if it was not included to the extent its nuclear deterrent was reassured. The decline was exacerbated by the NATO intervention in Libya that toppled the government, which Russia claims exceeded its mandate for protecting civilians. Vowing not to be fooled again, Russia and China became more cautious about accepting any resolutions in Syria where humanitarianism could be equated to regime change. Subsequently, the US and other NATO members in cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Qatar support, fund and arm anti-government groups, while Russia in concert with Iran provides political and military support for the government.

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27 Russia rejects resolutions that solely condemn the government and not the anti-government factions as well. It also rejects any resolution that could possibly be interpreted as authorising the use of force.
Developing a common approach to missile defence without obstructing autonomy

Discussions on missile defence cooperation between the US and Russia were initiated immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in January 1992. Yeltsin announced that Russia was “ready to develop, then create, and jointly operate a global defence system, instead of the SDI system” (Blechman and Vaickikonis, 2010: 29). The first Bush administration responded favourably by proposing the GPALS system (Hynek, 2010). A high level working group was established to work towards a system that would have a jointly manned data fusion centre with information from all radars, interceptors stationed and controlled by each side, and jointly-built space-based interceptors (Blechman and Vaickikonis, 2010). The project ended largely because Russia desired cooperation on Theatre Missile Defence while the US insisted on Strategic Missile Defence. In 1998, a US-Russian Joint Statement called for the establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches or a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), and in June 2000 they signed a Memorandum of Agreement (US Department of State, 2000). Work began on a site for shared information, but then stalled and was eventually dismantled (Sokov, 2010: 123).

Before the US withdrew from the ABM-treaty in June 2000, Moscow proposed a non-strategic missile defence system as a pan-European project, arguing that participation should not discriminate against anyone, irrespective of NATO membership. The Russians proposed a common rapidly deployable missile defence system that would be manned by a multi-national crew, and that could be moved to threatening areas after a negotiated decision for a military solution. In February 2001, this proposal was made more formal with the document “Phases of European Missile Defence”, which Russia presented to NATO.

Another Russian proposal emerged later during the Bush-era missile defence plans, which proposed that the US and Russia could have joint use of Russian radars rather than using the territory of the Czech Republic. This proposal sought to provide the US with a more ideal location for its radars, while making it impossible to turn the missile defence system against Russia if relations deteriorated. The defection-cost of
de-coupling from Russia could be measured in dollars and time due to the need to construct new radars. The proposal included a system with joint control over the Russian Gabala radar in Azerbaijan and Armavir radar in Northern Caucasus (Chivers, 2007; Sokov, 2010). Russia also proposed reactivating the JDEC project that had been agreed upon almost a decade earlier but never became operational.

Potential missile defence cooperation as a NATO-Russia project was first considered with the Rome Declaration in 2002 that established the NRC (NATO, 2002). The document included missile defence as a promising area of cooperation. The objective was to “enhance consultations on theatre missile defence, in particular on TMD concepts, terminology, systems and system capabilities, to analyse and evaluate possible levels of interoperability among respective TMD systems, and explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation, including joint training and exercises” (NATO, 2002). The NRC then established an ad-hoc working group on theatre missile defence. The decision to engage Russia with the potential of missile defence cooperation was partly motivated by the need to reassure Russia, as the US had announced its withdrawal from the ABM-Treaty on the 13th of December 2001. In the following years common missile defence exercises were held in the US in 2004, Netherlands in 2005, Russia in 2006, and Germany in 2008, though after the war in Georgia common exercises were suspended (NRC, 2013).

Following the 2010 Lisbon Summit, meetings and discussions on missile defence cooperation commenced in early 2011. Some common ground has been found with the idea of developing a data fusion centre and an operation centre. A jointly manned fusion centre would receive warning and tracking data from both NATO and Russian radars, which would be transmitted directly to their separate command and control centres. A jointly manned planning and operation centre would facilitate transparency and common threat assessments. While information from each other’s radars can be shared, NATO and Russia would both demand independent decision-making regarding launch of interceptive missiles given that the decisions about a launch must be taken within minutes and it would not be realistic to subject such a decision to lengthy discussions.
NATO proposed in July 2011 that Russian experts observe and analyse the missile defence tests and hold joint NATO-Russian theatre missile defence exercises. Most importantly, NATO proposed sharing data and supporting planning (Rasmussen, 2011e). Rasmussen (2011f) suggested that NATO:

[C]ould consider a joint centre where we look at the missile threat together. Where we share early warning data. And where we exchange information and share assessments. We could also consider a joint centre where we coordinate our responses. This would ensure we could each select the best and most appropriate response

In September 2011, US Deputy Secretary of Defence Alexander Vershbow proposed the establishment of two autonomous missile defence systems that could interact through two common structures (Gazeta, 2011). This would consist of:

[T]wo autonomous systems which could interact: First joint center to exchange data from Russian and NATO radars and sensors, and a second center to carry out joint planning and coordination of missile defence operation, both manned by joint Russian-American staff (Gazeta, 2011).

Such a format for sharing data from early warning radars and space sensors has also been proposed in a common commentary by former US Secretary of State Albright and former Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov (Albright and Ivanov, 2011). The EASI working group on missile defence, consisting of former and current senior decision-makers for creating an inclusive Euro-Atlantic Security Community, has also proposed a similar format for information sharing (Ivanov, Ischinger, and Nunn, 2012). The issue of preserving strategic balance was not addressed by these proposals, with the exception of the EASI working group advocating limitations on Russia’s exposure to NATO by dividing regions and making Russia responsible for stationing its ships in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and Barents Sea (Ivanov, Ischinger, and Nunn, 2012).

NATO is willing to share some information, but refuses to commit to limitations and/or become reliant on Russian information. Both the prospective jointly manned
“fusion centre” and the “planning and operation centre” could therefore easily be cancelled without any impact on capabilities against Russia or other defection-costs. Discussions on limiting current or future capabilities are rejected by NATO, which implies that measurements to ensure constraints and protection of Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities will not be a part of any discussions.

**Russian proposals for missile defence**

Russia first proposal is a common missile defence system with shared responsibilities in Europe. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, Russia outlined a specific proposal for a united full-scale interoperability with “sectoral defence”. The proposal advocates that NATO and Russia assume responsibility for defence of incoming missiles over different sectors of Europe to prevent NATO leaving too large a “footprint” on Russian territory. In other words, if the US will cover missile threats to NATO states along Russian borders, then the Russian exposure will be excessive. The proposal therefore outlines a common responsibility for the missile defence in Europe that also takes into account Russian retaliatory capabilities. It would also imply that most missiles fired from Iran over the Arctic towards the US would go through Russian territory and fall within the responsibility of Russia (Arbatov, 2011).

Alternatively, Russia demands legal guarantees which restrict certain capabilities. If Russia cannot be included, then the second proposal from Russia is for NATO to provide legal guarantees that Russia will not be the target of missile defence. The purpose of such guarantees is to clarify technical limitations on quantity, quality and location, to prevent missile defence from destabilising relations with continuous and unpredictable enhancements of capabilities. While the US withdrawal from the ABM-Treaty demonstrated that even legal treaties can also be temporary, a treaty would nevertheless set the foundation for specific technical negotiations and recognition of what would constitute a threat to Russia instead of dismissing all concerns as “misperceptions” about NATO’s “intentions”. Also, breaking a legal treaty would be obstructed by internal disputes and divisions within NATO, and bring legitimacy and
predictability to defensive Russian counter-measures. Such legal guarantees serve a very different purpose than “political guarantees”, which are non-committing and non-verifiable intentions (Author interview, 2012b NATO is perceived to have broken previous promises like the alleged commitment not to expand NATO, and not stationing substantial troops permanently in new member states. Medvedev (2011) has indicated flexibility as long as there are specific obligations:

We are willing to discuss the status and content of these obligations, but our colleagues should understand that these obligations must have substance and not be just empty words. They must be worded not as promises and reassurances, but as specific military-technical criteria that will enable Russia to judge to what extent US and NATO action in the missile defence area correspond to their declarations and steps, whether our interests are being impinged on, and to what extent the strategic nuclear balance is still intact.

**NATO's response to Russian proposals**

A “sectoral defence” system is rejected since it would make NATO dependent on Russian responsibility over some NATO territory, which violates its Article 5 commitments (Author interview, 2011e; Rose, 2012). Such an integrated system implies that certain territories and populations would be dependent on Russia, which is not acceptable to the US and other NATO members (Mankoff, 2012). Any limitations on the missile defence imply that Russia would have a “veto” over the security of NATO members. Some Eastern European NATO members have expressed concern that the sectoral approach would place them under a Russian “sphere of influence”. Jan Kavan (2011), the former Czech Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, asserted that: “Russia’s idea to build a sectoral BMD which would somehow renew its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe also makes such a proposal a non-starter.” The US therefore accepted the potential of using Russian radars in addition to, though not instead of its currently planned radar locations. Many commentators
also suggest that Russia’s main purpose in demanding inclusion is to divide Europe and the West (Stephens, 2007; Weitz, 2007; Slocombe, 2009: 56).

Legal guarantees that establish limitations on capabilities are rejected since it would give Russia the ability to constrain NATO from protecting its peoples: “We have made it clear that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners” (Rose, 2012). No restrictions are accepted on the mobile Aegis ships either as “these are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defence” (Rose, 2012). Rasmussen argues that legal guarantees would be too complicated since they require a complex legal formula which would face difficulties being ratified in all member states (NATO, 2011). A senior NATO official also argues it would be difficult to gain a consensus on the text among all member states and it would be too time consuming (Author interview, 2011e). The argument that accommodating Russian concerns would be too time consuming was also the argument of Stamatopoulos, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy: “Firstly, should we start negotiations on an agreement with all its legal parameters, can you imagine how long it will take?” (Paniyev, 2013). Furthermore, it is believed to be unlikely that Russia would accept the responsibilities that come with inclusion in missile defence (Author interview, 2011e). The official argued that given NATO has always adhered to its commitments to Moscow, NATO’s management of missile defence should be considered a guarantee to Russia (Author interview, 2011e).

While the US has rejected legal guarantees, it considers giving non-legal “political guarantees” of not targeting Russia that would not be accompanied by specific limitations. The US has offered to make some minor alterations in return for Russia withdrawing its opposition, though these alterations would not necessarily be permanent. Variation of opinions within NATO should be recognised, as French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé in September 2011 declared French willingness to extend a guarantee to Russia.
End of negotiations? Russia rejecting ultimatums disguised as common decision-making

Russia denounces what it considers a strategy of stalling Russia with empty talks while unilaterally deploying a missile defence system, and then forcing Russia to accept a NATO ultimatum of “limited inclusion” or exclusion. In October 2013, Russia began abandoning what it perceives as deceitful discussions. Russia cancelled an order that established a Kremlin working group on missile defence cooperation with NATO, and retracted the presidential decree that created a special envoy for missile defence negotiations with NATO (NTI, 2013).

The significance of discussions and the scope of Russian inclusion has already been diminished since NATO has already decided upon the missile defence architecture and commenced with deployments. Lavrov (2012b) proposed that a joint analysis on the basis of a system had lost some purpose: “we were prepared for this analysis after Lisbon, but, as you know, since that time the NATO Council adopted the decision approving the phased adapted approach proposed by the United States”. The format for discussions is also questioned since decisions are first made within NATO: “it seems that NATO in its internal deliberations over the MD issues intends to be a step or even two ahead of what we will be doing in this area within the NRC” (Lavrov, 2013a). The speed of decisions being made has also prevented Russia from influencing them in a meaningful way: “decisions are being made too quickly by NATO on implementing the American four-base plan for the adapted missile defence system” (Antonov, 2011). The speed appears to have the deliberate effect of excluding Russia. For example, NATO informed Russia about deployment of missile defence components in Spain only immediately before publicly announcing it, which was described by a senior Russian official as an attempt to prevent rather than accommodate Russian influence (Author interview, 2012b).

The Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the decision to deploy missile defence components in Spain and Romania, as “the US practice of ‘fait accompli’ on missile arrangement in Europe”, and for implementing these decisions parallel to the discussions with Russia regarding the format for cooperation (Russian Federation,
Medvedev (2011) similarly complained that the deployment of missile defence is “moving rapidly in Poland, Turkey, Romania, and Spain. We find ourselves facing a fait accompli.” Lavrov (2013a) condemned NATO’s history of taking such an approach and stated: “I hope that some will not try to present us again with a fait accompli”. Lavrov questioned the strategy of asking Russia to join a system designed unilaterally: if NATO “decided everything for us in advance and now just wants technical guidance, then this is the wrong approach” (RT, 2010). Lavrov (2013a) further warned against the strategy of presenting Russia with an ultimatum of limited or no inclusion, as Russia’s desire to cooperate “in no way means that Russia wittingly agrees to accede to the NATO programme development without Russia. The principle of ‘take it or leave it’ does not work here”.

6.3.3. Implementation

Missile defence components are currently being developed and deployed unilaterally by NATO since they are envisioned to exist independently from any potential common projects. The US and Russia carried out a successful “Joint Threat Assessment” in 2011 that analysed the development of ballistic missile technology by Iran and other states in the Middle East (Mankoff, 2012). However, a joint analysis on missile defence cooperation has failed to materialise. A joint report assessing 21st century missile challenges began with exchanges of American and Russian security experts in 2009 (NATO, 2011). NATO officials repeatedly mentioned the Chicago Summit in May 2012 as the aspired to time for reaching an agreement with Russia. Yet, no agreement materialised and NATO announced it would continue to deploy interceptive missiles without Russian involvement or consent.

Possible limits on the US willingness to share information are also becoming evident due to opposition in the Congress, which has never truly embraced the idea of missile defence cooperation with Russia (Mankoff, 2012). A legal treaty which imposes limits on missile defence would require a two-thirds majority for Senate ratification. Such a majority is unlikely to materialise due to the lack of incentives for making any concessions, given that missile defence is already being deployed. The
resistance to any cooperation with Russia was demonstrated by a group of 39 Republican Senators who sent a letter to President Obama in April 2011, demanding his written reassurance that he would not provide any information to Russia, “including early warning, detection, tracking, targeting, and telemetry data, sensors or common operational picture data, or American hit-to-kill missile defence technology” (May, 2011). The senators argued that “any agreement that would allow Russia to influence the defence of the United States or our allies, to say nothing of a “red button” or veto, would constitute a failure of leadership” (May, 2011). The US Congress has already denied their administration to pass on any information regarding missile defence to Russia (Mankoff, 2012). Russian officials reacted to this news by proposing that the US offer to “observe” missile defence tests and exercises would be meaningless without information on functionality (Author interview, 2012b).

6.3.4. Conclusion

There is a basic conceptual disagreement between the US/NATO and Russia regarding the purpose of inclusion that translates into incompatible demands for formats for cooperation. NATO seeks to empower its missile defence system, while Moscow seeks inclusion to constrain its potential offensive application. Including Russia prevents it from initiating counter-measures, which was also important to ensure that member states committed to the construction of the system. After the Lisbon Summit, the rhetoric of the US and NATO became more exclusionary. Any Russian influence is referred to as undermining alliance solidarity, giving Russia a veto over European security, and accepting spheres of influence.

Given that NATO’s own legal framework is cited as the key obstacle for “full inclusion”, NATO itself becomes an obstacle to rather than a facilitator of missile defence cooperation with Russia. NATO is not able to engage Russia in a multilateral format, while Russian proposals are rejected on the basis of “outsourcing” NATO’s responsibilities. Instead of negotiating over the infrastructure, NATO is developing missile defence unilaterally and then expects to be more conciliatory when it is presented with new realities on the ground that cannot be altered. NATO can then
“bring in” Russia at a later stage on its own terms by offering an ultimatum of “limited inclusion” conditional on Russia withdrawing opposition. The implicit understanding is that some transparency in a parallel initiative is better than nothing at all.

Russia is faced with a dilemma regarding the ultimatum of limited inclusion or exclusion. Russia can create trust and cooperation by consenting to a security infrastructure perceived to undermine its security, or reject cooperation and try to pressure through alternative solutions at the expense of heightening tensions and diminishing trust. Russia has previously pursued the former strategy, as increasing trust and cooperation was seen as possibly motivating reforms in European security. However, changes in the Russian posture should now be expected. First, Russia’s previous acceptance of ultimatums or “consolation prizes” after NATO had presented it with a \textit{fait accompli} has proven to be temporary. This has instead diminished NATO’s security dilemma sensibility by marginalising internal critique within NATO. Second, Russia has recovered and is in a stronger position to balance NATO, demonstrated by the sharp rise in its military expenditure. Third, Russia considers itself to have less room for unilateral concessions as the latest NATO initiatives have crossed red lines and constitute existential threats. Such as pushing for Ukrainian and Georgian membership, and developing unilateral missile defence.

Russia has been offered to possibly be included in formats that enhances mutual security, like sharing information to enhance common security against shared threats and transparency to reduce uncertainties. A compromise on “limited inclusion” that only addresses positive-sum issues could possibly emerge if it exists with some forms of Russian “counter-measures” to mitigate zero-sum effects. This would entail the possibility of a Russian pre-emptive strike on missile defence components. Such a compromise is however not probable since Russia will not legitimise a unilateral missile defence system and accept more ultimatums while NATO suggests that cooperation is dependent on Russia trusting NATO and therefore abstaining any counter-measures.
6. Case Study II: Missile Defence and Russia

6.4. Threat perceptions

Exploring NATO’s threat perceptions of Russia is not only a reference to whether Russia is considered a threat to be confronted or contained, but also if these perceptions are pre-determined due to Russian power and a dependency on an external threat for institutional solidarity.

It is argued that NATO is envisioned as an “insurance policy” against possible future conflicts. Russia is to some extent a pre-determined threat as there is no legitimate independent Russian influence in the NATO-centric format of Europe. Moscow can either accept the role of a peripheral object of security aspiring to join the West or become a counter-civilisational force. NATO supports the former by reassuring Russia it is not considered a threat, while at the same time deterring Russia from pursuing a different path. NATO members are divided over current threat perceptions of Russia, which results in disputes in terms of whether the balance should shift towards deterrence or reassurance. The compromise entails the CEECs toning down their critical rhetoric against Russia, while Western European states provide non-official security guarantees against Russia.

**NATO as an insurance policy against future threats from Russia**

The rise of a NATO-centric Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that Russia had to choose between two possible roles in Europe: an apprentice striving to join the Western civilisation by accepting NATO’s dominant role as a common good; or a “counter-civilisational force” that implicitly rejects Western values (Williams and Neumann, 2000). Since Russia does not clearly fit into either of the two roles, NATO has subsequently been conceived as an “insurance policy” against future conflicts with Russia. Former US Secretary of State James Baker (2002) suggested that many in the West still consider Russia a geopolitical rival and “NATO is an insurance policy against resurgent and possibly virulent Russian nationalism”. He further warned against such a policy, given that preparing against a future conflict
with Russia would result in confrontation becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy (Baker, 2002). The incompatibility of these two contradictory responses is referred to by Danilov (2005: 84) as the “deterrence-cooperation dichotomy” in Russia-NATO relations.

The expert group that drafted the recommendations for NATO’s new Strategic Concept attempted to differentiate between existing and future threats. The group stipulated that NATO does not currently consider Russia a military threat to the Alliance. However, they advocated that NATO should nonetheless prepare for potential future conflicts with Russia “because Russia’s future policies toward NATO remain difficult to predict, the Allies must pursue the goal of cooperation while also guarding against the possibility that Russia could decide to move in a more adversarial direction” (NATO, 2010c).

Differentiating between existing and future threats in military planning is also evident on the national level in the US. The 1992 leaked Pentagon paper, the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG), proposed that in the post-Cold War world Russia, was “the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States”, and called for an early introduction of a global anti-missile system (Tyler, 1992). The US Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 suggested that since the threat from the Soviet Union is gone and Russia is not considered a smaller version of the Soviet Union, the US should shift nuclear planning from the “threat-based approach” of the Cold War, to a “capabilities-based approach” (US Department of Defence, 2001). Irrespective of the receding confrontation, both the US and Russia fears the capabilities of the other and have strategic war plans for large nuclear strike options, with hundreds of pre-planned targets.

Defence Secretary Robert Gates argued that the US needs “the ability for regular force-on-force conflicts because we don’t know what’s going to develop in places like Russia and China, in North Korea, in Iran and elsewhere” (Garmone, 2007). A leaked paragraph from the draft of the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 likewise considered its nuclear weapons policy to hedge against possible Russian threats:
Russia’s nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and its future course cannot be charted with certainty. US planning must take this into account. In the event that US relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the US may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture (Weitz, 2005: 9).

Poland has sought reassurances that the missile defence system is reliable as an insurance guarantee against Russia, and sought to activate this policy. Claiming that Russia aspires to regain its sphere of influence, a Polish presidential advisor asked “how long will it take you to realise that nothing will change with Iran and Russia?” (Wikileaks, 2009b). Poland therefore requested a “large US military footprint” on the ground to deter Russia (Wikileaks, 2009b). As Poland does not perceive much security threats from Iran, it has enquired about the capacity of the missile defence system to target Russia in the future, asking “a series of hypothetical questions on the adaptive nature of the system vis-a-vis the changing threat” (Wikileaks, 2009c). In particular, Poland asked whether it had the ability to reconfigure the missile defence system to defend against “missiles coming from elsewhere” (Wikileaks, 2009c). The US reassured Poland that “sea-borne platforms could provide surge capability against threats from an unforeseen direction, land-based sites could be upgraded with more interceptors if the scale of the threat were increased, and radars could be reoriented” (Wikileaks, 2009c). Flexibility has also been advocated by some commentators, suggesting that due to “Russia’s return to authoritarianism” and its development of new delivery systems, missile defence should be flexible in order to possibly change targets if countering Russia was required in the future (Riemer, 2007: 610). The Russian intervention in Georgia demonstrated that missile defence could be used as a powerful diplomatic tool to pressure Russia. On the 14th of August 2008 while the conflict in Georgia was still ongoing, the US responded to the Russian intervention by announcing a deal to station US missiles in Poland. As the Polish president stated: “I believe that the events in Georgia caused the [US] government finally to understand that black is black and white is white” (Pasek, 2008).
Ambiguity bridging division

The unity over current threat perceptions have significantly receded since the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union disintegrated. NATO no longer fears a massive Russian attack on all member states, and the current threat perceptions therefore vary among individual NATO members. This disunity is reflected in NATO’s inability to formulate a clear response and a common posture. Noetzel and Schreer (2009) suggest a “multi-tier NATO” has developed where members with different interests and threat perceptions treat it as an “alliance à la carte”. In terms of relations with Russia, the US linked security to its hegemonic position following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its security documents advocate that security is ensured by preventing any power aspiring to challenge the US leadership (White House, 2002). Many Western European states are concerned about the direction of Moscow, but they fear to make matters worse by alienating Russia. Several Eastern European countries perceive a more pressing threat from Russia and seek NATO to contain it (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009).

An ambiguous position by NATO therefore becomes evident. NATO’s strategic documents posit that Russia is not considered a threat. However, such documents are also intended for foreign audiences and they claim that NATO does not have any adversaries. Consistent with liberal theories on NATO’s transformation, the NATO Security Concept of 2010 stipulates that “the Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary” (NATO, 2010a). Missile defence is argued to not be aimed against Russia, however, Iran is also not identified as a threat. Due to pressure from Turkey and to a lesser extent France, Iran was omitted from being mentioned as a threat and a target for missile defence (Migdalovitz, 2010: 49). Missile defence component were nonetheless accepted on Turkish soil. Rasmussen argued that “there is no reason to name specific countries” since there were many countries developing missile technology (Migdalovitz, 2010: 49). NATO instead vaguely declares that the missile defence system aims to defend member states from missile threats from “the south”. This vagueness and the claims of having no adversaries stand in stark contrast to statements at the state level, where the US clearly points to Iran. Meanwhile, Poland asserts that it does not consider Iran a threat (Rogin, 2010).
The lack of a common perspective about a Russian threat was illustrated by the sale of Mistral war ships by France to Russia. Russia purchased two Mistral class assault ships/helicopter carriers from France, constituting the largest military purchase to have taken place between a NATO member and Russia. The US and several CEECs criticised the sale, which was labelled as a “threat”. The French responded by asserting that refusing to sell arms to Russia “would amount to contradicting our own statements”, and challenged the ambiguous position towards Russia by asserting that Russia cannot be treated both as an ally and as an enemy (Cody, 2010). The identification of Russia as a threat does not only vary between member states, but also within states. For example, during the US presidential elections in 2012, Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney asserted that Russia “is without question our number-one geopolitical foe” (RT, 2012b).

The different perspectives on Russia are harmonised within NATO by strategic ambiguity, by not clarifying a common position. Thränert (2009a) suggests that NATO is dependent on ambiguity as a completely open debate could undermine NATO’s existence. Some Western European states would distance themselves from NATO if it declared Russia a threat, while some Eastern European states would lose confidence in the US/NATO’s commitment to defend them if Russia was unequivocally dismissed as a threat. The US threat interpretations of Russia are aligned closer with those of the CEECs due to the Russian obstruction of a broader NATO influence in the world, though the response takes into account the need for unity among members to preserve the alliance. NATO attempts to accommodate all the different threat perceptions of its members by responding to Russia with both reassurance and deterrence.

The CEECs had to adopt the Western rhetoric when they became members of NATO. The enlargement of NATO was considered by many CEECs as a hedge against a possible future Russian threat (Mandelbaum, 1995), an opinion that was shared by many in Washington (Grayson, 1999: 162). Many leaders in the CEECs desired NATO membership in order to become a part of the “West”. This vision of a civilizational community existed along with the idea that this community would be in opposition to Russia (Schimmelfennig, 2003). A collection of published views by
leaders in CEECs demonstrated that NATO membership was perceived as “the most efficient and abiding way to hedge against future pressures from Russia”, and a “safeguard against the unknown” (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 167). However, the need to conform to the NATO official policy on Russia not being an enemy has led to changes in the CEECs rhetoric. After the Cold War, the identity of NATO had to be changed, as well as the notion that its purpose had been “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down”. Former NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner (1991) promoted a benign identity of NATO by dismissing that it had ever been reliant on a threat, pointing to the evidence that “the Treaty of Washington of 1949 nowhere mentions the Soviet Union”. While Poland initially focused on a “security vacuum” and future threats from Russia, this was replaced with rhetoric seeking the moral high ground (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 235). The leaders of CEECs began to state publicly, sometimes contrary to their own beliefs, that NATO membership was in support of democracy and values, rather than being threat based. In Sweden, however, the ongoing debate of whether to join NATO does not entail “democratisation” or “return to Europe”. Instead the Chief of Defence, General Sverker Göransson, has warned that, without NATO membership Sweden would at best be able to defend itself for a week if attacked by Russia (SVD, 2013).

A discrepancy thus exists between the rhetoric of official policy and the sentiments of the political leadership. In an open letter to Obama, Central and Eastern European leaders have expressed concern about the reset policies of the US towards Russia. In Cold War terminology, it was argued that “Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods” (Adamkus et.al., 2009). It was claimed that “creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region could over time lead to a de-facto neutralisation of the region” would eventually lead to Russia re-establishing its “sphere of influence” (Adamkus et.al., 2009). Improving relations with Russia was recommended to be achieved by a tougher stance, as a “more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only strengthen the West's security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as well” (Adamkus et.al., 2009).
The Western European states, however, compromise by accepting NATO as an institution that will defend Europe from Russia. While some European member states are apprehensive about provoking Russia by, for example, accepting Polish requests to hold military exercises focusing on territorial defence, the compromise is to accept these requests to maintain solidarity (O’Donnell, 2012). Despite great disunity over the Russian intervention in Georgia, the call to reassure CEECs and support Georgia was similarly met. The EU’s own independent report had found Georgia to be the main actor responsible for the war, while the Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini even stated that “Italy’s view is that we can’t create a European anti-Russian coalition, and on that our position is close to Putin’s” (Rampino, 2008). However, in the Eagle Guardian plan drafted in 2010, NATO developed specific defensive war plans against Russia, which have since been expanded to also cover the Baltic States. The US recognised that these plans should be kept secret since “it would require specifying Russia as a potential threat”, which could contradict the official position whereby “NATO has consistently said that it no longer views Russia as a threat” (Wikileaks, 2009d). Furthermore, the US suggests that a shift in NATO policies would be opposed by several countries including Germany, given that “many Allies will take great pains to avoid even the suggestion that the Alliance and Russia are on course toward a new Cold War” (Wikileaks, 2009d). Secrecy is also deemed to be necessary in order not to disrupt cooperation with Russia: “A public discussion of contingency planning would also likely lead to an unnecessary increase in NATO-Russia tensions, something we should try to avoid as we work to improve practical cooperation in areas of common NATO-Russia interest” (Wikileaks, 2010).

6.4.1. Conclusion

NATO is argued to be conceived as an “insurance policy” against possible future conflicts with Russia. There is an absence of legitimate independent Russian influence beyond its borders, reducing the conceptual distinction between benevolent Russian influence and a belligerent Russian sphere of influence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was given the choice of either accepting the role of a peripheral
object of security that seeks to join the Western civilisation, or become a counter-civilisational force. NATO functions as an insurance policy by attempting to cultivate a subject-object relationship through reassuring Russia that it is not a threat in such a format, while concurrently increasing the military leverage to deter Russia from deviating from this format and thereby becoming a threat.

With the end of the Cold War and the following collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO no longer fears a large-scale Russian attack that would involve nuclear weapons. The extent to which Russia is perceived as a current threat differs between NATO member states in different regions. Subsequently there is less unity in terms of responding to a possible Russian threat with reassurance or deterrence. Western European states are more status-quo oriented and aim to resolve disputes by reassuring Russia. CEECs desire more focus on territorial defence to deter Russia. The US seeks to expand NATO influence which to some extent brings the US closer to the CEECs. US documents and discussions between the US and Poland suggest that missile defence is used as a security guarantee against Russia to reassure certain NATO members about possible threats from Russia.
6.5. Conclusion: Containing Russia by reducing nuclear parity

NATO’s development of missile defence adversely affects all four variables that are expected to impact the security dilemma. The missile defence system demonstrates an offensive posture by pursuing a continuous and incremental expansion of capabilities in terms of quantity, quality, and location of missile defence components. Despite having the capacity to distinguish between “rogue states” and Russia, NATO has not demonstrated the intention to make adjustments that would discriminate between potential targets. Uncertainty and insecurity is expected to escalate in Russia as NATO rejects any limitations on missile defence, and future improvements to the system will occur outside the framework and regulation of international treaties. It can be argued that the most pessimistic expectations of the neoclassical realist theory have not materialised due to the cancellation of Phase 4. However, the significance of this cancellation is uncertain since NATO has made it clear that it is not necessarily permanent and it was not attributed to maintaining strategic balance with Russia. US and NATO strategy indicate that mutual invulnerability is not the source of security and stability, but instead military supremacy and the pre-emptive use of force.

NATO demonstrates a reduced ability to recognise the security dilemma developing from missile defence. Institutional solidarity is frequently juxtaposed to recognition of Russian security concerns, while ideologically dichotomous political identities become almost the exclusive focus of analysis. Russia argues that its security concerns derive from the precedent of NATO deploying a unilateral and unconstrained zero-sum missile defence system that will gradually undermine the strategic balance with continuous improvements and further divide Europe. NATO insists that it is force for positive-sum game and defines zero-sum policies as a mentality or intention, implying that conflicts derive from Russia’s “zero-sum mentality”. NATO does not address the precedent set by a missile defence system without constraints by any international treaty, but rather dismisses Russian concerns by focusing on its currently announced missile defence deployments. NATO considers itself to be a force for uniting rather than dividing Europe by focusing on
the positive game of providing stability, rather than addressing the Russian concerns of possible zero-sum game vis-à-vis Russia.

The inclusion of Russia in missile defence is motivated by increasing influence over Russian policies and capabilities, but the prioritisation to maximise NATO’s autonomy imposes limitations. The purpose of “limited inclusion” is to develop trust, demonstrate benevolent intentions, reduce Russian opposition, improve internal cohesion by appeasing member states cautious about aggravating Russia, facilitate cooperation when common interests exist, and allow Russia to align itself with NATO when there are compatible interests. This format for limited inclusion to safeguard autonomy is incompatible with Russia’s demand for full inclusion to impose mutual constraints. Russia seeks institutional inclusion to ensure that it will not be turned against it in the future, thus mitigating the potential zero-sum features of missile defence. The inclusive rhetoric of building a shared missile defence system with Russia diminished after the Lisbon Summit in 2010. While the initial rhetoric focused on developing and managing a system that would bring Russia and NATO under the same roof, the post-Lisbon rhetoric of two separate system emphasised principles such as not “outsourcing” the security of member states or providing Russia with a “veto” in Europe. NATO is currently deploying a unilateral missile defence system, with the understanding that it would operate independently from any Russian contributions resulting from negotiations.

Threat perceptions of Russia vary greatly among NATO members in terms of the extent of threat and their imminence. However, there is a shared concern about possible future conflicts. NATO is deemed to be an insurance policy against Russia due to these possible future conflicts. Russia can be considered a pre-determined threat since it remains a peripheral object of security. This entails that Russia can either align itself with the West in a subject-object relationship, or become a counter-civilisational force. NATO supports the former by reassuring Russia it is not a threat, while preparing against the latter by deterring Russia from pursuing another path. NATO members commit to a benign rhetoric as a reassurance to Russia, though security guarantees and military plans are directed against Russia as deterrence.
7. Conclusion: Ideology, institutions and hegemony

Academic attention devoted to the development of inter-democratic security institutions following the collapse of the Soviet Union has predominantly focused on internal issues concerning the member states and the enlargement process. Liberal and constructivist scholars have been at the forefront in researching institutions and norms, and offer valuable insight into their influence on state behaviour. This internal focus has given much credence to liberal theories, producing strong arguments on the positive-sum game of advancing security by promoting liberal democratic norms and EU/NATO integration. The benign internal characteristics are often assumed to be externalised in relations with non-members. With the general acceptance of the benign virtues of the EU and NATO, the point of departure in scholarly work tends to be the challenges posed by Russia.

This thesis concludes that while liberal institutionalism provides insightful perspectives to explain the behaviour and internal dynamics of inter-democratic security institutions, neoclassical realism has more to offer in terms of explaining the power competition and security dilemma with Russia as a non-member state. The evidence from these case studies suggest that these institutions and ideology reduce the decision-makers’ ability to respond optimally to the systemic pressures in order to maximise security.

Power competition becomes a more prominent issue when dealing with Russia as it is too large to be included in these institutions, and when excluded it becomes a competitor for influence in Europe. Neoclassical realism demonstrates greater ability to address the contradictions emerging when the security institutions that credit themselves with the unification and integration of Europe to a great extent disregard the largest state on the continent as the only non-European European state and a peripheral object of security. With the rise of exclusive security institutions,
“European integration” and “democracy promotion” do not necessarily produce positive-sum security, but take on zero-sum characteristics since they are linked to competition for power. This undermines their ability to provide security by managing and mitigating the resulting security dilemma, irrespective of possible benevolent intentions.

Neoclassical realism can build on contributions from other theoretical frameworks in terms of institutional and ideological influence on decision-makers. However, the main difference is that neoclassical realism considers the ability to maximise security to be diminished by any influence on decision-makers that reduces their capacity to recognise the balance of power logic and to act strategically. The collapse of the Soviet Union skewed the balance of power which led to collective expansionism by the EU and NATO, at the expense of Russian security. However, neoclassical realism expects that the international system will automatically re-balance itself. The contribution of neoclassical realism is to assess the ability of the decision-makers ability to respond strategically to these changes in a manner that maximises security. The ability and intention of the EU and NATO to recognise the balance of power logic is diminished as the world tends to be seen through a Manichean prism of a struggle between the old world of *Realpolitik* and the new world that has transcended power competition. The EU and NATO do not demonstrate “rationality” in terms of acting according to the balance of power logic and subsequently maximising security. This would imply accepting the re-balancing of power, reflected by reaching a post-Cold War political solution with Russia that recognises it as a major European power with its own security interests and as an equal stakeholder in European security. Instead, the geo-ideological paradigm suggests that power maximisation is equated to security maximisation.

The security dilemma can be expected to intensify as the stakes increase on both sides. The EU and NATO are stepping across more Russian red lines by supporting what are considered to be anti-Russian regimes in the post-Soviet space that are prepared to make a zero-sum choice in favour of the EU and NATO, while missile defence will gradually undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Russia does not trust unilateral initiatives and will balance CSDP missions in Europe and NATO’s missile
defence plans. The failure by the Medvedev presidency to get the West to agree to, or at least engage in discussions about developing a new and common European security architecture has left Russia with the option of developing separate institutions like the Eurasian Union that will inevitably compete for influence in the shared neighbourhood. The prospect of competing blocs emerging in Europe is likely to create concerns and further unite the West.

There is a diminished ability to mitigate the security dilemma since the rivalry with Russia has been reinforced by assigning morally dichotomous political identities, and by demanding institutional solidarity founded on opposition to Russia. Inter-democratic security institutions and Russia no longer speak the same language due to conflicting concepts of “Europe”. The notion of being pro-European entails conforming to the EU and NATO. Russian definition of being pro-European by transcending zero-sum bloc-politics is interpreted as evidence of being anti-European and anti-Western. Zero-sum policies are not recognised or defined by objective and observable indicators, but dismissed as a perception, intention or mentality. Similarly, spheres of influence are not defined as exclusive influence resulting from zero-sum structures, but rather as the use of coercion to prevent the sovereign right of states to join “Europe”. The ability of decision-makers to make compromises is consequently diminished as multilateralism or a Russian “veto” in European security becomes conceptually indistinguishable from accepting a Russian sphere of influence. Since both the EU and NATO are to some degree envisioned as “insurance policies” by developing future leverage against a possible resurgent Russia, they are likely to become more confrontational as disputes intensify.

**Proxy variables**

This thesis has explored four variables assumed to affect the security dilemma. These proxy variables are credible indicators to assess contributions to the security dilemma, with both theoretical frameworks recognising their relevance to the security dilemma. They are also valuable because they single out the contributions to the security dilemma by one side in a dyad. For example, *instruments of power* addresses
objective observations of the ability and intentions to differentiate between an offensive and defensive posture rather than only focusing on the perceptions of Russia; *security dilemma sensibility* explores the ability to recognise and consider security concerns and the possibility of defensively motivated policies as opposed to evaluating whether Russia is correct or sincere with its concerns; *institutional inclusion* assesses the degree of willingness to accept influence from Russia in shared institutions at the expense of mutual autonomy; while *threat perception* explores if Russia is considered a threat and whether these threat perceptions are pre-determined due to its power and the need for an external threat for internal cohesion.

It is argued in this thesis that there is strong evidence from proxy variables that the rise of inter-democratic security institutions aggravate the security dilemma with Russia. Inter-democratic security institutions display: 1) offensive instruments of power by linking coercive means to zero-sum objectives; 2) reduced security dilemma sensibility through the influence of assigned dichotomous political identities; 3) a lack of institutional inclusion since maintaining autonomy has the highest priority, thus compromise over competing interests is rejected; and 4) pre-determined threat perceptions of Russia, given there is little conceptual space for independent Russian influence in Europe.

**Instruments of power** demonstrate offensive postures. While there are opportunities to differentiate between an offensive and defensive posture, they are not pursued by either the EU or NATO. Security institutions only pursuing objectives in accordance with and as an agent of the UN, or defending themselves from nuclear proliferation, can to a greater extent rely on defensive and non-provocative means. However, more offensive means become evident when power competition in Europe includes zero-sum objectives.

The EU’s format for “Europeanisation of conflict resolution” introduces coercive means that pursue zero-sum objectives, based on a narrow and contested interpretation of “European integration”. The EU adds its own objectives and conditions of EU integration to post-conflict political solutions, which take precedence and do not necessarily reconcile with UN objectives agreed in concert.
with Russia or the conflicting parties involved in a conflict. The EU’s objectives advocate exclusive influence by imposing structures whereby integration with the EU equates to de-coupling from Russia. Since EU interests tend to align it with one side in a conflict and/or since it strays from its UN objectives, more resistance develops and the EU becomes increasingly reliant on coercive means. The EU use authoritarian powers mandated for peacekeeping and peacemaking to advance its own objectives in Kosovo and Bosnia, where EU objectives undermine the sovereign entities. The CSDP does not require UN authorisation in Moldova and Georgia since its objectives are aligned with the sovereign entities. However, the EU attempts to coerce solutions favourable to its own objectives rather than prioritising a compromise with the breakaway regions.

NATO’s development of missile defence increases first-strike capabilities by gradually undermining Russia’s nuclear deterrent. NATO has some capability but demonstrates no intention to tailor its missile defence architecture to distinguish between potential targets and thereby minimising the adverse effects on Russia’s nuclear deterrent. The quantity and quality of missile defence components are set to incrementally increase, while the locations of these components become more flexible and uncertain with mobile and multi-functional ships. Any limitations on future missile defence deployments are refused and subsequently international treaties constraining and regulating missile defence are rejected. NATO and US strategies suggest that security is not pursued by accepting mutual constraints and vulnerability, but rather by seeking military superiority and the pre-emptive use force. Missile defence has developed within this context to reduce the risks of interventions.

**Security dilemma sensibility** is diminished since a degree of ideological fundamentalism and demand for institutional solidarity inhibits political pluralism. Fixed values are assigned to “Europe” and pluralist conceptions of this contested concept are rejected, resulting in the almost exclusive focus on assigned morally dichotomous political identities. This produces a pre-established narrative in which all competing security interests are depicted as EU/NATO “European integration” conflicting with a Russian “sphere of influence”. Security dilemma sensibility does not necessarily involve accepting the merit of Russian security concerns and
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responses. It is a reference to the ability to assess Russian security concerns and responses, for the purpose of altering one’s own policies when it serves one’s own security. Defending the role of liberal democratic norms and EU/NATO integration in security and being critical of Russia’s arguments and posture does not contradict security dilemma sensibility. However, a diminished security dilemma sensibility is evident by the absence of a conceptual space for their own policies possibly being offensive, while there is no conceptual room for legitimate independent Russian security interests and influence in Europe. Since the EU and NATO do not question the benevolent virtues of their policies, debates and self-criticism are restricted to the excesses, which may possibly provoke Russian responses caused by its unwarranted power interests.

Russia’s proclaimed security concerns regarding both the EU and NATO can be summarised as deriving from their exclusive structures. Russia fears that both the EU and NATO are unable to move beyond the bloc-politics of the Cold War, resulting in a reliance on unilateral and coercive policies to achieve zero-sum objectives. The CSDP is perceived to divide Europe by using coercive means to support political groups and governments that make a clear pro-EU/anti-Russian choice, while NATO’s missile defence is seen to further cement the division of Europe and undermine the Russian deterrent as an equaliser in terms of military capabilities. Russia presents its policies vis-à-vis the EU and NATO as balancing unilateralism and promoting a multilateral alternative.

Both the EU and NATO tend to perceive realist analysis, as communicated by Russia, to be immoral by condoning destructive Realpolitik. There is evidence of a reduced ability to reason dispassionately about European security, as emotional rhetoric promotes a narrow ideological narrative to which conformity is required to retain political and moral credibility. The European integration and democratisation versus Russian sphere of influence and authoritarianism prism undermines discussions on possible zero-sum structures where states must either integrate with “us” or “them”. Zero-sum policies are dismissed by defining zero-sum in terms intention, perceptions or mentality, which contradicts the mere positive-sum identity and nature of the EU and NATO. Russian pre-occupation with managing zero-sum
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politics is instead interpreted as evidence of its “Cold War mentality” and indication of its belligerent intentions. As self-proclaimed “force for good” with benign intentions, neither the EU nor NATO clearly distinguish between different Russian approaches to unilateralism and multilateralism. As a result, Russian attempts to balance unilateralism are perceived to invalidate the feasibility of engaging with Russia in multilateral arrangements.

**Institutional inclusion** of Russian influence is largely absent in terms of empowering Russia to influence decision-making. Autonomy is maximised by both the EU and NATO, which reduces the extent and significance of inclusion. The EU will not compromise by harmonising competing security initiatives and integration efforts in the common neighbourhood. NATO will not compromise by accepting that cooperation includes managing zero-sum impacts on strategic stability. The development of relations with Russia does not demonstrate any sign that Russia would be progressively included and empowered with institutional influence as trust develops. Instead, it is suggested that growing trust would result in Russia accepting the positive-sum nature of the EU and NATO, thereby abstaining from demanding constraints. In other words, while Russia seeks inclusion to institutionalise a soft balance of power, the EU and NATO treat institutions a tool to transcend power competition. A teacher-student relationship advocated by the EU and NATO suggests that cooperation does not entail compromising for mutual gain between two subjects of security, but rather requires Russia to make one-sided policy adaptations.

Both the EU and NATO have established parallel multilateral and bilateral/exclusive arrangements. However, the bilateral institutions invalidate the value of the multilateral initiatives as the former is consistently favoured when there are conflicting interests. Institutions tend to be non-binding and temporary, often serving the purpose of delaying Russian counter-initiatives and gaining support from member states apprehensive about aggravating Russia, before abandoning the multilateral initiatives and presenting Russia with *fait accompli*. By conditioning cooperation on Russia abiding by formats where power is centralising in Brussels or Washington, the responsibility for inclusion shifts to Russia. As these formats do not incorporate or recognise legitimate Russian security interests, Russia reaffirms its
commitment to sovereignty in defence of its security interests. Thus, Russia becomes responsible for its own exclusion as its focus on sovereignty is interpreted as evidence of its opposition to the basic values of inter-democratic security institutions.

High-level meetings are institutionalised, but Russian proposals for harmonising the approach to European security are rejected as they entail accepting Russian influence. Russian proposals to the EU are aimed to constrain unilateral initiatives towards the common neighbourhood in order to harmonise integration efforts and security initiatives. Russian proposals to NATO involve constraining unilateral missile defence deployments in order to prioritise multilateralism through either full inclusion or legal guarantees that can be monitored. These proposals are dismissed as multilateralism is equated to granting Russia a “veto” in European security that enables it to establish a “sphere of influence”.

The different conception of “Europe” has impacted the definition of key concepts like “sphere of influence” that become red lines for decision-makers in terms of limiting cooperation. The issue of spheres of influence is at the heart of the inability to establish a common format for cooperation, as both sides accuse the other of pursuing a sphere of influence. Russia defines spheres of influence as exclusive influence, and denounces EU/NATO structures that compel the common neighbourhood to make a zero-sum choice of integration. The EU and NATO seemingly define spheres of influence as coercing alignment, and they oppose Russian attempts to prevent the sovereign right of the common neighbourhood to choose a side.

Threat perceptions by the EU and NATO are to some extent pre-determined because Russia has remained an object of security. Russia can either be an apprentice in a subject-object relationship or become a counter-civilisational force and a threat to European security. A large power like Russia cannot accept the role of a peripheral object of security since it is a competing power with competing interests. Russia has its own integration projects with the same neighbourhood and as a rival nuclear power as evident by the mutual focus on nuclear parity by both the US and Russia.

Both the EU and NATO become “insurance policies” against Russia. This concept can be understood as a conflicting policy of both reassuring and deterring
Russia. The subject-object relationship is based on the notion that the EU and NATO take a positive-sum approach to security, thus Russia is frequently reassured that it is not a threat. Concurrently, deterrence is promoted by constructing leverage against Russia, with the understanding that Russia would be confronted if it challenges the leadership of these institutions and pursues its interests independently.

Since the different member states perceive the imminence and the extent of threat differently, they have conflicting preferences regarding the focus on the mutual contradictory policies of deterrence and reassurance. In broad terms, the main threat perception is divided between Western and Eastern Europe, while the US tends to align itself closer with the views of the latter. This translates into an ambiguous position. The EU attempts to provide reassurance by not identifying Russia as a threat to the common neighbourhood, while at the same time the EU builds leverage against Russia in these regions and avoids legitimising Russia’s role. NATO reassures Russia that is not considered a threat, while simultaneously providing defence guarantees to Eastern European member states with specific reference to Russia.

The limitations of the study and possible future studies

This thesis cannot explore the full dynamic of relations and provide a complete picture of the security dilemma. Only certain variables are assessed, not the actual impact on the security dilemma. Furthermore, the security dilemma is affected by both sides in a dyad, and Russian foreign policy must be considered as a second independent variable unless one presumes that Russian foreign policy is solely constructed as a response to the rise of inter-democratic security institutions. The focus solely on the contributions of the EU and NATO to the security dilemma is therefore a clear limitation in this study. Prioritising a focus on the EU and NATO could be justified since they are the main institutions shaping the European security architecture and are rarely examined in this manner.

A broader study on Russian contributions to the security dilemma is an area for future studies. This would provide further insight and a more complete picture of the
security dilemma. The evidence of this study indicates that Russia has a predominantly defensive position in seeking to balance unilateral zero-sum bloc-politics. It advocates a multilateral format which recognises a legitimate role for Russia in Europe. Russia has an inconsistent position on sovereignty as it adamantly supports its own in discussions with inter-democratic security institutions, but is often less concerned with the sovereignty of neighbouring states. While Russia is the main proponent of an inclusive European security architecture and pan-European integration, further research is needed on whether Russia would seek institutional privileges in its relations with its immediate neighbours. As a power that defends itself from the EU and NATO as revisionist powers promoting exclusive influence, Russia often indicates that its interference in neighbouring states is motivated by defence. However, assuming that Russia has security interests independent from these defensive concerns, further insight could be gained from exploring how Russian policy and behaviour impacts on the security dilemma.
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Het proefschrift onderzoekt een fenomeen dat zich ontwikkelde nadat de Sovjet-Unie uiteen gevallen was, namelijk de “opkomst” van de EU en NAVO als inter-democratische veiligheids organisaties in Europa. De EU en de NAVO in het post Sovjetische tijdsperk kunnen worden gedefinieerd als inter-democratische veiligheids organisaties aangezien het lidmaatschap “eksklusief” was voor liberale demokratieen. Het argument was dat de veiligheid werd versterkt door de ontwikkeling van stabiele demokratieen binnen Europa, aldus werd er een overtuigend argument geleverd ten gunste van het delegeren van meer verantwoordelijkheid naar de EU en de NAVO voor het beheren van de Europese veiligheids architectuur. Het gevolg was dat, in plaats van Russland te betrekken bij een meer inklusieve Europese veiligheids architectuur door een organisatie als de OVSE te versterken, de trend werd de EU en NAVO te ontwikkelen als de dominerende veiligheids organisaties door het uitbreiden van hun aantal leden en tegelijkertijd de verantwoordelijkheid te nemen voor de veiligheid buiten hun eigen grenzen.

De vraag die opkwam was, welk effect deze ontwikkeling zou hebben op de veiligheids relaties met Russland, aangezien de twee belangrijkste veiligheidsorganisaties, die verantwoordelijk waren voor de vereniging van Europa, niet ook de grootste staat op het continent omvatte. In dit proefschrift worden twee tegengestelde hypothesen gepresenteerd. De eerste hypothese is gebaseerd op liberaal institutionalisme en suggereert dat inter-democratische veiligheidsorganisaties de veiligheid voornamelijk bevorderen door integratie en democratisering als een “win-win situatie”, die ook zorgt voor stabiliteit en zekerheid voor Russland. De tweede hypothese, gebaseerd op neo-klassiek realisme, stelt dat zonder een balans met de Sovjet-Unie, de EU en NAVO zich ontwikkelen als expansionistische “collectieve hegemonieen” met een beperkte rationaliteit. Dat er stelselsmatige prikkels bestaan voor expansionistisch beleid als er een scheve machtsbalans is, is een centraal begrip in het neorealisme. Het denkbeeld van verminderde “rationaliteit” is er een die vraagt om onderzocht te worden door neoklassiek realisme, omdat het zicg richt op het aanpakken van “unit-level” variabelen. Rationaliteit in het realistisch begrip, is het
vermogen om strategisch te handelen in overeenstemming met de logica van de machtsverhoudingen, om de veiligheid te maximaliseren. Het argument hiervoor is, dat gewoonten en ideologie een ongunstig effect hebben op rationaliteit, wanneer de ideologie het denkbeeld omvat dat het zoeken naar hegemonee het realisme te boven kan gaan (power competition) terwijl de gewoonten afhankelijkheid en verstrengeling creeren, waar de inzet voor “solidariteit” en een “gemeenschappelijke stem” een over- of onder balans veroorzaakt. De theoretische benadering is het veiligheids dilemma te onderzoeken. Het veiligheids-dilemma brengt de moeilijkheid met zich mee om te bepalen of de bedoelingen van de ander defensief zijn of offensief, met als gevolg de vraag of men moet reageren met geruststelling of afschrikking. Zo onstaan vaak conflicten.

In dit proefschrift wordt voorgesteld dat exclusieve veiligheidsorganisaties een veiligheidsdilemma noch kunnen verzachten/veranderen of verergeren. Wat betreft het veiligheids dilemma, kunnen exclusieve integratieprojecten de veiligheid ondermijnen van de staat die buiten gesloten is en daarmee concurrerende «zero-sum initiatieven creeren om invloed te krijgen, terwijl het tegengestelde argument is dat de inter-democratische eigenschappen van deze organisaties externaliseren in “positive-sum” beleid.

Wat methode betreft, onderzoekt het proefschrift de bijdragen van de EU en NAVO aan het mogelijke veiligheidsdilemma met Russland. Dit is een onconventionele aanpak gezien het feit dat de aard van het veiligheids dilemma bepaalt dat beide partijen een bijdrage leveren. Dit wordt echter bereikt door het beoordelen van variabelen die eerder bijdragen aan het veiligheids dilemma, dan aan het veiligheidsdilemma als een eind resultaat. Beide theorieën herkennen vier variabelen die invloed hebben op het veiligheids dilemma. Deze zijn bedacht en geoperationaliseerd door het vaststellen van objectieve en meetbare indicatoren. Deze vier variabelen zijn: 1) machtinstrumenten: een verwijzing naar offensief/defensief debat. 2) De gevoeligheid van het veiligheidsdilemma: het vermogen en de intentie om de mogelijkheid te herkennen dat men zelf zou kunnen bijdragen aan angst en dat de ander kan reageren op deze angst.
3) Institutionele integratie: de manier waarop een niet-lidstaat word aangeboden een stem te hebben voor invloed. 4) Gevaar perceptie: de manier waarop een niet-lidstaat word geïdentificeerd als een mogelijke bedreiging vanwege de macht die de staat heeft, in tegenstelling tot hoe deze macht word gebruikt. Twee case studies zijn onderzocht om deze indicators te vinden. De eerste is de ontwikkeling van de raketverdediging van NAVO en de tweede is de ontwikkeling van de EU als een veiligheids organisatie bij de CSDP.

**Machtsinstrumenten**

De bevindingen van de eerste variabel, machtsinstrumenten, geven aan dat zowel NAVO als EU een offensieve houding aannemen ten aanzien van Russland. Het NAVO-raketschild toont aan dat er een mogelijkheid is om onderscheid te maken tussen een offensieve en defensieve houding. Er is echter geen poging gedaan om aan te geven dat de kwaliteit, hoeveelheid en de plaats van de raketverdediging defensief is. Verder verwerpt NAVO ieder internationaal verdrag voor de regeling en beperking van toekomstige raketschild implementaties. De ontwikkeling van de mogelijkheden die de veiligheid bevorderen door middel van onkwetsbaarheid word ook weerspiegeld in de strategie. De VS geeft een verhoogde ontwikkeling aan voor een counterforce strategy (first strike), voor de nucleaire wapens. De vernietiging van de vergeldingsmogelijkheden die de tegenstander heeft krijgt prioriteit.

De offensieve houding van de EU word beoordeeld op verschillende manieren omdat de focus op handhaving van vrede en politiek een direkte konfrontatie met Russland zeer onwaarschijnlijk maakt. Met andere woorden, wanneer de EU niet als een partner van de VN optreed, maar in plaats daarvan zijn eigen zero-sum geopolitische belangen nastreeft in strijd met de VN, word een dergelijk offensief beleid door CSDP gekarakteriseerd als de “Europeanisering van conflictoplossing”. Dat is wanneer het resultaat van een conflict direct gekoppeld is aan de integratie binnen de “Europese eenwording”. Omdat het begrip “Europa” van de EU exclusief is
en in tegenstelling met integratie pogingen van Russland voor dezelfde staten word de “Europese integratie” een zero-sum geopolitisch project. Dit word duidelijk in de Europese CSDP missies. In Kosovo en Bosnie steunde de EU gebaseerd op een VN mandaat om een beleid te voeren dat de doelstelling van het mandaat tegenspreekt. In Moldova en Georgia heeft de EU geen VN mandaat. In alle geschillen waar de EU deelneemt aan het conflict is het echter onder eigen voorwaarden en men verwerpt een compromis tussen de strijdende partijen als het de criteria ondermijnt voor “Europees integratie”.

Veiligheidsdilemma sensibiliteit

De bevindingen van de tweede variabel, veiligheidsdilemma sensibiliteit, suggereert dat de EU en NAVO minder geneigd zijn hun bijdrage aan de veiligheid te herkennen, vanwege “ideologisch fundamentalisme” en “instutionele solidariteit”. Ideologisch fundamentalisme veronderstelt dat ideologie een binair begrip van de wereld ondersteunt waarin de concurrerende veiligheidsbelangen worden gezien door het prisma van de toegewezen politieke identiteiten die moreel dichotoom zijn. Intussen verhinderd de instituionele eis voor “solidariteit” en een “gemeenschappelijke stem” iedere poging om Ruslands bezorgdheid over de veiligheid te erkennen. Als gevolg hebben zowel de EU als NAVO een verminderd vermogen om te reageren op het veiligheidsdilemma daar dit word gelijkgesteld met verraad van hun waarden en het de institutionele cohesie ondermijnt.

Ruslands bezorgdheid over de veiligheid met betrekking tot zowel de EU als NAVO kan worden ontleend aan hun exclusieve structuur. Russland vreest dat zoel de EU als NAVO niet in staat zijn over de blok-politiek van de koude oorlog heen te stappen, wat resulteert in een afhankelijkheid van unilateraal en dwingend beleid om zero-sum doelstellingen te bereiken. Men veronderstelt, dat de CSDP Europa wil verdelen door politieke groeperingen en regeringen die een duidelijk pro-EU/anti Russland keuze maken te ondersteunen, terwijl het raketschild van NAVO word gezien als bindmiddel voor Europa wat de Russische afschrikking ondermijnt als een equalizer in termen van militaire mogelijkheden. Er is bewijs van een verminderd
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vermogen van de EU en NAVO om Europese veiligheid en concurrerende veiligheidsbelangen onpartijdig te diskuteren vanwege emotionele retoriek. Op grond van de afwijzing van een pluralistische opvatting van Europa, de belangrijkste concepten, zoals “multilateralisme”, “zero-sum” en “invloedssferen” worden opnieuw gedefinieerd. Als een gevolg hiervan blijven er conflicten komen tussen “Europese integratie en democratisering” en de Russische “invloedssfeer”.

**Institutionele integratie**

Er zijn talrijke pogingen ondernomen door zowel de EU als NAVO om een partnerschap met Russland te institutionaliseren en Russland een stemrecht te geven om het wederzijdse vertrouwen en de veiligheid te verbeteren. Een effectieve manier om haar stem te laten horen en de mogelijkheid om invloed uit te oefenen, is echter grotendeels afwezig. Een organisatie wordt vaak verontschuldigd om vertrouwen te ontwikkelen door te functioneren als een forum voor het verminderen van misverstanden. Dit wilde men bereiken door Russland toe te laten als toeschouwer om gerust gesteld te worden over de goede bedoelingen. Maar Russland wil geïncludeerd worden om invloed te krijgen. Het weigeren van een effectieve stem is gebaseerd op het feit dat ze een “force for good” zijn, door het bevorderen van positive-sum beleid. De opname van Russland is daardoor vaak opgevat als een pedagogische leraar-leerling relatie waar de EU en NAVO een eenzijdig beleid voeren en Russland belonen of straffen voor wat ze beschouwen als “goed” of “slecht” gedrag. Het traditionele begrip van samenwerking met concurrerende interesses en het beleid coördineren voor een wederzijds gewinst is in tegenstrijd met hoe de EU en NAVO hun rol in Europese veiligheid beschouwen. Zowel de EU en NAVO hebben parallel multilaterale en bilaterale exclusieve regelingen vastgesteld. De instellingen hebben de neiging niet-bindend en tijdelijk te zijn, vaak met het doel de Russische contra-initiatieven te vertragen en het verkrijgen van steun van de lidstaten voor de multilaterale initiatieven opgegeven worden en het daarna aan Russland te presenteren als een “fait accompli”.

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Nederlandse samenvatting

**Bedreiging percepties**

Sinds de val van de Sovjet-Unie was Russland lang een bedreiging die onder controle was. Russland bleef echter een veiligheidsprobleem dat opgelost moest worden. Russland had daarom twee opties, of de rol aksepter en van een “civilisational object” dat streeft naar toetreden van het Westen of een “counter-civilisational” kracht die onder controle gehouden moest worden. Zowel de EU als NAVO hebben dus twee tegenstrijdige methodes gevolgd op het tweede niveau van het beveiligingsdilemma, door zowel Russland gerust te stellen dat het geen bedreiging is en aan te moedigen om de rol van “civilational object” aan te nemen, terwijl tegelijkertijd een asymmetrische macht ontwikkeld werd om Russland onder controle te houden als het de rol niet aan zou nemen. Het problem is dat voor een grote staat als Rusland, die niet vertegenwoordigd is in de belangrijkste Europese veiligheidsorganisaties, het genoodzaakt is zijn subjectiviteit in Europese veiligheid terug te winnen door zijn eigen integratie pogingen voort te zetten en zijn nucleaire vergeldingsmaatregelen te behouden.

Er wordt daarom beargumenteerd dat het dreiging perceptief van Rusland vooraf is vastgesteld omdat de subject-object relatie onhoudbaar is voor een grote staat als Rusland. Terwijl de argumenten die suggereren dat Rusland een bedreiging vormt, geldig en gerechtvaardigd kunnen zijn, is het de afwezigheid van een conceptuele ruimte voor een goedaardig Russland met een onafhankelijke rol in Europa wat het een vooraf bepaalde bedreiging maakt. Met andere woorden, het conceptuele onderscheid tussen Russische invloed en een sfeer van invloed is niet duidelijk. Daarom, zonder enige vorm voor legitieme en onafhankelijke invloed voor Rusland, word het herstel of heropleving van een “assertief” Russland een bedreiging.

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