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Nederlandse Samenvatting: Gevolgen van Multilevel Governance

Het samenhangende onderwerp van dit proefschrift is de vraag hoe het institutioneel ontwerp van een subnationaal multilevel systeem invloed kan hebben op het *proces* waarmee beleid tot stand komt (corruptie), *implementatie* (onpartijdigheid) en *witkomsten* (kwaliteit en generositeit van sociale voorzieningen).

Hoofdstuk 2 (samen geschreven met Natascha S. Neudorfer) gaat over de voornog onbeantwoorde vraag of decentralisatie leidt tot meer of minder corruptie. We beargumenteren dat landen met sterke regionale *self-rule* meer aanleidingen en mogelijkheden bieden voor het vormen van lokale netwerken, met een hoger corruptieniveau tot gevolg. *Shared rule*, daarentegen, leidt tot meer toezicht op nationaal niveau en vermindert zo corruptie. We maken gebruik van een recente dataset en testen onze hypothesen op een subset van 36 landen tussen 1984 en 2006. We vinden robuuste empirische steun voor de voorspelde contrasterende effecten van regionale autoriteit: *self-rule* leidt tot meer corruptie terwijl *shared rule* corruptie juist beperkt.

Het volgende hoofdstuk 3 (opnieuw samen geschreven met Natascha S. Neudorfer) gaat nog een stap verder met betrekking tot de vraag van het effect van *shared rule*. We stellen dat het effect van regionale *shared rule* op politieke corruptie afhankelijk is van het politieke systeem van het land. Presidentialisme vereist het sluiten van overeenkomsten en hindert daardoor verantwoordelijkheid. We betogen dat onder deze omstandigheden regionale afgevaardigden een toegangspunt

vormen voor particuliere belangen en *rent-seeking*. Parlamentarisme biedt geen gunstige omstandigheden voor corruptie. In landen met een parlementair systeem, daarentegen, draagt *shared rule* juist bij aan controle op de overheid. Dit houdt corrupte contacten af. De resultaten van een cross-sectionele tijdreeksanalyse (69 landen tussen 1984 en 2010) ondersteunen onze verwachtingen.

Het derde project, hoofdstuk 4, heeft betrekking op de relatie tussen regionale *self-rule* en de kwaliteit van de overheid in bredere zin. De kwaliteit van de overheid bestaat uit procedurele aspecten (corruptie), alsmede als de kwaliteit van de implementatie (onpartijdigheid) en een waardering van de prestaties (ervaren kwaliteit van overheidsdiensten). De focus verschuift zo van de kwaliteit van het *proces* van beleidsvorming (corrupt of niet) naar *implementatie* (onpartijdigheid) en de kwaliteit van de *uitkomsten* van de overheid. Waar de analyse in de vorige twee hoofdstukken op het niveau van de nationale overheid plaatsvond, zullen hier *regio's* in Europa worden bestudeerd. Sommige Europese regio's hebben een hogere overheidskwaliteit dan anderen. Ik betoog dat subnationale autoriteit, en *self-rule* in het bijzonder, een belangrijke verklaring vormt voor de variatie in de kwaliteit van de overheid maar dat het effect afhankelijk is van regionale voorwaarden: *self-rule* versterkt de kwaliteit van de overheid in regio's met een professionele bureaucratie, weinig prikkels voor corruptie en functionerende anti-corruptie mechanismen, terwijl *self-rule* de kwaliteit van de overheid vermindert in regio's waar deze omstandigheden ontbreken. Ik verstrek empirisch bewijs (196 regio's in 21 landen in 2013) voor de afhankelijkheid van het effect van *self-rule* op kwaliteit van de overheid op regionale voorwaarden.

Ten slotte, na de analyse van het proces van beleidsvorming, de implementatie en de kwaliteit van de output in het algemeen, richt hoofdstuk 5 de aandacht op de uitkomst van beleidsvorming in wat wellicht het meest relevante beleidsterrein is: de generositeit van sociale voorzieningen. Ik betoog dat regionale *shared rule* op nationaal niveau toegangspunten biedt voor lobbygroepen die hervormingen in de verzorgingsstaat kunnen tegenhouden en daardoor de grootte van veranderingen in generositeit wat betreft sociale voorzieningen kunnen verminderen. Regionale

overheden in landen waar de macht wordt gedeeld tussen het nationale en subnationale niveau kunnen een significant invloed hebben op nationale besluitvorming met betrekking tot het maken van wetten, controle op de uitvoerende macht, fiscale controle en constitutionale hervormingen. *Shared rule* van regio's op het nationale niveau kan daarom veel verder gaan dan het verschil tussen federale en unitaire grondwetten. Dit hoofdstuk betoogt dat landen met sterke regionale *shared rule* institutionele toegangspunten biedt voor het beperken van hervormingen van de verzorgingsstaat op nationaal niveau. Daarnaast zorgt de verspreiding van autoriteit over verschillende niveaus ook voor het verkleinen van verantwoordelijkheid en creëert zo prikkels voor regionale overheden om zich als veto spelers te gedragen. De empirische analyse van data uit 18 landen tussen 1971 en 2002 onderbouwt de hypothese dat absolute veranderingen in de generositeit van de verzorgingsstaat kleiner zijn in landen met sterke regionale *shared rule*. De resultaten zijn robuust onder verschillende specificaties van het model.

Al met al onderschrijft het onderzoek dat in dit proefschrift wordt gepresenteerd het belang van regionale autoriteit voor beleidsvorming (corruptie, hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4), alsmede implementatie (hoofdstuk 4) en de uitkomsten van dit proces (kwaliteit, generositeit van sociale voorzieningen, hoofdstukken 4 en 5). De resultaten van alle hoofdstukken benadrukken het belang van disaggregatie van het begrip decentralisatie (zoals gedaan in de *Regional Authority Index* van Hooghe et al. 2010, forthcoming), in plaats van het als een eendimensionaal concept te behandelen. Omdat de twee domeinen verschillende effecten hebben, is het onderscheid tussen regionale *self-rule* en *shared rule* essentieel in de studie van de gevolgen van regionale autoriteit (zie in het bijzonder de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4). Regionale autoriteit als één begrip behandelen kan tot verwarrende resultaten leiden.

