VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT

Hawks, Doves and ‘Rogues’. Liberal Democracies and the Dilemma of Response to ‘Rogue States’

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

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door

Michał Onderco
geboren te Presov, Slowakije
promotor: prof.dr. W.M. Wagner
copromotor: prof.dr. W.G. Werner
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**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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  Three debates about ‘rogue states’

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    - Evaluative debate
    - Policy debate
    - Gaps in existing research

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  - Material capabilities
  - Trade
  - Social norms

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

  - Mixed methods approach
  - Case selection
  - Selecting ‘rogue states’
  - The period under study
  - Quantitative data analysis
  - Small-N qualitative study

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