HAWKS, DOVES AND ‘ROGUES’

LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES AND THE DILEMMA OF RESPONSE TO ‘ROGUE STATES’
Michal Onderco, 2014

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HAWKS, DOVES AND ‘ROGUES’. LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES AND THE DILEMMA OF RESPONSE TO ‘ROGUE STATES’

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geboren te Presov, Slowakije
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1 INTRODUCTION

Deviant members of the international community, labeled as ‘rogue states’, ‘outlaw states’, ‘states of concern’, or ‘pariah nations’ became associated with the main threats to international peace and security in the post-Cold War era.

Already the choice of label to denote these countries carries ‘different assumptions about the sources of deviance and appropriate policy responses.’\(^1\) While the label of a ‘rogue state’ was associated with the resolve to confront these states (by both Clinton and Bush Administrations), the subsequent label of ‘state of concern’ signaled de-escalation (towards the end of Clinton’s second term in the office).\(^2\) The term ‘rogue states’ is a conciliation between reaping benefits of ‘defining power of the U.S. government that succeeded in establishing “rogue state” as an almost universally recognized and understood label’ and ‘[an obligation] to add inverted commas to emphasize that […] these states [do not] have any objective quality of rogueness.’\(^3\)

Some of the actions that ‘rogue states’ engage in – such as the proliferation and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction – have clearly Cold War origins. Already the 1994 National Security Strategy argued that anti-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction is a ‘critical priority’ for the United States.\(^4\) Under the presidency of William Clinton, then, the language of ‘rogue states’ has become all the more important. Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake wrote of ‘backlash states […] that not only choose to remain outside the family but also assault its basic values’ or ‘a group of outlaws.’\(^5\) The then-Secretary of State Albright, in her address at Howard University, summed these states as ‘the outsiders […] basically […] states that feel that they not only have no stake in the system but, on the contrary, that their very being revolves around the fact that they want to undo the system, literally throw hand grenades into it to destroy it.’\(^6\) The language did not change drastically during the presidency of George W. Bush, Clinton’s successor. His first major foreign policy speech (well before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001), Bush spoke of ‘the world’s least-responsible states […] for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life […] gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States of America. They hate our friends, they hate our values,

\(^{1}\) Wagner, Werner and Onderco (2014a: 4)
\(^{2}\) Feinstein and Slaughter (2004), Litwa (2000)
\(^{3}\) Wagner, Werner and Onderco (2014a: 4)
\(^{4}\) White House (1994: 11)
\(^{5}\) Lake (1994: 45)
\(^{6}\) Albright (1998)
and they hate democracy and freedom and individual liberty.\textsuperscript{7} He upped the ante in his 2002 State of the Union speech, where he stated: ‘States like [North Korea, Iran, Iraq] constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. […] the price of indifference would be catastrophic.\textsuperscript{8} Statements such as these, however, clearly denote that the logic of the Cold War was upgraded. Due to the potentially ‘catastrophic’ outcome, also attempts to acquire WMD capabilities are understood as in need of tackling.\textsuperscript{9} And it was not only the US administrations, who signed up to this logic. In response to the parliamentary inquiry about what the government thought of the ‘axis of evil’, the then Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozias van Aartsen remarked in 2002 that ‘vocabulary was probably not ours but we can support the vision that these words represent.’\textsuperscript{10}

**The Dilemma of ‘Rogue States’**

Even if the threats posed by actions of ‘rogue states’ are identified (or assumed to be identified), the ‘dilemma of response’ exists. ‘The dilemma of response’ is a term originating among the scholars of security dilemma\textsuperscript{11}. Booth and Wheeler, in what is arguably the most systematic study of the theory behind security dilemma, argue that the security dilemma is composed of two problems – the dilemma of identification (is this a threat or not?) and the dilemma of response (how to best react).\textsuperscript{12} The essential options for reaction are accommodation or confrontation. These choices originally reflected strategies of cooperation or defection from the simple game theoretic models of Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt.\textsuperscript{13} Cooperation was initially associated with ‘backing down’, whereas defection with ‘firmness’. Scholars have long underlined that reacting cooperatively in dilemma of response requires sensibility to the other sides’ considerations, trust and/or margin of safety. Booth and Wheeler, in their account of security dilemma, consider also expression of security dilemma sensitivity as a sign of cooperation.\textsuperscript{14} Confrontation, ‘firmness’, is on the other hand

\textsuperscript{7} Bush (2001)
\textsuperscript{8} Bush (2002)
\textsuperscript{9} More on this logic, see Press-Barnathan (2004)
\textsuperscript{10} Quoted in Aalberts (2011: 160)
\textsuperscript{11} For many scholars, the term ‘security dilemma’ denotes essentially security paradox – in short, steps made by states to improve their security will make other states feel less secure, thus driving them towards their own acquisition of arms, effectively generating strife. See Herz (1950), Jervis (1976), Jervis (2001). While most scholars assume that states seek physical security, Mitzen (2006) argues that states may as well seek ‘ontological’ (or identity) security.
\textsuperscript{12} For security dilemma, see Booth and Wheeler (2008).
\textsuperscript{13} These three games provided initial framework to think about the security dilemma. See Jervis (1978)
\textsuperscript{14} Booth and Wheeler (2008), Wheeler (2010)
associated with unilateralism and obsession with one’s own security, and disregard for other side’s considerations.\textsuperscript{15} The choice of response is neither simple nor straightforward.\textsuperscript{16} Scholars of security dilemma understand how important it is to correctly identify a possible threat as well as to choose the correct response. This means, for example, successful identification of both desirable endgame as well as the correct path towards it. Even if states agree about the desirable endgame, they may still prefer different paths towards it.

The differences about how to deal with the ‘rogue states’ have existed among the democracies already for some time. These differences were not minor – for example, in 1986, France refused to allow the US Air Force to use its airspace en route to bomb Qadhafi’s Libya, in response to the bombing of La Belle disco in Berlin earlier that year (even though France itself was a victim of Qadhafi’s terror earlier). Thinking about this incident, the President of the United States at that time, Ronald Reagan, wrote in his memoirs: ‘the refusal upset me, because I believed all civilized nations were in the same boat when it came to resisting terrorism.’\textsuperscript{17} The 2003 Iraq war offered too an opportunity to see how states differ in their preferences in dealing with ‘rogue states’. While the United States and some of its European allies preferred military confrontation, other states remained deeply skeptical. We can clearly observe the similar differences when it comes to the Iranian nuclear program. President Bush stated very clearly that ‘[t]he guilty party is Iran. They’re the ones who are not living up to international accords’\textsuperscript{18}. On the other hand, the EU in its WMD strategy postulated that ‘[t]he best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them. If possible, political solutions should be found to the problems, which lead them to seek WMD.’\textsuperscript{19} EU’s main negotiator Javier Solana in 2006 called Iran ‘an old, wise nation’ and ‘a key partner in regional and world affairs.’\textsuperscript{20}

This dissertation is, however, not about the merits and demerits of accommodation and confrontation as policy strategies towards ‘rogue states’. Instead, this dissertation asks a more

\begin{itemize}
\item Glaser (1997), Schweller (1996)
\item Moreover, security dilemma is an ‘endogenous social process’, in which with increasing intensity, ‘the meaning of cooperative moves is discounted and the meaning of conflictual moves amplified’, see Johnston (2011: 18). This process is underlined by what Holsti (1962) called the ‘inherent bad faith’ model, and by the importance of the perceptions of the other side, see Jervis (1976). For application of ‘inherent bad faith’ model to the study of rogue states, see Bleiker (2003), Suh (2006)
\item Reagan (1990: 519) own emphasis
\item Bush (2005: 355)
\item Council of the European Union (2003)
\item Solana (2006)
\end{itemize}
fundamental question – why do some states prefer accommodation and others confrontation when it comes to facing ‘rogue states’?

As will be discussed in the subsequent section, scholars studying ‘rogue states’ have tried to define them, evaluate their impact on world politics, or suggest ways of dealing with them. The big gap which emerges is the question why states respond to the challenge of ‘rogue states’ differently – why some prefer accommodation and others confrontation. Surely, variation over time can be explained by the developments in ‘rogue state’s’ behavior. Yet, the persistent and existing differences between countries continue to exist when it comes to preferences for accommodation or confrontation. This dissertation seeks to explain the difference, using mixed qualitative and quantitative research methods.

One intuitive explanation – rooted in the liberal theory of international relations – is that states would pursue their economic self-interest and would not endanger it by taking confrontational steps. In other words, the stronger economic relation with a ‘rogue state’, the more preference for accommodation towards it. What emerges from this dissertation is a critique of the economic liberalism. In the quantitative analysis, I show that economic interests of states are only weakly – if at all – correlated with states’ positions towards ‘rogue states’. Instead, domestic norms, relations with the United States and military power matter.

More fundamentally, this dissertation studies the roots of foreign policy behavior, trying to understand the influence of military power, culture and commerce on foreign policy of states. Besides this academic interest, it provides a highly topical and relevant study of one of the main conundrums of international politics at the eve of the 21st century. The argument of this dissertation is laid out in a is a collection of seven articles, of which four were published or are slated to appear in peer-review outlets, two are currently under review, and one has been invited for a special issue of a peer-reviewed journal. The remainder of this introduction will briefly introduce the existing research into ‘rogue states’; outline the three possible theoretical explanations – related to power, commerce, and social norms; provide a framework for the mixed-methods approach and conclude by sketching the path for the rest of the dissertation and its contribution to scholarly and policy debates.
THREE DEBATES ABOUT ‘ROGUE STATES’

Thus far, the students of ‘rogue states’ focused on three main debates in their studies:

- The definitional debate about who ‘rogue states’ are and what defines them
- The evaluative debate about their impact on world politics
- The policy debate on how to deal with them

DEFINITIONAL DEBATE

The definitional debate on who ‘rogue states’ are and how they are defined actually comprises two inter-related debates. The first one is whether ‘there is something’ to the concept of the ‘rogue states’ (as opposed to it being the label to describe the opponents of the US) and the second one about the features of the ‘rogue states’.

In the first question, the bone of contention, is whether the concept of ‘rogue states’ is analytically valuable. The opponents argue that the concept of ‘rogue states’ is either void or that if there is one rogue state, it must be the United States. This position was most prominently taken by public intellectual Noam Chomsky21, who summed under the title of ‘rogue states’ the United States and all its allies, for their violations of human rights. How Chomsky selected his cases and why so many blatant violators of human rights remained outside of his analysis remains a question, however. Similar positions were taken by William Blum in his book on the US foreign policy.22 Scholars arguing that the concept of ‘rogue state’ is void, argue that ‘rogue states’ is, in fact, a term used to denote countries which refuse to succumb to the American pressure or remain reluctant to engage in economic dealings with the United States. De Graaff and van Apeldoorn identify ‘rogue states’ as those resisting the neoliberal globalization and ‘liberal end-of-history world order’, drawing near the intellectuals such as Chomsky discussed above.23 A similar logic has been employed by Panah in her study of Iran’s interaction with the wider world, where she argues that Iran was portrayed as a renegade once it discontinued the Western exploitation of the country.24 Authors in this stream of literature, however, fail to answer why Iraq, for example, became a paramount example of a rogue state even though Saddam Hussein was more than willing to sell his oil riches abroad or why the United States never attempted to portray non-democratic countries in Central Asia as ‘rogue states’, even if they refused the US to use their territory for military purposes.

21 Chomsky (2000)
22 Blum (2002)
23 De Graaff and Van Apeldoorn (2011)
24 Panah (2007)
Another argument against the analytical value of ‘rogue states’ is the sub-stream considering them to be an invention of bureaucracies. The main contribution in this sub-stream is Michael Klare’s *Rogue states and nuclear outlaws*.\(^\text{25}\) Klare in his oft-cited book argued that the US Department of Defense had switched its main focus from the Soviet Union to the ‘rogue states’ in order to keep its funding. This explanation, based on the theory of bureaucratic politics\(^\text{26}\), was not unique to the Department of Defense after the end of the Cold War though, the same could be observed when it came to NATO as well. Klare took a clear policy advocacy position and his position that the ‘rogue states’ did not pose a grave threat remained in opposition to the main current of thinking for an extended period of time.

From those authors who take the concept of a ‘rogue state’ as analytically valuable, many of them attempted to define ‘rogue states’ on the basis of hard-and-fast criteria. Miroslav Nincic’s study of the norms-violation and ‘rogue states’ stands out in this stream\(^\text{27}\). In his study of rogue states, he considers that ‘rogue states’ stand out in four important aspects:

- Pursuit of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Support for international terrorism
- Committing acts of aggression
- Conducting externally consequential repression (meaning that the domestic population not only suffers but also creates external consequences from this repression (such as migration flows))

A similar approach was used by Geldenhuys in his study of the deviance in world politics, where he considers most of the ‘sins of the contemporary deviant states’\(^\text{28}\) stemming from the inside of the state. In addition to the signs developed by Nincic, Geldenhuys adds conventional armaments, revolution export, anti-Westernism and assertiveness. However, he also adds that most countries designated as ‘rogue states’ fulfill only some of the criteria and none of the countries fulfills all of them. Geldenhuys, as Nincic, also traces the origin of the ‘rogue state’ labeling to the violation of norms. However, the two researchers differ when it comes to importance of norms. While Nincic adopts norms and values in his research, he remains largely a realist and his assumptions about the behavior of states rest on the expectations of utility-maximization. On the opposite, Geldenhuys sets

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\(^{25}\) Klare (1995)  
\(^{26}\) Allison (1971)  
\(^{27}\) Nincic (2005)  
\(^{28}\) Geldenhuys (2004: 23)
his account of the norm-breaking by ‘rogue states’ within the framework of international community and its emergence as a community act. Although he does clearly differ from the English School scholars by not placing attention to the disruption of the international normative order, he clearly agrees with them that norms exist because they are beneficial for the organization of the (international) community per se.

Thomas Henriksen’s work on the development of ‘rogue states’ was similar to Geldenhuys’ by tracing the emergence of ‘rogues’ as deviants from the Gauls to pirates to Bolsheviks, through their unpredictable and criminal character. A variation of this theme emerges in (not too numerous) literature on the role of international law in labeling of states as ‘rogue regimes’, which includes the critique of the unequal understanding of state sovereignty (and its consequences) and likens it to the description of criminals in domestic system.

An important contribution to the debate was done by Paul D. Hoyt’s quantitative textual analysis of the speeches of the relevant US officials regarding ‘rogue states’ pre-2000. In the speeches, Hoyt found that the most frequent user of the term was the President Clinton himself, who accounted for almost one fifth of all mentions of the ‘rogue states’, followed by Secretaries Cohen, Albright and Perry. Hoyt also found that the four countries most frequently identified as ‘rogue states’ were Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. These countries were found to be dangerous either because they attempted to acquire the capability to use the weapons of mass destruction or posed threat in general.

EVALUATIVE DEBATE

The *evaluative debate* about the impact of ‘rogue states’ on world politics includes both reading into ‘rogue states’ influence on international norms as well as on other aspects of world politics – such as the incidence of conflict. This debate has focused on ‘rogue states’ as norm-breakers or even those who attempt to destroy the international system. On the fringes of this stream of research, new research agendas such as on norm entrepreneurship of the ‘rogue states’ began to emerge. This

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29 Henriksen (2001)  
30 For a discussion, see Werner (2004), Werner (2014)  
31 Minnerop (2003), Simpson (2004)  
32 Roele (2012), Wagner (2014)  
33 Hoyt (2000)  
34 Ogilvie-White (2010), Saunders (2006)  
35 Wunderlich (2014), Wunderlich, et al. (2013)
debate should be seen as separate from the policy debate outlined below, for it concerns itself with the evaluation of the impact of the ‘rogue states’, not with the appropriate policy response.

When it comes to international norms, systemic level of norms-related research on ‘rogue states’ has been provided by the English School scholars, such as Tanya Ogilvie-White. Ogilvie-White, in her analysis of Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, argues that these countries possessed low interaction capacity and thus were not able to become integrated into the normative order. Consequentially, Iran and North Korea then proceeded to delegitimize the normative order (related to non-proliferation) with a goal to destroy it. A similar analysis within the framework of English School was conducted by Elisabeth Saunders who explored the possibility of the international society to exclude the ‘rogue states’ from its midst. To the opposite goes the argument made by Carmen Wunderlich, who has argued that the rogue states’ attempts to delegitimize the existing normative order (in particular in the field of nonproliferation) should be read as a reinstatement of original norms, which have – in Wunderlich’s understanding – deviated in the meantime.

Evaluation of the impact by ‘rogue states’ on world politics using quantitative methods was conducted by Mary Caprioli and Peter Trumbore. Caprioli and Trumbore go back to the early literature when ‘rogue’ status had been derived from egregious treatment of own population and construct their own list of ‘rogue states’, based on human rights related criteria. Unsurprisingly, their list includes 24 (2005) or 46 countries (2003). However, their list more resembles a list of human rights violators than threats to international peace and security (which explains appearance of countries such as Chad, Ecuador or Turkey on their list). Taken together with their inclusion of basically all current conflict hotspots in the world (including countries such as Congo), the results of their empirical analysis showing that these ‘rogue states’ are indeed more involved in armed disputes remains unsurprising.

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36 Ogilvie-White (2007), Ogilvie-White (2010)
37 Saunders (2006)
38 Wunderlich (2014), Wunderlich, et al. (2013). The change in the interpretation of nonproliferation norms is, in itself, an exciting research theme and a possible promising avenue for future research. The main argument in this debate is whether the norms of nuclear nonproliferation have been re-interpreted by the Nuclear Weapon States (and mainly the United States) to the disadvantage of the Non-Nuclear Weapons States. For an affirmative argument, see Joyner (2011); for a counterargument, see Hibbs (2011)
40 Caprioli and Trumbore (2003: 395)
POLICY DEBATE

The policy debates about how to deal with ‘rogue states’ are by far the most populous debates and doing a comprehensive review of literature in this stream is next to impossible. Instead, the main lines of argument can be identified.

The first line of argument is about the possibility of application of deterrence to ‘rogue states’. Proponents of deterrence suggest that ‘rogue states’, just like any other adversary, can be deterred.\textsuperscript{41} Such arguments have been made about the possibility of deterrence of Iraq prior to the 2003 Iraq war\textsuperscript{42}, the possibility of deterring nuclear-armed Iran\textsuperscript{43} or North Korea.\textsuperscript{44} Scholars in favor of applicability of deterrence as a policy response to ‘rogue states’ generally agree that for all their shortcomings, the leaderships of ‘rogue states’ are not suicidal, but rather rationally seeking keeping their own positions.\textsuperscript{45} Similarly, scholars have advanced a proposition that ‘rogue states’ exploit the ebbs and flows of the US foreign and domestic policy to be hostile towards the United States,\textsuperscript{46} possibly with an extension towards an argument that relations between ‘rogue states’ and the US is in fact a signaling towards own domestic populations.\textsuperscript{47} An opposite argument was made by Smith, who argued that irrationality of ‘rogue states’ leads to the failure of conventional deterrence.\textsuperscript{48} The second line of argument is about the evaluation of strategy towards ‘rogue states’ and suggestion of alternative routes (or new steps to be taken). Policy analysts have been active, especially in relation to the US-Iran relationship.\textsuperscript{49} There are numerous arguments that the US

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\textsuperscript{41} For classical formulations of the deterrence as a policy, see Freedman (2004), Schelling (1960), Snyder (1961). For a general argument about deterrence against adversaries (including ‘rogue states’), see Allison (2012), Dueck (2006b)
\textsuperscript{42} Jervis (2003), Mearsheimer and Walt (2003)
\textsuperscript{43} For the most famous statement, see Waltz (2012)
\textsuperscript{44} Jackson (2012)
\textsuperscript{45} For example, an influential argument has been made about the rationality of terrorism (and suicide bombing) as a political strategy. See Byman (2005), Pape (2003), Pape (2005a)
\textsuperscript{47} Davies (2007), Davies (2012), Malici (2007), Malici (2009), Malici and Buckner (2008)
\textsuperscript{48} Smith (2006)
\textsuperscript{49} For notable examples, see Cordesman and Toukan (2010), Dobbins, et al. (2011), Perthes (2008), Perthes, Takeyh and Tanaka (2008). See for example Pollack (2002) for an argument about the necessity to undertake military campaign against Iraq
strategy of confrontation towards Iran is misguided and should, instead, be changed towards the gradual opening\(^{50}\) (or, alternatively, offering a really big carrot\(^{51}\)). Trita Parsi, for example, argued that ‘[s]ustained diplomacy is the only policy that remains largely unexplored and that has a likelihood of achieving results amounting to a more than simply kicking the can down the road. However, as long as US policy focuses on military action and containment, which instead of resolving the nuclear dispute merely slow down or set back Iran’s program at best, it exacerbates rather than addresses other points of tension […]’.\(^{52}\)

Leverett and Leverett went even further, arguing in favor of a ‘Nixonian moment’ in US-Iranian relations, akin to the grand opening between the US and China under the Nixon Administration.\(^{53}\) In their own words,

‘[the Nixonian moment] must be predicated on American acceptance of the Islamic Republic as an enduring and legitimate political entity with legitimate national interests. […] A comprehensive top-down approach is absolutely essential for Washington and Tehran to come to terms with each other, and the record indicates that the current Iranian leadership would be as receptive to such an approach as the Chinese leaders were in the early 1970s. […] Without a clear American commitment to comprehensiveness, Tehran will be obliged to continue assuming that the ultimate objective of Washington’s Iran policy is the Islamic Republic’s overthrow.’\(^{54}\)

Alternative are suggestions about changing the course of negotiations or the negotiations with Iran in order to gain more concessions.\(^{55}\) Robert Jervis, for example, suggested ‘[the United States] will have to convince Khamenei that successful negotiations would greatly reduce the threat to his country posed by the United States and that Washington would be willing to accept an appropriately safeguarded Iranian civilian nuclear program.’\(^{56}\) A former Iranian negotiator, Hossein Mousavian


\(^{51}\) Malici and Walker (2014)

\(^{52}\) Parsi (2012: 234), italics in original

\(^{53}\) The account of the opening was masterfully narrated by its main orchestrator, Henry Kissinger in his two books, Kissinger (1994), Kissinger (2011)

\(^{54}\) Leverett and Leverett (2013: 388-389)


\(^{56}\) Jervis (2013: 115)
too, in his memoir, suggested that ‘[t]he United States should seek a broad relationship with Iran based on mutual respect, noninterference, equality, justice, and common interests,’\textsuperscript{57} noting that ‘there will be no final resolution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear program as long as the bilateral relationship between Tehran and Washington continues to be dominated by hostilities, threats, and mistrust.’\textsuperscript{58}

\textit{Gaps in Existing Research}

Literature dealing with ‘rogue states’, however, remains problematic on three accounts. \textit{Firstly}, there seems to be rather strange fixated focus on the enumeration of the features of ‘rogue states’. The international law does not differentiate between ‘orderly’ and ‘rogue’ states.\textsuperscript{59} The deviance and ‘rogueness’ remains constructed inside states as well as in the international community. As such, the definition remains a contentious topic and no academic work can exhaustively respond to the question ‘who are the rogue states?’ Accepting that objective pinning definition is impossible, the agreed (conventional) opinion accepts that ‘rogue states’ violate core norms of the international community, but this recognition of such behavior cannot be objectively determined. Many researchers, nevertheless, recurrently return to this issue.

\textit{Secondly}, the existing literature is heavily focused on policy. Once the authors answer the question ‘which states are “rogue”?’ they jump to the issue of ‘what to do with them’?. The perplexing situation arises as the step in between, the one which would analyze what the impact of the ‘rogue state’ status and designation is, is absent.\textsuperscript{60}

The \textit{third} limitation, then, stems from the fact that much of the analytical or policy-related literature is focused on single cases – either focusing on particular ‘rogue state’ or dyadic relations of this state with the United States (more often than not, one particular ‘rogue state’). This fixation causes also blindness to the most interesting question of all – why do various countries respond differently to the ‘rogue states’?

This dissertation aims at transcending all three gaps. The first gap, fixation on the enumeration of the features of ‘rogue states’, needs to be overcome by grounding roots of labeling of certain actions as norm deviance in the existing IR literature. The second gap can be overcome by looking at how other states interacted with the ‘rogue states’ and how they reacted to their norm-breaking. And the

\textsuperscript{57} Mousavian (2012: 467)
\textsuperscript{58} Mousavian (2012: 463)
\textsuperscript{59} Werner (2014)
\textsuperscript{60} An unusual example of such study is Heradstveit and Bonham (2007)
third limitation can be overcome by conductive a comparative study of multiple countries’ policies towards ‘rogue states’.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATION

It has been the work of scholars of international relations and foreign policy for many decades by now to explain not only particular moves by states, but to see long-term or wide-spread patterns of behavior among states. Understanding why different democracies respond differently to the challenge of ‘rogue states’ is an important empirical puzzle for the study of international politics.\(^{61}\)

Finding and interpreting general patterns of behavior across states requires the use of different theories of international relations\(^ {62}\).

Explaining individual states’ foreign policies requires a combination of material as well as ideational variables.\(^ {63}\) Use of such framework, on the one hand, weakens the ability to produce a coherent general theory of the international relations.\(^ {64}\) On the other hand, it permits inclusion of insights from other streams of the study of international relations, thus enriching both realist traditions of international politics as well as the other schools of foreign policy analysis.\(^ {65}\)

Three main arguments have been made about the material and ideational influences on foreign policy. The first one has been about the distribution of material capabilities, the second one about the influence of trade and the third one about the influence of ideas.\(^ {66}\)

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\(^{61}\) Throughout this dissertation, I will somehow loosely refer to international relations as international politics, world politics, or international affairs. These terms are meant to denote the same phenomenon. On the other hand, term ‘International Relations’ (or IR) is meant to denote the academic discipline studying the above-mentioned phenomenon.

\(^{62}\) Note that there is a long-standing debate of whether the theories of international politics are applicable as theories of foreign policy. Waltz (1979) famously claimed that the theory of international politics should deal with ‘constraints that confine all states’ (122), whereas its purpose is not to explain ‘why state X made a certain move last Tuesday’ (121). Colin Elman (1996) in the reply to this proposition argued that if states are to behave in ways that Waltz described as general laws, then at the end of the day their moves would amount to the exercise of foreign policy, thus making the claim that the theory of international politics is simultaneously the theory of foreign policy.

\(^{63}\) Wiwel (2005: 369)

\(^{64}\) Donnelly (2000)

\(^{65}\) Little (2003). For schools of foreign policy analysis, see Carlsnaes (2013).

\(^{66}\) The three explanations that follow understandably overlap sizably with the large-N study, where the same criteria are described in a journal-length article.
**MATERIAL CAPABILITIES**

Explaining states’ foreign policy through the influence of material capabilities is the home ground for the neorealist approach to the study of international politics.

For neorealists, policy differences result from differences in states’ power positions. According to Kenneth Waltz ‘the placement of states in the international system accounts for a good deal of their behavior.’ In Mearsheimer’s language, given the anarchic nature of the international system, states are forced to maximize their share of world power in order to maximize their security. This, in turn, means that weak states, lacking the military capabilities to carry out military threats, opt for diplomatic, non-military means. In contrast, powerful states have the full(er) spectrum of foreign policy instruments at their disposal and frequently make use of it. Robert Kagan popularized this notion vis-à-vis the USA and Europe: ‘American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power.’

Neorealists posit that ‘the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics.’ The militarily preponderant powers tend to be more likely to escalate conflicts towards war. By a similar token, countries which have better trained troops tend to win confrontations and therefore can be expected to be more likely to escalate disputes into a military confrontation. Therefore, countries possessing ‘a hammer’ might be reasonably expected to see international disputes as nails.

With a view to nonproliferation, Matthew Kroenig has argued along neorealist lines that nonproliferation policy is best explained by a state’s strategic considerations and its ability to project power over the potential proliferator. Countries able to project power over a nuclear proliferator are more likely to oppose proliferation since it would restrict their freedom of action. While the

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67 Waltz (1993: 45)
68 Mearsheimer (1990)
69 Though defensive realists warn that this strategy may be a foolish one, cf. Walt (1985), Walt (1987)
70 Kagan (2002: 10)
71 Mearsheimer (1995: 91)
74 Kroenig (2009), Kroenig (2014)
argument that power ratio influences the targeting of nuclear weapons programs has been challenged, the methodological questions put some doubts over these challenges.\textsuperscript{75}

Some scholarly as well as journalistic accounts of US policy towards ‘rogue states’ have taken up the neorealist explanation of power capabilities as the driver of the policy.\textsuperscript{76} Similarly, European scholars have argued that the military preponderance drives the United States to pursue a different policy compared to the European diplomatic approach towards Iran.\textsuperscript{77}

**Trade**

The relation between trade and foreign policy can be subsumed into two wide schools: the ‘trade follows the flag’ school and the ‘flag follows the trade’ school.

The ‘trade follows the flag’ school subscribes broadly to the neomercantilist and realist notions of trade being only one of the instruments of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{78} This school’s main point is that ‘political concerns driven by anarchy must be injected into the liberal calculus [about the effect of trade].’\textsuperscript{79}

Realists generally assume that increasing interdependence leads to increasing vulnerability and thus, by the usual realist token of maximizing security, dread it.\textsuperscript{80} For realists, who assume that states think in terms of relative gains as opposed to absolute ones, benefits from trade, obtained by the opposing side, play a significant role.\textsuperscript{81}

Therefore, an argument has been made that trade follows the flag, meaning that the political relations of states are primary to the trade relations\textsuperscript{82}, and while conflict may decrease levels of interdependence overall, the reverse is not true.\textsuperscript{83} Similarly, trade ties are more common among the

\textsuperscript{75} Fuhrmann and Kreps (2010) use the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) as the proxy for power. This index combines military power with other aspects (including industrial production, population and energy consumption). These other aspects are only tangentially related to the neorealist arguments and therefore it is better to look at military aspects alone. This will be, too, path taken in this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{76} Goldberg (2010), Klein (2010), Woodward (2010)

\textsuperscript{77} Posch (2007), Posch (2009)

\textsuperscript{78} Drezner (2010)

\textsuperscript{79} Copeland (1996: 11)

\textsuperscript{80} Gilpin (1977), Waltz (1979)

\textsuperscript{81} See Powell (1991) for a discussion of relative and absolute gains in IR. For an application to the study of trade and political relations, see Liberman (1996)

\textsuperscript{82} Neorealists such as Waltz and Gilpin maintain that trade creates opportunities for conflict. Barbieri and Levy (2003) find that war causes little disruption to the trade, thus challenging the notion that trade and security relations are in any way connected. For similar argument, see Gartzke and Li (2003a)

\textsuperscript{83} Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny (2004), Reuveny, Pollins and Keshk (2010)
allies, but less across alliances.\textsuperscript{84} Middle ground in these arguments have been attempted to be struck by arguments about the effects of trade on conflict being contingent on domestic regime type or coalition ideology, which have produced mixed empirical results.\textsuperscript{85} A major refashioning of this debate has been brought by Copeland’s trade expectations theory, which argues that high interdependence may induce peace, but only if there is an expectation of the maintenance of the relation. In other words – if there is no likelihood of war or major confrontation otherwise, the economic relations induce peace among countries.\textsuperscript{86} This point simultaneously corresponds to the argument that if worsening of relations between states is not seen as permanent or leading to a serious confrontation, trade between them may not reflect the political change.\textsuperscript{87} This point corresponds with other research on economic sanctions, which found that sanctions are more likely to be imposed if there is an expectation of the future conflict, but less likely if there is an expectation of the future cooperation.\textsuperscript{88}

The ‘flag follows the trade’ school, on the other hand, highlights the pacifying effects of trade. The school is spiritually rooted in Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws, which argued that commerce leads to peace, for self-interest would preclude war.\textsuperscript{89} Its later roots are found in the works of the Manchester Liberalism (Adam Smith, followed later by Richard Cobden), Norman Angell and the most recent resurrection in the work of Salomon Polachek and Richard Rosecrance.\textsuperscript{90} Units are \textit{structurally} interdependent if ‘affected by one another’s behavior (whether they like it or not)’.\textsuperscript{91} As De Wilde argues, interdependence can affect units’ behavior in three ways: systemic, functionalist or integrative. Systemic interdependence relates to the macro-structure within which the units interact. Functionalist interdependence, refers to cooperative mechanisms coordinating interaction between units, such as intergovernmental organizations regulating interaction between states. The third type

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\textsuperscript{84} Gowa and Mansfield (1993), Gowa and Mansfield (2004). See Pollins (1989) for an argument that customers prefer goods produced by allies. Similar results were found by Dixon and Moon (1993) who argued that the United States tend to trade with allies
\textsuperscript{86} Copeland (1996). Morrow (1999) makes the argument that the maintenance of trade is a signal towards the counterpart about the expectation of a long-term political relation. For a similar argument, see Mastanduno (1999)
\textsuperscript{87} Davis and Meunier (2011), Meunier (2013)
\textsuperscript{88} Drezner (1998), Drezner (1999)
\textsuperscript{89} Montesquieu (1989 [1748]). Gaddis (1986) persuasively argues that there is nothing automatic about interdependence promoting peace.
\textsuperscript{90} Angell (1913), Polachek (1980), Rosecrance (1985)
\textsuperscript{91} Wilde (1991: 17). Zurn (2002) calls the same phenomenon \textit{societal} interdependence
\end{flushright}
is integrative interdependence, which refers to ‘intertwinement of activities of [units]’. This is where one would find the vulnerability/sensitivity interdependence that scholars of international relations most frequently associate with the term ‘interdependence’.  

If there is a reciprocally costly effect of transactions between two states, and this then leads to more peaceful relations between states. Such hypothesis may then fall into what Nye termed ‘commercial liberalism’. The proposition that the cost of potential confrontation would avert conflict was later turned into an expected utility of trade model which has found general empirical support. This argument was confirmed in Rosecrance’s research, who found that trading states fight less. Polachek’s argument was later refined by Baldwin, who argued that it is not trade in general, but mostly trade in goods with inelastic demand and supply which increases opportunity costs of conflict. De Wilde, in his early work, however argues that to promote peace, interdependence must be associated with the perception thereof. In other words, leaders of states must perceive their interdependence with other countries before the effects of interdependence materialize.

The claim that trade diminishes the incidence of conflict was shown to work particularly well for democracies. Recently, this stream of research became part of the liberal peace arguments, where trade, democracy and institutions are used to explain the lack of armed conflict between states. While the main arguments about this phenomenon remain about the reluctance of states to break costly ties, an argument was made that trade creates connections between people, further making the war difficult.

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92 Wilde (1991: 18-20), Zurn (2002: 235): ‘the notion of interdependence refers to a growing sensitivity and vulnerability between separate units’
93 Keohane and Nye (1977)
94 Nye (1988: 246); though Nye acknowledges that the original author of the label is Robert Keohane in an unpublished manuscript
95 Polachek (1980)
96 Rosecrance (1985). Rosecrance’s book stands apart from the bulk of research in this stream as he uses qualitative research methods.
97 Baldwin (1985)
98 Wilde (1988). Wilde’s conclusions on this point, drawing on Angell, suggest that interdependence is somewhat of an ideology (1988:163)
100 The field is dominated by contributions of Bruce Russett and his numerous coauthors. For main arguments, see Russett (1993), Russett and Oneal (2001)
101 Dorussen and Ward (2008)
Two major problems have been symptomatic of the research on trade and conflict. Firstly, in spite of Baldwin’s early observation that goods with inelastic demand should, in theory, matter more, the consideration to individual goods was for the first time given in qualitative literature on economic interdependence and conflict. Blanchard and Ripsmann in their study of pre-World War I economic ties between the United Kingdom and Germany focused on so-called ‘strategic goods’ essential for the survival of state (and its economy). Quantitative application of the same research has been limited, approximated only in the works of Dorussen and Goenner.

Secondly, there has been a lack of theoretically sound causal explanation for the effect of economic interdependence on conflict. While selectorate theory has been used to partially explain why trade leads to more peaceful relations between states, important gaps remain in precise explanation of causal links. Given the largely de-nationalized nature of the globalized commerce, links between how states and firms interact and how this affects states policies remain largely underexplored.

SOCIAL NORMS

Since, however, ‘rogue states’ have been defined in terms of violation of the norms, then the response to these challenges could be reasonably expected to be guided by norms as well. As the social constructivists teach us, norms and values inform the international conduct of states. Social norms are defined as ideas about ‘appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.’ Compliance with international norms, according to constructivists, is motivated by values and cultural practices, rather than material interests. Legal obligations are then perceived in the context of social standards of behavior and judgment of whether a certain act is a violation or an act of compliance cannot be objective, but is necessarily intersubjective.

The significance of domestic norms for international conduct of states has been largely explored in the field of international relations research and comparative foreign policy analysis. The early democratic peace research, for example, argued that states apply the norms of non-violent conflict resolution from their domestic environments in the international environment in their transactions.

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102 Baldwin (1985)
105 Schneider and Gleditsch (2010)
108 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891)
109 Adler (1995)
110 Koh (1997), Simmons (1998)
with other democracies.\textsuperscript{111} In the field of comparative foreign policy analysis, social constructivists made inroads too. Katzenstein argued that norms, derived from domestic structure, drive the foreign economic policy of industrialized nations. Similarly, Jachtenfuchs and others have shown that the polity-ideas about the legitimate political order, stable over time, influence the debate of the shape of the European Union\textsuperscript{112}, while Risse et al have shown that the national identity was important in creating preferences regarding the adoption of Euro as a single European currency.\textsuperscript{113}

An equivalent of a ‘rogue state’ is a renegade at home. As Lebow and Lowenheim and Heimann argued, states may use force in international politics with goals akin to retributive justice.\textsuperscript{114} Wagner maintained that an appropriate equivalent of a norm-breaker at home is a state violating international norms abroad. If states have accommodationist policies towards renegades at home, they may be reasonably expected to apply similar policies towards states violating norms abroad.\textsuperscript{115} It therefore makes sense to look at how states deal with violations of norms at home when looking for clues to explain the differences in behavior towards the norm-violation abroad.\textsuperscript{116}

Such reasoning, deeply rooted in the constructivist international relations theory, is not without a parallel. At the individual level, social psychology offers a clue. Peter Liberman showed that individual punitiveness (support of death penalty) is related to the support for 1991 and 2003 wars in Iraq. Liberman found empirical evidence that the supporters of death penalty will tend to view wars to punish ‘rogue states’ as legitimate, while opponents will tend to see them as immoral.\textsuperscript{117} Similarly, his later research has shown that ordinary citizens tend to support punishing ‘rogue’ actors (including torture of suspects) out of moral outrage, not for protection of national interests.\textsuperscript{118} Liberman related, however, retributive and humanitarian positions to emotions, not norms.\textsuperscript{119} He does not theorize about the international relations, his research focuses on political psychology. If

\textsuperscript{111} Doyle (1983a), Doyle (1983b), Owen (1994)
\textsuperscript{112} Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung (1998)
\textsuperscript{113} Risse, et al. (1999)
\textsuperscript{114} Lebow (2010), Lowenheim and Heimann (2008)
\textsuperscript{115} Wagner (2010b), Wagner (2014)
\textsuperscript{116} It comes without saying that confrontation abroad for the sake of punishing wrong-doers was a concept which caused much hair-raising among the early realists, and already George Kennan warned before moralistic crusading Kennan (1951)
\textsuperscript{117} Liberman (2006). In a separate study, Liberman (2007) found similar patterns of support for the 1991 war among the foreign policy elites
\textsuperscript{118} Liberman (2013)
\textsuperscript{119} Other research suggested that support for state violence (at the individual level) may be related to trait (personality) aggression. See Kalmoe (2013)
we wish to transcend the individual level of emotions, we need to look into norms and then the concept of culture of control becomes crucial. According to David Garland, states have different culture of control in their approach towards norm violations at home. Answers to questions of what constitutes a violation, what is a proper punishment and how should society react to crime are all socially constructed.\textsuperscript{120} While this line of thinking has found application in some research related to inter-state conflict\textsuperscript{121}, its potential remains heavily understudied. These three basic explanations will guide the initial large-N analysis and the subsequent case studies. Given that the ‘trade follows the flag’ thesis has been largely ignored in the contemporary research in the IR\textsuperscript{122}, I will start off with the hypothesis about the pacifying effect of trade.

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

MIXED METHODS APPROACH

The debate between qualitative and quantitative scholars has been ongoing in social science research for quite some time by now. Though arguments have been made by proponents of both qualitative and quantitative methods/approaches about their suitability to achieve similar ends (understanding of social phenomena).\textsuperscript{123} This dissertation adopts a mixed methods approach. This approach combines the strengths of quantitative analysis – finding systematic patterns among correlates, with strengths of qualitative analysis – using empirical richness of data to develop, verify, and strengthen causal arguments. We can think about concepts in social science as \textit{thin} or \textit{thick}. \textit{Thin} concepts are ‘simple, clear, and objective’, whereas \textit{thick} concepts ‘cannot be reduced to a single indicator without losing some important part of their meaning.’\textsuperscript{124} Mixing methods allows us to gain ‘thick view’ on thin concepts, put the flesh on the numbers used in the quantitative analysis. Furthermore, given the inability of the quantitative research to bridge levels of analysis, combining large- and small-N provides a neat solution, for influences from multiple levels are, however, often present and contribute to existing outcomes.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{120} Garland (2001)
\textsuperscript{121} Stein (2011)
\textsuperscript{122} Drezner (2010)
\textsuperscript{123} Brady and Collier (2004), Jackson (2011), King, Keohane and Verba (1994)
\textsuperscript{124} Both quotes from Coppedge (1999: 468)
\textsuperscript{125} Levels-of-analysis problem has been one of the first methodological problems analyzed in the study of international politics, cf. Singer (1961). Most scholars accept there are three levels of analysis in the international relations – systemic, national and individual, originating in the work of Kenneth Waltz (1959). However, recently as many as six have been identified by Kinsella, Russett and Starr (2013): individual decision-maker, their roles, government structures, societal structures,
Multiple calls for mixing methods to gain insights from both quantitative as well as qualitative analysis have been present in political science research. The earliest call for data triangulation was followed by more elaborate calls for systematic use of both types of methods. Case study in such situation is not meant to provide significant leverage for the explanations and inference across units but rather to ‘adequately assess the causal processes on the within-case level.’ In the present dissertation, I will make use of the nested analysis approach to mixed methods research, as outlined by Evan Lieberman. Such method is interested in both ‘exploration of general relationships and explanations and the specific explanations of individual cases’, while being agnostic to the sources of theory — whether they come from formal models or from elsewhere.

Lieberman suggests that multi method research starts with a large-N analysis, to assess plausibility and robustness of hypotheses. The model fit should be assessed by visual inspection of the predicted vs fitted values. If the model is robust, the small-N analysis can follow. If there are important outliers or cases which do not fit well, these should be selected for further in-depth study. Lieberman, in this case, suggests a rule of a thumb of deviation of two standard deviations of the predicted score from an actual score. If there are none, one may take a number of smaller case studies to observe data in depth. Lieberman advocates selecting fewer cases for more detailed study as opposed to selecting multiple thinner cases, given that small-N study is inherently unable to assess external validity. One can then conduct model-testing small-N analysis, which is aimed at ‘[gaining]
contextually based evidence that a particular causal model or theory actually “worked”.' Case selection can be done through usual case selection methods, or randomly. The small-N study may confirm the conclusions of the large-N analysis, which suggests a happy ending. If this is, however, not the case, then the model-testing small-N analysis becomes a model-building small-N analysis.

As Lieberman suggests, sometimes researchers observe causes which are clearly not applicable elsewhere or are hard to operationalize for a quantitative analysis. In other cases, insights gathered in a small-N analysis may be used to build a new model and test it in a large-N analysis.

In the present dissertation, I will follow Lieberman’s suggestion to conduct first the large-N analysis, followed by two in-depth case studies. Appendix 1 includes the evidence that the data in the large-N analysis does not suffer from under-specification. Then I select two case studies based on two main independent variables of interest from the outset – prison population (as a proxy for the cultures of dealing with the deviance) and trade in carbohydrates (as a proxy for economic interests). This procedure is outlined later in the introduction. These two case studies have been conducted using the process-tracing procedure. As will be discussed in the outline of the dissertation later in this introductory chapter, the two case studies do not confirm the findings from the large-N analysis. I therefore use the insight from these two case studies to develop a testable hypothesis and test it on a restricted sample for which measurable indicators can be easily obtained. This analysis is later more in line with the findings of the case study.

CASE SELECTION

This dissertation focuses on policies of democratic countries vis-à-vis ‘rogue states’. This means that both democracies as well as ‘rogue states’ need to be identified.

When it comes to democracy, there is a wide choice of instruments to identify democracies. The Polity IV dataset has become a standard measurement for the quantitative research. I select countries with a score of 9 or higher (on a 21-point scale) for the whole duration of the dispute with

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134 Lieberman (2005: 442), inverted commas in original
135 George and Bennett (2005)
136 The first part of this endeavor is what Carlsnaes (2013) calls a ‘holistic’ foreign policy analysis, where the ‘social scientific explanations [are] reducible to the properties or interactions of independently existing individuals’, see Wendt (1999: 26). The latter part – turning the case studies into a model-building small-N analysis – uses a bottom-up process, the second way of studying foreign policy, called ‘individualism’ by Carlsnaes. The use of insights from the bottom-up study for a large-N study means the return to the analytical holism.
137 Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2009b)
138 Bogaards (2010)
each of the renegade states. Each of the renegade states. 9 was selected as a cut-off point as to select only the countries whose democratic character is beyond reproach. Literature usually considers 7 as being the point where the threshold for democracy is located. 140 I selected countries which are located two points above the threshold as to avoid any debates about the nature of a particular polity. I select only countries which have been democratic for the whole duration of the dispute and thus establish a common background for all countries and therefore keep institutional background same. Selecting countries which are considered democracies according to the above-mentioned criteria assures that only established democracies have been selected. 141

SELECTING ‘ROGUE STATES’

Defining ‘rogue states’ is – as has been outlined in the first section of this introduction – one of the most recurrent activities of scholars studying the ‘rogue states’. Any attempt to create hard and fast criteria for choosing ‘rogue states’ is, however, doomed to fail. As Wendt remarks, rogues states’ are ‘constituted by social relations to other states in the form of the representational practices of the international community (and of the Great Powers in particular)’. 142

Which countries become labeled as ‘rogue states’ is therefore an outcome of a social process, which is to a large extent arbitrary. While some elements of behavior can be distinguished, none of them (or any combination thereof) makes a state automatically a rogue state. In the seminal study of ‘rogue states’, Miroslav Nincic identified five such elements of ‘rogue behavior’:

- Development, acquisition and proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction
- Support for terrorism
- Aggressive external behavior
- Externally consequential repression
- Non-democratic character

There is no way to objectively select countries on the basis of such criteria, because any closer look at countries which have been labeled as ‘rogue’ reveals double standards that apply in the labeling process imbued with power. 143 Even in the absence of objective criteria for defining ‘rogue states’,

139 Discussion of the selection of ‘rogue states’ and the time periods covered can be found below.
140 Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2009b)
141 Exact list of countries is included in Chapter Three.
142 Wendt (1998: 113)
143 Pointed out by, for example, Chomsky (2000), who is in his own work on ‘rogue states’ also committing an objectivist fallacy.
observers of international politics can easily pinpoint examples. In the past these examples would include the apartheid South Africa, or Qaddafi’s Libya whereas in the more contemporary era, most prominent examples include Iran, North Korea or Iraq. For the purpose of this dissertation, I have selected Iran and North Korea from these. If part of what marks the ‘rogue states’ is their exclusion from the international community\textsuperscript{144}, then Iran and North Korea are almost perfect examples – they have faced a wide range of multilateral and unilateral sanctions by the UN, the EU, and national governments (mostly the US).

The arbitrary nature of labeling of rogue states also explains why this dissertation does not seek to explain why ‘rogue states’ engage in any of these behaviors. Instead, it focuses on policies towards those labeled as ‘rogue states’, not on ‘rogue states’ as such.\textsuperscript{145}

While quantitative analysis of policies towards both will be conducted, in-depth studies are focused on policy towards Iran. This choice has been made for multiple reasons – the controversy about Iran’s nuclear program has been more salient internationally, Iran has been more plugged in the global economy and therefore economic interests can be considered more salient (in other words, variation in economic interests in the policy towards North Korea is between ‘non-existent’ and ‘absolutely minuscule’).\textsuperscript{146}

\textbf{The period under study}

The study will look only at policy towards ‘the rogue’ during its ‘renegade period’, the period through which the ‘rogue’ behavior was exhibited. Time points have been established when the policy positions of the democratic states towards the ‘rogue state’ are measured. These points were selected because they triggered different responses in the international arena and constituted important breakpoints for the perception of ‘rogueness’ of a given countries.

In case of Iran, the policies will be analyzed at three time-points: at the beginning of the crisis in 2002, when the extent of the program was revealed; in 2006, when the matter was for the first time dealt with by the UN Security Council; and in 2009, when the secret facilities in Fordow were

\textsuperscript{144} For an in-depth argument about exclusion and ‘rogue states’, see Wagner (2014), Wagner, Werner and Onderco (2014a)

\textsuperscript{145} Studying why ‘rogue states’ engage in any of their behavior is similar to the security dilemma sensitivity. While states may express appreciation for ‘rogue states’ motivations, any such appreciation is already a sign of cooperative move, within the framework of security dilemma.

\textsuperscript{146} Trade exposure of democracies towards Iran is about 100 times higher compared to North Korea.
uncovered. This brief timeline is not meant to serve as a comprehensive overview\textsuperscript{147}, rather as a
description of why these points were selected.

The extent of the Iranian nuclear programme has been exposed by the National Council of
Resistance of Iran in August 2002, an Iranian opposition group that presented evidence that Iran has
secretly pursued nuclear capabilities with a potential weapons use for two decades.\textsuperscript{148} While these
news were not shocking\textsuperscript{149}, the extent of the Iranian program was unexpected. In June 2003, the
IAEA declared that Iran had violated its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement,\textsuperscript{150} a claim that
Iran challenged by stating that all violations were minor. The main concern of relevant stakeholders
has been that Iran may be able to redirect the enriched uranium into a military programme, a claim
Iran has denounced repeatedly.\textsuperscript{151}

Between 2003 and 2005, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and the United Kingdom (later
joined by Javier Solana and negotiating on behalf of the EU) negotiated with Iran over its nuclear
program. In two separate agreements (Tehran and Paris Agreements), they reached a conclusion that
Iran would suspend enrichment in exchange for future negotiations and concessions. These have,
however, never led to lasting settlement, due to disagreements over their interpretation. In
September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors resolution found Iran in non-compliance and
threatened submission to the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{152} After Iran resumed uranium enrichment for
research purposes in early 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to forward the Iranian case
to the UN Security Council.

In March, the UN Security Council adopted a Declaration of Chairman, a non-binding document in
which it called for the suspension of enrichment. In April, however, Iran declared that it mastered
the full enrichment process. At the end of July 2006, the UN Security Council adopted the first
binding Resolution 1696 calling on Iran to suspend the uranium enrichment by the end of August
2006.\textsuperscript{153} What followed was a stream of reports by the IAEA which have highlighted unanswered

\textsuperscript{147} For an excellent recent overview, see International Crisis Group (2012). An impressive
chronology of the Iranian nuclear program has been produced by Nuclear Threat Initiative (2011)
\textsuperscript{148} Fitzpatrick (2006), Fitzpatrick (2008a)
\textsuperscript{149} Shahak (1993) provides a good overview of the Israel’s fears of Iranian nuclear capability as early
as in 1993
\textsuperscript{150} IAEA (2003a)
\textsuperscript{151} See footnote 163 for the existing literature on Iranian nuclear intentions
\textsuperscript{152} IAEA (2005)
\textsuperscript{153} These were renewed and expanded in further rounds by UN Security Council Resolutions
questions about the Iran’s nuclear path (especially the ‘alleged studies’ on weaponization) and Iran’s insistence that these have been settled. The UN Security Council also called on Iran to cease all enrichment and reprocessing activities, which Iran repeatedly refused. Rounds of negotiations ensued, with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (the P5+1) negotiating with Iran.

In September 2009, the news broke that Iran has built a secret facility in Fordow near Qom. This came shortly after the anti-government protests following the 2009 presidential elections. The facility has confounded West’s fears about Iran’s program – the facility was build underneath a mountain near a base of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, dubbed by some as the IRGC missile base. What followed was a series of proposals for uranium swaps (in 2009 by the US for Tehran Research Reactor; in 2011 by Brazil, Turkey and Iran; in 2012 by Russia), which have since fallen through. Multiple rounds of negotiations between P5+1 (and IAEA, separately) with Iran are yet to produce settlement to the crisis.

When it comes to North Korea, the policies will be evaluated at four time-points. In 1993, when North Korea for the first time announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT; in 2003 when it actually withdrew; in 2009 when it performed its first nuclear test; and in 2009 when it conducted the second nuclear test.

In 1993, North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT as a reaction to the strong pressure to open some of its nuclear installations. As a reaction to this decision, the UN Security Council adopted the resolution 825/1993, which called on the North Korea to reconsider the withdrawal and ‘thus to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty’. It rethought its decision within three months, after intensive negotiations with the United States, and continued towards conclusion of so-called Agreed Framework, within which North Korea agreed to reinstate the 1992 Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. As a part of the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to start again cooperation with the IAEA and to freeze and dismantle its nuclear complex in Yongbyon. In return, an international consortium (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation, or KEDO) pledged to provide light-water reactors and fuel oil.

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155 Arms Control Association (2013)
156 United Nations (1993b)
157 Jehl (1993)
158 Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
The late 1990s and the break of the century is marked, in North Korea, by floods and famine. In 2002, as it became clear that North Korea was enriching plutonium for weapon purposes, the Agreed Framework collapsed. The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on January 6, 2003, calling on North Korea to cooperate closely with the Board and threatening declaring North Korea in noncompliance should the country not cooperate.\footnote{IAEA (2003b)} The reaction came in less than a week, on January 11, 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT.\footnote{Legality of this withdrawal is still a hotly contested issue among the NPT parties. See Bunn and Timerbaev (2005)} In the following years, the talks with North Korea are taking place within the framework of Six Party Talks, bringing together the United States, North Korea, Russia, China, South Korea and Japan.

In 2006, after a week of North Korean declarations of intent to test a nuclear weapon and the calls by the US and the UN not to do so, on October 9, North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon, a move condemned by the UN Security Council Resolution 1718.\footnote{United Nations (2008)} As a part of the follow-up Six party talks negotiations, North Korea agreed to the return of the IAEA inspectors to the country to verify shutting down of the Yongbyon facility. In October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from the list of the state sponsors of terrorism. In September 2008, the country asked to have the IAEA seals removed and in 2009, it ceased all cooperation with the IAEA. After a missile test in April 2009, the UN Security Council adopts a Presidential Statement condemning the test. In reaction, on May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted the third nuclear test. This test was followed by tightening of sanctions and further condemnation by the UN Security Council, in the Resolution 1784.\footnote{United Nations (2009)}

In the following years, North Korea has sunk a South Korean warship Cheonan and shelled South Korean island. The most recent step in the confrontation was the third successful nuclear test, taking place in February 2013.
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

The empirical analysis employed in this dissertation uses quantitative data analysis in its first step. This analysis employs appropriate statistical techniques (ordinary least square regression with corrections for panel data structure).\textsuperscript{163}

The quantitative section of the analysis looks more precisely at the military material capability, the domestic culture of control and the economic ties as the three hypothesized influential predictors (independent variables). The domestic cultures of control are approximated by the prison population data. Higher prison population data suggest more retributive domestic culture of dealing with deviance, ceteris paribus.\textsuperscript{164} When it comes to trade, both general trade as well as strategic commodities more specifically are looked into.

The dependent variable for the quantitative section of this dissertation originates in an expert survey undertaken in early 2011. Expert surveys are not the usual instrument to relations between two countries. One of the more usual ways to assess the ‘closeness’ of policies of two countries is their membership in the same alliance or international organization\textsuperscript{165}, voting in the United Nations General Assembly\textsuperscript{166}, event data\textsuperscript{167}; in case of an existing armed conflict, the use of the Correlates of War dataset\textsuperscript{168} or Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset.

These data are not, however, helpful for the present analysis. Institutional membership or voting records do not capture policies of one country towards the other, but rather compare their external behavior. Alternatively, event data, Correlates of War data or MID dataset offer less rich and unsophisticated data when it comes to comparing countries’ positions towards a specific international policy issue. An expert survey offers a promising avenue of exploration of state policies towards the renegade regimes. Chapter two of this dissertation provides more information about the expert survey conducted in the course of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{163} More detailed information on quantitative data analysis, models employed, particular sources of variables as well as the results can be found in the third chapter of the present dissertation.

\textsuperscript{164} Society’s reactions to norm violations are reflected in the state’s criminal law system. The interaction between penal code, sentencing guidelines and the practice of punishment is reflected in the prison population. High shares of prisoners indicate that a country’s criminal law system emphasizes retribution, incapacitation and deterrence over rehabilitation and re-socialization. Chapter Three offers a detailed description of advantages of this measure of punitiveness.

\textsuperscript{165} Mansfield and Pevehouse (2003)

\textsuperscript{166} Gartzke (2007)

\textsuperscript{167} Pevehouse (2003)

\textsuperscript{168} For a brief overview, see Sarkees and Wayman (2010)
**SMALL-N QUALITATIVE STUDY**

From the total population of all countries which were considered democratic according to the criteria outlined above, I select two countries according to the following criteria. Careful case selection will, in my research, serve as a method to control for variation in order to be able to draw causal arguments.\(^{169}\)

**Figure 1.1** Cross tabulation of prison population and trade in energy

Figure 1.1 plots trade relations and domestic culture of dealing with deviance as two of the independent variables. The first one is a mean ratio of oil imports from Iran as a share of total oil imports in 2002-2008. The second variable is mean prison population per 100,000 inhabitants in the same time period. The United States were excluded, as its prison population is by far the highest and the case thus represents an extreme outlier. The main cluster of countries can be defined as being under 10% of oil imports from Iran and less than 200 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants. This can be divided into four quadrants, one boundary being at 100 prisoners and the other at 5% of oil imports. We thus get four quadrants. I select two countries, one from the countries which score high on both

\(^{169}\) Gerring (2007)
prison population and oil imports and one from those which score low on both variables. This case selection follows ‘diverse case selection technique.’¹⁷⁰ This technique has been considered as appropriate for testing hypotheses (as opposed to creating them), because they represent the variation on independent variable.¹⁷¹

As Gerring suggests, it may happen that one case is, in fact, representative of multiple types of cases. In the present situation, this happens too – South Africa, one of the cases selected, is also extreme on both trade in energy as well as prison population. On the other hand, India – the other case - seems to be a typical basket case of a country with moderate (-to lenient) domestic culture of control and somewhat lively energy trade with Iran. These two cases are also interesting because the predictions of the outcome are conflicting for independent variables.

The case studies themselves use process tracing¹⁷² to test whether economic interests or normative cultures of dealing with deviance drove the policies towards Iran. Process tracing has been used as a strategy particularly suited to create explanations of particular cases, with the ability to connect these with the existing theory¹⁷³. Process tracing offers a great strategy particularly when the theoretical explanations are conflicting.¹⁷⁴ In these case studies, I employ the data triangulation strategy, combining insights from national and international press, official documents, and elite interviewing of relevant officials.

**CONTRIBUTION AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY**

This dissertation makes a triple contribution to the study of comparative foreign policy and wider field of international relations. *Firstly*, it makes a theoretical contribution to the study of roots of foreign policy and specifically, it contests the argument about economic interests driving the foreign policy of countries. In particular, it provides a richer account of how economic interests may (but not necessarily have to) contribute to foreign policy decision-making. Especially in case of disagreements in the European Union about the correct course of action vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear program in early 2000s, this dissertation shows that it was countries’ ties with the United States (as opposed to economic interests) that drove their confrontationist positions. This finding further

¹⁷¹ Or, as is the case in the present dissertation, on independent variables. As Gerring (2010) suggests, variation on dependent variable is optional. I disregarded the variation on dependent variable.
¹⁷² Collier, Brady and Seawright (2010), George and Bennett (2005)
¹⁷³ George and Bennett (2005), Rohlfing (2012)
¹⁷⁴ Bennett (2010)
suggests that even if correlation between economic interests and foreign policy exists, it may be either spurious, causally reverse or confounded by a different variable. This underlines the need to redirect the study of influence of economic interests in foreign policy to more detailed studies looking at particular causal mechanisms.

Secondly, the dissertation provides an empirically rich study of foreign policy towards countries aspiring to acquire necessary means to produce nuclear weapons should they choose to. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, papers included in this dissertation describe and analyze policies of several countries towards one issue, providing a rich comparative study. Furthermore, by looking at foreign policies of India and South Africa, this dissertation is entering largely uncharted waters for much of the Western academic study of foreign policy. Inclusion of two non-Western countries then, therefore, provides a stress test for the IR theory, which has been repeatedly accused of not being applicable outside of the Western sphere.

Thirdly, this dissertation suggests that realism is not quite as dead as the state of the international relations as the discipline may suggest, though its understanding needs to move beyond the structural realism towards the richer accounts provided by different varieties of realist thought (whether classical or neoclassical). Realist explanations for the influence of trade as well as (the perceived need of) positioning towards the hegemon suggest that explanatory power of realism should not be discounted. Given hegemonic origins of the notion of ‘rogue states’, such finding should not be too surprising.

This dissertation is a cumulative collection of seven papers. These papers all stem from the same research project, and are closely connected to one another.

The first paper, the second chapter of the present dissertation, presents the dependent variable measured by the expert survey. The chapter starts with acknowledgement, that the policies toward

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175 The discussion of whether Iran is interested in acquisition of nuclear weapons resembles tea leaf reading exercises of Cold War Sovietologists. Official Iranian position is staunchly opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Verification of such position is, however, next to impossible, given fractious and opaque nature of the Iranian regime. Analysts have, however, repeatedly pointed to steps which suggest that Iran may have options of latency or ‘breakout capability’ in mind. See Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2012), Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (2012), Chubin (1995), Davies (2008a), Lebow (2010), Lippman (2008), Reuveny and Thompson (2008). Most recent assessment of the US intelligence services is that Iran technically has the breakout capacity and the decision to build deliverable nuclear device remains political. See Clapper (2014)

countries aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons continue to be heavily contested, differing even among countries that consider nuclear proliferation as one of the main threats to international security. In this article, co-authored with Wolfgang Wagner, we map the actual policies of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum from confrontation to accommodation. Using data from an expert survey, we find that a) policies toward both Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time; b) no policy convergence was observed among the states studied and notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions, differences remained between states preferring confrontation and those opting for accommodation; c) states maintained remarkably stable policy profiles over time and d) despite obvious differences between the norm violations of North Korea and Iran, states generally followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries. We therefore conclude that states exhibit stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation toward nuclear aspirants. This paper is a minor revision of a paper published in The Nonproliferation Review in June 2012.

The second paper, the third chapter of this dissertation, provides an empirical quantitative analysis of the policies of liberal democracies towards Iran. We start with the finding from the previous chapter that liberal democracies disagree over the appropriate course of policy response even if they share the perception of Iran as a threat to peace and security. In this paper, co-authored with Wolfgang Wagner, we set out to examine why some democracies prefer accommodation while others plead for confrontation. Using the dataset presented in the first paper, we assess the impact of power positions, commercial interests and domestic political cultures while controlling for government ideology. While we find little support for any impact of power positions, ‘cultures of dealing with deviance’ have a substantial and statistically significant effect on state policies. We also find qualified support for commercial liberalism: whereas high levels of total trade do not have the expected effect of making states more accommodationist, high levels of trade in strategic goods such as oil do. This paper is a minor revision of a paper accepted for publication in International Studies Quarterly, slated for publication in September 2014.

The third paper, the fourth chapter in the present dissertation, presents an analogous paper focused on analyzing policies towards North Korea. In this paper, also co-authored with Wolfgang Wagner, we analyze the influence of domestic culture of dealing with deviance and military superiority on the policy towards North Korea. While due to peculiar position of North Korea we do not test formally for the influence of commercial interests, we include such test as a robustness measure. Our results in this paper indicate that while norms of dealing with deviance are always positively and statistically
significantly associated with policy towards North Korea, military superiority is significantly associated with confrontationist policy only for democracies other than the United States.

The fourth paper, the fifth chapter of this dissertation, provides the first case study, of South Africa. The paper builds on field research in South Africa and detailed case study of South Africa’s response to Iran’s nuclear program. This policy has been extremely puzzling — a rising power in the international system, subscribing to a global norm of nuclear non-proliferation but challenging the interpretation and application of that norm. This paper asks why this is the case, and demonstrates that South Africa’s policy towards the Iranian nuclear program has been clearly marked by a strongly held belief regarding the value of negotiations, a distrust of the global North, and a preference for a wide multilateral approach in institutions. This paper is a minor revision of the paper which was published in *South African Journal of International Affairs* in December 2012.

The fifth paper, the sixth chapter in the present dissertation, provides the second case study, that of India. This chapter too is based on field research in India and provides a detailed account of India’s response to Iranian nuclear program. India’s response has been far more cautious and been marked by attempts to appease the global hegemon, the United States, while maintaining reasonably good relations with Iran. This policy was critically received in both the United States (where it lead to disillusionment about India’s role as a rising power) as well as in Iran (which has seen this policy as courting the United States). This paper has not been published previously. It finds that the India’s foreign policy has been driven by the same forces as it has been driven by since its reorientation in 1990s. Indian foreign policy became more focused on serving the domestic goals – of economic development and growth. In the light of the uncertain results of the security rebalancing in the region with the view towards advancing the goals of domestic economic development, India tried to advance multiple strategies. As the leaders’ understanding of the Indian foreign policy changed, it also called for a more cautious role for Indian foreign policy, carefully weighting costs and benefits of individual moves. Part of that rebalancing was an attempt to strengthen the relations with the United States.

As is by now clear, the country’s positioning towards the United States seems to have influence on how states respond to ‘rogue states’. This clearly means that in terms of Lieberman’s nested analysis, my model-testing small-N analysis has become a model-building one. It is, however, far from easy to gauge reliably how states position themselves towards the United States for a large-N quantitative analysis. As argued above, the voting in the United Nations is often taking place along the
predefined lines and en bloc. The voting in the IAEA Board of Governors and/or the UN Security Council gives insight into positions of only a small sample of countries. Additionally, given that votes take place after lengthy negotiations with an express goal to gather widest coalitions possible, they may not be the ideal solution. Last but not least, in different regions states can use different strategies of aligning with the United States – thus making a cross-regional comparison difficult.

Bearing these limitations in mind, I devised a test using an alternative sample – the EU member states. The sixth paper, the seventh chapter of the present dissertation, uses quantitative analysis to study the EU members’ policies towards Iran. The controversy of the Iranian nuclear program divided the European Union member states. Policy commentators frequently ascribed this difference to diverging economic interests of Europeans, but this link remained underexplored. International relations scholars would not be surprised, as economic liberals showed that trade does indeed have a pacifying effect on the relations between countries. In this paper the empirical link between the economic interests and positions towards Iran is explored. The analysis rests on the evaluation of both overall and strategic trade flows. The results suggest that while trade plays a certain role in the shaping of the policies, the effect of the strength of the alliance with the United States explains a large part of the puzzle. The article thus casts a shadow on the established policy narrative of economic interests being the driver of the EU members’ Iran policy and confirms that positioning towards the United States plays a significant role in formation of policy towards ‘rogue states’. This paper is one of a series of papers submitted as a special issue to European Security.

The final, eighth, chapter of this dissertation, the seventh paper included in this dissertation, provides an epilogue – a story of how ‘rogue states’ end. This paper looks at the demise of the ‘rogue states’, a neglected area of the study of ‘rogue states’. While the study of the emergence of ‘rogue states’ abounds, it is far less frequent to study their end. Yet when we acknowledge that the renegade statehood is socially constructed, the end of such social construction is a matter of re-construction. This chapter explores how the US and British governments managed the transformation of the image of the Libyan regime from one of a renegade to the one of a respected

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177 In a different paper, I show that the Central European allies of the United States have been consistently voting consistently more similarly to the Soviet Union (and later Russia) than the United States, even after the end of the Cold War. See Onderco (2014). Furthermore, as literature on ‘soft balancing’ suggests, even the US allies sometimes use the UN General Assembly as the locus where to voice opposition towards the United States, because the costs are not as high as they would be elsewhere. See Pape (2005b), Voeten (2000).
partner. By looking at the reversal of the frames, we learn about the ability of the policy-makers to steer the public opinion by re-construction of frames. This chapter is slated to appear in the volume *Theorizing Deviance in International Relations: ‘Rogue States’ in International Relations*, jointly edited together with Wolfgang Wagner and Wouter Werner, published by Palgrave in 2014.
As already suggested in the introduction to the dissertation, the pursuit of the weapons of mass destruction has been one of the most important constituents of behavior of ‘rogue states’. In this paper, co-authored with Wolfgang Wagner, we set out to map the policies of liberal democratic countries towards Iran and North Korea. We focus on their challenge to the global nonproliferation regime as one of the defining claims of their ‘rogueness’. This paper introduces the empirical measure of democratic states’ policies towards Iran and North Korea over time, illustrating similarities and differences these two ‘rogue states’ faced. While the finding determinants of these positions towards Iran and North Korea are undertaken in the two subsequent chapters, this chapter offers a very simple test of differences in positions towards Iran on the basis of the membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. This paper was published in The Nonproliferation Review in 2012.

Whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime succeeds in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states depends to a considerable extent on the strategic interaction between the international community and ‘nuclear aspirants’—states like Iran and North Korea, who violated the norms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), indicating both a capability and an interest in developing nuclear weapons. The decision of North Korea about whether to acquire nuclear weapons or to abandon its respective programs depends at least in part on the policies of the international community. However, what the appropriate policy response to nuclear aspirants should be has been heavily contested, even among liberal democracies that generally share the perception of nuclear proliferation as one of the foremost threats to international security. As students of the security dilemma have pointed out, interpreting other states’ intentions is already a demanding challenge, but even if the ‘dilemma of interpretation’ is resolved, a ‘dilemma of response’ remains. In general, states can opt for either a confrontational or an accommodationist policy in response to a threat posed by another state. The confrontational strategy is based on the

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1 The terminology stems from Kenneth Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, who analyze the security dilemma as a “two-level strategic predicament.” The first level consists of a dilemma of interpretation that results from “the perceived need to make a decision in the existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others.” See Booth and Wheeler (2008: 4). On the security dilemma, see also Herz (1950), Jervis (1976) For the analysis of defiance to nuclear nonproliferation beyond the security dilemma taking into account the regime constraints, see Ogilvie-White (2010)
idea that threats can and should be deterred. A state’s undesired actions, such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons, should be made as costly as possible because the higher the costs, the more likely a cost-benefit calculating actor will back down. Sanctions serve the dual purpose of making undesired actions costly and signaling a resolve to not tolerate any further provocations.

In contrast, an accommodationist strategy starts from the notion that the security dilemma exists for both parties in a confrontation. As a consequence, the ‘opponent’ state’s policies are seen primarily as reactions to the other state’s policies under conditions of uncertainty and possibly driven by fears about its own survival. Instead of simply assuming that one’s own actions have to be acknowledged as defensive by the opponent, an accommodationist strategy accepts that one’s own actions can be interpreted as offensive. In this case, the opponent’s policies may result from the mistaken interpretation that it needs enhanced efforts to guarantee its security in the face of a growing threat. An accommodationist policy then aims at de-escalating the conflict by signaling reassurance to the opponent. Addressing an opponent state’s security concerns (e.g., by guaranteeing nonaggression) thus lies at the heart of an accommodationist policy. In addition, economic incentives may be used to exchange economic gains from trade or technology transfer for political concessions. In contrast to sanctions, economic incentives can lead beneficiaries in the target state to ally with the sender state and thus encourage cooperation.\(^2\)

The debate about an appropriate policy response to Iran and North Korea clearly illustrates the different rationales. A confrontational strategy assumes that sanctions, or even the threat of possible military action, can make the development of nuclear weapons too costly for either state to merit further investments into the program. This approach was exemplified by President George W. Bush, who not only revived the stigmatizing label of ‘rogue state’ for Iran and North Korea, but also placed both states on an ‘axis of evil.’ According to Bush, ‘the Iranians need to feel the pressure from the world that any nuclear weapons program will be uniformly condemned.’\(^3\) In contrast, an accommodationist strategy points to the precarious security situations of both Iran and North Korea. Iran faces a hostile neighborhood, while Russian and Chinese support for North Korea decreased with the end of the Cold War. From an accommodationist perspective, the US-led intervention in Iraq can be understood as a reason for Tehran or Pyongyang to acquire nuclear weapons because the invasion signaled the resolve to topple the regime of any ‘rogue state’ that the

\(^2\) Long (1996)

\(^3\) Allen (2004)
US president considers part of an ‘axis of evil.’ An accommodationist strategy would therefore aim at reassuring Iran and North Korea of the accommodating state’s non-aggressive intentions, thereby removing the reason to acquire nuclear weapons. Instead of sticks (such as sanctions), carrots are the main policy instruments of any accommodationist strategy. This approach is exemplified by the European Union’s 2003 strategy against WMD proliferation, which holds that the ‘best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them.’\(^4\) With a view to Iran, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder told the Munich Security Conference that Iran will only abandon its nuclear ambitions for good if not only its economic but also its legitimate security interests are safeguarded.\(^5\)

Neither strategy is guaranteed to succeed, or to fail. As international relations scholar Robert Jervis has pointed out, an accommodationist policy can successfully prevent a situation from spiraling into conflict if the target state is prepared to de-escalate in response to reassuring and conciliatory moves.\(^6\) However, if the target state is committed to pursuing its course (e.g., acquiring nuclear weapons), then an accommodationist policy will be understood as a sign of weakness and further encourage the target state.

In a similar vein, theorist James Davis has argued that promises, in contrast to threats, may even increase the demands of the target state if it is driven by a sense of strategic opportunity. However, states who are ‘motivated to challenge the status quo by fear of losses and a sense of strategic vulnerability are best influenced through the use of assurances and promised rewards.’\(^7\)

In his analysis of economic coercion, political scientist Daniel Drezner found that it is the target state’s expectation of future conflict that influences the success of inducements or sanctions. In 1994, North Korea expected future conflict with the United States, making concessions unacceptable. According to Drezner, North Korea would only give up its nuclear program in exchange for a substantial carrot (the delivery of nuclear reactors and heavy oil worth $5 billion)—but not in response to economic sanctions.\(^8\)

\(^5\) Schröder (2005)
\(^6\) Jervis (1976)
\(^7\) Davis (2000: 5)
\(^8\) Drezner (1999: 251ff)
Even though scholars may disagree over the specifics of a target state’s motivation (that is, whether it seeks opportunity or expects future conflict), research on sanctions and economic coercion suggests that the success or failure of either accommodation or confrontation depends mostly on these motivations. However, as students of the security dilemma remind us, the true motivation of any government is difficult if not impossible to establish; this creates the dilemma of interpretation that lies at the heart of the security dilemma. Examples of misinterpretations abound. Proponents of confrontational strategy sometimes point to one of the most prominent cases of failed accommodation: the appeasement of Nazi Germany, which resulted from a misinterpretation of the motives driving Hitler and his cronies. By the same token, advocates of an accommodationist policy have pointed out that US policy toward Iran may have been self-fulfilling, in that it may have created the very threat it was designed to deter.\(^9\)

Given the difficulties of discovering a government’s true motivation, it may not be surprising that liberal democracies have quarreled over the appropriate course of action regarding the apparent nuclear aspirations of Tehran and Pyongyang. The aim of this article is not to discuss the merits and shortcomings of either confrontational or accommodationist strategies. Instead, we are interested in mapping the actual policies of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum that stretches from confrontation on one end to accommodation on the other. In so doing, we hope to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the strategic interactions between nuclear aspirants and the international community, which we consider a crucial element in the success or failure of nonproliferation. Systematic comparative studies have advanced our understanding of the forces driving potential nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons (or to refrain from doing so).\(^10\) However, the confrontational or accommodationist policies formed in response to nuclear aspirants remain understudied.

The lack of comparative quantitative studies of foreign policies toward ‘nuclear aspirants’ such as Iran and North Korea is partly due to the difficulties in measuring degrees of confrontation or accommodation.\(^11\) Although states’ particular policies may be obvious to educated observers, they often do not translate into observable (and thus measurable) indicators that could form the basis for

\(^9\) Malici (2009)
\(^{10}\) For recent empirical studies, see Jo and Gartzke (2007), Kroenig (2009). For less recent theoretical discussion, see Sagan (1996)
\(^{11}\) Qualitative studies are rare but more common. See Ogilvie-White (2010); and Ogilvie-White and Santoro (2012)
a systematic analysis. The main reason for this is that states act strategically toward nuclear aspirants: whether they prefer accommodation or confrontation, states generally benefit from a common, unified position toward aspiring nuclear powers; such unity improves states’ bargaining position. States crafting policy regarding nuclear aspirants therefore have incentives to find compromises and keep their differences quiet. This is reflected in states’ voting behavior on the UN Security Council or on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors: resolutions condemning nuclear aspirants’ noncompliance or even imposing sanctions are usually carried by large majorities that result from sometimes lengthy and cumbersome negotiations.\(^{12}\)

These large majorities, however, do not reflect the differences in policy preferences. As a consequence, roll call data are of little use in identifying different degrees of accommodation or confrontation.\(^{13}\) In addition, voting on the IAEA Board of Governors is often done by the raising of hands, individual votes are not officially recorded, and only aggregated data are published officially. With the help of an expert survey, this article aims to redress this problem by mapping the policy preferences of thirty-five democracies toward Iran from 2002 to 2009 and of twenty-two democracies toward North Korea from 1993 to 2009.

An expert survey offers a promising avenue on which to explore state policies toward Iran and North Korea; it creates the possibility of a reliable, valid assessment of various states’ preferences in contemporary international disputes that can be compared cross-sectionally with temporal variation. The next section will give a brief overview of the previous uses of expert surveys in political science. We then introduce our own survey and discuss some of its methodological aspects related to sampling, data collection, and survey design, as well as its reliability and validity. Our survey has yielded four main findings that we then discuss in turn. First, policies toward Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time. Second, there has been no policy convergence among the states we studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions, states continued to differ regarding their preferences for confrontation or accommodation. Third, countries maintained remarkably stable policy profiles, remaining either more (or less) confrontational in comparison to other states at a given time. Fourth, despite differences between

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\(^{12}\) Although we have seen increasing numbers of split votes in the IAEA Board of Governors, consensus-seeking remains consistent. On voting in the UN General Assembly, see Peterson (2006)

\(^{13}\) As indicators of policy similarity between states, roll call data are otherwise used successfully by Gartzke (2007), Signorino and Ritter (1999)
the norm violations committed by North Korea and those by Iran, states in general followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries at any point in time. All in all, our findings indicate that countries have remarkably stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation.

USE OF EXPERT SURVEYS

Expert surveys have been generally acknowledged as an inexpensive, relatively easy-to-administer way to gather highly relevant data on topical issues. Another advantage of an expert survey is that it does not require a specific data source (such as UN and IAEA voting records, as used in the example above) and is available for all cases for which experts are available, which is not necessarily the case with other data.

Most expert surveys have come from the field of comparative politics, in which expert surveys have been extensively used as a means to establish party positions on specific issues (most often, European integration). However, expert surveys have also been used in other fields of political science, including comparative foreign policy; political scientist Eoin O’Malley, for instance, used expert surveys to measure the power of 139 prime ministers in twenty-two parliamentary democracies over twenty years. In the study, O’Malley looked at the influence prime ministers exercised over the policy output of their governments and their ability to ‘get their ‘preferred policies enacted’.

Furthermore, expert surveys were used to study the outcomes of particular crises for national governments. International relations scholars Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow solicited thirty-four expert assessments of thirty-three crises over twenty-five years, asking experts what impact a particular crisis had on an actor’s national interests (on a scale from significantly advanced to significantly hindered) and what impact the decision had on the level of international conflict and tension (ranging from ‘increased significantly’ to ‘decreased significantly’). The expert surveys have

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15 Hooghe, et al. (2010)
17 O’Malley (2007)
18 O’Malley (2007: 11)
19 Schafer and Crichlow (2002)
also been used by researchers to establish perceptions of democracy on the national level as well as on regional levels.²⁰

**TABLE 2.1 THE USE OF EXPERT SURVEYS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts asked</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Time Points</th>
<th>Expert per Case Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huber &amp; Inglehart 1995</td>
<td>‘over 800’</td>
<td>‘almost 40%’</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ray 1999</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schafer &amp; Crichlow 2002</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>~62%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benoit &amp; Laver 2006</td>
<td>5947</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>47 countries, 387 parties</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>König &amp; Hug 2006</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’Malley 2007</td>
<td>413 (15-30 per country)</td>
<td>~63.4%</td>
<td>22 countries, 139 PMs</td>
<td>multiple (20 years span)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gervasoni 2010</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the main advantages of expert surveys is that they are designed by a researcher deductively and thus allow for a creation of constructs according to his or her requirements. Therefore, an expert survey can ask a direct question without much further input from the researcher. Expert surveys also allow researchers to make sense of a multitude of sometimes contradictory documents and statements. The added value of an expert is that he or she is able to make a sensible evaluation based on his or her experience and to see a general policy profile that can become muddled in the

²⁰ Gervasoni (2010)
jungle of different sources. Additionally, experts are knowledgeable about their subject and can make judgments based on already-existing data, documents, and publications—thus a researcher’s need to engage with and interpret these data decreases.

In Table 2.1 we present a non-comprehensive overview of some of the expert surveys undertaken in comparative politics and international relations. The list represents the recent main trends and applications of the expert survey technique and demonstrates that establishing common standards for an expert survey is difficult, if one is to take the previous research as a yardstick. All of the listed expert surveys used more than three experts per case, though using six to ten experts per case seems to be an accepted standard. Similarly, although some scholars remain reluctant to ask experts about past events or use multiple time points, such queries have been successfully conducted.\footnote{An example of an expert survey that did not inquire about the past or use multiple time points is Hooghe, et al. (2010)\footnote{All data gathered in our survey were be made available online. The exclusive focus on democratic countries is due to the broader program of the research project Rehabilitation or Retribution, which is financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research and of which this expert survey forms a part. To identify the democracies whose policies toward Iran and North Korea we wanted to study, we draw on the Polity IV database, which has become widely employed in international relations and comparative politics research to measure the “democraticness” of a country. It includes an 11-point democracy scale (0 to 10) and an 11-point autocracy scale (0 to 10). A country’s regime type (“combined Polity score”) is then measured by subtracting its autocracy score from its democracy score yielding a 21-point scale (–10 to +10). See Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2009a). Although a score of 7 is often used as a threshold for considering any country a democracy point, we apply a more restrictive measure because we wanted to include only those states whose democratic character is uncontested (that is, we want to exclude “illiberal” or “defect” democracies). We therefore included only states with a combined Polity score of at least 9 over the periods under study (from 2002 to 2009 in the case of Iran and from 1993 to 2009 in the case of North Korea). Forty-two countries qualified as uncontested democracies for the period from 2002 to 2009: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. Thirty-one countries qualified as uncontested democracies for the period from 1993 to 2009: Australia, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and}}
international community was confronted with a challenge to the nonproliferation regime either because norm violations had been detected or because obligations under the regime had been questioned.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, policies toward North Korea were measured for 1993, 2003, 2006, and 2009. In 1993, North Korea announced for the first time that it intended to withdraw from the NPT; in 2003, it finally withdrew from the treaty. In 2006 it conducted its first nuclear test; in 2009 it conducted second—both tests which were accompanied by the test-firing of long-range missiles. Policies toward Iran were measured for 2002, when its nuclear program was revealed; 2006, when the IAEA published its report on Iran’s NPT implementation, concluding that Iran had stepped up its enrichment efforts; and 2009, when secret nuclear facilities near Qom were uncovered.\textsuperscript{24}

We divided the survey into two sections, based on the two nuclear aspirants under study: Iran and North Korea. In each section, we asked the expert to evaluate the actual policies (not policy preferences) of six countries toward a given nuclear aspirant at each of the time points, from ‘very accommodationist’ to ‘very confrontational’ (on a 7-point semantic differential scale).\textsuperscript{25} Mitigating the effects of the positive bias to select positive values, all options had been numbered with positive values (that is, the scale ranged from 1 to 7).\textsuperscript{26} We provided the experts with definitions of both confrontational behavior (making strong and far-ranging demands, pressing for hard solutions such as sanctions, and threatening or using military force) and accommodationist behavior (preferring compromise, expressing empathy, and seeking dialogue).

\textit{Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.} All of these countries have been democratic (measured by score of 9 or more on the Polity IV index) for the whole duration of the disputes with the nuclear aspirants. Countries that are italicized were excluded from the study due to an insufficient number of expert judgments.

\textsuperscript{23} Although our focus on crisis episodes makes the observation of policy differences easier, it also introduces a bias toward more confrontational behavior. We owe this point to one of the peer reviewers.

\textsuperscript{24} It is important to note that in 2009 policies toward Iran were not only influenced by the IAEA’s report that Iran was continuing to enrich uranium (published in February 2009), but also by Iran’s violent suppression of protests against the rigged presidential elections of June 12, 2009.

\textsuperscript{25} Semantic differential scales are considered to efficiently approximate interval (continuous) data. See Lewis-Beck, Bryman and Liao (2003), Smith and Albaum (2005), Zikmund and Babin (2010). Such treatment enables us to calculate means and standard deviations. Both Hooghe, et al. (2010), Ray (1999) utilize the same treatment. Our online appendix provides detailed information about the measures of central tendency of our data beyond means and standard deviations.

\textsuperscript{26} Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski (2000)
The six countries comprised the expert’s own country, three other countries in the region, the United States, and Japan. Including the United States and Japan in all of the surveys allowed us to study the impact of large numbers of respondents on the reliability of the data. We encouraged the experts to not answer questions on countries they did not feel knowledgeable about. Many experts used this opportunity.

It has been argued that questions concerning past policies engender memory problems that could lead to less reliable answers. However, such research in comparative politics has been done: Schafer and Crichlow asked their experts to consider crises outcomes of twenty-five years earlier; O’Malley also asked experts about distant events. In all cases, checks proved that the data were reliable and valid, so it seems reasonable to expect that experts, as opposed to ‘lay participants’ in censuses or general surveys, tend to have reliable memories. Indeed, our data also show that there is no dramatic or significant pattern of decreasing reliability of data with increasing time difference. Our data thus show that with expert surveys, one can examine historical events without compromising the reliability of the data. In total, we asked 451 experts from forty-seven countries to complete the survey. These experts were researchers at universities or think tanks who study nuclear nonproliferation, or international security more broadly, though in the case of a few small countries we also asked foreign policy analysts. Having received 173 responses that had at least one valid answer, our response rate reached 38.36 percent.

EVALUATING DATA RELIABILITY

Compared with the policy positions of political parties, states’ security policies are more elusive because states prefer to retain a maximum room for maneuver. Elections provide political parties with strong incentives to stand out with clearly defined positions in order to attract voters. In

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27 For experts who work in countries different than the country of their nationality, country of nationality and the country of residence were both considered as “home,” but only the country about which expert wrote extensively was considered “home” for the determination of regional affiliation.
30 We correlated the time elapsed from the episode assessment and the measurement with the standard deviation for the given observation. If extended time since the event worsens experts’ judgment, the standard deviations should be higher—in terms of correlations, they are expected to be strong, positive and statistically significant. This is not the case – we find positive but weak and statistically non-significant correlation. Pearson Correlation r(189)= 0.1, p=0.17
contrast, diplomats by and large aim at remaining flexible on issues of international security. We therefore expect higher degrees of disagreement among our experts than among experts on political parties.

Indeed, standard deviations in our data are slightly higher than, for example, in Ray’s data on party orientations.\(^{31}\) We follow Leonard Ray in identifying those expert judgments that deviate excessively from the mean as ‘suspect’\(^{32}\). We then exclude them from our sample and further exclude all time-points with fewer than three observations. If more than two time-points were eliminated from a particular country year, we also excluded the country from the analysis.

**FINDINGS AND TRENDS**

Our expert survey contributes to the study of nonproliferation by answering four main questions. First, how have policy responses toward Iran and North Korea developed over time—have countries become more (or less) confrontational or accommodationist in their policies? Second, has there been any convergence of policies among the countries under study; that is, have differences over the appropriate degree of confrontation or accommodation narrowed over time? Third (related to the previous), have there been any country-specific policy profiles; that is, do some countries generally prefer a more confrontational stance toward nuclear aspirants, while others generally opt for a more accommodationist policy? (If this is the case, which countries are most confrontational or accommodationist, in general?) Finally, have there been any differences in how democracies reacted to the challenges posed by Iran, on the one hand, and North Korea on the other hand?

Figure 2.1 depicts the overall trends in policies toward Iran and North Korea. In the figure’s box plots, the thick lines represent the median, and the gray boxes represent the middle 50 percent of the data, with the second quartile above the mean and the third quartile below the mean.\(^{33}\) ‘Whiskers’—the long vertical lines—represent the spread of data up to one-and-half-times of the interquartile range (the difference between the first and the third quartile). The dots above (or below) represent outliers within the data.

\(^{31}\) Whereas the standard deviation in Ray’s data is up to 0.97, it is 1.1 in our data sample.

\(^{32}\) With an average (and median) of 0.2 on our seven-point scale, the effect of excluding excessively deviant experts is limited. In order to check the robustness of the findings we present in this article, we re-run all analyses also with excessively deviant experts included; our main findings remain.

\(^{33}\) Medians were almost equal to means in our data; the difference between them ranged from less than 0.01 to 0.19
States moved toward a more confrontational position toward Iran across time, even though the difference between overall policy responses in 2006 was only slightly more confrontational than in 2002. On the other hand, we observe a sizeable shift toward more confrontational policies in 2009. Two countries are also notable outliers, pursuing much more confrontational policy toward Iran compared to others: Israel (in all three years) and the United States (in 2002 and 2006) were strongly more confrontational compared with the rest of the sample. We will return to these two countries later.

In the case of North Korea, we observe a similar overall shift toward a more confrontational policy, but the shift is much more gradual and incremental. We observe only one outlier on the confrontational side: the United States in 2003, when North Korea withdrew from the NPT. There is also one outlier on the accommodationist side: Mongolia in 2003 and 2009.

We can thus conclude that the dynamics of policy change in the case of Iran were much stronger and more rapid when compared with the policy response to North Korea.

**Figure 2.1 Development of policies toward Iran and North Korea over time**
TOWARD A POLICY CONVERGENCE?

Table 2.2 presents the means and standard deviations of the policy positions toward Iran and North Korea for each time point. For the sake of comparison, we also include the medians and interquartile ranges.

Both standard deviations and interquartile ranges indicate that democracies have followed quite divergent policies toward Iran and North Korea. At any crisis period, both proponents of an accommodationist policy and those of a confrontational one had considerable numbers of followers.

Moreover, we observe a clear lack of convergence among states over time: there is no discernible trend of decreasing standard deviations or interquartile ranges. In the case of Iran, there has been almost no convergence between 2002 and 2006 (in fact, the pattern is one of divergence) and only limited convergence between 2006 and 2009. In the case of North Korea, there was a pattern of divergence between 1993 and 2003 that barely changed thereafter. Thus, although liberal democracies share common values—and, on a general level, the perception that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international security—they have remained in considerable disagreement over the appropriate policy response to nuclear aspirants whenever a new violation of NPT obligations was detected. What is more, even though democracies voted en bloc in the IAEA Board of Governors to request cooperation—ordering special inspections, referring Iran and North Korea to the UN Security Council, and imposing sanctions on Iran and North Korea via the Security Council—the underlying dispute about the appropriate policy remains. Even intense interactions among the members of NATO or the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy over a period of more than fifteen years has not narrowed differences over how to address the challenges posed by Iran and North Korea. We will now further explore the characteristic policy profiles across individual states.

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34 As the example of Israel and Iran makes clear, differences about the immediacy and severity of the threat of nuclear proliferation persist.

35 This is surprising if one shares the expectation of many constructivist scholars that intense interactions among state representatives would foster shared perceptions and values that in turn would lead to a truly common policy. See Glarbo (1999), Jørgensen (1997), Smith (2000), Tonra (1997)
Table 2.2  Mean policy positions toward Iran and North Korea over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Interquartile range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran 2002</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 2006</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran 2009</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea 1993</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea 2003</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea 2006</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea 2009</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC POLICY PROFILES

The results of the survey demonstrate states’ remarkably stable policy profiles over time. Although countries of course become more confrontational or accommodationist in response to the nuclear aspirant’s behavior, many democracies keep a distinct policy profile, in that they remain more (or less) confrontational in comparison with other democracies.

Figure 2.2  Policy positions of selected countries toward Iran

![Graph](http://home.fsw.vu.nl/wm.wagner/data.html)

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36 Graphs depicting exact country patterns, as well as more detailed data, are available online, at http://home.fsw.vu.nl/wm.wagner/data.html.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 represent the policy positions over time of selected countries toward Iran (Figure 2.2) and North Korea (Figure 2.3). Country-specific policy profiles (lines that keep a characteristic distance to the others and rarely cross other lines) are especially discernible in the case of Iran: for example, the United States and the United Kingdom were always more confrontational than all other countries. On the other end of the spectrum, South Africa was always more accommodationist than all the other countries, except for Australia in 2009.

**Figure 2.3 Policy positions of selected countries toward North Korea**

Of course, some countries have changed their policies in comparison with other states. As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, France adopted a position of neither conciliation nor confrontation at the beginning of the dispute and then clearly moved toward the most confrontational countries by 2009. Similarly, India moved from one of the most accommodationist countries toward more confrontation. Figure 2.3 also demonstrates that France and Germany moved closer toward the confrontational policy of the United States and the United Kingdom toward North Korea as of 2009.

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37 We decided to present only a selection of countries because any graph of the complete sample would make any recognition of individual lines almost impossible. We decided to include the most powerful states of our sample, i.e. the permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States, United Kingdom and France, the regional powers Japan, India, Australia and South Africa, as well as Germany and Italy. Unfortunately, we lack data on Indian and South African policies towards North Korea because not enough experts found themselves competent enough to assess their policies in this case. Data for all countries are available at http://home.fsw.vu.nl/wm.wagner/data.html.
2006. Notwithstanding such policy changes, however, the continuity of policies in comparison with other states remains remarkably stable. Thus, on North Korea, the policy of the United States was always amongst the most confrontational ever since Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT. In contrast, Australia has always been more accommodationist than the other countries we selected. In the same vein, it is also interesting to note that (although they are not included in Figure 2.3) the policies of Estonia, Switzerland, Mongolia, Japan, and the Netherlands remained almost unchanged since 2003. All in all, we observe far fewer policy-position changes in the case of North Korea compared with developments in Iran—an intriguing phenomenon.

DO NUCLEAR ASPIRANTS FACE THE SAME POLICY RESPONSE?

Finally, we use our data to assess whether Iran and North Korea have been treated in the same way; that is, whether they faced a similar degree of confrontation or accommodation in response to their violations of nonproliferation norms. Of course, any such comparison is made difficult by the fact that Iran and North Korea violated nonproliferation norms in different ways: whereas Iran’s nonproliferation violations are suspected to serve the maintenance of a secret weapons program (which Iran denies), North Korea withdrew from the NPT and carried out nuclear tests. Different as these behaviors may be, they both raise the question of whether norm-breakers are best addressed by confrontational or accommodationist strategies.\(^{38}\) Because states have exhibited specific policy profiles toward individual nuclear aspirants over time, we may also expect similar policies toward both Iran and North Korea.

In order to see whether countries indeed treat nuclear aspirants differently or whether they prefer accommodationist or confrontational policies in general, we correlated our data on Iran and North Korea at individual time points. We found strong, positive, and significant correlations between policies toward both Iran and North Korea in 2002/2003, in 2006, and in 2009.\(^{39}\) This indicates that at all points in time when Iran and North Korea can be compared, policies toward nuclear aspirants were driven by general considerations about how to respond to violations of NPT norms, independent of the nuclear aspirant under consideration. Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 show the

\(^{38}\) For the underlying philosophies of how to deal with deviant behavior see Wagner (2010b)

\(^{39}\) For 2002/2003: Pearson correlation \(r(20) = 0.41, p < 0.1\) (significant at 10 percent level); 2006: Pearson correlation \(r(20) = 0.44, p < 0.1\) (significant at 10 percent level); 2009: Pearson correlation \(r(22) = 0.49, p < 0.05\) (significant at 5 percent level)
relationships between policies toward Iran, on the one hand, and North Korea on the other. Countries positioned on the straight line across the graph prefer exactly the same degree of confrontation or accommodation toward Iran and North Korea. Countries above the line were more confrontational toward North Korea than Iran, while countries below the line were more confrontational toward Iran.

Figure 2.4 Policies toward Iran and North Korea, 2002/2003

The graphs demonstrate that, although few states prefer an identical degree of confrontation or accommodation toward the two nuclear aspirant states, many states prefer remarkably similar policies. In other words, states tend to prefer either confrontation or accommodation in general, rather than confronting one nuclear aspirant while accommodating the other. Obvious exceptions include Israel, which advocates a maximum degree of confrontation toward Iran but not North Korea, and Mongolia, which was consistently more confrontational toward Iran when compared with North Korea, although not to the same extent as Israel.

These graphs display only the positions of the countries for which policy positions towards both Iran and North Korea are available.
The graphs also demonstrate that most countries’ policies toward North Korea have been more confrontational than their policies toward Iran (with Israel and Mongolia as the exceptions). These differences correspond with the fact that North Korea’s actual nuclear tests posed a larger and more concrete threat to nonproliferation than Iran’s more nascent and ambiguous nuclear program.

A few countries exhibited comparable patterns in their policy positions toward Iran and North Korea. The United States was always the most confrontational, while Australia was always among the least confrontational. The Netherlands’ policy was remarkably stable over time, though its policy toward Iran shifted markedly between 2006 and 2009. Ireland followed a similar policy profile; it had a moderately accommodationist policy at the outset, followed by even more accommodationist shift, followed by a return to a moderately accommodationist policy. Switzerland followed a similar path; initially it moved toward a more confrontational policy, then its policy barely changed in subsequent periods. French policy, on the other hand, has consistently grown more confrontational toward Iran; with respect to its North Korea policy, the only pronounced shift was in 2006, toward more confrontation.
Looking back at Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2, we see that over time states have not come to any convergence of policy on the two ‘nuclear aspirants.’ On the contrary, the standard deviations increase, suggesting that there was more divergence in states’ policies toward both Iran and North Korea.

**EXPLORING CLEAVAGES AMONG STATES**

Although it is well beyond the scope of this article to explore the drivers of different states’ policies, we nevertheless set out to explore one of the explanations frequently leveled, especially with a view to the Iranian nuclear program. According to both policy insiders as well as academic accounts, a major cleavage within the IAEA Board of Governors runs along a North–South line, i.e., between countries that argue for a more interventionist form of global governance and others that maintain a restrictive interpretation of sovereignty and non-intervention. Since the Cold War era, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has been a prominent voice of the latter—that is, the ‘global South.’ We

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41 For a more comprehensive discussion of explanatory factors, see Wagner and Onderco (forthcoming)
42 For a policy account, see El Baradei (2011). For academic accounts, see Ogilvie-White (2007), Ogilvie-White (2010)
therefore explored whether this cleavage is present within our data. (Because there were no NAM members in the sample of countries of whose policy toward North Korea we studied, only Iran is examined in this question.)

We conducted a simple, repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a single between-subject factor. The repeated measures represent multiple observations of the policy toward Iran (the three points in time mentioned above), and the between-subject factor is NAM membership. We observe a significant effect of NAM membership. This indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between NAM members and non-members in their policy toward Iran. Subsequent Bonferroni-corrected contrasts reveal that NAM non-members were 0.8 points more confrontational toward Iran compared with NAM members (p = 0.034).

Although the repeated-measures ANOVA does not fully explain the difference, our results confirm that the NAM members do indeed have a more accommodationist policy toward nuclear aspirants in comparison to non-NAM states. Although the forces behind policy differences need to be further explored, this finding suggests that general ideas about the trade-off between effective nonproliferation governance, on the one hand, and respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, on the other hand, play a role in states’ considerations.

**CONCLUSION**

We used an expert survey to map democracies’ policies toward two nuclear aspirants, Iran and North Korea. Based on the statements of some 170 experts, our analysis suggests four main findings.

First, the policies of democratic states toward both Iran and North Korea have become more confrontational over time. On average, democracies’ policies toward Iran started out as accommodationist but turned significantly more confrontational in 2009; the change has been more gradual vis-à-vis North Korea. Second, there has not been any policy convergence over time among the states we studied. Given that nonproliferation policy is high on the international agenda and that some states have made considerable diplomatic efforts to create common policy positions toward the nuclear aspirants, it is remarkable that the question of whether an accommodationist or confrontational policy is more appropriate remains contested. Third, countries maintained stable

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43 Here, F(1,31) = 4.9, p = 0.03.
policy profiles; that is, states generally remained more (or less) confrontational in comparison to others at all points in time. Fourth, states followed very similar policies toward both Iran and North Korea at any point; this policy coherence is noteworthy in light of obvious differences between the norm violations committed by the two nuclear aspirants.

Our data show that countries generally demonstrate relatively stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation, suggesting that states have a default policy of either using diplomacy and positive incentives or sanctions and threats. An explorative study of the forces driving these default policies found that there is a major cleavage between members and non-members of the NAM. Whether democracies prefer accommodation or confrontation thus depends on their stance toward general questions of respecting sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention; further research into states’ policy choices is warranted.
3 Accommodation or Confrontation? Explaining Differences in Policies Towards Iran

Building on the data presented in the previous chapter, this paper, co-authored with Wolfgang Wagner, looks at the determinants of policies of liberal democratic countries towards Iran. As we noted in the previous chapter, despite changes over time in response to the developments in 'rogue states' behavior, countries do maintain surprisingly stable policy profiles. In an attempt to explain this discrepancy, we look at three possible explanations of policies towards Iran – power positions, commerce and domestic cultures of dealing with deviance. Using quantitative methods, we study how these factors are related to countries' positions towards Iran. This paper was accepted for publication in International Studies Quarterly and is scheduled to appear in print in 2014.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, liberal democracies in particular have considered Iran as a threat to international peace and security. Although most liberal democracies do not fear to become the victim of a military attack themselves, they share a concern that Iran undermines international peace and security by continuously violating key international norms. Violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2003 and 2006, weigh particularly heavy as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a cornerstone of the post-Cold War international security order. Especially since 9/11, Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas has been seen as breaching another key norm, namely the prohibition to support terrorism. Massive human rights violations and the rigging of the 2009 presidential elections have further added to Iran’s reputation as a ‘pariah’, ‘renegade’, ‘rogue’ or ‘state of concern’.

Despite a widely shared concern about Iran, liberal democracies have disagreed over the appropriate policy responses. Discussions about the merits of a ‘critical dialogue’ and negotiations over the imposition of sanctions have demonstrated that liberal democracies have remarkably stable policies in this respect. Some typically plead for an accommodationist approach that emphasizes diplomatic,
non-military means to foster mutual trust and reassure Iran. This approach is exemplified by former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who told the Munich Security Conference that ‘Iran will only abandon its nuclear ambitions for good if not only its economic but also its legitimate security interests are safeguarded.’ An accommodationist approach has also inspired the European Union’s strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction which states that

The best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them. If possible, political solutions should be found to the problems, which lead them to seek WMD. The more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to abandon programs: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programs can lead to an arms race.

For such an accommodationist approach, empathy and understanding are key strategies for dealing with Iran. For example, the European Union’s High Representative Javier Solana reasoned

All countries are difficult to understand. Iran is one of the most difficult. […] Its more recent history has in many ways been tragic. It is therefore not surprising that, in the light of that history, many Iranians have a profound suspicion of the outside world. And it is not surprising either that many other countries have a profound suspicion of Iran. Iran is a sophisticated but complicated country and it is not easy for others to deal with […] No doubt they think the same about us.

On the other end of the confrontation/accommodation spectrum, some democracies typically prefer a confrontational policy that increases the pressure on Iran’s government, imposes sanctions and includes the threat to use military force. Such an approach is exemplified by former US President George W. Bush who not only revived the stigmatizing label of ‘rogue state’ for Iran but also placed Iran on an ‘axis of evil’. According to Bush,

The guilty party is Iran. They’re the ones who are not living up to international accords. They’re the people that the whole world is saying, ‘Don’t develop a weapon’.

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2 Schröder (2005)
4 Solana (2005)
5 Bush (2005: 355)
Instead of engaging Iran in some form of ‘critical dialogue’, Bush suggested to isolate Iran and to build a united front against it:

the Iranians need to feel the pressure from the world that any nuclear weapons program will be uniformly condemned.\(^6\)

What accounts for the policy differences among liberal democracies towards Iran? Of course, Iran’s actions may explain confrontational or accommodating moves over time. However, the puzzle remains why some democracies always tend to be more accommodationist than others. In this article, we test the impact of power positions, commercial interests, and political culture on policies while controlling for government ideology. We find qualified support for the commercial-liberal notion that high levels of trade makes countries refrain from coercive diplomacy: whereas trade as such seems to have the opposite effect, trade in strategic goods such as oil does. We also find consistent support for the liberal-constructivist explanation according to which policies towards Iran are driven by domestic ‘cultures of dealing with deviance’, i.e. discourses and practices of dealing with violations of norms domestically as institutionalized in a society’s criminal law and justice system. In contrast, we find only little support for the (neo-)realist notion that powerful states have a higher propensity to use coercive diplomacy and no support for the influence of government ideology.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: the following section introduces our theoretical framework in greater depth. It first presents (neo-)realist and commercial-liberal accounts of policies towards Iran according to which policies are driven by power positions and commercial interests. It then introduces our liberal-constructivist explanation in greater depth. Drawing on sociological and criminological literature, it distinguishes a rehabilitative from an exclusionary culture of dealing with deviance and outlines how such cultures can be expected to influence foreign policy towards states that repeatedly violate international norms. Section 3 presents our research design that correlates data on 34 democracies’ policies towards Iran with data on their power positions, commercial interests and domestic cultures of dealing with deviance while controlling for government ideology. As discussed in section 4, our results show that trade in strategic goods and domestic cultures of dealing with deviance indeed have a significant impact on policies towards Iran.

\(^6\) Bush (2004: 645)
Explain different policies vis-à-vis a third state is the home ground of foreign policy analysis. Of course, theories of international bargaining may explain why states make confrontational or accommodating moves in response to Iran’s actions over time. However, theories that focus on characteristic patterns of interactions have difficulties to account for different degrees of confrontation or accommodation across states at the same time. In this article, we therefore test realist, commercial-liberal and liberal-constructivist theories of foreign policy to account for different policies towards Iran.7

The Power of Power Positions: (Neo-)Realist Accounts of Foreign Policy Differences

According to (neo)realists,8 policy differences result from differences in states’ power positions. According to Kenneth Waltz9, ‘the placement of states in the international system accounts for a good deal of their behavior.’ Weak states that lack the military capabilities to carry out military threats, will therefore chose diplomatic, non-military means. In contrast, powerful states have the full spectrum of foreign policy instruments at their disposal and frequently make use of it. This notion was popularized by Robert Kagan with a view to the USA and Europe: ‘American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power.’10

Realists posit that ‘the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics’.11 The militarily preponderant powers tend to be more likely to escalate conflicts towards war.12 By a similar token, countries which have better trained troops13 tend to win confrontations and therefore can be expected to be more likely to escalate disputes into a military

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7 Because we only study the policies of liberal democracies, we do not test the effect of regime type.
8 Although neorealism differs from realism in many respects, both agree on the point of interest here, namely that foreign policy differences are by and large explained by states’ power positions. We follow Elman Elman (1996) in taking neorealism not only as a theory of international politics but also as a theory that can and is frequently used to explain the foreign policies of states.
9 Waltz (1993: 45)
10 Kagan (2002: 10)
11 Mearsheimer (1995: 91)
13 This property that can be conveniently approximated by military spending, see Reiter (1999)
confrontation. Therefore, countries possessing ‘a hammer’ might be reasonably expected to see international disputes as nails.

With a view to nonproliferation, Matthew Kroenig has argued along (neo-)realist lines that nonproliferation policy is best explained by a state’s strategic considerations and its ability to project power over the potential proliferator.

The (neo-)realist notion that policies towards Iran are driven by states’ power positions can be found in both scholarly and journalistic accounts of US policy. By the same token, European authors have argued that the military preponderance drives the United States to pursue a different policy compared to the European diplomatic approach towards Iran.

‘IT’S THE ECONOMY….’: COMMERCIAL LIBERAL EXPLANATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCES

Commercial liberals argue that foreign policies are not a function of states’ power positions but of their commercial interests. From this perspective, states that extract significant commercial benefits from a relationship with Iran may suffer economic losses if the conflict escalates and are therefore served best by an accommodationist strategy. In contrast, states with insignificant trade ties to Iran are free to confront the regime. Democracies are particularly considered sensitive to the disruptive effects of conflict on commerce because leaders are held accountable by a large ‘selectorate’. The elected leaders of democratic countries will therefore seek as little conflict with a country with which they are economically interdependent as possible, in order not to impose costs on their domestic constituencies.

Commercial liberals have disagreed over the type of trade that is expected to lead to a more accommodationist policy. Whereas ‘mainstream commercial liberals’ do not distinguish between different forms of trade but expect any form of commerce to have an impact on foreign policy, ‘strategic commercial liberals’ have argued that not trade as such but rather trade in so-called

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14 Stam (1996)  
15 Kroenig (2009; forthcoming)  
17 Posch (2007), Posch (2009)  
strategic goods impacts on a state's foreign policy. Strategic goods are defined as those essential for
the survival of the state and its economy\textsuperscript{21} such as energy or arms. A decline in trade in strategic
goods therefore does not only hurt the economy in general but may compromise the security of the
state as such. From this perspective, states with significant trade in strategic goods (such as oil) with
Iran can be expected to adopt an accommodationist policy to avoid damage not only to their
economy but also to state security. We will test both the ‘mainstream’ and the ‘strategic’ commercial
liberal hypotheses.

With a view to policies towards Iran, pundits and scholars alike frequently draw on commercial
liberal arguments. The most popular version is that dependence on oil makes states adopt a soft
approach towards Iran. In his analysis of the EU’s hesitation to impose sanctions against Iran, for
example, Orde Kittrie quotes Germany’s then foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, who had commented
on this decision by saying that ‘You cannot reproach us for following our economic interests.’\textsuperscript{22}

REHABILITATION OR EXCLUSION? DOMESTIC CULTURES OF DEALING WITH DEVIANCE

Whereas commercial liberalism traces states’ policies back to economic interests, constructivist
liberalism emphasizes the impact of political culture and identity. Governments are not regarded as
utility maximizers but as acting in line with the norms and values that are widely shared and
institutionalized within society. In some cases, such norms and values are explicitly geared towards
foreign policies issues. For example, EU members’ policies towards a deepening of European
integration can be explained with their political identities that incorporate a European dimension to
different degrees.\textsuperscript{23}

In most cases, however, foreign policy issues have not been salient enough to have become part of a
state’s political culture or identity. Instead, foreign policy issues are linked to political culture via a
domestic analogy: norms and values which are institutionalized in an analogous area of domestic
polities also guide foreign policy. This is because decision-makers (as well as society at large) strive
for a consistent set of norms and values.

Arguments linking domestic culture to foreign policy have been brought forward with a view to
various areas of foreign policy: Most prominently, Bruce Russett and others argued that democracies

\textsuperscript{21} Blanchard and Ripsman (1996)
\textsuperscript{22} qtd in Kittrie (2007)
\textsuperscript{23} See Risse, et al. (1999) for this argument with a view to Economic and Monetary Union.
Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung (1998) have made a similar argument about different institutional
‘Leitbilder’.
do not wage war against each other because their domestic culture of non-violent conflict resolution
leads them to abhor the use of force internationally as well\textsuperscript{24}. In international political economy,
Peter Katzenstein\textsuperscript{25} argued that consociational democracies are more accommodating in
international politics, too, because a culture of compromising is part of the political culture and
identity in consociational systems. Lumsdaine\textsuperscript{26} suggested that Scandinavian welfare states spend
more on foreign aid than Anglo-Saxon liberal states because their domestic culture emphasizes the
responsibility of the state (rather than that of the individual) in alleviating poverty. Finally, Wagner\textsuperscript{27}
demonstrated that states with regional parliaments also support a strengthening of the European
Parliament whereas unitary states are opposed to any form of parliamentarianism above or below
the national level.

We argue that democracies’ policies towards Iran are influenced, via a domestic analogy, by their
domestic discourses and practices of dealing with norm violations. Drawing on research on
deviance in sociology and criminology, we distinguish a rehabilitative culture from an exclusionary
one. Such cultures of dealing with deviance characterize a country’s criminal law system in particular
as well as its welfare state more broadly. A rehabilitative culture is characterized by the basic axiom
that ‘penal measures ought, where possible, to be rehabilitative interventions rather than negative,
retributive punishments.’\textsuperscript{28} Institutions, discourses and practices all center around inclusive notions
of assimilating deviance.\textsuperscript{29} An underlying assumption is that the frequency of norm violations can be
reduced by means of social engineering. The main approach towards crime is to address ‘directly the
factors – economic, social, or personal – believed to be the cause of crime.’\textsuperscript{30} In this culture,
punishment only seems legitimate to the extent that it contributes to rehabilitation. As the 1972
edition of the US Model Sentencing Act puts it:

\begin{quote}
Persons convicted of crime shall be dealt with in accordance with their potential for
rehabilitation, considering their individual characteristics, circumstances and needs.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{24} Russett (1993) et passim
\textsuperscript{25} Katzenstein (1978)
\textsuperscript{26} Lumsdaine (1993)
\textsuperscript{27} Wagner (2002)
\textsuperscript{28} Garland (2001: 34)
\textsuperscript{29} Young (1999: 1-29)
\textsuperscript{30} Hollin (2001: 241)
\textsuperscript{31} Quoted from Hirsch (1986 [1976]: 9)
Punishment, therefore, is seen as one of many possible treatments. If the individual characteristics, circumstances and needs are unlikely to be advanced by harsh penalties, an alternative treatment seems appropriate. The key is to understand the offender’s individual needs and to find measures that enhance his or her self-esteem that forms the basis of re-integration.

The exclusionary paradigm has developed as a critique of the rehabilitative optimism about the correctability of offenders. It combines two different lines of thinking: First, it draws on retributionist thinking according to which penalties are imposed because they are just and wrong-doers simply deserve them for what they have done. Especially conservatives were found to make strong attributions of personal responsibility, to experience anger and contempt towards norm-violators and to advocate, sometime even to see them punished. According to Bennett, Dilulio and Walters, ‘virtually all of those in prison […] are just what most average Americans suppose them to be – not victims of unfettered capitalism, rampant racism, a reactionary citizenry, or Reagan-era budget cuts, but duly tried and convicted violent and repeat criminals who are either dangerous enough, or deserving enough (or both), to merit secure confinement.’ This retributionism often comes with a ‘criminology of the other’ that regards certain criminals as intrinsically different from the rest of the community. Attempts to understand deviant behavior thus appear as morally dubious and are associated with an expert discourse out of touch with popular moral sentiments. Punishment then also serves the moral purpose of expressing that someone’s conduct was wrong and that (s)he is blameworthy for having committed it.

Second, the exclusionary paradigm is fuelled by actuarial ideas and language that are typical of a risk-society. In the absence of the optimism that characterizes the rehabilitative paradigm, people ‘formerly defined as aberrant and in need of transformation are […] seen as high-risk subjects in need of management.’ Penology is thus recalibrated away from a focus on individual guilt to the identification and management of unruly groups.

Retributionist and risk-societal thinking concur in assigning priority to social defense, i.e. the deterrence, punishment and incapacitation of deviant delinquency. It is the protection of the public

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32 Skitka and Tetlock (1993)
33 Bennett, Dilulio and Walters (1996: 91)
34 Garland (1996: 461)
35 Hirsch (1986 [1976]: 48)
37 Simon (1998: 453)
38 Feeley and Simon (1992: 455)
and the concern for victims of crime that drives scholars and politicians in the exclusionary paradigm. Society is ‘exclusive’ and ‘responds to deviance by separation and exclusion’\textsuperscript{39}. Incarceration is considered a technique of maximizing the protection of possible future victims against ‘high-risk individuals’.

These domestic cultures of dealing with deviance are expected to influence policies towards Iran because the underlying problem – how to approach actors who break core norms of the community? – is analogous. Countries characterized by a rehabilitative domestic culture of dealing with deviance are expected to adopt rather accommodationist policies towards Iran whereas states with an exclusionary culture are expected to prefer a rather confrontational policy.

\textbf{Research Design}

\textbf{Measuring Foreign Policy Differences with the Help of an Expert Survey}

To close observers of policies towards Iran, differences among democracies' policies are obvious. However, and unfortunately from a scholarly perspective, such policy differences rarely find expression in measurable indicators. The main reason for this is that states act strategically towards nuclear aspirants: whether they prefer accommodation or confrontation, states are aware that their bargaining position improves with the degree of unity with which it is presented. States therefore have incentives to keep differences among themselves behind closed doors and to find compromises that all states can accept. According to British diplomat Michael C Wood, ‘most of the negotiating history of a resolution is not on the public record, and indeed may be known in full only to Council members or even to a limited number of them.’\textsuperscript{40} Indeed, the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran were all carried either unanimously or by large majorities with all democracies under study voting \textit{en bloc}\textsuperscript{41}.

On the IAEA Board of Governors, voting is often done by raising hands, individual votes are not officially recorded and only aggregated data is published officially. To the extent that unofficial sources provide insights into voting behavior, they, by and large, reveal the same \textit{en bloc} votes as in the UNSC. South Africa was the only democracy under study that abstained when the large majority

\textsuperscript{39} See also Bauman (2000), Young (1999: 26)
\textsuperscript{40} Wood (1998)
\textsuperscript{41} The non-unanimously adopted resolutions related to Iran include UN SC Resolution 1969 (2006, no sanctions, Qatar against), UN SC Resolution 1803 (2008, sanctions tightened, Indonesia abstained), and UN SC Resolution 1929 (2010, sanctions adopted, Lebanon abstained, Turkey and Brazil against).
on the Board (and all other democracies in our sample) voted in favour of condemning Iran in 2005 and 2006. \textsuperscript{42} Such large majorities, however, obscure the policy differences among democracies. As a consequence, we carried out an expert survey to obtain data on a country’s degree of confrontation and accommodation. \textsuperscript{43}

Expert surveys have been widely used in European studies\textsuperscript{44} and foreign policy analysis\textsuperscript{45}. In total, we asked more than four hundred experts from forty-seven countries to complete the survey. These experts were researchers at universities or think tanks who study nuclear nonproliferation or international security more broadly, though in the case of a few small countries we also asked foreign policy analysts. Having received 173 responses that had at least one valid answer, our response rate reached 38 percent. Our survey aimed at mapping the policies of democratic countries towards Iran. We focused on those moments in time when the international community was confronted with a challenge to the nonproliferation regime either because norm violations had been detected or because obligations under the regime had been questioned. Thus, policies were measured for 2002, when the nuclear program was revealed, 2006 when the IAEA published its report on NPT implementation by Iran in which it concluded that Iran stepped up its enrichment efforts and 2009, when secret nuclear facilities near Qom were uncovered.

Each expert was given the above-mentioned time points and was asked to evaluate policies of six countries towards Iran at each of the time points from ‘very accommodationist’ to ‘very confrontational’ on a seven-point scale (ranging from 1 to 7).

We evaluated the reliability of our measure by looking at the standard deviations of expert scores for each state-year. We expect higher degrees of disagreement among our experts than among experts on, for example, positions of political parties. Whereas diplomats aim at remaining flexible on issues of international security, elections provide political parties with strong incentives to stand out with clearly defined positions in order to attract voters. Indeed, standard deviations in our data are slightly


\textsuperscript{43} For a detailed discussion of our expert survey see Onderco and Wagner (2012)

\textsuperscript{44} Hooghe, et al. (2010), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Ray (1999), Whitefield, et al. (2007)

\textsuperscript{45} O'Malley (2007), Schafer and Crichlow (2002)
higher than, for example, in Ray’s data on party orientations.\footnote{Whereas the standard deviation in Ray’s data is up to 0.97, it is 1.1 in our data sample.} We follow Leonard Ray\footnote{Ray (1999)} in identifying those expert judgments that deviate excessively from the mean as ‘suspect’\footnote{With an average (and median) of 0.2 on our seven-point scale, the effect of excluding the excessively deviant experts is limited. In order to check the robustness of the findings we present in this article, we re-run all analyses also with excessively deviant experts included; our main findings remain, though the magnitude and statistical significance of some effects varies.}. We then exclude them from our sample and further exclude all time-points with fewer than three observations. If more than two time-points were eliminated from a particular country year, we also excluded the country from the analysis.

**Figure 3.1  Positions toward Iran in 2002 and 2009**

We report the expert scores for all countries and episodes in Appendix 2. Figure 1 visualizes how the experts view states' policies towards Iran for 2002 (x-axis) and 2009 (y-axis). The figure captures the escalation of the crisis over Iran's nuclear programme between 2002 and 2009 as the vast majority of countries' positions lie above the x=y line. At the same time, it visualizes the diversity of policies and shows that countries maintain typical policy profiles over the course of the crisis. For
example, the USA and Israel were always more confrontational than any other state, the United Kingdom was always more confrontational than France which in turn was always more confrontational than Germany etc. The figure also squares well with the sparse information we obtain from the available data on voting on the UNSC and the IAEA Board of Governors, namely that South Africa has been among the most accommodationist countries. At the same time, the figure demonstrates that the expert survey allows for a differentiated map of democracies' policies toward Iran.

DATA AND METHODS

We analyze the relationship between three independent variables (domestic culture of dealing with deviance, commercial interests and power positions) and policies towards Iran as the dependent variable while controlling for government ideology. We include only UN members whose democratic nature is beyond doubt and thereby also control for regime type. Thus, we select all countries (except Taiwan) whose Polity IV score is 9 or higher for the entire period under study, 2002-2009.49

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Our dependent variable is the degree of confrontation and accommodation as measured by the expert survey for a particular country during one of the three crises outlined above (2002, 2006 and 2009). Out of the initial sample of 42 democracies, two countries had to be excluded entirely because we miss data on their policies for two or three time points. As data on the degree of accommodation and confrontation were available for three time points for each country, our sample included 102 cases.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Power position The (neo)realist hypothesis holds that countries are the more likely to adopt a confrontational policy towards Iran the more military power they can muster. We measure the relative military power by measuring democracies’ military expenditures as a share of Iran’s military expenditure.50 This operationalisation captures how many times more any given democracy spends on defense compared to Iran. The data is taken from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.51

The military power of the democracies under study varies considerably, ranging from 0.001 for

49 Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2009b)
50 similar to eg. Reiter (1999)
51 SIPRI (2011)
Mauritius in 2006 to 84.3 for the United States in 2009. The mean value of the variable is 3.06 and the median is 0.55 (within our sample).

Commercial interests According to commercial liberalism, states are the more likely to adopt an accommodationist policy towards Iran the higher their commercial stakes in their relationship with Iran. Following the discussion among commercial liberals, we distinguish a ‘overall trade’- and a ‘strategic goods’-hypothesis. According to the former, states are the more likely to adopt an accommodationist policy towards Iran the higher the level of their overall trade with Iran. According to the latter, states are the more likely to adopt an accommodationist policy towards Iran the higher the level of trade in strategic goods with Iran. For the ‘overall trade’-hypothesis, commercial interests are measured by the amount of overall trade between a democracy and Iran as a share of democracy’s gross domestic product52. Values range from 0% in the case of Israel in 2009 to 1.25% for India in 2009.

For the ‘strategic goods’-hypothesis, we adopt the categorization and the list of strategic goods created by Cullen Goenner53 which includes energy, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, electronics, nuclear goods, and armaments. Commercial interests are measured by the aggregate amount of trade in strategic goods with Iran as a share of the country’s total trade in strategic goods. All data on the trade volumes were obtained from UN Comtrade.54

Domestic culture of dealing with deviance We hypothesize that the more exclusionary a state’s culture of dealing with deviance is, the more confrontational the state would be towards Iran, ceteris paribus.

A state’s culture of dealing with deviance finds expression in various ways. On a rather general level, the degree to which a state has assumed responsibility for socially marginalized citizens can be taken as an indicator for the priority assigned to the principle of rehabilitation. Welfare states can then be expected to be less punitive than states that attribute responsibility for the well-being of its citizens to individual responsibility, rather than to malleable structural circumstances. As a consequence, the percentage of GDP devoted to social welfare may indicate differences in countries’ culture of dealing with deviance. However, when applied to a group of both developed and developing countries, it first and foremost measures differences in socio-economic development, rather than

52 This measure is widely accepted to capture the dependence of an economy on the trade with another country Barbieri (2003), Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny (2004)
53 Goenner (2010: 550)
54 UN COMTRADE (2011)
different cultures dealing with deviance. With a view to the countries under study here, the percentage of GDP devoted to social welfare is therefore not a valuable proxy for cultures of dealing with deviance.

A more pertinent indicator is a state’s criminal law system which reflects how punitive a society reacts to norm violations. A country’s penal code as well as sentencing guidelines show what kind of sanction is considered appropriate for what kind of norm violation. However, to fully capture a country’s culture of dealing with deviance, one would have to take their actual implementation into account, i.e. to what extent harsh provisions remain dead letter and to what extent rehabilitative measures such as probation and parole are used in practice.

The interplay between penal code, sentencing guidelines and the actual practice of punishment is well captured by prison populations, i.e. the number of prisoners per 1,000 inhabitants. High shares of prisoners indicate that a country’s criminal law system emphasizes retribution, incapacitation and deterrence over rehabilitation and re-socialization. A country’s prison population is low if either the penal code refrains from harsh punishments, if sentencing guidelines prioritize rehabilitative over retributive measures or if courts use the discretion they have to avoid retribution (e.g. by using probation and parole).

Of course, the use of capital punishment is also an important indicator for a country’s punitivity. However, in contrast to prison populations it only allows for distinguishing between a very small group of countries who use it and the large majority that do not. Thus, incarceration rates are a much more fine-tuned indicator than the death penalty.

One may object that prison populations reflect crime rates, rather than cultures of dealing with deviance. However, criminologists have argued that prison populations ‘are largely unrelated to victimization rates or to trends in reported crime’\(^{55}\); instead they are ‘ultimately a matter of political choice’\(^{56}\). At the same time, research on prison populations has pointed out that incarceration and welfare are alternative ways of ‘governing social marginality’\(^{57}\). A state’s culture of dealing with deviance is therefore closely tied to related cultural features of the welfare state.\(^{58}\) Thus, although we have rejected the percentage of GDP spent on welfare as a good measure of culture of dealing with

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55 Lappi-Seppälä (2011: 308)
56 Morgan and Liebling (2007: 1107)
57 Beckett and Western (2001)
58 see also Greenberg (2001), Lacey (2008)
deviance, the use of prison populations as an indicator brings the welfare state back in as part of a broader picture of governing social marginality.

A final advantage in using prison populations as a measure for cultures of dealing with deviance is that high quality time series data are available for all countries in our sample from the International Centre for Prison Studies.\(^59\) According to its figures, prison populations range from 0.28 per 1000 inhabitants in India in 2002 to 7.56 per 1000 inhabitants in the United States in 2009, with a mean of 1.52 and median of 1.08 (within our sample).

**CONTROL VARIABLE: GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY**

Power position, commercial interests and political culture are all structural attributes of the state that may pose considerable constraints on government policy. The government of the day, however, retains considerable discretion in how it interprets these structural constraints. Moreover, it may endorse and reproduce them or it may ignore them or even invest in (slowly) re-shaping them, e.g. by changing the military budget, by setting new economic incentives, or by promoting new norms. Governments may use this room for manoeuvre ‘to shape their countries’ policy according to their political beliefs and ideology’.\(^60\) To capture the possibly confounding role of a government’ political beliefs, we control for government ideology. Differences in government ideology have been mostly used to account for variance in domestic policies\(^61\). However, Rathbun\(^62\) and Schuster and Maier\(^63\) have demonstrated that government ideology can also explain variance in foreign and security policies. According to their studies of military interventions in the Balkans and in Iraq, left-wing governments value non-military conflict management much higher than right-wing governments.

We measure the government ideology using the Schmidt-Index, measuring the cabinet composition. Discreet values of the Schmidt-Index range from 1 to 5, where 1 denotes the hegemony of right-wing parties and 5 the hegemony of left-wing parties. Data was obtained from the dataset collected

\(^{59}\) International Centre for Prison Studies (2010)

\(^{60}\) Schuster and Maier (2006: 230)

\(^{61}\) such as the welfare state, cf. Schmidt (1996)

\(^{62}\) Rathbun (2004)

\(^{63}\) Schuster and Maier (2006)
by Armingeon. Data missing in Armingeon were supplied by Woldendorp et al., the remaining missing data were coded by authors using the information from the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

To be sure, explanations based on government ideology overlap with those drawing on structural attributes because, especially in liberal democracies, the government is likely to reflect the interests and normative orientations in society. At the same time, however, the inclusion of a government ideology-variable allows us for the possibly confounding effect of an entrepreneurial government that deliberately challenges vested interests and established norms.

Addressing the issue of endogeneity and allowing for dynamic panel model, we used one-year lag for all dependent variables.

We decided to address the issue of missing data not by listwise deletion, for it has been argued that imputation is superior to listwise deletion when meaningful imputation can be done. The missing data on trade in specific trade groups were first imputed by back retrieval (exports from A to B in particular goods X were retrieved as imports to B from A in the given goods). Where these were incomplete, the missing values were imputed with zeroes as it seems safe to assume that there simply is no trade between the two states under consideration.

We use panel data analysis using Stata 11. Our temporal variable is a crisis because during crises confrontational or accommodationist policies become more visible (between crises, the unwillingness to confront Iran would be overdetermined). Following Beck and Katz, we estimate our models using ordinary least squares estimator with panel corrected standard errors model, with first-order autocorrelation. We also included country dummies to control for unobserved and pre-existing variance. Model 1 tests prison populations, military spending and aggregated total trade, Model 2 adds the aggregate measure of trade in strategic goods and Model 3 disaggregates trade in strategic goods into its various components (energy, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, electronics, ...
nuclear-related goods and armaments) (Models 1-3 are reported in Table 3.1). In order to test the robustness of our results, we then repeat the same analyses without the USA and Israel that are outliers in respect to several variables. The analyses are conducted in Models 1a-3a, which correspond to Models 1-3 respectively (Models 1a-3a are reported in Table 3.2).

RESULTS

Table 3.1 reports results of the Models 1, 2 and 3, Table 3.2 reports results of the Models 1a, 2a and 3a. To make the substantial effects of the various variables comparable, Table 3.3 calculates how a change by one standard deviation influences the degree of confrontation towards Iran.

As Table 3.1 indicates, we found no evidence that lower levels of total trade or higher levels of military spending would lead to more confrontational policies. Instead, our analysis suggests that confrontational policies are associated with low levels of trade in strategic goods and an exclusionary culture of dealing with deviance.

Though in two of the three models with the full sample of liberal democracies we found statistically significant influence of military expenditure, the individual coefficients were all negative, statistically significant only at the 10% level and with a paltry substantive effect. This suggests that countries which overspend Iran in military expenses do not tend to be more confrontational towards the country. However, once we exclude the United States and Israel from the sample of democratic countries we observe that military expenditure increases in statistical significance, and the direction of the effect is positive. This suggested that confrontational behavior towards the country is associated with the military expenditure, but only once we exclude the two most confrontationist

73 Both states are the most confrontational and are thus outliers on the dependent variable. Moreover, the USA has a far higher military spending and a far higher prison population than any other democracy in our sample.
74 One reviewer drove our attention to the sensitivity of our results to pooling of cross-sections within the sample. There are good reasons to believe that the pooled analysis provides better understanding of our data (taking into account both within and between group variation), as described by Wooldridge (2002). To alleviate these concerns, we conducted a repeated cross-section analysis, using simple multivariate OLS regression with robust standard errors. The only statistically significant result in contradiction to our findings concerns overall trade: in two out of eighteen models, we find that overall trade is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with confrontation, rather than positively as in the pooled model. This does not challenge our main findings in this article but only underscores our doubts about the effect of trade as a useful predictor of policies towards Iran.
countries from the sample. Having a big hammer thus does make countries bolder in their foreign policies.

Table 3.1  Panel model of confrontation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prison population</td>
<td>0.636***</td>
<td>0.684***</td>
<td>0.581***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total trade</td>
<td>177.622***</td>
<td>408.681***</td>
<td>207.450***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.053)</td>
<td>(54.124)</td>
<td>(18.370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in strategic goods</td>
<td></td>
<td>-53.417***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.088)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-11.692***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in non-ferrous metals</td>
<td>-49.286*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19.542)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in chemicals</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.147***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(14.934)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in electronics</td>
<td></td>
<td>-85.316***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(25.551)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in nuclear-related goods</td>
<td>-7.610</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.725)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in armaments</td>
<td></td>
<td>-26.974+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(16.398)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.924***</td>
<td>2.739***</td>
<td>2.843***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; we control for country-level fixed effects but do not include these for the reasons of brevity.

In all three models, we found a statistically significant and positive influence of the exclusionary culture of dealing with deviance (as expressed by high prison population) on the adoption of confrontational policies towards Iran. As expected by constructivist liberals, countries with an exclusive domestic culture of dealing with deviance are also more confrontational towards norm-
breakers abroad. Substantially, an increase in prison population by one standard deviation is associated with the increase in confrontation by approx 0.8 points (0.4 – 0.5, if the United States and Israel are excluded). The results resonate with findings in political psychology according to which individuals have consistent policies of addressing norm violations. For example, probands that tend to attribute responsibility to individuals, rather than society are motivated by considerations of punitiveness across different situations. In a similar way, individual support for retributionist policies towards norm breaking and for the death penalty are linked to support for hard-line policies towards norm breakers abroad. Our results suggest that this connection has been institutionalized in domestic discourse and practices. These findings fit well with previous scholarship on the importance of domestic norms in foreign policy.

With a view to commercial liberalism, we find mixed results. Only the trade in strategic goods has a significant impact in the expected direction, confirming earlier results by Goenner and Dorussen. In contrast, democracies do not become more accommodationist with higher levels of total trade, as mainstream commercial liberalists would expect. In fact, we find a statistically significant effect in the opposite direction. While an increase in total trade by one standard deviation is associated with a move towards more confrontation by 0.5-1 point on a 7-point scale (0.3-0.9 point, if the US and Israel are excluded), increasing the trade in strategic goods is associated with a move towards accommodation by about 1 point. When we dissect our data into repeated cross-sectional analysis, we find that in two out of 18 year-models, we find a statistically significant opposite effect of trade. This underscores the thrust of our argument that trade is not a reliable predictor of policies towards Iran as commercial liberalism suggests.

Model 3 disaggregates strategic goods and therefore helps to scrutinize which goods in particular are associated with more accommodationist policies: A significant decrease in confrontation is associated with trade in energy, non-ferrous metals and electronics, whereas the opposite move is associated with trade in chemicals (this effect disappears once the US and Israel are excluded). These findings qualify those of Goenner who found that trade in energy, non-ferrous metals and electronics was associated with an increased likelihood of conflict, whereas the trade in chemicals

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75 Skitka and Tetlock (1993)
78 Goenner (2010)
79 Dorussen (2006)
was associated with a decreased one, in other words – our results point in the completely opposite direction. Goenner also predicted energy and non-ferrous metals to be less important than other goods, due to the relative elasticity of their demand and supply. Instead we find that trade in energy-related goods has by far the strongest substantive impact on policies confirming the notion that major importers of Iranian oil tend to adopt a accommodationist policy. An increase in the trade in energy by one standard deviation leads, ceteris paribus, to decrease in confrontation by about half a point. Substantive effects for all commodities can be found in Table 3.3.

### Table 3.2 Panel model of confrontation (excluding USA and Israel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 3a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prison population</td>
<td>0.548***</td>
<td>0.615*</td>
<td>0.506**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total trade</td>
<td>120.781***</td>
<td>359.817***</td>
<td>194.119***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(32.455)</td>
<td>(55.469)</td>
<td>(18.639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.062*</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure</td>
<td>0.290***</td>
<td>0.310***</td>
<td>0.264**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in strategic goods</td>
<td>-56.168***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.609)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in energy</td>
<td></td>
<td>-12.868***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.249)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in non-ferrous metals</td>
<td>-42.024*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(19.899)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in chemicals</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.022</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(26.283)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in electronics</td>
<td>-88.066**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(29.057)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in nuclear-related goods</td>
<td>-11.314</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(10.553)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in armaments</td>
<td>-22.377</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(14.537)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.469***</td>
<td>2.218***</td>
<td>2.536***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses $^+ p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^** p < 0.01, ^*** p < 0.001$; we control for country-level fixed effects but do not include these for the reasons of brevity. Models presented are identical to those presented in Table 3.1, but exclude Israel and USA.
Table 3.3 Change in confrontation score when variable changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 1a</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 3a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prison population</td>
<td>0.83***</td>
<td>0.89***</td>
<td>0.76***</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.51*</td>
<td>0.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall trade</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>1.02***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.91***</td>
<td>0.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure</td>
<td>-0.10+</td>
<td>-0.10+</td>
<td>-0.10+</td>
<td>0.58***</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
<td>0.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in strategic goods</td>
<td>-1.01***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.08***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in energy</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.46***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.52***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in non-ferrous metals</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.26*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in chemicals</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in electronics</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in nuclear-related goods</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade in armaments</td>
<td>-0.10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We find almost no statistically significant effect of government ideology. The only point where the effect of government ideology is weakly statistically significant (at the 10% level) is in Model 1, if the United States and Israel are excluded. Even then, however, the substantive effect of a one-point move on the Schmidt-scale is associated with no more than a 0.06 point move towards more accommodation. A purely left-wing government would be thus 0.3 point more accommodationist compared to a purely right-wing one.

CONCLUSION

Among democracies, Iran's nuclear program has been one of the most divisive security issues. For more than a decade, it has pitted countries preferring confrontation and stigmatization against those
pleading for diplomacy and 'critical dialogue'. Although countries recalibrate their policies in interaction with Iran, they maintain remarkably stable policies relative to each other. As this paper has demonstrated, these policy differences do not result from different power positions, as realists would expect. Instead, we have found support for liberal foreign policy theories that highlight the domestic sources - both materialist and ideational - of security policies.

The import of oil and gas in particular is associated with an accommodationist policy. This resonates well with popular notions that the dependence on oil and gas stands in the way of a more confrontational stance towards Iran. At the same time, however, our findings also point to the importance of principled beliefs about rehabilitation, punishment and exclusion. Discourses and practices of dealing with deviance domestically also inspire policies towards violators of international norms.

We have no reason to assume that the effects of material interests and political culture on the emergence of confrontational policies are limited to the single case of Iran. Rather, our analysis suggests that similar effects should be expected in comparable cases of states that challenge international security by violating key community norms. While the escalation or de-escalation of a crisis will to a large extent depend on the behavior of the norm violator, democracies' policies are likely to be driven by a mix of material self-interest and principled beliefs.
4 HONEY OR STING? EXPLAINING POLICY DIFFERENCES TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

This paper, too, builds on the data presented in the second chapter, collected in an expert survey. In this paper, co-authored with Wolfgang Wagner, we study the determinants of policies of liberal democracies towards North Korea. As opposed to the study of policies towards Iran, we did not study the influence of commerce on policies towards North Korea, given the minuscule extent of the trade between North Korea and the outer world. Nevertheless, for robustness, we did re-run all analyses with the inclusion of trade — which did not lead to any appreciable differences in results. In all other aspects, factors considered in this paper are parallel and similar to those considered in the previous chapter.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, US governments have referred to North Korea as a ‘rogue state’, a ‘state of concern’, a ‘backlash state’ and, together with Iran and Iraq, as an ‘axis of evil’. The stigmatizing language has been accompanied by diplomatic efforts to increase the pressure on the regime in Pyongyang and by threats of ‘isolation and hardship’. Although the USA has indicated its preference for a negotiated settlement, it has been an entrepreneur for imposing various rounds of sanctions against Pyongyang.

The nine resolutions passed in the United Nations Security Council indicate that American concerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are shared by the international community. Beneath the surface of a common policy, however, fundamental policy differences persist that pit the USA as a champion of a stigmatizing and confrontational policy against most other states that prefer a more moderate stance with an emphasis on negotiations and reassurances. To be sure, policy differences between the USA, on the one hand, and China and Russia, on the other hand, are no surprise to any observer with a sense for great power competition and for the conflict between the liberal internationalism of the former and the concerns for sovereignty and non-intervention among the latter. Within the political West, i.e. among liberal democracies, the policy differences are more

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1 Albright (1998)
2 Marquis (2000)
3 Lake (1994)
4 Bush (2002)
5 (Lake 1994: 46)
puzzling. These countries do not only share a concern about the nuclearization of North Korea but also contempt for the regime’s human rights violations and authoritarian practice.

Splits among liberal democracies go back to the 1993 nuclear crisis. The split was not only transatlantic – European countries, too, were divided between those advocating for strong sanctions against the regime, and others pleading for a more measured response (Bridges 2003). Those pleading for accommodation emphasize the importance of fostering mutual trust and cooperation. The perfect epitome of such accommodationist position is German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s comment on South Korea’s ‘sunshine policy’ a few years later:

I see an interesting parallel between President Kim's winning the Nobel Peace Prize this year and former German chancellor Willy Brandt's winning the same prize thirty years ago. Brandt's initiative led to Germany's unification twenty years later. […] According to Brandt’s Ostpolitik, we first got the talks started, and they gave way to more bilateral contacts. Then came various exchanges.\(^7\)

A few months later, when Germany opened diplomatic relations with North Korea, the Federal Foreign Office touted the step as a ‘contribution of the Federal Government to the gradual reintegration of the North Korea to the international community.’\(^8\) On the other hand, France has been perceived as being the most severe of all European countries, while reasons for such policy have ‘not [been] entirely clear.’\(^9\)

At the same time, the US Secretary of State Powell made it clear how a confrontationist policy looks like. In 2002, he argued ‘We cannot suddenly say, ‘Gee, we're so scared. Let's have a negotiation because we want to appease your misbehaviour'. This kind of action cannot be rewarded.’\(^10\) Only a year later, a similar position was reiterated, arguing that ‘[f]irst is the regime change. It need not necessarily be military, but it could lead to that’.\(^11\)

How can we explain the policy differences among liberal democracies towards North Korea? To be sure, developments towards greater confrontation or accommodation over time can, to a large extent, be understood as a reaction to Pyongyang’s actions. It remains puzzling, however, that some

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\(^7\) Korea Times (2000)
\(^8\) AFP/dpa (2001)
\(^9\) Dorient (2002: 177)
\(^10\) The Telegraph (2002)
\(^11\) quoted in Kang (2003: 57)
liberal democracies always tend to be more accommodationist than others. In this article, we advance an explanation by testing the influence of military power and domestic culture, while controlling for government ideology. As opposed to the preceding study of policies towards Iran, in this article we do not study the influence of economic factors, given how minuscule the trade with North Korea is for democracies.

Our results suggest that differences in government ideology, i.e. between right and left governments, have no discernible impact. Moreover, differences in military power are of limited significance. Instead, the single most important factor influencing policies towards North Korea are differences in the domestic culture of dealing with deviance, i.e. discourses and practices of dealing with violations of norms domestically as institutionalized in a society’s criminal law and justice system.

Our argument proceeds as follows: we start by presenting the results of a survey among nonproliferation experts, which we used to determine countries’ policies towards North Korea. We then draw on theories of (comparative) foreign policy analysis to discuss potential explanations for the differences in liberal democracies’ policies. Subsequently, we proceed to outlining the methodological approach and data used in our research. This section is followed by a section in which we discuss our findings. The final section concludes.

Existing Policy Differences

A major challenge to any large-N comparative study of policies towards North Korea is that policy differences are obvious to participants in and educated observers of international diplomacy yet observable and measurable indicators are difficult if not impossible to find. Although *prima facie* both the absence or presence of diplomatic relations and the voting records on United Nations Security Council seem valuable indicators, a closer look reveals insurmountable difficulties for using any of them.

Voting records in international organizations have become accepted indicators of states’ positions towards major relevant issues in international politics and have thus been used to map cleavages within the international community.\(^\text{12}\) However, like-minded states also act strategically and are aware that the chances for successful coercion increase with the unity with which demands, offers and threats are voiced. Therefore the like-minded states prefer to keep their policy differences out of the public eye which makes pinning down individual countries’ positions difficult. It is telling that,

except for the first UN Security Council Resolution related to North Korea’s nuclear program (UN SC Resolution 825 of 1993; with the abstention of China and Pakistan), all remaining eight resolutions have been adopted unanimously. As former British diplomat Michael C. Wood argued, ‘most of the negotiating history of a resolution is not on the public record, and indeed may be known in full only to Council members or even to a limited number of them.’ Similarly, voting in the IAEA Board of Governors is done usually simply by raising of hands and individual votes are not officially revealed. Even if they are unofficially leaked to the press and media, voting in the Board tends to be done en bloc after extensive negotiations.

In a similar way, diplomats consider the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea as a sign of overcoming confrontation and of ‘warming up’ the relations with the country. However, this measure is rather crude as it can only capture the establishment, suspension and severance of diplomatic relations, and none of these actions is suited to capture policy nuances short of full-scale confrontation or accommodation. Indeed, democracies have established diplomatic relations with the North Korea in waves, and none of them has suspended or abandoned diplomatic ties since, even though policy differences have been pronounced. Figure 4.1 provides a graph of the development of the relations between North Korea and the democratic countries within our sample, since the end of the Cold War until today.

**Figure 4.1  Diplomatic relations of democratic countries with North Korea**

Source: The National Committee on North Korea (2013)

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13 Wood (1998)
Policy differences among democracies therefore remain hidden behind a façade of consensus and unity. To overcome this limitation, we decided to systematically ask those who have insights into the nuances of accommodationist or confrontational policies. We thus carried out an expert survey to determine liberal democracies’ policies towards North Korea.\textsuperscript{14}

To identify the democracies whose policies we wanted to study, we draw on the Polity IV database, which has become widely employed in international relations and comparative politics research to measure the “democraticness” of a country.\textsuperscript{15} It includes an 11-point democracy scale (0 to 10) and an 11-point autocracy scale (0 to 10). A country’s regime type (“combined Polity score”) is then measured by subtracting its autocracy score from its democracy score yielding a 21-point scale (-10 to +10). Although a score of 7 is often used as a threshold for considering any country a democracy, we apply a more restrictive measure because we wanted to include only those states whose democratic character is uncontested (that is, we want to exclude “illiberal” or “defect” democracies). We therefore included only states with a combined Polity score of at least 9 over the entire period under study (1993 to 2009). Thirty-one countries qualified as uncontested democracies. Austria, Finland, Hungary, Jamaica, Mauritius, New Zealand, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay were excluded from the study due to an insufficient number of expert judgments. This leaves 22 democracies in our sample: Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.

For the survey, we asked over four hundred experts\textsuperscript{16} from forty-seven countries to evaluate positions of six countries (their own [or that of their research specialty] plus 5 other) vis-à-vis North Korea from ‘very accommodationist’ to ‘very confrontational’ on a seven-point scale (ranging from 1 to 7). Experts were asked to evaluate the positions at four time points: 1993, when North Korea for the first time announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT; in 2003, when the country actually withdrew from the NPT; in 2006, when it conducted its first nuclear test; and in 2009, when

\textsuperscript{14}For a detailed discussion of the expert survey see Onderco and Wagner (2012)
\textsuperscript{15}The Polity project was founded by Ted Gurr in the 1970s; the Polity IV database is located at the Center for Systemic Peace at George Mason University and directed by Monty G. Marshall, www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.
\textsuperscript{16}Our experts were mainly were researchers at universities or think tanks who study nuclear nonproliferation or international security in general, though in the case of a few small countries we also asked foreign policy experts.
it conducted its second nuclear test.\textsuperscript{17} We have received 173 responses with at least one valid answer, reaching the response rate of 38 per cent.

We excluded from our sample those experts who deviated by more than one point from the mean and re-estimated expert scores. Further, we excluded all time-points with fewer than three observations. If more than two time-points were eliminated from a particular country year, we also excluded the country from the analysis.

Figure 4.2 presents the boxplot with the overall trend of development of democracies’ positions towards the North Korea. This graph clearly demonstrates two points: First, taken together, the states examined became more confrontational over the course of consecutive crises. This can easily be explained by the interaction between liberal democracies and North Korea. Second and most important for the purpose of this paper, considerable differences between states advocating confrontation and those preferring accommodation remain throughout the period under study. As indicated by the gray boxes, representing the middle 50 per cent of the data and the long vertical lines (‘whiskers’), representing the spread of data up to one-and-half-times of the interquartile range (the difference between the first and third quartiles), policy differences among states are large and persistent.

Figure 4.2 Overall trend of democracies’ positions towards North Korea

\textsuperscript{17} The survey was executed before the most recent nuclear test of 2013.
Whereas Figure 4.2 provides an overview over the entire group of states under study, Figure 4.3 maps a few selected states to further demonstrate the stability of policy differences. As seen in Figure 4.3, throughout the entire period between 1993 and 2009, Portugal always followed a more accommodationist policy than Canada and Norway. Compared to the USA, the United Kingdom and France, however, all three states have been advocates of accommodation rather than confrontation. It goes without saying that a graph of all countries’ policies would not exhibit 22 lines in perfect parallelism. Instead, some states became more confrontational or accommodationist than other ones over time as well. In any case, however, the main point remains, namely that states by and large keep country-specific preferences for confrontation or accommodation relative to other states.

**COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND THE EXPLANATION OF POLICIES TOWARDS NORTH KOREA**

Explaining different policies vis-à-vis a third state is the home ground of foreign policy analysis. To be sure, theories of international bargaining may explain why states make confrontational or accommodating moves in response to North Korea’s actions over time. However, theories that focus on characteristic patterns of interactions have difficulties to account for different degrees of confrontation or accommodation across states at the same time.
A popular explanation for policies towards third countries lies in the commercial ties between them. Such a proposition is in line with the so-called commercial liberalism\(^\text{18}\), which argues that foreign policies are a function of states’ commercial interests. States with significant economic ties stand to lose a lot from potential escalation of confrontation. Governments will therefore tend to avoid conflict with a country with which they are economically interdependent. This well established theory, however, is difficult to apply to the case of North Korea as Pyongyang’s juche ideology has minimized economic ties with the outside world. Although North Korea has not achieved economic autarchy, the volume of its trade has remained insignificant for its trading partners. Since we are interested in explaining policies towards North Korea, the absence of any significant economic dependence for the states interacting with North Korea led us to exclude commercial liberalism from the research design.\(^\text{19}\) Instead, we look into (neo-)realist, and constructivist theories of foreign policy to account for different policies towards North Korea.

**The power-political roots of coercive diplomacy: (Neo)realist foreign policy theory**

According to (neo)realists, policy differences result from differences in states’ power positions. According to Kenneth Waltz\(^\text{20}\), ‘the placement of states in the international system accounts for a good deal of their behavior.’ Weak states that lack the military capabilities to carry out military threats, will therefore choose diplomatic, non-military means. In contrast, powerful states have the full spectrum of foreign policy instruments at their disposal and frequently make use of them. This notion was popularized by Robert Kagan with a view to the USA and Europe: ‘American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power.’\(^\text{21}\) Indeed, the militarily preponderant powers tend to be more likely to escalate conflicts towards war.\(^\text{22}\) Therefore, countries possessing ‘a hammer’ might be reasonably expected to see international disputes as nails. In the particular case of nuclear proliferation, it has been argued that proliferation policies may be best understood by countries’ ability to project power over the likely proliferator\(^\text{23}\). When it comes to the particularities of the North Korean dossier, similar arguments were advanced by analysts. It has been

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\(^{18}\) The term has been coined by Joseph Nye (1988)

\(^{19}\) We nevertheless decided to re-run all models with trade as an additional variable included. As expected, there was no significant impact of commercial ties on policies towards North Korea nor did the inclusion change any other finding of the regression analyses reported below. See Table 4.3

\(^{20}\) Waltz (1993: 45)

\(^{21}\) Kagan (2002: 10)

\(^{22}\) Huth (1989), Siverson and Tennefoss (1984)

\(^{23}\) Kroenig (2009), Kroenig (2014)
argued that the EU’s almost inexistent clout on the Korean Peninsula is at least partly due to the absence of EU’s power projection in the region. When it comes to the policy of European countries, these were mostly associated with soft power, which is considered as distinguishing Europeans from the United States. Indeed, even North Korea expected that the European countries focused on ‘soft power’ will be more amendable to it.

THE CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: CONSTRUCTIVIST FOREIGN POLICY THEORY

Constructivists regard governments not as utility maximizers but as acting in line with widely shared norms and values. While international norms can explain similarities among states, domestically shared and institutionalized norms and values often account for differences in policies.

Although some domestic norms and values are explicitly geared towards foreign policy issues, many foreign policy issues are not salient enough to be anchored in a state’s political culture. In such cases, foreign policy issues are often linked to political culture via a domestic analogy: norms and values which are institutionalized in an analogous area of domestic politics are also reflected in foreign policy.

Arguments linking domestic culture to foreign policy have been brought forward with a view to various areas of foreign policy: to explain the emergence of democratic peace by extension of domestic norms of nonviolent conflict resolution, foreign aid spending by culture of responsibility for poverty alleviation or preference for European Parliament role by extending domestic norms of democratic accountability.

We argue that democracies’ policies towards North Korea are influenced, via a domestic analogy, by their domestic discourses and practices of dealing with norm violations. Since North Korea is framed as a persistent violator of international norms, the challenge posed by this ‘renegade regime’ is similar to the one posed by criminals in domestic society.

Sociologists and criminologists distinguish between a rehabilitative and an exclusionary culture of dealing with deviance. The rehabilitative culture is characterized by an understanding that ‘penal

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24 Kelly (2012)
25 Fitzpatrick (2012), Worre and Han (2012)
26 Ford and Kwon (2008)
27 Russett (1993), Russett and Oneal (2001)
28 Lumsdaine (1993)
29 Wagner (2002)
measures ought, where possible, to be rehabilitative interventions rather than negative, retributive punishments.\textsuperscript{30} This approach premises that, by means of social engineering, norm violations can be reduced. Moreover, it underscores the need to understand the individual offender (and their motivation) and is aimed towards their reintegration.

The exclusionary paradigm was developed as a critique of the rehabilitative one. It draws on retributionist thinking, according to which penalties are just and deserved.\textsuperscript{31} This line of thinking frequently regards criminals as fundamentally different from the rest of the community. While rehabilitative line of argumentation underscores the importance of understanding criminals, for retributionist thinking such arguments appear morally dubious and out of touch with popular moral sentiments.

Furthermore, this argumentation is fueled by considerations from a ‘risk society’ approach\textsuperscript{32}, highlighting the need to identify and manage unruly groups.\textsuperscript{33}

Retributionist thinking assigns priority to the deterrence, punishment and incapacitation of deviant delinquency. The protection of the public and the concern for victims of crime drive scholars and politicians in the exclusionary paradigm. Society is ‘exclusive’ and ‘responds to deviance by separation and exclusion.’\textsuperscript{34} The underlying problem is similar to the one in case of North Korea – how to approach actors who break core norms of the community? Thus, countries characterized by a rehabilitative domestic culture of dealing with deviance are expected to be rather accommodationist whereas states with an exclusionary culture are expected to prefer a rather confrontational policy.

**QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS**

We investigate the influence of two independent variables – domestic culture of dealing with deviance and military superiority – on policies towards North Korea. We furthermore control for another possible influence: government ideology. In a second set of models, we examine the robustness of our models by excluding the United States because it is an outlier in both military

\textsuperscript{30} Garland (2001: 34)
\textsuperscript{31} This line of argumentation is particularly strong among conservatives, see Skitka and Tetlock (1993)
\textsuperscript{32} Beck (1992), O’Malley (2010)
\textsuperscript{33} Feeley and Simon (1992: 455)
\textsuperscript{34} Young (1999: 26). See also Bauman (2000)
superiority and domestic culture of dealing with deviance. By including only UN members whose democratic nature is beyond doubt we implicitly control for regime type.

**Dependent variable**

Our dependent variable is the expert score, measuring the degree of confrontation and accommodation as captured in the expert survey for each country and year. Out of 31 countries, we had to drop nine due to unavailable data. We are therefore left with 22 countries. Due to missing data for some individual years, we are left with 83 observations.

**Independent variables**

- We capture the military superiority by measuring democracies’ military expenditures as a share of North Korea’s military expenditure.\(^{35}\) This operationalisation captures how much more any given democracy spends on defense compared to North Korea. The data is taken from the Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities database.\(^{36}\) The military expenditures of democracies range from 0.2% of those of North Korea (in case of Mauritius) to 110 fold (in case of the United States). Missing data on military expenditure was imputed by the next most recent version available.

- We use the prison population of given country per 1000 inhabitants to measure the domestic culture of dealing with deviance. This measurement is based on the expectation that the more exclusionary the states are domestically towards norm-breakers, the more confrontational they would be towards North Korea, ceteris paribus. A state’s culture of dealing with deviance finds expression in various ways. State’s criminal law system reflects society’s punitiveness to norm violations. The interplay between penal code, sentencing guidelines and the actual practice of punishment may be measured by prison populations, i.e. the number of prisoners per 1,000 inhabitants. High shares of prisoners indicate that a country’s criminal law system emphasizes retribution over re-socialization. A country’s prison population is low if either the penal code refrains from harsh punishments, if sentencing guidelines prioritize rehabilitative over retributive measures or if courts use the discretion they have to avoid retribution (e.g. by using probation and parole).

\(^{35}\) Similar to for example Reiter (1999).

\(^{36}\) Correlates of War (2012)
Capital punishment could also be considered an important indicator for a country’s punitivity. Nevertheless, it only allows for distinguishing between a very small group of countries who use it and the large majority that do not.

An objection could be raised that prison populations reflect crime rates, not cultures of dealing with norm violations. As criminologists have argued, however, there is sparse relation between prison populations and victimization rates, and trends in reported crime, but are rather “a matter of political choice.”

We obtained the data on prison populations from the International Centre for Prison Studies. According to its figures, prison populations range from 0.36 per 1000 inhabitants in Japan and Cyprus in 1993 to 7.56 per 1000 inhabitants in the United States in 2009.

**CONTROL VARIABLE**

- The government of the day retains considerable discretion responding to pressures and constraints. Governments use this room ‘to shape their countries’ policy according to their political beliefs and ideology.’ We therefore control for government ideology, to capture different ways governments respond to pressures and constraints. Differences in government ideology have been mostly noted to account for variance in domestic issues. However, Rathbun, Schuster and Maier, and Hofmann have all demonstrated that government ideology can be useful to account for variance in foreign and security policies. According to their studies, left-wing governments value non-military conflict management much higher than the right-wing governments, while party ideologies may influence how states approach coalition-building.

Similarly, it has been argued that European social democratic parties have perceived North Korea more as a ‘failed’ state as opposed to a ‘rogue’ state, thus exercising feelings of compassion rather than retribution. We measure the government ideology by measuring the cabinet composition, the so-called Schmidt Index. Discreet values of the Schmidt Index range from 1 to 5, where 1 denotes the hegemony of right-wing parties, 3 the balance between right-
and left-wing parties and 5 the hegemony of left-wing parties. Data was obtained from the dataset collected by Armingeon, while the missing data were supplied by Woldendorp et al. All remaining missing data was coded by authors from the information from the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

We use one year-lags to address endogeneity and possible reverse causality.

We use panel data analysis with country-fixed effects using Stata 12. We use country fixed-effects to control for unobserved and pre-existing variance. Model 1 looks at military superiority and prison populations, controlling for government ideology. Model 2 looks at domestic culture of dealing with deviance, and the government ideology. Model 3 looks at military superiority, and the government ideology. To ensure robustness of the results, we then repeat the same analyses without the USA which is an outlier in respect to several variables. The analyses are conducted in Models 4-6, which correspond to Models 1-3 respectively. Models 1-6 are presented in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 presents substantive effects of change by one standard deviation (one point on the Schmidt index in case of the government ideology) on the predicted confrontation score.

RESULTS

Let us first turn to the domestic culture of dealing with norm violation. We see that domestic culture of dealing with deviance is strongly and positively associated with increased confrontation towards North Korea. Countries with exclusionary cultures of dealing with deviance are more confrontationist towards North Korea compared to countries with more rehabilitative ones. This is clear from Models 1 and 2. The effect is present regardless of whether military expenditure is controlled for. Thus, institutionalized discourses and practices of punitiveness domestically are

46 Statistically, we treat government ideology as a continuous (as opposed to a categorical) variable. This treatment is more intuitive, as the Schmidt Index captures the political ideology of the government on the basis of the share of seats in the parliament by parties. For robustness, we re-estimated models with treatment as categorical variable. The main findings remain.
47 Armingeon, et al. (2010)
48 Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2011)
49 IPU (2011)
50 Plümper, Troeger and Manow (2005). We also tested for overidentifying restrictions (orthogonality conditions) using xtoverid test in Stata, using the program of Schaffer and Stillman (2006), implementing Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002). This test, too, recommended using fixed-effects model as more reasonable.
51 The USA has far higher military spending and a far higher prison population than any other democracy in our sample.
associated with punitiveness towards North Korea regardless of military expenditure, or government ideology. An increase by one standard deviation in prison population is associated with an increase in confrontation by about 0.9 point. Even if the military expenditure is excluded, the effect of increase of prison population by one standard deviation is approximately 0.5 points.

Once the United States is excluded, the effect of the domestic norms of dealing with norm violations persists, but estimated coefficients, statistical significance as well as substantive effects change. If the military expenditure is taken into account, increase by one standard deviation of the prison population is associated with the increase by approx. one third of a point. This effect is, however, statistically significant only at 10% level. On the other hand, once the military superiority is not taken into account, change in prison population by one standard deviation (while keeping government ideology unchanged) is associated with a move towards accommodation by about 0.5 points. This effect is significant at 5% level. This testifies that the effect of domestic culture of dealing with deviance is persistent among democracies, even if one disregards the United States as the most punitive one.

Table 4.1  Regression analysis of policies towards North Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prison population</td>
<td>0.62**</td>
<td>0.39*</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
<td>0.73**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.64***</td>
<td>3.81***</td>
<td>4.33***</td>
<td>3.10***</td>
<td>3.48***</td>
<td>3.53***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 83 83 83 79 79 79

legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Moving to military expenditure, we observe that within the full sample, the effect is not at all statistically significant. The situation slightly changes when the United States is excluded. The United States is by far the biggest outlier on the military expenditure scale. Once it is removed, the effect reverses and becomes much stronger. Military expenditure is then positively and statistically significantly associated with confrontation towards North Korea (this is, as is important to remember, once the United States is excluded). Substantively, the increase in military expenditure by one standard deviation is associated with increase in confrontation by 0.8 points if the norms of dealing with domestic norm deviance are taken into account. If they are not, the effect is even
stronger, increase in standard deviation is associated with move towards confrontation by about 0.9 points.

**Table 4.2** Substantive effect of models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prison population</td>
<td>0.86**</td>
<td>0.54*</td>
<td>0.32*</td>
<td>0.48**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
<td>0.87***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asterisks denote the statistical significance of the individual effects: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

As for the control variable, government ideology is not a significant factor, in any of the models. Thus, contrary to notions of left governments being more accommodationist than the right ones, no such pattern can be found in our data. As advertised above, for robustness we re-estimated all models including a control for bilateral trade. As can be seen in Table 4.3, this does not change the results.

**Table 4.3** Models 1-6 controlling for trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prison population</td>
<td>0.60**</td>
<td>0.38*</td>
<td>0.44*</td>
<td>0.70**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>635.96</td>
<td>661.99</td>
<td>709.57</td>
<td>637.25</td>
<td>622.49</td>
<td>690.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.68***</td>
<td>3.85***</td>
<td>4.34***</td>
<td>3.14***</td>
<td>3.52***</td>
<td>3.55***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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| N                   | 83      | 83      | 83      | 79      | 79      | 79      |

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>Military expenditure</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
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<td>4.34***</td>
<td>3.14***</td>
<td>3.52***</td>
<td>3.55***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                   | 83      | 83      | 83      | 79      | 79      | 79      |

Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01

Our findings square well with existing research on both roots of confrontation in foreign policy as well as the importance of domestic norms. For example, political psychology research has shown that individuals supporting retributionist policies towards norm breakers and the death penalty
domestically are more likely to support for hard-line policies towards norm breakers abroad. Our results suggest that this connection has been institutionalized in domestic discourse and practices. These findings square well with previous scholarship on the importance of domestic norms in foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

How to deal with the North Korean nuclear program has been one of the most divisive issues in international security. Similar challenges posed by Iran and, at different periods by Iraq or Libya, have brought unprecedented tensions not only between the West, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other hand, but also among the liberal democracies of the political West. In other words: hardly any question has put the unity of the political West under similar strains than the question of how to respond to the so-called ‘rogue states’.

Our analysis sheds some light on the sources of these divisions. Our data show that both military superiority and domestic cultures of dealing with deviance influence states’ policies towards North Korea. Of course, the significance of military superiority has been well established by generations of (neo)realists who argue that powerful countries have a higher tendency to engage in confrontational behavior than weak states.

In contrast, our finding that domestic cultures ways of dealing with deviance is another influential factor impacting on states’ policies, suggests a new look at the sources of foreign policies and, by implication, divisions among liberal democracies. Of course, constructivist scholars have long argued that political culture and identity heavily influence state actions. Moreover, the political and/or strategic culture of individual states has been identified as an important driving force for a state’s security policy. However, the cultural roots of coercive diplomacy have hardly been examined thus far. Our findings suggest that the impact of institutionalized discourses and practices on coercive diplomacy should not be underestimated. Instead, they are the key element in any comprehensive understanding of liberal democracies’ policies towards the ‘rogue states’.

5 South Africa’s Iran policy. ‘Poster child’ meets ‘renegade’

As I outlined in the Introduction, this dissertation uses a mixed-methods design which combines the quantitative and qualitative research methods. This paper serves as the first qualitative probe of the quantitative results obtained in previous chapters. In Chapter three we argued that liberal democracies’ policies towards ‘rogue states’ are related to their domestic cultures of dealing with deviance and military power, and much less so by the commercial considerations. This case study looks at the policy position of South Africa towards Iran and is the first of the two in-depth case studies conducted for this dissertation. South Africa was selected as a country with strong economic ties and punitive domestic culture of dealing with deviance. This paper tried to discern whether the discussion of mutual power positions, economic concerns or notions of dealing with ‘deviance’ appear in South African decision-making. These were not too prominent – in their stead, South Africa’s position was marked by perceptions of the United States and the multilateral institutions. The only notions related to domestic culture were the ones related to South Africa’s own transition from the apartheid to democracy. This paper was published in South African Journal of International Affairs in 2012.

While the Iranian nuclear programme has attracted the attention of the international community and has been dealt with in various international forums, analyses of the responses thereto have been largely limited to the study of Western countries.¹ However, Western countries are not the only ones within the policy game dealing with the Iranian dossier. At the same time, if we see the Iranian programme as a study in noncompliance with international norms,² analysing positions of norm ‘poster children’, or states exemplary in their compliance with a norm and well-plugged within the system, would help to understand the dynamics of norm deviance and responses thereto in international relations. It is, therefore, all the more surprising that the South African foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear programme has received so scant academic attention.³

South Africa is a global non-proliferation ‘poster child’, the only country to give up nuclear weapons it built and a member of all nuclear non-proliferation clubs. It sat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during two sanction votes regarding Iran (UNSC Resolutions 1747 of 2007 and 1803 of 2008) and continues to be an influential voice in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, the main international non-proliferation organisation’s top decision-

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² Ogilvie-White (2007), Ogilvie-White (2010), Wagner and Onderco (forthcoming)
³ For some tangential treatment, see Leith and Pretorius (2009), Serrão (2012)
making body. This position makes South Africa an excellent case to study the relations towards Iran and the country’s nuclear program.

This contribution seeks to fill the gap by not only providing the narrative for the relations between the two countries, but also outlining how South Africa’s post-apartheid policy towards Iran may be explained in terms of International Relations theory with a view towards generalisable implications for the understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy. Whereas the majority of studies on South Africa’s foreign policy have focused on traditional ‘turfs’ (e.g. Zimbabwe, Congo, Darfur) or evaluating South Africa’s stints on the UNSC (2007-2008 and 2011-2012), this article looks at the policy towards an issue of global importance where South Africa has a vested normative interest outside of its immediate neighbourhood.

This article argues that South Africa’s lenient position towards the Iranian nuclear programme is heavily influenced by the South Africa’s perception of the North. As South Africa is distrustful of their interests on the issue, its position is best explained by the geopolitical opposition to the global North. This geopolitical opposition is, however, mediated by the country’s principled belief in negotiated settlements, stemming from its domestic framework of dealing with norm deviance and its own recent history. Empirically, the article builds on the research conducted in South Africa, interviews with South African policy-makers, diplomats and academics as well as an extensive study of newspapers. Fieldwork for the article was conducted in early 2012.

The article is structured into four main sections. In the first section, the non-proliferation credentials of both Iran and South Africa are discussed. The second section discusses the general setting of relations between South Africa and Iran from the apartheid era until today, including the economic and political ties between the two countries. The South African position towards the official nuclear dossier on Iran is discussed in the third section. The argument advanced in the fourth section is that Pretoria’s position is distinguished by three main features: emphasizing the importance of negotiations; distrusting the North; and stressing the importance of wider multilateral forums. These features capture the dynamics of the position.

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A POSTER CHILD AND A PARIAH

International relations scholars argue that the non-use of nuclear weapons is caused by a ‘taboo’, which is best explained by the importance of norms in international politics.⁵ States do not refrain from the use of nuclear weapons because they fear retaliation or because they are deterred; rather, states do so because they are driven by norms, defined as ‘collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given entity’.⁶ Similarly, an argument has been advanced that by virtue of the near-universal ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); a norm of non-development of nuclear weapons has by now been not only established but also observed by a majority of states.⁷

The Iranian nuclear programme has sparked a major heated debate and has led to the image of Iran as a renegade regime.⁸ Although Iran has continuously argued that the country’s nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only, such claims have been seriously doubted.⁹ Due to the nature of nuclear technology, there is little doubt that a civilian nuclear cycle can be turned into a military programme relatively easily.¹⁰

The extent of the Iranian nuclear programme has been exposed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian opposition group that presented evidence that Iran has secretly pursued nuclear capabilities with a potential weapons use for two decades.¹¹ In June 2003, the IAEA declared that Iran had violated its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement,¹² a claim that Iran challenged by stating that all violations were minor.¹³ The main concern of relevant stakeholders has been that Iran may be able to redirect the enriched uranium into a military programme, a claim Iran has denounced repeatedly.¹⁴

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⁵ Tannenwald (1999), Tannenwald (2002)
⁷ Ogilvie-White (2007), Rublee (2009)
¹⁰ Wohlstetter (1976)
¹¹ Fitzpatrick (2006)
¹² IAEA (2003a)
¹³ Fitzpatrick (2008a), Heisbourg (2007)
¹⁴ A recent report by the International Crisis Group provides a helpful overview of political and economic rationale for a peaceful nuclear program in Iran. See International Crisis Group (2012)
In contrast, South Africa has been seen as a global nuclear non-proliferation ‘poster child’ since the post-apartheid transition in 1994. After F.W. de Klerk became the President of South Africa in 1989, he ordered the dismantlement of the country’s nuclear programme and nuclear devices, which was accomplished between July 1990 and July 1991. When de Klerk informed the parliament about the nuclear programme in 1993, six nuclear devices had been dismantled, much of the documentation destroyed, and laboratories converted or shut down. South Africa opened all its facilities for inspection to the IAEA and provided complete information about its nuclear past. Although the current South Africa’s leadership derives much of its non-proliferation stature and concomitant high moral ground from the fact that South Africa was the first (and the only) country to build and give up nuclear weapons, the African National Congress (ANC) was not involved in the process of the South African nuclear roll-back. However, the post-apartheid South African government, through its UN representative, announced its commitment as early as 1994 to ‘a policy of non-proliferation and arms control which covers all the weapons of mass destruction’ and to ‘be a responsible possessor of advanced technologies’.

In step with this resolution, South Africa was instrumental in securing the support for the indefinite extension of the NPT during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (REC) of the NPT. One needs to understand that before the REC, there was no agreement about the further course of action and countries were divided into two camps, namely one led by the United States advocating unconditional indefinite extension and the other of the South (composed of a wide range of countries, and not unified) arguing for a time-limited extension with conditions. Although there was a discussion within South Africa’s foreign policy leadership regarding the best course of action, in the end South Africa pushed for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Pretoria adopted a middle-power position of a bridge-builder between the nuclear- and non-nuclear weapons states, the North

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15 Liberman (2001), Purkitt and Burgess (2005)
16 Keller (1993)
17 Harris, Hatang and Liberman (2004), Liberman (2001), Purkitt and Burgess (2005)
18 Stott (2007)
19 Ukraine and Kazakhstan surrendered their nuclear arsenal in early 1990s. However, this arsenal was not built by these countries but rather dislocated there by the Soviet army. Libya, on the other hand, pursued a lively nuclear program but abandoned it before a nuclear device was obtained. Cf. Bowen (2006), Braut-Hegghammer (2008)
20 For a recent statement, see Statement by Ambassador as Minty (2011)
21 Quoted in Van Der Merwe (2003)
22 Interview with Thomas Wheeler, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, February 2012.
and the ‘non-aligned’ states. South Africa proved instrumental in achieving the greatest possible consensus. The success of this strategy elevated South Africa to a prominent position with a high level of legitimacy and stature. In addition, South Africa in 1995 reclaimed its permanent position on the IAEA Board of Governors (as the representative of Africa, after its suspension from the organisation in 1977, taking over from Egypt) and became a member of all relevant groups related to nuclear energy. Thus, South Africa is ideally positioned within the global non-proliferation regime and enjoys a strong position therein.

RENEWED FRIENDS

The dominant narrative of relations between South Africa and Iran is generally simple: the apartheid regime enjoyed good relations with the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s regime in Iran. After the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, the new regime in Tehran led by Ayatollah Khomeini terminated diplomatic ties with South Africa and supported the anti-apartheid struggle. Once apartheid was terminated, the gates were open for trade and political ties between the two partners. Many parts of the jigsaw fit together – Iranian anti-Western discourse squared well with the anti-Western discourse in the new South Africa, where the US and the UK were perceived as having been the main supporters of the apartheid regime.

The full story is, of course, less straight-forward. The two countries re-established their ties in January 1994, after 15 years, following passage of the UN General Assembly resolution calling for the restoration of economic ties with South Africa. Iran was fêted as a ‘friendly country’ at that time by the leaders of the ANC. In 1995, a joint bi-national commission at Deputy Minister level was established, initially dealing almost exclusively with trade-related issues.

24 Flemes (2009)
25 South Africa is a party to or a member of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (though this treaty is not in force yet, South Africa has acceded to it) Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Suppliers Group, The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, The Missile Technology Control Regime, The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the Zangger Committee.
26 Although Iran never ceased to be represented in Pretoria, through the Iranian interests section of the Swiss Embassy. See New Iran Ties 'Won't Affect Oil Supplies' (1994)
27 United Nations (1993a)
28 New Iran Ties 'Won't Affect Oil Supplies' (1994)
29 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (2006)
One of the main issues in the economic relations between Iran and South Africa has been South Africa’s historical oil dependence on Iran. Even under the apartheid regime, South Africa was dependent on Iranian oil. The resulting skewed trade balance remained one of the main topics for the joint bi-national commission after the end of apartheid; the ANC readily admitted at that time that South Africa depended on Iran for 65-90% of its oil imports. South Africa’s oil dependence has continuously been decreasing to 35% and, in July 2012, in response to the pressure from the United States threatening sanctions against entities in countries which continue to import Iranian oil, South Africa suspended oil imports from Iran altogether and replaced them by imports from Angola and Saudi Arabia. In any case, the progressive decrease of the dependence on oil imports from Iran and the diversification of supplies undermine a potential argument that South Africa has been interested in protecting its oil interests in the country.

Oil is, however, not the only commercial tie between Iran and South Africa. South African businesses have considered other opportunities in Iran since the re-establishment of economic relations. SASOL, a South African state-owned energy enterprise, has invested millions of dollars in Arya Sasol, a petrochemical joint-venture with Iran’s state-owned National Petrochemical Company located in the Pars Special Economic Energy Zone in the province of Bushehr. The South African telecommunications conglomerate MTN views Iran as one of its most important markets: 10% of the MTN group’s revenue is generated there, where the company has an above 100% market penetration and controls about 45% of the Iranian telecommunications market. The importance of

30 Although such imports were of course a matter of secrecy, Iran owned a stake in a Natref refinery in South Africa (from the Shah's times) and had a legal obligation to supply the refinery with the oil. Selling the refinery was not an option without a significant financial loss. Furthermore, with the Iran-Iraq war, Iran needed a weaponry supplier whereas (apartheid-) state-owned Armaments Corporation was producing high-quality weaponry and looked eagerly for buyers (such considerations led to a $750 million deal in 1985, where Iran agreed to purchase weapons and South Africa oil from each other). However, the main source of oil for South Africa was from secret deliveries and spot market, where Iran was active as well. See De Quaasteniet and Aarts (1995)
31 Cohen (1996), Streek (1996), Trade Imbalance to Dominate Agenda During Iranian Premier’s Visit to Sa (1996)
32 Sa Cuts Oil Imports from Iran (2012), U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013)
33 As of early 2012, Sasol was reviewing its investment in Iran. According to the media reports, the investment is worth about $900 million. See Faucon and Maylie (2012)
34 Dolan and Nyambura-Mwaura (2012). The importance of the Iranian market for MTN can also be illustrated by the fact that in spite of inability to transfer the revenues out of Iran (and thus a necessity to resort to swaps with companies which require liquidity within Iran), the company did not consider pulling out of Iran. In early 2012, allegations were made that the MTN has used bribery to win the operating license in Iran. As of the time of writing (August 2012), the only outcome
the Iranian market to South African business can be illustrated by the fact that Iran accounts for 31% of the credit insurance exposure by the South Africa’s Export Credit Insurance Corporation, a percentage second only to SA’s exposure in Mozambique, due to heavy investment in the Moosal aluminum plant (if the Moosal investment were to be excluded from this calculation, Iran would account for twice as much risk exposure as second in the rank – again Mozambique). It is notable that as recently as 2005, Iran did not figure in the statistics of South African risk exposure at all, so negligible was the associated risk.  

According to Aziz Pahad, former South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, South Africans regarded Iran as a regional power and Iranians hoped to use South Africa as ‘a springboard to Africa’. The binational commission with Iran, while remaining at the deputy-ministerial level when other such bodies have met at the ministerial or higher levels, has proven to be one of the most active of all South African binational commissions, meeting every year, whereas many others met only once or twice. In addition to trade, the binational commission facilitated the exchange of views on politics, including the Middle East peace process, where South Africa did not share Iran’s stand. However, over time, the Iranian nuclear dossier became the main topic of the meetings. 

Ever since the normalisation of ties between the two nations, issues related to nuclear energy have been on the table. In 1995, the South African Sunday Tribune wrote that ‘[South Africa] has enough scientists, equipment and expertise to make it a perfect partner for Iran, whose race to acquire weapons of mass destruction has set alarm bells ringing around the world […The] Tehran government always supported the African National Congress and President Mandela clearly feels indebted to Iran’. Soon thereafter, South African Minister of Minerals and Energy Pik Botha (formerly minister of foreign affairs until 1994) denied any agreement on nuclear deals with Iran. This denial was followed by reports that ‘South African scientists and experts who once worked on

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available is that DIRCO suspended then-ambassador to Iran from active service pending investigations. See England (2012)
36 Interview with Aziz Pahad, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Johannesburg, February 2012
37 South Africa supports the two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
38 Interview with Aziz Pahad, Johannesburg, February 2012
39 Iran Nuclear Link Fears (1995)
40 Pik Denies Any Nuke Deal with Iran (1995)
nuclear weaponry for their country will shortly receive offers from Iran'. The information about nuclear cooperation between the two countries resurfaced even in mid-2000s, but it was always met with a denial from South African officials.

**SQUARING WITH IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME**

South Africa has been consistently seen as ‘one of Iran’s doughtiest supporters at the UN’, and given South Africa’s importance within the system of international institutions (including but not limited to those dealing with non-proliferation), such a position is given prominence. South Africa consistently abstained on resolutions critical to Iran in the IAEA Board of Governors; although it has voted twice in favour of sanctions against Iran in the UNSC, this followed fierce argument from South African officials against the sanction in each case.

South Africa’s approach to the Iranian nuclear dossier is characterised by three distinguishable features: emphasizing the importance of negotiations; displaying a firm distrust of the North; and stressing the importance of wider multilateral forums.

**ABOVE ALL, NEGOTIATE**

From 2002, when the Iranian nuclear programme became known to the international community, South Africa has shown a strong aversion to any confrontational moves and has consistently argued for more time to negotiate with Iran before proposed courses of punitive action. South African officials have sought broad international cooperation, and opposed the route pushed by the US beginning in 2004 to refer the Iranian nuclear dossiers to the UNSC. According to US diplomats, South African Governor Abdul Minty of the IAEA Board of Governors insisted that pushing for the UNSC referral would ‘split the [Board] and ensure no consensus’. The IAEA Board of

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41 Iran to Make Offers to Sa Nuclear Scientists (1995)
42 Nuclear-Iran-Israel (2005), South Africa Denies Proposing Iran Nuclear Enrichment (2005)
43 A Search for Allies in a Hostile World (2010). Similar results were found in an expert survey by Onderco and Wagner (2012).
44 South Africa voted for the first time for an IAEA BoG resolution critical to Iran on November 18, 2011 (GOV/2011/69). After this article was accepted for publication, SA voted again in favor of a IAEA BoG resolution on September 13, 2012 (GOV/2012/50)
45 Abdul Minty is not only a ‘mere’ Ambassador. As a foreign diplomat described him in an interview with the author, ‘Mr Minty is the nuclear policy of South Africa’ (February 2012). By all accounts, Abdul Minty has been a trusted advisor on all nuclear matters to Presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma (although less so under the last).
46 South Africa’s Position on September Bog: Cooperation with Usg, but No Unsc Referral ([2004])
Governors finally referred Iran to the UNSC on February 4, 2006 by Resolution GOV/2006/14, on which South Africa abstained from voting.

In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in non-compliance with its legal obligations under the NPT. Two months later, the Director General of the IAEA submitted a follow-up report on the issue to the Board of Governors, which stated that Iran was complying only partially. Minty, on the other hand, commended Iran on its compliance and praised the positive trend of ‘co-operation and transparency South Africa argued that ‘the correct course of action remains for the Board to allow for more time that would enable the [IAEA] to continue with its process to clarify certain issues pertaining to the Islamic Republic of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme’. At the same time, South Africa proposed that Iran be permitted to continue enriching uranium in exchange for continued negotiations, a proposal which Western diplomats saw as giving Iran the time to solve technical problems associated with the enrichment programme. By February 2006, however, South Africa’s voice was overridden and IAEA referred the dossier to the UNSC, which dealt with the dossier in July 2006 and passed the first round of sanctions in December of the same year.

South Africa made another attempt with a similar proposal in 2007, as a non-permanent member of the UNSC when the Iranian nuclear dossier re-appeared. South Africa proposed trimming the list of sanctioned entities and an introduction of a 90-day freeze on Iranian nuclear enrichment activities in return for simultaneous suspension of UN sanctions. The proposal was rejected by the five permanent members of the UNSC. In subsequent very heated discussion on what would later become UNSC Resolution 1747 placing further sanctions on Iran, the tone turned sour when South African Permanent Representative to the UN Dumisani Kumalo reproached the countries tabling the resolution for treating it as if it were ‘written by God or [had] the wisdom of God in it’. However, only two days later, South Africa voted in favour of the resolution, justifying the vote as

47 IAEA (2005)
49 Hibbs (2005)
50 UPI (2007)
the only way to stop a possible military conflict.\textsuperscript{51} The obvious discrepancy between the words before the vote and the vote itself remain unaddressed.

In 2007, just three months after the passing of Resolution 1747, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in her speech on the budget vote in the South African Parliament reiterated with regard to Iran:

\begin{quote}
[At] every point we have called for dialogue and negotiations and in the current crisis encourage all parties to spare no effort to seek a comprehensive and sustainable solution. South Africa will continue to encourage all the parties concerned to enter into dialogue and negotiations in order to seek a comprehensive and sustainable solution. South Africa and the international community do not wish to see Iran develop nuclear weapons and also do not wish to see war over Iran's nuclear programme…\textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}

Similar aversion to the sanctions was reflected in 2008, when South Africa argued against the third round of the UNSC sanctions against Iran. South Africa argued that adoption of sanctions was not necessary and more time was needed. Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)\textsuperscript{53} Director General George Nene argued that ‘nobody expects a terrible atomic catastrophe to take place in a month’ and in favour of further IAEA-Iran negotiations.\textsuperscript{54} Similarly, South African UN Permanent Representative Kumalo expressed his displeasure with the pace of the negotiations when he argued for more time for the IAEA reports.\textsuperscript{55} When he was joined two weeks later by Abdul Minty, who argued that ‘all the outstanding issues that had existed have been clarified’, everyone expected that South Africa would abstain or vote against the sanctions. The opposite happened —South Africa voted in favour of the resolution.\textsuperscript{56} South Africa’s UNSC experience with the Iranian dossier was described as a ‘group coach tour where you don’t have too

\textsuperscript{51} Sa Says It Acted on Iran to Stop 'Short of War' (2007)
\textsuperscript{52} Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, to the National Assembly on the Occasion of the Budget Vote of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town 29 May 2007 (2007)
\textsuperscript{53} DIRCO was the new name for South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs as of 2009.
\textsuperscript{54} South Africa Urges Unsc Self-Restraint on Iran Nuclear Case (2008)
\textsuperscript{55} Lederer (2008)
much to say about the itinerary’. The actual vote resulted in heated discussions within South Africa, as it appeared on face value to contradict the importance attached to negotiations as well as the rhetoric of the South African representatives.

South Africa’s UNSC votes in these cases also caused turmoil in bilateral Iran-South African relations. Former Iranian ambassador to South Africa, Javid Ghorbanoghli, wrote in the South African press that voting in favor of the resolution 1747 was ‘no way to treat a friend’. Similarly, the Iranian deputy foreign minister stated during his visit to Pretoria in July 2007 that Iran was ‘disappointed with South Africa supporting the March resolution imposing unjust sanctions on us. Pretoria made real efforts to have the draft resolution amended, something for which we are grateful. But at the end, they voted for resolution 1747.’ South African officials have discussed their voting record with Iranian officials, especially in March 2007 after Resolution 1747 passed. According to Aziz Pahad, while Iran was not happy with the vote, ‘[Iran] never went publicly against [South Africa]’ on this matter.

This is true only partially. It is important to note that South Africa was presiding over the UNSC (as a non-permanent member) during the period of 1747’s passage. South Africa tried to play the bridge-builder between Iran and the permanent members of the UNSC, upon the explicit request of Iranians. South Africans had already expressed concern that the hard-line approach by the US was alienating the moderate elements within the Iranian leadership circles, and were therefore well poised and willing to mediate. However, Iran subsequently failed to deliver evidence of the non-diversion in its nuclear programme as promised to South Africa in return for Pretoria’s brokering. Consequently, South Africans felt deceived and saw no other choice than to vote in favour of the sanctions. One can observe that South Africa maintained its strong belief in negotiations until they themselves were let down.

57 Fabricius (2008)
58 Interview with Dumisani Kumalo, Johannesburg, February 2012
59 Ghorbanoghli (2007)
60 Kaninda (2007)
61 Interview with Aziz Pahad, Johannesburg, February 2012
62 Interview with Aziz Pahad, Johannesburg, February 2012
63 Interviews with Aziz Pahad and Dumisani Kumalo, both in Johannesburg, February 2012.
Distrust of the North

An equally important feature behind South Africa’s relations with Iran is Pretoria’s distrust of the North, and especially of the US and the European Union (EU) in their involvement in the UNSC on the matter of the Iranian nuclear dossier.\(^{64}\)

The South African government has clashed with the United States on its approach towards Iran repeatedly and openly since 1994. US pressure to amend Pretoria’s ties with Tehran was not new. Already in 1995, Minister of Minerals and Energy Pik Botha stated that South Africa would not bow to the US on its business dealings with Iran.\(^{65}\) The statement was repeated by the Foreign Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in 2002, who stated that ‘the US is not going to dictate to the SA government whether Iran, […], should be this country’s friends or enemies’, while arguing that the US policy is based on ‘a misunderstanding of the Iranian situation’.\(^{66}\) Even more powerful was a statement by South African President Thabo Mbeki during his speech at the presentation of credentials by the new Iranian ambassador in 2004, when he vowed to battle to prevent the powerful to do what they please to smaller countries and promised to fight (together with Iran) against the tactics of powerful countries to interfere with less powerful nations.\(^{67}\)

South Africa saw the initiative of the US and Europeans as a way to restrict a rising power (Iran) which discomfited them.\(^{68}\) In bilateral exchanges, South Africa encouraged Iran to become fully transparent and compliant with the IAEA (following the South African example), because in this way ‘[Iran] would pull the rug from under the P5+1’.\(^{69}\) In addition, South Africa, opposed to the sanctions being pushed by the North, saw its own role as preventing ‘their crazy language from getting into the resolution’ regarding sanction.\(^{70}\)

\(^{64}\) It may be important to note, that in the understanding of the South African officials and policy-makers, the US and the EU member states form a unified entity. I will therefore also treat them as unified entity (referred to as the North), although as shown before, the differences between these countries are large and important. See Onderco and Wagner (2012)

\(^{65}\) Pik: Sa Won't Bow to Us on Iran Deal (1995)

\(^{66}\) Mvoko (2002)

\(^{67}\) Mbeki Takes Swipe at World’s Bullies (2004)

\(^{68}\) Interview with a South African diplomat (B), Pretoria, February 2012

\(^{69}\) P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, the main negotiators with Iran over its nuclear programme. Quote source: Interview with Dumisani Kumalo, Johannesburg, February 2012
Associated with the distrust of the North is the fear that steps taken against Iran were in fact aimed at restricting the right of states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, a right granted under the NPT to signatories of that treaty. As a South African diplomat explained, especially in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a frequent Iranian line of defence to rally support has been ‘today the restrictions happen to us, tomorrow it may happen to you’. This assertion has received some (albeit limited) sympathy within the NAM.\(^{71}\)

The fear of possible future limitations also lay behind South Africa’s resistance to the introduction of nuclear fuel banks or benefaction, which South Africa sees as a way to restrict access to most advanced technologies to only a handful of countries.\(^ {72}\) Especially in the mid-2000s, when South Africa was considering development of a pebble bed modular reactor as a way to solve its domestic energy needs,\(^ {73}\) Pretoria was concerned about possible restrictions on access to advanced nuclear technologies.

In February 2004, the US government proposed to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)\(^ {74}\) that the transfer of uranium-enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies be restricted to countries with facilities already in place.\(^ {75}\) South Africa did not appear on the list of countries with existing facilities and adoption of the restrictions would mean that the country would not be able to enrich its own uranium in the future. Abdul Minty explained in 2004 to US diplomats that South Africa did not agree with the restrictions on enrichment proposed by the US government as a response to the Iranian nuclear programme, precisely because Pretoria was eyeing the possibility for the peddle bed modular reactors.\(^ {76}\) Aziz Pahad, the deputy minister of foreign affairs at that time, argued that ‘South Africa fought the idea like mad’ because officials felt that it would make South Africa vulnerable in the future.\(^ {77}\)

One year later, in 2005, Foreign Affairs Minister Dlamini-Zuma argued in relation to the Iranian programme that ‘Western countries wanted to make nuclear technology available at market values for civilian use to developing countries’ and that ‘those countries, which had the capacity, [should be

\(^{71}\) Interview with South African diplomat (A), Pretoria, February 2012

\(^{72}\) Interview with South African diplomat (B), Pretoria, February 2012

\(^{73}\) For a useful overview of the project, see Thomas (2009)

\(^{74}\) NSG is a global export control body for nuclear and nuclear-related goods. More info at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/default.htm

\(^{75}\) Boese (2004), Boese (2008)

\(^{76}\) South Africa’s Position on September Bog: Cooperation with Usg, but No Unsc Referral ([2004])

\(^{77}\) Interview with Aziz Pahad, Johannesburg, February 2012
allowed to] to develop that nuclear technology themselves’. The point was driven further by DFA’s then-Director General Ayanda Ntsaluba when he told the parliamentary portfolio committee on foreign affairs in his comments on the Iranian nuclear programme that, ‘what we think we should not do is to be complacent and think that if there is any undermining of international law and existing agreements on Iran it will not happen to us. That is the approach we are taking to it’.

South Africa did not believe that the purpose of the North’s activity was merely to resolve the questions around the Iranian nuclear programme, but suspected a wider agenda of restricting developing countries’ rights to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The association in the language of South African officials between the Iranian programme and the possible restrictions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy clearly indicates that South Africa saw the two as interconnected – and as a possible further reason to distrust the North.

MULTILATERALISM PREFERRED
The last feature of the South African approach to the Iranian nuclear dossier is the preference for wide multilateral forums over narrow decision-making bodies. South Africa has repeatedly argued that the Iranian nuclear dossier should be dealt with in the IAEA Board of Governors, comprised of representatives from 35 nations, instead of the UNSC. This may be a curious position in view of the apparent value South Africa places on its stints in the non-permanent seats of the UNSC and of Pretoria’s drive to acquire a permanent seat.

In March 2006, shortly after the IAEA Board of Governors first decided to refer the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UNSC, Abdul Minty spoke to the parliamentary portfolio committee on foreign affairs and reiterated that South Africa believed that the IAEA should deal with the dossier and ‘was opposed to moves by the UNSC to stop Iran’s civilian nuclear programme’. Only a few days later, President Thabo Mbeki reiterated the point when he argued that the IAEA, not the UNSC, should deal with the dossier. The position was maintained by Minister Dlamini-Zuma after a meeting with her Iranian counterpart.

South Africa’s argument in favour of the IAEA Board of Governors as arbiter stands on two grounds: firstly that the IAEA possesses unique technical expertise which makes it best placed to

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78 South Africa: Minister Defends Iran's Use of Nukes for 'Peaceful Reasons' (2005)
79 SABC News (2006)
80 Alden and Vieira (2005), Barber (2005)
decide on matters nuclear, and secondly, that dealing with the nuclear programme of Iran constitutes a ‘mission creep’ for the UNSC, an extension of the mandate of the UNSC into areas where it was not before and where it does not belong. South African officials perceive the IAEA Board of Governors as an important body for the global South, but also sense that its importance is lesser for the North. South Africa has long attributed to the IAEA Board of Governors the position of ‘the judge in the middle’, although this view has certainly receded since the 2009 election to the IAEA leadership of Yukiya Amano, whom many of South Africa’s officials perceive as partial to the United States and Israel. It must not be overlooked, at the same time, that South Africa has much more power in the IAEA Board of Governors, where it leads a much bigger group of states on a permanent basis. This element will, however, be discussed in the subsequent section.

**SOUTH AFRICAN JACKAL?**

This analysis would argue that the most important constitutive element of South African policy towards Iran is the countering of the North, and specifically the US and its dominance in the interpretation of non-proliferation norms. Opposition to global hegemony, whether geopolitical or ideational, is not new to the study of international relations or particular to South Africa. Power transition theory within the study of international relations explains why change in relative power of states may lead to a confrontation between rising powers and established dominant powers, as well as the conditions upon which this change may lead to war. If the established powers prefer the status quo (that is, they are satisfied with both the workings of the international system as well as the formal distribution of power within international institutions), the revisionist powers seek change in order to enhance their positions within the system, seeing the latter as unjust and thus in need of readjustment.

The Iranian nuclear programme is just one example where this comes into play for South Africa — seen in how the UNSC’s involvement is frowned upon, major powers are distrusted and other international forums preferred. South Africa endorsed the norm of non-proliferation, but

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82 Interviews with South African diplomats (A) and (B), Pretoria, February 2012
83 Interview with South African diplomat (C), Pretoria, February 2012
84 Interview with Dumisani Kumalo, former Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Johannesburg, February 2012
85 Organski and Kugler (1980)
challenged its hegemonic application. It is not a coincidence that South Africa preferred the IAEA Board of Governors – there it could have used much more leverage compared to the UN Security Council. Developing countries are far more numerous on the IAEA Board of Governors (which as noted earlier is also larger, with 35 seats compared to 15 in the UNSC); there is no veto-power; and South Africa sits on the Board permanently. South Africa shows similar tendencies to prefer multilateral forums can be seen also for example in the debate about the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, where South Africa argues for more voting power for itself (and other countries of the South).  

South Africa expresses a strong belief in international institutions but wants to see them reformed. Indeed, the final draft of the 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy maintains that ‘South Africa will actively participate in the BRICS [Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa], whose members are reshaping the global economic and political order.’ South Africa seeks to reshape the international order, in favour of developing countries. The South African Presidency’s ten year review of 2003 lists among the goals for South African foreign policy the drive ‘[to] reform and strengthen the multilateral rules-bound political, economic, security and environmental organisations in order to advance the interests of developing countries’. To refer again to the tour group image painted with regard to the UNSC, South Africa’s desire to reform institutions — and to stand up for the rights of developing nations such as Iran — presents not only an attempt to influence the itinerary but also to influence who is in the driving seat.

Such a position is focused ultimately on bringing about ‘the transformation of the global system of governance from power-based to a rules-based system in a just and equitable global order’. This requires as a precursor, from South Africa’s perspective, changes that bring more power to the countries of the global South. As the successful bid (in July 2012) to place South African Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma at the helm of the African Union Commission has shown, however, South Africa does not hesitate to flex its own muscles.

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88 Siphamandla Zondi characterises this drive as a Kantian belief in the international system mixed with the Marxist notion of the transformation from within. Interview with Siphamandla Zondi, director of the Institute for Global Dialogue, Pretoria, February 2012
89 Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu (2011)
90 Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services of The Presidency (2003)
91 Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu (2011)
92 For a similar evaluation, see Habib (2009)
South Africa is a typical ‘jackal’ in terms of Randall Schweller’s version of neo-realism. As Schweller argues, ‘jackals’ and ‘wolves’ are powers that have more interest in changing the status quo than in the maintenance thereof. Wolves are the leaders of the pack (the revisionists), whereas jackals bandwagon with them for the spoils. South Africa cannot often be the lead wolf of a global pack to change the status quo. This is evident within the BRICS club of rising powers, where South Africa is by far the smallest member; it lacks the weight of its partners in terms of demographic size, economic and military power (though on non-proliferation issues, South Africa is clearly a very important voice).

This theoretical outline is not completely new to the study of South Africa’s foreign policy, though it has received less attention compared to other interpretations. Laurie Nathan has shown that much of the Mbeki-era foreign policy was driven by anti-imperialism, frequently equated with anti-Westernism and opposition towards the global North. Specifically in the case of South Africa’s nuclear policy, Leith and Pretorius have shown that South Africa has moved from a middle-ground position towards a more revisionist position, signalling a move away from the North. In alternative explanations, it has been argued that South Africa’s opposition to the North’s interpretation of international norms ought to be seen in the light of alternative norm entrepreneurship or shifting norm subsidiarity, implicitly considered as benevolent. Similarly, South Africa’s drive to transform international institutions and its preference for alternative venues has been generally conveyed as an expression of its altruistic desire for advancement and giving more voice to the less powerful countries of the globe.

**ACTING IN PRETORIA’S OWN INTERESTS?**

An alternative argument could be advanced that South Africa’s policy on Iran has been driven by its commercial (oil) interests. Such a view is, in this author’s view, unfounded. Firstly, officials, foreign diplomats and analysts alike interviewed for this research refuted such a link. More importantly, if South Africa was indeed driven by commercial considerations, then the commercial ties with the United States would have been taken into account too and South Africa would be more likely to

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93 Schweller (1994) In the following analysis, I adopt Elman’s understanding of realism as not only theory of international relations but also of foreign policy, cf. Elman (1996)
94 Qobo (2011)
95 Nathan (2011)
96 Leith and Pretorius (2009)
97 Neethling (2012), Serrão and Bischoff (2009)
98 Alden and Le Pere (2003), Bischoff (2003)
follow the United States. Given that the commercial ties to the United States are much stronger than those with Iran, a soft position towards Iran is counter-intuitive. This is, however, precisely what exists. South Africa’s July 2012 suspension of oil imports from Iran is an anomaly, not to be seen as a reprimand to Iran but as a tactical step taken in self-protection against potential adverse effects from specific US sanctions against states trading with Iran.

Rather, the argument advanced here builds on the realist theory that the policy is to be understood as an example of South Africa’s desire to acquire more power in international politics. South Africa’s Iran policy is a direct challenge against the North’s interpretation of international norms, as much as Pretoria may subscribe to those same norms. In the same vein, South Africa exhibits a preference for forums where it holds most voice, which is neither unusual nor particular to South Africa.

Partially subscribing to a similar view, Flemes argued that South Africa’s regional leadership is seen (in part) in the region as selfish.99

Realists would further argue that foreign policy is not only composed of material factors; ideational factors influence it as well.100 The ideational sources of South African foreign policy stem from the ideology of the ANC, perceived as ‘the custodian and steward of South Africa’s foreign policy’;101 the party has indeed left a heavy ideological imprint on South African foreign policy.102 Part of this ideological imprint is a Marxist, anti-imperialist leaning, sometimes mixed with racial undertones.103 Such a worldview justifies opposition to the North and its pressure on smaller, weaker states, even more so within a system seen as unjust. The overall thrust of South African foreign policy, then, would by this reckoning be to seek more power to make changes which in turn would give the global South more power over world affairs.

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99 Flemes (2009)
101 Interview of the author with Garth Le Pere, February 2012
102 Alden and Le Pere (2003), Nathan (2011)
103 Lipton (2009), Sidiropoulos (2008). Geldenhuys (2013) calls this “liberatory solidarity”. For an example of racial thinking, see speech by former President Thabo Mbeki (2012). Transformation of Mbeki from a pro-Western neo-liberal to a third-worldist Marxist was discussed in Gevisser (2007)
A mitigating factor in a realist drive for power: South Africa’s penchant for negotiations

South Africa’s realist outlook in foreign policy is mediated by a ‘mitigating factor’ – its belief in negotiations. The belief in negotiations is a fundamental element of South African foreign policy. Even though negotiations form a basic element of diplomatic practice, South Africa’s penchant for negotiations is extraordinary to all domestic and foreign observers. Foreign diplomats speak of ‘the mantra of inclusive negotiations’, whereas domestic observers speak about the religious belief in inclusiveness. South Africa has eagerly offered the good offices of its officials in negotiations in and outside of its region, for example during the 2008 Zimbabwean electoral crisis, the Lockerbie crisis in early 2000s or the 2012 Libyan crisis. Even in Syria currently, in the midst of an ongoing civil war, South Africa continued to call for ‘an all-inclusive process of national dialogue, free from violence, intimidation and outside interference aimed at regime change[…].’ This principled belief was amply exhibited when dealing with the Iranian nuclear dossier. South Africa believed in inclusive negotiations and trusted that these could overcome the impasse. South Africa, however, never succeeded in any of these cases.

South Africa’s support for negotiations comes from the country’s own experience in ending apartheid peacefully and from strongly held values. It is no surprise that South Africa seeks to export its own domestic norms and values abroad. Such exports do not make South Africa in any way unique – it is indeed a well-known aspect of international politics, that states reflect their domestic values in their foreign policy. Inspired by the negotiated end of the apartheid regime, South African leaders believe that negotiations can be used to overcome deep divides within societies. As explained by Jerry Matjila, current political director at DIRCO, ‘South Africa’s transition to democracy was widely used as a model’ in such societies. However, this belief is

104 Interview with a Western diplomat, Pretoria, February 2012
105 Interview with Siphamandla Zondi, director of the Institute for Global Dialogue, Pretoria, February 2012
107 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2012)
109 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2012)
driven further not only by historical experience but also by a reflected belief about how norm violations should be addressed.\textsuperscript{110}

Indeed, South Africa’s domestic criminal system is characterised by the system of restorative justice (for lesser crimes). Restorative justice is distinguished by recognition that crime creates scars within the society. The restorative process is geared towards reconciliation and inclusiveness and, as such, does not exclude the criminal but seeks to redress the vice done in a crime and most importantly to support reconciliation.\textsuperscript{111} One can observe similar values and beliefs in South African foreign policy. From the South African responses to the Iranian nuclear dossier, it is clear that there remains a normative belief that negotiations may resolve the issue. The South African belief is deeply seated within the South African normative framework of how norm violations should be redressed. Such belief has been reflected in numerous calls by South African diplomats to resolve the issue diplomatically, as noted above, and to refrain from isolating Iran. The votes in favour of sanctions within the UNSC, on the other hand, can be also explained by this framework. Restorative justice is not endless – and when a serious breach occurs, it is suspended, as in the cases where South Africa voted in favour of the UNSC sanctions against Iran an Iranian breach of trust occurred.

CONCLUSION

Pretoria’s responses to the Iranian nuclear programme have been inconsistent with the positions that this ‘poster child’ of the non-proliferation cause would be expected to adopt. Whereas South Africa maintains a prominent and important position within the global non-proliferation regime, it may be reasonably expected to be critical of actors undermining or deviating from the norms of the regime. However, South African policy has been distinguished by a remarkable accommodation towards Iran.

This accommodation is distinguished by three features, namely exhorting the importance of negotiations, distrusting the North and underlining the importance of multilateral forums. South Africa has repeatedly argued for negotiations instead of sanctions or confrontation. Such arguments have been repeated by South African officials across time, regardless of the specific circumstances. The policy was also marked by distrust towards the North. Not only did South Africans believe that

\textsuperscript{110} On how domestic norms of dealing with norm deviance is reflected in foreign policy of states, see Wagner (2010a), Wagner (2014)

\textsuperscript{111} Such elements are present in criminal systems in South African townships, such as the Community Peace Foundation working outside Cape Town, see Monaghan (2008), Roche (2002)
the dispute is driven by an underlying aversion to Iran on the part of the governments of the North, but Pretoria also believed that the North wanted to use the dispute as a vehicle to restrict access to and peaceful uses of nuclear energy by developing countries. Last but not least, South African leadership preferred the wider multilateral IAEA compared to the more narrowly comprised UNSC. These positions can be explained by South Africa’s geopolitical opposition to the North, as a country of the rising global South. Such opposition is, however, mediated by the belief in negotiation as an instrument of settlement and a principled belief – grounded in a domestic normative system – in reconciliation.

This analysis of South Africa’s position towards the Iranian nuclear programme enhances our understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy. South Africa boasts strong non-proliferation credentials and is widely thought to be a true norm supporter, however, its responses in the case of Iran show that the country perceives global non-proliferation politics in terms of the North-South geopolitical struggle. Whereas such an observation does not surprise, it may serve to contradict some of the existing perceptions about South Africa’s foreign policy.
STIRRED, NOT SHAKEN: INDO-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

This paper serves as the second qualitative probe of the quantitative results obtained in Chapters three and four. Chapter three showed that liberal democracies’ policies towards ‘rogue states’ are related to their domestic cultures of control and military power, and much less so by the commercial considerations. This case study looks at India’s policy towards Iran. India was selected as one of the countries with little economic engagement and very accommodationist culture of dealing with deviance. In analyzing the Indian position towards Iran, I paid particular attention to the mutual power positions, economic concerns or notions of dealing with ‘deviance’ appearing in Indian decision-making. The most prominent notion which emerged from this study was the preoccupation of the policy-makers to maintain reasonable working relations with all parties to the dispute in order not to endanger the country’s domestic economic growth. Such argument goes beyond the usual economic liberalism and requires a more sophisticated explanation of the foreign policy formation.

INTRODUCTION

For Western observers, Indian reactions to the Iranian nuclear program have been more than mildly surprising. For many policy-makers, it became a litmus test of how Western India has become, how serious its great power aspirations are and how reliable a partner it is for the West.1 Academics outside India have been only slowly catching up with the analysis of India’s foreign policy, beyond its nuclear program. And while Indian academics have spent considerable amount of ink on describing the empirics of the Indo-Iranian relations, there was almost no attempt to link them to the general Indian foreign policy, let alone to the general international relations theory.2

Yet, both, India’s foreign policy and the Indo-Iranian relations merit special attention. Already in 2003, RAND Corporation warned of ‘The Tehran-New Delhi Axis’. C. Christine Fair then warned that

1 Numerous references to such evaluations can be found not only in statements of officials (referenced in this text) but also in the “India Cables”, leaked by Wikileaks, which can be accessed at http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/

2 For example, the November 2012 issue of the prominent Indian journal Strategic Analysis features a monothematic special issue focused on India-Iran relations. Of the eleven articles presented in the issue, only one is making any reference to the international relations theory and even that one is limited to a one-line reference to Waltz’s 1979 Theory of International Politics, the “bible” of the discipline of the IR. See Mishra (2012)
the two nations have been overcoming past antagonisms and developing closer ties that will affect not just Southwest Asia and the Middle East but also the United States. Their new relationship could powerfully influence such important matters as the flow of energy resources, regional and worldwide efforts to combat terrorism, and political developments in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other states in Central Asia. The consequences will not always suit U.S. interests.³

Indian foreign policy has undergone a significant shift of orientation since the economic opening in early 1990s. This shift has been mistaken for a reorientation towards the West, perhaps in the light of India’s domestic democratic system which some Western observers mistake for India’s similarity of foreign policy outlook with the West (Malone 2011 provides an excellent overview of such worldview). Other analysts argued that India is ‘neither fully part of the West nor squarely opposed to the current global order’ (Stuenkel 2011: 179). India, on its own part, has shown its refusal to be seen as ‘being required to gang up with the United States against Iran’, with PM Singh wowing that ‘no legislation enacted in a foreign country can take away from us [the] sovereign right [to decide our own foreign policy].’⁴ The US pressure on India to cease its relations with Tehran were met by a quip by Delhi-based analyst who argued that ‘[the United States] cannot expect India to be a Germany or Japan in the 21st century.’⁵

India’s reluctance to comply with the US-imposed sanctions, cease its oil imports from Iran (as some other countries, previously much more heavily dependent on Iran, such as South Africa⁶, did) and continuous engagement with Iran has been flabbergasting for the Western observers. Together with officials they have been surprised by the fact that a Western-style democracy can be so different when it comes to an important issue such as the Iranian nuclear program. As an US administration official said in 2005 in an interview, ‘Indians are emerging from their nonaligned status and becoming a global power, and they have to begin to think about their responsibilities. It’s a basic choice you make.’⁷

In this paper, I argue that India’s foreign policy reorientation made India more self-interested and its domestic economic development an issue of primary importance for its policy-makers. The foreign

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³ The Atlantic (2003)
⁴ Gentleman and Shanker (2006)
⁵ Giridharadas (2005)
⁶ Sa Cuts Oil Imports from Iran (2012)
⁷ Weisman (2005). Similar point was raised also in interviews by numerous interviewees
policy, therefore, also serves this goal, which is a sea change from the foreign policy of the first four decades of independence as well as the final point of its use. The surprise about the Indian reactions to the Iranian nuclear program hints at misunderstanding of the redirection of the Indian foreign policy in 1990s, which culminated in the nuclear deal with the United States. Whereas on the first sight it may look like a pro-Western reorientation, the actual change was towards the discovery of self-interest. This, however, also requires re-thinking of the assumptions about India’s foreign policy which will make its understanding easier.

The relations between India and Iran provide a useful lens to observe India’s foreign policy after the change. Iranian nuclear program has grown into the prime issue of policy relevance for the Western policy makers. India’s engagement with Iran is an appetizer to the full meal of a rising power’s engagement with the established powers in the global arena, on an issue of global importance. The empirical analysis for this paper rests on the analysis of newspaper reports, secondary academic literature and interviews conducted with Indian foreign policy elites in October and November 2012 in New Delhi. This paper proceeds in four parts. After sketching out India’s reactions to Iranian nuclear program, I will proceed to outline the non-nuclear parts of the story – the economic relations between the two countries and their strategic engagement. The fourth part of the article provides a structural explanation of the India’s foreign policy, directly engaging the argument about the pro-Western orientation of Indian foreign policy. Instead, I argue in favor of an argument stating that the change of thinking about the purpose of the foreign policy among Indian foreign policy elites as the explanation for the Indian engagement with Iran. The concluding section follows.

SETTING THE STAGE: THE CHANGE IN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Seeing foreign policy as a tool for the advancement of domestic economic policy is rooted in the change of India’s foreign policy after the liberalization in 1990s. Indian foreign policy has undergone a significant change since the economic liberalization of the country in 1991. This opening, led by then-Minister of Finance and current Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh, led to replacement of what was known as ‘Hindu rate of growth’ (essentially an economic stagnation) by steady economic growth. Whereas the imminent reason for this change was to avert the collapse of state finances, the more long-term goal was poverty alleviation and creation of bigger middle class.

This rediscovery meant that foreign policy became a tool of fulfillment of the goals of the domestic economic policy. The reorientation meant the transformation of Indian foreign policy from ‘ethic of
conviction’ to ‘ethic of responsibility’ towards India’s own population. The change came as a follow-up to the change of minds by the Indian political elite which embraced economic liberalization and opening. This was quite a feat since ‘self-reliance and economic self-sufficiency were a mantra for more than four decades after independence, and there were real doubts as to whether the country should open itself up further to the world economy. While in most of the West the majority of people axiomatically associated capitalism with freedom, India’s nationalists associated capitalism with slavery.'

An outcome of this policy was that it made India a much richer country. In line with the reorientation of the domestic policy towards economic growth, the foreign policy reoriented too. During the first decades after independence, India pursued a non-aligned policy, with much more criticism towards United States than towards the Soviet Union. Such policy relied heavily on moral superiority, political greatness and leadership of the former colonies in the Non-Aligned Movement. This outlook was epitomized in the oath of the members of the Indian Constituent Assembly in 1947, who, inter alia, swore to ‘make [India] full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and welfare of the mankind,’ not to attain ‘glory and aggrandisement’ for the nation. After the economic liberalization, the goals of the foreign policy were reoriented more closely towards supporting the domestic economic growth. Very succinctly characterized by Shashi Tharoor, former UN Under Secretary General and former Minister of State for External Affairs of India, ‘[in] the past, India’s policy pronouncements on the world were often justified on the grounds that our position was right in principle rather in practice, that they were correct more than they were useful. […] Today, India’s foreign policy is much more overtly focused on the task of facilitating India’s economic growth.'

8 This tradition in realism hails back to Politics as a Vocation by Weber ([1919] 1965), as traced back by Smith (1986). See also Schweller (1997)
9 Tharoor (2012: 4)
10 Ganguly (2010a)
11 Malone (2011)
12 Tryst with Destiny (1947)
13 Subrahmanyam (2012: 13)
14 Tharoor (2012: 14)
technology transfers and energy security." The point was also reiterated during the expert meeting on grand strategy for India, which stated that 'India's ability to secure itself from both internal and external threats will depend on the progress it makes on the economic front.'

The moral exceptionalism was soon supplanted by another source of Indian political greatness, found in the country's strength. Indian strategic community developed a common understanding that India is destined to be a great power. The non-alignment in foreign policy, which was the underlying drive beneath the desire to conduct a moral foreign policy was replaced by the strategic independence, which was still rooted in the desire to make own decisions for itself, but was more considerate towards the economic and strategic interests. India, in a way, started to recognize the power structure of the world and its own place in it.

Nuclear weapons occupied a special place among the Indian foreign-policy makers and thinkers. Before 1991, Indian position was that of advocating absolute disarmament. Considering them unjust, India rejected joining any of the existing non-proliferation regimes, prominently among them the Nonproliferation Treaty. Already in 1977, Indian Foreign Minister Vaypajee stated that India 'would never manufacture atomic weapons nor proliferate the technology for weapon development.' India perceived that the existing NPT arrangements constituted a 'stitch-up among the five original nuclear weapons states which it could not influence.' The test in 1998 meant for India that the equity-based thinking changed and Indians came to realize two things about the 'ultimate weapon'. Firstly, Indian strategic community developed understanding that nuclear weapons are part of the 'great power package.' Secondly, Indians agreed that the nuclear club should be closed. India thus became 'a responsible nuclear power', its nonproliferation tenet until today and a major bedrock of the post-1998 foreign policy.

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15 Address by Eam [External Affairs Minister] at the Editors Guild Meeting (2009)
16 Gupta (2012)
17 Engelmeier (2009)
18 Raja Mohan (2003)
19 Quoted in Frey (2009: 195). Ironically, it was Vaypajee under whose premiership India tested its nuclear weapon in 1998.
20 Author’s interview with David Malone, November 2012
21 Nevertheless, it may be important to note that in the Indian strategic thinking, nuclear weapons are not meant for fighting but for deterrence and India maintains a strict no-first-use policy, see Kanwal (2010)
22 Frey (2009)
23 Sasikumar (2007)
The biggest recognition of the Indian newly found geopolitical importance has certainly been the 123 Agreement, also known as the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. This agreement allowed civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the United States in return for India’s regularization of its domestic nuclear industry and extensive inspections by the IAEA. The agreement simultaneously signalized the recognition of India as a special partner for the United States and a boost for India’s position in the world.\(^{24}\) The nuclear deal signed in 2006 meant a major initiative to integrate India into the global nonproliferation order. For India, this meant a pragmatic embracing of the existing regime, not dissimilar to the previous change in case of the Chinese government. From targeting the NPT as a symbol of ‘nuclear apartheid’, it came close to agreeing with the system.\(^{25}\) In his interview with Fareed Zakaria on the show GPS, the PM Singh went as far as to admit that India would be willing to join the Nonproliferation Treaty as a nuclear-weapon state.\(^{26}\) In 2010, the External Affairs Minister Krishna stated in similar terms to the parliament that ‘[t]hough not a party to the NPT, India’s policies have been consistent with the key provisions of NPT that apply to nuclear weapon states’. He continued to say that ‘[t]he NPT community needs to understand that India cannot join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.’\(^{27}\) This shift towards pragmatism was not without criticism – as Raja Mohan argues, for much of the Indian strategic community, adoption of pragmatism meant discarding the notion of Indian exceptionalism.\(^{28}\) Signing the deal brought about the domestic opposition which shared the understanding of the deal as a sign of geopolitical change, but deeply disagreed with it. For the Indian left, the deal meant that India would be reduced to a secondary role to the United States.\(^{29}\) Such opposition tied well to the nativism and traditionalism which often place India and the West on the opposing sides.\(^{30}\) Simultaneously, the vocal opponents of the nuclear deal with the United

\(^{25}\) India held a similar position on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, when it opposed the negotiations on the treaty until it had enough fissile material for its own defense, see Raja Mohan (2009). During the 1996 negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, India adopted a confrontationist position too: ‘India was widely seen as disruptive and Indians “gave themselves a black eye” unnecessarily, as they did not change the outcome and seemed tremendously isolated.’ (Author’s interview with David Malone)
\(^{26}\) CNN (2009)
\(^{27}\) Suo Motu Statement Made in the Parliament on May 9, 2000 by the Minister of External Affairs on the Npt Review Conference (2010)
\(^{28}\) Raja Mohan (2009)
\(^{29}\) Pant (2011b)
\(^{30}\) Raja Mohan (2003)
States were also opposed to the agenda of economic opening and liberalization and criticized the globalization and its impact on India.\textsuperscript{31}

**SKETCHING THE INDIA-IRAN RELATIONS**

While Indian officials frequently argue that India and Iran have a millennia-old relation, the current relationship between countries is much younger. The relations between India and Iran started to fully develop only after the Islamic Revolution, when the new regime in Tehran started to look for friends in the Non-Aligned Movement.

During the Iran-Iraq war, India shifted its oil supplies from Iraq and Iran elsewhere to the Gulf, but desired to keep good relations with both countries.\textsuperscript{32} The first bilateral visit of the Indian Prime Minister Rao to Iran took place in 1993 and only a year later, Iran prevented Pakistan from tabling a resolution critical of India on Kashmir issue in the UN Human Rights Commission.\textsuperscript{33} Rao’s perception has been that India has more in common with Shia Iran than with the ‘increasingly Wahhabized Arab world’.\textsuperscript{34} In 2003, the two countries signed New Delhi Declaration during the Iranian President Khatami’s visit to New Delhi as a guest of honor at the Republic Day, calling for a strategic partnership between the two countries.\textsuperscript{35} In 2003 and 2006, India and Iran conducted naval exercises.\textsuperscript{36} Furthermore, besides the lively official visits, there was also a Track II dialogue in early 1990s, organized by the Tehran-based Institute for Political and International Studies and New Delhi-based Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. Originally, these debates were related to the debates on energy security, Central Asia and cooperation in Indian Ocean (such as disaster relief). As India’s domestic economic wealth grew, it became less interested in these Track II debates and took a more ‘pragmatic approach to issues.’\textsuperscript{37}

The cordial relations were testified also in the Annual Report of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs from 2005-2006:

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\textsuperscript{31} Stuenkel (2011)  \\
\textsuperscript{32} Tishehyar (2011)  \\
\textsuperscript{33} Pasha (2000)  \\
\textsuperscript{34} Quoted in Kemp (2010: 53)  \\
\textsuperscript{35} Hathaway (2004), Pant (2007)  \\
\textsuperscript{36} Tishehyar (2011)  \\
\textsuperscript{37} Interview of the author with Udhoy Bhashkar (former Indian coordinator of Track II with Iran), New Delhi, October 2012s
\end{flushright}
India’s relations with Iran have acquired a strategic dimension in the recent times. High level interactions at the level of Foreign Ministers, exchanged in security and strategic spheres, in the energy sector, cooperation in transit to Afghanistan and burgeoning trade have all strengthened bilateral relations between the two countries. 38 Nevertheless, the foreign policy reorientation of India also meant that Iran became a ‘loyalty test’ for Indian relations with the West, position which India tried to reject. 39 Representative Lantos, the top Democrat in the House International Relations Committee, stated this position very clearly in 2005: ‘[if] we are turning ourselves into pretzels to accommodate India, I want to be damn sure that India is mindful of U.S. policies in critical areas, such as U.S. policy toward Iran.’ 40 In 2007, Congressional leaders signed a letter to the Indian Prime Minister arguing that India’s ties with Iran ‘have the potential to significantly harm prospects’ to conclude the nuclear deal with the United States. 41 India had to adopt a position towards the Iranian nuclear program five times in the IAEA Board of Governors thus far. 42 In all of these votes, India has voted in favor of resolutions critical to Iran, even though in at least three cases such votes have been widely divisive (votes on resolutions (resolutions GOV/2011/69 and GOV/2012/50 were not as divisive). In all of these resolutions, India voted together with the Western countries, facing strong domestic opposition. In 2005, India did not expect to have to make up its mind on how to vote – Indian officials expected that the resolution would be passed again by consensus. However, as the last night before the vote the negotiations failed, the Indian officials took a decision based on a legalistic analysis of Iran’s compliance with the Safeguards Agreement. 43 India was dissatisfied with unresolved issues which have been raised since the 2003 IAEA report and worried about potential military dimensions. 44 The US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns called the vote ‘[a reflection of] 38 Ministry of External Affairs (2006: 46) 39 Pant (2011a), Pant (2011b) 40 Giridharadas (2005) 41 Kessler (2007) 42 The IAEA Board of Governors, on which India serves as a designated member since the Board’s inception in 1957, has passed 10 resolutions relevant to the Iranian nuclear program. The initial five were, however, adopted by consensus and no vote took place. 43 Author’s interviews with Shyam Saran and Sheel Kant Sharma (then-Indian Ambassador to the IAEA), New Delhi, October 2012. As a side remark, one of the foreign diplomats interviewed for this article remarked that this situation was a perfect demonstration that ‘India does not call the shots but is called by the shots.’ Interview with the author, New Delhi, October 2012 44 Author’s interview with an Indian diplomat (A). The report in question is IAEA (2003a).
India's coming of age as a responsible state in the global nonproliferation mainstream.\(^{45}\) This vote also precluded Iran from portraying the vote as rich vs poor vote, and signaled the first important split within the IAEA Board of Governors.\(^{46}\) However, India engaged in negotiations with the West about the best course even before and was a subject to intensive lobbying.\(^{47}\) Domestically, the vote was subject to a fierce criticism. PM Singh faced criticism from his own coalition partners from the Left and Communists (with the traditional anti-American position) and from the Hindu nationalists who also criticized surrender to the US hegemony.\(^{48}\) Similarly, the media called the vote 'shameful' and abandonment of the independent foreign policy.\(^{49}\)

The vote in 2006 did not take Indians by surprise, on the other hand. Already before the vote, there had been a lively debate in India. While the spokesperson for the MEA stated that India's vote 'would be determined by India's own judgment of the merits of the case,' US Ambassador to India David Mulford stated that anything other than agreement would be 'devastating' to the US-India nuclear deal.\(^{50}\) Shortly before the vote, the PM Singh, in a statement to the Parliament, reiterated that India would consider Iranian nuclear program in the light of its own national interests,\(^{51}\) just as the high level European and US officials visited New Delhi for consultations.\(^{52}\) India, however, voted again in favor of the resolution. As Indian Ambassador to the IAEA at that time Sheel Kant Sharma remarked, the vote was a logical sequel to the 2005, since Iran did nothing in the meantime to alleviate the concerns which were voiced in the 2005.\(^{53}\) In a comment on the resolution, the MEA stated that it was 'well-balanced' and that the vote to refer Iran to the UN Security Council should not be seen as a retraction from 'the traditionally close and friendly' relations with Tehran.\(^{54}\)

The two votes left a significant dent on the India-Iran relations and Indian leverage on any nuclear matter diminished, even though India kept bringing the issue up on a bilateral basis.\(^{55}\) Another diplomat remarked that 'Iranians took the IAEA votes pretty badly' and the relations were very

\(^{45}\) Gentleman (2005: 4)
\(^{46}\) Gentleman (2005), Ogilvie-White (2007)
\(^{47}\) Weisman (2005)
\(^{48}\) Bhattacherjee (2005), Velloor (2005)
\(^{49}\) The Hindu Online (2005b)
\(^{50}\) Sengupta (2006a: 2)
\(^{51}\) Sengupta (2006b)
\(^{52}\) Mustafa (2006)
\(^{53}\) Author’s interview with Sheel Kant Sharma, New Delhi, October 2012. Similar explanation was given by the PM Singh to the Parliament, see Varadarajan (2006)
\(^{54}\) BBC Monitoring South Asia (2006).
\(^{55}\) Author’s interview with KC Singh (former India’s Ambassador to Iran), New Delhi, October 2012
strained. On the other hand, high-level officials admitted that the direct retaliation by Iran was highly unlikely – as remarked by Chinmeya Gharekhan, ‘if Iranians weren’t happy about our votes, too bad for them.’ Simultaneously, the olive branch came first from Tehran, when Foreign Minister Mottaki, during his official visit to New Delhi in late 2006 remarked that ‘[Iran] look[s] to the future. We have a lot to cooperate.’

The vote in 2009 was much less contentious within India. Already long before the vote, PM Singh had called on Iran to ‘re-establish’ the confidence of the country’s nuclear program. When the IAEA Board of Governors was considering how to respond to the news about the Fordow complex, India was clear about its choice. Even though Indian officials admitted that the issue was ‘largely technical, that is when such installations should be declared’, in the present situation ‘Iranian behavior did not create an atmosphere of trust.’ Indian officials, however, also pointed out that the vote should not be construed as Indian agreement with ‘a renewed punitive approach or new sanctions.’ Iranian FM Mottaki responded to India’s vote by sending a letter to Indian FM Krishna, expressing surprise and drawing parallels between the two countries’ nuclear programs. FM Krishna, however, replied with an extensive delineation of the differences and argued that India’s ‘non-proliferation record is free from blemishes.’

Two major streams of argument are intertwined when it comes to considerations related to the Iranian nuclear program among the Indian policy-makers and strategic thinkers. The first one is the right to develop nuclear program for peaceful use and the other one is the firm persuasion that it ‘do[es] not support nuclear weapon state emerging in [its] region.’

Indians have been vocal in what they call the support for Iranian right to peaceful nuclear development. From early on, Iranian officials highlighted that Iran had the right to develop domestic nuclear program. In response to the 2005 Russian proposal to share the ownership of a uranium enrichment plant in Russia, Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran supportively acknowledged ‘Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,’ and went on to posit that ‘[e]ven in terms of

56 Author’s interview with an Indian diplomat (B), New Delhi, October 2012
57 Author’s interviews with Shyam Saran and Chinmeya Gharekhan, New Delhi, October 2012.
58 BBC Monitoring Middle East (2006b)
59 BBC Monitoring South Asia (2008)
60 Author’s interview with an Indian diplomat (B), New Delhi, October 2012
61 Samanta (2009)
62 Roy (2009)
63 BBC Monitoring South Asia (2008)
enrichment, it has certain right. But in terms of exercising that right, perhaps a degree of flexibility is possible. Prime Minister Singh reiterated the point in the reply to the Parliament in response to the 2006 IAEA vote. He reiterated the point in 2008 that Iran as a signatory of to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was entitled to all that is needed to develop its civil nuclear programme for which it must undertake all the obligations. The point was reiterated by the Foreign Minister Krishna, who in 2012 reasoned that ‘just like India has exercised the option of using nuclear energy to meet its growing energy demands, so is every nation entitled to develop that.

This, however, does not mean that India does not have any doubts about the Iranian nuclear program. As former Foreign Secretary Saran remarked, ‘Iran has a right to the peaceful program, but its record has been sometimes questioned by the IAEA.’ India was also clear that it did not support any nuclear weapon ambitions of Iran. This point, stated clearly by the Prime Minister in the quote above, was repeatedly reiterated by other officials. In 2008, an Indian official stated for the Times of India that ‘a nuclear Iran is not in India's interest, it does not contribute to regional security’ and later Indian Foreign Minister Krishna said that ‘India expects Iran to do more to address international concerns about its nuclear programme.’ On the other hand, Indian strategic thinkers, concerned with non-proliferation, are more likely to highlight the risk of transfer of nuclear technologies to terrorists (a less than subtle hint towards Pakistan) than be worried about Iran.

An interesting twist of the argument is provided by Indian officials who argue that Iran must fulfill its obligations under the NPT. Such position is surprising since, as has been argued above, India continues to see the existing nonproliferation regime as unjust. However, Indian officials are perfectly clear about it – ‘[India] still sees NPT as a discriminatory regime, but if Iran did sign up

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64 BBC Monitoring Middle East (2005)
65 Pm's Reply to the Lok Sabha Debate on India's Vote at the Iaea on Iran's Nuclear Programme (2006)
66 BBC Monitoring South Asia (2008)
67 Keinon (2012: 1)
68 Interview of the author with Shyam Saran, Delhi, October 2012
69 BBC Monitoring South Asia (2008), The Hindu Online (2005a)
70 Bagchi (2008)
71 Dikshit (2012a)
72 For example, Bajpai (2012), Sisodia (2012)
onto it, then it should fulfill its obligation\textsuperscript{73}, arguing that ‘fulfilling legal obligations is the bedrock of civilized order’\textsuperscript{74}.

**TWO EXTRA PIECES OF PUZZLE**

While the Iranian nuclear program is a predominant part of the Western relations with the country,\textsuperscript{75} for India it is just one part of the jigsaw. Two additional major aspects influence how Indian looks at Iranian nuclear program – economic relations and strategic considerations. Economic relations are heavily dominated by the trade in oil. Given India’s pre-occupation with energy security, considered a sine qua non for the future of India’s development, security of oil supplies plays a pre-occupying role in the minds of India’s political leaders.\textsuperscript{76} On the other hand, the strategic considerations affect how India sees Iran in its geostrategic future.

**ECONOMIC RELATIONS**

Two aspects of economic relations between India and Iran are worth highlighting. The first one, and the more salient one, is the Indian resistance to the sanctions imposed upon Tehran by anyone else but the UN Security Council, with the other one being the trade in oil.

India repeatedly rejected the unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran from the West. India accepted the application of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, even though there is a widespread doubt about their usefulness.\textsuperscript{77} The main bone of contention is, however, the India’s refusal to implement the extraterritorial sanctions imposed on Iran by the Western countries.\textsuperscript{78} In 2010, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao stated clearly: ‘We are justifiably concerned that the extraterritorial nature of certain unilateral sanctions recently imposed by individual countries, with their restrictions on investment by third countries in Iran’s energy sector, can have a direct and adverse impact on Indian companies.’\textsuperscript{79} The perception of many elites in India was captured by The Hindu, which editorialized: ‘Put simply, New Delhi is being asked to undermine its own economic and

\textsuperscript{73} Interview of the author with Vijay Thakur Singh (Joint Secretary at the National Security Council Secretariat), Delhi, October 2012. Similar statement was given to in an interview with the author by Chinmaya Gharekhan, PM’s Middle East envoy (2007-2009), Delhi, October 2012.

\textsuperscript{74} Interview of the author with an Indian diplomat (A), Delhi, October 2012

\textsuperscript{75} Posch (2007)

\textsuperscript{76} Carl, Rai and Victor (2008), Ganguly (2010b)

\textsuperscript{77} Author’s interviews with Vijay Thakur Singh, Vijay Jolly (BJP’s Foreign Affairs Cell), Indian Diplomat (B), New Delhi

\textsuperscript{78} Virtually every interviewee in New Delhi raised this point

\textsuperscript{79} The Hindu Online (2010)
strategic interests […] in order to comply with extra-territorial sanctions that have no basis in international law. On the other hand, the former chief negotiator of the US-India nuclear deal, Nicholas Burns criticized the Indian government’s decision as ‘not just a slap in the face for the US’ but as ‘rais[ing] questions about its ability to lead.’ India, however, remained a target of lobbying (from both the West and Iran) when it came to the compliance with the US-imposed sanctions. Nevertheless, as these sanctions impact banking and indirectly thus the Indo-Iranian trade, India had to adjust.

Iranian oil is a staple which heavily dominates the bilateral trade between the two countries. By some calculations, beyond oil, the annual trade between India and Iran amounts to about as much as trade between India and Bangladesh. Iran presently supplies about 12% of India’s oil imports and was for a long time India’s second most important source of oil after Saudi Arabia. Even though Iran used to hope that India would provide expertise in electronics and telecommunications for the Iranian market, this did not materialize. All other economic projects between India and Iran are mired with problems, of which the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI) is a perfect example. While the memorandum of understanding has been signed by the three governments in 1993, there has not been much progress on the project. The initial project was signed in 1996, with a budget of 7 bn US dollar. The project, however, proved too controversial within India. Most importantly, there are doubts whether the safety of the pipeline in Pakistan can be assured. Secondly, Iran has repeatedly tried to increase the price of the gas to be pumped through the pipeline, especially after 2005 and 2006 IAEA votes. Thirdly, the project is too costly to be implemented at this point – in 2005, the Indian PM Singh argued that ‘there are many risks because considering all the uncertainties of the

80 The Hindu Online (2012).
81 The Times of India (2012a)
82 Author’s interviews with foreign diplomats in New Delhi, October 2012
83 Singh Roy and Lele (2010)
84 By the end of 2012, India has sizeably decreased its imports from Iran Verma (2012). This was a result of the diversification strategy as well as purposeful lobbying by the United States which offered India to help finding other suppliers of oil Narayanan and Antony (2012). This shift was recognized by the United States which extended exemption from the sanction regime imposed by the US Department of State (2012).
85 Fair (2007)
86 Kumaraswamy (2008)
87 Fair (2007), Kemp (2010)
88 BBC Monitoring Middle East (2006a)
situation there in Iran. I don't know if any international consortium of bankers would probably underwrite this. Currently, there are no plans to revive the IPI project.

After the implementation of the most recent round of sanctions, India devised a strategy with Iran to circumvent the US-imposed extraterritorial sanctions. The mechanism is fairly simple – India deposited an agreed amount of money in Indian Rupees to a bank in Kolkata, Iran then purchased goods (mostly rice, tea, pharmaceuticals and wheat) in Indian Rupees directly in India and had them shipped to Iran, also insured by Indian public sector insurers who are almost completely isolated from the Western financial markets (thus are not vulnerable to US Treasury review). About 45% of the Indo-Iranian trade takes place within such framework. Even though such policy could seem straight-forward, interviewees familiar with the situation were quick to point out that Indian banks and insurers mounted opposition against the government’s plans to ‘sacrifice them.’ Given the difficulty of conducting business in Iran and obtaining insurance cover, the market is presently dominated by companies large enough to bear the risk, although some smaller businesses use the ‘free-on-board’ contracts.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

India considers three major issues of strategic importance when thinking about policy towards Iran – access to Afghanistan, balance of regional alliances in the Middle East and its northern neighbor, Pakistan.

The access to Afghanistan is currently by far the most important strategic reason for Indian continuing engagement with Iran, though rarely acknowledged so by foreign analysts. Afghanistan is only a small economic partner for India – the total trade in 2012 reached 639 million US dollars, which is less than one per cent of the India’s total trade. Indian businesses have, however, plans to invest up to 10 billion US dollars in the extraction of resources from Afghanistan. Being one of the largest donors to Afghanistan, India has also taken a leading role in construction of infrastructure in Afghanistan and is playing a leading role in the construction of a high-voltage transmission power

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89 The Times of India (2005)
90 Author’s interview with an Indian diplomat (B). Shortly before the author conducted research in Delhi, Iran had experienced the currency collapse, see Dereini (2012). As my interviewees pointed out, there was no way to do damage assessment for the trade in rupees at that point
91 Author’s interview with a foreign diplomat, New Delhi, October 2012
92 Author’s interview with Ajay Sahai, Director General of Foreign Trade at the Federation of Indian Export Organisations, New Delhi, October 2012.
93 Upadhyay and Zafar (2012)
line in a project supported by the Asian Development Bank. Indian businesses are also active in signing contracts in mining in Afghanistan, such as the plan to mine iron ore in the Hagijak province, a 14 billion US dollar investment. Indian government supports actively Indian investment in Afghanistan, including organizing events such as the Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan, which took place in June 2012.

Iran plays a key role in these plans. To be able to physically move their products out of Afghanistan, Iran is the only way (given the tense relations with Pakistan) for Indian businesses. India is aware of this problem – it has constructed the 220 km-long road from Delaram in Nimruz province of Afghanistan to Zaranj on the Afghan-Iranian border and is eager to develop the port in Chabahar in Iran as well, which would allow for the shortening of time and costs related to transshipment. Even though the plan to construct the port in Chabahar is increasingly high on the agenda (it was the main topic of the trilateral Indo-Afghan-Iranian meeting on the fringes of the NAM summit in Tehran in August 2012), a senior Iranian official Seyyed Abbas Araghchi stated that ‘[the three countries] have just started in a tangible way.’

Balancing of the regional alliances is another delicate reason for Indian careful approach to Iran. As remarked above, the Persian Gulf is the single biggest source of hydrocarbons imported to India. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil supplier to India and overall, almost two thirds of India’s oil imports originate in the Gulf. This dependence commits India to carefully balancing between the Sunni and Shia countries in the Gulf, where Indian officials are very much aware of the geopolitical competition. As opposed to Iran, Indian trade with the Arab countries of the Gulf is rich also in the non-hydrocarbon fields – currently, the annual trade between the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and India reaches about 24 bn US dollars. India also tries to ‘soften’ the economic and political ties by referring to the ‘people-to-people’ connection, highlighting the fact that 5 million Indian expatriates work in the countries of the Gulf, this provides an ample opportunity for Indian

95 According to Ajay Sahai, the cost could drop by as much as one third from Mumbai, compared to shipping to Bandar Abbas. Author’s interview with Ajay Sahai, New Delhi, October 2012.
96 The Times of India (2012b)
97 Dikshit (2012b) Interestingly enough, it seems that the port itself will be managed by the Iranian side.
98 Carl, Rai and Victor (2008)
99 Chakrabarti (2007)
officials to raise issues of regional politics referring purely to concerns for its own citizens.\textsuperscript{100} Combined with the fact that India is home to the second largest Muslim community in the world and one of the three world’s largest Shia communities, the country is careful to keep a balance in its politics towards the countries of the Gulf.\textsuperscript{101}

When discussing the regional alliances, the big elephant in the room is Israel. Ever since the inception of their official diplomatic ties in 1992, the cooperation between the two countries has been growing, reaching its climax during the 2003 visit by Ariel Sharon to New Delhi. The cooperation is active especially in the defense and counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{102} Currently Israel is the number two arms supplier to India, expected to become the most important one soon.\textsuperscript{103} Indo-Israeli ties have already prompted two uproars in Iran. The first time was in 2003, when Israel’s Prime Minister Sharon visited New Delhi. During this visit, he called Iran the center of world’s terrorism, prompting heated reaction from Iran.\textsuperscript{104} Second occasion occurred in 2008, when India launched an Israeli espionage satellite into orbit, which according to the observers, was destined to monitor Iranian nuclear program.\textsuperscript{105} Iran complained about the move and Iranian ambassador to India saying to the reporters that ‘[Iran] hope[s] that wise and independent countries like India do not give their space technologies to launch spying operations against Iran.’\textsuperscript{106} Indian policy-makers consider Israel to be ‘India’s strategic friend’\textsuperscript{107} and India made sure to separate its relations with Israel from its relations with the rest of the Middle East. The cooperation with Israel not only

\textsuperscript{100} Tharoor (2012)
\textsuperscript{101} Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2009). Iran has been active in supporting cultural activities in India, amongst them opening of the branch of Al Mustafa International University in Delhi. Unfortunately, the extent of these activities is severely understudied. Some observers (e.g. Chinmeya Gharekhan in an interview with the author) mention that the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran also plays out in India, where each of the countries is active in supporting “its” constituency (Sunnis and Shias respectively), by educating clergy, building mosques and offering scholarships to study abroad. The size and potential impact of such competition are severely understudied, calling for further scrutiny.
\textsuperscript{102} Kumaraswamy (2004), Kumaraswamy (2010)
\textsuperscript{103} $10$ Bn Business: How Israel Became India’s Most Important Partner in Arms Bazaar (2012)
\textsuperscript{104} BBC Monitoring Middle East (2003)
\textsuperscript{105} Peterson (2008)
\textsuperscript{106} Iran Upset over Launch of Israeli Satellite by India (2010)
\textsuperscript{107} Interview of the author with Vijay Jolly. His party, the Hindu nationalist BJP, maintains a cell in Israel.
signifies an important (and in many ways the only) option to access the top military technologies, but was, in early 2000s, considered a consolidating factor in Indo-US relations.\(^{108}\)

Last but not least, Pakistan is an important strategic consideration for Indian relations with Iran. India has used Iranian nuclear program to attack Pakistan indirectly – through calls for more considerations given to the origins of nuclear program in Iran.\(^{109}\) This, of course, implicates the A.Q.Khan network and calls into question the involvement of Pakistan’s officials in the whole network.\(^{110}\) The perception of Indian policy circles was summed by the father of Indian nuclear strategy K. Subrahmanyam in his column: ‘For other countries of the world (including the various Islamic countries), [Iranian nuclear program] was an issue of proliferation in some distant country. For India, it was a case of clandestine proliferation involving Pakistan, Khan, the US and various West European countries which were the sources for Khan's proliferation. India would have made a laughing stock of itself if it had ignored Khan's activities.’\(^{111}\) Indirectly, India is aware of the evolving security balance in the region, the evolving China-Pakistan axis and China’s growing foothold in areas which India considers its strategic ‘backyard.’\(^{112}\) On the other hand, India tries not to upset relations with Muslim countries which could potentially backfire in its relations with Pakistan. Iran has played the Indo-Pakistani rivalry both ways – while in early 1990s it blocked Pakistan’s attempt to block a resolution on Kashmir in the UN Human Rights Commission, in 2010 Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei called three times on ‘the Islamic Ummah’ to support ‘the struggle’ in Kashmir, prompting disquiet in Delhi.\(^{113}\)

**Drawing Lessons**

In the introduction to this paper, I argued that much of surprise about India’s difference when it comes to the country’s policy towards the Iranian nuclear program is caused by the misunderstanding of the change that occurred in the Indian foreign policy in early 1990s. This

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108 Kumaraswamy (2004). The American Jewish Committee (2008), for example, urged the Congress to approve the US-India nuclear deal.
109 Interviews of the author with Shyam Saran and an Indian diplomat (A)
110 Fitzpatrick (2007) provides an excellent overview A.Q.Khan and Iranian nuclear program, esp. Chapter 3
111 Subrahmanyam (2008)
112 Even a casual observer of India’s strategic and international relations thought may observe how predominant the concern about the rise of China has become. China tops charts about the strategic and geopolitical challenges for Indian thinkers chapters in Venkhatshamy and George (2012) provide an excellent example. See also Simón (2013)
113 Dikshit (2010)
change meant that India oriented more towards the advancement of domestic economic development, for which its foreign policy became one of the tools.

For international relations scholars, such understanding is not surprising. Two prominent schools of international relations would both predict such an outcome. The economic liberals argue that the foreign relations are driven by the desire of states to increase their domestic wealth. Though not too detailed on the actual causal mechanism of such process, the economic liberalism’s home ground is the argument that an increased commercial interconnectedness of countries leads to a decreased likelihood of engaging in armed conflict. As Mansfield and Pollins argued, however, the economic liberals have by now almost completely ignored whether peaceful relations follow the trade (which is the generalization of the economic liberal argument) or whether the link flows in the other direction – trade following peaceful relations.

If the economic liberals are right, then Indian government, concerned with the achievement of the economic performance, would be oblivious to its partners. In other words, if India’s thirst for oil continues to drive India’s relations with a country, then it shall be fairly open to the potential alternative sources, for it shall not matter whether the oil arrives from India or Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, because the goal of domestic economic policy would be attained. This is, however, not achieved, because India has repeatedly refused the appeals of the United States to switch its oil supplies from India more towards the Arab Gulf countries. Furthermore, India also portrays the oil supplies continuously in the light of domestic development and security. The India’s Planning Commission in 2006 concluded that ‘We are energy secure when we can supply lifeline energy to all our citizens irrespective of their ability to pay for it as well as meet their effective demand for safe and convenient energy to satisfy their various needs at competitive prices, at all times and with a prescribed confidence level considering shocks and disruptions that can be reasonably expected.’

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114 Three distinct causal links have been developed and empirically tested: for the so-called ‘selectorate theory’, see Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003); for the historical materialist argument that domestic leaders need favorable business conditions to deliver on their domestic economic policy, see Anievas (2011); and for the argument that trade supports war-fighting capabilities of the other party, see Blanchard, Mansfield and Ripsman (2000)

115 In the wealth of literature treating the subject, the following are amongst the most insightful contributions Gasiorowski and Polachek (1982), Gelpi and Grieco (2008), Mansfield and Pevehouse (2003), Oneal, et al. (1996), Oneal and Russett (1999), Pollins (1989), Reuveny (2003), Schneider (2010), Schneider and Gleditsch (2010)


117 Planning Commission (2006: 54)
The second stream of arguments comes from the realist camp, especially the neoclassical realist camp. Neoclassical realists consider trade as one of the aspects of the foreign policy. While realism is, in its Waltzian form, usually associated with the polarity and military power, neoclassical realists argue that we need to go back to the pre-neorealist origins of the realist theory, looking inside the state, to be able to explain foreign policy of states. Within such framework, culture influences how events and pressures are perceived by the policy-makers. This does not mean that foreign policy reflects the culture of the domestic state, as liberal constructivists argue. Rather, it posits that what the national interest is, is shaped by states’ domestic culture. The Indian policy makers’ perception that the economic development is essential for the future of India makes it understandable that they attempt to steer their foreign policy towards Iran. Trade in oil is an important aspect of these, but it is not the only or even the most important driving force. It may be better to understand the trade in oil as ‘a costly signal’ towards Iran about India’s seriousness about future geopolitical relations.

Seen within this framework, drawing closer to the United States is just one of the ways to fulfill the goal of supporting the domestic growth; not the goal itself. As Indian careful balancing in the Gulf as well as the attempt to develop long-term presence in Central Asia testifies, India is trying to support the creation of the geopolitical environment conducive to the pursuit of the domestic economic goals. Such understanding is deeply rooted in the persuasion of the Indian leaders about the need for growth in order to make India the power of the 21st century.

This need is, however, to be achieved in a rapidly changing environment where the long-established order has been (and will continue to be) realigning. In such situation, states may prudently opt to hedge against unexpected future developments. While hedging has been used to describe the foreign policies of small states between balancing and bandwagoning, there is nothing inherent about hedging (understood as a strategy to offset potential high-uncertainty and high-stakes risks by

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118 Taliaferro (2006)
119 Ironically, the most frequent charge of neorealism – that it ignores unit-level factors when analyzing states’ foreign policy misses the point, because Waltz himself raised repeatedly that neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy. His own foreign policy writings give them ample attention, see for example Waltz (1967)
121 Dueck (2006a)
122 Risse, et al. (1999)
123 For more references on costly signaling, see Fearon (1997), Morrow (2003).
pursuing multiple policy directions) which could not apply to a power such as India. In fact, given the uncertain future of India’s neighborhood, hedging aimed at the pursuit of the future domestic development is a very likely explanation of the India’s mixed response to the Iranian program.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I used the lens of the India’s response to the Iranian nuclear program to develop an argument about the wider direction of India’s foreign policy. Indian perceived accommodationist position towards Iran has been surprising for Western officials. As I argue in this paper, this surprise is rooted in the misunderstanding about the direction of the India’s foreign policy. While this has been seen by many as the reorientation towards the West, I argue that the reorientation is more towards the self-interest (as seen in terms of realpolitik).

India has at all occasions voted in line with the Western countries at the IAEA Board of Governors and its top officials have explained repeatedly that they wished no new nuclear powers in India’s neighborhood. At the same time, India has been reluctant to cease its relations with Iran and continued cooperation with Tehran. This has led many Western observers to question sincerity of India’s foreign policy change and its face as an important global player in the future.

The economic relations with Iran, particularly the oil imports, provide one of the drivers of the relations. As India’s economy is growing rapidly, country’s dependence on foreign oil supplies may make it potentially more vulnerable. India therefore attempts to diversify its oil supplies portfolio in order to make it less vulnerable to sudden shocks. Simultaneously, the trade in oil serves as a ‘costly signal’ to Iran that it wishes to maintain the relation. A more important driver, however, is the growing awareness of the strategic importance of Iran for the Indian geopolitics. This awareness stems from the consciousness of the fact that for the future access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, India will need good relations with Iran, but also appreciation that India needs balanced relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf.

These drivers can be explained by the nature of the change occurring in the Indian foreign policy in early 1990s. Together with the Indian domestic economic reorientation, Indian foreign policy became more focused on serving the domestic goals – of economic development and growth. In the light of the uncertain results of the security rebalancing in the region with the view towards advancing the goals of domestic economic development, India tried to advance multiple strategies.
As the leaders’ understanding of the Indian foreign policy changed, it also called for a more cautious role for Indian foreign policy, carefully weighting costs and benefits of individual moves.
MONEY CAN'T BUY YOU LOVE: EU MEMBER STATES AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM 2002-2009

As the two case studies in Chapters five and six showed, the three potential explanations presented in Chapters two and three are not showing the full story. It may be understandable that discerning the influence of domestic culture and domestically-grounded norms may be difficult in foreign policy analysis. Part of what makes norms special within any community – whether domestic or international – is that their meaning is deeply embedded in human behavior and thus individuals (and states) do not express it openly. However, what is also clear from the two case studies is that the countries’ relations with the United States (as the hegemon shaping the international normative order, particularly when it comes to the regulation of weapons of mass destruction) and the rest of the region are an important factor in decision-making of countries. On a global scale, it would be next to impossible to measure countries’ relations with the United States, given that they are frequently expressed differently. On a smaller, regional scale, this could be done. In this paper, I test whether these factors are important also in the decision-making of the EU member states’ towards Iran. This paper has been invited for a special issue of European Security at the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the European Security Strategy.

The ‘West’ has been the strongest opponent to the Iranian nuclear program, by academic1 as well as insider policy accounts.2 While studies on the Iranian nuclear program have focused mostly on the US policy towards Iran, the United States is not the only player; other states’ preferences are important too. Bearing the peculiar position of the United States in the dispute (being the most vocal critic yet refusing to directly engage with Iran until recently), it does not take a stretch of imagination to realize that the European Union member states’ policies were crucially important since the discovery of Iranian installations in Natanz (in 2002). However, policies of EU member states were not identical and in fact diverged significantly. While some states preferred confrontation with Iran, others preferred accommodation, in spite of the existence of the European Union’s coordinating mechanisms. One of the most frequently leveled explanations for accommodationist policies has been precisely the presence of strong economic ties.3 Calculations are known that the sanctions cost major EU economies up to 2 billion US dollars.4 Moreover, it has been suggested that Iran itself uses selective awards of contracts to some Western countries as a tool to ‘drive a wedge’

1 Ogilvie-White (2007), Ogilvie-White (2010)
2 El Baradei (2011)
4 Botenga (2010)
into the Western pressures over its nuclear program. Empirically, such claims have been explored only insufficiently and mostly in a rather haphazard fashion, taking into account only a few high-profile cases, while ignoring systematic nature of the relationship between economic interests and security policy.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the existing analysis of the importance of trade to the study of confrontation short of war. Although calls for studying the importance of trade in situations of confrontation short of violent conflict have been voiced, few of such studies materialized. The present article thus provides a new look at the study of confrontation in world politics in situations short of war. The paper also seeks to explain the variation in EU member states’ policies vis-à-vis Iran since the beginning of the dispute surrounding Iran’s nuclear program in 2002. In particular, this paper aims to evaluate the role of the economic ties of the EU member states’ with Iran and the Persian Gulf countries in forming the policy towards the country, and compare them with other geopolitical considerations. As a result, this article provides an answer to a practical and highly topical policy puzzle.

Using a new dataset obtained by a survey of more than 450 foreign policy experts from 43 countries, this paper presents a comprehensive evaluation of all 27 EU member states’ positions towards Iran between 2002-2009. The results of the analysis suggest that the importance of trade has been overstated and that geopolitics provides a more meaningful clue to explaining the diverging policy paths. More importantly, the article shows that trade with Iran is not associated with greater accommodation – or to put it differently, money cannot buy Iran love. The article thus questions the dominant narrative of the drivers behind the EU member states policies towards Iran.

At the same time it provides a qualification of the applicability of the commercial liberal hypothesis in the absence of the violent war.

The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The following section provides an insight into the role of EU and the puzzle of Iranian nuclear program. This section is not meant to provide a comprehensive treatment for the topic, instead it is meant to provide a background and setting for the following analysis. The next section provides a brief summary of the theoretical arguments about the influence of trade in conduct of foreign relations of states. In this section, the issue of crisis

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5 Nougayrède (2006)
6 For one of the first ones, cf. Mansfield and Pollins (2003)
escalation and states’ behavior is tackled as well. The third and fourth sections provide the setting for the data analysis followed by the analysis of the results.

THE EU AND THE PUZZLE OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

The discovery of the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz in mid-August 2002 placed European countries in a perplexing situation. Even before, Iran had been seen as a problematic actor on the international scene. Described as a ‘rogue’ by some, perceived as a spearhead against Western dominance by others and acknowledged to be a regional mover and shaker by all, Iran attracted worries of the international community.

For a long time, European countries have had difficult relationships with Iran. Their positions oscillated between the lure of seemingly endless business opportunities and the strategic puzzle posed by Iranian foreign and defense policy. On the one hand, states have seen Iran as an underdeveloped country with enormous natural resources. The underdevelopment was expected to yield opportunities for investment and public contracts in the sphere of modernization, provision of public works and public services were immense. Furthermore, contracts in development of natural resources were attractive for all corporations, major or minor. On the other hand, states were taken aback by continuing Iranian support for terrorist movements and what many saw as a continuing drive to acquire nuclear weapons.

The discovery of the Natanz facility in 2002 confirmed some of the worst fears of many EU and other countries. Iranian nuclear program did not, per se, pose a direct military threat to Europe. However, combined with a danger to the stability in the Middle East and a potential emboldening of Iranian foreign policy, the Iranian nuclear program created a perception of a security threat for the European countries.

Although Iran’s relations with Europe were overall much better than those with the US, they were not without ups and downs. While this paper is about the policies of all EU member states, it may be useful to outline the positions of the main actors, the UK, France and Germany before the beginning of the dispute and throughout its duration. The relations with the United Kingdom were heavily influenced by the past marked by the British interference in the Iranian domestic politics

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7 Ansari (2006)
8 Coticchia et al provide one of the few studies of other EU members’ policies towards Iran
Coticchia, Giacomello and Sartori (2011)
under Shah which as a consequence led to the country being castigated as the ‘little devil’ soon after the Islamic Revolution. Nonetheless, the business and diplomatic relations remained ‘reasonably satisfactory.’ The great rupture in the relations occurred in 1989, when Salman Rushdie published *The Satanic Verses* in the United Kingdom. Publication of the book, perceived as blasphemous by Iranian mullahs (but not only by them), prompted severe criticism by Ayatollah Khomeini, who issued a fatwa over Rushdie. Despite the moderation of the statement, the damage had already been done.

In contrast to the above, Iran’s relations with France were good. During the Shah’s regime, France offered a refuge to Iranian clerical intellectuals who later staged the Islamic revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini himself enjoyed asylum near Paris from where he was sending his inflammatory sermons to Iran. Officially, the French government declared ‘neutrality’ in the conflict between the mullahs and the Shah and after the revolution; it was praised for this stance by Khomeini himself. Iran saw France as its emerging main partner in Europe, a ‘friend of Iran’. Iranians even believed that France was cooling its relations with the US. The relations were thus on the mend and France saw Iran especially as a future source of oil for Europe. The policy of French Foreign Ministry in the field of commercial diplomacy can thus be characterized as expansionist, pushing for French businesses and exports, especially beyond OECD countries. Also, both the government and the Foreign Ministry have been traditionally looking favorably at ‘grand contracts’ abroad. Political goals are thus often pushed through economic means. Iran fit well into this scheme.

As for Germany, Iranian officials at various levels – from mayors to ministers - were regular visitors to Germany, while German officials frequented Iran. German policy towards Iran led to major disagreements with the United States and Israel on a number of occasions. In 1993, Germany and the US clashed in the North Atlantic Council over the US policy of isolation towards Iran, which was countered by the German claim that engagement helps foster moderate powers in the country. In 1995, German Chancellor Kohl fell out with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin over Iran, which resulted in Kohl’s cancellation of his trip to Tel Aviv and Rabin’s flash visit to Berlin overnight. However, the situation changed in 1996, when a German prosecutor indicted Ayatollah

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9 Panah (2007)
10 Tarock (1999: 58)
11 Panah (2007)
12 Carron de la Carrière (2002), Kessler (1999)
13 Mousavian (2008)
Khomeini, President Rafsanjani and Foreign Minister Velayati among others, for killing of three Iranian Kurdish leaders in Mykonos restaurant in Berlin. German Chancellor Kohl tried to defuse the tension with a letter to Ayatollah Khomeini in which he stressed the fruitful nature of the Irano-German relations.\(^{14}\) The crisis reached its apex by the 1997 ruling of Kammergericht (the highest state court) in Berlin which implicated all three above-mentioned officials. This led to a diplomatic crisis and ensuing withdrawals of EU ambassadors from Tehran.

Even casual observers of the foreign policy of European countries could observe diverting paths of policy responses to the challenge posed by the Iranian nuclear dossier. Implicitly, many scholars assume that the differences in state policies towards Iranian nuclear program arise due to the economic interests of states. These are not new, of course. Already in late 1990s, Tarock expected trade to pacify relations between Iran and Western Europeans countries.\(^{15}\) More recently, Kittrie argued that states indeed shape their policies towards Iran according to their economic interests.\(^ {16}\) Others, such as Iranian scholar Kayhan Barzegar, argued that economic reasons, \textit{inter alia}, will force the EU to engage with Iran.\(^ {17}\) Numerous analysts consider the amount of agreed contracts as being important for the policy formulation, even though there is a systematic pattern of cancellations or non-fulfillment of such contracts (apart from sanctions, existing long before).

**THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES**

A downside of the existing research on trade in international security is that the existing research program is heavily focused on the interstate war (or armed conflict in general), which remains an infrequent event in world politics.\(^ {18}\) The gray area of serious disputes short of war and coercive diplomacy remain severely understudied in the field of international relations.\(^ {19}\) Most of the foreign policies of states pursue is not about fighting (or averting) deadly conflicts. Foreign policy of states is predominantly concerned with steering events in a desired direction and cajoling partners in the

\(^{14}\) Mousavian (2008)
\(^{15}\) Tarock (1999)
\(^{16}\) Kittrie (2007), Kittrie (2008)
\(^{17}\) Barzegar (2010)
\(^{18}\) King and Zeng (2001) show that only 0.3\% of all dyads in Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset are at war.
\(^{19}\) For a rare example of the opposite, see Colaresi and Thompson (2002)
international arena to pursue certain paths. Cajoling does not have to include threat of force – indeed; threats are fairly high in the toolbox of the foreign policy.\textsuperscript{20}

At the same time, we also know that international crises do not happen between two countries solely. While most studies in crisis escalation and de-escalation consider crisis behavior to apply to two countries only,\textsuperscript{21} in fact this is rarely the case in major international disputes nowadays. The two limitations of the existing policy come together when we study international crises of global importance where we cannot successfully pinpoint only two main stakeholders and while the crisis has not taken a military turn (yet). The dispute surrounding the Iranian nuclear dossier is a perfect example of such situations. While most studies focused on the US policy towards Iran, the EU member states’ policies matter too.

COMMERCIAL LIBERALISM

Economic interdependence has long been perceived as having a pacifying effect on the relations between countries. According to the definition by Keohane and Nye, interdependence means mutual dependence, in which dependence is defined as ‘a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces.’\textsuperscript{22} Such interdependence then restricts the autonomy of action. Economic statecraft and security has been historically interlinked and strong economic ties mean that the relation with the other side is there to stay.\textsuperscript{23} Such hypothesis may then fall into what Nye termed ‘commercial liberalism.’\textsuperscript{24} The main rationale behind the logic of commercial liberalism is the idea that increased trade flows decrease the resolve for war due to the fear of losing the benefits from the trade.\textsuperscript{25}

The theory is expected to work particularly well for democracies (and thus for all EU members). Democratic leaders are accountable to their domestic publics and are expected to pursue policies which benefit their constituencies. Therefore, leaders of democratic countries will think very carefully about committing themselves to a decision which is costly to their domestic constituency (in any sense of the term).\textsuperscript{26} The elected leaders of democratic countries will therefore seek as little

\textsuperscript{21} Fearon (1994b), Morrow (1989), Smith (1999)
\textsuperscript{22} Keohane and Nye (1977: 8)
\textsuperscript{23} Mastanduno (1999)
\textsuperscript{24} Nye (1988).
\textsuperscript{25} Barbieri and Levy (1999), Morrow (1999)
\textsuperscript{26} Moravcsik (1997). For the purpose of this paper, I assume that the whole selectorate is equally vulnerable to the trade disruption Frieden and Rogowski (1996). Given that strategic goods are
confrontation with a country with which they are economically interdependent as possible, in order not to bring costs to their domestic constituencies.\textsuperscript{27}

Despite Baldwin’s early observation that goods with inelastic demand should, in theory, matter more,\textsuperscript{28} the existing research has been treating trade largely as aggregate. A consideration to individual goods has for the first time been given in qualitative literature on economic interdependence and conflict. Blanchard and Ripsmann in their study of pre-World War I economic ties between the United Kingdom and Germany focused on the so-called ‘strategic goods’ essential for the survival of the state (and its economy).\textsuperscript{29} These goods are critical because they are either difficult to procure or central for the proper functioning of the state (e.g. energy). They are therefore important for the well-being of all voters, not only a limited group. Some limited applications of the qualitative research tradition into the quantitative research has been applied by Dorussen and Goenner.\textsuperscript{30} In analyzing the trade in strategic commodities, both sensitivity and vulnerability come into play – sensitivity traditionally reflecting the amount of trade and vulnerability reflecting the cost of being hurt by the discontinuation of the trade.\textsuperscript{31}

In case of an escalation to a full-blown conflict, not only the trade with Iran would be affected, but also the trade with the rest of the Persian Gulf. Not only are the countries of the Gulf afraid of the potential repercussions of the Iranian nuclear program on their security,\textsuperscript{32} they also find themselves threatened by Iran signaling that any escalation towards a violent conflict would affect the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{33} However, as Gulf countries do not have a positive view of the Iranian program and see it as a potential threat, the logic of the economic ties should be reverse – countries with sizeable economic interests should be more confrontational towards Iran.

This is where the focus of this paper lays. The paper is to analyze the frequently evoked explanation of economic self-interest in forming of the policy towards Iran, combined with testing the appropriateness of the application of the commercial liberalism to the disputes below the threshold vitally important for the functioning of the whole economy, the assumption is not unrealistic. For selectorate theory, see Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003)\textsuperscript{27} Gelpi and Grieco (2003), Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001) make similar claims when it comes to violent conflict.\textsuperscript{28} Baldwin (1985)\textsuperscript{29} Blanchard and Ripsman (1996)\textsuperscript{30} Dorussen (2006), Goenner (2010)\textsuperscript{31} Barbieri (2003)\textsuperscript{32} Fitzpatrick (2006), Kaye and Wehrey (2007)\textsuperscript{33} Scarborough (2011)
of war. This paper builds on the theoretical grounds laid by the international relations scholars and extends their application to the current dispute regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. The general hypotheses of the paper are:

**H1:** The more sizeable commercial benefits states extract from a relationship with another country, the less confrontational policy towards the country they will adopt.

**H2:** The more sizeable commercial benefits states extract from a relationship with the region, the more confrontational policy towards the problematic actor they will adopt.

**ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS**

This paper tests two possible alternative explanations. Both of them assert that the debate about the Iranian nuclear program is about geopolitics, yet with a different twist on either side.

The first one rests on an argument built on the observation mentioned above, that is that the Iranian nuclear dispute is primarily seen as a dispute between the US and Iran. Such argument is not unsustainable. The United States have been seen as the main driver of the non-proliferation regime after the end of the Cold War. Nuclear weapons have occupied a special place in the US security thinking, different from biological or chemical weapons. Nuclear weapons stand out, however, because of their continued relevance for policy-makers, even if their military use has been doubted by scholars (Mueller 1988, 2009). Moreover, the United States has been the main proponent of the ‘non-proliferation’ pillar of the NPT (to the detriment of the cooperation pillar) and has been seen as using the NPT to impose law on the weak nations. The willingness to use the coercion towards Iran can therefore be seen not only as an expression of coercive diplomacy, but also as expression of the positioning vis-a-vis the United States.

**H3:** Countries with stronger alliance tie with the US are more confrontationalists towards Iran

Another possible explanation is that the EU members see the Iranian nuclear program within the wider scope of the Middle Eastern conflict, given Iran leaders’ statements towards Israel and Iran’s continuing support for the militant movements hostile to Israel (such as Hamas or Hizbullah). Similarly, Israel has seen Iran as a threat to its survival and has been one of the main proponents of confrontationist approach towards the country. Iran’s nuclear program could be seen as an extension of dilemmas posed by the wider Middle Eastern conflict. Given that Iran and Israel stand

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35 Norton (2009), Perthes (2010)
on opposing sides of the most geopolitical issues in the Middle East, similarity to Israel’s outlook on the Middle East may be reasonably expected to share Israel’s confrontationist views towards Iran.

**H4:** *Countries with higher similarity of positions towards the Middle Eastern conflict with Israel are more confrontationist towards Iran*

**DATA AND METHODS**

**DEPENDENT VARIABLE – POLICY ASSESSMENT**

The assessment of the foreign policy of a country towards another nation has been traditionally undertaken in qualitative way in the subfield of foreign policy analysis (cf. Hey et al. 1995 for a rare contemporary look at the quantitative foreign policy analysis). While highly valuable, such assessment can hardly be employed in large-N statistical analysis without complicated data transformation procedures. Monadic assessment of effects of domestic factors on foreign policy has gained importance recently from theoretical as well as empirical point of view.

There has been no shortage of measurements of similarity of foreign policies of two countries. The earliest measure were devised in 1970s by Bueno de Mesquita and further developed by Signorino and Ritter, both based on similarity of alliance portfolios. Other more usual ways to assess ‘closeness’ of policies of two countries is a membership in the same alliance or international organization, use of the voting records of the United States General Assembly, event data, in case of an existing armed conflict, use of the Correlates of War dataset or Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset. The problem with these data sources, however, is that they offer less rich and relatively unsophisticated data when it comes to comparing countries’ positions towards a specific international policy issue, let alone another country.

Most of the expert surveys come from the field of comparative politics, where they have extensively been used as a means of establishing party positions on specific issues (most often European politics). The failure of projects such as CREON, see Hermann (1984), Gartzke and Li (2003b), Gleditsch, et al. (2002), Grimm and Merkel (2008), Russett and Oneal (2001), Bueno de Mesquita (1975), Signorino and Ritter (1999), Mansfield and Pevehouse (2003), Gartzke (2007), Signorino and Ritter (1999), Barbieri (2003), Pevehouse (2003), Ripsman and Blanchard (2003), For a brief overview and further pointers, cf. Sarkees and Wayman (2010), Faten, Glenn and Stuart (2004)
introduction.\textsuperscript{45} However, expert surveys have been used as a measurement in other subfields of political science, including comparative foreign policy.\textsuperscript{46}

The data for this paper come from the survey of policies of democratic countries towards Iran and North Korea.\textsuperscript{47} In this survey, more than 450 experts from 43 countries were asked to assess policies of their countries (and six others) towards Iran and North Korea in the period between 1993 and 2009. Most of the experts addressed in this research were well-established academics, think-tank researchers and analysts, specializing in international security, nuclear non-proliferation or area studies (with a particular attention to security affairs). They were asked to evaluate the policy on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, where 1 meant most accommodationist and 7 most confrontational policy.

Three time-points in the development of Iran-EU relations were used to measure the relations: 2002, when the nuclear program was revealed, 2006 when the first round of sanctions in the UN Security Council was adopted and 2009, when secret nuclear facilities near Qom were uncovered. For each time-point, we established the score on the basis of three to eleven expert responses. The strip plot Figure 7.1 provides a quick overview of experts’ judgments and their overall distributions. Each strip represents one country’s position, whereas the boxplots above the strips represent the boxplot for each of the years, including the 95% confidence interval.

Following Ray\textsuperscript{48}, experts deviating more than one point from the mean were identified as suspect and then excluded from the analysis. Subsequently, time-points with less than three observations were also eliminated, in order to make our data more representative. Analyzing standard deviations, the data oscillated between 0 and 1.15 (per dyad). These results are slightly higher than those in Ray’s research on party positions, but understandably so, given that diplomats seek flexibility, whereas parties seek attracting voters with clear-cut positions.

As members of the European Union, all current members of the European Union have been included in the analysis for the whole duration of the dispute, including the newly-acceded member states. Considering the impact of the European Union accession process on the policies of the candidate countries as it has been asserted and demonstrated in literature\textsuperscript{49}, as well as the fact that

\textsuperscript{46} e.g. O’Malley (2007), Schafer and Crichlow (2002).
\textsuperscript{47} Onderco and Wagner (2012)
\textsuperscript{48} Ray (1999)
\textsuperscript{49} Mungiu (2007), Noutcheva and Bechev (2008)
the European Union had used the vision of enlargement as a strong leverage to guide behavior of countries outside of its borders\textsuperscript{50}, it is sensible to include the candidate countries in the analysis as well. These countries were therefore included for the whole period under study, including prior to the accession.

**Figure 7.1  Expert assessments of EU members’ policies towards Iran**

![Expert assessments of EU members' policies towards Iran](image)

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

**TRADE**

Trade with both Iran and the Gulf region (Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Oman) was measured as the aggregated trade (both imports and exports) as a share of GDP.

In order to look only at the strategic goods, I employ the categorization and list developed by Goenner\textsuperscript{51}. In one of the sub-models, I focus particularly on the trade in energy (oil, natural gas, coal and electricity). The data on the trade volumes were obtained from the UN Comtrade.\textsuperscript{52} Strategic trade (as well as the trade in energy) was measured as a share of total trade in given category by the given EU member state.

\textsuperscript{50} Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006), Featherstone and Radaelli (2003), Schimmelfennig (2007)
\textsuperscript{51} Goenner (2010)
\textsuperscript{52} UN COMTRADE (2011)
ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES

Not all allies are made equal – some countries in the European Union have a stronger tie with the United States than others. To measure this tie, I use an additive index to measure the strength relation, with score ranging from 0 to 7. Individual scores for each EU member and year can be found in Appendix 3.

*Coalition of the Willing* Members of the Coalition of the Willing, taking part in the Operation Iraqi Freedom, showed their increased willingness to share the United States’ preference for using force against ‘rogue states’. The list was obtained from the official list published by the White House.\(^53\)

*NATO membership* NATO represents the main institutionalized alliance of the United States and membership therein indicates the institutionalized political proximity. Countries received an extra point for being members of the *NATO military command*.

*ISAF* Participation in ISAF mission in Afghanistan is a sign of a costly commitment to the arguably most important military mission led by the United States. States receive an extra point for sending *more than 500 troops* to the mission (the results are robust to exclusion of this extra point)

*US base* Willingness to host a US base on own territory is a sign of strong relation between a country and the United States. The list was adopted from the [http://militarybases.com/](http://militarybases.com/)

*Torture* Participation with the United States in the secret detention and extraordinary rendition, controversial programs internationally, symbolizes that states are willing to cooperate with the US even if this may violate the norms of international law. The list of countries which cooperated with the United States in these programs was adopted from Open Society Justice Initiative (results are robust to the exclusion of this variable)\(^54\)

GEOPOLITICAL PREFERENCES

The affinity with Israel on the Middle East is measured through the similarity of voting on issues related to the Middle Eastern conflict in the United Nations General Assembly. The United Nations General Assembly votes have been retrieved from the ‘United Nations General Assembly Voting

\(^{53}\) White House (2003)
\(^{54}\) Open Society Justice Initiative (2013)
Data’ database.\textsuperscript{55} In the most recent version, each vote is also coded for six categories, one of them being the Palestinian conflict. I have calculated the agreement scores between each of the EU members and Israel. These were computed as session-averages of vote agreements. Each vote agreement was counted as ‘1’, disagreement as ‘0’ and abstentions as ‘0.5’. If any of the countries was absent, the vote was not counted (classified as ‘missing’). Total score per session\textsuperscript{56} was divided by the number of votes. The score thus ranges from 0 (all votes different) to 1 (all votes identical).\textsuperscript{57}

**CONTROL VARIABLES**

**IDEOLOGY**\textsuperscript{58}

It has been shown that government ideology can also explain variance in foreign and security policies.\textsuperscript{59} According to their studies of military interventions in the Balkans and in Iraq, left-wing governments value the non-military conflict management much higher than the right-wing governments. Government ideology is measured using the Schmidt-Index, measuring the cabinet composition. Discreet values of the Schmidt-Index range from 1 to 5, where 1 denotes the hegemony of right-wing parties and 5 the hegemony of left-wing parties. Data was obtained from the dataset collected by Armingeon.\textsuperscript{60}

**CAPABILITIES**

I control for the military expenditure of states as a proxy for military power.\textsuperscript{61} This is measured by military expenditure as a share of Iran’s expenditure. The data is taken from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.\textsuperscript{62}

Estimation has been executed using ordinary least squares regression with fixed effects and Sandwich/White robust standard errors. The temporal dimension was captured with the ‘crisis episode’, not year, because unwillingness to confront the renegade would be over-determined

\textsuperscript{55} Strezhnev and Voeten (2012)
\textsuperscript{56} UN GA sessions do not fully overlap with calendar years but form a unified set of votes
\textsuperscript{57} This score should not be confused with S-scores measuring metric distances between votes on the scale from -1 to 1, see Signorino and Ritter (1999)
\textsuperscript{58} Estimation is robust to the exclusion of these two control variables, except for Model 4, where the effect of similarity with Israel becomes statistically not significant once not controlling for ideology and capabilities.
\textsuperscript{59} Rathbun (2004), Schuster and Maier (2006)
\textsuperscript{60} Rogers (2011)
\textsuperscript{61} Similar to eg. Reiter (1999)
\textsuperscript{62} SIPRI (2011)
outside of the crisis episodes. The crisis episodes represent time points when tensions are high and therefore allow for good estimation of the trade ties importance on policy. The missing data on trade in specific trade groups were first imputed by back retrieval (exports from A to B in particular goods X were retrieved as imports to B from A in the given goods). Where these were incomplete, the missing values were imputed with zeroes as it seems reasonable to assume that there simply is no trade between democracies and Iran in given goods.\(^{63}\)

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

Before embarking on the analysis of the estimated models, it is worthwhile to inspect Figure 7.1. It demonstrates that the positions of the EU Member States oscillated between relatively accommodationist to fairly confrontational. Overall, EU members became more confrontational over time. Interestingly enough, however, in spite of the existing internal coordinating mechanisms (at least since 2006), EU members' policies did not converge. On the contrary, we observe increasing gaps between EU members. This may reflect on the observed preference of some EU member states not to press further on Iran, as reported in WikiLeaks.\(^{64}\)

Firstly, I estimate the full model with all variables (Model 1). Secondly, I analyze a battery of trade models, testing the commercial liberalist thesis. I offer a full model, looking at all trade-related variables (Model 2). Then I look at a model including only the overall trade with both Iran and the Gulf (Model 2a) followed by a model where overall and strategic trade are taken into account (Model 2b). Model 3 looks at the first alternative explanation, looking at the role of the relations with the US. Model 4 looks at the effect of the similarity of outlook on the Middle East conflict on the policy towards Iran. Table 7.1 includes the results of the statistical analysis, whereas Table 7.2 shows the substantive effect of change of individual by one standard deviation (except for transatlantic tie and the government ideology, where the change is by one point) on the confrontation score, the dependent variable.

\(^{63}\) Similar technique (imputation with zero) is not unknown to political scientists for overview of the debate, cf. Oneal and Russett (1999). The counterargument leveled is that non-reported trade is simply not known Reuveny, Pollins and Keshk (2010) and the results are sensitive to data imputation Boehmer, Jungblut and Stoll (2011). In the present case, about 29% of the data has been imputed with zeroes in particular trade commodities. It seems safe to assume that the pattern of missingness in the data suggests that it can be reasonably assumed that no trade takes place (e.g. 60% of the data on trade in nuclear goods has been imputed with zeros).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Full Model</th>
<th>Model 2 Full trade model</th>
<th>Model 2a Overall trade model</th>
<th>Model 2b Overall &amp; strategic trade model</th>
<th>Model 3 Transatlantic tie model</th>
<th>Model 4 ‘Middle East conflict’ model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall trade with Iran</td>
<td>3.277</td>
<td>72.297</td>
<td>114.583</td>
<td>183.482</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(124.087)</td>
<td>(119.789)</td>
<td>(108.548)</td>
<td>(125.254)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall trade with the Gulf</td>
<td>66.998+</td>
<td>95.591*</td>
<td>91.226*</td>
<td>75.254*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35.607)</td>
<td>(35.956)</td>
<td>(32.896)</td>
<td>(35.317)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic trade with Iran</td>
<td>-7.077</td>
<td>-5.521</td>
<td>-7.169</td>
<td>-6.194</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.199)</td>
<td>(11.141)</td>
<td>(6.194)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic trade with the Gulf</td>
<td>3.598+</td>
<td>4.331+</td>
<td>3.091</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.106)</td>
<td>(2.160)</td>
<td>(2.465)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy trade with Iran</td>
<td>9.608</td>
<td>4.416</td>
<td>7.525</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.195)</td>
<td>(10.767)</td>
<td>(3.317)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy trade with the Gulf</td>
<td>-9.441**</td>
<td>-8.708*</td>
<td>3.091</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.337)</td>
<td>(3.668)</td>
<td>(2.465)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transatlantic tie</td>
<td>0.462*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.664**</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.161*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity with Israel</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.161*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>0.173**</td>
<td>0.197*</td>
<td>0.243**</td>
<td>0.258**</td>
<td>0.203***</td>
<td>0.383***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.476</td>
<td>3.178***</td>
<td>3.126***</td>
<td>3.054***</td>
<td>1.080</td>
<td>3.490***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.919)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
<td>(0.878)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root MSE</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
### Table 7.2 Substantive effect of indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 2a</th>
<th>Model 2b</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall trade with Iran</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall trade with the Gulf</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic trade with Iran</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic trade with the Gulf</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy trade with Iran</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy trade with the Gulf</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transatlantic tie</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity with Israel</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The effect on Expert score of an increase by one SD (except for transatlantic tie, where the difference is of moving by one point). Indicators with statistical significance at at least 10% level are marked in italics

Let us start with the trade-related indicators. None of the indicators of trade with Iran (whether overall, strategic or energy-related) is, surprisingly, statistically significantly influencing the policy towards the country. The estimates of the total and energy-related trade have positive sign, suggesting that more trade is associated with more confrontation towards Iran. This effect is, however, not statistically significant. The overall trade with the Gulf is a statistically significant predictor of the policy in all models, though only weakly so in the full model. This means that countries trading more with the Gulf are also more confrontationist towards Iran. Strategic trade with the Gulf is weakly or not at all associated with confrontationist policy afterwards. The trade in energy with the Arab Gulf countries, on the other hand, is always associated with accommodationist policies towards Iran.
Contrary to the hypothesized, both effects of overall trade are positive, suggesting that more trade is associated with more confrontation. The stronger economic ties with the Gulf countries the EU members have, the more confrontationist towards Iran they tend to be. In this way, the European countries with significant economic interests in the Gulf region become more confrontationist towards Iran, whereas having strong economic relations with Iran makes them more confrontational too (although this effect is not always statistically significant). The dual logic can be easily explained by the simple logic of magnitude. The volume of trade with Iran is relatively small for the Europeans but potentially important for Iran. European states thus feel less constrained to use coercion. On the other hand, economic losses (the chief driving force behind the logic of commercial liberalism) potentially incurred in the Gulf are far more sizeable. While the overall trade with the Gulf is associated with more confrontation towards Iran, the more states trade in energy-related goods, the more accommodationist they are towards Iran. The effect can be seen in both Model 1 and Model 2. Similarly, trade in energy-related goods can potentially create increased costs and therefore states with sizeable energy interests in the Gulf tend to have more accommodationist policy towards Iran. Such policy would fit well with the prescriptions of some analysts suggesting that the main threat of the nuclear-equipped Iran would not be a threat for Europeans per se but Iran may feel emboldened in its foreign policy in the near neighborhood.

When it comes to the effect of a transatlantic tie, it is strongly associated with the confrontationist policy towards Iran both when considered in isolation and when controlling for other factors. Change by one point on the transatlantic tie index is associated with the increase in the confrontationist policy towards Iran by 0.6 point (on the 7-point scale) if considered in isolation and by about 0.5 point when considered alone. This is a strong effect and shows that states’ relations with the United States do influence their policy towards Iran.

The regional politics considerations matter surprisingly little. EU members which share the preferences with Israel are confrontationist towards Iran, but this effect is statistically significant only when considered alone (with the controls) – if other factors are taken into account, the effect becomes statistically insignificant. The difference between EU members’ positions towards various issues in the Middle East is well noted in the literature where particular reasons are also more

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66 It should be noted again that if the control for capabilities and government ideology be removed, the regional politics considerations are not statistically significant
elaborated on.\textsuperscript{67} The magnitude of the effect is also meager, change by one standard deviation is associated with the change by about 0.1 point on a 7-point scale.

Briefly commenting on the two controls – military capability proves a surprisingly strong predictor of confrontationist policy of the EU members. Countries which overspend Iran in military expenditure are more confrontationist towards the country. This effect is strong and apart from the transatlantic tie, it is the strongest predictor of confrontationist policy. In spite of the recent discussions of the ‘normative power Europe’ and Europe’s decreasing military capabilities, European countries behave as neorealisists would predict, ‘the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics.’\textsuperscript{68} These findings are along the lines of the research by Kroenig\textsuperscript{69} who argues that the ability to project power explains great powers’ nonproliferation policies. Government ideology, however, does not have any statistically significant effect on the likelihood of using tools of coercive diplomacy.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the present paper was to explore whether the commercial liberalism applies also at the levels of confrontation short of violent war by testing whether the policy of the EU member states towards Iran can be related to different trade relations between EU member states and Iran. In this chapter I offered an alternative, arguing that the confrontationist policy towards Iran can be a demonstration of the intra-EU positioning towards the United States or of the expression of preferences regarding the Middle Eastern regional politics. The results of the analysis demonstrate that the relationship between economic interests and policy towards Iran is not as straight-forward as the commercial liberals and critics assert, but that relations with the United States do influence the policy. Regional political considerations play a little role.

In this article, I have shown that the effect of trade is far from straight-forward. While both the trade with Iran and the trade with other countries of the Gulf region (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman) are associated with more confrontation towards Iran, only the trade with the Gulf is a statistically significant predictor. Such finding is in line with previous studies by practitioners who suggested that economic interests, however promising in Iran,

\textsuperscript{67} Asseburg (2003), Dosenrode and Stubkjaer (2001)
\textsuperscript{68} Mearsheimer (1995: 91).
\textsuperscript{69} Kroenig (2009), Kroenig (2014)
never deterred European countries from taking confrontational steps against Iran. Trade in strategic goods (and energy in particular) with Iran plays no role in shaping the accommodation or confrontation. Strategic trade with the Gulf is weakly associated with the confrontationist policies, whereas trade in energy-related commodities with the Arab Gulf countries is associated with accommodationist policy towards Iran.

Transatlantic tie – the strength of the relationship with the United States – is strongly associated with the confrontationist policy towards Iran. This finding confirms that countries with strong relations with the United States tend to see and evaluate the appropriate response towards the Iranian dossier similarly to the United States. Voting affinity on Middle East-related issues in the UN GA is, on the other hand, only a weak predictor of the policy towards Iran.

The results of the research, in effect, question the applicability of the commercial liberalist thesis to situations of confrontation short of war. Trade is therefore neither the only nor the most important driver behind the policy towards Iran. On the aggregate level, we observe that trade with Iran is of little importance and if any trade matters, then it is the trade with the Gulf countries. However, geopolitical considerations are far more important than the trade. Disaggregated, trade is still less relevant to the formation of policies towards Iran than geopolitical considerations. Within a larger picture, the research presented here suggests that in situations short of war, countries (even democracies) are not likely to be influenced by the considerations originating from a potential loss of trade. Not only does the trade make states less accommodationist, the evidence points that under some circumstances, it may even make states more confrontational.

In explaining the confrontational policies in times of crises, we would therefore have to resort back to geopolitics or find other factors. Trade will not suffice.

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70 Such as following the Mykonos affair, cf. Mousavian (2008)
From a ‘rogue’ to a parolee. Analyzing Libya’s ‘de-roguing’

This chapter is slightly different from the other chapters in this dissertation. It is not about analyzing policy towards one or more ‘rogue states’. Instead, it focuses on the study of how ‘rogue states’ end – what processes accompany the process of turning a ‘rogue state’ to an ‘ordinary state’. In many ways, this paper shows the final stages of policy towards a ‘rogue state’ in a scenario that does not end with a war (as was the case with Iraq). By looking how the US and UK governments managed the transformation of Libya away from being a ‘rogue state’, I look at how frames and labels in international system are constructed, de-constructed and re-constructed. This paper is a chapter in the edited volume Deviance in International Relations: ‘Rogue states’ in international security, co-edited together with Wolfgang Wagner and Wouter Werner and accepted for publication with Palgrave.

Introduction

While studies on how countries come to be seen as ‘rogue’ abound, the international community’s reintegration of ‘rogue states’ remains an overlooked aspect.

This absence is surprising for a number of reasons. First, given that the literature on the strategies of coping with ‘rogues’ is so copious, it is unexpected that the literature on the actual demise of ‘rogue state’ status is as scarce. Second while numerous authors have studied how frames emerge and change within international politics, studies of the reintegration of ‘rogues’ are by and large missing (Patrick T. Jackson’s study of how Germany was reintegrated to Europe after the Second World War being a rare exception).

This is not to say that there are no empirical descriptions of changes in states’ behavior that led to discontinuation of ‘rogue’ status. Still, we need to theorize how the status of ‘rogue’ is de- and re-constructed. Being a ‘rogue state’ is a socially constructed quality, conferred upon an entity.

Reintegration of a state is thus a matter of frame reversal and re-construction.

In this chapter, I will examine how the American and British governments turned the status of Libya away from that of a ‘rogue state’. I focus on the United Kingdom and the United States for two

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1 Other chapters in this volume provide excellent contributions as well as literature overviews.
4 Jackson (2006).
chief reasons – first, because these two countries were in the forefront of the international effort to isolate Libya and second, their mutual relations are extremely close – described by the former UK Foreign Secretary Miliband as UK’s ‘most important bilateral relationship’ and by the US Secretary of State Clinton as a partnership which withstood ‘the test of time.’ I will especially focus on the period between 2002 and 2004, from the beginning of the secret negotiations between the US, the UK and Libya up to Tony Blair’s visit of Libya, a moment widely acclaimed as the final point of Libya’s reintegration into the international community. This period marks the final transformation of the Libya’s ‘rogue’ status. The United States and the United Kingdom provide a particularly good case to study how ‘de-roguing’ works. Muammar Qadhafi’s Libya was connected with numerous bomb attacks, which not only demonstrated Libya’s support for terrorism, but also created legitimate domestic constituencies opposed to accommodating Muammar Qadhafi’s regime.

Thus far, the scholars writing about the Libyan decision to come clean about its WMD programs and to cooperate in counter-terrorism have treated the Libyan action as a success, with the country leaving its ‘rogue’ status behind. Thus, not only did they imply that Libya’s action and Western reaction amounted to the discontinuation of the status of a ‘rogue state’, but they also argued that Libya has been welcomed to the family of nations. Such a view is flawed though, because, in hindsight, we may observe that the decision to reintegrate Libya was driven by expediency. We can now see that the status conferred upon a former renegade can be quickly overturned, as shown by the use of military force in the spring of 2011 against Muammar Qadhafi’s regime.

We may define ‘de-roguing’ as the strategic and purposeful reversal of a ‘rogue’ status. The status of a rogue goes beyond the mere label, and attaches a specific exclusionary quality. The reversal of such status therefore goes beyond the change of label too, and includes the reintegration of the former ‘rogue’ into the international community, encouraging future cooperative relations with the regime. The deconstruction of the status of a ‘rogue’ can be considered along the lines of desecuritization, with a difference being in the scope of such an action. As a consequence, desecuritization brings about a substantial change of the normative framework, whereas ‘de-roguing’ concerns only the application (and the end thereof) of a particular status of ‘rogue’ to a particular state. In effect, the

5 Giles (2007)
6 BBC News (2009)
7 Leverett (2004)
10 O'Reilly (2010)
‘de-roguing’ does not mean any significant change in what is called ‘what good people do’, but only signals that a certain state is no longer a ‘bad guy’. However, as I will argue in this chapter, in the Libyan case the deep-seated nature of the former status as a ‘rogue’ makes it impossible to remove it swiftly and without reservations. Therefore we end up in the middle of the road between a ‘rogue’ and an orderly citizen, at a position akin to that of a parolee. By using ‘de-roguing’ to study change of frames, I use the demise of application of a ‘rogue state label to a particular state to study the interplay between the domestic constituencies and foreign policy. While other Contributors to this volume look at what we can learn about the international order by analyzing ‘rogue states’, I look at what we can learn about the interplay between domestic constituencies and foreign policy by looking at the demise thereof. Two other contributions in the edited volume by Wagner, Werner and Onderco touch on the issue of the demise of ‘rogue states’. Jorg Kustermans addresses the matter, arguing that the demise of ‘rogue state’ is associated with the change of the understanding of international citizenship on the part of the United States. Contra Derrida’s argument that ‘rogue states’ will disappear because the importance of nation-states will generally decline, Kustermans rightly argues that such grand historical appreciations hardly inform a policy-maker’s decision-making process. Kustermans’ argument on the demise of rogue states is based on the assumption that rogue states would come to be seen as rational and thus possible to deal with. As is clear from the case study, considerations of Qaddafi’s rationality do not arise and are thus inconsequential in de-roguing Libya. This can be arguably ascribed to the fact that the dismantling process was, in fact, handled by the United States and Britain themselves. The other is the contribution of Akan Malici and Stephen Walker. Their argument about ‘de-roguing’ focuses on the altercasting strategy, essentially offering carrots so big that the other side would not even expect them. This contribution, in short, can be seen as parallel to mine. While Malici and Walker’s argument is based on the understanding of how to convince a former ‘rogue’ to change hearts, my argument deals with how ‘de-roguing’ is portrayed and offers a theoretically informed account of it.

11 Fearon (1998)
12 Wagner, Werner and Onderco (2014b)
14 An exercise worthy of further research would be to see how rationality is ascribed to friends and foes in international relations. It is quite possible that rationality, similarly to democracy, is seen as something we can assume foes do not possess. Owen (1994) argues that in case two democracies engaged in war, one did not regard the other as full democracy. It may be thus quite possible that enemies are ascribed irrationality as a part of the stigmatizing discourse.
The chapter starts with a brief historical outline of the relations between the United Kingdom and the United States, on one hand, and Libya, on the other, outlining the main points of contention between these three states, such as the bombing of La Belle disco in Berlin, the US bombardment of Tripoli, the murder of Yvonne Fletcher and the Lockerbie bombing. This section is followed by an account of the ‘de-roguing’ of Libya. The subsequent section provides an explanatory argument on how to square the circle of ‘de-roguing’. This section is divided into three subcategories, in which I analyze the status deconstruction, relevance of desecuritization for the study of de-roguing, and mechanisms of ‘de-roguing’. In the concluding section, I synthetize the argument how ‘rogues’ are ‘de-rogued’.

ROGUISH BEHAVIOR AND THE END OF IT

The image of Libya as a ‘rogue state’ emerged in 1980s following Reagan’s presidential inauguration, when the country was accused of being a supporter of various terrorist groups. Libya’s leader was given the derogatory title of ‘mad dog of the Middle East’. Libya was construed as a ‘rogue’ also in the language of policy-makers. Beyond Reagan’s repeated ‘mad dog’ statements, the image of Libya as a ‘rogue state’ was perpetuated during Clinton’s presidency. In one fifth of all presidential statements dealing with ‘rogue states’, Libya was depicted as falling within this category.

Qadhafi’s regime assembled biological and chemical weapons and pursued an active link to the nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan. Although a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention, Libya actively developed both nuclear and biological weapons. The country also developed chemical weapons and successfully used them against Chad in 1987. Libya also pursued an active missile program, based on old Soviet designs, though with debatable active attack abilities.

Other incidents followed, such as the killing of Yvonne Fletcher, a British policewoman who was fatally shot during an anti-Qadhafi demonstration in front of the Libyan People’s Bureau in London by a fire originating from the Bureau. Most importantly, however, Muammar Qadhafi’s regime was known for having links with a number of terrorist organizations. Libya was harboring the Abu Nidal

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16 Reagan (1986)
17 Hoyt (2000)
19 Hogendoorn (1997)
Organisation (ended effectively in 1999), and maintained tacit links with the IRA and ETA. Libya’s support for terrorism culminated in three well-known incidents – the bombing of La Belle disco in Berlin in 1986, during which 230 visitors were hurt (including 79 US servicemen) and 3 were killed. As a response to this bombing, US President Ronald Reagan ordered the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi, during the El Dorado Campaign operation. This behavior peaked in 1988, when Pan Am flight 103 from London’s Heathrow Airport to New York’s JFK exploded over the Scottish village of Lockerbie, killing all 259 on board and 11 on the ground. Last but not least, in 1989, a bomb hidden in the cargo section destroyed UTA flight 772 from Brazzaville to Paris via N’Djamena, killing all 170 on board.\(^{21}\)

More important than these facts was the perception of Libya as a norm-breaking ‘rogue’, violating the international norms against terrorism and development of weapons of mass destruction.\(^{22}\) Sanctions against a regime, in addition to being a tool of coercive diplomacy, can also be a signaling device to show that the behavior of that regime is unacceptable.\(^{23}\) In this respect, Libya has been repeatedly exposed as engaging in such behavior. The country has been under international sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in the Resolutions 748 and 883, banning aviation relations and arms transfers (UN SC Resolution 748) and freezing assets abroad (UN SC Resolution 883).\(^{24}\) In addition to these, unilateral US sanctions against Libya were introduced as early as in 1986 through the executive order under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, strengthened in 1996 by passing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in the US Senate. Furthermore, once designated by the US as a state sponsor of terrorism, Libya faced a number of important trade restrictions, including a ban on trade in dual-use technology and weapons.

Crucially, though, Libya’s status as a ‘rogue’ was broadly embraced. As Totman and Hardy show, the American public supported the air campaign against Qadhafi in 1986 and continued to consider Libya as one of the main threats to US national security.\(^{25}\) Although a similar appreciation is difficult to make in the case of the United Kingdom (because of the lack of comparative data), Greenwood mentions in his analysis that pre-Lockerbie British public was opposed to military attacks against

\(^{21}\) All of these incidents were attributed by courts to Libyan agents and after 2004, Libya accepted responsibility and compensated the families of victims.

\(^{22}\) On existence of the norm against terrorism, see Katzenstein (1993), on chemical and nuclear weapons, see Price and Tannenwald (1996).


\(^{24}\) Schwartz (2007) provides a legal discussion

\(^{25}\) Totman and Hardy (2008)
Libya. When Prime Minister Thatcher allowed the US to use British air bases to launch air strikes against Libya in 1986, the public opinion turned against her. However, after Lockerbie, she refused an air strike upfront, maintaining that ‘[r]evenge is never a good word to use because it can affect innocent people.’ However, in the same interview, she attacked Libya as a ‘rogue’ and described the disgust of public opinion saying: ‘Public opinion is disgusted with nations that will not try to track down terrorists. Absolutely disgustd, and is making its own view felt - that is the most important thing of all.’

In the mid-1990s, matters started changing slightly. In 1996, the US State Department, while continuing to list Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism, noted that ‘[t]errorism by Libya has been sharply reduced by UN sanctions.’ In 1998, after making use of the good offices of Nelson Mandela, the Libyans and the UK agreed to conduct an independent trial of the two suspects of the Lockerbie bombing in Zeist, the Netherlands, under Scottish law. Next year, Libya expelled the Abu Nidal Organisation and officially conveyed its decision to begin discussions on giving up on its WMD programs.

While Libyans were sending signals that they had started feeling both the isolation and the need to reintegrate into the international community (St John 2004), the international community was unsure of how to read these signs. In fact, US Deputy Assistant for Near East and South Asia Ronald Neumann remarked that ‘[…] the picture of Libya’s current actions is only slowly coming into focus, and our understanding of Libyan intentions or how the Libyan government sees itself in the world remains quite unclear.’

Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi expressed his shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequently offered cooperation in the fight against terrorism. However, the unconventional weapons program remained an open question. This changed in 2002, when Libyans approached the British government for discussions on dismantling its WMD programs. After rounds of secret talks, shortly before the end of 2003, the Libyan foreign minister announced that the state had decided to renounce its unconventional weapons, shortly followed by press conferences of the British Prime

26 Greenwood (1986)
27 Brown (1989)
28 US Department of State (1996)
30 Quoted in St John (2004: 390)
Minister and the US President to the same effect.\textsuperscript{31} Libyan rehabilitation thus seemed to have been under way, with the important work of ‘de-roguing’ a former ‘rogue state’ lying ahead.

‘DE-ROGUING’ LIBYA

The conviction of the Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi in 2001 in Zeist certainly did not alleviate the status of a ‘rogue’, despite the statement of the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook who argued that ‘[…] at last [the] relatives know that in a fair trial before an open court justice has been done.’\textsuperscript{32} Immediately after the sentence was passed, Bert Ammerman, spokesperson for the Lockerbie victims, accused the Libyan leader of being ‘a coward’, adding that ‘[he] is a ‘rogue’ leader and Libya is a ‘rogue’ nation.’\textsuperscript{33} The British government, which expected Libya to pay the compensation and to take up the responsibility for these actions, certainly did not contemplate easing up the sanctions.\textsuperscript{34} In plain language, The Sun expressed that ‘Libya should be treated as a pariah […]’ and that ‘[…] justice will not be complete while guilty Gaddafi still rules Libya.’\textsuperscript{35}

Already in 2002, Blair had expressed his hope that ‘Libya comes into the full community of international relations’, being personally prepared to ‘extend the hand of partnership on terms that people recognize.’\textsuperscript{36} These comments arrived as secret negotiations between Libya and the West about the Libyan WMD programs and on the Lockerbie issue had already been under way. Similarly, the 2002 report on Patterns of Global Terrorism remarked that, together with Sudan, ‘Libya [seems] closest to understanding what they must do to get out of the terrorism business and each has taken measures pointing it in the right direction.’\textsuperscript{37} Shortly before, British minister for the Middle East Mike O’Brien, during his historical visit to the country (O’Brien was the first British official to visit Libya in 20 years) stated that ‘Libya, which cooperates fully with the international community, […], is very much in our interests.’\textsuperscript{38} O’Brien went further and stated that Libya was ‘moving away from being an outlaw pariah state towards engagement, with the rest of the international community and compliance with the international law.’\textsuperscript{39} Foreign Secretary Straw took matters to another level in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{31}] Martinez (2006), St John (2004)
\item[\textsuperscript{32}] Xinhua (2001)
\item[\textsuperscript{33}] Ward (2001)
\item[\textsuperscript{34}] Knox (2001)
\item[\textsuperscript{35}] The Sun (2001)
\item[\textsuperscript{36}] AP (2002), Tyler (2004)
\item[\textsuperscript{37}] US Department of State (2002)
\item[\textsuperscript{38}] AFP (2002)
\item[\textsuperscript{39}] Lucazeau (2003)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
2004, when, during a press briefing with his Libyan counterpart, he maintained that ‘[the United Kingdom has] always regarded Libya as a good country. We regret the fact that there have been difficulties in the relationship, which is a separate matter, and we are now looking forward to putting those difficulties behind us.’

In late 2003, Blair declared that ‘Libya’s actions entitle it to rejoin the international community. […] I now look forward to developing a productive relationship with him and with Libya.’ When Libya confirmed its intention to give up non-conventional weapons in 2002, the international community cautiously welcomed it as a step forward. Bush remarked that ‘[…] when leaders make the wise and responsible choice, when they renounce terror and weapons of mass destruction, as Colonel Qadhafi has now done, they serve the interest of their own people and they add to the security of all nations.’ While both Blair and Bush applauded the move, Bush assured that ‘[because] Libya has a troubled history with America and Britain, we will be vigilant in ensuring its government lives up to all its responsibilities.’ If the process went well, Bush promised Libya ‘a secure and respected place among nations.’

This status still contained pre-existing ideas about norms and threats. The first hint came from Prime Minister Blair, who, in February 2004, told the House of Commons that ‘rogue states’ with WMDs were ‘the security threat of the 21st century.’

Blair’s visit to Libya in March 2004 was groundbreaking. Shortly before the trip, Blair announced that the United Kingdom had offered to help Libya to renounce terrorism. The British PM clearly distinguished between terrorist networks and Qadhafi, saying that he believes in negotiation that can achieve peace, whereas organizations such as Al-Qaeda have no demands that can be negotiated. During this visit, British Prime Minister Tony Blair observed that Libya ‘made a remarkable progress’ and exclaimed it was ‘good to be [t]here at last.’ Blair in Tripoli also announced he was struck by Libya’s ‘determination to carry on down this path of cooperation’, including in the military

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40 Transcript of Press Conference Given by the Foreign Secretary, Mr Jack Straw and the Libyan Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr Abdul Rahman Mohammed (2004).
41 Morris and Buncombe (2003: 1)
42 Sanger and Miller (2003), Tyler and Risen (2003)
43 Sanger and Miller (2003)
44 Sanger and Miller (2003). Nancy Pelosi, the leader of the Democratic caucus in the House remarked virtually the same Libya to Dismantle Its Weapons, Gadhafi Oks Inspections Too (2003)
45 Roberts (2004)
46 AFP (2004)
47 Marcian (2004a)
Greatly appreciated was his exclamation, in which he hailed Libya’s leadership’s decision as ‘right and courageous’, adding that Qadhafi’s choice ‘will make the region and the world more secure’. George Bush made previously similar comments, arguing that ‘Ghadafi’s commitment, once it is fulfilled, will make [the United States] more safe and the world more peaceful.’

Blair recognized ‘a common cause, with us, in the fight against Al-Qaeda extremism and terrorism, which threatens not just the Western world but the Arab world also.’ During the historical visit to Tripoli, Blair’s spokesperson told the media that the UK and Libya agreed on the need to ‘unite together, to recognize the problems caused to the world by fundamentalism’, including terrorism and extremism. He insisted on ‘an overriding duty to try to preserve and enhance the security of my country and of the wider world.’ Blair called the rapprochement a ‘major victory’ in the war on terror.

Demonstrating the persisting importance of the non-proliferation framework and finding solutions for it, Blair declared the Libyan leadership’s actions demonstrate that ‘problems of proliferation’ can be solved by ‘discussion and engagement’ with the participation of ‘responsible international agencies.’ He added that, if Libya continued to give up its WMDs, it would be ‘a huge gain, not just for us in Britain or the United States, but the whole of the world.’ An equivalent statement was made by President Bush, who argued that ‘those weapons do not bring influence or prestige. They bring isolation and otherwise unwelcome consequences.’ Bush also connected the decision to the wider war on terror, arguing that ‘opposing proliferation is one of the highest priorities of the war against terror […] any danger is dramatically increased when regimes build or acquire weapons of mass destruction and maintain ties to terrorist groups.’

These statements served the purpose of removing the Libya’s old status and showing the country’s newly acquired desire to continue down the road towards orderly citizenship of the international
community. The comments do not only portray Libya’s change of behavior and its perception by policy-makers, but they also appeal to the rationality of national interests.

Qadhafi’s removal from the list of global ‘rogues’ by the British and US leadership also resonated well in Germany. Blair’s course of action got an additional boost from his German counterpart, Gerhard Schröder, who backed him up by stating that ‘the change of [Qadhafi’s] politics is really remarkable’ and deserves every support.\(^59\) Such a reference helped to reinforce the new status of Libya.

An interesting element of Libya’s ‘de-roguing’ comes with the fact that Qadhafi’s rationality has suddenly not been questioned. His dedication to the abandonment of WMDs and terrorism have been rather taken at face value.\(^60\) This acceptance resulted in strict dismantling and destruction process which was handled directly by the US and the UK, followed by the verification by international agencies.\(^61\) Whereas the early dominations of Qadhafi as ‘the mad dog’ signal that he was considered an irrational leader, his rationality was not questioned in 2002-2004. Similarly, his continuously abhorrent – domestic human rights record did not stand in the way of ‘de-roguing’.

Blair’s removal of the old status was not easy, nor was it completely successful. When confronted about Libya’s past, Blair asserted that dealing with Qadhafi ‘doesn’t mean forgetting the pain of the past but it does mean recognizing it is time to move on.’\(^62\) A similar statement was issued by White House spokesperson Gordon Johndroe, who called the historical call between President Bush and Muammar Qadhafi a way to ‘bring a painful chapter in the history between our two countries closer to closure. […] While we will always mourn the loss of life as a result of past terrorist activities, the settlement agreement is an important step in repairing the relationship between Libya and the United States.’\(^63\) In addition to general opposition from the families of Lockerbie victims, the timing of Blair’s trip to Libya was also questioned, as he flew to Libya right after the commemorative service for the victims of the terrorist bombing in Madrid. He was criticized for this by the

\(^59\) Fischer (2004)  
\(^60\) Bowen (2006), St John (2004)  
\(^61\) Squassoni and Feickert (2004)  
\(^62\) Marciano (2004b). Similar statements were also made by other European leaders, such as Jacques Chirac who stated that “all the conditions are in place to open a new chapter” in cooperation between France (and the West) and Libya during his visit to Tripoli Ollivier (2004)  
\(^63\) Washington Post (2008)
Conservative Party’s leader Michael Howard, who remarked ‘odd timing’ in Prime Minister’s schedule.\textsuperscript{64}

Partial and incomplete success of ‘de-roguing’ can be also demonstrated when looking at the opinion polls. In the United States, the negative view of Libya declined steadily in post-9/11 era and in 2005/2006 and an equal number of people (about 20 per cent) held neutral and positive views of Libya. Similarly, fewer and fewer people identified Libya as ‘greatest enemy’ of the United States. In 2005 and 2006, more people attributed this label to France than to Libya.\textsuperscript{65} Although a systematic study of the British public opinion towards Libya or its leader is lacking, two polls conducted seven years apart can be insightful. The first one was carried out on the eve of Blair’s historical visit to Libya. According to a YouGov poll (as reported in The Guardian), over three fifths of Britons approved of his visit to Libya, with only one fifth being opposed (though the public was much more heavily opposed to military links between the countries).\textsuperscript{66} A similar poll, seven years later, during the apex of the NATO-led Libya mission, asked Britons whether they considered the re-establishment of positive ties with Libya seven years ago as the right thing to do. While about one third of voters thought so and only a slightly higher proportion was opposed, closer scrutiny shows that the public opinion was heavily split along partisan lines. Whereas roughly one half of Conservative voters considered the re-establishment of ties with Libya as wrong, the same proportion of Labour and Liberal Democratic voters thought it was right. About one fifth of voters in each of the camps were not sure.\textsuperscript{67}

This example, as imperfect as it may be, demonstrates that the ‘de-roguing’ can be a temporarily successful process, but it did not lead to a complete removal of the tag of a ‘rogue’. Effectively, the new frame used in subsequent portrayals of Libya seems closer to the one of a paroled criminal than the one of an orderly citizen. The difference between the two is important – while for the orderly citizen, there is no retrospective re-analysis, for a paroled criminal, past crimes are not forgotten. In particular, the example shows that as the events were unfolding, British voters were persuaded by the change of the Libya’s status. Yet, as the status changed back, the reversal was not as difficult for the voters of the opposition but persisted for the voters of the party that was in power during the period when the reversal took place. An additional example corroborating such a reading of Libya’s

\textsuperscript{64} Macpherson (2004), Marciano (2004b)
\textsuperscript{65} Gallup polls cited in Totman and Hardy (2008)
\textsuperscript{66} Ahmed (2004)
\textsuperscript{67} YouGov (2011)
'de-roguing' may be the reaction of Obama’s administration to the release of the Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, calling it ‘highly objectionable’ and ‘deeply disappointing.’ This essential finding calls for further investigation of the dynamics and change of frame perception, where ‘de-roguing’ can be a convenient case for analysis.

THEORIZING ‘DE-ROGUING’

In the introduction to this chapter, I defined ‘de-roguing’ of states as a strategic and purposeful process of reversal of the ‘rogue’ status. The goal of such an action is to reverse the pre-existing status of the given country, but goes further and is directed at re-integrating the former ‘rogue’ into the international community. By doing so, ‘de-roguing’ aims at future relations possible by increasing their legitimacy. Only then can transactions with a formerly ‘rogue’ country be seen as acceptable, which is necessary if any accountable government wants to avoid an unnecessary, uphill fight against public opinion.

Deconstructing a ‘rogue’ is a process very similar to desecuritization. Although one of the main features of securitization is that, in effect, the measures taken against the securitized threat are ‘beyond political process,’ the process leading to the securitization of threats is simultaneously strategic and political. Its strategic nature stems from the purposefulness of the act, whereas the political nature is given by the frame formation being influenced by actors’ power position.

The dominant framing of the international system comes from the prevailing parts of the international system, which enjoy centrality and importance. Within a seemingly anarchic environment of the international system, where a tacit hierarchy, formed by the power and centrality of actors, exists nevertheless, the hegemonic power fulfills the role of the manager of system, ensuring its workability. It has been recognized that one of the prerogatives of the hegemon is to ‘name things.’ As ‘rogues’ deviate from, challenge or violate the framework, the

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68 Huffington Post (2009)
69 Unfortunately, the study of desecuritization is far less popular compared to securitization studies. For notable recent examples, see Aradau (2004), Kim and Lee (2011), Ogbodo (2012), Roe (2004). Authors tend to treat desecuritization as a process identical to that of securitization, just in reverse. I shall adopt the approach of these scholars, highlighting differences when necessary and appropriate.
70 Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998)
71 Bull (1977), Waltz (1979)
72 Donnelly (2006), Lake (2009), Werner (2014)
73 Schroeder (2009)
74 Kratochwil (2011)
hegemon is interested in its maintenance, developing thus into the accuser, whose purpose is to defend the existing normative order against the ‘rogue’s’ actions. ‘rogue state’ is thus similar to a securitized threat.

If the hegemon is instrumental in the creation of international normative order and in its maintenance, it also has a stake in it.\textsuperscript{76} The purpose of such an international framework is to create compliance associated with a legitimation procedure, which would go beyond coercion and persuasion. Since security norms are not pre-set but in fact socially constructed and thus amendable\textsuperscript{77}, it is much easier to grasp that what constitutes the violation of norms is also dependent on time and environment. Securitization theory tells us about construction of issues as security threats (Buzan et al. 1998). Securitization mechanisms include speech acts by powerful central actors, which create a framework to perceive an issue as a matter of security, even if it has not been so before. The main argument to securitize a threat is along the lines of ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or be free to deal with it in our own way).’\textsuperscript{78} Successful securitization differs from securitizing moves by acquired legitimacy – successfully securitized threats are seen as legitimately threatening. The legitimacy is conveyed by an appropriate audience, which provides the context in which construction of security takes place.\textsuperscript{79}

Desecuritization refers to a process in which an item is retracted from the security agenda. The process of such retraction can be either passive (the issue loses its threatening status because its nature changes) or active (when the relationship between audience and issue changes).\textsuperscript{80} Both desecuritization and ‘de-roguing’ converge when it comes to the essential political nature of the preceding process and the social construction thereof. As said above, ‘de-roguing’ does not mean that the framework of international norms changes, only that the status of a ‘rogue’ is no longer

\textsuperscript{75} Violation of international norm is to be understood as different from non-compliance with international law and as a necessary but not a sufficient condition.

\textsuperscript{76} Ikenberry (2001), Keohane (1984)

\textsuperscript{77} Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998)

\textsuperscript{78} Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998: 24)

\textsuperscript{79} McDonald (2008). I am aware of grossly oversimplifying the actual mechanisms of securitization, but for the present purposes, it shall suffice. For more detail, see Buzan and Wæver (2003), Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998), esp on securitization as a mechanism, cf. Guzzini (2011). Bigo (2002) argues that speech acts are not the only way to securitize issues, but there’s also an institutional route to securitization. One of the few studies of desecuritization studies, Kim and Lee (2011), adopts such approach of sorts, combining selectorate and liberal approaches to desecuritization, ignoring completely speech acts.

\textsuperscript{80} Oelsner (2005)
applied to a given state. Within Oelsner’s framework and using the example of Libya, neither states became immune to terrorism (which would be the passive way) nor did they become oblivious to the threat (which would be the active way). Rather, Libya stopped to be seen as a potential terrorism exporter.

As it has been argued, securitization is to be understood as a strategic practice taking place within a specific set of circumstances, which include a specific context and the existence of a pre-disposed audience. When it comes to de-roguing, there are actually two audiences. The first one is other states in the international community, to whom the signal about the unacceptability of behavior is addressed. States can, however, accept or reject the attachment of the status of rogue to a particular state. The ‘rouging’ and ‘deroguing’ are partly aimed at domestic audience, too, where the label proves stickier. This is why the process of ‘de-roguing’ is likely end up with the status of a parolee.

The analytical result of ‘de-roguing’ can be thus seen as a removal of the former status of a ‘rogue’ against a backdrop of an existing normative framework, which remains the same.

The removal of the status of ‘rogue’ and its replacement with the new status of a parolee requires three independent actions: removal of an old status (‘A is no longer as wicked as it used to be’), maintenance of the normative framework (as described above, ‘Action that A used to engage in is still abhorrent’) and creation of a status in which actor is now to be seen (‘Look, A is now our new friend’). An additional strengthening of the third status can come in by showing that the actor not only stopped engaging in norm violation but that it currently and actively works within the frame of the norm (‘A is now an active promoter of the norm they used to violate!’). However, the creation of the new status is the most difficult, because the old status of a ‘rogue’ is likely too sticky and thus we will probably end up with the status of a parolee – someone who has been released from his previous state but has not become a full ‘orderly citizen’ yet.

Without diving too much into the criminological literature, we may observe many parallels between ‘de-rogued rogues’ and parolees. Criminological research has repeatedly shown that conditions for

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81 Balzacq (2005). This question also points to an existing gap in the securitization literature which acknowledges that the notion of “audience” is heavily under-theorized in the securitization literature, see Buzan and Wæver (2003), Buzan, Wæver and Wilde (1998), Leonard and Kaunert (2011).

82 The observation that how states approach others comes from their perception builds on political psychology and emerges out of Jervis’s early work Jervis (1970). As the reader can see, I do not follow his later observations that serious research on ideas must stem from political psychology Jervis (2008).
parole release are numerous, vague and often unrealistic to be of any value. Similarly, as West-Smith et al showed, it is not good behavior, but rather the misbehavior and noncompliance which mostly affects the parole release decisions. We also know from the criminological research that the danger and risk of potential future crimes and offender blameworthiness both affect the judges decisions in cases of parole.

A similar logic applies to ‘de-roguing’. From the above, one may clearly see that I nowhere gave any agency to A and its actions. Does that mean that A does not have to change anything and only that the discourse changes (similar to how good behavior is not the most important driver of parole decisions)? No, but how and to what extent A changes is of secondary importance, because whatever the change of behavior, it does not necessitate anything of what follows. If it is seen as a mere window dressing or not realized it at all, such change of heart would be at best an altruistic move towards another actor. On the other hand, only when a change of behavior by A is seen and understood as true and trustworthy, the ‘de-roguing’ can take place.

**HOW DOES THE FRAMEWORK PLAY OUT?**

We see the three-step mechanism clearly at work in the case of Libya, when it came to ‘de-roguing’ Qadhafi. Both American and British leaders went to great lengths to deconstruct the status of Qadhafi ‘the lawbreaker’ and Libya the ‘rogue state’. This is demonstrated not only by the willingness of Prime Minister Blair to extend the hand of partnership to Qadhafi, but also by arguments that Libya was coming to understand ‘what [it] must do to get out of the terrorism business’ (US Department of State 2002). Senior policy-makers were praising Libya widely as a hopeful example for other countries to follow.

Similarly we observe that the maintenance of the normative framework remains. Both the importance of the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of WMD featured prominently in the discourse. Both of them were portrayed as clear dangers to national security and global peace; importance compounded by the fact that the ‘de-roguing’ of Libya took place only two years after the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the invasion of Iraq, on the grounds that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction. Finding a common cause in terrorism with Muammar

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84 West-Smith, Pogrebin and Poole (2000)
85 Steffensmeier and Demuth (2000)
86 After all, measuring the honesty of “change of hearts” is extremely difficult in interpersonal relations, let alone in the international relations.
Qadhafi’s regime is an example of how the normative framework remains intact while the positions of actors therein change considerably. As explained above, this is one of the crucial steps of ‘de-roguing’, because it shows that the ‘sin’ is still on the book, but the actor is no longer a ‘sinner’.

Last but not least, I argue that the building of the new normative status of the former ‘rogue’ is not straightforward. The status building was related to both previous ‘sins’ – terrorism and proliferation. When it comes to terrorism, Qadhafi was being shown as a reformed, willing cooperator in the fight against terrorism, sharing the cause with the US and Britain.

Although the country was shown as a new partner against the proliferation of WMD, through the cooperation with international institutions, the new status of Libya as a responsible partner has not completely permeated public opinion. We may observe that Libya’s deroguing has not been achieved completely and we may instead want to think about the new status as akin to that of a parolee. The failure to completely replace the old status with a new one is likely to be due to the sticky old status, too strongly internalized by the public and always ready to be revived.

The difference between the status of parolee (stickiness of the old status) and full ‘de-roguing’ may dwell in the persistence of the regime previously portrayed as ‘rogue’. While a full analysis is beyond the scope of this brief paragraph, the difference between the reintegration of Germany into the European community after the Second World War is striking, compared to the persistence Libya’s parolee status. The violations of core community norms by Germany were far more grave than those of Libya and most of them were related to German actions in Europe (which makes post-WW II reintegration more important than the 1973 UN admission when it comes to the status of Germany). Yet, after the Second World War, the regime in Germany was changed completely, while in Libya, Qadhafi’s regime remained in place. There are many ‘butts’ to the story (Germany was militarily defeated, its status of renegade was much stronger, there were many more victims, the international order was being recreated), but all these count against the reintegration of Germany. It may be recalled that already during the final phases of WW II, US Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau advocated the complete deindustrialization of Germany to prevent future wars, a plan known also as the Morgenthau Plan. The policy was, however, overturned already one year after the war, with US Secretary of State James Byrnes’ ‘speech of hope’, in which he clearly signaled that German militarism (equaled with Nazism) is over and that the American and German people are on.

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87 I am thankful to Wolfgang Wagner for bringing this parallel to my attention.
88 Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany (1944)
the way towards reconciliation. Germany was reintegrated into Europe, mostly because the former Nazi regime was removed and the new one installed. This did not happen in Libya, where the regime stayed in place. This, however, also made it possible to re-invoke the old status of ‘rogue’ in the spring of 2011. It remains to be seen whether the regime change in Libya in 2011 will lead to complete removal of the status of ‘rogue’.

**HOW ARE ‘ROGUES’ ‘DE-ROGUED’?**

This paper sought to provide a theoretically informed account of ‘de-roguing’ of ‘rogue states’, an often overlooked feature of their lifecycle. In this chapter, I assume that ‘de-roguing’ can be approached as a reversal of the ‘rogue’ status, necessary to reintegrate the former ‘rogue’ into the international community. This chapter has demonstrated that we indeed should approach ‘de-roguing’ as a purposeful behavior directed at reintegration of such an actor into the international community. The process of ‘de-roguing’ takes place in three steps, which may be simultaneous, but should be kept separate for analytical purposes.

The initial stage of ‘de-roguing’ is the deconstruction of the ‘rogue’ status, in which the process of de-construction is akin to desecuritization. As such, the process is a strategic one, dependent on a specific time, place and audience. This, in turn, requires that the ‘de-roguing’ means the discontinuation of the application of the particular status of ‘rogue’ while the structural conditions (normative framework) remain in place. Maintaining the normative framework not only analytically distinguishes ‘de-roguing’ from desecuritization, but also serves as a reinforcement of the normative framework. Therefore, it is not the actions of the former ‘rogue’ which become acceptable, but the former ‘rogue’ is declared as not engaging in unacceptable behavior any longer. The final step is the application of a new status of parolee upon a former ‘rogue’, instead of the full ‘de-roguing’. The former ‘rogue’ status may be too sticky and, thus, we observe that a former ‘rogue’ is likely to be seen as a parolee, as opposed to a full-fledged, orderly citizen. As such, the former ‘rogue’ may live a ‘normal life’, reintegrated into the international community but always threatened by the possibility of a quick regression to the old status quo.

This chapter applied the concept of ‘de-roguing’ to the case of US/UK-Libyan relations. Given the rocky past of the US, the UK and Libya, marked by the terrorism incidents and Muammar Qadhafi’s

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89 See Gimbel (1972) for a more detailed study of the reversal of Morgenthau Plan, Restatement of Policy on Germany (1946)
90 Jackson (2006)
desire to acquire WMDs, Libya’s ‘de-roguing’ provides a particularly interesting study example. The British officials focused on ‘de-roguing’ Libya and its leader Muammar Qadhafi, mostly by arguing that he has set on a road towards transformation. At the same time, British officials maintained that the terrorist networks and illicit WMD transfers are still a threat for the 21st century, reinforcing the existing normative framework.

As this chapter has shown, although ‘de-roguing’ might have been successful in the short term, in hindsight it would seem that the new status of Qadhafi’s regime was closer to the one of parolee. If we measure the success of the ‘de-roguing’ strategy by public support, then the British ‘de-roguing’ of Libya was successful, as about three fifth of the British electorate supported the rapprochement with Libya at that time and, similarly, the American public no longer saw Libya as a great danger. However, looking at the fluctuating levels of support and later statements by officials, this chapter provides evidence that a complete removal of the status of a ‘rogue’ is highly unlikely, as long as the formerly ‘rogue’ regime remains in place. The ‘de-rogued’ state is thus akin to a parolee, with whom cooperation is possible, but who has still not yet reached the role of the orderly citizen. And as we may observe with the developments in the spring of 2011, the status of a parolee can be quickly revoked. It remains to be seen whether the 2011 regime change in Libya will lead to full ‘de-roguing’.
9 Conclusion: ‘It’s not the economy, …’

This dissertation aimed at explaining why liberal democracies disagreed in their positions towards the so-called ‘rogue states’. Even if democratic states shared the assessment that ‘rogue states’ (or some of their actions) may pose a threat to the international system and norms it is ruled by, their responses have differed between accommodation and confrontation. While accommodation is marked by pleading for fostering of mutual trust and cooperation, confrontation highlights both the need to stand fast and coercive solutions of crises.

The main take-home message from this dissertation is that the commercial interests are not the primary drivers of foreign policy of states. ‘Rogue states’ cannot simply ‘buy the love’ of liberal democracies by conducting extensive commerce with them. Countries’ commerce with ‘rogue states’ seems to have little influence on how accommodationist or confrontationist countries are. Instead, policy-makers are to a much bigger extent driven by their domestic norms, and their countries’ relations with (and positioning towards) the United States. Given that the United States as the hegemonic power in the international order have a privileged position in singling out, labeling and targeting ‘rogue states’\(^1\), such finding is not entirely shocking. Yet, this finding is important for scholars of foreign policy and international relations, because it points to a continuing importance of structural factors in international politics. For scholars of WMD proliferation –violation of which norms most of the dissertation has focused on – this means to continue looking at proponents and origins of the norms and the regime.

To be more concrete, when it comes to North Korea, the first of the ‘rogue states’ under study, the difference could hardly be starker. The accommodationist policy can hardly be captured better than in a quote by German Chancellor Schroeder, quoted already earlier in this dissertation, who saw ‘an interesting parallel between President Kim's winning the Nobel Peace Prize this year and former German chancellor Willy Brandt's winning the same prize thirty years ago. […] According to Brandt's Ostpolitik, we first got the talks started, and they gave way to more bilateral contacts. Then came various exchanges.’\(^2\) On the other hand, US Secretary of State Powell, also already quoted in this dissertation, commented on North Korea ‘We cannot suddenly say, “Gee, we're so scared. Let's

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\(^1\) Litwak (2000), Litwak (2012), Nincic (2005)

\(^2\) Korea Times (2000)
have a negotiation because we want to appease your misbehavior”. This kind of action cannot be rewarded.\(^3\)

Similarly in case of Iran, European and American officials clashed repeatedly. While the United States placed Iran on the ‘axis of evil\(^4\) for its assumed pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, EU’s Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction postulated on the same risk that ‘[t]he best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them. If possible, political solutions should be found to the problems, which lead them to seek WMD.’\(^5\) Matters get even more complicated if we look beyond the North Atlantic area, where disagreements over appropriate response to Iran’s nuclear program led to questioning of countries’ maturity (in case of India) or bitter disappointments (in case of South Africa).

This dissertation was not meant to discuss either accommodation or confrontation as strategies, let alone to advocate either of them. While I was frequently\(^6\) asked by my interview interlocutors or journalists about suggestions for future course of negotiations with either Iran or North Korea, this research is agnostic to my preferred strategy. In fact, I am not even sure I have one. Instead, I aimed to analyze why different countries give different answers to the question ‘how to deal with “rogue states”’. In this final chapter, I will summarize the empirical contribution and theoretical implication of the present research and sketch a possible course for future research.

**Empirical Contribution**

This dissertation offers an empirical account of foreign policies towards Iran and North Korea, two ‘rogue states’ who aspire to procure necessary means to produce nuclear weapons should they decide to. The dissertation uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze policies of multiple countries towards one issue, providing a rich comparative study of foreign policy.

The research for the present dissertation started with pinpointing the individual positions of countries towards Iran and North Korea over time. Experts on foreign relations of these countries or their counterparts can easily describe the ebbs and flows of bilateral relations in much detail. The problem of such descriptions is, however, that they are extraordinarily hard to translate into indicators allowing for multiple comparisons, across units and times, let alone for quantitative study.

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\(^3\) The Telegraph (2002).
\(^4\) Bush (2002)
\(^6\) Actually more frequently than comfortable
Our survey attempted to transcend this limitation. In this paper, we found that policies toward both Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time; discernible differences remained across countries in spite of existing sanction regimes; individual country profiles were remarkably stable across time and countries maintained remarkably similar policies towards Iran and North Korea. Beyond the importance of getting reliable estimates of country-year positions towards the two ‘rogue states’, this expert survey was a demonstration of expert surveys as reliable instruments in foreign policy analysis.

The third and fourth chapter of this dissertation uses quantitative analysis of policies towards Iran and North Korea, respectively. These chapters look systematically at the role played by military superiority, commercial ties and domestic culture of dealing with deviance in shaping of policies towards ‘rogue states’. When it comes to the policy towards Iran, we find very little influence of the military superiority on the policy positions, although this influence increases markedly once the United States and Israel are disregarded. Yet, commercial ties, in general, play a very little role – if anything, it is trade in strategic goods such as oil that is associated with more accommodationist positions. On the other hand, domestic culture of dealing with deviance has statistically significant effect and is positively related to the positions towards Iran.

In policy towards North Korea, unsurprisingly, commercial ties play a little role (the main models presented in the present dissertation do not even include the variable, but robustness checks including commerce do not lead to different results), given how isolated North Korea is from the international trade. Military superiority is associated with confrontationist policy only for democracies other than the United States. Nevertheless, punitivedomestic norms of dealing with deviance are associated with confrontationist positions towards this ‘rogue state’.

Furthermore, this dissertation includes two qualitative case studies of foreign policies of India and South Africa, entering largely ignored waters for much Western academic foreign policy analysis. In two case studies, I looked at how these two democracies responded to the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program. While being a ‘rogue’ state is of course more encompassing than being a ‘violator of WMD norms’, these challenges of international norms related to weapons of mass destruction have been one of the main markers of Iran’s image of a ‘rogue state’. Both India and South Africa developed nuclear weapons in the past outside of the non-proliferation regime and both came to embrace the virtues of the non-proliferation regime. South Africa has done so by building its global

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When referring to a co-authored article, I use ‘we’ in this conclusion.
'good citizenship' and moral stature in the post-apartheid era on the basis of having renounced nuclear weapons, acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT hereinafter) and being the bridge-builder during the 1995 NPT Review Conference. India, while still remaining on the outside of the regime, has come to agree with the regime and has not been shy to admit that the only reason for not joining the NPT is that it cannot do so as a nuclear power. Such enthusiasm for the NPT and non-proliferation regime has been, however, contrasted with rather lukewarm position towards Iran. These two case studies clearly show that countries not only perceive the ‘rogue state’s’ actions, but also the structure of the international system (and their place within), and the international norms. Therefore, their responses to the ‘rogue states’ are more directly linked to their positioning towards the hegemonic power within the international system (the United States), perceptions of how the norms in international system are created and enforced and how they see their own role in the international system. For India, with the domestic economic advancement being the dominant goal for foreign policy, the careful attempt not to anger any of the sides was the pervasive goal. For South Africa, the foreign policy has been marked by dominant anti-Westernism which has also led its opposition to the involvement of the (perceived) US-dominated international institutions (such as the UN Security Council) and the hegemonic interpretation of the international norms. These two case studies, furthermore, provide a novel look at foreign policy of these two countries, taking into account both international relations theory and generalizing lessons from a single issue for wider foreign policy of these countries. For example, Indian academics have spent considerably more time describing the empirics of the Indo-Iranian relations, but made almost no attempt to either link them to the main directions of the Indian foreign policy, or to the general international relations theory. Similarly, South African foreign policy analysts have spent much less time analyzing South Africa’s foreign policy outside Africa or BRICS, though with stronger connections to the general international relations theory. Indeed, even though nonproliferation is one of the main grounds for South Africa’s foreign policy, very little attention has been given to the topic among South African foreign policy analysts.10 To corroborate the story from the two case studies – about the importance of the nature of ties with the United States for the creation of policies towards ‘rogue states’ – I employed such framework

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8 Flemes (2009), Leith and Pretorius (2009)
9 CNN (2009), Raja Mohan (2009)
10 Shortly before submission of the present dissertation, a dissertation was defended at the University of Pretoria dealing with South Africa’s nonproliferation policy. See Van Wyk (2013)
for the study of EU member states’ policies towards Iran. The differences among them have been frequently ascribed to their diverging economic interests, but this link remained systematically underexplored. I put this claim to the first empirical test and found out that while trade plays a certain role in the shaping of the policies, the effect of the strength of the alliance with the United States explains a large part of the puzzle. The article thus casts a shadow on the established policy narrative of economic interests being the driver of the EU members’ Iran policy and confirms that positioning towards the United States plays a significant role in formation of policy towards Iran.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

This dissertation aimed at uncovering the sources of foreign policy. If there is one important theoretical point, it is the contestation of the oft-raised argument about the economic interests driving the foreign policy of countries. In the academic study of international relations, the argument usually made is that the more two countries trade, the less likely they are to engage in an armed conflict. While causal logic for such an argument is quite murky\textsuperscript{11}, at least three possible mechanisms have been found: mutual trade increases costs for its disruption in case of war, thus making war unlikely\textsuperscript{12}, trade creates social ties which make war unlikely\textsuperscript{13} and potential adversaries are unlikely to trade in the first place.\textsuperscript{14}

This dissertation engages with this argument on two levels. Firstly, it heeds earlier calls\textsuperscript{15} to move the study of commercial liberalism from the exclusive focus on armed conflict to the wider study of coercive diplomacy. Secondly, it looks at the role of different goods and staples in influencing the foreign policy, as suggested by early theorists of economic statecraft\textsuperscript{16}. As for the former, the dissertation finds that economic interests in general play only a minor – if at all – role in shaping foreign policy of countries towards ‘rogue states’. While commercial ties in specific groups of goods may have influence on the foreign policy, they are clearly insufficient to explain the shape of the foreign policy which makes other factors equally or even more important.

This finding further suggests that even if there is a correlation between economic interests and foreign policy, it may be either spurious, causally reverse or confounded by a different variable. The

\textsuperscript{11} Simmons (2003)
\textsuperscript{12} Angell (1913), Polachek (1980), Rosecrance (1985)
\textsuperscript{13} Dorussen and Ward (2008)
\textsuperscript{14} Barbieri and Levy (2003), Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny (2004), Reuveny, Pollins and Keshk (2010)
\textsuperscript{15} Mansfield and Pollins (2003)
\textsuperscript{16} Baldwin (1985)
phenomenon can be very neatly illustrated at the two cases of India and South Africa. South Africa has spent considerable political effort in opposing the US confrontationist strategy against Iran and has historically depended on Iran for much of its oil imports (in early days after the end of apartheid up to 90%, later around 20%). Yet, in late 2012, South Africa replaced imports from Iran by imports from Saudi Arabia and Angola.\(^\text{17}\) On the other hand, India has been clearly reluctant to break oil import ties with Iran, because it considered them an important signal to maintain ties with the country. If India’s thirst for oil was driving its relations with Iran, it would be fairly open to the potential alternative sources, especially when faced with the difficulties associated with circumnavigating the minefield of extraterritorial sanctions. This is not the case, though, for India has repeatedly refused the appeals of the United States to switch its oil supplies from India more towards the Arab Gulf countries. Whereas in the South African case the economic ties and political positions were almost disconnected, in the Indian case the trade – seen as the driver for domestic development – was seen as an asset for future political relations, thus making foreign policy serve this goal.

Findings from this dissertation underline the need to redirect the study of influence of economic interests in foreign policy to more detailed studies looking at particular causal mechanisms.

The importance of domestic culture of control – the shared norms of dealing with deviance – has been confirmed in the initial quantitative studies but not found directly in individual case studies. Part of the reason why this is so may be in the fact that, by their very nature, social norms are part of behavior exhibited often unwittingly and therefore they are less frequently raised.\(^\text{18}\) While various officials mentioned throughout this dissertation show convincingly that parallels between policies towards domestic law-breakers and ‘rogue states’ can be found, it is much more difficult to find systematic evidence. One of the potential reasons being that thinking about crime and punishment is often not articulated in public. This poses, of course, an additional burden for the strategy of triangulation – if a phenomenon is related to aspects of behavior realized without too much conscious action, finding empirical support for it may prove exceedingly difficult.

Further complicating the situation, country’s punitiveness happens to be correlated with a country’s relations with the United States. Figure 9.1 shows that members of the EU who are also members of NATO happen to be more punitive. Similarly, countries with stronger transatlantic ties with the

\(^{17}\) U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013)

United States (measure of which was outlined in Chapter 7) also tend to be more punitive. This means that domestic punitiveness and strength of the relation with the United States seem to have similar patterns of occurrence (this is, in itself, a very interesting finding and merits further study). In practical terms, the two may well influence each other as well as the policy towards ‘rogue states’. Understandably, this all underscores why finding support for the influence of domestic norms of dealing with deviance is difficult in case studies.

**Figure 9.1 Relations with the US and domestic punitiveness in the EU**

![Graph showing relations with the US and domestic punitiveness in the EU](image)

*Individual points are jittered to improve readability*

This dissertation also suggests that realism remains an important and relevant theoretical approach to study the world politics. Clearly, one needs to move beyond structural realism, which is admittedly concerned mostly with the phenomenon of great power war. Once we move towards richer varieties of realism – in its classical or neoclassical forms – we may be able to better grasp the responses towards ‘rogue states’ in particular and foreign policy in general. Whereas neorealists focus on hard-and-fast distribution of capabilities within the international system and hard-core balance of power logic, (neo)classical realists bring the influence of ideas into considerations on how states exercise their power. By combining power and ideas, they are able to overcome the essential reductionism of neorealism and social constructivism, for which interests are not fundamentally different from ideas or vice versa (respectively).\(^{19}\) By going back to pre-Waltzian origins of the realist theory of international relations, neoclassical realists look at ideas and perceptions and how these

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\(^{19}\) Kitchen (2010)
shape the foreign policy of states. Both realist explanations for the role of trade in international politics as well as the implications of different perceptions of systemic pressures play an important role. Given the hegemonic origins of the ‘rogue states’, such finding is probably not surprising. Lastly, the dissertation conclusions suggest that even the important global norms – such as those against nuclear proliferation – are subject to evaluation and political positioning among political elites. The research clearly shows that perceptions of these norms – and their enforcement - vary across countries and have very strong political undertones. This paper has demonstrated that creation and maintenance of the international normative framework is a profoundly political act, in which power mingles with ideas. As power distribution changes and ideas possibly too, norms are constantly being reevaluated. The responses of states to Iran’s nuclear program clearly testify to this – countries not only evaluate Iran’s behavior, but also the evolving shape of the global nonproliferation regime and the US’s behavior within. Such evaluation not only underscores that states interpret norms differently, but also unsystematically.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Seemingly, at every turn of research, this dissertation opened a new door for future academic endeavors.

As I mentioned above, the dissertation highlighted that the need to continuously evaluate commercial liberalism continues to be present. While these arguments have become a staple stock in both academic literature on liberal peace and policy arguments about states guarding their economic interests, its empirical validity and causal direction need to be better evaluated, including exploration of what the scope conditions for its applicability are.

Associated with the point above, commercial liberalism needs to be tested in situations short of war and coercive diplomacy in general. The recent resurrection of event data in the form of the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) gives a good opportunity for doing so. If indeed additional studies show that states, in fact, do not always approximate their foreign policy to their economic interests, a need for theories explaining such behavior will arise. While building on norms of appropriateness may take us so far, new theories will also have to take into account power, geopolitics and perceptions.

Leetaru and Schrodt (2013)
For those without the taste for commercial liberalism, the study of behavior of states within international regimes is also a fruitful field of study. For scholars of nuclear proliferation, regime most frequently invoked in this dissertation, this will mean moving beyond analyzing membership in the NPT and both expand the scope to other aspects of the nuclear nonproliferation regime (such as additional instruments, supplementary to the NPT). While a small group of scholars of international institutions have already started looking in this direction, research in this direction is clearly in its infancy. A different, but potentially even more fruitful avenue for research, is to look at the change in the interpretation of the rules within regimes. A little secret of most international regimes is that what is allowed or prohibited is quite often uncertain and certainly changes. Mapping of these positions and their development provides a good source for future research.

For scholars of Global South (or BRICS, or ‘rising powers’ – the labels are multiple) this dissertation should serve as one more call to systematize their research and interconnect their research foci with the existing study of international relations. The study of Indian and South African foreign policy, as undertaken in the present dissertation, has shown that lacunae exist in analyzing the behavior of these states within international regimes, systematic analysis of their foreign policy and comparison with more established powers. As suggested, analysis of non-Western countries can provide critical cases for applicability of the international relations theory. Therefore, systematic look at the foreign policy of these countries with the general international relations theory in mind may benefit both sides, theorizing international politics and understanding foreign policies of particular countries.

See papers presented in twin panels ‘Contested World Orders I: Authority and Contestation of International Institutions’ and ‘Contested World Orders II: Agents of Contestation in Global Governance’ at the ECPR General Conference in Bordeaux in September 2013.

Johnston (2012)
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APPENDIX 1 REGRESSION EQUATION SPECIFICATION ERROR TEST

As outlined in the introduction, Lieberman\textsuperscript{771} suggests to use visual inspection of the observed-vs-fitted values as a robustness check for nested analysis. Rohlfing\textsuperscript{772} adds that such analysis should be accompanied by a test for model misspecification, using a Ramsey’s Regression Equation Specification Error Test.\textsuperscript{773} To check for model misspecification (omitted variable), I will analyze Model 1 of the analysis presented in Chapter Three. This model is the most basic and simplest of all, and therefore is most likely to suffer from the omitted variable bias.

FIGURE A1.1 OBSERVED VS FITTED VALUES IN MODEL 1

First, I employ the visual inspection to study the observed and fitted model. Figure A1.1 shows the graph, with the line being the $x=y$ line. This graph shows that the Model 1 fits data fairly well, as there are no apparent outliers. No predicted value is more than one point away from the observed value, and over 90% are under 0.5 point away from the observed value (standard deviation of the

\textsuperscript{771} Lieberman (2005)
\textsuperscript{772} Rohlfing (2008)
\textsuperscript{773} Ramsey (1969)
dependent variable is 0.89, which means that no observation is more than two standard deviations from the fitted value).

The next step is implementation of the Ramsay’s Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET). RESET tests whether non-linear combinations of fitted values help explain the dependent variable. This test is based on the assumption that these combinations of independent variables explain the dependent variable, then model is misspecified. On the basis of multiple Monte Carlo tests, Thursby and Schmidt recommend using three powers (quadratic, cubic and quartic) of the fitted value\textsuperscript{774}.

**TABLE A1 1 MODEL 1 WITHOUT AND WITH POWERS OF FITTED VALUES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 1 with fitted values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prison population</td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>25.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total trade</td>
<td>177.62***</td>
<td>7024.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ideology</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{Y}^2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-13.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{Y}^3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{Y}^4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.92***</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* \(p < 0.10\), \** \(p < 0.05\), \*** \(p < 0.01\),

I thus run Model 1, in the specification as used in Chapter Three and reported in Table 3.1. After running the model, I captured the predicted value and calculated its quadratic, cubic and quartic powers. I then added them to a model and re-fitted the new model. As can be seen in Table A1.1, none of them is statistically significant. Further, I tested their joint significance using the F-test. This one was not statistically significant, \(F(3, 100) = 2.68, p = 0.26\). These tests demonstrate that the empirical model used in Model 1 does not suffer from underspecification, a concern raised by Rohlfing.

\textsuperscript{774} Thursby and Schmidt (1977: 641)
## APPENDIX 2  EXPERT SCORES

<table>
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HAVIKEN, DUIVEN EN 'SCHURKEN'. LIBERALE DEMOCRATIEËN EN HET DILEMMA VAN OMGAAN MET ‘SCHURKENSTATEN’.

‘Schurkenstaten’, de afwijkende leden van de internationale gemeenschap, werden al lang vóór het George W. Bush tijdperk en ook door andere staten buiten de VS, gezien als een van de voornaamste bedreigingen van de internationale vrede en veiligheid in de jaren na de Koude Oorlog. Verschillen tussen hoe de democratische landen omgaan met ‘schurkenstaten’ bestaan al langere tijd. Of het nu gaat om het Libië van Khadaffi, het Irak van Saddam Hoessein, of de kernprogramma’s van Iran en Noord-Korea, de verschillen zijn zelfs voor een leek overduidelijk. Dit proefschrift stelt de vraag, waarom sommige staten kiezen voor een compromis en andere voor confrontatie, wanneer ze tegenover schurkenstaten staan.

Eén intuitieve verklaring – geworteld in de liberale theorie van internationale betrekkingen – is dat staten handelen uit economisch eigenbelang, en dat ze dit belang niet in gevaar willen brengen door te kiezen voor de confrontatie. Met andere woorden: hoe sterker de economische banden met een ‘schurkenstaat’, hoe sterker de voorkeur voor een compromis met de ‘schurkenstaat’. Wat in dit proefschrift naar voren komt, is een kritische noot op het economische liberalisme. In de kwantitatieve analyse toon ik aan dat de economische belangen van staten slechts zwak – of helemaal niet – gecorreleerd zijn met hun houding jegens ‘schurkenstaten’. In plaats daarvan draait het om nationale waarden, de betrekkingen met de Verenigde Staten en militaire macht.

Het proefschrift begint met het presenteren van de afhankelijke variabele welke is gemeten door een enquête onder experts. Het beleid ten aanzien van landen die het bezit van kernwapens nastreven blijft onderwerp van hevig debat, zelfs tussen landen die de verspreiding van kernwapens beschouwen als een van de voornaamste bedreigingen voor de internationale veiligheid. Dit hoofdstuk geeft het huidige beleid weer van liberale democratieën ten aanzien van Iran en Noord-Korea, op een continuüm van confrontatie tot compromis. De gegevens verkregen uit uitgebreid onderzoek tonen aan dat a) het beleid jegens zowel Iran als Noord-Korea mettertijd steeds minder aantuurt op confrontatie; b) er geen afstemming van beleid is waargenomen tussen de onderzochte landen en dat er ondanks het treffen van gemeenschappelijke sancties, verschillen blijven bestaan tussen staten met een voorkeur voor confrontatie en staten die kiezen voor een compromis; c) het beleidsprofiel van staten door de jaren heen opmerkelijk stabiel blijft en d) ondanks duidelijke verschillen tussen de normschendingen door Noord-Korea en Iran, staten doorgaans een
opmerkelijk vergelijkbaar beleid voeren ten aanzien van beide landen. Kortom, in de omgang met aspirant-kernmachten, vertonen staten een stabiele voorkeur voor ofwel confrontatie ofwel een compromis.

De volgende twee hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift bieden een empirische kwantitatieve analyse van het beleid van de liberale democratieën ten aanzien van Iran (hoofdstuk 3) en Noord-Korea (hoofdstuk 4). In deze twee hoofdstukken wordt onderzocht waarom sommige democratieën kiezen voor een compromis en andere pleiten voor confrontatie. Aan de hand van de eerder gepresenteerde dataset, wordt in Hoofdstuk 3 het effect beoordeeld van machtsposities, handelsbelangen en de nationale politieke cultuur, waarbij gecontroleerd wordt voor regeringsideologieën. Terwijl uit de analyse blijkt dat er weinig bewijs is voor het effect van machtsposities, heeft de manier waarop met afwijkend gedrag wordt omgegaan een aanzienlijk en statistisch significant effect op het overheidsbeleid. Er is ook een beperkte ondersteuning voor het effect van commercieel liberalisme: terwijl een grotere omvang van het totale handelsverkeer van een staat niet leidt tot de verwachte grotere compromisgezindheid, geldt dit wel voor een grotere omvang van de handel in strategische goederen zoals olie.

Hoofdstuk vier presenteert een vergelijkbaar paper, gericht op het analyseren van het beleid jegens Noord-Korea, met de nadruk op de invloed van de nationale cultuur met betrekking tot hoe er wordt omgegaan met afwijkend gedrag en militaire superioriteit op het beleid ten aanzien van Noord-Korea. Hoewel de invloed van commerciële belangen niet formeel getoetst is, ten gevolge van de bijzondere positie van Noord-Korea, is een dergelijke toets opgenomen als robuustheidsmaatregel. De resultaten in Hoofdstuk 4 wijzen erop dat de normen voor hoe er wordt omgegaan met afwijkend gedrag altijd positief en statistisch significant correleren met het beleid ten aanzien van Noord-Korea, terwijl militaire superioriteit alleen significant correleert met op confrontatie gericht beleid in democratieën buiten de Verenigde Staten.

De Hoofdstukken 5 en 6 bieden (respectievelijk) diepgaande casestudy’s naar het buitenlands beleid van Zuid-Afrika en India inzake het kernprogramma van Iran. Hoofdstuk 5 is gebaseerd op veldonderzoek in Zuid-Afrika en een gedetailleerde casestudy van de reactie van Zuid-Afrika op het Iraanse kernprogramma. Dit beleid was uiterst verwarrend - een opkomende macht in het internationale systeem, die de internationale normen voor nucleaire non-proliferatie onderschrijft, maar de interpretatie en toepassing ervan betwist. Dit paper onderzoekt waarom dat zo is en toont aan dat het beleid van Zuid-Afrika ten aanzien van het Iraanse kernprogramma zich duidelijk

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kenmerkt door een sterke overtuiging van de waarde van onderhandelingen, wantrouwen jegens het Globale Noorden en een voorkeur voor een brede multilaterale aanpak in internationale instellingen.

Hoofdstuk 6 is ook gebaseerd op veldonderzoek in India en biedt een gedetailleerd overzicht van de Indiase reactie op het Iraanse kernprogramma. De reactie van India is veel voorzichtiger en wordt gekenmerkt door pogingen om de wereldmacht, de Verenigde Staten, te sussen, met behoud van redelijk goede betrekkingen met Iran. Dit beleid werd kritisch ontvangen, zowel in de Verenigde Staten (waar het leidde tot teleurstelling over de rol van India als opkomende macht) als in Iran (waar dit beleid werd beschouwd als een poging om bij de Verenigde Staten in de gunst te komen).

Uit dit paper komt naar voren dat het buitenlands beleid van India is ingegeven door dezelfde factoren die een rol spelen sinds de heroriëntatie in de jaren '90. Het buitenlands beleid van India heeft zich sterker gericht op het dienen van nationale doelstellingen – economische ontwikkeling en groei. Door de veranderde opvattingen van de Indiase leiders inzake het buitenlands beleid, wordt hierin meer voorzichtigheid betracht en worden de kosten en baten van individuele stappen zorgvuldig tegen elkaar afgewogen.

De casestudy’s hebben duidelijk aangetoond dat de houding van landen ten opzichte van de Verenigde Staten invloed lijkt te hebben op hoe deze landen omgaan met ‘schurkenstaten’. Het is echter verre van eenvoudig om voor een kwantitatieve analyse op betrouwbare wijze te peilen hoe staten zich verhouden tegenover de Verenigde Staten. Stemgedrag bij internationale organisaties is geen betrouwbare graadmeter en in verschillende regio’s kunnen staten verschillende strategieën toepassen om toenadering te zoeken tot de Verenigde Staten, waardoor interregionale vergelijking lastig kan zijn.

Met het oog daarop heb ik, in Hoofdstuk 7, een toets ontwikkeld die gebruik maakt van een alternatieve steekproef – de EU-lidstaten. Beleidscommentatoren schrijven deze verschillen vaak toe aan de uiteenlopende economische belangen van Europeanen, maar dit verband moet nog verder onderzocht worden. In dit paper wordt het empirische verband tussen de economische belangen en de houding jegens Iran onderzocht. De resultaten duiden erop dat, hoewel handel een zekere rol speelt in de totstandkoming van het beleid, het effect van de band met de Verenigde Staten een betere verklaring biedt. Zo werpt het artikel een schaduw op de gangbare beeldvorming met betrekking tot het beleid, waarin economische belangen de voornaamste basis vormen voor het Iran-beleid van de EU-lidstaten en bevestigt het dat de houding ten opzichte van de Verenigde Staten een belangrijke rol speelt bij de totstandkoming van het beleid jegens ‘schurkenstaten’.
Hoofdstuk 8 bevat een epiloog – een verhaal over hoe het afloopt met ‘schurkenstaten’. Hoewel de onderzoeken naar de opkomst van ‘schurkenstaten’ overvloedig zijn, wordt hun einde veel minder vaak bestudeerd. Echter, als we erkennen dat de afvallige staat een sociaal constructie is, moet het einde van een dergelijke constructie beschouwd worden als een kwestie van reconstructie. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt hoe de VS en Britse regeringen erin slaagden om het beeld van het Libische regime om te vormen van dat van een afvallige naar dat van een gerespecteerd partner. Aan de hand van deze kaderwisseling, komen we meer te weten over het vermogen van beleidsmakers om de publieke opinie te sturen door de reconstructie van kaders.

Dit proefschrift levert een drievoudige bijdrage aan het onderzoek naar vergelijkend buitenlands beleid en het bredere gebied van internationale betrekkingen. **Ten eerste** levert het een theoretische bijdrage aan de bestudering van de wortels van buitenlands beleid en in het bijzonder betwist het de stelling dat economische belangen de drijfveer zijn achter het buitenlands beleid van landen. Deze uitkomst suggereert dat zelfs als er een correlatie bestaat tussen economische belangen en buitenlands beleid, deze óf wel vals is, óf oorzaak en gevolg zijn omgedraaid, óf hierbij sprake is van verstoring door een andere variabele. **Ten tweede** biedt het proefschrift een empirische diepgaande bestudering van het buitenlands beleid jegens aspirant-kernmachten. De papers die zijn opgenomen in dit proefschrift geven een zowel kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve beschrijving van het beleid van verscheidene landen inzake één kwestie, wat een omvangrijk vergelijkend onderzoek oplevert, met inbegrip van een diepgaand onderzoek naar twee niet-Westere landen. **Ten derde** wijst dit onderzoek erop dat realisme niet zo dood is als men zou verwachten, op basis van de staat waarin internationale betrekkingen als discipline zich bevindt; het begrip moet echter verder reiken dan het structurele realisme, tot de rijkere duidingen die de verschillende vormen van realistisch denken bieden (zij het klassiek of neoklassiek). Realistische verklaringen voor de invloed van handel evenals de (noodzaak van) stellingname tegenover de wereldmacht, wijzen erop dat de zeggingskracht van het realisme niet moet worden onderschat. Gezien het feit dat de oorsprong van het begrip ‘schurkenstaten’ in de wereldmacht is gelegen, is deze bevinding niet zeer verrassend.