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## CHAPTER 13 – LOCAL FRELIMO LEADERS: THE PARTY IN POWER AS CONTROLLING INSTITUTION

In this chapter it will be shown how in Barue Frelimo has been capable of monopolizing power relations with the population to the detriment of other political parties. Crucial for such a monopoly is Frelimo's organization as a hierarchy of cells (*células*) and higher-level organs such as circles (*círculos*) and zones (*zonas*) that know linkages with the government which is itself under control of Frelimo. A description of the cell-system will be given, showing (with few exceptions) its non-representativeness concerning party-political diversity in some concrete cells studied in more detail and explaining its control of people using bureaucratic methods.

### Background of the cell/circle system

At its First Congress, Frelimo had defined the *círculo* (circle) as its most basic organizational unit (Frelimo 1963: art. XII). However, nowadays the cell (*célula*) is the basic structure of the party, where several cells form a circle. The statutes established at the Ninth Congress of 2006 (relevant at the time of my fieldwork) stipulate that apart from a secretariat a cell has a General Assembly (*Reunião Geral*), which meets every fortnight (Frelimo 2006: art. 30.4, 30.6). A cell should have at least three members and be established in residential areas as well as in work environments (2006: art. 30.2, 30.3). The *Cell Manual* of July 2010 adds that a cell can have at most fifteen members (Frelimo 2010: art. XV.3), the exceeding of which number may induce redefinition of cells (2010: art. XVII.1). Decree 15/2000 does not seem to know “cells” or “circles” and speaks of “neighbourhood” (*bairro*) and “village” (*aldeia*) when dealing with secretaries. Circle Secretary Roberto TP revealed that the establishment of circles (as they are today) is indeed a relatively new phenomenon. This is consistent with De Brito's (2010: 14-16) indication that the “revitalization” of party structures has been due to Guebuza rather than Chissano.

Cells are not only directed to party members but also to the general population, and not only in the sense of gaining new members: they must (*devem* – note obligation) organize meetings with “sympathizers and other members of the community” to hear them about national questions and to enable the formulation of party goals and programmes (Frelimo 2006: art. 31.1), promote solutions for “problems of the community in which they are incorporated”, promote “political education” of the members and the “citizens in general”

and promote solidarity between Party members and members of society (2006: art. 31.3c, d, f). On the other hand, however, the cell is supposed to combine two objectives that are not necessarily compatible especially considering that cells target both members and non-members:

The Cells, in general, contribute to the definition of the collective will and execute the political line of the Party.

As Células, em geral, contribuem para a definição da vontade colectiva e executam a linha política do Partido. (Frelimo 2006: art. 31.2)

The *Cell Manual* explicitly states that a cell's actions must "have impact in the community" and that "residents or work colleagues must feel that their lives are influenced by the nearest Cell" (Frelimo 2010: art. XVII.4; cf. XXIV.4). The cell "mobilizes and organizes the People" against poverty and is the link with the people, implementing "in the field" (*no terreno*) the decisions and orientations of the Party (2010: art. XVIII.5 and 6; cf. art. XXVIII, XXIV.10e). The *Cell Manual* also suggests Frelimo members of a cell may form a campaign team during (non-internal) elections (2010: p. 31). What follows below assesses aspects of the extent and quality of the interaction between "the Party" and "the community" in twelve cells in the Tongogara and Sabão neighbourhoods (*bairros*) in Catandica.

#### Leadership in cells and circles and party-political representativeness of a sample of cells

In 2010 there were in the adjacent Tongogara and Sabão *bairros* six and eighteen cells respectively. Together these make up the circles of Tongogara and Sabão, where each circle of the Frelimo party corresponds with a government *bairro*. Each cell is headed by a *secretário*<sup>216</sup> *da célula* (cell secretary), each circle by a *primeiro secretário do comité de círculo* (first secretary of the circle committee). For ten cells in the Sabão and Tongogara neighbourhoods where an estimate could be made for the number of plots (for living) they contain, the average is about 60 plots, where each plot is more or less square with a side of about 25 meters. In 2010 all of Sabão and Tongogara together made up around, I estimate, one square kilometre.<sup>217</sup>

I visited all six cells in Tongogara and six of the eighteen in Sabão. In most of the cases I studied, cell secretaries were chosen from amongst a number of candidates in a voting contest

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<sup>216</sup> « *Secretária* » is the female variant.

<sup>217</sup> This total area fits in reasonably with the smaller scale data: one plot is about  $25 \times 25 = 625 \text{ m}^2$ ; times 60 plots =  $37,500 \text{ m}^2$  per cell; times 24 cells =  $0.9 \text{ km}^2$ . Space is furthermore taken by roads and meeting places.

within the cell. In Table 7 below, selection as candidate and the method for choice from amongst the candidates are given for those who eventually became cell secretary. From the table it is obvious that there is rather considerable variation in how cell secretaries are selected within the about one square kilometre of the two adjacent circles combined. Four manners can be distinguished, in ascending degrees of inclusiveness: (a) in one case a vote by a select group of other Frelimo secretaries including from other cells; (b) a vote by Frelimo members of the cell (below indicated with « FM »); (c) a vote by Frelimo members and sympathizers (*simpatizantes*) (« FS »); (d) a vote by inhabitants of the cell irrespective of political affiliation. From the table it becomes clear that a “first past the post” system is applied; voters express their first preference and the candidate with the greater number of votes wins immediately without the need for a second round (explicitly confirmed by Girasse L).

In Tongogara there were two female cell secretaries, the other ten studied cells in Tongogara and Sabão had male secretaries. The approximate average age at the time of interview was 49 ( $N = 12$ ), range 27-80; the approximate average age when starting as cell secretary was 37 ( $N = 10$ ), range 22-69.<sup>218</sup> Average schooling was approximately six years ( $N = 11$ ), ranging from zero to twelve.

Table 7 shows the wide variety in the ways cell secretaries were selected as candidates and who can then vote for these candidates. Data are presented for twelve cells in Tongogara and Sabão: In eight out of ten clear cases, selection was limited to people associated with Frelimo.

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<sup>218</sup> One interviewee (André AG) had been a secretary before he went to live in Barue, another had had another function before; these two individuals are not included in the latter calculation.

Table 7: Selection of cell secretaries in 12 Tongogara and Sabão cells

Case	Year	Manner secretary had become candidate	Candidates #	Voters #	Votes won	Background of voters
Tg i	X	FM nominated	4	39	18	FM
Tg ii	2007	X	2	X	RH	X
Tg iii	2007	X	3	93	52	any, Frelimo or not
Tg iv	2010	N	X	6	5	other Frelimo leaders
Tg v	2008	N	2	43	22	FS
Tg vi	2007	inhabitants <sup>a</sup> nominated	X	X	RH	FM or FS
Sb vii	2006	volunteered	4	38	22	FS
Sb viii	2007	population <sup>a</sup> nominated	X	260	98	any, Frelimo or not
Sb ix	2010	X	4	14	6	X
Sb x	2008	population <sup>a</sup> nominated	3	74	32	FM
Sb xi	2008	X	2	52	32	FM
Sb xii	2009	X	X	X	X	FM or FS

*Legend:* FM: Frelimo members; FS: Frelimo members and sympathizers;  
 RH: vote by raising hands; exact numbers cannot be given;  
 N: no prior knowledge; secretary was only informed about the vote after its completion.  
 X: missing or unclear data;

*Círculos:* Sb: Sabão; Tg: Tongogara; cells anonymized

*Note:* a) according to interviewees; expressions like “population” or “people of the cell” may mean “Frelimo members/adherents only”.

*Source:* author’s interviews.

As indicated, two cell secretaries reported not to have been informed beforehand about their possibly being elected and appointed for that function. This is against the stipulation in art. 18 of the Frelimo (2006) Statutes that “prior consultation” is “essential”. It is not clear what the statutory status is of the vote by raising hands. Art 17.1a requires “secret vote” for “all Party organs and their leaders”, but art 21.1 allows for “open vote” and art 20.2 for “raised hand [arm]” (*braço levantado*) for “decisions”. That non-members (of Frelimo) would be able to vote is excluded by the *Cell Manual* of July 2010. All elections studied here were before that date, so whether in later elections this empirical possibility will disappear remains to be investigated. However, it is characteristic that no cell secretary ever mentioned to me the Frelimo Statutes or similar documents to motivate selection, the way of voting or the task portfolio within cells. Though the fact that only Frelimo-adherents would be able to participate in a vote for Frelimo secretaries is in conformity with the *Cell Manual*, from a perspective of participation of the general populace this fact yields a problem when it is considered that Frelimo secretaries can influence lives of non-Frelimo people, a topic that will be discussed below.

Overall, there exists a correlation between the number of voters (inclusiveness) and the background of voters, although the difference between FM and FS alone does not fit such

pattern neatly. However, if FM and FS are taken together, a clear correlation emerges as in the following table:

*Table 8: Correlation between background of voters and the number of voters for cell secretaries*

<i>Background of voters</i>	<i>Voters #, specimens (if known)</i>	<i>Voters #, average of mid column</i>
other Frelimo leaders	6	6
FM or FS	39, 43, 38, 74, 52	49
any, Frelimo or not	93, 260	177

There is, at least judging from Table 8, a robust correlation in that when the number of voters is greater, the less the vote depends on Frelimo exclusivity. However, Table 8 does not reckon with the general size and party-political composition of cells in Tongogara and Sabão. It could be that cells that have FM or FS as voters known no more than these as cell inhabitants while those cells that have “any” as voters are indeed much larger and more diverse. Thus the difference between the numbers of voters in cases of Frelimo voters versus voters irrespective of Frelimo party affiliation must be judged against two other parameters which may not be uniform, namely the size of cells and the proportion of Frelimo members and sympathizers within a cell.

The author did not perform a total population census, but there is information that is useful. One of the tasks of cell secretaries is the very administration of *all* of a cell’s inhabitants, whether Frelimo member or not. Specifically in case *ii* (in Tongogara) my informant was so kind as to show me the cell’s administration on four folded sheets with information as of 30 April 2010. This was very illuminating, as informants would often mean the existing *households* when answering the question “How many people live in *célula* ...?” In this particular registration, households (*agregados* or *casas*) occupying a plot (*talhão*) in the area of the cell were consecutively numbered and identified with one individual, usually a man but sometimes a woman, in one column. Then a column with numbers of women followed,<sup>219</sup> and then two columns with numbers of male and female children respectively (not necessarily under 18), all horizontally subsumed under a particular household. (Probably this way of registering people is related to tax collection because information obtained from

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<sup>219</sup> Sometimes such a number was zero when the person identifying the household in the left-most column was a woman. Apart from the woman only children would be numbered then. Some households were polygynous, thus giving more than one woman in the second column.

*Líder Comunitário* Sueta AC of Tongogara indicated that there exists a general tax of MZN 20 to be collected per any household that would usually include a male between 18 and 49 years of age – field data 13/04/2010.)

In total there were 80 households of which three were “not registered” (not processed), leaving 77 registered houses. One numbered household was specifically given as having zero inhabitants, and one had no totals given which the author also counts as having zero inhabitants. This left 75 households on 30 April 2010 for which a total number of persons (young, old, male, female) could be summated (done by the author during the interview), which was 377. There were 75 women mentioned in the second column, giving a minimum of 150 adults. In the sequel the minimum number of adults will be estimated as twice the number of households. The average number of persons per households was  $377 / 75 = 5.0$  person per household for the concerned cell. This seems a rather low average, given that people otherwise often mentioned to have far more than three children, but it is nevertheless close to the average that Åkesson and Taímo (2003: 74) have for Tongogara in 2002 ( $796 / 152 = 5.2$ ). (Mozambique 2005a: 12 reports an average of 5.2 for the whole of Barue District.) Comparison with the Åkesson and Taímo reference also shows that Tongogara has grown considerably in eight years, because their observation of 152 households is only two times the studied cell in 2010. Not all secretaries had a neat answer to the question of population statistics, but data for the six cells in Tongogara in 2010 as given in interviews yield the following picture (Table 9):

*Table 9: Population statistics per cell in Tongogara*

<i>Case</i>	<i>Data from interviews</i>	<i>Interpretation of the author</i>		
		<i>households</i>	<i>persons</i>	<i>average</i>
<i>i</i>	310 all inhabitants	62	310	5.0
<i>ii</i>	75 households, 377 persons	75	377	5.0
<i>iii</i>	71 adults with their families, 307 children	71	449	6.3 <sup>a</sup>
<i>iv</i>	about 250 persons <sup>b</sup>	50	250	5.0
<i>v</i>	72 plots	72	360	5.0
<i>vi</i>	data not available during interview	X	X	X

*Legend:* X: missing or unclear data.

*Notes:* a) this average is high but unfortunately no further interpretation of “adults with their families” is available;

b) corroborated by written information on about 50 households from field data.

*Source:* author’s interviews with cell secretaries.

For four cells in Tongogara the number of Frelimo members has been established. When we

combine information about the estimated number of adults, the number of voters for a contest for a cell secretary and furthermore available information about the number of Frelimo members within cells of Tongogara, it can be observed from Table 10 that participation varies across cells but that most of the adult population is not involved concerning the selection of cell secretaries. Note that the left column presents the minimum estimated number of adults for a cell; the number may actually be higher if there are some adults among those counted as children. A higher number in the left column corresponds with *less* participation of the general population in selecting a cell secretary; Table 10 is conservative.

Table 10: Participation of the population in electing cell secretary, Tongogara

Case	Est. minimum # adults	# Voters	Voters' background	Frelimo members	Proportion Frelimo to adults	
					members	Voters
<i>i</i>	124	39	FM	≥ 39	≥ 31%	31%
<i>ii</i>	150	RH	X	26	17%	X
<i>iii</i>	142	93	any, Frelimo or not	40	28%	NA
<i>iv</i>	100	6	other Frelimo leaders	11 <sup>a</sup>	11%	6% <sup>b</sup>
<i>v</i>	144	43	FS	18	13%	30%
<i>vi</i>	X	RH	FM or FS	X	X	X

*Legend:* Est.: estimated; FM: Frelimo members; FS: Frelimo members and sympathizers; NA: not applicable; RH: vote by raising hands, number of voters unknown; X: missing or unclear data

*Notes:* a) excluding four *simpatizantes* (sympathizers); b) includes non-cell members

From Table 10 it can be observed that from four out of six cells the known proportion of Frelimo members does not exceed 28% of the estimated minimum adult population. Of one other cell it may be more than 31%, but chances are small it will deviate a lot from the 11%-28% range of the cells with clear data; likewise for Tongogara case *vi*. That means that when only Frelimo members or sympathizers are allowed to vote for a cell secretary (which is the case in at least four cells in Tongogara), only about one-third or less of the adult population of the concerned cell has a chance to influence the decision while the other adult cell members are still subject to the outcome. Where data are available they suggest that the number of sympathizers is certainly not twice the number of members in a cell. One cell (case *iv*) knew four sympathizers, and one cell (case *v*) apparently allowed at least 25 sympathizers to vote along with 18 or less members. In the latter case, this still yielded only a 30% proportion who voted, as seen in the right-most column. Another cell (case *i*) yielded a decision making proportion of 31% and another (case *iv*) only 6%, including non-cell members. Only in one cell (case *iii*), there is a clear demonstration that more than half of the

adult population could influence the decision. It can be seen that it is common to have more than fifteen Frelimo members in a cell, in apparent contradiction with the current *Cell Manual* stipulations. Two Frelimo informants in Tongogara (LJ) and Sabão (RVR) stated that a cell must have 15 members, taking that number as a minimum rather than a maximum. Although the *Cell Manual* as a document dates from after these interviews, it seems that the stipulation in question has been misinterpreted.

For Sabão I do not have data on Frelimo membership in cells, and some information on inhabitants is missing, so the picture is less clear-cut here than for Tongogara. What can be ascertained for the six researched Sabão cells, however, supports the conclusions made for Tongogara. See Table 11:

*Table 11: Participation of the population in electing cell secretary, Sabão*

<i>Case</i>	<i>Est. minimum # adults</i>	<i># Voters</i>	<i>Voters' background</i>	<i>Proportion Frelimo voters to adults</i>
<i>vii</i>	158	38	FS	24%
<i>viii</i>	240 <sup>a</sup>	260	any, Frelimo or not	NA
<i>ix</i>	116	14	X	X
<i>x</i>	X <sup>b</sup>	74	FM	X
<i>xi</i>	56 <sup>c</sup>	52 <sup>c</sup>	FM	X <sup>c</sup>
<i>xii</i>	X <sup>b</sup>	X	FM or FS	X

*Legend:* Est.: estimated; FM: Frelimo members; FS: Frelimo members and sympathizers; NA: not applicable; X: missing or unclear data.

*Notes:* a) “120 inhabitants” reported; as explained, this may refer to household heads, yielding an estimated minimum number of adults of 240. At least 20 voters may have been adults who were registered as “children” within households;  
 b) information was not readily available with interviewee;  
 c) in case *xi* unfortunately no reliable information on the proportion of Frelimo voters can be calculated; the interviewee reported, however, that the cell was previously *larger*, consistent with a limited proportion of Frelimo voters in the reported vote.

In the sample of Table 11 there is only one cell (case *viii*) that unambiguously allows people of any political affiliation to participate in the voting of cell secretary.<sup>220</sup> Case *vii*, however, is again an instance of a cell in which the limitation of the vote to Frelimo adherents unambiguously affects the overall participation of the cell’s inhabitants at the vote (probably the same holds for case *xi*; compare cases *i* and *v* with similar magnitudes as *vii*).

<sup>220</sup> In case *ix* the data are unclear because the interviewee said first that people of any political orientation participated (I gave MDM as an example), but when I asked if I then could interview someone of MDM the answer was no. This uncertainty is expressed by scoring “X”. The reported “58” are taken as households rather than as individuals.

Asked why their cells (cases *iii* and *viii*) allowed all to vote while others did not, the cell secretary of the first answered that “[t]hey say it’s because they are all citizens” (Tongogara case *iii*),<sup>221</sup> but the cell secretary of Sabão case *viii* elaborated only that one could not discriminate in polygynous households, where different wives could each have a different “position” (*posição*) and it would be inappropriate to discriminate between wives of one household in such cases. Neither of these two answers explains the exceptionality of their case. On the other hand, the cell secretary of Tongogara case *v* straightforwardly denied that it would be a good idea to let non-Frelimo inhabitants vote for cell secretary. On the suggestion that the secretary works with people of other political affiliations, the answer was that

we of the cell have the right to talk with [a person] or supporter of another party [...] to be together with us

... nós de célula tem [sic, i.e. temos] direito a falar com aquele ou outro partidário [...] para ficar junto conosco (Tongogara case *v*)

(cf. Frelimo 2006: art. 9.2d, which mentions this as a duty). A bit later the same cell secretary explained that people can become Frelimo member at the age of 18 and then stated:

Thus they are member always just as they are lords of that cell; they are lords who can play with this country.

Assim eles são membro sempre como são donos daquela célula; são donos que podem brincar com esse país, eles. (ibid.)

The cell secretary of case *i* (Frelimo voters only) answered on the question whether it is not difficult to work with members of other parties:

No, the Frelimo party joined all [...]. The party that is in power is the Frelimo party. [H]ere in the neighbourhood there is neither Renamo nor Frelimo, it is all the Mozambican people, it is the people of Frelimo.

Não, o partido Frelimo juntou tudo [...]. O partido que está no poder é o partido Frelimo. [A]qui no bairro não existe Renamo nem a Frelimo, tudo é povo moçambicano, é o povo da Frelimo. (Tongogara case *i*)

The latter two quotes unambiguously portray Frelimo as master of the country Mozambique and of its inhabitants, the Mozambicans. According to the last quote any party-political difference is irrelevant. Another cell secretary commented that Frelimo is in power anyway (*wanyantsimbawa* – Pita GN).

Reported tasks of cell secretaries were: handling settlement of people who move home to the cell and deciding on approval for the establishment of such items as mills within the area (Tonito MM).

<sup>221</sup> *Dizem que porque são todos cidadãos.*

### Circle secretaries of Tongogara and Sabão

Cells may be grouped into circles (*círculos*), which, like zones, districts and provinces, know a Conference (*Conferência [do Círculo]*), a Committee (*Comité [do Círculo]*) and a Secretariat (*Secretariado [do Comité do Círculo]* – Frelimo 2006: art. 32, 33; cf. 35, 37, 38). A Conference is composed of elected delegates plus members of the respective Committee (2006: art. 40.1), the Committee itself of people elected by the Conference<sup>222</sup> plus the first secretaries of the committees of the level immediately below<sup>223</sup> and the executive director of each social organization of Frelimo at the same level (2006: art. 43), such as for youth (2006: art. 79, 80.4).

The interviewed circle secretaries (full title: «*Primeiro Secretário do Comité do Círculo*» – «First Secretary of the Circle Committee») of Tongogara (Roberto TP) and Sabão (Raúl VR) were senior in function relative to cell secretaries. The average age of these two men at the time of the interview was about the same as the cell secretaries' ages, also 49 years. However, they started as circle secretary at the average of about 46, which is six years older than the average starting age of cell secretaries given above.

The 2006 Statutes stipulate that a first secretary of a committee is elected by that committee (Frelimo 2006: art. 42). Roberto TP and Raúl VR were elected in 2007; Roberto TP stated that he was voted by “residents” (Frelimo members only), in a contest between two candidates, the other being Sueta AC. Roberto TP seemed not to remember how many votes he had and another person present at the interview stated it was 32 out of 62 votes. Raúl VR reported fifteen candidates and winning 45 out of 68 votes. The voters were also Frelimo members here.

Asked what the tasks of a circle secretary are, Roberto TP answered that these comprise to “conquer” (*conquistar*) citizens to become Frelimo member. Raúl VR spoke of a “struggle” (*luta*) to gain new members.

### Community leaders (*líderes comunitários*)

Five community leaders (*líderes comunitários*) were interviewed, in Tongogara, Sabão,

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<sup>222</sup> For this apparent circularity the Frelimo (2006) Statutes provide no explanation. Perhaps only the elected delegates in the Conference elect in a secondary election Committee members who may or may not be in the original Conference group (i.e. of earlier elected delegates).

<sup>223</sup> This cannot hold for circles, since cells do not know committees. This is not made explicit by the Frelimo (2006) Statutes.

Chuala, Honde and Sanhatunze. Their status in Decree 15/2000 is rather obscure (see also Nuvunga 2013: 44), yet in the field they are very visible as they may wear a uniform and have the national flag hoisted at their premises. The term « *líder comunitário* », in practice often shortened to « *líder* », is not to be confused with « *autoridade comunitária* », since the latter can denote any local leader, “traditional” or not, who is “legitimized” and “recognized”. The main text of the Decree does not mention the term « *líder comunitário* » at all; it is only introduced without definition in the accompanying Regulation of 25 August 2000 (*Regulamento do Decreto N.º 15/2000*), in the stipulation about “State recognition”, which is described as “formal act by which [...] the State identifies and registers the *líder comunitário* already legitimized or enthroned” (*Regulamento*, art. 2). (The Decree does use « *outros líderes* », but without « *comunitário* » as the Regulation does.)

The Regulation mentions the term also in art. 11, again in relation to “recognition”. In the Regulation it may seem that the term « *líder comunitário* » would be just an everyday synonym for « *autoridade comunitária* », inadvertently inserted without observing juridical propriety. Interpreting the Regulation with the aid of field data it may be hypothesized, however, that this insertion was a deliberate move rather than a clerical lapse in terminological strictness. A *líder comunitário* is a very specific authority whose position can affect citizens’ chances in life. They often have been Frelimo secretaries and by mentioning them in the Regulation, it has become impossible to argue that they are not covered by the Decree. On the other hand the legal construction makes formally invisible the *líderes’* secretary background (although also covered by the Decree), making them look like genuinely neutral government officials for all and “legitimized” by party-neutral “communities”. Let us now study the field practice.

The average age of the *líderes* at the time of interview was about 56, range 41 to about 78; the average age at the time of recognition as *líder* was about 52, range 35 to about 78. These ages are mostly higher than for the secretaries above, consistent with a political career in which *líder*-ship presupposes an earlier position as secretary. The cases of Tongogara and Sabão are less clear-cut concerning their ascendancy as *líderes*, as these *líderes*, Sueta AC and Francisco L respectively, were “recognized” as late as 19 March 2010 (nine days before Makombe Day), although Sueta AC did say he had been *líder* already for ten years, thus since about 2000. This situation is compatible with the distinction between *legitimation* and *recognition*. As said, Roberto TP reported Sueta AC had been a candidate for circle secretary in 2007; this does not necessarily contradict Sueta AC’s being *líder comunitário*, but may indicate that in an “unrecognized” state the position of *líder comunitário* was less preferable

than that of circle secretary. Isaque T referred to Sueta AC as being *líder* back in 2008.

The *líderes* in Honde and Chuala, Simão GT and Zacarias NG respectively, told a remarkably similar story (even overlapping in wording) about how they became *líder*:

[T]here came a team from the district, in every zone, to know: “Who [is] the person in charge here?” Well, when the community said that “our person in charge, whom we know here, is the gentleman”, that is when I became [...] legitimized as community leader.

... v[eio] uma brigada do distrito, em cada zona, para saber: “Quem [é] dirigente aqui?” Então, a comunidade quando dizer que “o nosso dirigente, que nos conhecemos aqui, está [sic] o fulano”, é quando logo, passava já [...] para ser legitimado como líder comunitário. (Simão GT)

[W]hen there came a district team they called a meeting just to say: “Who leads you here, your representative of this community?” Well, the population [indicated] to legitimize me, because they knew that I was the representative of this community. It was by a legitimation by the population.

... quando v[eio] a brigada distital convocaram uma reunião só para dizer que: “Quem que vos lidera aqui, o vosso representante desta comunidade?” Então, a população indic[ou] legitimar a mim, porque conheceram de que eu sou representante desta comunidade. Foi por uma legitimação da população. (Zacarias NG)

It is not clear exactly when these district team visits occurred but it was not many years after the introduction of *Decreto* 15/2000. Simão GT and Zacarias NG made clear the close connection of their *líder*-ship with being *secretário*: Zacarias NG even insisted he is a *secretário do bairro* even though he also described himself as “*líder de primeiro escalão*” (first-tier authority also usually associated with *régulo*). Zacarias NG stated he became cell secretary in 2000, while the “recognition” took place in 2003. Simão GT reported he was first a cell secretary, then a circle secretary, and from that position became a *líder comunitário*. He indicated that the visit of the district brigade was in 2002.

The interviews with Simão GT and Zacarias NG indicate that the Barue district government was already busy installing *líderes comunitários* at least around 2002-2003. Adjunct-*Régulo* Maurício JC, who lives much more to the north than Zacarias NG and Simão GT, confirmed that *líderes comunitários* were former party (i.e. Frelimo) secretaries but dates their introduction around 2007. Mr. Henriques Q, Chefe do Posto in the Chôa area, identifies “*Líder Comunitário*” Matias FD of Nhacapanga also as a “secretary with uniform” of the *primeiro escalão* (FN<sup>s</sup> 10/09/2010).

As said, Francisco L and Sueta AC were “recognized” as *líder comunitário* on 19 March 2010. Of this I observed a document announcing this to Sueta AC dated 10 March, from the *Técnico Superior* (Senior Staff Official) Mr. Cherege of the Catandica municipal government. Another observed document showed Sueta AC’s own signature and stated that he will duly perform his duties (FN<sup>s</sup> 13/04/2010). Francisco L indicated that in 2008 there was a vote with

paper ballots with the participation of the general population under auspices of the (Frelimo) party. Francisco L won this vote from one other candidate, the late Mr. Niza. That he was *líder comunitário* in the period 2008-2010 (i.e. before the “recognition”) is implied by a comment of Raúl VR who stated:

[O]ur *líder*, [FL], before having a uniform, before that whole ceremony had been done, he worked without prestige. Now he works with prestige because now he has a flag at his house.

[O] nosso líder, [FL], antes de ter fardamento, antes de ser feito portanto aquela cerimónia toda, trabalhava sem peso. Agora se trabalha com peso porque já tem bandeira em casa.

An intriguing aspect of the quote is that it suggests that the “prestige” does not follow from a bottom-up indication by the “community”, but from the “recognition” of the government in a top-down procedure, in contrast with what Decree 15/2000 seems to identify as the “valorization” of the “social organization” of “local communities”.

Areas of *líderes comunitários* vary considerably. Francisco L and Sueta AC have rather compact areas which are together about 1 km<sup>2</sup>, but the less densely populated area of Zacarias NG is in the order of about 200 km<sup>2</sup>.

#### Other local leaders within the Frelimo party or the government

At the time of interview Lúcia C had been appointed five months earlier by the mayor of Catandica Mr. Lambo as the *chefe de localidade n.º 2* (chief of locality number two) within the municipality, comprising seven out of a total of twelve neighbourhoods in Catandica. She had been member of the Municipal Assembly and an alderman for amongst other things health (Mozambique 2002: 143-144). She is now (2010) *presidente* for a group dealing with health issues (including the OMM leader, church leaders and AMETRAMO<sup>224</sup> members) comprising *localidades* one and two. She supervises *líderes comunitários* as well as *Régulo Sabão*.

The *chefe* represents efforts to increase women’s involvement within government. She thinks it good for Mozambican women in general and also for herself to show her capacities (Lúcia C). I was present at a neighbourhood meeting with Sra. Lúcia C in *bairro* Samora Machel on 7 August 2010. There were about 30 women, some 10 men and a dozen or so children. There she was presented a chicken as a courtesy gift from the people; this was

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<sup>224</sup> AMETRAMO: Associação dos Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique (Association of Mozambican Traditional Doctors).

accompanied by a Christian prayer. My assistant, who lives there, told me it is to thank God for having a leader from their own community and to stress that although she is a woman she must be listened to (FN<sup>s</sup> 07-08/08/20).

*Adjuntos* (adjuncts, vice-secretaries) of a cell take over a secretary's tasks in case the latter is absent (Pedro MN). Lourenço J reported that someone who ends second in a vote for *secretário* automatically becomes *adjunto*, although the cell of Andrew J provides a counterexample. *Chefes de 25 (10, 5) casas* (leaders of 25 [10, 5] houses) are Frelimo party officials responsible for an (approximately) corresponding number of compounds within a cell. They may be elected by party members (Maria F), or appointed (Rosalina M). The reported task setting of *chefes de 10 (5) casas* consists of motivating people to go to meetings where neighbourhood problems such as the functioning of the water pump are discussed (Maria F), settling fights, and mediating in marital problems (Rosalina M). *Régulo* Seguma indicated that the system of *chefes de 10 casas* was used a lot in work with the population.

Isaque T was a scribe (*escrevão*) for *Líder Comunitário* Sueta AC, as well as president of the *Conselho Local* (Local Council)<sup>225</sup> of Tongogara. He was elected scribe with 11 out of 22 votes amongst a total of three candidates in 2008. He had not known he was a candidate. The voting procedure consisted of writing names on pieces of paper (in this sense a “secret” procedure because it contrasts with a procedure in which people raise their hands to indicate their preferences). Isaque T explained the voters were “members” or “representatives” (of the *líder* Sueta AC), *círculo* and *célula* secretaries and *chefes de 10 (5) casas* within Tongogara neighbourhood. Since a *líder comunitário* is generally seen as a government official, this means that Isaque T's position as a government scribe had been dependent on election by Frelimo party officials. Structurally the connection between party and government exists through the scribe Isaque T because information from the *células* is transmitted through him to the *líder*. The Local Council has a president, vice-president and a secretary, of which the positions between them are determined in a single vote by the ranking of the votes they get from an electorate consisting of the twenty members of the Local Council. Members consist further of local entrepreneurs (*negociantes*) “all of Frelimo”. The Local Council is responsible for such things as the coordination of the maintenance of local water pumps and

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<sup>225</sup> “Local councils”, briefly alluded to in chapter 10, are defined in Ministerial Directive 107-A/2000, art. 1-6 (see Carrilho [ed.] 2009: 554) as “consultative organ[s] of the authorities of local administration, concerning the search for solutions for fundamental problems affecting the life of populations [...]” in which “also the community authorities participate”. They are not to be confused with community courts for administering justice, see e.g. Open Society Foundation (2006) and Igreja (2012).

roads (the actual work being done by inhabitants of the neighbourhood).

Ernesto TM was president of the *Conselho Consultivo* (Consultative Council) of Sabão, established in 2010 (see Decree 11/2005; cf. ch. 10). He was elected president with 24 votes out of an unspecified total of more than 54 votes. Ernesto TM, himself a Frelimo member and a cell secretary, stated the voters were from the population of Sabão, no further specification is possible from the data. *Líder Comunitário* FL was, but *Régulo* Sabão was not, a member of the *Conselho Consultivo* at the time of interviewing Ernesto TM. Contact with people from non-Frelimo parties consists only as subsumed under contact with the general population of Sabão (Ernesto TM; Bento GC). The task portfolio of the *Conselho Consultivo* overlaps with that of the *Conselho Local*: water provision, cleaning the neighbourhood, but also the provision of electricity.

Jorge S had been *secretário de verificação* (control secretary) of the Tongogara circle since 2007. He was elected with 28 votes out of 37, while there were seven candidates. The voters were identified as Frelimo members and members of OMM. The task of a control secretary is to check documents and intervene when the circle secretary makes a mistake. He may also write a declaration (*declaração* – formal document; cf. below) for a citizen from Tongogara if need be. Jorge S had been a Frelimo-soldier from 1987 until 1994 and regretted that he gets no military pension from the government and that there is no employment (“some are suffering, others are dying”). When a day later I said goodbye to him he declared that “all Frelimo” were “thiefs” (*mbava*), even if himself being Frelimo (FN<sup>s</sup> 15/09/2010).

Leadership is no guarantee against grave problems; former District Administrator Luís Alberto Chimoio received death threats through telephonic messages from around six persons (apparently including influential people within Frelimo). At the time of my return to Barue on 22 March 2010 Mr. Chimoio had been transferred to Mossurize District and been replaced by the current District Administrator, Mr. Joaquim Zefanias. According to a source close to Mr. Chimoio, who was known as the “Administrator of the people”, a motive for the threats may have been his cooperation with non-Frelimo people. Mr Chimoio himself stated that his replacement was a decision of the government because of a new vacancy for Administrator in Mossurize (FN<sup>s</sup> 28/03/2010; 30/05/2010; Chekwa [N] 2010; Luís AC).

### Impact of district and central governments

The district government plays an important rôle in the allocation of substantial tracts of land to foreigners. Sävström (2005) refers to “white” Zimbabweans as enjoying land acquisitions

in Manica Province. Sävström mentions *Régulo* Mpanze but does not make clear who were settling in the chiefdom then. Not all farm businesses are of Zimbabwean background. The company Mafuia, which is as far as I could ascertain Mozambican, is located in the Mpanze chiefdom. Another farm in the same chiefdom is owned by Mony B and her husband Christoph B who are of Swiss origin. Mony B told that they have been there since 2008 and are leasing 1,000 ha land for 50 years with the possibility to renew. The Department of Agriculture of the district government demarcated the area. Apparently the government did not inform the local population beforehand, so when they got on the land local people insisted they would continue farming in the estate area. Mony B told she and Christoph B arranged compensation for those who moved out of the plots they had been clearing, after giving them the opportunity to complete the farming season. Only five or six local farms still exist along the edges of the estate. According to Mony B they refuse to move without a huge compensation. Christoph B said the government “see you one time to give the land and then they do not care anymore” (FN<sup>s</sup> 07/08/2010).

When I asked *régulo* Mpanze in this context about the formal proceedings, he seemed genuinely irritated about this and referred to the “mad government” which had shown a “map coming from Maputo”. The government had indicated that the agreement with a foreign farmer (unspecified) had already been concluded before any genuine debate with him and the population could be held. The information indicates that events connected with these land deals occur between immigrant commercial farmers and the district government without great interference by the *régulo* or due consultation of the community as required by the Land Law (Mozambique 2009: art. 13.3). The arrival of companies is not judged entirely negatively *per se*, as they may provide employment (*Régulo* Mpanze in Sävström (2005) and *Régulo* Sanhatunze).

Chekwa [N] (2013) reports more examples showing the little impact that locals have on activities in their own environment. Early 2013 *Régulo* Macufa was detained by the police for having arrested 10 people who were searching for precious stones in his area without consultation. *Régulo* Sabão pointed out that his community did not receive the 20% of the gains of construction companies that are active there which the community was supposed to receive.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> “20%”: cf. Mr. Doménico Liuzzi, director of Kulima, in Maputo (FN<sup>s</sup> 21/08/2009).

### Bureaucratic devices employed by Frelimo to control the population

There are specifically two phenomena, encountered during the fieldwork, which are not mentioned in the 2006 Frelimo Statutes or the 2010 *Cell Manual* but which indicate how the Frelimo party intends to *control* the population (whether member or not) rather than *serve* it, an idea that would emerge from formulations in the 2010 *Cell Manual* (e.g. p. 5) and Roberto TP's vision of his own job as circle secretary ("I am serving the people in general"). The first is engineering "contributions" to the party. I have seen (April and May 2010) specimens of payment receipts of amounts which a teacher (not a Frelimo member) had to pay to a Frelimo official at the school every month. In case of non-compliance someone may be branded as "not of the party" and suffer obstacles in career opportunities later in life. The payment receipts resembled Frelimo membership payment receipts, but may represent a multiple factor of common membership contributions. In this way Frelimo easily earns monthly amounts from a few teachers similar to hundreds of members in, say, Tongogara and Sabão. Similar "fees" due by teachers at a primary school in Nampula have been reported (*O País* in Hanlon 2011). Payment receipts shown to me were already from 2008, however. This example shows that Frelimo is not simply exercising a patron-client system (cf. discussion by Machohe 2011: 27-32; on neo-patrimonialism more generally: Chabal and Daloz 1999; cf. Abbink and Van Dokkum 2008). In such a system clients can at least expect to obtain immediate gains, but with the described payments one just avoids obliterating *possible* gains in an undetermined future while the "patron" has the immediate gains. A genuine example of neo-patrimonialism may be found with the so-called "seven million" district development loans, about which Orre (2010: 331-332) found direct evidence of party-politically skewed allocation. Nuvunga (2013) argues that desired access to mosquito and fishing nets may partly be responsible for the diachronic increase in votes for Frelimo in Nicoadala (Zambézia) and Angoche (Nampula). However, neo-patrimonialism has limited explanatory value for Mozambique today, as pointed out by Sumich (2008: 113): economic cleavage in society "appears to be based far more on elite solidarity than on competing vertical networks" and is hardening by the circumstance that wealth is *not* redistributed. In fact, the middle class is seen as having paid *for* the elite's privileges (cars etc.). They still vote Frelimo because "[w]ith Renamo we would have to start all over again" (2008: 119).

The second encountered non-statutory way of controlling the population (member or not) is by demanding a "declaration" (Pt: *declaração*; Bw: *tsamba*) to be used in bureaucratic situations (here to be understood as paperwork necessary for certain government approvals or

services) but to be processed first within the Frelimo party system. At least in Maputo these “declarations” must have existed since 2004 because Fumo (2007: 122) mentions them briefly (for a more recent mentioning of attestations (*atestados*) of residence, see Nuvunga 2013: 51-52). Such declarations as I have knowledge of are issued by secretaries of the neighbourhood in which one lives. Declarations may be needed for various purposes, such as moving home,<sup>227</sup> getting a subsidy and so on. For example one person intended to open a bank account at a financial office. This person showed me the declaration to be handed over to the concerned financial institution: it was a handwritten A5-size paper with an elaborate text (covering almost all of one side of the sheet) by the *secretário* of the informant’s neighbourhood, stating that the informant is inhabitant of that neighbourhood and that the *secretário* is declaring this so that the informant can open an account with the concerned financial institution. The document’s opening contained the words “*Partido Frelimo*” and further down it stated “*Frelimo – a força da mudança*” (“the powerhouse of change”). The declaration would require a *carimbo* (stamp) of the Frelimo party; after realizing such a stamp, the informant would be able to open the desired bank account (FN<sup>s</sup> 13/04/2010). The informant was not a member of any political party at the time of the fieldwork but said that Renamo members may be refused such a document.

The possibility of such refusal was confirmed by information of one of my assistants about an individual in Sabão, A, who was a former Renamo combatant. After the refusal of a declaration he became a Frelimo member but, according to my assistant, could not entirely get rid of his Renamo past (FN<sup>s</sup> 14/07/2010). Bonifácio TQ also affirmed that it may be difficult to get a declaration for Renamo members and mentioned that in times of elections people may specifically have difficulty obtaining a declaration. Frelimo secretaries may refuse giving a declaration to a Renamo member because they themselves may be accused of being in favour of Renamo (Bonifácio TQ). Neto VM explained that a declaration functions to facilitate control by party functionaries, who operate like an “eye of the [Frelimo] party” over people who are considered an “enemy” (i.e. if they are not Frelimo – cf. Bento GC). Even the recognition of a *régulo* seems to require a party *declaração* (José NS).

One case of presenting a declaration I witnessed in action. My assistant and I were having a chat with *Líder Comunitário* Sueta AC in his *gabinete* when an elderly lady came in. She handed over some documents to the *líder comunitário* who passed them on to my assistant (not on my request). I could see then that one of the documents was a Frelimo

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<sup>227</sup> This conflicts with the GPA, since that guarantees free settlement for people and does not mention the need for any document issued by a political party.

*declaração* similar to the one described above, handwritten but here on an A4 sheet. My assistant explained later on the basis of the event that it was about obtaining a government subsidy in the framework of *acção social* (social action/assistance for the sick and elderly). The secretary responsible for the declaration was Roberto TP, thus the circle secretary. At least in this case, the *líder comunitário* was the link between the party and higher-level government: the request with the declaration was submitted to the *líder comunitário*, who after giving his own approval would pass the material on to the government in the Vila (Catandica centre).<sup>228</sup> Apparently the documents were not wholly to the *líder comunitário*'s satisfaction, because they were returned to the lady, who would, according to my assistant's summary of the conversation, come back later (FN<sup>s</sup> 20/05/2010).

The *líder comunitário* of Tongogara, Sueta AC, later revealed another case, namely that he was busy processing a declaration from someone who came from Munene (outside of Catandica municipality) and wanted to settle in his area. The party secretariat in Catandica still had to be informed about this (FN<sup>s</sup> 11/07/2010). Several cell secretaries confirmed to me that that if people want to move home, they need to get a *declaração de transferência* (transfer declaration) from their old neighbourhood and submit it to the cell secretary of their new one, so that

we may know what behaviour it is that [that person] brings. We might receive a bandit, we might receive a thief, haha!

[...] saberemos qual [...] comportamento é que traz. Podemos receber um bandido, podemos receber um ladrão, haha! (Girasse L)

(Note that « bandit » may refer to a Renamo member in Frelimo-jargon.) Other cell secretaries explained that they should be presented a declaration issued by the cell secretary of the previous cell of the person who moves home (Pita GN, Tonito MM). The *líder comunitário* of Tongogara stated that the declaration should be submitted to him, not to any cell secretary who would have nothing to do with it (Sueta AC in FN<sup>s</sup> 27/05/2010). On the other hand it was also reported that a cell secretary passes the declaration on to the *líder comunitário* (Girasse L). Tax payments associated with moving home were mentioned (by an immigrant: MZN 150 – Girasse L; by a vendor of a plot: MZN 100 – Sueta AC in FN<sup>s</sup> 27/05/2010).

Cell and circle secretaries do not seem to get a salary for their work. *Régulos* do get salaries or other remunerations, but the low level and irregular payment of these trigger

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<sup>228</sup> I do not know whether this is the municipal or district government; I suspect the latter since it is more likely to have such social funds available for distribution.

dissatisfaction (Luís MS). *Régulo* Sanhatunze explained that *primeira escalão* (first tier; mostly *régulo* level) gets MZN 2400 per six months and *segundo escalão* (second tier; mostly headman level) MZN 1600 per six months. People in third tier get nothing (FN<sup>s</sup> 17/07/2012). Adjunct-*régulo* Chapanga reported MZN 6 (six) per year as compensation for tax collection efforts (“thank you very much”, he commented), plus MZN 1500 per six months regular salary. *Régulo* Seguma reported MZN 400 per month. *Líder Comunitário* Francisco L reported MZN 1500 per three months. One *sabhuku/mpfumu* reported to receive no salary at all (anonymized [R]).<sup>229</sup>

### Other forms of checking the population

Two men in their late thirties/early forties indicated the possibility that one’s children may be victim of politically improper behaviour (from Frelimo’s perspective) of a parent (interviews May and September 2010). One of them gave this as motivation not to reveal to the present author what he had voted at the last elections, invoking the principle of the secrecy of the vote. When such information would be known, he explained, a child might realize (as an embarrassment), “well have you, here’s my father” (anonymized [R]). The other stated the following about dealing with the Frelimo government and party apparatuses:

[T]here it’s like the eye of the party. Thus, all information that they find [people] submit, they think that “[...] it’s information of my enemy”, and not of a citizen [...] who lives in the neighbourhood with the others, no. “That man is not one of us.” [...] And [they are] prepared to pursue your child at school to make it fail its tests, because [...] its father is not “one of us”.

[L]á está como olho do partido. Então, toda informação que eles acham que estão a entregar, acham que “[...] é informação do meu inimigo”, e não é dum cidadão [...] que está no bairro com os outros, não. “Fulano não é nosso.” [...] E promete até [...] perseguir sua criança na escola para fazer chumbar, porque [...] o pai dele não é “nosso”. (Man, 40s, anonymized [R])

The latter informant also speaks of Frelimo cells in hospitals so that it can be monitored who is ill, or at decision institutions for the so-called “seven million” (state loans distributed on district level for individual entrepreneurs), to ensure party-political conformity of applicants (the informant himself at the time of interviewing being rejected for an application). On allocation of “seven million” funds, see also Orre (2010: 331-332; cf. above).

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<sup>229</sup> The question poses itself whether the low payments do not induce people in a local party or governmental position to ask or accept bribes. This thesis does not accuse any individual of asking or accepting bribes for themselves. In the researcher’s experience, individual bribes were not complained about but rather the occurrence of intimidation and the extortion of money for the party in power.

When I asked Bento GC whether he ever attended (neighbourhood) meetings, he answered:

[W]hen they are organizing meetings, when one arrives there one is perceived as from Renamo, I would be looked at by the *secretário* here. They stay talking about me that “he is from Renamo [...]”. I have an acquaintance<sup>230</sup> [...], I was there [...], they think “he is here with the Renamo people” [...] [They are] pondering amongst themselves. Here [...] we have nowhere to go.

... sewali kuita mabanja, seungasvika penepo unabva pana muRenamo, ine ndibatarisikwa nasecretário kuno. Wanagara wacindilonga kuti “iye ndimuRenamo [...]”. Ndina mwanzangu [...], ndikandokhala pano [...], unabva “aya wadaungana maRenamo” [...]. [...] [Wali] kubvundzana. Apa [...] hatina kwakuenda.

Concerning cooperation with the *secretário de círculo*, he said:

We do not do anything, we are afraid. [...] We have not been asked to do this or that, no, we just keep staying down here.

Hatise kuzviitaba, tiri kutya. [...] Hatise tiwo kubvundzwa kuti mbatite izvi izvi, nkhabe, só zvikulamba zviri pantse basi zvatu.

I myself became under scrutiny of people associated with the Frelimo election campaign team in Cagole, where I stayed for a while in a temporarily abandoned rural shop (*banca fixa*) some time before the 2009 general elections. This may give an indication of how Mozambicans are under scrutiny. On 16 October I visited a quite big election party of Frelimo in Cagole with, I estimate, around 500 visitors and electronically amplified music. The next day, 17 October, the Renamo election campaign team convened behind my *banca fixa*, and I spoke with them. After nightfall, somebody from Frelimo came to me at the *banca fixa* and explained that I would have to “apologize” to Frelimo. It was OK to visit Frelimo election parties (which I had done at the mentioned party of the 16<sup>th</sup>) but it was not allowed to visit Renamo election parties, he continued. Frelimo was also afraid that I was trying to convince the *régulo* to vote for Renamo, my assistant reported (FN<sup>s</sup> 16-17/10/2009).

Francisco JB related how he approached one of the *sabhukus/mpfumus* in my field study (anonymized) to have a meeting of Renamo in the *sabhuku/mpfumu*'s area. Apparently Frelimo got notice of the idea and, still according to FJB, went to the *sabhuku/mpfumu* to say to him that if he would receive Renamo he would get no bicycle and, what is more, would cease to be a leader. Bento GC reported that one of the *régulos* (anonymized) had been intimidated by Frelimo in July 2010. Renamo appeared to try to find a way to avoid “the *régulo* being beaten up” but Bento GC does not seem to have been an eyewitness and exact information about what happened is unknown to me.

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<sup>230</sup> Presumably an adherent of Frelimo, not indicated in the response.

The above data show that as far as Barue is concerned there is some difficulty to speak of a genuine reconciliation between Frelimo and Renamo (and anyone not showing allegiance to Frelimo for that matter). At the moment of research the existence of this situation is unambiguously a result of Frelimo's exploitation of its power at the national, district and local levels, enhancing that power even more with means solely of its own fabrication. No Frelimo official interviewed was ever apologetic to me as a foreign investigator about the treatment their party meted out to fellow Mozambicans by way of *declarações*, *quotizações* (payments), neighbourhood registrations and exclusion from elections which they cannot influence but which influence them. One *líder comunitário* declared:

[W]hen the population came out of the war it suffered intimidation [...] from the other parties [...] but from 2000 until now I believe that the population now has a vision [...] that they are [...] in victory, are free.

... a população já que saiu da guerra sofria de intimidação [...] dos outros partidos [...] mas a partir de 2000 até este ano acho que a população já tem uma visão [...] que estão [...] na vitória, estão liberdades [sic, *probably* em liberdade]. (Zacarias NG)

In 2000 the interviewee became cell secretary, but it may also be considered the beginning of a decennium in which, as we have seen in this chapter, Frelimo's hold on the population in Barue has been greatly increased and consolidated amongst other things through the leadership framework of *Decreto 15/2000*.

### Summary

An overview of Frelimo's power apparatus at local level was given. The network of secretaries and community leaders, connecting party and government, is able to penetrate deeply into the country side and into people's lives. The method of working with documents is effective in controlling citizens. An individual's association with non-Frelimo parties may be disadvantageous when dealing with the government.