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## **Politics, history and conceptions of democracy in Barue District, Mozambique**

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CHAPTER 14 – RENAMO, MDM AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON POLITICS IN BARUE: “DEMOCRACY” AS IDEAL AND AS REALIZATION

Renamo adherents on “democracy”

Renamo adherents may be heard stating that “we fought for democracy” (*lutámos para a democracia* – Vasco BN). Also one *régulo* described the Frelimo-Renamo war as “the war for democracy” (anonymized [R]); cf. Cahen 2009: 78n250). Vasco BN stated that Frelimo disappointed people after achieving independence by overregulating rural life and providing “nothing” in the shops. He was of the opinion that the Peace Agreement (i.e. the GPA between Frelimo and Renamo of 1992) “served for nothing” (*não serviu nada*) and eventually did not bring “democracy” because he would not be able to work as a nurse (*enfermeiro*) as he did with Renamo during the war:

[Does] democracy exist, I can say “no”, because I have my skills but I sit still (i.e. only work in the fields). But Frelimo does not accept that I can work as a nurse, I am not counted.

... existe a democracia, eu posso dizer “não”, porque eu tenho meus conhecimentos mas estou sentado. Mas a Frelimo não aceita que eu posso trabalhar como enfermeiro, não sou contado.

According to him such exclusion from work is widely experienced amongst Renamo adherents. He also stated that

[T]hey [Frelimo] are governing the democracy because of us [Renamo], and we work [and] we are eating nothing. They are just eating alone, [...] many of us died, but today we are eating nothing. [...] How [shall we] develop?

... eles estão [a] mandar a democracia devido de nos, e nos trabalhamos, não estamos [a] comer nada. Já estão [a] comer sozinho, [...], nos, morremos muito, mas hoje em dia não estamos [a] comer nada. [...] Como desenvolver?

Vasco BN spoke of “fear” (*medo*) when describing hypothetical discussions where Renamo adherents would openly identify themselves as such. Bonifácio TQ also mentioned fear “for retaliations” (*medo de represálias*) in a similar fashion. I asked Francisco JB if I could interview Renamo adherents whose jobs might be jeopardized if it would become known they were of Renamo, but this was refused because it was “secret” (*secreto*).

Francisco JB added:

Our government is just a dependent of [its] master [...] which is Frelimo. It is therefore [that]

O nosso governo só está dependente do patrão [...] que é Frelimo. É por isso, as vezes

at times our [Renamo's] members live oppressed because of this. [...] It is therefore, that Renamo says, there is no democracy in Mozambique, only Frelimo lies that they are democrats and they are not.

nossos membros vivem oprimidos por causa disto. [...] É por isso, que a Renamo diz, não há democracia em Moçambique, só a Frelimo mente que são democratas e não são.

José A [U] stated that Frelimo executed people in public, that both the 1994 and 1999 elections were really won by Renamo, that Mozambique was not independent under Frelimo, and that people were now suffering under Guebuza. He believed it would be Renamo that would change the political situation; about MDM he said this party was an idea of Frelimo, a joke (*brincadeira*).

During the Frelimo-Renamo war, internal political decision making was not necessarily participatory within Renamo. When asked whether Renamo cooperated with certain spirit mediums, Vasco BN explained he could not know:

I was a simple member [...] [A]s cadre [one] is like the father, and so [a] commander is like a father, thus what he does is secret for the children.

... eu era um elemento simples [...] [C]omo quadro é como o pai, e por isso comandante fica como pai, então [o] que faz é secreto para os filhos.

Also, the Renamo military was not supposed to stay too long with the same civilian population. Vasco BN initially remained within or near Barue District where he was born, but was later transferred to Casa Banana (in Gorongosa), not for a specific reason to go there but because as a guerrilla one had to be on the move regularly so as to avoid developing close relationships with the population. This might raise security issues. This indicates that it is difficult to see wartime Renamo as a “normal” government, simply replacing an absent Frelimo. Such local situations must be regarded as essentially transitory, waiting for a resolution on a national level.

The importance for Renamo of the *régulos* to wage the war should also not be exaggerated, at least not in Barue. Bonifácio TQ maintained that the war and its sacrifices in terms of lives lost was not only for putting the *régulos* in place but also because Frelimo had forgotten about its ideal to introduce democracy as defined at its First Congress, created problems through “certain tribalist persons from the south”, and killed Uria Simango and others, and because

some [...] ambitious persons who after killing Mondlane within Frelimo deviated from the principles of independence, which is to

... alguns [...] ambiciosos que depois de matar o Mondlane desviaram dos princípios de independência, que é de [...] democratizar

democratize the country, give economic freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of choice, of residence.

o país, dar liberdade de economia, liberdade de expressão, liberdade de escolha, de residência.

He added:

[T]his connotation [of Renamo fighting for the sake of *régulos*] exists because of Renamo's leader; his father is a *régulo*. Thus when he talks of reinstalling the traditional structure, it appears he is defending his father to be *régulo* [...] haha!

... esta conotação existe por causa do líder da Renamo; o seu pai é um régulo. Então quando ele fala de restaurar a estrutura tradicional, parece que está a defender o pai [...] ser régulo [...] haha!

At present *régulos* and Renamo have difficulty communicating with each other. According to Vasco BN Frelimo would not want it because of “envy” (*ciume*), thinking that *régulos* would try to induce the population towards Renamo. My experience in Cagole described above confirms this evaluation. The communication between Renamo and Frelimo in the Catandica Municipal Assembly seems troublesome as well, although information is admittedly limited. When asked what his tasks were as member of the Catandica Municipal Assembly, Bento GC answered that there was little to do apart from raising the flag.

#### MDM: building up a party

At the time of interviewing (26/05/2010) Neto VM was a delegate of MDM. When he studied in another province during the second half of the 1980s, he was a member of Frelimo. Later he became a member of Renamo, disappointed by the “false promises” of Frelimo. Being a Renamo member blocked his possibilities to become a teacher. Dissatisfied with Renamo as well, he became involved with MDM, which he associated with young people. He was self-employed and had applied for a loan from the so-called “seven million” funds (government funds distributed through the districts targeted at the promotion of private enterprise). At the moment of interview he had difficulties in obtaining an adequate response concerning his application and interpreted such procedural difficulties to party-political bias (i.e. against non-Frelimo people).

Neto VM's election as a district delegate of MDM occurred at a time of much pressure (*de muito emergência*) when the party was still in a process of establishing itself, and everyone could be both a candidate and an elector for the election event. He stated there are about 2,000 adherents of MDM in the district, although his own election as a delegate seems to have depended on a meeting with a far smaller number of people. Apart from visible

members and sympathizers there are adherents in secrecy (*na clandestinidade*). Concerning himself Neto VM reported to have had good relations with the two most recent District Administrators. At the time of interviewing the building up of the party in Barue District was still ongoing; for instance Munene was yet to be approached.

For Barue Neto VM envisaged that MDM would promote the supply of energy (i.e. electricity) and piped drinking water. According to him infrastructure was just a matter of the present government making promises it does not fulfil. Neto VM stated that one day the political situation in Mozambique will change and that Frelimo “will leave” (*irá sair*), that people work towards a change, some “in hiding” (*escondes*), others “at the front” (*em frente*).

### Multipartyism

I asked some people whether they considered the multiparty system something that came up from within Mozambique or was something foreign. The answers are of a nature I would call “cosmopolitan”; voting is not specifically Mozambican but it occurs in other countries too as a matter of fact, see table 12:

*Table 12: Reflections on the multiparty system in Mozambique*

<i>Comment translated</i>	<i>Comment in original</i>	<i>Interviewee</i>
It [is] here, it [is] also abroad.	Dzi[na] muna, dzi[na] kunza <i>também</i> .	Angelina GA, Catandica, woman, 26
I do not know, [...] but it is possible [...] that from there abroad it came to here.	... handicazvidziwi, [...] <i>mas pode</i> [...] zvakunza kwadzikoko zviciuya muno ...	Berinha A, Sanhatunze, woman, ± 30
[This thing] of parties is within the country and within all of Africa. [...] [This thing] of voting [...] is coming from abroad because it is others who come to help here so that we may vote well.	... zvemabato zviru munyika dzese dzemuAfrika. [...] [Z]vemavhoti [...] zviru kubudikidza nekunze kwacho nekuti ndiwo vamwe vanouya kuti [ku]batsira muno umu kuti tione kuvhota zvakana.	Fungai TN, Mangawe, man, 48
The political system of the country [Mozambique], [...] it is of all countries, [...] it occurs in all countries.	Zvematongerwe enyika, [...] ndezve nyika dzose, [...] zvinoitika nyika dzose.	Mary M, Nhachigo, woman, 32

The answers given here do not show any opinion that the multiparty system is something imposed onto Mozambicans against their will. Specific active foreign influence is only mentioned in the answer by Fungai TN, who maintained that the fact that there are election

observers from abroad indicates that such elections come from abroad. Francisco JB on the other hand considered that Renamo had fought against the one-party system, and that the current multiparty system was important because now anyone “could talk about what is in their heart”.

Definitions of “mutendere” and “rusununguko”

I shall now establish that the Barwe word « *mutendere* » is at least sometimes used locally as a translation of the Portuguese « *democracia* » which may be associated with the English « *democracy* ». <sup>231</sup> I discussed the problem of translation of « *democracia* » into Barwe with two of my assistants. One of them said there is no translation and the Portuguese word should be used in Barwe conversation. The other maintained, however, that « *mutendere* » is a correct translation. The following conversation during an interview confirms the latter’s approach. A bystander during the interview interrupted to give the interviewee an explanation of “*mutendere*” after the interviewee (Lapson JT) gave an uncertain answer to a question what “*democracia*” is (mentioned in Portuguese within an otherwise Barwe question):

Q: What is “*democracia*” as you have heard talking about?

R: But “*democracia*”, that is that your thing is my thing, isn’t it? Something that is mine is yours, is that “*democracia*”?

[Other person] – “*Mutendere*”, a person does the things s/he needs/wants [to do].

R: Ah, a person does the things s/he needs/wants, ah, I’ve heard [about] that.

Q: Apo canyi kuna imwepo cinabvi “*democracia*” mumbabva kulongapo?

R: Kodi “*democracia*” ndiko kuti cinhu canu ndico cangu, *ne*? Cangu ine ndico canu imwe, ndiyo “*democracia*”?

– “*Mutendere*”, munhu anazviitira zvace anada.

R: Ah, munhu anazviitira zvace anada, ah, ndakhazvibva.

Clearly the person interrupting considered « *mutendere* » a translation of « *democracia* ». That he also gave a specific definition, centering on individualism, is another matter. One *mpfumu/sabhuku* (Elias TM, Vulamite, man, 34) gave an identification of “*mutendere*” and “*democracia*” with a more collectivist interpretation:

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<sup>231</sup> Unfortunately I cannot give a historical etymology of the Barwe word « *mutendere* » and its Shona counterpart « *rusununguko* ». Especially for « *mutendere* » this will be impossible because, as far as I know, there does not even exist a simple dictionary of the Barwe language. I also know of no source that could explain the historical etymology of « *rusununguko* ». (The word is sometimes used in the context of the Zimbabwean independence struggle, but that is more a matter of application than etymology.) The verb « *kusununguka* » can mean “come undone”, “be set free”, “be relaxed” or “give birth” (Hannan 2000).

*Democracia* [...] it's [...] the same thing as the topic of *mutendere*, [...] we do visible things where there are other people, where there are other countries [...] democracy [is such] that it is just like *mutendere*.

*Democracia* [...] zvinapindirana [...] nanyaya pakuti *mutenderei zvayo*, [...] ngatitei zvinhu [...] zvinangoonekerawo kuna wamwewo wanhu, kuti dzimwewo nyika [...] *democracia* kuti ndiwo idafanana namutenderei basi.

These two examples invoke individuals' freedom of action, resembling the liberal aspects of definitions (10) and (11), and the aspects of collective coordination present in definitions (6) and (8). Tables 13 and 14 give more definitions of *mutendere* (Barwe) and *rusununguko* (Shona):

Table 13: Definitions of *mutendere*

<i>Definition translated</i>	<i>Definition in original</i>	<i>Interviewee</i>
To stay well [so that] we do not have bad things, to stay free.	Kukhala mushe, tisingaxupiki, kukhala <i>free</i> .	Mutarato LC, Nhabuto, man, 64
To stay easily.	Kukhalika.	Angelina GA, Catandica, woman, 26
To stay easily. [A situation in which] we do things that anyone wants to do according to one's own will; there is nothing that disturbs.	Kukhalika. [...] titewo zvinhuwo kuti munhu acibatira adadzicalirawo zvacewo; hapana cinhu cinaviringawo.	Elias TM, Vulamite, man, 34
To stay well, to stay easily. [...] to stay well, eat well, take bath, cultivate, [...] and without fighting with people or stay with quarrels in your house.	Kukhala <i>bom</i> , kukhalika. [...] kukhala mushe [...] kuzha <i>zvabom</i> , kusambawo, kulima, [...] <i>nem</i> kupoka nawanhu, ucikhalawo <i>nenoise</i> pamwi wako.	Berinha A, Sanhatunze, woman, ± 30
Peace.	<i>Paz</i> .	Vasco T, Sanhatunze, man, 53
To stay well. There is no war [...] we just want prosperity here in Mozambique.	Kukhala <i>bom</i> . Hakuna nkhondo [...] tiri kuda upfumi basi muno muMozambique.	Luís MS, Sanhatunze, man, 40

Table 14: Definitions of rusununguko

<i>Definition translated</i>	<i>Definition in original</i>	<i>Interviewee</i>
People staying in peace [so that] they are free.	Kugara vanhu vakasununguka vari <i>free</i> .	James IM, Chôa, man, ± 75
To stay happily in your house here [...] [without] being threatened, being beaten, or anything [bad].	Kugara udapfantsa mumwi pako [...] nekushupa, nekuneriwa, nekutani.	Angelina GA, Catandica, woman, 26
To stay well, without fighting, to understand one another so that when there is a fault one asks for pardon; this is called to understand one another in a place. We like to stay with <i>rusununguko</i> because we need/want to develop; one develops when there is a situation of peace/freedom [ <i>kusununguka</i> ].	Kugara zvakanaka, pasina kukana muchingowiriranana kana mashaishirana muchidzorana ndiko kunonzi kuwirirana panzvimbo. Kugara nerusununguko tokufarira nekuda kwekuti kana muchida kubudirira, munabudirira kana makasununguka.	Fungai TN, Mangawe, man, 48
Every person can do all things in freedom.	Kuita zvinhu zvese kungoita <i>be free</i> kune munhu wese.	Elisabete T, Nhachigo, woman, ± 30
To have peace/freedom of the country, a state of the country such that you are doing things in peace/freedom; in case you need/want to request something from the government you are being helped with what you need.	Kusununguka kwenyika, magariro yemunyika muchiita zvinhu zvakasununguka; pane zvamuchida kukumbirawo kuhurumende muchibatsirwawo nezvamunenge mashaya.	Mary M, Nhachigo, woman, 32

The above definitions given in Barue are overlapping with comments made by Woodruff (2005: 81-107) about “harmony” (*homonoia*) as an important aspect of in ancient Athenian “democracy”, with people having the possibility to differ from each other while living together without experiencing civil war. An idea like “majority rule” does not play a decisive role in such a harmony, and may even be detrimental to “democracy” (2005: 11-15, 93).

Asked whether Soda GC considered *régulos* to be conducive for *mutendere* amongst the people, he answered confirmatively, pointing out that a *régulo* considered bad could be deposed and replaced by another person within the ruling family. According to *sabhuku* Elias TM, his own position was *not* one of *mutendere*, because “here night and day I am worried about governing, everything needs to be governed” with the effect that “everyone loathes you”.<sup>232</sup> In a related context *Régulo* Sanhamáuè made a comment that he himself is also dependent on the population, for example to help him move home to be more accessible. He also mentioned that he might be confronted with conflicting, e.g. because simultaneous, demands. Elias TM, when asked if he considered his own voting as *sabhuku* to be

<sup>232</sup> Here night: ... *ine pano usiku namasikati ndinatotya utongi zwentse zvinada utongi*. Everyone: ... *munhu wentse ndimunhu [...] anakuzonda*.

“*democracia*”, responded affirmatively.

I also asked more or less randomly approached people if they could give a definition of “*democracia*”, thus using the Portuguese word in an otherwise Shona or Barue question. This is the way Afrobarometer has put the question to interviewees (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005: 66), motivated as follows:

Some vernaculars include indigenous terms for this concept [of democracy], but these are too often freighted with narrow meanings that predispose idiosyncratic answers (2005: 413n8).

Karlström (1996: 487) is more open to considering definitions in local (Ugandan) languages, but it is unfortunate that the reader is not presented with answers in the original language of the respondents in his examples. In my research a common response (10 out of 11 asked) amongst more or less randomly approached persons was that the respondent would not know what « *democracia* » stood for, also in case one had heard the word before (Dete E, Eliza V [U], Sra. F, Lúcia J [U], Merisina G, Lapson JT, Angelina GA, Berinha A, Fungai TN, Mary M). Nevertheless the present author considers the analysis of the above quote problematic. First, exactly because Afrobarometer did not ask about indigenous terms there is no demonstration that such terms would be unexciting (“narrow”). Second, the analysis is unclear about “democracy” itself, for it is not necessarily a single concept, as argued in the theory part of this thesis and also indicated by Afrobarometer itself (2005: 66) – although later Afrobarometer itself seems to narrow down the meaning of “democracy” to “peaceful multiparty elections” (2005: 67). (A later publication by Shenga and Mattes 2009: 127 indicates that in Mozambique a translated term was in fact used, but no details are given.) Likewise, in the empirical cases of “*mutendere*” and “*rusununguko*” described here, there is no indication of these (clusters of) concepts being “narrowly” interpreted, encompassing individualistic and social ideas. Keeping in mind that in Barue the local terms are used to translate « *democracia* », the statement that “one person in five [in the sampled countries of Afrobarometer] is unable to say what democracy means” (2005: 66) is problematic, because the respondents were not given the term(s) they use in their own languages. Most of the Barue respondents referred to above were indeed unable to define “*democracia*” but that did not mean they had no ideas about “*mutendere*” and “*rusununguko*”. Afrobarometer’s responses on the input “democracy” yielded *freedom* as a top interpretation (2005: 68), which is also what looms large in the responses to the inputs of “*mutendere*” and “*rusununguko*”. Consequently the conclusion that “a sizeable minority [of Africans] still admits to blissful

ignorance [of democracy]” is only true if one insists that the use of the *word* « democracy » is essential for understanding any *concept* of “democracy”. But, as appears from Afrobarometer’s own data, there is no reason why “freedom” could not be an acceptable understanding of “democracy”. Hence one cannot conclude from the fact that people who do not know the word « democracy », that they have no understanding of “democracy” if they reveal “freedom” to be the main understanding of a word in a local language that is otherwise used as a translation for « democracy ».

For contrast, it is illustrative to give more of Lapson JT’s answers. He explained collective decision making in both economic and religious terms. It was good for people to rule themselves, because (interpreting “people” as “we” i.e. cultivators) “we have our cultivation [and] selling of products to do and [have to] see to it what to do”,<sup>233</sup> i.e. one should have control over one’s own business and livelihood. When asked whether he preferred a majority (*wanhu wazinji*) to define law against a minority (*wanhu wadoko*) or that a majority and a minority should define law together he chose the last.<sup>234</sup> It was good to have an identical law (*mutemo mbodzi nambodzi*) for people, first because Jesus Christ had chosen twelve people to do one thing (*cinhu cibodzi*), therefore people stay united; second because law may be compared to the situation of buying bars of soap at the market, sometimes one needs to take 12 of them at a purchase, but other times it is 13, 14 or 15, a confusing situation; such a quantity should be stable according to Lapson JT.

In summary, if we may be allowed to speak of “Barue political philosophy” on the basis of the examples given above, it could be interpreted as a philosophy which does not stress procedural matters like those found in the theory of Arrow. Where Arrow focuses on a proper handling of inputs, Baruese would focus more on an evaluation of results of political processes for individuals, relationships between individuals, and peace in a general, collective sense. There is little interest in technicalities of voting, although Vasco BN and José A [U] in Chimoio did allude to election fraud in the past to the disadvantage of Renamo. But also most Renamo adherents quoted invoked aspects of participation in society more than electoral technicalities.

#### Relative political influence of *régulos*, *secretários* and *líderes*

Present-day party politics influences the hereditary leaders as an institution. I have argued

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<sup>233</sup> ... *tinalima zvakulima zvathu* [...] então *totengesa* então *toona kuti ndezvipi*.

<sup>234</sup> We are reminded of Habermas’s (1996: ch. 7) “deliberative politics”.

that De Sousa destroyed most of the earlier existing set-up of chiefdoms in Barue during the 1880s, and that Makombe Hanga set up a new structure of chiefdoms which partly formed the basis of some chiefdoms existing today. According to Bonifácio TQ (Renamo), nowadays Frelimo is destroying these Makombe-derived chiefdoms:

[W]e were to have also traditional leaders who are those *régulos*, [the] basic structure of Makombe, isn't it. Well, what Frelimo did [was] to abolish the traditional structure putting that elected structure, democratic as it [is] said, isn't it, which is [of] those leaders. It is just that these [traditional] leaders [...] do not have a function. The neighbourhood secretaries have more work in the neighbourhood. The [traditional] leaders cannot even sign a declaration for any person [...]; they do not have that power. If there are disputes, they do not resolve [them], because there have been created community courts and [...] those community courts are also members of Frelimo.

... devíamos também ter líderes tradicionais que são aqueles régulos, [...] estrutura base [...] do Makombe, não é. Então, o que é a Frelimo fez, abolir a estrutura tradicional colocando esta estrutura eleita, democrática como disse, não é, que são os líderes. Só que esses líderes [tradicionais] [...] não tem função. Têm mais trabalho no bairro são os secretários dos bairros. Os líderes [...] nem podem até passar uma declaração para uma pessoa qualquer [...], não têm esse poder. Quando há problemas, eles não resolvem, porque foram criados tribunais comunitários e [...] esses tribunais comunitários também são membros da Frelimo ...

Later he added: “[F]or me traditional authority no longer exists”;<sup>235</sup> views similar to Bonifácio TQ’s were expressed by Renamo representatives Francisco JB and Bento GC, and Frelimo-representative Tique Z (“[The *secretário*] resolves all the cases [...] [for the] *régulo* there is nothing to rule”).<sup>236</sup> When asked who she considered more important, *régulo* or *secretário*, Samia M chose the last. Three others approached with the question said the *régulo* was the most important leader, but they gave rather symbolic motivations: the *régulo* deals with ceremonies and *mhondoro* spirits (Augusto BC, José L), or “all [are] his [the *régulo*’s] children”<sup>237</sup> (Lapson JT). An exceptional view was that of adjunct-*régulo* Maurício JC who found the *régulo* more important than the *secretário* because the latter is of the party, while the first is in the government and, as traditional leader (*líder tradicional*), is the leader of the community. *Secretários* and *líderes*, in contrast with most views on *régulos*, are associated with practical power: the *secretário* “rules everything” (Dete E), arranges things and is closer by (Sra. F), while the *líder comunitário* is “the grand ruler of all” (Eliza V [U]). Merisina G maintained that “the *régulo* rules, but the *secretário* controls”.

<sup>235</sup> ... para mim já não existe autoridade tradicional.

<sup>236</sup> Ndiye anatonga mirandu yentse [...] Nyakwawa hapana ciri kutonga.

<sup>237</sup> ... wentse iwawo mbana wace.

## Rituals and meetings

Local meetings that are carried out under the auspices of the government, in order to exchange information and views with the general population, often take place (literally) under a Frelimo flag. On one occasion I heard a municipal officer criticizing this, but it was a rather private comment and without further effect (FN<sup>s</sup> 14/09/2010). Francisco JB indicated the use of the flag does discourage Renamo (and also MDM) members to come to public government meetings. Government leaders (lower as well as higher ranking) may also shout “Frelimo *hoje!*” (Long live Frelimo!) during meetings meant for the general public (FN<sup>s</sup> 30/04/2010; 14/09/2010).

At a monument positioned at a small distance from the centre of Catandica, wreaths and flowers are deposited on special dates, such as 7 September (signing of the Lusaka Agreement) or 1 May (Labour Day). Many participants are in fact school children, who are responsible for singing the national anthem. Such ceremonies tend to be dominated by Frelimo government and party officials (FN<sup>s</sup> 07/09/2009; 01/05/2010; 01/06/2010; 07/09/2010; notes of assistant about 7 April 2010 [death of Josina Machel]; see also photo 6 of 1 May festivities).

On 23 May 2010 the Unity Torch (*Chama de Unidade*) passed through Catandica. It had gone through other Mozambican places and had as final destination Maputo, in congruence with the original Unity Torch which travelled across the nearly independent country in 1975 (Muiuane [ed.] 2006: 386). A considerable number of people stood gathered in front of the district government building. Several speeches celebrated the unity of the Mozambican people. Frelimo gave a prepared speech; then MDM and Renamo were asked whether they had somebody in the crowd who could come forward to say something. Nobody reacted. After the speeches the gathered people one by one touched the torch, which was put up for this purpose in a wooden frame (FN<sup>s</sup> 23/05/2010). José A [U] explained that Renamo did not participate because the event would only represent the “unity of Frelimo”.

## Summary

Experiences of some individuals adhering to Renamo and MDM were represented. General considerations about “democracy” and multipartyism were formulated. Those people in Barue who were asked about it did not see the multiparty system as unfitting for their country, also if they recognized it occurred in other countries as well. Very few people could give a

definition of the Portuguese word « *democracia* »; where people translated the word, they did it with Barwe « *mutendere* », where « *rusununguko* » is the Shona counterpart, and these words were in turn understood as freedom, peace with one's fellow human beings, prosperity in Mozambique, and government support. As for the Mozambican multiparty system and the recognition of "traditional authorities", even where the latter were considered practically existing these were not seen by many as having much impact, as Frelimo has an overwhelming control of political life.

### CONCLUSION OF PART III

In Part III information about Barue District was provided with fieldwork material collected by the author. Arguments that had been developed in Part I about theory and in Part II about historical backgrounds could be given a concrete form by reference to specific phenomena as encountered in Barue. It was shown that many different kinds of political leaders exist in Barue, were hereditary leaders function besides Frelimo government and party officials. Indeed, the political histories of hereditary leaders could be used as a window through which selection of leaders in non-party situations could be studied. On the other hand it appeared that hereditary leaders, just as officials from other political parties, had little political leeway relative to Frelimo officials.