VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT

HAN, RESURRECTION, AND THE QUESTION OF MEANING

Exploring the Question of Meaning through the Han of the Korean Minjung and Christian Faith in Resurrection

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
on gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. L.M. Bouter,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de faculteit der Godgeleerdheid
op dinsdag 16 januari 2007 om 15.45 uur
in het auditorium van de universiteit,
De Boelelaan 1105

doo:

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geboren te Namyangju, Korea
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Cover:

The people at this photo are the minjung of the author's hometown long time ago, including his father with the dog. The laughing friends arm in arm are the best hometown friends of the author's eldest brother. Do we not see from this photo the minjung, who have tried to find an answer to the question of the meaning of their rugged lives in shalom, co-humanity and waiting for their eternal home?
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**Acknowledgements**

Eventually, I am getting in touch with the finis of my long, long theological journey. I thank God for this and everything.

Many people have helped me to finish this thesis. Here I would like to express my gratitude to them.

First of all, I have to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Martien E. Brinkman, my first supervisor, who gave me an opportunity to finish my thesis. He brought my thesis, which had been in a dormant situation, back to life. From the time of our first meeting he has shown his earnest and sincere attitude towards my thesis studded with flaws, which made me resolve to finish this long theological journey. Without his help, I would not have finished this journey. His earnestly guiding me back to the right track to the end; his fruitful suggestions to me for the enhancement of the thesis; giving his kind regards to my family every time he sent an e-mail to me; kindly and encouragingly informing me of the good news of a financial support by the Free University of Amsterdam... I cannot forget all of these forever, for which I am expressing my deepest gratitude to him.

I also have to express my thankfulness to Prof. Dr. Andrew Sung Park, my second supervisor, at the United Theological Seminary in the USA. As a theologian of the same national origin, he genuinely showed his compassion to me, who had been in a miserable situation with regard to finalising the progress of this thesis. I cannot forget his kind encouragement, his prompt consent for being one of my supervisors, his giving me proper suggestions for the improvement of the thesis, and so on, for which I am presenting my deepest gratitude to him.

I am very grateful to Rev. Dr. Robyn McPhail in New Zealand for her correcting my English. Without her sharp-eyed proofreading, I could not have presented the thesis in the
present form of English expressions. I cherish our friendship, on the basis of which she could devote herself to the rewardless correction, her encouraging me to finish the thesis, and her appropriate hints for the improvement of the thesis. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to her for all of these.

I have to mention my gratefulness to Rev. Dr. Pong Nang Park, who was my supervisor for the master of theology program at Hanshin University in Seoul. As a Barthian, he urged me to study Barth and the resurrection, as a result of which I could write a thesis with the theme of the resurrection. I cannot forget his leading me to the finish of the master program in his steadfast love, and, especially, his promptly consenting to be the leader of my nuptial ceremony after the graduation, which made me feel his fatherly love. I also express my deep gratitude to Rev. Dr. Wilson Chang at Hanshin University, whose letter of recommendation contributed to the starting of my theological study abroad.

I am very grateful to Rev. Dr. Harry Wardlaw and his wife, Mrs. Ruth Wardlaw, for their help and encouragement. Especially, I cannot forget Mrs. Wardlaw’s taking care of my first boy when I started my study in Melbourne. I also give my thankfulness to Rev. Bruce Barber for his advice and encouragement.

I want to express my gratitude to Dr. Seok-Dae Kang, my best friend, for his encouragement and financial support. Whenever I visited my homeland, he gladly met me, giving many pieces of medical advice for the maintenance of my health. It is beyond doubt that our long established friendship has contributed to the finalisation of the thesis.

I would like to express my gratitude to Rev. Hyun Shin Joo and his wife, Mrs. Bong Sook Cha, for their supporting. Rev. Joo prepared some source material in Korean for me. Mrs. Cha gave me her constant support in good friendship. They also gave me some financial support, for which I am very grateful to them.
I would like to give my gratitude to all my family members in Korea for their support and encouragement. My brothers and sisters have incessantly prayed to God for the success of my study abroad. My parents-in-law have done the same. Especially, I have to mention here that my mother-in-law’s unceasing tearful prayer has made a good contribution to the finishing of my thesis.

Special thanks are given to my mother and my father, the late Rev. Geun-Bae Lyew, whose panoramic biography is partially depicted in the ‘Statement regarding the Background of my Thesis’ below. During his lifetime my father had shown his tenacious will to educate illiterate minjung (lower, poor people), which resulted in the establishment of a school and a church. My mother has also shown her indefatigable efforts like a prairie fire to sustain her ten children. One example is enough for her indefatigability. She had been preparing some groceries until two o’clock in the morning to sell in the dawn market. She then slept and awoke at three o’clock to catch the first bus to the market according to the time schedule. The later she got to the market, the lower the price awaiting her groceries. Hence the very short time she took for sleeping so she could earn a little more to sustain her family. Even nowadays she, in her late eighties, tries to do something for the betterment of her children. Without this legacy of indefatigability from my parents, it would have been impossible for me to finish this thesis. I express my deepest gratitude to them for providing me with a good reason to finish this thesis, in which I have tried to answer the question of the ‘why’ of their life-long hardship.

I have to say my heartfelt apologies to my three children, Han Nool, Hayandle and Laerimie. Because of my long study, I have not played a proper role for them as their father. When I got stressed, they provided me with good reasons to get out of the stressed situation. They got me opportunities to smile happily. They have grown up well, despite my lack of time for them. My first boy has always encouraged me to finish the thesis; the younger two
may not realise its significance, but they have always given silent encouragement to me through their smiling and cute tricks. I am very grateful to them for all of these.

Lastly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my beautiful and elegant wife, Sun Nie, for her patient support, encouragement and love. For so long a time, she has been burdened with the responsibility of the sustenance of her husband and three children. For seven years she had worked hard as a shoe factory worker for the sustenance of her family. She had coped with this hardship patiently and elegantly, though. Her constant love has prevented me from falling into the pit of frustration and resignation. Without her patient love, I would not have finished this thesis. She has a right to be very happy with the eventual completion of my thesis. Needless to say, this book is dedicated to her, whom I love forever.

May God be praised for God’s fundamental protection of us all from evil through Jesus’ resurrection!

September, 2006
Statement regarding the Background of my Thesis

With the beginning of the collapse of the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910) in Korea, brought about by the attack of the Japanese imperialists, my great-grandfather and my grandfather began to lose all hope for the future. In their bewilderment they started out on a roving journey from village to village, all over the country. They earned some money as pedlars, but then they turned to drink to help them forget their country’s miserable and hopeless situation. Inevitably they also forgot about supporting their family.

Soon after they had left home, my great-grandmother died as a result of a gastric disorder, probably arising out of her anger, forlornness and despair. Several years later, my grandmother also died of a disease, which resulted from continuous malnutrition, leaving her four children in dire and abject poverty.

Thus my father, in his teens, was virtually left orphaned, together with a younger brother and two younger sisters. It was under these bleak and dire circumstances that his life of rugged independence began.

Meanwhile the two bohemians continued to wander about, abandoning themselves to the pursuit of pleasure without pleasure and it was not until some years later that they came home, only to see what an abject state of poverty their home had been reduced to.

On arriving home, my grandfather was utterly prostrated by fatigue and by a gastric ulcer which resulted from his addiction to drink. Soon after this he died. It was not until a long time later that my great-grandfather, while having enjoyed his rambling life, went to his eternal home, perhaps dreaming of becoming an unw worldly long-lived hermit. (I still remember my father saying that his grandfather enjoyed ‘Taoist loafing’ which contained within it some ‘crane-like elegance’. In Korea the crane, especially the ash-coloured one, is an emblem of elegantia.)
At this time, the oppression by the Japanese imperialists was reaching its culmination. The Japanese soldiers and police ravaged the land, carrying off most of the agricultural products of the Korean farmers. My father took any work he could find to sustain his life. In the end he found a village where he could work as a drudge for a rich farmer. He started out early in the morning, returning to his room late at night, sometimes as late as midnight. This reduced him to a state of inexpressible tiredness.

One day my father came upon a small church near his village and he participated in the service, which was led by a Canadian missionary. In the course of time he became a Christian, being baptised by the missionary. (Long afterwards my father said to me that, as well as finding his individual salvation in Christianity, he also found a hopeful way to the modernisation of Korean society, especially in regard to minjung’s education.) So he came to believe in Jesus Christ and began to serve the church with desperate intensity. He gave his all to learning and coming to understand the sayings of Jesus and the Bible, and after some years was elected as an elder of the Presbyterian church.

Meanwhile my father had also been ardently concerned to eradicate the illiteracy of minjung, the poor, lower people, because he always thought that lack of education and of a modernised educational system available to the people was one of the basic causes of the country’s collapsing and becoming colonised by the Japanese imperialists. And now an educational system for the younger generation was the country’s most urgent need for regaining its independent sovereignty.

This led to my father’s dreaming of building an educational institute, because there was nothing of the kind in the village. He never gave up this thought as he went on clandestinely teaching the younger generation the Korean and the Chinese characters, while he was teaching them about the sayings of the Bible each Sunday. (Though, under the imperial regime, he had never himself attended a modem educational institution, he could read and
write the Chinese characters as a result of his father and grandfather having intermittently
given lessons in great Chinese classics such as the Four Books [The Analects of Confucius,
The Works of Mencius, The Doctrine of the Mean and The Great Learning] and the Three
Classics [The Book of Odes, The Canon of History and The Book of Changes]. He showed his
erudition especially in his handling of The Analects of Confucius and he also displayed his
excellent calligraphy in his handling of these texts. As well, he taught himself to read and
write Korean.)

And then at last, all of a sudden, my father, indeed, all those oppressed under Japanese
imperialism met, with indescribable rapture, the blessed liberation which resulted from the
victory of the allies on 15 August, 1945.

After the liberation, my father became a peasant, in accordance with the agricultural policy
of the new Korean government. Now his social status was elevated from slavery to liberty, so
that he was able to enjoy much individual freedom and leisure. He could never conquer his
poverty, however, mainly because he was too altruistic, at a time when absolute poverty was
rampant in Korean society.

Notwithstanding his poverty, my father gave up neither his vision of establishing an
educational institute nor his own desire to study theology systematically. This vision kept him
teaching the younger generation through the church more and more frequently, and in the end,
every night of the week. At the same time, he did attend a small theological seminary in Seoul
for a while. But then, alas, the Korean War broke out.

Even during the war my father did not give up his vision of establishing a school and when
the war ended in a stalemate, he and his friends did in fact build a middle school, though this
was no easy task. The story of how these difficulties were overcome is worth recounting in
some detail.
When my father and his comrades began to make their plans for the new schoolhouse, they lacked both the materials and the appropriate support for the job. Fortunately they found a patron. He was a battalion commander with the U.S. Army and he promised to provide the materials, cement and timber and so on, necessary for the construction. He failed to keep his promise, however, when he was put under pressure by the local Member of Parliament, who wanted the materials for other purposes. My father was filled with indignation against the two of them, but especially against the army officer who had the materials at his disposal and had promised to make them available for the school building project. Eventually my father went to confront the army officer at his barracks. Having worked in the fields all day and having spent the evening teaching the children, it was quite late at night by the time he approached the barracks, where he was challenged by a sentry and asked to give the password. When it became clear that he did not know the password, the sentry was preparing to shoot when my father, moved by a desperate hope, took his courage in both hands and cried out in Korean, “Help me! Help me! I believe in Jesus Christ.”

The sentry knew no Korean, but there is enough similarity between the Korean pronunciation of the name of Christ and the English pronunciation to give the sentry pause, and an interpreter later told my father that this was what had saved him. As a consequence, a sentry brought him before the commander and with the aid of an interpreter he expressed his indignation at the fact that the officer was going to break the promise he had made and he implored him to think better of it. The commander would not listen to him and tempers were roused as my father pleaded with him and he defended himself, until my father seized him by the throat and they began to fight with each other, rolling over and over on the damp ground outside the barracks.

As he fought, my father was filled with a feeling of bitterness, resignation and despair and eventually began to weep, venting his feelings by swearing loudly at the officer. “American
number ten,” he cried. (The Canadian missionary had taught him a few English words and “American number ten” was the most spiteful English phrase he could think of.) Eventually the American was overwhelmed by my father’s indefatigable pleading and agreed to help him. Thus the school was built.

(I heard this story told by my father in his last sermon preached at the small church which he had himself established. In some strange way he seemed to know at the time that he was approaching the end of his life and he preached a sermon titled, “My experiences through the thirty years since the Liberation.” When he uttered his ‘spiteful’ swear-word, “American number ten,” we could see the tears welling up in his eyes. This sermon, which was also a kind of personal confession, was the only time in his life that he told us about his past experiences.)

After the school was built, my father served for ten years as vice-principal, teaching the young students the Chinese classics and the Bible, while, at the same time, he attended the Hankuk Theological Seminary for three years in order that he might become a pastor. Meanwhile, the local landowner became the principal and chairperson of the school board.

My father’s theological college, the HTS, was a Presbyterian seminary established in 1938. In it, radical theological trends and viewpoints had been taught. After the war, my father was invited to join in a special course, training men for pastorship. This invitation came from a man who had first come to our village to seek refuge from the communists during the war. This man had been excommunicated by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in 1953 because of his radical and progressive theological views and had subsequently established a new denomination named ‘The Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea (PROK or PCROK)’. When he came to our village, he was befriended by my father and the school principal, who both helped to keep him safe from the communist threat, and this led to a sincere friendship developing between him and my father.
After his ordination my father served the church as school chaplain, but then he retired from the school both as chaplain and vice-principal and established a new church. It was a small and humble church in which I myself served as accompanist for ten years.

Finally, my father died on a fine summer day in 1975, three days after the above-mentioned sermon, having served the church as pastor and having proclaimed the gospel to the people of his village, people who stubbornly adhered to their own shamanism. He died on a Wednesday, while preparing his sermon for a prayer meeting which was to be held that day, dreaming perhaps of the resurrection of all people and especially of the minjung at the end of time.

I was born in 1956, being the fourth son of my father. At this time he was engaged in his theological studies at the HTS. He taught me the Confucian way of thinking as well as the Christian one. He also taught me the way human beings should live and what we should live for, giving particular emphasis to honesty as his maxim for life. It was through him that I learned the sayings of Jesus Christ and the Bible. And through this learning, my Christian world-view was firmly established, even though it was blended with Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist ways of thinking. My father, together with my mother, really had great influence on the establishing of my view of life, my Christian faith, my views about virtue and truth, and my Christian viewpoint regarding the ultimate meaning of our existence. In short, I was so deeply influenced by my father that, when he suggested to me, before his death, that he wanted me to study theology systematically and profoundly, I could not but resolve to follow this, his dying wish, a wish which I knew had developed out of his lifelong han (which here means partly ‘regret’) in the face of his own lack of a comprehensive understanding of theology. This is what has led me to my theological studies up to the present.
INTRODUCTION

1. Raising Questions about the Meaning of Human Existence in the Midst of Suffering

Neither at our home

Nor at the home of one of our relatives
Nor even at our hometown
Our father faced his last moment on no bed at that night
Filled with the chirping of grass-insects.

To his son and daughter
Whom he had painfully brought up
By working even in the territory of Russia
He left no word.
...
Laying his head on the tree-made pillow

Into his two eyes unable to be opened again
His unblown bud of dream sank.
His limbs gradually got cold,
And his lip pointed to the eternal stop of his heart.
After the doctor coming too late went back home with no word
His face reflecting the grey of the morning with snow
Was silently covered by the hands of an old-aged neighbour.
We prostrated ourselves near his head,
Crying ourselves sick.

Our father faced his last moment on no bed at that night

Filled with the chirping of grass-insects.¹

This poem was composed by a poet who had experienced extreme poverty and hardship under the Japanese imperialist colonisation of Korea during the first half of the 20th century. In this poem the poet writes of the bleak experience of his family’s dire fate during his childhood. The dark experience begins with his father dying away from home, a father who sustained his family’s living by smuggling salt into Russia. With the death of the father anxiety, frustration, trouble and despair come to the family, especially to the children, who were totally dependent upon their father.² Looking at the father’s closed eyes, into which ‘his unblown bud of dream sank,’ the poet experiences excruciating pain full of inconsolable grief. This kind of experience is called han,³ and people as the bearers of han are called minjung.⁴

Why did the father in this poem have to face the last moment of his life in absolute solitude, with the agony of ‘his unblown bud of dream’? Why did the children have to weep inconsolably in their excruciating pain of grief? We are simply asking: why must people suffer? Why must so many anonymous minjung suffer from han? Can we find any meaning in

² Cf. ibid., p. 155.
³ Briefly, han is the most painful mentality that the Korean minjung have accumulated through their inescapable and insurmountable suffering from oppression throughout the whole Korean history. As Nam-Dong Suh expresses: “Han is an accumulation of suppressed and condensed experiences of oppression.” (Nam-Dong Suh, “Towards a Theology of Han,” in Yong-Bock Kim, ed., Minjung Theology: People as the Subject of History [Singapore: The Commission on Theological Concerns, The Christian Conference of Asia, 1981], p. 60.) In this thesis han is conceptualised atomistically and holistically. Atomistically, han is composed of five elements: excruciating pain, pining for something unattainable, waiting, autogenous sadness, and resignation. Holistically, han is identified with hwangohit (yellow ochre) han studded with nihilistic Weltanschauung and fundamental han. For the details of han, see below, Chapter IV, Sections A and B.
⁴ There are various definitions of minjung used in the fields of sciences and religions in Korea, which can be seen in the final chapter. Briefly, minjung as the bearers of han are the oppressed people who are manipulated, exploited and alienated politically, economically, socially and culturally. Because in this thesis minjung as the bearers of han are so closely related to han, the domain of which is expanded even to God (I call this God’s han), my attempt to define minjung cannot but be made after my conceptualisation of han, and after my establishment of God’s han. This is why my definition of minjung comes so late in the final chapter. For the details of minjung, see below, Chapter V, Section C-a: “Definitions of Minjung.”
human existence studded with suffering? Is it really possible for us to ask a question of the meaning of minjung suffering under the name of han? If God exists, does God give to us any answer to the question of the meaning of human existence in the midst of suffering? If so, what is the answer? Where are we to find it? Can we really find any clue to the answer in our history?

2. The Main Concern of the Thesis

This thesis is concerned about the above-mentioned questions. That is to say, it is about the question of the meaning of human existence, especially, of the existence of minjung filled with han, one example of which is found in the life of ‘our father’ in the above poem, and about my attempt to find an answer to the question. In this thesis I try to find an answer to the question of meaning, asked on the basis of han, with the help of the concept of resurrection in Christianity. Why would I try to find an answer to the question of meaning in the Christian belief in the resurrection? To answer that, I consider first some possibilities of our future fate and begin by considering the absurd aspect of the resurrection as a possibility of humanity’s future fate.

5 Whenever I use the expression ‘the question of meaning’ in this thesis, I mean by it the question of the meaning of han, a typical representative of human suffering. Hence the question of meaning in this thesis is nothing other than the question of the meaning of suffering.

If an attempt is to be made to find an answer to the question of meaning in the resurrection, this attempt is intrinsically teleological. Here the resurrection plays a salvific role. Teleologically, the question of meaning cannot be asked in the cyclic view of time, as in Hellenism, because in this view “the idea that redemption is to take place through divine action in the course of events it time is impossible.” (O. Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History, rev. ed., trans. Floyd V. Filson [London: SCM Press, 1962], p. 52.) In Hellenism redemption is spatially determined. That is to say, redemption here means the transferring of our existence from this time-conditioned phenomenological world to the time-transcendental Beyond. (Cf. Ibid.) Notably, Buddhism also has the circular view of time. In contrast, the Biblical view of time is rectilinear. In this view salvation is accomplished at the end of time. As Cullmann puts it: “Because time is thought of as a progressing line, it is possible here for something to be ‘fulfilled’; a divine plan can move forward to complete execution, the goal which beckons at the end of the line can give to the entire process which is taking place all along the line the impulse to strive thither; …” (Ibid., pp. 53-4.) The question of meaning can be asked only in this view of time. For Cullmann’s contrast between the Hellenistic and the Biblical views of time, cf. ibid., pp. 51ff.
What is the meaning of our existence? Is there any meaning for our life? Can any ultimate meaning be found in time, where “[t]here are no absolutes,” and “from the beginning to the end of [which] all is time-conditioned”? Especially, is it really meaningful for Christians to ask about their future fate with relation to Jesus’ resurrection? Is it really permissible for them to believe with reference to Jesus’ resurrection that “something else will come,” as in the following poem?

But we have all got to die, and disintegrate.

We have got to die in life, too, and disintegrate while we live.

But even then the goal is not death.

Something else will come.8

What, then, does the future mean to Christians? Is the future really open to Christians and all humanity? Can all human beings have an optimistic vision for the future under the guidance of the Christian doctrines and dogmas? If there is a gap between the Christian doctrines and dogmas and the modern Weltanschauung, and if these doctrines and dogmas give no meaning to the lives of human beings influenced by the modern scientific and technological world picture, then of what use is it to talk about the human future in these Christian terms? Regarding this modern world, Dostoyevsky speaks of the ‘man-god,’ who, “[v]anquishing nature hour by hour, already without limits, by his will and science, …will thereby experience, hour by hour, a pleasure so elevated that it will replace all his former

hopes of celestial pleasures." Of what use is it to tell such a person about his or her future in the terms of the old Christian traditions? What then can be the raison d'être of Christianity?

We live in an anthropocentric and materialistic era. Living in this era and with this Weltanschauung, how can we accept the Christian otherworldly doctrines? And must we not reject faith in the resurrection which is the basis of Christianity, and with which Christianity stands or falls? From the modern scientific point of view, how can the resurrection be understood and proved? From the materialistic point of view, how can the bodily resurrection have a meaning? Modern humankind, haunted by its technological and scientific success, thinks that it is a nonsense or an idle talk, as Dostoevsky anticipated: “Every man will discover that he is wholly mortal, without the possibility of resurrection, and will accept death proudly and calmly, like a god.”10 If the resurrection is only a nonsense or an idle talk, then what is the meaning of the existence of God’s church in which the resurrection is proclaimed, and in which so many Christians gather every Sunday to confess their belief in the resurrection? Even though the question of the origin of the church is investigated by the application of the historico-critical method, it is obvious that the church began with the Apostles’ faith in the risen Lord. But if the resurrection can no longer appeal to modern humankind without religion, and even to some Christians, it is reduced to a fossilised article of Christian faith, and the church, whose foundation is the very faith in the resurrection, has no cause for its existence. If the church no longer exists, there also cannot be Christians any longer, and the church will become one of the traditional relics in which only some people, such as historians, archaeologists, etc., are interested. And the resurrection, which was the point of departure of the church, and has been an object of so many people’s hope, will be stripped of its dynamic, future-oriented meaning. It will fall away into the pit of a dead language-game.

10 Ibid.
If the term, ‘resurrection,’ is destined to be buried deep in the storage of dead languages some day in the future, then what alternative is there to the ‘resurrection’ for explaining humanity’s fate, especially minjung’s fate, with regard to the question of meaning? What is their state of being after death? In addressing ourselves to these serious questions, we cannot help asking other fundamental, ontological questions related to the question of the meaning of our existence *hic et nunc*: “Who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going? What are we waiting for? What awaits us?”11 If we cannot but fall into the darkness of nothingness after death, then what are we? What must we do, while we suffer so ephemeral a life in which all we can do is struggle against uncertainty and anxiety, if our existence is destined to be absolutely terminated in death? If our fate is not different from that of animals, plants, or even rocks in terms of the extermination of existence, what does the ontological question about our transient existence mean? Of what use is it asking about our fate after death, or in the time to come? Is it not out of the question that we ask the question of the meaning of our existence full of suffering? In the long run, all these questions would seem to lead us to nihilism.

As an alternative to the resurrection the concept of the immortality of the soul can be considered. This concept stems from the ancient Greek philosophers’ way of thinking according to which human being is made up body and soul. In *Phaedrus* the soul is compared to a winged charioteer ruling a pair of horses, one of which is “fine and good and of noble stock, and the other the opposite in every way.”12 The Platonic Socrates explains the whence of the human soul by means of the soul’s pre-existence. How did the soul come to be given to the body? He describes it on the basis of the concept of the pre-existent soul’s transmigration:

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Soul taken as a whole is in charge of all that is inanimate, and traverses the entire universe, appearing at different times in different forms. When it is perfect and winged it moves on high and governs all creation, but the soul that has shed its wings falls until it encounters solid matter. There it settles and puts on an earthly body, which appears to be self-moving because of the power of soul that is in it, and this combination of soul and body is given the name of a living being and is termed mortal.\textsuperscript{13}

According to this description, what is mortal is only the body. The soul “is immortal; because what is always in motion is immortal,”\textsuperscript{14} and the soul is a self-mover, that is, “self-motion is of the very nature of soul.”\textsuperscript{15} It is natural, then, that the body should be condemned as the “walking sepulchre”\textsuperscript{16} of the soul, because the soul is thought to be bound to the body like an oyster to its shell.\textsuperscript{17} From the viewpoint of this dichotomy of the person, the only way out of the soul from the imprisonment in the body is its separation from the body, which means death.

We have no means of evidence to establish whether the soul’s movement towards a higher, brighter and mystic state via its transmigration is our fate or not. Similarly, we cannot be sure that the truth of our fate is to be found in the Buddhist view that the ego in a living body is in the ‘way’\textsuperscript{18} to the attainment of nirvana. What is obvious, however, is that all human beings are inherently afraid of death. And the intrinsic fear of death by all living beings cannot be explained by the perspective of the soul-centred transmigration, in which

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 57.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} This means the ‘Aryan Eightfold Way or Path’, which is “defined in terms of right understanding, right aspiration, right speech, right action, right mode of livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, and right concentration.” (S. Neill, \textit{Christian Faith and Other Faiths: The Christian Dialogue with Other Religions} [London et al.: Oxford University Press, 1961], p. 117.)
the soul attains its genuine freedom through the death of its body. That is to say, there is a contradiction between the phenomenological thanatophobia by all living beings and the view of the soul’s transmigration for genuine freedom, which disregards the seriousness of the body’s death and suffering. It seems to me that we cannot find a genuine answer to the question of the meaning of human existence in suffering from this point of view.

Another possibility to be considered as an alternative to the resurrection can be sought in the concept of ‘process’. Process philosophy, the proximate cause of which seems to be Darwinian evolutionism,\textsuperscript{19} and which, “in a very broad sense, … is classifiable as philosophy of science,”\textsuperscript{20} sees the reality of the world in process. Heraclitus, who can be most obviously designated as the father of process philosophy,\textsuperscript{21} thinks of fire among all phenomena as the one most in process.\textsuperscript{22} He universalises constant movement in the striking image of the flowing stream such that one cannot step into the same river twice:\textsuperscript{23} “This world was made neither by gods nor by men, but always was, now is, and shall be—an everliving fire, catching in measures and going out in measures.”\textsuperscript{24} From the process philosopher’s viewpoint on the basis of the Heraclitean concept of ‘constant change’, there is nothing that has its own immutable being. Everything is in becoming. In this becoming all things enjoy an organised system in which things not previously existent may come into existence, and within which something coming into existence neither remains intact, nor is simply located and relocated from one place to another, but emerges step by step within time. The creativity of its genesis causes it to be involved in real transformation rather than mere relocation.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, in becoming the future cannot be prognosticated, and is open, on account of the

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{21} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{22} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{23} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 14-5.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 15.
creative will, to real transformation in things already existing. According to Charles Hartshorne, “even an omnipotent God could not ‘see’ the future, because it is not ‘there’ to be seen; it implies no limitation of God to say that he cannot ‘see’ what does not exist.”

On this view, therefore, there is no fixed horizon of the future onto which human beings can project themselves, because there is a space between the present and the future, in which they must precariously travel through the labyrinth posited by Nature’s providence, or by the will of the universe, to the unforeseeable state of the future.

The view of the future in process philosophy, however, is not pessimistic, because all things in process develop. The universe is in process, orientating towards a goal. To put it more accurately, if we adopt an evolutionary point of view, all phenomena themselves are always processes or parts of processes, and the universe itself is a gigantic process, a process of becoming, of attaining new levels and dimensions of existence. In the centre of the process of the becoming of being, humankind will develop until it reaches the state of “ultrahominisation.” Teilhard de Chardin called this state the ‘Omega Point’, the final state of the process of human convergence.

Patently, process is based on matter from its beginning. In other words, matter is the only prerequisite of process. This is very plausible in the opinion of modern science. In that case, however, how can the problem of the origin of human mind, or human mental activity, be explained? Is there any room for human mind (soul, or spirit) to reside in the process of all actual entities ex nihilo?

We find a possible solution to these questions in T. de Chardin’s idea of ‘mental evolution’ in line with the organic evolution. He maintains that following the

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complexification of simple organs, the potential mind-like properties in them came into being as an actual entity. To put it in more biological terms, as J. Huxley had once understood it, “mind is generated by or in complex organisations of living matter, capable of receiving information of many qualities or modalities about events both in the outer world and in itself, or synthesising and processing that information in various organised forms, and of utilising it to direct present and future action—in other words, by higher animals with their sense-organs, nerves, brains, and muscles.”

More comprehensively, using the concept of ‘involution’, de Chardin explains the origin of human mental activity in terms of the cosmic evolution of matter: “… if the universe, regarded sidereally, is in process of spatial expansion (from the infinitesimal to the immense), in the same way and still more clearly it presents itself to us, physicochemically, as in process of organic involution upon itself (from the extremely simple to the extremely complex)—and, moreover, this particular involution ‘of complexity’ is experimentally bound up with a correlative increase in interiorisation, that is to say in the psyche or consciousness.”

From the viewpoint of this evolutionary process, mentality is subordinated to physicality. Without a physical body there can be neither mind nor soul. Accordingly, there can be no dichotomisation of a person into body and soul, nor can there be the trichotomisation of a person into body, soul and spirit. The body and the soul can never be separated from each other, though one cannot be sure that the soul is involved in the mind, or the mental activity generated by the organic complexification. When this idea is related to human fate after death, we can deduce that an individual soul has no option but to be dissolved at the time of its body’s being decayed, though we are not sure whether it will be absorbed into the world soul to which the whole process of all the actual entities is subjected, or into nothingness. In either case, in this opinion, animus singularis evanescit.

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30 T. de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, p. 329. (author’s emphasis)
Until now, two alternatives to the resurrection have been considered: the immortality of the soul and the *evanescentia animi singularis*. These two are worthy of consideration as alternatives to the resurrection, because each of them depicts human destiny in its own systematic way. Like the resurrection, however, both of them also have absurdities in how they describe the unforeseeable enigma of the future state of human beings. In the former idea, for example, a soul can be said to have passed through from one body to another during its travel through the chains of transmigration to its most elegant and refined state. What is problematic here is that a body cannot have its own personal identity, while an immortal soul can enjoy moving with its own personal identity onto the highest plateau in which all sorts and conditions of gods reside.\(^{31}\) In that case, it is hard to know what ‘I’ means to me: it may only be said that if my self is represented by the soul of which my personal identity consists, then this self does not belong to me but rather to a pre-existent soul, which has existed through many bodies. My body, which is the only representative of my personal identity in the world of phenomena, is sooner or later decayed with its separation from the soul, and vanishes into nothingness. In ordinary usage, however, ‘I’ seems to include the bodily life as well as the soul.

The problem of personal identity also arises for the process philosophers. In this case, however, it is the soul that is problematic, not the body. In all the progressions, what emerges into actual entities has its own identity. Even a soul (or mind), which is subordinate to its body, can be thought to have its own personal identity, though only during the time of its body’s being alive. But as it was already mentioned above, in this evolutionist viewpoint, it is impossible to think that human mentality (or soul) can exist without its physical body. Then, what will happen to human individual consciousness after its body’s death? There is no way

\(^{31}\) Curiously, unlike this, in Hinduism and Buddhism the goal of the soul’s travel through birth and rebirth is to discard its ego, which represents its individuality, so that it may finally merge into the Infinite (or Nirvana) without individual consciousness, memory, or boundaries of any kind. Cf. S. Neill, *Christian faith and Other Faiths*, p. 111.
in which this question can be logically explained by this idea, although de Chardin tried to explain it in his fundamental principle that ‘union differentiates’, which means that, while evolution is always moving toward greater complexity, it does so in a way which preserves the individual identity of the parts.\textsuperscript{32} It can be explained more plausibly in this way, avoiding the predicament of human fate falling into the annihilated nothingness—every individual soul (or mental activity), while its personal identity is kept in it even after its body’s death, is united with the ‘Cosmic Energy’ causing the whole universe to move toward the ultimate culmination\textsuperscript{33}—but the prerequisite for this is that the power of the mental activity should be able to be converted into material energy.\textsuperscript{34} If this can be permitted, then de Chardin’s bold imagination may appeal to the logicality of modern humanity:

Christ, principle of universal vitality because sprung up as man among men, put himself in the position (maintained ever since) to subdue under himself, to purify, to direct and superanimate the general ascent of consciousness into which he inserted himself. By a perennial act of communion and sublimation, he aggregates to himself the total psychism of the earth. And when he has gathered everything together and transformed everything, he will close in upon himself and his conquests, thereby rejoining, in a final gesture, the divine focus he has never left. Then, as St. Paul tells us, \textit{God shall be in all}.\textsuperscript{35}

But, even though based on the materialistic technology and science, this is not as yet acknowledged by modern humankind to be intellectually sound. So de Chardin’s own claim that personal identity can be preserved in such a union ends in what remains a vague and mystical vision.

\textsuperscript{32} Cf. de Chardin, \textit{The Phenomenon of Man}, pp. 288ff.
\textsuperscript{33} T. de Chardin obviously argues against the thought that \textit{animus singularis evanescei}: “The conclusion is inevitable that the concentration of a conscious universe would be unthinkable if it did not reassemble in itself \textit{all consciousesses as well as all the conscious}; each particular consciousness remaining conscious of itself at the end of the operation, and even ... each particular consciousness becoming still more itself and thus more clearly distinct from others the closer it gets to them in Omega.” (\textit{Idem, The Phenomenon of Man}, p. 287; author’s italics)
\textsuperscript{34} J. Huely perspicuously points out the difficulty of understanding de Chardin’s attitude towards this problem: “He seeks to link the evolution of mind with the concept of energy. If I understand him right, he envisages two forms of energy, or perhaps two modes in which it is manifested—energy in the physicists’ sense, measurable or calculable by physical methods, and ‘psychic energy’ which increases with the complexity of organised units. ... It is ... visionary: but it is the product of a comprehensive and coherent vision.” (J. Huely, “Introduction,” in de Chardin, \textit{The Phenomenon of Man}, pp. 16-7.)
\textsuperscript{35} T. de Chardin, \textit{The Phenomenon of Man}, p. 322. (author’s italics)
It is evident *a priori* that these possibilities and the others not mentioned (for example, the taoistic or the shamanistic viewpoint of human fate after death) cannot be realised simultaneously to humankind in the other world. Contemplating these possibilities for human fate in the future, we cannot help asking a question: which is the genuine one? But we cannot give an answer *a posteriori* to this question. This is our limitation. All that we can do is to know that we can only long for the possibility chosen by our own will on the basis of our faith. Here we must confess that faith is the only way to the choice of one possibility, though we in this world cannot be sure whether the choice on the basis of our faith—a faith that is not itself our own choice but in some ways is inevitable to us—is a right one or not.

In Christianity, the resurrection is handed down as the only possibility of human fate in the future. As mentioned above, the idea of ‘resurrection’ is so absurd that modern human beings find it difficult to choose as the only possible occurrence to happen to them in the time to come. Modern Christians nevertheless accept and cherish this legacy as the foundation of their faith, because they acknowledge that faith must be founded on tradition, and this acknowledgment forces them to follow the mode of faith of their predecessors. For their future they are willing to remain with the hope for the resurrection, because any other alternative does not appeal logically to them. Therefore, in their venture of faith they can dream of a pilgrimage to the *ens perfectissimum* on the futuristic horizon of hope for the resurrection. In the long run, in their very venture of faith Christians cannot avoid the challenge of this stumbling block, that is, the absurdity of the resurrection. It is through their venture of faith that they try to overcome the absurdity of the resurrection, to hope for the resurrection as the only possible turning point of human history and a point at which all sorts of absurdities in human society and all kinds of human sufferings will be extirpated—so that this world may be transformed into the world created anew by God—and to realise *hic et
nunc what is required by faith in the resurrection in the past and hope for the resurrection in the future.

In this thesis I select the resurrection as the most plausible possibility for human future fate. The selection is based upon the venture of my personal faith. In my faith-guided opinion, there is no better explanation for human future fate than the resurrection. Hence I make an attempt to find an answer to the question of meaning in the resurrection.

The historical basis for my thought of the resurrection as the most plausible possibility of human future fate is Jesus’ resurrection. It plays a pivotal role in establishing Christian faith as a genuine faith in the proper sense. Christianity stands or falls with the truth of Jesus’ resurrection. In my opinion, Christian faith cannot seek the ultimate truth-claim without Jesus’ resurrection. This means that in and through it we can ask the question of meaning. Without it, we cannot ultimately explain why we do and must suffer. Without it, our futuristic hope for our own resurrection is futile, which means that the selection of the resurrection as the most plausible possibility of our future fate is based upon a superstition. Without it, the Kingdom of God, in which “he [God] will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning nor crying nor pain any more [Rev. 21:4; RSV],” is to be tantamount to “the highest of all castles in the air, the pure light-castle of paradise[, to which] Christ’s ascension was considered the highway.”

36 In that case, we ourselves cannot but fall into a pit of anomic, crying in despair: “World, society, and life are neither intact, humane, nor meaningful. In them there is much about night, hardship, meaninglessness, negativity and death. How is God’s salvation related to this real hopelessness? How is God’s meaningfulness related to the really experiential meaninglessness in this world?”

37 This is the fundamental reason why I try to find an answer to the question of the meaning of our existence, studded with suffering, in the resurrection.

3. The Unfolding of the Thesis

When we consider Jesus’ resurrection, our consideration of it is naturally focused on its historicity. No one can deny that historicity is the most important and urgent aporia to be solved in considering Jesus’ resurrection. How can and must we deal with this aporia?

As for the basic material for dealing properly with the aporia of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, we know that we have a legacy of human history handed down to us over many generations and successive centuries: the New Testament. It is only the New Testament that records the resurrection as an event which actually occurred after the painful death of a man, Jesus of Nazareth, on a cross.\(^{38}\) In the New Testament we encounter the resurrected Jesus, who “was raised (ἐγέρθη) on the third day” (1 Cor. 15:4), visually “appeared to (ὁφθη)” the disciples (1 Cor. 15:5-8), and “was lifted up (ἀνῄρηθ”) (Acts 1:9) into heaven. And all the Gospels tell us that the disciples found Jesus’ tomb empty. How do we interpret these descriptions?

Examining the resurrection texts in the New Testament for an interpretation\(^{39}\) of these descriptions of the resurrected Jesus, we find that in them there is a trend among their authors

\(^{38}\) Of course, we are given some reports of Jesus’ resurrection in such Apocryphal writings as The Gospel of the Hebrews, the Gospel of Peter, Epistula Apostolorum, Acts of Pilate. When we try to use these for the interpretation of the resurrection, however, what is problematic is their authenticity. For the texts of the resurrection narratives of these books, see R. H. Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), pp. 189-197.

\(^{39}\) All subsequent interpreters of the resurrection must find the starting point of their interpretation in the resurrection narratives depicted in the New Testament, though in the sphere of ancient mythology it is asserted that before the New Testament era the concept of the resurrection had been already established in the ancient Near Eastern myths, and the hope of the resurrection of the dead, the roots of which lie in ancient Persian ideas which became woven into Judaism, is, in its origin, not a specifically Christian hope at all. (Cf. W. Marxsen, The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, trans. M. Kohl [London: SCM Press, 1970], p. 175; also cf. D. S. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic [London: SCM Press, 1964], pp. 385ff.) The interpreter in his or her own Weltanschauung and Zeitegeist looks into the narratives which were written down and formed into a text under the influence of the writers’ own world pictures. So between the interpreter and the text there is always a gap that cannot be made narrow. And the interpreter sets up his or her criteria for judging the tradition of interpretation in order to find another possibility of interpretation. In this respect, the text is not absolutely objective, and the interpreter’s interpretation of the text is not absolutely subjective. Here the interpretation of the resurrection comes to fall into the category of a hermeneutical interpretation, because, although the resurrection narratives are objectively confined in a text, “the meaning that governs our interpretation of the text is not an act of subjectivity but forms a sense of community that binds us to a tradition,” which “we produce ourselves insofar as we understand and participate in the evolution of a tradition.” (T. Hoy, Praxis, Truth, and Liberation: Essays on Gadamer, Taylor, Polanyi, Habermas, Gutierrez, and Ricoeur [Lanham: University Press

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to emphasise the historicity of the event itself. Paul emphasises the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection by enumerating the witnesses to the post-resurrection appearances (1 Cor. 15: 5-8). Even though they do not depict the *brutum factum* of Jesus’ resurrection, the writers of the Gospels in the New Testament do emphasise it by describing Jesus’ resurrection through the ‘picture’ narratives such as the disciples’ finding the tomb of Jesus empty (Mt. 28:1-8; Mk. 16:1-8; Lk. 24:1-11; Jn. 20: 1-10), and the resurrected Jesus’ corporeal appearances to the disciples (Mt. 28:16-20; Mk. 16:9-1841; Lk. 24:13-49; Jn. 20:11-21:24). Why did the writers of the resurrection texts try to emphasise the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection without reporting the resurrection event as such? Asking more naively, what was the basis of their claim that Jesus’ resurrection was an event that really occurred *illie et tunc?* Was it the *brutum factum* of the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, or only their belief in Jesus’ resurrection, which caused their faith? Here we are confronted with the most difficult problem to be solved in interpreting the resurrection texts.

In spite of the difficulty in solving the aporia of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection through interpreting the resurrection texts, I have to confront the aporia bravely, because for me Jesus’ resurrection is the only clue in human history to solve the question of meaning. More concretely, it is because Jesus’ resurrection is an enigmatic cicatrix42 in human history,

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40 I follow here Heinrich Ott’s concept of ‘picture’. According to him, “our experience of reality always has to do with ‘picture’ and never with ‘facts’ (in the sense of *bruta facta*) … [R]eality itself is the first to impress itself upon us in the form of pictures … We can have experience only of a picture, and there is no access to reality which precedes that of experience.” (H. Ott, “The Historical Jesus and the Ontology of History,” in Carl E. Braaten and Roy A. Harrisville, trans. and eds., *The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ* [New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1964], pp. 160-1.) We have the report not of the *brutum factum* of Jesus’ resurrection, but of the disciples’ experience of their encountering the risen One in the resurrection narratives in the New Testament. Thus, they can be called the ‘picture’ narratives. For Ott’s detailed explanation of the concept of ‘picture’, cf. *ibid.,* pp. 159-71.

41 The original text of *The Gospel according to Mark*, which ends with 16:8, has no description of the resurrected Jesus’ appearance to the disciples.

42 I chose these words, because I think that there is a similarity between Jesus’ resurrection and Kafka’s ‘Castle’. In Kafka’s *The Castle* the Castle is hard to be grasped: “… the longer he looked [at the Castle], the less he could make out and the deeper everything was lost in the twilight.” (F. Kafka, *The Castle*, trans. W. and E. Muir [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1957], p. 97.) Perhaps by the ‘Castle’ Kafka emblemsifies human epistemological-ontological limitation, which has to be intrinsically put to human efforts to approach the
the one and only cicatrix on the basis of which we can make an attempt to solve the question of meaning. Hence this thesis begins with the aporia of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.

In dealing with this aporia, I am primarily concerned with the systematic-theological consideration of the resurrection. My first attention will be given to Karl Barth’s understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. I have selected him first, because in his understanding I could see a possibility to relate Christian belief in the resurrection to the question of meaning. Before I examine his understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection in the form of expounding in the first chapter, I will give particular attention to his view of history, which will be contrasted with the history of han in the fifth chapter.

In the second chapter I will deal with Wolfhart Pannenberg’s understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. I have selected him because I found something interesting in his claim that Jesus’ resurrection is historical-critically verifiable. Here again, I will give my attention to his view of history before examining his understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, which will be contrasted with the history of han in the fifth chapter.

In the third chapter I will first criticize Pannenberg’s establishment of Jesus’ resurrection as something historico-critically verifiable. Then I will relate my view of the role of faith in understanding the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, as found in Barth’s understanding of it, to the question of meaning.

In the fourth chapter I will ask the question of the meaning of the minjung existence full of han. In so doing, I will first examine the unique historical background contributing to the

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ultimate truth-claim. In that case, the ‘Castle’ is paralleled with Jesus’ resurrection, which in my opinion cannot be grasped by any means of human intellect and reasoning but only by the means of faith. In faith, Jesus’ resurrection is grasped as something that happened historically. Even in faith, however, it does not come to us crystal clear as something real in human history. It just comes to us as a pure object of faith, which can be shattered in our mental domain of faith and evaporated from it whenever we doubt its historical reality. This is why I call Jesus’ resurrection an ‘enigmatic cicatrix’. Epistemologically-ontologically, it exists as an enigma; but it exists as the only ‘cicatrix’ for healing human history studded with unjustifiable suffering. In this regard, this expression can be replaced by ‘ineffable paradox’, as Prof. Andrew Sung Park, one of my supervisors, suggested.
formation of 
han in the Korean minjung psyche, which will be followed by my own conceptualisation of han.

In the fifth and final chapter I will seek an answer to the question of meaning in the resurrection. In so doing, I will first contrast the above-mentioned theologians’ views of history with the history of han, which will be followed by dealing with the Christian understanding of the suffering of God. This will entail the pursuit of a solution to the aporia of the why of evil. Then I will try to find an answer to the question of meaning in ‘resurrection’ in two ways. First, I will consider the passive and active solutions to han as the praxis of resurrection, which forms the practical part of the answer. Second, I will consider Jesus’ resurrection as forming the fundamental part of the answer, that is, Jesus’ resurrection as the only fundamentum of the answer to the question of meaning.

The final chapter will be followed by a conclusion, in which I will mention a radical understanding of the resurrection in relation to the ‘domain-oriented’ dualism. Then a summary and a bibliography will follow the conclusion.

4. The transliteration


CHAPTER I. JESUS’ RESURRECTION AS A NON-HISTORICAL BUT HISTORICAL EVENT: KARL BARTH

Karl Barth understands Jesus’ resurrection as a non-historical but historical event. On the one hand, he claims the resurrection as a non-historical event on the basis of his view of history as ‘salvation history’ (= the ‘history of the covenant of grace’). Hence we need to consider his view of salvation history before we deal with the non-historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. Before considering Barth’s salvation history, I will deal with a theme regarding
the meaning and telos of history, which can be related to the main theme of this thesis, as a prolegomena to the understanding of Barth’s salvation history. On the other hand, he claims the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection from the perspective of the concreteness of the incarnation. Hence we will consider the concreteness of the incarnation before dealing with his claim of the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection.

A. The Non-Historicality of Jesus’ Resurrection

a. History without Meaning and Telos?

What do we see in all kinds of phenomena in human history? What can we gain from the phenomenological understanding of history? Does history have any meaning or goal? Or is it merely a casual flowing of meaningless events in time and space, whether they are good or bad?

What makes us ask these questions? It may be the thought that, though “[i]n every age and place throughout world history, there have always been also the laughter of children, the scent of flowers and the song of birds and similar things which cannot be affected by any confusion with nothingness,” nonetheless the ugliness of human confusion with nothingness has so powerfully overwhelmed world history. So no one can deny that the very moment we open the window of human history to see what is there inside, we have to let our faces be pummelled with the fists of all sorts of absurdities caused by the confusio hominum to the extent that we should feel grief with no tears from our black and blue eyes, and pain and suffering with no groaning from our bruised mouths. In fact, in the most unsettling way, the confusio hominum “stands before us as an obscurely and even absurdly distinctive reality

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44 For the confusio hominum against Dei providentia explained by Barth, cf. ibid., pp. 693ff.
which we can neither overlook nor deny as such, but which we must clearly grasp in all its inexplicability, because otherwise all consideration sub specie aeternitatis would show a fatal inclination in the direction of mere optimism.”

Mere optimism. When we see the ugly face of human history, which has been bruised by the confusio hominum and its condemnation, death, in this superficial optimism, our Weltanschauung abruptly becomes transformed from unqualified optimism to a real pessimism. It is because this mere optimism does not provide any antithesis to them, and without any antithesis we alone cannot cope with the overwhelming power of the descendants of nothingness. Without any antithesis to that chaotic power in history, we can indeed see nothing in it but absurdity and meaninglessness. History in general, that is, world history, thus falls a prey of chance. Then we are to saunter through a long lane, along both sides of which are planted so many cosmos of nihilism, the end of which is nothing other than nothingness itself. Or we are to roam an endless circular way filled with tragedy, in which the question of the meaning of all kinds of absurdities in history remains unsolved.

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45 ibid., p. 693.
46 For the reality of nothingness explained by Barth, cf. CD, III/3, pp. 289ff.
47 The tragic view of history as an endless circular way is notably found in Greek thought. According to this thought, history is repeated. “History, in this view, does not run toward a historical or transhistorical aim but in a circle back to its beginning.” (P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 3 [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963], pp. 350-1.) In modern times this view comes to be revived in Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. Influenced by Heraclitus, whose belief was “in a periodically repeating end of the world, and in an ever renewed emergence of another world out of the all-consuming world-conflagration,” through a “world-forming” impulse which “calls other worlds to life” in a manner at once “playful” and repetitious” (R. Schacht, Nietzsche [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1983], p. 254), Nietzsche’s nothing new in the eternal recurrence. What is happening is what has already happened. What will happen is still what has already happened. The same things happen time after time. Thus in the eternal recurrence history becomes like a squirrel cage. Hence “to understand history is... to know that what has been will be again and that what will be has already been.” (J. Macquarrie, Existentialism [New York: Penguin Books, 1973], p. 228.) It is to be noted, then, that Nietzsche could never see any teleological development in the eternal recurrence. What he tried to find out in the above-mentioned Heraclitian vision was the possibility for him “to express its complete rejection of all views according to which the world develops in some sort of linear, teleological manner, proceeding toward some pre-established final goal or end-state.” (R. Schacht, Nietzsche, p. 254.) He found out the possibility, realising it with the proclamation: “Everything goes, everything returns; the wheel of existence rolls for ever. Everything dies, everything blossoms anew; the year of existence runs on for ever.” (F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One, trans. R. J. Hollingdale [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961], p. 234.)

What else can we pursue with the idea of ‘eternal recurrence’ of the same, if it “is not meant to be a coherent principle of becoming or being, but merely an expression of the absurdity of the whole happening”? (H. Küng, Does God Exist?: An Answer for Today, trans. E. Quinn [London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd.; New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980], p. 401.) How is it possible for us to ask a question about the ultimate meaning of our existence, if “every event in the universe in all its details and in its whole cosmic coherence will
Here once again we must seriously face the question of the meaning and goal of history. Is human history really meaningless? Can we not seek after an answer to the question of the telos of history other than in a pessimistic Weltanschauung such as Schopenhauerism? Is human life really just a “business in which the proceeds do not cover the costs,” as in Schopenhauerism? Is social life really only a “hell where human beings are both tormented souls and tormenting devils”? Can we really accept the view that “[t]he true goal of world and man, then, is not any kind of Brahma or Nirvana but, whether we like it or not, nothingness”? Is there really no antithesis to the confusion hominum so that we cannot but “accept either human confusion or a cosmic confusion perhaps concealed behind it as the final meaning of world-occurrence”? And if we can approach questions about the aim of history in a negative way, why can we not approach the same questions with a positive attitude? Can we really think of history without meaning and telos, when we hear the agonising cries from the pandemonium of human conflicts, especially, from the acmes of the confusion hominum such as the racially inspired Holocaust, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, both caused by a tragic aftermath of man-made eschatological ideology, and so on? Can we still claim that we are able to face those human tragedies by ourselves without any (or, perhaps, the only) antithesis to the otherwise meaningless han, caused by the tragic confusion hominum?

Human suffering is not phantasmagoric. It is a reality, and, moreover, a historical one. But the question of its fundamental cause eludes the positivistic historian. The positivistic

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91 *CD*, IV/3, p. 693.
historian, who would not admit any *deus ex machina* to human history, can only depict human suffering as a sheer phenomenon in history, without asking about its meaning. In other words, the question of the meaning of suffering (which is the basic theme of this thesis) has nothing to do with the historian’s reasoning upon the causality of an event in history. Hence, asking about the meaning and goal of history, especially with relation to the question of the meaning of human suffering, cannot belong to the domain of the historian’s logic. If it could be pursued in the realm of history proper, according to M. C. D’Arcy, it can be done only by historicists, who admit a *deus ex machina* to human history. Here, in the long run, we come to see that we cannot avoid Paul Tillich’s ‘theological circle’, which is “an unavoidable circle wherever the question of the ultimate meaning of history is asked.” It is within this circle that we come to recognise salvation history as the meaning and *telos* of history in general.

b. Salvation History

Christian theology seeks to do justice to the meaning of human existence from its theistic viewpoint on the basis of the proclamation of the Bible. Unlike the thought of human being as a sheer chance existence, as it is from the existentialist viewpoint of the intelligent being expressed by K. Löwith, the Christian way of thinking is oriented towards humankind’s being created by God the Creator as proclaimed in the Old Testament: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth (Gen. 1:1; RSV).”

Why were human beings created? In other words, what was the purpose and aim of God the Creator when God made human beings come into existence along with other creatures?

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52 As in ancient Greek and Roman plays, ‘*deus ex machina*’ in this thesis refers to a transcendental being “that appears or is introduced (as into a story) suddenly and unexpectedly and provides an artificial or contrived solution to an apparently insoluble difficulty”. (P. B. Gove et al., ed., *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* [Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Company, Publishers, 1976], p. 617.)

53 For the difference between history and historicism, see M. C. D’Arcy, *The Sense of History: Secular and Sacred* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1959), Chapter II: History and Historicism, pp. 63-74.


Moreover, why did the ‘fall’ happen to them after their being perfectly created, if the ‘fall’
became the fundamental cause of their suffering and death?

When we ask about the why of the beginning of human beings’ existence, we discover that
we cannot find any answer to the question; indeed the Bible itself never tries to answer it.
What we find in the creation description in Genesis is the declaration of the beginning of time,
which means the start of history, with the Creator’s creatio ex nihilo. Speculatively, it is
impossible for us in time to think of the before of time’s beginning, that is, of anything that
precedes God’s creation. It is because: we are at this side of time where time exists and
elapses; and through our way of thinking which has always got accustomed to time’s running
from past to future, we can never reach the other side of time where time was never created,
and where there is neither past, present, nor future. Therefore, “[i]n thinking of the
beginning thinking collapses. Because thinking desires to penetrate to the beginning and
cannot do so, all thinking crumbles into dust, it runs aground upon itself, it breaks to pieces, it
is dissolved in the presence of the beginning which thinking posits and cannot posit.”

Nevertheless, Christians never give up asking about the unsolvable question of the
beginning of time and the meaning of human beings’ existence. They find through the Bible
that the answer to the question should not be sought after etiologically, but
phenomenologically. This means that the question of the beginning of time must be answered
proleptically and, most of all, christologically. In other words, the why of human existence in
time and of the ‘fall’ of human beings in the hope for becoming sicut deus should be pursued
in the proclamation of the New Testament that God penetrated time (lost time on account of
human beings’ ‘fall’) through Jesus. Here it is worth noting what D. Bonhoeffer said of the
Creation: “Therefore the Church only sees the beginning in the end; from the end. It sees the

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56 Barth posits only God at the other side of time, and with this he asserts that nothing but God Godself prior to
the beginning of time can be even imagined. Cf. CD, III/1, p. 43.
creation *sub specie Christi*; better still, in the fallen, old world it believes in the new creation world of the beginning and of the end, because it believes in Christ and in nothing else."58

In line with this, Barth puts special emphasis on Christocentricity in his theological system, when he seeks to interpret human history as salvation history. Barth patently seeks after the meaning of human history within the transcendental realm of God’s penetration into time through Jesus Christ. According to him, the beginning of time, i.e., God’s *creatio ex nihilo*, should be understood from the perspective of the incarnation. God created human beings and the world for the purpose of realising the incarnation. For this he emphasises with the support of the proclamations in Jn. 1, Col. 1 and Heb. 1 that “*τὰ πάντα*, all things in heaven and earth, were created by God, but by Jesus Christ (*ὁ λόγος*), and therefore… in their creation God had in mind His only Son, Jesus Christ, and this Son in His human form and reality, so that this one man was and is and always will be the meaning and motive of all creation.”59 What does this mean? How are we to understand this?

To understand Barth’s statement, “this one man was and is and always will be the meaning and motive of all creation,” we should examine his remarkable exposition of the relationship between creation and covenant.60 What we have to note first of all in his explanation of the connexion between creation and covenant, is the fact that Barth has two poles, creation and incarnation, between which his thought runs both prospectively (i.e., from creation to incarnation) and, simultaneously, retrospectively (i.e., from incarnation to creation). Ultimately, however, his thought is oriented towards the one-sided retrospectivity, which means that we cannot avoid pursuing the meaning of creation only through the prism, Jesus Christ, according to the Bible. It is evident that Barth’s thought is oriented towards this one-sidedness, when we see him emphasising the ‘reflection’ upon the inner relationship between the Father and the Son as providing the key to understanding the meaning of creation:

58 Ibid., p. 9.
59 CD, III/2, p. 137.
60 Cf. CD, III/1, pp. 42-329.
Only when we keep before us what the triune God has done for us men in Jesus Christ can we realise what is involved in God the Creator and His work. Creation is the temporal analogue, taking place outside God, of that event in God Himself by which God is the father of the Son. ... But what God does as the Creator can in the Christian sense only be seen and understood as a reflection, as a shadowing forth of this inner divine relationship between God the Father and the Son.\(^{61}\)

When we consider his thought’s running in retrospect, we see in it the inevitability of God’s creation: “The creature does not exist casually. It does not merely exist, but exists meaningfully... It has not come into being by chance but by necessity...\(^{62}\) What is meant by the inevitability of creation is that God needed a means to reveal God’s glory. So creation is a revelation of God’s glory. And in and with this creation God made human being the ‘exponent’ of God’s eternal purpose in God’s free love. God’s eternal purpose here, according to Barth, is that in God’s free love “He has resolved in Himself from all eternity on His fellowship with man in the person of His own Son.”\(^{63}\) This spontaneous resolution of God on God’s fellowship with human being in free love is nothing other than the covenant between God and human being in salvation history.

Then the covenant sets up the direction of creation. The covenant of grace “constitutes the scope of creation.”\(^{64}\) Of course, the covenant chronologically follows the *creatio ex nihilo*. This means that creation is “the road to the covenant, its external power and external basis.”\(^{65}\) Nevertheless what we have to emphasise here, according to Barth, is the fact that creation has the covenant as its internal basis. By this internal foundation creation is given its ultimate

\(^{62}\) *CD*, III/I, p. 229.
\(^{65}\) *Ibid.*, p. 44.
meaning. If we see that creation is followed by a history, this history is nothing other than the history of the covenant of grace, which means salvation history. So the purpose and the meaning of creation is “to make possible the history of God’s covenant with man which has its beginning, its centre and its culmination in Jesus Christ.”

Now what Barth proleptically and ultimately sees in the dialectical relationship between the creatio ex nihilo and the covenant of grace is the eventual appearance of a crucible where the history of creation and the history of the covenant of grace are blended to produce a Novum, by which the reconciliation between God and human beings can be fully accomplished: the incarnation of the Son of God.

The creatio ex nihilo was indeed the luminous appearance of the covenant, because “God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good (Gen. 1:31; RSV).” While creation shows its bright aspect, however, according to the Bible, something disastrous happens to the covenant without any basic cause or fundamental ground in the domain of creation. It divests God’s creation of its goodness. It gives birth to a tragedy proper, the background music of which, as one might say, is filled with bleak, dreary and gloomy sounds like bass tones of aboriginal people’s long bamboo flutes, heart-rending high pitches of black people’s spirituals, or the melody of Arirang⁶⁷ (one of the representative Korean folksongs) which runs in the major key, but is felt like a melody in the minor, etc. It is the mother of suffering and death. It is the yin of the covenant in God’s creation, while creation itself is its yang. It is the ‘fall’ of human beings, which means sin against God the Creator.

Sin is the scandal of the covenant of grace, and the stumbling block of salvation history. It threatens the covenant of grace itself established from the eternity. It menaces the fellowship between God and human beings with its contradictory absurdity. Then the covenant cannot

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 42.
help being described as “the fellowship which originally existed between God and man, which was then disturbed and jeopardised, the purpose of which is now fulfilled in Jesus Christ and in the work of reconciliation.”\textsuperscript{68} Here the covenant’s having been disturbed and jeopardised means that human beings have lost their aptitude for being God’s covenant partner. To put it in another way, human beings in their sin cannot but be antagonistic towards God, because sin itself is against God’s will and providence, and it directly derives from human beings, not from God, in respect of its having the characteristic of human disobedience to God’s goodness. Simply speaking, human beings need to be reconciled with God when they have fallen into the bottomless pit of sin.

We are now facing the question of the possibility of the reconciliation of human beings in peccato with God. How is it possible for human beings in peccato to be reconciled with God? To answer this question, first and foremost, we need to pay attention to the essence of sin.

When we try to consider the essence of sin, we have to face the question of its whence. Regarding this question, Barth sees the origin of sin as nothingness, out of which God created the whole cosmos. For Barth sin is a concrete form of nothingness.\textsuperscript{69} Sin belongs to nothingness. Sin and nothingness, including suffering and death, are in the same ontic category, which cannot be directly known to us.

From this perspective, Barth sees that there is a common ground for gaining real knowledge of sin and of nothingness, and this ground is the only way to reach into the realm of meaning for sin and nothingness.\textsuperscript{70} Without this ground, according to Barth, there can be no real knowledge of sin and nothingness. Of course, this ground means the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. Seeing nothingness through the prism of the incarnation, we can grasp the reality of nothingness. In the final chapter I will deal in detail with Barth’s understanding

\textsuperscript{68} CD, IV/1 p. 22.  
\textsuperscript{69} Cf. CD, III/3, pp. 307-10.  
\textsuperscript{70} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 302ff.
of the origin of sin and nothingness on the basis of his Christocentric scheme of salvation in history.

One thing to be mentioned here regarding the non-historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is that the non-historicity of history is related to the immediacy of history to God. Barth says: “Not all history is ‘historical’, … [I]n its immediacy to God every history is in fact ‘non-historical’, i.e., it cannot be deduced and compared and therefore perceived and comprehended.”\(^\text{71}\) Barth seeks one of the most remarkable examples of this immediacy of history to God in the creation story of Genesis. According to Barth, God’s creation was carried out in time. Anything in time belongs to history. Therefore, God’s creation in time is a history. It is actually the beginning of all history. Here Barth repudiates the thought that the creation story in Genesis is a myth. It is because, for Barth, the creation story depicts a sort of history, which is not accessible to us human beings on account of its pure immediacy to God.\(^\text{72}\) (So Barth calls it ‘saga’.\(^\text{73}\))

Barth seeks another remarkable example of the immediacy of history to God in the event of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, which is in God’s creatio continua. Of course, “… of the miracle of all miracles, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, it has to be said that … it takes place in a relationship of mediacy to God as well as immediacy,”\(^\text{74}\) because in it, still, “the ‘historical’ element is not wholly extinguished; there is a deep ‘historical’ twilight but not absolute obscurity.”\(^\text{75}\) Yet, Barth claims, the cause of the resurrection of Jesus Christ is related

\(^{71}\) *CD*, III/1, p. 80.

\(^{72}\) Barth sees only its non-historicity in the history of creation on the basis of creation’s pure immediacy to God, whereas he sees its historicality as well as its non-historicity in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, because he thinks that it occurred “in a relationship of mediacy to God as well as immediacy.” (CD, III/1, p. 77.) However, Barth does not exclude creation history from the horizon of history. Instead, he “makes it objectively a singular and unique history in relation to all others,” (Ibid.) just because “[i]ts content is the pure emergence of the creature as such, beyond which there is … either nothing at all or … only God and His will and act.” (Ibid.) Thus, for Barth creation history is non-historical or pre-historical history. (Cf. ibid., p. 80.)

\(^{73}\) Barth uses saga “in the sense of an intuitive and poetic picture of a pre-historical reality of history which is enacted once and for all within the confines of time and space.” (CD, III/1, p. 80.) By this he asserts that the creation story is a saga, a pure saga, not a myth. Cf. ibid., pp. 81ff.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., p. 77.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., p. 79.
to God so immediately that, first and foremost, it must be non-historical. Therefore, when we deal with salvation history, which is scattered with miracles (i.e., occurrences the causes of which are related to God so immediately that we can see nothing but God Godself as the real *causa* of all those transhistorical episodes), it seems inevitable that we should emphasise its non-historical aspect, as Barth does with his description of creation history:

If the history of the covenant of grace with its miracles, and especially its great central miracle [the resurrection of Jesus Christ], is not only undoubtedly historical but also (to the extent to which it is itself a continuation of the history of creation) highly “non-historical”, we can only say of the history of creation in itself and as such that it is by nature wholly “non-historical”, and that the biblical accounts of it are also by nature wholly “non-historical” and can only be read and understood as such.⁷⁶

In the light of this, then, we can grasp Barth’s understanding of the non-historicity of the resurrection of Jesus Christ as on the vertex of salvation history along with his death. This theme will be examined from now on.

c. The Non-Historicity of Jesus’ Resurrection

1) In the Early Writings

The early Barth struggles to make a theological breakthrough by which he can break with ‘liberal’ theology; because he sees so great a danger for theology proper in Schleiermacher’s ‘God’ who is indifferent to humanity,⁷⁷ in W. Herrmann’s ‘religious individualism’, entailing

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“historical relativism”,78 in A. Harnack’s ‘individual soul’,79 etc., where the main characteristics of the liberal theology lie. Confronting the serious danger of the “prevailing theology which had become religionistic, anthropocentric and humanistic, with a new and at the same time older and original Christian knowledge and language,”80 Barth seeks after an object of theology, which cannot be under human subjectivism. For Barth it is ‘God in the Bible’. ‘God in the Bible’ is “the new, incomparable, unattainable, not only heavenly but more than heavenly interest, who has drawn the regard of the men of the Bible to himself.”81 Only this object, Barth asserts, makes theology not as anthropology but as theology proper possible, because only in it we can find out “the Godness of God, precisely God’s Godness, God’s own peculiar nature over against not only the natural, but also the spiritual cosmos, God’s absolutely unique existence, power and initiative above all in His relationship to man.”82 Here in ‘letting God be God’ Barth establishes the diastasis, “the distance, the separation [or the ‘radical disjunction’83] between God’s ways and man’s ways, God’s thoughts and man’s thoughts, between Christianity and culture, between Gospel and humanism, between Word of God and word of man.”84 But this ‘God in the Bible’ is not the god who remains aloof (like Schleiermacher’s God who is indifferent to human beings), but the God who “must and does come to man on this earth, in man’s sin and in his death, in order to become his succour.”85 Here Barth grasps the true meaning of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ, especially through the resurrection, as the absolutely objective norm of theology all against the subjectivism of liberal theology. And by and in this idea of a radical revelation,

82 T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931, p. 39.
84 T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931, p. 49.
85 Ibid., p. 40.
rooted in the resurrection, he could find a way out from the fear of liberal theology. Thus for Barth, the resurrection becomes an ‘overdetermined’ concept, as K. Sonderegger puts it:

Associated with the crucifixion, Christ’s resurrection revealed that God’s encounter with the world could bring only judgment. Associated with the eschaton, the resurrection was a sign that God has done away with Religion and the culture of human self-assertion. Associated with higher criticism, the resurrection marked the place where revelation could not be received or contained by human thought. Powerfully condensed and transformed, the images of the resurrection appearances reveal that God stands at the limit, at the End of all earthly things. All creaturely things become relative to this Absolute point where Revelation entered but could not be grasped.

And with the emphasis upon this ‘overdetermined’ concept, Jesus’ resurrection, Barth orientshim totally towards Biblical eschatology, in which “God is the eschatos and absolute telos of the creature, which is the perfect antithesis of ‘voidness’, sinfulness, nothingness, meaninglessness and aimlessness.” Here we see that what made possible his breaking with ‘Liberalism’ was his eschatological orientation towards the resurrection, by which he could set up the objectivity of theology, thus enabling him to assert that “the resurrection [was] an objective event, an act of revelation in which God, not human subjectivity, declared the victory over death.”

We now come to face the problem of Barth’s attitude towards the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. What does it mean, when Barth considers the resurrection of Jesus Christ as an event (Ereignis)? How does he understand this event’s being related to history, if it is to be comprised in history as an event?

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87 Ibid., pp. 78-9.
88 G. Greshake, Auferstehung der Toten: …, p. 55. (my translation)
Barth puts Jesus’ resurrection in ‘Biblical history’, which “has the distinction of being in its essence, in its inmost character, neither religion [as it is understood in Liberalism] nor history—not religion but reality, not history but truth,” and so, “is not really history at all, but seen from above is a series of free divine acts and seen from below a series of fruitless attempts to undertake something in itself impossible.” This Biblical history is nothing short of primal history, or of salvation history (more preferably, the history of the covenant of grace) in Barth’s later theology. By positing Jesus’ resurrection in this primal history, he obviously claims its non-historicality. One notable example of this claim is found in this statement: “… the raising of Jesus from the dead is not an event in history elongated so as still to remain an event in the midst of other events. The resurrection is the non-historical relating of the whole historical life of Jesus to its origin in God.” Another example from the perspective of the immediacy of history to God is: “… the resurrection as the deed of God, whom no eye has seen nor ear heard, who has entered no human heart, neither outwardly nor

90 WGM, p. 66.
91 Ibid., p. 72.
92 This was originally used by F. Overbeck as a historical category especially for referring to the earliest Christianity, and was transformed by Barth into a non-historical, theological category exclusively for the eschatological interpretation of the revelation of God. (Cf. D. Schellong, “Noch einmal: Franz Overbeck—Unerledigte Anfragen an die Theologie,” in R. Bründle and E. W. Stegemann, eds., Franz Overbecks unerledige Anfragen an das Christentum [München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1988], pp. 159-60.) According to Overbeck, “[p]rimal history has to be oriented towards the fundamental mark, Genesis [Entstehungsgeschichte]” (F. Overbeck, Christientum und Cultur: Gedanken und Anmerkungen zur modernen Theologie, ed., C. A. Bernoulli [Basel: Benno Schwabe-Verlag, 1919; republished by: Darmstadt: Nachdruck, 1963], p. 24; my translation.) In Overbeck this ‘primal history’ is referred to the “incomprehensible, supratemporal beginning of our being, the ‘history before history’” (T. W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison of Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Barth [New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1965], p. 86), and thus, “insofar as historical knowledge is characterised by the triple of analogy, criticism and correlation, primal history per se comes to evade the hands of the historian.” (W. M. Ruschke, Entstehung und Ausführung der Diastasen-Theologie in Karl Barth’s zweitem „Römerbrief” [Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1987], p. 38; my translation.)
93 In his Church Dogmatics Barth prefers the history of the covenant of grace to salvation history (Heilsgeschichte). By this he tries to present the non-historical factors of history, such as the atoning cross, the resurrection, etc., whereas he tries to put these in the realm of history. Anyway, for Barth it embraces “God’s entire gracious dealing with man from eternity to eternity.” (H. Hartsell, The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction [London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1964], p. 38, n. 45.)
inwardly, not subjective and not objective, but as a historical divine fact, which as such is only to be grasped in the category of revelation and in none other.” 95

In his assertion that the resurrection is not “in any sense of the word a ‘fact’ in history,” we can obviously see that “there is, therefore, surely a hiatus to be established between history and this eschatological reality.” 96 On the basis of this chasm he regards Jesus’ resurrection as “an event which took place outside of space and time,” 97 for the sake of the protection of its persistent validity. What we should not overlook here is that Barth, by his removal of the spatiotemporal limitation of the resurrection, ascribes it to the dimension of ‘eternity’, thus claiming: “Resurrection means eternity. Since it is the sovereignty of God which gives significance to time, it is for that very reason not in time. It is not one temporal thing among others.” 98

When the resurrection comes to belong to the dimension of eternity, Jesus as Christ does not belong to temporal relativity any longer. 99 This means that the resurrection, as belonging to eternity, is the ultimate meaning of God’s revelation, “the disclosing of Jesus as the Christ, the appearing of God, and the apprehending of God in Christ.” 100 For Barth the resurrection thus becomes “the most splendid verification of Christ’s being sent, and the surest evidence for God’s having watched his teaching, acting and suffering with pleasure.” 101 And only with the resurrection’s disclosure of Jesus as Christ can we ask the question about the objective possibility of ‘Deus dixit’ proclaimed in the Bible. And only with it can we also comprehend the secret of the incarnation, the only ‘objective’ disclosure of the deus absconditus in the

96 Romans, p. 204.
99 WGM, p. 89. (author’s emphasis)
100 Cf. van der Kooi, Anfängliche Theoologie: ..., p. 147.
101 Romans, p. 30.
dimension of the eternity. In other words, without it, we human beings can neither find any objective clue to the *deus absconditus*, nor grasp the meaning of the revelation, nor ask the question about the meaning of the ultimate meaning. Speaking in the extreme, “[t]he revelation proclaims only the resurrection of the dead. But it does proclaim it.”  

Now we see that the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the *conditio sine qua non* of Barth’s theological thinking. Barth tries to restart his theological thinking with the resurrection, not understood as “the first disciples’ faith in Jesus’ resurrection,” but as “the believed resurrection of Jesus Christ itself.”  

This resurrection, according to Barth, is “the inevitably non-historical *[das notwendig Unhistorische]*, because it is beyond the realm of possibilities of all our experience, thought and comparison, because it excludes any realisation of our human possibilities in it.” Hence “the resurrection of Jesus Christ is God’s eschatological act, which is impenetrable and unambiguous, because and whilst it is in no sense ‘a fact in history,’ because and whilst it is not involved in the ‘see-saw of Yes and No, life and death, God and man, which is characteristic of all that happens on the historical plane.”  

If the resurrection of Jesus Christ is in no sense of the word a fact in history, then, what is it? What does Barth mean by designating it as “the non-historical event κατ’ ἐξονομίαν”? Is he talking about a real occurrence in history, or only about a phantom in the kaleidoscopic phantasmagoria of history?  

We see that Barth excludes the possibility of Jesus’ resurrection as a mirage of history by his choice of antidocetic terms. In this he also rejects any consideration of the resurrection.

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105. *Ibid.* (my translation)  
106. *Romans*, p. 204. (quoter’s emphases)  
as the purely noetic reverse of the cross, or as a merely epistemological principle,\textsuperscript{110} although he admits that there should be some noetic content in it. Hence, “Barth does not consider the resurrection from the perspective of the life of Jesus ended with his death (if this were the case, then we could ascribe only a symbolic, mythological or kerygmatic character to the resurrection), but the life of Jesus from the perspective of the resurrection, which is corporeally thought of, thus perforating the boundary of death, [but] which cannot be grasped by history.”\textsuperscript{111} Thus for Barth, “[n]on-historical does not mean in this context the pure negation of the resurrection as a concrete happening [Geschehen], but only the negation of the resurrection as [belonging to] a historiographical [geschichtswissenschaftliche] category.”\textsuperscript{112} It is because “[t]he possibilities of history are not permitted to determine the possibility of the resurrection, but the historically discernible impossibility of the resurrection makes clear the impossibility of a historical judgment on the resurrection.”\textsuperscript{113}

Here we see that Barth pictures the Janus-faced, ambiguous relationship between the resurrection and history: “As history, it [the resurrection of Jesus Christ] lies on the frontier of that which is not history; as non-history, it lies on the frontier of history.”\textsuperscript{114} Thus the resurrection of Jesus Christ has, as it were, two wings, with the one of which it can soar up into somewhere beyond space and time, and with the other of which it can simultaneously plane down into the realm of history. To put it in another way, it is a historical event inasmuch as it can be said that it “took place outside the gate of Jerusalem in the year A.D. 30,”\textsuperscript{115} but it is simultaneously a non-historical event, inasmuch as its cause is immediately related to God, and so it is “the utterly strange.”\textsuperscript{116} When the non-historical aspect of the resurrection of Christ is emphasised, its historical aspect ineluctably dwindles. The young

\textsuperscript{110} Cf. Ruschke, Entstehung und Ausführung..., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{111} ibid. (my translation)
\textsuperscript{112} van der Kooi, Anfängliche Theologie..., p. 147. (my translation)
\textsuperscript{113} Ruschke, Entstehung und Ausführung..., p. 43. (my translation)
\textsuperscript{114} Romans, p. 222.
\textsuperscript{115} ibid., p. 30.
\textsuperscript{116} ibid., p. 381.
Barth needed the former aspect to react to ‘Liberalism’. It is thus natural for him to pursue that aspect overwhelmingly in his early theology, especially with the help of the metamorphosed Christological category, prinal history. Now we can conclude from all of these that the early Barth asserts the non-historicity of Jesus’ resurrection more stalwartly than its historicality, but not without it.

How is this attitude of Barth towards the non-historicity of Jesus’ resurrection changed in his later theology? Investigating this is our next task.

2) In the Later Writings

Even though we conspicuously realise that Barth’s later theology emphasises the objective reality of Jesus’ resurrection on the basis of his claim of Jesus’ existence as a historical reality,117 we can still grasp his positive attitude towards the non-historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. What we can assume for the non-historicity of Jesus’ resurrection under the circumstances of Barth’s remarkably realistic, antiodetic depiction of it,118 is that he seems to posit a ‘black hole’ of history between Jesus’ death and resurrection, which the historian cannot penetrate. He thus says that “[t]he death of Jesus Christ can certainly be thought of as history in the modern sense, but not the resurrection.”119 What he tries to make clear by positing the ‘black hole’ of history between Jesus’ death and resurrection, which literally absorbs all the attempts of every historian to pierce into it so as to gain access to the brightness of the resurrection, is that the resurrection does not belong to the history of Jesus in its unity and totality from birth to death. As Gotthard Oblau points out: “For the

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117 Here Richard Niebuhr’s comment on this claim is noteworthy: “The distinctive feature of Barth’s *Church Dogmatics* is the conception of reality it entails and the idea of revelation by which reality is made known. ... Theologians ought in particular to realize that Jesus Christ is an historical reality, not an ontological structure ... Barth’s intention is to replace the neutral language of ontological theologizing with a more dynamic vocabulary, in which history is the category of the real.” (R. R. Niebuhr, *Resurrection and Historical Reason: A Study of Theological Method* [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957], pp. 43-4.)

118 For Barth’s realistic, antiodetic depiction of Jesus’ resurrection, cf. *CD*, I/2, p. 114; IV/1, pp. 351-2; IV/2, p. 143; IV/3, p. 323; IV/4, p. 24, etc.

119 *CD*, IV/1, p. 336.
understanding of Barth’s Christology it is important to see that he does not secure the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead as a stage in the scope of his history. For Barth Easter is not an event in the history of Jesus Christ. The last event in the scope of the series of events in his history is his death at Golgotha.”120 In this respect, Barth obviously shows that Jesus’ resurrection means neither the beginning of “a second history of Jesus Christ with a different content,”121 nor “a continuation of the first history in further acts and events on a different, higher, otherworldly plane.”122 What, then, is meant by the resurrection? According to Barth, Jesus’ resurrection means the real unfolding of the secret meaning of God’s revelation through the incarnation. In other words, it means the beginning of the manifestation of the history of Jesus Christ, the goal of which was accomplished in the event of the cross. What we should not overlook here is that Barth sees that the aim of the history of Jesus Christ has been already achieved through his death on the cross, and his resurrection is just the beginning of the manifestation of his perfectly performed life. As he puts it: “His resurrection was rather the beginning of the manifestation of what He was and did perfectly there and then … In His resurrection His perfected history began to come to light both intensively and extensively in the world, in all other human history.”123 Hence it should be right that G. Oblau says: “Barth reads the Easter occurrence not as the continuation or revision of Jesus’ history, but as the commentary on the irreversible history of Jesus Christ, the end of which was attained at Golgotha.”124 In this regard, Oblau keeps saying, “the resurrection of Jesus Christ is not a substantial event with regard to his history, but a formal one. To put it in another way,

121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
the Easter reports do not tell us about a new event of the history of Jesus, but about a new happening upon this history and through this history.\textsuperscript{125}

Barth, by setting up the ‘black hole’ of history which was caused by God Godself and by God alone, sees a Novum in Jesus’ resurrection. This means that it is new, not in the sense that it consists of heterogeneous elements, thus making Jesus’ being ontically quite different from his being in his history from birth to death, but in the sense that it is totally and directly purposed and caused by God alone in God’s omnipotent power. Just here the historian finds no possibility of the establishment of Jesus’ resurrection as an event belonging to his or her historiographical field. Just here, however, Barth distinguishes Jesus’ resurrection as an event from other ordinary events in human history. To put it more clearly, he employs two different genres of historical events: one is Historie, in which ordinary occurrences in history are dealt with, and so every historian can establish his or her historical view of them; the other is Geschicchte, in which extraordinary happenings (which are to be comprehended only by faith) are treated, and so it is not possible for the historian to establish his historical view of them.\textsuperscript{126}

Barth, by making this distinction, sees that “the resurrection of Jesus is the principal event of the latter kind.”\textsuperscript{127} This means that Jesus’ resurrection as God’s objective revelation attested to in the Bible should be posited in Geschicchte. According to him, the biblically attested revelation is partially ‘historical’, because it should be imparted to human beings for its being unveiled. Even in this case, however, the ‘historical’ cannot mean “historically demonstrable or historically demonstrated.”\textsuperscript{128} By this, Barth understands that any neutral observer cannot approach the revelation in the Bible as a mystery. For “[T]he neutral observer who understood the events recorded in it as revelation would cease thereby to be a neutral observer.”\textsuperscript{129} For the non-neutral, i.e., for the believer, who can see, hear and apprehend the hidden meaning of the

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid, p. 214. (my translation; author’s emphases)
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} CD, I/1, p. 325.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
revelation, the revelation remains mysterious, thus being still far from human reasoning and comprehension. Hence he or she cannot but realise that “what can be established here ‘historically’ (historisch) is very little or nothing at all or something quite different which is of no importance for the event of revelation.”

Likewise, for the believer “[t]he ‘historical’ [historisch] element in the resurrection of Christ, the empty tomb as an aspect of the event that might be established, was not revelation. This ‘historical’ element, like all else that is ‘historical’ on this level, is admittedly open to very trivial interpretations too.”

In this respect, the languages related to Jesus’ resurrection are the ones “of religious faith rather than of scientific, critical-historical enquiry.” And with regard to this aspect, “the resurrection of Jesus must be treated essentially as a revelatory event in so far as it is directly caused by God and as a soteriological event in so far as it is for men and women and their salvation.”

In connection with this, it is now time for us to consider the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the perspective of salvation history. As we have already seen, when Barth posits Jesus’ resurrection in salvation history, he inevitably comes to emphasise its non-historically, because it is immediately caused by God. Should we repeat once again, Barth sees its non-historically as well as its historicality in Jesus’ resurrection, because “even of the miracle of all miracles, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, it has to be said that ... it takes place in a relationship of mediacy to God as well as immediacy.”

Unlike the history of creation, the ‘miracle of all miracles’ comprises a sort of historicality to the extent that “[e]ven the human account of it, the description of the event, seems necessarily to have to burst through the framework of historical relation.” Though it be the case, however, “the historical element in the event seems almost to have disappeared and the ‘non-historical’ to have taken the upper

\[\text{\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{132} P. Canley, The Structure of Resurrection Belief, p. 101.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., p. 102.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{134} CD, III/1, p. 77.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., pp. 78-9.}\]

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hand.”  

Barth can thus say that “the history of the covenant of grace with its miracles, and especially its great central miracle, is not only undoubtedly historical but also … highly non-historical.”

Until now, we have investigated Barth’s attitude towards the non-historicity of Jesus’ resurrection in his later theology. We have seen that, even though he overwhelmingly emphasises the historical aspect of Jesus’ resurrection in his later theology, he still sustains his attitude towards its non-historical aspect by positing a sort of ‘black hole’ of history between Jesus’ death and resurrection, which means none other than the understanding of the causa of the resurrection as God Godself, thus enabling him to see in it a Novum, to which the historian can gain no access. Here we see that, even though he changed his attitude towards the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus Christ in terms of his remarkably antidocetic emphasis on the resurrection as a historical occurrence, especially against R. Bultmann, Nevertheless he did not fundamentally change his attitude towards its non-historicity. Thus for him, the resurrection of Jesus Christ is always an event which evades the historian’s hands. Hence it is permissible to say that “we can pursue an organic development in Barth’s theology at least from the second edition of The Epistle to the Romans on,” especially with regard to his attitude towards the non-historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.

In spite of all this, Barth firmly grasps Jesus’ resurrection as a historical event. Now is the time for us to consider his attitude towards the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.

B. The Historicity of Jesus’ Resurrection

a. The Concrete Reality of the Incarnation in History

136 Ibid., p. 78.
137 Ibid., p. 79.
138 Cf. CD, III/2, pp. 444ff.
139 W. M. Ruschke, Entstehung und Ausführung ..., p. 47. (my translation)
Before investigating the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection, we first need to seek a better understanding of the concrete reality of the incarnation in history, because the latter illuminates the former in Barth’s theology.

Focusing on Jesus Christ, who is the Lord of world history as well as of salvation history, Barth naturally tells us about the concrete reality of his history in world history. As Walter Kreck points out: “Barth’s dogmatics is fundamentally based on the knowledge of this one person, his life, death and resurrection as an event occurred in space and time.”140 Speaking more concretely, “[t]he Word of God becomes man, flesh, history, human word and human thinking; … the question about revelation does not point to an everywhere and nowhere, but to a concrete place and a worldly history.”141 To put it simply, the Word of God as revelation perforates human history. “But really history! Really time!”142 This is the meaning of “the Word became flesh” (Jn. 1:14), the incarnation.

The subject and the phenomenological object of the incarnation are God and a human being, respectively. This human being is none other than Jesus of Nazareth. He exists as a human being, and simultaneously as the Son of God. What we should patently state here, according to Barth, is that “[t]he Son of God becomes and is as men become and are.”143 This means that “[h]e exists, not only inconceivably as God, but also conceivably as a man; not only above the world but also in the world, and of the world; not only in a heavenly and invisible, but in an earthly and visible form.”144 We see in him the total transformation of our existence just on account of his existing like this: “God Himself is in the world, earthly, conceivable and visible, as He is this man.”145 From the soteriological perspective, “[t]he human speaking and acting and suffering and triumphing of this one man directly concerns us

141 Ibid. (my translation)
143 CD, IV/2, p. 50.
144 Ibid
145 Ibid., p. 51.
all, and His history is our history of salvation which changes the whole human situation, just because God Himself is its human subject in His Son, just because God Himself has assumed and made His own our human nature and kind in His Son, just because God Himself came into this world in His Son, ...”

Here we can see that Barth’s theology pursues the harmonious blending of *anhypostasis* and *enhypostasis*, i.e., the *unio hypostatica*, as being characteristic of Jesus’ existence in his particular humanity, thus enabling Barth to see Jesus Christ as the *vere Deus vere homo*. Bruce Marshall perspicuously points it out in this statement: “Barth’s theology is not only consistent with but tellingly exemplifies the procedural rule that Jesus Christ as a particular person is the norm for all that is ultimately meaningful or significant. At the same time, Barth seems fundamentally committed to the principle that the divinity of Jesus Christ functions as the *sine qua non* for all other significance we ascribe to him; if we could not ascribe the incarnation of God to him, nothing else we predicate of him would be ultimately meaningful or significant.”

Barth, with his view of Jesus’ existence as the congruous blending of *anhypostasis* and *enhypostasis*, i.e., as the *unio hypostatica*, now emphasises the fact of ‘ἀγένετο’ in “ο λόγος σώμα ἐγένετο”. For him, “[ἐγένετο, the event of the incarnation of the Word, of the *unio hypostatica*, has to be understood as a completed event, but also as a completed event.”

With this assertion we can discern his great emphasis on the concrete reality of the incarnation

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146 Ibid
147 Timothy Bradshaw perspicuously points out this harmonious blending of *anhypostasis* and *enhypostasis* of Barth like this: “Barth’s doctrine is synthetic, while it also maintains distinctions. Dualism is overcome without being destroyed. His doctrine is Chalcedonian in the sense that it affirms both divinity and humanity, as integrated yet distinct. Barth also embodies some Kierkegaardian emphases of encounter, summons, pure miracles. He also seems to exploit the basic Hegelian concept of the relation of opposites and their integration through self-abnegation.” (Ibid, *Trinity and Ontology: A Comparative Study of the Theologies of Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg* [Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 1988], pp. 22-3; author’s emphases.) For the detailed explanation of this theme by Barth, cf. *CD*, I/2, pp. 163ff.; *CD*, III/2, p. 70; *CD*, IV/2, pp. 49-50, 91; and also cf. T. Bradshaw, *Trinity and Ontology: ...*, pp. 23ff.; B. Marshall, *Christology in Conflict: The Identity of Saviour in Rahner and Barth* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987), pp. 172ff., 193-4, n. 31-3. For the distinctive feature of the two terms employed in Barth’s early theology, cf. W. Kneek, *Gradendcheidungen in Karl Barths Dogmatik*, p. 87.
150 *CD*, I/2, p. 165. (author’s emphases)
in human history, as he puts: “What the New Testament tells us of the reality of Jesus Christ
is undoubtedly meant to be heard as the news of an accomplished fact, namely, that in the
fullness of time it became true—and it was this that made this time fulfilled time—that once
and for all God became Man and so His Word reached the ears of us men, and so we men
were reconciled to God. The reality of Jesus Christ is an objective fact.”\textsuperscript{151} We have no other
revelation except this one, “no other form or manifestation [of God’s revelation] in heaven or
on earth save the one child in the stable, the one Man on the cross.”\textsuperscript{152} If we should abandon
the incarnation due to our being so powerfully influenced by up-to-date scientific and
technological development, or due to our reason’s enjoyment of the historical logicality
flourishing in modern historiography, or whatever else,\textsuperscript{153} then nothing meaningful can be left
in Christian theology. If the incarnation is really given up, then first of all, as William J.
Abraham has claimed, “[t]he Christian could no longer listen to this story [the story of Jesus]
as the account of what God has done for him and the world’s salvation.”\textsuperscript{154} Or, as Kern R.
Trembath has described it, “one would only be able to think of Jesus as a human and not, as
the church has always attempted, as both God and human.”\textsuperscript{155} Hence we cannot and may not
dispense with the incarnation in order to go on to do Christian theology. Only when we firmly
lay hold of the incarnation, can we see the ultimate meaning in our history. Only in respect of
the incarnation, can we realise that “[h]istory as a whole will be seen in a new perspective; it
becomes the arena of God’s concern and care, and even though what God is doing at any
particular moment or even over many centuries may be opaque and unclear, overall its
direction is in His hands and sustained by His love.”\textsuperscript{156} Barth thus adheres to the historical

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{151}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{152}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{156}] W. J. Abraham, \textit{Divine Revelation and the Limits of Historical Criticism}, p. 56.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
reality of the incarnation of the Word, i.e., God Godself: “It is in virtue of the eternal Word that Jesus Christ exists as a man of flesh and blood in our sphere, as a man like us, as an historical phenomenon. But it is only in virtue of the divine Word that He exists as such.”\textsuperscript{157}

Now the meaning of the incarnation is found in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. \textit{Cur Deus homo?} This is the fundamental question about the incarnation, and we are given the answer in Jesus’ atoning death and his resurrection. Without our consideration of Jesus’ death and resurrection, we cannot identify Jesus of Nazareth with the \textit{vere Deus vere homo}, as É. Schillebeeckx points out: “Therefore the identity of Jesus, his revelation of both the way in which God is God and the nature of true humanity, is incomplete unless we take into account his death and resurrection.”\textsuperscript{158}

From the perspective of epistemology, however, we have to posit a dividing line between Jesus’ life and death and his resurrection, because the hidden meaning of Jesus’ life and death is known to us only through the resurrection. Asking phenomenologically, how could the first witnesses know that Jesus of Nazareth, an ordinary human being, was the Son of God, without their having perceived that something extraordinary happened to his life and death? And how can we of \textit{hic et nunc} acknowledge Jesus of \textit{ille et tune}, without our belief in the earliest disciples’ proclamation of the extraordinary happening? If Jesus of Nazareth had lived for a while and died (whatever the cause of his death might have been) like all men and women, then how could they, and how can we, confess him as the lord of history? How could they say, “[W]e have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father [Jn. 1:14; RSV]”? How can we say that we have an ‘enigmatic cicatrix’ in our history, which prevents it from being absurd and meaningless? Hence our logical pursuit of the ultimate of all meanings must be based on the only ‘enigmatic cicatrix’ in human history: the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{CD}, 1/2, p. 165.
In light of this we now come to Barth’s emphasis on the historicality of the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

b. The Historicality of Jesus’ Resurrection

As in the case of W. Künneth’s claim of the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection, Barth shows his robustly positive attitude towards the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. In particular, he claims it from the perspective of his ‘theology of the forty days’. Let me consider this.

In his theology of the forty days, i.e., of the resurrection, Barth really follows the Biblical witness to the reality of the resurrection of Jesus with regard to the happenings during the forty days, “as if he had walked with Jesus and His disciples during the forty days between Jesus Christ’s resurrection from the dead and His ascension when Jesus no longer appeared to His disciples only as the man Jesus of Nazareth whom they had known in the flesh but, as the crucified and risen Lord Jesus Christ, was now truly revealed to them in the full majesty and glory of His Godhead.” For example, by describing Jesus’ enjoyment of his co-humanity (Mitmenschlichkeit) with his disciples during the forty days as “a συναλίζωσα (‘to take salt with’) in Ac. 1:4,” and by citing Peter’s speech, ‘(We) did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead (Acts 10:41),” Barth contends that “[i]t is impossible to erase the bodily character of the resurrection of Jesus and His existence as the Resurrected.” To cite another example, by enumerating the two texts (Lk. 24:36f. and Jn. 20:24f.) as the specific ones against Docetism, he clearly shows his belief in the Antiochian-Christological character of

159 Cf. W. Künneth, The Theology of the Resurrection, trans. J. W. Letch (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1965), pp. 23-4: “The resurrection is ... an event which took place in a quite definite way, at a quite definite time, to quite definite people, in the context of quite definite external phenomena. ... It concerns an event which took place on the morning of the third day and hence in time, outside the gates of Jerusalem and hence in space, before the eyes of individual men and hence in the midst of human history.”
161 Cf. ibid.
162 ibid.
163 ibid., p. 448.
164 Cf. ibid.
the Resurrected, thus saying: “The Resurrected is the man Jesus, who now came and went among them as such, whom they saw and touched and heard, who ate and drank with them, and who ... was still before them as true man, vere homo.”¹⁶⁵ This is that about which the Easter story tells us. And with this a new Gospel history, i.e., the history of the Church, begins. As Barth points out: “It [The Easter story] tells us of the forty days in which this same One—whose history this was and had to be—was again in the midst of His disciples, differently, but still actually in time and space, talking with them, eating and drinking with them, beginning with them a new Gospel history, the time of His community, the time of the Gospel as the good news about the Judge who allowed Himself to be judged, the time of the proclamation of this event.”¹⁶⁶

With all of these Biblical examples demonstrating the antidotic aspect of Jesus’ resurrection, Barth evidently shows his positive attitude towards its historicality. For him, first of all, it is a matter of standing or falling for Christian theology to enunciate the resurrection within the spatiotemporal dimension. So he really had to emphasise first and foremost that Jesus’ resurrection was an event that occurred in time and space: “In the first instance, it is essential to grasp that when the New Testament speaks of the event of Easter it really means the Easter history and Easter time. We are here in the sphere of history and time no less than in the case of the words and acts and even the death of Jesus.”¹⁶⁷ This aspect has to be firmly grasped and emphasised, because otherwise Jesus’ resurrection will be ultimately nothing but a mockery, and all the doctrines of atonement and redemption founded on it will become phantasmagoric, as T. F. Torrance points out:

… the resurrection of Jesus is to be thought of as the recreating and restoring of man into the same sphere of real being as that to which we human creatures

¹⁶⁶ *CD*, IV/1, p. 227.
¹⁶⁷ *CD*, III/2, p. 442.
belong, and is, as such, an historical happening in continuity with the whole historical happening of Jesus, the incarnate Son. If the resurrection is not an event in history, a happening within the same order of physical existence to which we belong, then atonement and redemption are empty vanities, for they achieve nothing for historical men and women in the world. Unless the atonement through the resurrection breaks into, and is real in, our historical and physical existence and continues to be valid as saving power in our earthly and temporal being, it is ultimately a mockery ... Everything depends on the resurrection of the body, otherwise all we have is a Ghost for a Saviour.¹⁶⁸

Hence Barth so pertinaciously clings to this aspect at all costs, as we can see it especially in his doctrine of reconciliation:

The resurrection of Jesus Christ ... was, however, a happening in time with a definite beginning and end like other happenings.¹⁶⁹

The resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead ... has in fact happened. It has happened in the same sense as His crucifixion and His death, in the human sphere and human time, as an actual event within the world with an objective content.¹⁷⁰

... in the resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ we have to do with an inwardly coherent event ... we must stress that it is an event. ... But it has the same character as what had gone before to the extent that it, too, is an event within the world, in time and space. It, too, takes place in the body, although not only in the body. It, too, was experienced and attested, not only inwardly but outwardly, by certain men.¹⁷¹

He is flesh and blood in His being, and therefore in its revelation. It is inevitable, then, that the power which proceeds from His resurrection, and He Himself as the Resurrected, should sow a seed which is not only psychical but

¹⁶⁹ *CD*, IV/1, p. 318.
¹⁷¹ *CD*, IV/2, pp. 142-3. (author’s emphasis)
physical, and give nourishment which is not only spiritual but material—a whole preservation of the whole man.\textsuperscript{172}

It did not take place in a heavenly or supra-heavenly realm, or as part of an intra-divine movement or a divine conversation, but before the gates of Jerusalem in the days of Tiberius Caesar and therefore in the place and time which are also ours, in our sphere.\textsuperscript{173}

What we see in Barth’s ‘theology of the forty days’ with all of these assertions is his hanging on to the “extraordinary reality, the risen Christ, whose presence is endlessly rich and fruitful for understanding and for all of life.”\textsuperscript{174} Now we can realise with his theology of the resurrection that “[h]is main concern is to state this [reality] clearly and to work out its implications, and this involves his distinctive theological method centred on biblical narratives.”\textsuperscript{175} Hence it is beyond question that Barth, as a realist of a very special kind,\textsuperscript{176} posited the resurrection of Jesus Christ at the centre of his theology, and thought of it as the starting point of theology.\textsuperscript{177} For him, therefore, “it is the eschatological history of Jesus Christ which provides us with the prototypic understanding of the ‘true God’, the ‘real man’, the ‘real reality’, the ‘real time’, the ‘true being’, the ‘true history’, etc. To grasp this as clearly as possible by a sustained listening to the biblical testimony to the eschatological reality of the risen Christ is our first task as theologians.”\textsuperscript{178}

Up to this point, we have seen Barth’s positive attitude towards the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection from the perspective of his ‘theology of the forty days’. This can be summarised by this statement of his: “The resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead …has in fact

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., pp. 316-7.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{173} CD, IV/3, p. 298.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{174} D. F. Ford, “Barth’s Interpretation of the Bible,” in S. W. Sykes, ed., Karl Barth—Studies of His Theological Method (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 84}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{177} Cf. ibid., p. 41.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., p. 38.}
happened. It has happened in the same sense as His crucifixion and His death, in the human sphere and human time, as an actual event within the world with an objective content.  

In summary, we have done justice to both the non-historicality and the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection in Barth’s theology in this first chapter. The early Barth certainly shows a tendency towards the anhypostatical understanding of Jesus’ resurrection, in which “it [the resurrection] can be interpreted merely in terms of some sort of super-history, touching our history only in a tangential manner, and therefore not as really historical.” But even here in his early theology he did not ever overlook the antidocetic aspect of Jesus’ resurrection, in which, however, narrowly, he seemed to cling to Jesus’ resurrection as an occurrence in time and space. In his later theology, however, he puts great emphasis on the historical reality of Jesus’ resurrection. He here sloughs off the earlier drift towards the anhypostatic understanding of Jesus’ resurrection, “much as a snake sloughs off its skin.” But even here in his later theology he obviously takes hold of the chasm between Jesus’ death and his resurrection in the light of modern historiography. As we have seen, he claims that something like a ‘black hole’ in history really happened between Jesus’ death and resurrection, so much so that the resurrection as such cannot be approached by the historian. Then, what is he talking about now? He is saying: the resurrection of the crucified should be understood as a real event in the person and history of Jesus Christ; but this event does not lie in the logicality of human history, but it is an incomprehensible new beginning. He is saying that, especially in relation to the resurrection, “Christ is not a product of human history, but he is—as an event in human history—God’s action, which can

179 CD, IV/1, p. 333.
180 T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Resurrection, p. 95.
181 Ibid.
be understood only as God’s election, as God’s free engagement [Eingriff].”183 In short, he talks about an event happened in space and time, which is nevertheless transhistorical, i.e., cannot be historiographically dealt with. This is the limitation of Barth’s understanding of the resurrection, which will be seen in detail in Chapter III. Now we will turn to the second chapter, and see what W. Pannenberg says about the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection.

183 ibid. (my translation)
CHAPTER II. JESUS’ RESURRECTION AS A HISTORICAL EVENT: WOLFHART PANNEMBERG

In W. Pannenberg’s theology Jesus’ resurrection as a historical event plays a crucial role for the whole scheme of his systematics. As G. E. Michelson points out, Pannenberg’s theology “relies heavily on the resurrection of Jesus as a genuinely historical event.”184 This means that Pannenberg’s theology stands or falls with his argumentation for the historicality of the resurrection of Jesus.

For his argumentation for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection Pannenberg lays emphasis on its four-dimensionality, thus saying: “The Easter message certainly states that the resurrection of Jesus was an event of transition from this earthly world to a new and imperishable life with God, yet the event took place in this world, namely, in the tomb of Jesus in Jerusalem before the visit of the Women on the Sunday morning after his death.”185 This spatiotemporality of Jesus’ resurrection is accessible only by historical research, as he asserts: “Whether or not a particular event happened two thousand years ago is not made certain by faith but only by historical research,”186 Thus for him, “[t]he notion that a leap of faith, or an appeal to ‘intuitive certainty’,…, or a claim for the self-authentication of a contemporary encounter with the risen Jesus, can independently establish the facticity of a past occurrence is seen as sheer foolishness.”187 How does he assert this? Before our inquiring into the detailed process of his historical reasoning for Jesus’ resurrection, we need to consider his view of history and revelation, because he emphasises the historicality of

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revelation in his view of the ‘revelation as history’. In so doing, I will first deal with a question about meaning as a prolegomena to his view of revelation as history.

A. History and Revelation

a. In Search of the Ultimate Meaning

Inquiring into the ultimate meaning of all phenomena seems an inevitable fact of our humanity, even though it remains unreachable in spite of our desperately endeavouring to find it. Our search is halted, when we come to face ugly absurdities such as human suffering and death with no justifiable cause. Why do and must we exist? Cosmologically speculating, even if the Big Bang theory ultimately turns out to be true as the origin of the universe, can it be the answer to the question of ultimate meaning? Even if the Big Bang theory could be established as true, it seems inevitable that we should still ask a further question in order to keep pursuing ultimate meaning: what caused the Big Bang? Was it chance or a sort of necessity by a certain transcendent power? Hence it can be said that the question of ultimate meaning is wholly dependent upon the aporia of the cause of the beginning of cosmic history. This means: if the universe, on the one hand, had begun with the Big Bang by chance, so much so that it had been ruled by randomness, as in the subatomic realm, then we can neither find the ultimate meaning of the existence of all phenomena, nor experience any meaning in our lives; on the other hand, if the universe had been originated by a certain being, then we can be sure that there is a meaning given to us. Therefore, we must ask: “Is the experience of meaning a matter of creating meaning or of discovering an already given meaning?”

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Pannenberg, with his understanding of the semantic structure of linguistic utterances, asserts that the pursuit of the question of ultimate meaning is a matter of discovering an already given meaning. The starting point of his understanding of this is his distinction of the formal concept of meaning from the one experienced in our life. According to him, “[t]he formal concept is more comprehensive than the actually meaningful.”190 By this he claims: “… the experience of the absence of meaning is also semantically structured and thus not devoid of meaning; the same pertains as well to the nihilistic denial of meaningful world. Indeed, it is only because of the semantic or meaning-related structure of language that one can even articulate the conviction of the meaninglessness of life.”191

Hence we can express ultimate meaning only through our language. But all linguistic expressions are ones in which our thought, feeling, intuition, and other mental activities are represented. In other words, language is the outcome of human mental activity. By this, then, we can be led to the thought that “[s]ince meaning can only be grasped linguistically, the belief that language is the product of human activity suggests to us that we might view all meaning as the product of a human bestowal of meaning.”192

Pannenberg strongly argues against this. According to him, “[m]eaning can be approached through language but it is not the product of language.”193 This means: “If the use of assertions is meaningful … then reality must be somehow meaningfully structured prior to its being grasped in language, even if language is the only way to articulate this meaning structure.”194 Thus for him, “[t]o reduce meaning to language is to take the first step along a path which culminates in the position that all meaning is merely created through human
action—that is, that it is the product of a bestowal of meaning.”\textsuperscript{195} which “falsifies the actual state of affairs by reversing the actual priority.”\textsuperscript{196}

When this linguistic pursuit of the question of meaning enters the realm of religion, the reality, which is ‘meaningfully structured prior to its being grasped in language,’ comes to mean the divine reality that is the basis of the structure of meaning. Hence, as Pannenberg states, “[r]eligion has above all to do with the divine reality that grounds and completes the meaning totality of the natural and social world, and thus only indirectly with the totality of meaning of the world itself.”\textsuperscript{197} Thus in the domain of religion the question of the ultimate meaning of the existence of all phenomena from beginning to end is tantamount to the question of the truth claim of God (or gods) as the foundation of meaning, even though “the truth claim made by the religious consciousness must authenticate itself by showing that the God (or gods) alleged by it can actually be understood as the creator and perfecter of the world as in fact experienced.”\textsuperscript{198}

In Christianity God is thought of as the ultimate being that is responsible for the whole structure of meaning. Christian theology posits God as the answer to the question of the ultimate meaning. As Pannenberg puts it: “The idea of God as such is always an answer to the question of meaning of reality as a whole.”\textsuperscript{199} This means that God was the cause of the Big Bang, is the sustainer of the panoramic history of the universe, and will eschatologically complete it. From the perspective of this idea of God Christianity can be seen to reject K. Löwith’s claim: “Historical processes as such do not bear the least evidence of a comprehensive and ultimate meaning.”\textsuperscript{200} And through its confession that “in Jesus of Nazareth the divine Logos has become human, the one in whom all things have their

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p. 167.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., p. 170.
being.”\textsuperscript{201} Christianity tries to show that there is a meaning (or the ultimate one) in history. What we should make clear here is that we are dealing with God’s revelation in history by the claim that God revealed Godself in Jesus. Thus for the Christian theologian, if there is to be meaning in history, it can only be when history is thought of as the space for God’s revelation. Pannenberg in this context emphasises the concept of ‘revelation as history,’ proposing “a thorough-going historical interpretation of revelation as self-disclosure[of God].”\textsuperscript{202} For him, “[r]evelation is historical event; it is historical event interpreted as ‘act of God’.”\textsuperscript{203} Revelation as history (which, for the theologian, can and must be the only clue to the question of the ultimate meaning of history)—this is Pannenberg’s fundamental view of history to which we shall now attend.

b. Revelation as History

How can we know that God exists? How can we gain the knowledge of God? If God exists in history as the basis of its meaning, and leads it as its driving force, how can we know it? Pannenberg explains the how of these questions as follows:

God can be known only if he gives himself to be known. … If the knowledge of God be understood in such a way that in our own strength we can wrest from deity the secret of its nature, deity is lacking from the very outset. This kind of knowledge would not be knowledge of God, for it would contradict the concept of God. Hence the knowledge of God is possible only by revelation.\textsuperscript{204}

\textsuperscript{201} Pannenberg, \textit{Metaphysics and the Idea of God}, p. 170.
\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Ibid} (author’s emphasis)
When Pannenberg asserts that “the knowledge of God is possible only by revelation,” he means by this that God is hidden. The concealment of God prevents us from thinking that “[t]he uniqueness of the deity might be experienced as so evident in the medium of divine works of power that no special revelation beyond that is necessary.”  

We can find this kind of thinking in the ancient Greeks’ belief in their gods. For them, their gods “had no need to be revealed, because their nature was everywhere close and familiar to men.”  

Unlike this, however, Pannenberg “is speaking solely of the Deus pro nobis—of the Deus in se, [of whom] nothing whatsoever can be said.”  

Hence, for Pannenberg, the only way for us to be accessible to the Deus in se, i.e., the hidden God, is God’s free self-disclosure.

According to Pannenberg, God’s self-disclosure does not happen in the form of theophany, but in the form of history. Of course, he finds the clue to it in the biblical traditions, as he points out: “According to the biblical traditions, the mysterious being who in the oldest period did not even possess a name of his own but was designated as the God of Abraham, the Fear of Isaac, or the Mighty One of Jacob, and then appeared to Moses as Yahweh, showed himself to be God by the historical deeds he performed.”  

But these deeds as God’s self-disclosure, Pannenberg contends, should not be understood as belonging to such a special dimension of history as salvation history (Heilsgeschichte) or primal history (Urgeschichte). He “rejects the distinction, so beloved by a whole generation of Biblical theologians, between sacred and

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205 Ibid.
209 FaR, p. 53.

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profane history."210 For him, "[t]here are not two kinds of history, but one."211 And "God works in the ordinary world of profane history."212 For this he emphatically argues:

The basic principle of the universal correspondence of all historical phenomena rules out any attempt to delimit redemptive history as a realm of a different kind from the rest of history, ... It belongs to the full meaning of the Incarnation that God’s redemptive deed took place within the universal correlative connections of human history and not in a ghetto of redemptive history, or in a primal history belonging to a dimension which is “oblique” to ordinary history … 213

Hence God’s activities are ordinary events in history. And God’s self-revelation occurs in and through history. Here revelation is identified with history, with “history in its full temporality and contingency.”214 In this way, as E. F. Tupper states, “[a]ffirming the historicity of revelatory events against existentialist and salvation-history theology on the one hand and against a doctrinaire historiography on the other, Pannenberg constructs a unique conception of ‘revelation as history.’”215

In establishing this conception of “revelation as history,” Pannenberg does not confine the temporal scope of revelation to the past, in which the history of Israel is represented as the form and content of God’s self-disclosure as history. As having shown by the second thesis in his “Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation” (i.e., by the thesis that “revelation is not

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211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
comprehended completely in the beginning, but at the end of the revealing history, he extends the temporal scope of revelation to the future (more accurately, to the end of history), in which the goal and ultimate meaning of history will be crystallised to such an extent that all human beings will be able to grasp it clearly. And he also extends the spatial scope of revelation from the history of Israel to universal history (*Universalgeschichte*), in which alone an event comes to ‘manifest itself for what it really is.’ As he points out: “…the event sought in inquiring… does not manifest itself for what it really is when taken as an isolated fact, but does so only within universal continuities of events and of meanings, i.e., only within the horizon of universal history.” How can he claim these extensions? He finds the basis of this claim in the fate of Jesus of Nazareth. In the fate of Jesus we can proleptically taste the end of history; and in it we can anticipatorily grasp the realisation of the universality of revelation, as we see in his fourth thesis: “The universal revelation of the deity of God is not yet realized in the history of Israel, but first in the fate of Jesus of Nazareth, insofar as the end of all events is anticipated in his fate.” Hence for Pannenberg, “[r]evelation is conceived in relation to the comprehensive whole of reality, as a temporal process of history that is not complete but open to the future—yet a future already anticipated in the history and destiny of Jesus.” And with this conception of revelation Pannenberg throws into relief the importance of Jesus’ resurrection. According to him, the resurrection of Jesus should be proleptically understood as the partial accomplishment of the end of history. This means: “The occurrence of the end of history within the midst of history happened in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. But what has happened to him remains outstanding, still unaccomplished, for the rest of us.” In other words: “…in the fate of Jesus Christ the end is not only seen ahead of time, but is

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216 *Rah*, p. 131.
217 *ROI*, p. 98.
218 *Rah*, p. 139.
experienced by means of a foretaste. For, in him, the resurrection of the dead has already taken place, though to all other men this is still something yet to be experienced.”

Therefore, “[a] radical realistic doctrine of the resurrection as a historical event is essential to Pannenberg’s theology of revelation as history.”

In the light of this scheme for constructing the conception of ‘revelation as history,’ therefore, we need to examine briefly the flow of Pannenberg’s understanding of revelation through the history of Israel, and of ‘revelation in the future’ through the apocalyptic vision of the end of history. Then we will try to grasp his Christological approach to revelation through the conception of ‘prolepsis’ for the understanding of his attitude towards the historicality of the resurrection of Jesus.

1) Revelation through the History of Ancient Israel

Three elements should be considered for Pannenberg’s understanding of revelation in the history of ancient Israel. The first one is his claim of history as the primary locus of revelation. For him the form of revelation in the Old Testament is the history of Israel. This view is established with the help of Rolf Rendorff, who, against Walther Zimmerli’s view of the form of revelation in the Old Testament as the word of God, sees it instead as history, that is, the history of Israel. We can obviously see this view of Pannenberg in his contention: “That knowledge of God is made possible on a path guided by God himself—by a history—was already known to Israel. In the Old Testament tradition we find over and over again the idea that the basic acts of Yahweh in history were intended to make known to Israel

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221 Ralph, p. 141.
the divinity of Yahweh.”225 With this contention, Pannenberg now argues that priority should be given to the historical deeds of Yahweh, rather than to the Word of God, for the understanding of the locus of revelation in the Old Testament. According to him, “the whole Israelite tradition was convinced that it was the will of Yahweh that his divinity should be made known by his historical acts.”226 Hence for Pannenberg, history becomes a basic mode of revelation, on view of which he establishes the proposition, ‘revelation as history’.

The second element to be considered is the indirectness of God’s self-revelation. Through his view of history as the locus of revelation, Pannenberg “sees that the goal of the acts of God is to let Israel recognise God through them”.227 On the basis of this view, he thinks that God’s “self-revelation must be thought of as mediated through God’s action.”228 He makes this thought clear in his ‘Thesis 1’: “The self-revelation of God in the biblical witnesses is not of a direct type in the sense of a theophany, but is indirect and brought about by means of the historical acts of God.”229 Although we have direct types of theophanies in the Old Testament such as God’s self-declaration of God’s own name, the prophetic reception of the word of God, or the proclamation of the Law on Sinai, Pannenberg repudiates the directness of God’s self-disclosure in these.230 What he tries to show by this repudiation is that we cannot see “an unveiling of the ‘essence’ of Yahweh”231 in each of these. It is because “unveiling of essence is something ultimate, and if one claims such for an event of divine self-manifestation witnessed to in the Old Testament, it becomes impossible to understand the God of Jesus as identical with the God of Israel, at least in a Christian theology that first ascribes finality to Jesus’ message of God and not already to the Old Testament.”232 With all these assertions

226 Ibid., p. 119.
229 RaH, p. 10.
230 For this repudiation, cf. ibid., pp. 9ff.
231 TaH, p. 234.
232 Ibid.
Pannenberg can conclusively state: “[W]e are given cause to think in terms of an indirectness of God’s self-revelation by the finding that in the biblical texts themselves the direct content of the reception of revelation... is not God himself but ourselves and our world.”

The third element to be mentioned is the provisionality of God’s revelation through Israel’s history. On the basis of the indirectness of God’s self-revelation (Thesis 1), Pannenberg proposes his second thesis on the doctrine of revelation: “Revelation is not comprehended completely in the beginning, but at the end of the revealing history.”

For Pannenberg, God’s revelation in the Old Testament does not consist of single, isolated events in history, but of a series of events (which may be called history itself). As S. Talmon perspicaciously points out:

The revelation gives Israel the objective Law, in which Yahweh’s subjective commandment is contained. The revealed Law is the foundation of the Covenant, which Yahweh manifestatively set up with his people there at Sinai, and which henceforth decides the way of Israel in history, and should prove itself in history. Covenant, Law and Revelation thus develop as subcategories of history. The institutions, which spring from Covenant and Law, attest to the uninterrupted revelation of God’s presence in history. The fusion of the Exodus-event and the revelation at Sinai gives rise to a new phenomenon in Israel: history as revelation.

According to Pannenberg, in the fusion of all events indirectly showing God’s self-disclosure, i.e., in history as revelation “there is knowledge of God only in retrospect of his past action..., just as Moses sees God’s glory only when it has gone by.” This means that the past activities of God are provisional, because their meaning should be revised by the revelatory events to come. Hence “[r]evelation comes about through the series of occurrences

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233 STI, p. 244.
234 Radl, p. 131.
236 STI, p. 244.
which themselves continually revise the content of revelation until the completion of history when God’s deity will be in full view. Each event is seen as only one step toward always future full revelation of God.”

In this respect, history as revelation is full of novitas. Through the novitas of every event in history we see the openness of history towards the future, in which the final self-revelation of God will be shown as the totality of all revelatory events in history. Hence the goal of history “is not deducible from its beginning.” From the perspective of this finality of God’s self-revelation, therefore, every event in the past and present should be interpreted and reinterpreted. However, it should not be done in its own realm of interpretation. It should be done in the context called tradition, to which it belongs. Only when it is done in its context, its novitas can be experienced as a reality in history, which requires a ‘new song’ to celebrate it in its deeper level, as in The Psalms: “O sing to the LORD a new song, for he has done marvellous things!” (98:1; RSV).

For the people of Israel, history full of novitas is closely related to the concept of their God. For them, the reality of God is not experienced as static, but as dynamic. Their God does not exist only as “the origin of the world, that is, of normal, ever self-repeating processes and events.” The God of Israel is the God who penetrates “into the course of his creation and initiate[s] new events in it in an unpredictably way.” Hence “[t]he certainty that God again and again performs new acts, that he is a ‘living God,’ forms the basis for Israel’s understanding of reality as a linear history moving toward a goal.”

Along this line, Israel finds that her history is led to a goal in the pattern of history as promise and fulfilment. In the Old Testament we see that the history of Israel was the space of God’s self-disclosure expressed in the tension between promise and fulfilment. The promises

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239 *BOTI*, p. 18.
240 *Ibid*.
241 *Ibid*. 

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of Yahweh to the patriarchs are fulfilled by the Israelites’ conquest of the Canaanites’ land by way of the Exodus. We can obviously see this paradigm of history as promise and fulfilment in the Yahwistic document, which opens with Yahweh’s promise to Abraham, and ends with the fulfilment of this promise through Israel’s conquering the land.\textsuperscript{242} And we can find another example for that pattern in the history of Davidic dynasty. God’s promise to David through Nathan is fulfilled by Solomon’s coronation.\textsuperscript{243} Now we can be sure to say with all of these that “[a] rhythm between promises and fulfilments can be traced in the course of Israel’s experience and understanding of her history.”\textsuperscript{244} For Israel, therefore, “[h]istory is event so suspended in tension between promise and fulfilment that through the promise it is irreversibly pointed toward the goal of future fulfilment.”\textsuperscript{245}

The Old Testament shows, however, that the scheme of promise and fulfillment in history had to be altered with the fall of Judah and the Babylonian Captivity. With the coming of these events Israel had to realise that those fulfilments in the past such as the Exodus, the conquest of the Promised Land, the prosperity of King David, etc. were provisional. And this made her anticipate the ultimate paragon of fulfilment, in which God would totally and finally reveal Godself. As Pannenberg points out, in this anticipation Israel’s “[a]ttention now turns away from the past saving deeds of Yahweh connected with the exodus and the conquest and focuses on the future of a new and definitive event of salvation.”\textsuperscript{246} This was the new movement led by the prophets of the exile, in which the temporal dimension of God’s ultimate deeds for human salvation changed from past and present to future. In other words: “The prophets of the exile looked forward to the decisive event of salvation, which now, for the first time, was in the future. The decisive and ultimate revelation of Jahweh was also

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 19.
\bibitem{} Cf. \textit{ibid.}
\bibitem{} \textit{BQJT}, p. 18.
\bibitem{} \textit{STJ}, p. 246.
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removed to the future.”247 This means that God’s salvific deeds as God’s self-revelation were eschatologised in this prophetic movement. Of course, this movement acknowledges that “God is the one God that he has already shown himself to be, and he will show that he is the same God by his future acts.”248 Yet we can clearly see the eschatologising of God’s self-revelation through God’s salvific deeds in the prophetic proclamations.249

We see that the prophetic turning to eschatology was continued in the apocalyptic movement. As Pannenberg points out, the benchmark of this movement is the vision that “the future consummation of world history which is connected with the coming of God’s kingdom that will end all human rule, with the judgment of all human injustice, with the transformation of the present creation, and with the resurrection of the dead, will finally also make God’s deity and divine glory manifest to ‘all flesh’.”250 Here in this apocalyptic vision Pannenberg perceives the reality of future history, and seeks the possibility of the universalisation of history, the actual expression of which is to be found in the fate of Jesus. We shall now examine these themes.

2) Revelation in the Future

a) Apocalyptic as Eschatalogising of History

We have seen above that, since Judah’s knuckling under the power of Babylonia, eschatology had developed in the prophetic movement. Prophetic eschatology proclaims a new covenant251 by which God will establish a new community to show God’s deity to all peoples. From the perspective of this new covenant it can be said that prophetic eschatology

247 Radl, p. 132.
248 STI, p. 246, n. 150.
249 For example, Isa. 43:18ff.; Jer. 16:14-5, etc. Cf. ibid.
250 Ibid., p. 246.
shows that the prophets of the exile had waited for the realisation of God’s establishment of God’s sovereignty in this world at some time in the future of history. The prophets, who experienced the superiority of the Babylonian power, needed a vindicator for their nation. They proclaimed that God would be the only vindicator for Israel. God will vindicate Israel through God’s judgment and God’s new turning to her as God’s chosen people. This means that God will ultimately reveal Godself through these events yet to come. The prophets thus eschatologise God’s self-revelation through these events. And prophetic eschatology proclaims this, as Pannenberg points out: “The nations as well as Israel will know the God of Israel as the true God by both: by his judgments because they make known his power and deity as the guardian of his right and righteousness, by his deliverance of Israel because this brings honor again among the nations to the name of Yahweh as the name of the covenant God of Israel (Ezek. 36:22ff.; cf. Isa. 48:9ff.).”252 It can be said, therefore, that prophetic eschatology shows this-worldly expectations in the main, which “were to be realized through the action of God in history.”253

The this-worldly expectations of Israel were originally nationalistic in character. This means that Israel’s hope expressed in prophetic eschatology “looked for a restoration of the Davidic kingdom under a Davidic King, the ‘Messiah’.”254 For Israel “the Messiah was not a supernatural agent of redemption, but the restorer of the Davidic dynasty[; h]e was a human figure, and he would set up his throne at Jerusalem.”255 Hence the Israelites tried to reconstruct their nation under the guidance of Zerubbabel, who was thought of as their Messianic king. Later, they tried to establish the realisation of their Messianic expectation through the Maccabees’ struggle for the independence of Israel. And there were other Messianic movements in the history of the sovereignty-lost Israel, including the ones

252 STI, p. 206.
255 Ibid.
“awakened by the preaching of John the Baptist and the appearance of Jesus,” for the realisation of the Messianic hope.256 All these were in vain. And these failures made Israel’s hope for the realisation of the Messianic kingdom in this world totally shattered.

Along with those failures of the realisation of the Messianic kingdom the prophetic-eschatological movement turns into the apocalyptic-eschatological movement. As J. Macquarrie points out, “certainly it was in the time after the destruction of Jerusalem and the scattering of the nation, when hopes of a political consummation had pretty well foundered, that the apocalyptic literature began to flourish.”257 Since the fall of Judah the prophetic promise that God would restore the Davidic kingdom had never been fulfilled through the bleak history of the sovereign-ty lost Israel. Apocalypticists reacted against this unfulfilled prophetic promise, and totally eschatologised it. This means that they had to transfer the temporal horizon of the fulfillment of the promise from the near future to the end of history.

Can we say that the totally-eschatologised apocalyptic vision has a real relevance to history? Apocalyptic, which is totally eschatologised, “relates to final, divine secrets, lying beyond the usual revelations entrusted to the prophets; these secrets look to events no longer having a direct point of contact with the events to which we are witnesses.”258 If there should be an unbridgeable chasm between the events in the apocalyptic vision and the events in the present, how can it be claimed that apocalyptic is the portrayal of the future of history? If the apocalyptic vision is nothing but “either piantasy or gnosticism,”259 or its characteristic cannot but be “a certain burning hue, the symptom of a passionately aroused fantasy, [the analogy of which can be found] in mythology...”260 how can we claim that it has a historical

256 Cf. ibid.
relevance? Is it nothing but a collection of “those descriptions of the future which serve as pure speculations merely to satisfy human curiosity, without any actual interest in salvation”\textsuperscript{261}? If this be the case, how can we find any historical element here in these caricatured expressions of the future of history?

Pannenberg argues against all these negative aspects of apocalyptic in terms of its relevance to history. He regards “apocalyptic as the legitimate heir of the Old Testament and the essential precursor of the New.”\textsuperscript{262} From the view of apocalyptic as the legitimate continuation of the Old Testament, he contends that apocalyptic is a development out of prophecy. According to him: “Later generations certainly lived through the return from exile but did not experience the all-surpassing age of salvation that the prophets had promised. Instead, under the experience of successive empires there developed the eschatological expectation of a final actualizing of the kingdom of God at the end of the series of earthly kingdoms.”\textsuperscript{263} Pannenberg’s view of this can be supported by Paul Hanson’s assertion: “apocalyptic eschatology is seen primarily as a development out of prophecy abetted by the bitter experiences of the exilic and post-exilic period and the pessimistic attitude arising in visionary circles that Israel’s sin was so deeply ingrained as to necessitate a radical break with the past and a new beginning initiated by Yahweh.”\textsuperscript{264} This new beginning appears in apocalyptic as closely related to the interest in the individual fate in the future expressed through the ideas of the resurrection of the just and God’s judgment for sinners. Hence for Pannenberg, “[I]nked to this [the eschatological expectation of a final actualizing of the

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\textsuperscript{262} O. Cullmann, \textit{Salvation in History}, p. 80.


kingdom of God] was the expectation of God’s righteousness for individuals beyond this earthly life with the resurrection of the just and judgment for sinners.”

However, Pannenberg neither gives up nor minimises the relevance of these expectations to history. His theology rather hangs on to the real relationship between the apocalyptic vision and the future of history. This attitude of his towards the relation of the apocalyptic to history coincides with D. Rössler’s view that “[apocalyptic literature, … —particularly in vision—gives an impressive insight into the coherent progress of world history according to God’s plan, from creation to the end of the world, a history which includes the whole of mankind.” In line with this view, Pannenberg asserts: “To the apocalyptic seer there is disclosed in a vision… what will be manifest to the whole world only at the end of this aeon, namely, all the hidden things of heaven that are to take place on earth…” It is evident here that Pannenberg finds the eschatologisation of history in apocalyptic. For him apocalyptic vision is not a phantasmagoric speculation about the future of history ‘merely to satisfy human curiosity,’ but the absolutely unique means for human reception of God’s revelation in the future of history. Only through this can we gain, in advance, access to the knowledge of God’s universal self-revelation in future history and of our fate in the future. Hence he can assert that “Jewish apocalypticism completed the extension of history so that it covered the whole course of the world from Creation to the end.”

Pannenberg finds the foundation of his view of apocalyptic as the eschatologisation of history in the fate of Jesus of Nazareth, especially in the eschatological event of the resurrection of Jesus. For Pannenberg the thought of the apocalyptic vision as having relevance to history is justifiable, because we have an eschatological event in our history.

265 ST1, p. 207.
267 Ibid., pp. 40-1 (author’s emphasis).
268 ST1, p. 207.
269 Cf. O. Cullmann, Salvation in History, p. 80.
270 BQT1, p. 20.
Hence the historicalness of the apocalyptic vision is sealed by Jesus’ resurrection. Conversely, Jesus’ resurrection should be understood within its apocalyptic matrix, because “[i]t is … true that the New Testament statements about the resurrection are incomprehensible without their apocalyptic pre-history.”\textsuperscript{271} From this perspective, we can realise that how important it is in Pannenberg’s theological system to establish the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection, which will be dealt with in Section B. Before coming to that section, we need to turn to Pannenberg’s concept of the universality of the historical revelation.

\textit{b) The Universality of the Historical Revelation}

Can we find the universal aspect of Yahweh’s self-revelation in the Old Testament? Or will the ultimate, universal revelation of God take place at the end of history? With regard to these questions, it should be first noted that there is a disagreement between R. Rendtorff and W. Pannenberg on the understanding of the universality of God’s revelation.

In the early sixties R. Rendtorff emphasised the eschatological aspect of Yahweh’s full revelation, to which Pannenberg agreed: “The still imminent and future self-vindication of Jahweh comes more and more into the center of expectation and hope. The earlier stress, especially the basic one concerning the exodus from Egypt, is not forgotten, but it can no longer be understood as the sole and ultimate self-revelation of Jahweh. New and greater things are expected. The full revelation of Jahweh has become an eschatological fact.”\textsuperscript{272} Twenty years later, however, Rendtorff changes his attitude towards the understanding of the universality of Yahweh’s self-demonstration. He regretfully recollects that those assertions resulted from the then attempt to interpret the whole Old Testament eschatologically (or

\textsuperscript{271} K. Koch, \textit{The Rediscovery of Apocalyptic:}, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Ralt}, p. 33.
apocalyptically.²²³ And he asserts that the Old Testament should be exegetically interpreted. When we see the Old Testament from the exegetical perspective, he criticises, we realise that Pannenberg’s assertions (such as: “In the history of Israel, Jahweh had not proved himself to be a God for all men. He had only established himself as the God of Israel.”²²⁴; “Whenever the historical self-demonstration of Jahweh in his acts was viewed as being definitive and lasting, this demonstration still retained a provisional character. It is always surpassed with new events, new historical activity in which Jahweh presents himself in new ways. Thus, we saw that it is only the end of all events which could bring in the final self-manifestation of Jahweh, the perfection of his revelation.”²²⁵) are dogmatic (or philosophical) postulations which distort the exegetical facts.²²⁶ How does Pannenberg come to postulate the particularity and the provisionality of Yahweh’s self-revelation through the history of Israel? According to Rendtorff, these postulations are brought about by Pannenberg’s acceptance of the dialectical relationship between promise and fulfillment, in which every fulfillment of a promise presupposes another promise (which means that there is no finalised fulfillment in the Old Testament), and so it is not until the events of Jesus Christ that we have a completed fulfillment of all promises in the Old Testament.²²⁷ What then does Rendtorff infer from his exegetical perspective? Within the realm of his exegetical understanding of the Old Testament, there is no room for the provisionality of God’s self-demonstration. Of course, he admits that we can find many expressions of the eschatological expectation of Yahweh’s new and great historical act in the texts in the exilic and postexilic period.²²⁸ “However,” he claims, “the very deuter-Isaiah, which typically shows those expressions, emphasizes that God has proved himself to be the one God and no one else, and that the expectation of God’s

²²⁴ Ralf, pp. 139-40.
²²⁵ ibid., pp. 140-1.
²²⁷ Cf. ibid., pp. 45-6.
²²⁸ Cf. ibid., p. 46.
future act is based on this fact.”279 “Here,” he keeps maintaining, “we have nothing to do with the provisional character of God’s self-demonstration. On the contrary: the formulated hymnic-confessional [hymnisch-bekenntnis] speech in deuter-Isaiah constantly emphasises the very unequivocal and definitive self-disclosure of this God. The multifarious variations of the form ‘I am Yahweh’ by deuter-Isaiah shows this very intention.”280 What he eventually tries to infer from these assertions is that God has proved Godself to be the one God ‘in Israel’. According to him, this ‘in Israel’ has many meanings. First of all, for him it means ‘in the history of Israel’. In the history of Israel God has revealed Godself as the one God through God’s salvific deeds. Here Rendtorff regards the exodus from Egypt as the most fundamental one among them.281 “Therefore,” he concludes, “Pannenberg’s thesis should be reversed: ‘The self-demonstration of God of Israel takes place not at the end, but in the beginning of the history of Israel.”282 Hence he can claim with this assertion that “the expression of ‘in Israel’ does not exclude the universal aspect [of the self-revelation of the God of Israel], but includes it,”283 although there still remains for him a tension between the particularity and the universality in Israel’s knowledge of God.284

Of course, within the exegetical perspective of the Old Testament it can be said with Rendtorff that Yahweh, the God of Israel, fully revealed Godself as the one God, i.e., as the absolute One in philosophical terms, in and through the events of the Exodus. What do the events and the fate of Jesus Christ mean to us, then? If God revealed Godself as the one and true God in Jesus Christ, is this a secondary or supplementary revelation for the full self-disclosure of God in the Exodus? Conversely, is God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ not the fundamental and ultimate self-demonstration of God, and the revelation of Yahweh in the

279 Ibid (my translation; author’s emphases)
280 Ibid (my translation)
281 Cf. ibid., p. 47
282 Ibid (my translation)
283 Ibid, p. 48. (my translation)
284 Cf. ibid.
Exodus, a secondary and supplementary one? Or, will the final and ultimate self-revelation of God occur at the end of history, which means that all sorts of God’s revelations in the Old and New Testaments are just provisional?

When we try to consider these questions in Pannenberg’s theological system, we should pay, first of all, attention to his concept of the singularity of God’s self-revelation. As we have already seen, Pannenberg relativises all self-manifestations of God in the Old Testament, which means that every depiction of God’s self-revelation in the Old Testament shows its provisional character. As we were told above, Pannenberg’s position of this is in opposition to Rendtorff’s exegetical understanding of God’s self-revelation in the Old Testament; Rendtorff regards this view as a dogmatic postulation. But Pannenberg still argues against Rendtorff’s view of this, thus saying: “In Isa. 40ff., of course, God is the one God that he has already shown himself to be, and he will show that he is the same God by his future acts …, yet there is also a call not to remember former things nor to regard the past, for God is doing a new thing (Isa. 43:18). Jer. 16:14-15 even has the express prediction that in the future age of salvation people will no longer say: As the Lord lives who brought Israel out of the land of Egypt, but they will connect the name of the Lord with his new saving deeds.”285 With this argument Pannenberg vindicates his claim that the provisionality of God’s self-manifestation in the Old Testament presupposes the final and universal self-revelation of God at the end of history. According to him, this final and universal self-revelation of God occurs in its singular form in history from beginning to end. He emphasises this singularity of the form of God’s self-revelation, thus claiming: “The very concept of self-revelation really implies that it cannot take place in manifold forms, but that if it happens at all, it can only be in a single form.”286 To put it more perspicuously: “The concept of self-revelation includes the fact that

285 STJ, p. 246, n. 150.
286 FaR, p. 60.
there can be only a single revelation. God cannot disclose himself in two or more different ways as the one who is the same from eternity to eternity. When someone has disclosed himself ultimately in a definite, particular event, he cannot again disclose himself in the same sense in another event different from the first. Otherwise, he has not disclosed himself fully and completely in the first event, but at most partially.”

As we know, Pannenberg’s view of the final and universal self-revelation of God as occurring once at the end of all events derives from the apocalyptic vision. “In apocalyptic,” he claims, “the future of the divine self-demonstration, of the revelation of the glory of God, was pushed further back and merged into the future of the end of the age.” Of course, the prophetic seers, he notices, proclaim the future dimension and the universality of the self-manifestation of God, as in Isa. 40ff., for the first time. According to him, however, it is in the apocalyptic thought that we find the universal-historical aspect of God’s self-revelation at the end of all events. Thus he says: “The apocalyptic thought conceives of a universal history. Thus, the revelation of God and his glory is transferred to the end of all events.” Here we have to note that what makes possible Pannenberg’s inferring the realisation of the final and universal self-revelation of God at the end of history from the apocalyptic vision is his view of the apocalyptic vision as the eschatologising of history, as we have already seen. Through the apocalyptic seer God shows the making of God’s history to us. This is why God’s revelation is shown to us through history as a whole. Hence, for Pannenberg, “[p]lacing the manifestation of God at the end of history means that the biblical God has, so to speak, his own history. That is, the historical event of revelation cannot be thought of in an outward way as revealing the essence of God.” What does this mean? According to Pannenberg, within the perspective of the apocalyptic vision, God’s essence will be inevitably revealed at the end

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287 JGM, p. 129.
288 STI, p. 193.
289 Cf. Rat, p. 132.
290 Ibid., pp. 132-3.
291 Ibid., p. 133.
of history. What does the process of history mean to the revelation of God, then? Is it meaningless for the realisation of final and universal self-revelation of God at the end of history? With regard to these questions, Pannenberg views history *in toto* as the revelation of God, thus claiming that “insofar as the end presupposes the course of history, because it is the perfection of it, then also the course of history belongs in essence to the revelation of God, for history receives its unity from its goal.”\(^{202}\) Hence, for Pannenberg, “Jahweh first becomes the God of all mankind in the course of the history which he has brought to be.”\(^{203}\) In other words: “It is only in the course of this history brought about by Jahweh that this tribal God proves himself to be the one true God.”\(^{204}\) Of course, according to Pannenberg, “[t]his proof will be made in the strict and ultimate sense only at the end of all history.”\(^{205}\) However, he asserts that we have already got the proof, insofar as “in the fate of Jesus, the end of history is experienced in advance as an anticipation.”\(^{206}\) Hence he can claim: “Jesus of Nazareth is the final revelation of God because the End of history appears in him.”\(^{207}\) With this he goes on to say: “God’s demonstration of himself through the ministry and the history of Jesus of Nazareth is that final revelation of God which is to be recognized by all peoples. It is that revelation, but for the time being it is only prophetic so, not yet as the general occurrence of the End for all men.”\(^{208}\)

As we know, in Pannenberg’s theology the basis of the proof, or the prophetic realisation of the final and universal self-revelation of God, is the eschatological event in the fate of Jesus Christ, i.e., Jesus’ resurrection. For Pannenberg, the expectation of the universal self-manifestation of God in the prophetic eschatology is realised in the event of Jesus’ resurrection. Likewise, the apocalyptic seers’ visionary End-of-all-events on the future

\(^{204}\) *Ibid.*  
\(^{205}\) *Ibid.*  
\(^{206}\) *Ibid.*  
\(^{207}\) *TalH*, p. 125.  
horizon of history is proleptically, but concretely in history, established in and through Jesus’ resurrection. This is why we cannot view the content of apocalyptic as based upon “pure speculations merely to satisfy human curiosity, without any actual interest in salvation.”

“Therefore,” Pannenberg emphasises, “Jesus’ resurrection from the dead, in which the end that stands before all men has happened before its time, is the actual event of revelation. Only because of Jesus’ resurrection, because this event is the beginning of the end facing all men, can one speak of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ. Without the event of Jesus’ resurrection the ground would be pulled out from under theological statements about God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ.”

Up to now, we have seen that the foundation of Pannenberg’s understanding of God’s self-revelation as history in toto is Jesus’ resurrection. In Pannenberg’s system the realisation of God’s past and future self-revelation is focused on Jesus’ resurrection, even though it still has its provisionality, which means that, according to the Easter message, God’s final and universal self-demonstration confirmed in Jesus’ resurrection still needs to be reconfirmed by the return of Jesus Christ. Hence, “[w]hat becomes all-important in Pannenberg’s doctrine is to ascertain the fact and the meaning of the resurrection of Jesus.” Here we can realise once again that Pannenberg’s theology stands or falls with the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection, to which we are now turning.

B. The Historicality of Jesus’ Resurrection

In the New Testament we find two fundamental elements on the basis of which one can argue for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection: the appearances of the resurrected Jesus to

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299 O. Cullmann, Salvation in History, p. 80.
300 JGM, p. 129.
his disciples and the discovery of the empty tomb. This is also the case for Pannenberg. For he claims: “Decisive for confidence in the facticity of the resurrection of Jesus as the Christian message proclaims it are the primitive Christian testimonies to the appearances of the risen Lord to his disciples, along with the discovery of the empty tomb of Jesus in Jerusalem.”\(^{302}\) Pannenberg sees these two strands of the Easter tradition as being separated from each other in the oldest stratum of tradition (such as in Mark’s Gospel and Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians), and then, subsequently tied together.\(^{303}\) So we are about to examine them respectively, on the basis of which Pannenberg argues for the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.

\[a. \text{The Appearances of the Resurrected Jesus}\]

According to Pannenberg, in the earliest Christian community the facticity of Jesus’ resurrection is mainly dependent upon the tradition of the appearances of the resurrected Jesus. Pannenberg finds the older stratum of the appearance-tradition in 1 Cor. 15:3-7, although he, in line with J. E. Alsup, suggests that there may be a core of historical facticity in the Gospels’ reports of the appearances of the resurrected Jesus.\(^{304}\) Basically, he regards the Gospels’ appearance-narratives as “[having] a later stage of the tradition with legendary and in part tendentious features (Luke 24:39ff).”\(^{305}\) Unlike W. L. Craig, who takes the view that “[t]he gospel accounts of the resurrection appearances are fundamentally reliable historically,”\(^{306}\) he is thus reluctant to grasp the historical reality of Jesus’ resurrection.

\(^{302}\) ST2, pp. 352-3. (author’s italics)
\(^{303}\) Cf. JGM, pp. 88-9; ST2, p. 353.
\(^{305}\) ST2, pp. 353-4.
through the material of the resurrection appearances in the Gospels.\footnote{Cf. ST2, pp. 353-4, n. 83.} Hence he is mainly concerned with Paul’s information of the older stratum of the appearance-tradition in 1 Cor. 15:3-7 for his argumentation for the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection in relation to the strand of the appearance-tradition.

For Pannenberg there is no doubt about the oldness of Paul’s information of the appearances of the resurrected Jesus in 1 Cor. 15:3-7.\footnote{Cf. ST2, p. 355.} Emphasising Paul’s intention of the enumeration here as “giv[ing] proof by means of witnesses for the facticity of Jesus’ resurrection,”\footnote{JGM, p. 89.} he, like C. F. Evans,\footnote{Cf. C. F. Evans, Resurrection and the New Testament (London: SCM Press, 1970), p. 42: “Hence it comes about ... that this passage [1 Cor. 15:1-11] is both the earliest written testimony to the resurrection in the New Testament and, since Paul includes his own experience, probably its only written testimony to come from one who could claim to be himself an ‘eye-witness’ of the resurrection.”} regards this Pauline report as the oldest stratum of the Easter tradition in two respects, i.e., in the respect of the person of Paul and in the respect of the age of the formula as such. 1) According to Pannenberg, Paul should have visited Jerusalem to meet Peter and James between six to eight years after the events, if he was converted in 33-35 A.D. (dated on the basis of the information in the first chapter of Galatians) and if Jesus’ death occurred in 30 A.D., because we are definitely informed of Paul’s having been in Jerusalem three years after his conversion in Gal. 1:18.\footnote{Cf. JGM, p. 90.} By this Pannenberg claims that “the statements in 1 Cor., Chap. 15, are very close to the events themselves.”\footnote{Ibid.} 2) Pannenberg asserts that Paul uses previously coined formulations for the enumeration report. For Pannenberg this means that “he [Paul] does not create his statements ad hoc from a possibly inaccurate memory, but he appeals to a formulated tradition.”\footnote{Ibid.} And Pannenberg views this formulated tradition as arising “very early, namely, prior to Paul’s visit in Jerusalem.”\footnote{Ibid.} What Pannenberg tries to assert by these is that the report of the
appearances of the resurrected Jesus is based on the historical reality. He thus concludes: “In view of the age of the formulated traditions used by Paul and of the proximity of Paul to the events, the assumption that appearances of the resurrected Lord were really experienced by a number of members of the primitive Christian community and not perhaps freely invented in the course of later legendary development has good historical foundation.”

Here one of the most inscrutable aporias should be faced: what was the original form of the Easter appearances experienced by the disciples? Was it a sort of appearance of light (as in the case of Paul), or a sort of somatic one (as in the Gospels’ reports on the appearances)? Pannenberg tries to answer this question on the basis of Paul’s experience of the light- appearance of the resurrected Jesus (cf. Acts 9:3). According to Pannenberg: “If we start with the biblical material relating to the appearance of the risen Lord to Saul the persecutor, we can arrive at more solid conjectures as to the nature of the Easter appearances.” This means that Pannenberg views “the reconstructed form of the appearance to Paul as an indication of the original behind the Gospel accounts.” Pannenberg has two reasons for this view: 1) “we have the fact that in the oldest NT witness the resurrection and ascension of Jesus form a single event, as in Phil. 2:9; Acts 2:36; 5:30ff.; the self-declaration of the risen Lord must thus have been from the concealment of heaven”; 2) “the Jerusalem disciples seem to have recognized the apostolic commissioning of Paul by the Lord himself in accordance with Paul’s own resolute appeal (Gal. 1:1,12) and on the basis of the appearance of the risen Lord to him (cf. Gal. 2:9) [which] means that they found sufficient agreement between his experience and the meetings of the original disciples with their Lord.” For Pannenberg, therefore, the original form of the appearances of the resurrected One is, as R. H. Fuller

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315 Ibid, p. 91.
316 ST2, p. 354.
319 ST2, p. 355.
suggested, the form of light-appearance, which is against the physical nature of the resurrectional body of Jesus as narrated in the Gospels.

When we try to approach to the reality of the appearances of the resurrected One from the perspective of Paul’s experience of the appearance of light, we are inevitably to confront the question of whether it was a ‘visionary’ experience, or not. More specifically, if it was a visionary experience, was it of ‘subjective visions,’ or of ‘objective visions’? In other words, ‘[w]as the ‘seeing’ a perception of mind or of eye?’

The starting point is, of course, the “objective, external event [which] had a soul-stirring effect on the very centre of Paul’s being (2 Cor. 4:6; Gal. 1:16).” If we can claim that the ‘soul-stirring effect’ was caused by Paul’s experience of a sort of ‘heavenly vision,’ however, the ‘objective, external event’ is ineluctably to be judged by a category of ‘visions’. Furthermore, as we have seen right before, if it can be claimed that “the Pauline experience of a heavenly vision as narrated by Luke in Acts, in terms of a light and a voice, may have reflected the true nature of all the original experiences,” then it may be said that the true reality of the appearances of the resurrected One must be of a category of visions. As Pannenberg himself puts it: “With regard to the character and mode of the Easter appearances, the first thing to be considered is that it may have involved an extraordinary vision, not an event that was visible to everyone. This is especially clear with regard to the Damascus event. ... If someone sees something that others present are not able to see, then it involves a vision. ... It involves extraordinary sights that were not imparted to all and also (in any event in the case of Paul) were not perceived by all present. These are the characteristics

320 Cf. R. H. Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, pp. 47ff. Fuller suggests here that “the form which the self-disclosure of the Risen One took for Paul (and therefore presumably, also for the recipients of appearances prior to him) was the form of a vision of light.” (p. 47.)
323 P. Carnley, The Structure of Resurrection Belief, p. 239.
of visions.”\footnote{JGM, p. 93. Cf. P. Canley, \textit{The Structure of Resurrection Belief}, p. 69.} Here we are unavoidably to face the possibility that the disciples’ original encounters with the resurrected One might have been nothing more than subjective visions.

So far as we are concerned with the so-called ‘subjective vision’ hypothesis, we have to mention D. F. Strauss, from whom it was derived.\footnote{Cf. P. Canley, \textit{The Structure of Resurrection Belief}, pp 150ff.} According to him, St. Paul was converted by a visionary experience “which Paul attributed indeed to an external cause, but which nevertheless took place in his own mind.”\footnote{D. F. Strauss, \textit{The Life of Jesus for the People}, Authorised Translation, vol. 1 (London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1879), p. 414.} At best, Strauss regards Paul’s seeing and hearing in the event on the Damascus road as “an imaginary command of Christ revealing himself to him in a dream or waking moment.”\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, p. 418.} In this respect, Strauss eventually concludes:

If then we are right in supposing that this appearance of Christ which occasioned the conversion of the Apostle Paul ... was of this character, and if those appearances which in the older disciples accompanied the rise of the faith in Jesus as the risen Messiah were of essentially the same kind as in the other case—then were these latter solely internal states of mind, which might indeed present themselves to the subjects of them as external sensible perceptions, but are to be considered by us only as results of mental excitement—as visions.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, pp. 420-1.}

resurrected Jesus. By this ‘vision’, however, he would never mean that “what was seen was imaginary.” In him, ‘vision’ cannot deprive the phenomenological appearances of their realities. He thus contends: “If by ‘vision’ one understands a psychological event that is without a corresponding extrasubjective reality, then one can certainly not presuppose such a ‘subjective’ concept of vision for the resurrection appearances as self-evident.” For him, therefore, “[t]he thesis that we must regard all visionary experiences as psychological projections with no basis in reality cannot be regarded in any case an adequately grounded philosophical postulate.”

Then, what is Pannenberg’s alternative for the subjective vision hypothesis? Patently, he claims that objective visions should be considered as the content of reality of the appearances of the risen Jesus. It is because, as we have seen above, he repudiates the subjective vision hypothesis, but simultaneously regards those appearances as having the characteristic of ‘extraordinary vision’. Two things are argued for the support of the objective vision. The first thing is a psychological consideration, in which Pannenberg contends that it is psychologically out of the question that the disciples produced the appearances through their ‘enthusiastically excited imagination’ for surmounting their grief caused by their master’s catastrophic death. In other words, without any objective reality as the basis for the expression of ‘appearances’, it is psychologically unexplainable how the disciples could overcome their grievous loss of the beloved master, and proclaim the news of the resurrection of their master in rapture at the risk of their lives. In line with this, it can be contended that the thought of “the Easter narratives [as] fabrications is rather implausible in view of the fact that the primitive Christians were prepared to die for what they claimed to have witnessed:

330 Cf. ST2, p. 354.
331 JGM, p. 94.
332 Ibid., p. 95.
333 ST2, p. 354.
334 Cf. JGM, p. 96.
one does not normally give up one’s own life in defence of one’s own fraud.”\textsuperscript{335} The second thing is that, considering ‘the number of the appearances and their temporal distribution’, it is highly untenable to say that the appearances have something to do with the subjective vision hypothesis. This means that, for Pannenberg, the report of the witnesses’ enumeration in I Cor. 15:5-8 can be used as an evidence for the objective vision hypothesis.\textsuperscript{336}

Here we have to face the aporia of the possibility of the distinction between the subjective and objective visions. Is there any phenomenological category to distinguish the objective visions from the subjective ones? Pannenberg does not answer this question easily. But he carries on with the claim by his assertion that “[i]f the term ‘vision’ is to be used in connection with the Easter appearances, one must at the same time take into consideration that primitive Christianity itself apparently knew how to distinguish between ecstatic visionary experiences and the fundamental encounters with the resurrected Lord, [even though], [t]o be sure, the question about how this distinction was understood in primitive Christianity is difficult to answer.”\textsuperscript{337} This may mean that the question of the phenomenological-categorical distinction between the two kinds of visions should remain an open question, which contributes to an intrinsic limitation in Pannenberg’s argument for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. (This will be further dealt with in Chapter III.) To sum up, even though Pannenberg feels some difficulty in answering the question of the earliest Christians’ way to distinguish an objective vision from a subjective one, he nevertheless claims that the experiences of Jesus’ disciples and of Paul in their encounters with the resurrected One as objective visions were the content of the reality of the post-resurrectional appearances.

With his contention of the ‘objective visions’ as the realities of the appearances of the resurrected Jesus Pannenberg makes one thing clear: the post-resurrectional appearances as

\textsuperscript{335} P. Canley, \textit{The Structure of Resurrection Belief}, p. 149
\textsuperscript{336} \textit{JGM}, pp. 96-7.
\textsuperscript{337} \textit{JGM}, p. 94.
the *fons et origo* of the disciples’ faith in the resurrection of Jesus. The important thing in Pannenberg is that the causal relationship between the origin of the disciples’ resurrectional faith and their faith in the resurrection: the appearances caused the disciples’ faith in Jesus’ resurrection. If this causal relationship is to be reversed, then the factuality of Jesus’ resurrection cannot but vanish from the horizon of our history. If we are solely to be permitted to say that “[t]he doctrine that Jesus became the Christ at his resurrection is only one of the later theories to explain Jesus’ messianic failure: he did not accomplish the messianic mission before his crucifixion because God had not yet give him the power and authority of the Messiah,” then all the reports on Jesus’ resurrection in the New Testament are nothing other than fabricated stories, and all the Christological statements with regard to Jesus’ resurrection are nothing but ‘castles in the air’. Hence Pannenberg clearly contends, as J. Moltmann does: “The Easter appearances are not to be explained from the Easter faith of the disciples; rather, conversely, the Easter faith of the disciples is to be explained from the appearances.” For Pannenberg, therefore, the appearances of the resurrected Jesus are historical events that happened *illie et tunc*, on the basis of which the disciples’ faith in Jesus’ resurrection and the Church itself as their community for its testimony were established.

To sum up, Pannenberg’s understanding of Jesus’ post-resurrectional appearances as objective visions orientates towards the view of Jesus’ resurrection as *Tatsächlichkeit* on the basis of which the disciples’ faith in it had been established, not as a kind of product of faith. In this understanding, however, the aspect of the physical metamorphosis in Jesus’ resurrection is apt to be overlooked. Pannenberg makes up this deficiency by giving historical reliability to the discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb.

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339 Cf. J. Moltmann, *The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions*, trans. M. Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1990), pp. 217-8: “...the phenomena ... cannot be explained by the faith of the disciples. On the contrary, their faith has to be explained by the phenomena. ... The ‘seeing’ of the risen Christ became faith.”

As in the case of the understanding of the historicality of the appearances of the resurrected Jesus, there are pros and cons of the discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb as historically reliable. Are the stories about Jesus’ tomb to have been found empty in the Gospels products of the disciples’ faith in Jesus’ resurrection for the vindication of it as a real occurrence, or descriptions of something really happened *ille et tune*? If we are only to follow the former opinion, the stories about the empty tomb come to fall into a category of legend, which means that no historical reliability is to be bound in them.\(^{341}\) Pannenberg, however obviously asserts that the discovery of the empty tomb of Jesus is historically trustworthy. To claim this, he first examines the reports on the discovery of the empty tomb in the Gospels. Against the view that the empty tomb pericope in Mark’s gospel “belongs to a late stage of the Easter traditions,”\(^{342}\) he regards it as an old one, i.e., “as a local Jerusalem tradition and an original part of the passion story.”\(^{343}\) Although he minds “doubt as to whether it [the empty tomb pericope in Mark] may be viewed as simple historical narration,”\(^{344}\) he nevertheless claims that “the present form of the story might well preserve individual recollections that are historically relevant, especially that of the role of the women in finding the empty tomb and that of early appearances in Galilee rather than at the tomb.”\(^{345}\)

This means that for Pannenberg the empty tomb pericope in Mark’s Gospel consists of

\(^{341}\) Many scholars claim that there is no historical facticity in the stories about the empty tomb. One of the most notable supporters for this claim is R. Bultmann, who, in his book, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), claims that the empty tomb pericope in Mark as an “apologetic legend” (p. 287). For H. Graa there was no empty tomb. (Cf. *idem, Ostergeschichten und Osterverichte*, pp. 257-68.) W. Kasper claims that “it [Mark 16:1-8] is in no way an historical account.” (*idem, Jesus the Christ*, trans. V. Green [London: Burns & Oates, 1976], p. 127.) For more supporters for this view, cf. P. Carnley, *The Structure of Resurrection Belief*, pp. 48ff.


\(^{343}\) *ST2*, p. 356.

\(^{344}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{345}\) *Ibid.*
historically reliable descriptions of events, which eventually leads up to the historical reliability of the discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb.

Secondly, for his claim of the historical reliability of the empty tomb Pannenberg considers the *quondam* circumstantial situation which the earliest Christians’ Easter proclamation underwent. That is, according to Pannenberg’s argument, if it is right that what was to be supposed in the perspective of the then Jewish understanding of the resurrection of the dead is the emptiness of his or her tomb, it might have been impossible for the disciples to have proclaimed Jesus’ resurrection under the circumstances that the remains of Jesus could have been found in his tomb. In other words, if the presupposition could not have stood firm with regard to Jesus’ tomb, how could the disciples’ proclamation of the resurrection of the crucified Jesus have spread in Jerusalem, the very place of his interment?346 For Pannenberg the fundamental and important fact for this argument is that there is not any vestige at all, on the basis of which we can say that the earliest Christians surely held that the remains of the crucified had lain in his tomb. Even in the polemic between the Christians and the rival Jews the point at issue was not whether but why Jesus’ tomb was empty.347

On the basis of this point of view, Pannenberg brings forth an *argumentum e negatione*. According to him, those who want to deny the factuality of the discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb must bear the evidence that in the then Jewish thought of resurrection there was a conception that the resurrection of the dead has nothing to do with his or her remains in his or her tomb. Furthermore, they must show that such an idea was popular enough at that time in Palestine (which has not been proved yet), so much so that the earliest Christians’ successful proclamation of Jesus’ resurrection would not have otherwise been possible with the presupposition of Jesus’ intact place of interment. And then it remains yet to be cleared why the Christians and the Jews had argued about the whereabouts of Jesus’ corpse. So long as

the evidence cannot be given, Pannenberg claims, it must be assumed that Jesus’ tomb was really empty.\(^{348}\)

For his assertion of the emptiness of Jesus’ tomb, however, Pannenberg should face a stumbling block, i.e., the fact that Paul never mentioned it explicitly. Pannenberg disparages this fact. According to Pannenberg, one need not infer from the fact that it was unknown to him or her. Rather, it should be noted that the emphasis on this datum with regard to Paul’s argument for Jesus’ resurrection in his letters was not important to him, because for him the appearances of the resurrected Jesus were the evidence of the event, not the empty tomb. For Pannenberg this is understandable, considering the variously possible interpretations of it. He assumes that the factuality of Jesus’ empty tomb must have been important in Jerusalem as a self-reliant datum, but not to the same extent in Ephesus or in Corinth. Besides, he claims, if the emptiness of the tomb should be already implied in the idea of resurrection, then the factuality of the tomb’s emptiness would have definitely had no particular meaning.\(^{349}\)

Hence for Pannenberg the empty tomb tradition is not at all meaningless to the whole framework of testimonies to the Easter occurrence, even though it seems that the earliest Christian assurance of Jesus’ resurrection mainly relies on the appearances of the resurrected Jesus. When Jesus’ empty tomb comes to us as a reality, Pannenberg asserts, it keeps us from thinking that the appearances of the resurrected Jesus are surely meant to be only pure ‘hallucinations’. On the other hand, he goes on to say, it prevents the Easter message from vanishing into spiritualisation, so surely so that it can bring forth ‘the idea of the transformation of Jesus’ physical body into the eschatological reality of a new life’.\(^{350}\) What Pannenberg could conclude with all of these is this: “We thus cannot explain the finding of the empty tomb as a product of Easter faith and must recognize that it happened independently of the appearances. Accordingly, even if this tradition developed in the light of

\(^{348}\) Cf. ST2, pp. 358-9;

\(^{349}\) Cf. ibid., p. 359.

\(^{350}\) Cf. ibid.
Easter faith, we must still assign to the report the function of confirming the identity of the reality of Jesus encountered in the appearances with his resurrection from the dead.\(^{351}\)

Up to now, we have seen Pannenberg’s claim to the facticity of the two evidences of Jesus’ resurrection, on the basis of which he thinks that it can be proved to be a four-dimensional event. Some may agree to Pannenberg’s argument for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection in that way. As I mentioned above, however, his argument has its own limitation in the respect that it is totally dependent upon the Biblical hermeneutics. In this limitation we see a gap between Pannenberg’s understanding of the concept of historicity and the one of modern historiography. And in this gap we see that Pannenberg’s argument for the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is insufficient for the establishment of Jesus’ resurrection as a historiographically verifiable event, which eventually leads us to the understanding of Jesus’ resurrection as an object of faith. This will be dealt with in the next chapter, to which we are now turning.

\(^{351}\) ibid.
CHAPTER III. FAITH AND THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS’ RESURRECTION

In this chapter an attempt is to be made to grasp the role of faith in understanding Jesus’ resurrection as a ‘non-historical but historical’ event. In order to do this, we need first to deal with the limitations of Pannenberg’s argument for the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. Then we will consider the role of faith in understanding Jesus’ resurrection as a non-historical but historical event through Barth’s attitude towards the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, with which the question of meaning, the main theme of this thesis, is to be related.

A. Jesus’ Resurrection as the Foundation of Faith?

a. Pannenberg’s Enlarged Concept of Historicity for the Vindication of the Historicality of Jesus’ Resurrection

When we think of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical event, we are inevitably to face the aporia of its historicity. This aporia is caused by its uniqueness. That is to say, it was a transitional event brought about by God, the reality of which was an eschatological one, and could be by no means grasped by humanity. Nevertheless, we are told that it occurred in our history once and for all. In other words, as Pannenberg puts it, “the resurrection of Jesus was an event of transition from this earthly world to a new and imperishable life with God, yet the event took place in this world, namely, in the tomb of Jesus in Jerusalem before the visit of the women on the Sunday morning after his death.”352 When we emphasise the former aspect of the event, it is meant to be non-historical, or transhistorical; when we do the latter, it is historical.

As we have seen in the second chapter, Pannenberg gives his emphasis totally to the latter aspect. This results in his making a normal historical claim concerning the event of Jesus’ resurrection, as for any other common event in history. However, Pannenberg himself admits that the historical claim to Jesus’ resurrection can be problematic from the perspective of modern historiography, mainly because the uniqueness of the event makes it incompatible with the principle of analogy, one of the principles of modern historiography. To clarify this problematic aspect, and to vindicate his making a normal historical claim concerning the event of Jesus’ resurrection, Pannenberg sets out his case against the following four points.

1) **Against the Principle of Analogy**

To begin with, Ernst Troeltsch posits three principles for critical historical enquiries in his essay, “Über historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie”\textsuperscript{353}: (1) the principle of criticism which means that “historical work yields only judgments of varying degrees of probability, not of absolute certainty”\textsuperscript{354}; (2) the principle of analogy, which means that “historical events are not radically dissimilar from one another”\textsuperscript{355}; (3) the principle of correlation, which means that “historical events take place in contexts which condition them, and which they themselves in turn affect.”\textsuperscript{356} Pannenberg is in agreement with the first and the third principles; “he himself recognizes the ‘probable’ character of all historical knowledge [as it is to be seen in the following third point], and his own doctrine of *Traditionsgeschichte*

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\textsuperscript{355} Ibid.

presupposes an equivalent to the correlation principle.”\textsuperscript{357} But he repudiates the second principle, the principle of analogy.

The fundamental reason for Pannenberg to repudiate the principle of analogy is that by this principle Troeltsch postulates a “fundamental homogeneity [\textit{Gleichartigkeit}] of all historical events.”\textsuperscript{358} According to Pannenberg, the principle of analogy with Troeltsch’s presupposition of a ‘core of homogeneity’ in all historical events cannot be a proper method for critical historical enquiries, because the presupposition prevents the historian from seeing the peculiar and contingent aspect of an event in history.\textsuperscript{359} In other words, when this aspect is overlooked, the historian’s use of analogy comes to be futile, because “[t]he cognitive power of analogy depends upon the fact that it teaches us to see contents of the same kind in nonhomogeneous things [\textit{das Gleichartige im Ungleichartigen}].”\textsuperscript{360} Therefore, when the historian critical-historically investigates an event, Pannenberg argues, he or she is to be concerned, first and foremost, with its heterogeneity: “Provided that historical science is occupied above all with the particularity and uniqueness of phenomena, its interests must therefore be focused more upon the ever peculiar, nonhomogeneous features, rather than the common ones first obtruded by analogies.”\textsuperscript{361} Otherwise, “[t]he particularity of phenomena, on which genuine historical interests must be focused, [is] threatened to be levelled by a one-sided orientation toward the typical [at the expense of the individual], and historiography [becomes] constructivistic.”\textsuperscript{362}

By this argument, however, Pannenberg does not totally reject the use of the principle of analogy. He does not disagree to the positive use of analogy,\textsuperscript{363} what he opposes is the


\textsuperscript{360} \textit{BQTJ}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{361} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{362} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{363} Cf. \textit{TaH}, pp. 264-5, n. 75.
negative use of analogy.\textsuperscript{364} He sees by the positive use of analogy the possibility that analogical comparison “can be used as much for establishing what is individual and distinctive about the phenomenon under investigation as it can be for locating its similarities with other phenomena.”\textsuperscript{365} This possibility is shattered by the negative use of analogy, which “necessarily presupposes that world-view in which everything actual must conform to a ‘core homogeneity,’ the knowledge of which is already in the possession of the historian.”\textsuperscript{366} In this case, the principle of analogy comes to be “elevated to an ontological principle,”\textsuperscript{367} by which no historical-critical enquiry into a historical novum without analogy is possible. What Pannenberg contends by opposing the negative use of analogy is that “the absence of an analogy does not prove the nonhistoricity of an event, for a given event may burst all analogies and still be a reality.”\textsuperscript{368} On the basis of these assertions against the principle of analogy, Pannenberg affirms his positive attitude towards the historicity of the event of Jesus’ resurrection without analogy.\textsuperscript{369}

2) \textit{Against the Influence of the Eschatological Dimension of Jesus’ Resurrection upon Its Historicity}

It is the absence of its eschatological reality in history that makes Jesus’ resurrection so unique, which results in its total lack of analogy. As we have seen in his argument against the

\textsuperscript{364} For a distinction between the positive and the negative use of analogy, cf. T. Peters, “The Use of Analogy in Historical Method,” p. 480.
\textsuperscript{365} ibid., p. 481.
\textsuperscript{366} ibid.
\textsuperscript{368} ibid.
\textsuperscript{369} Unlike Pannenberg, J. Moltmann seems to claim that the eschatological event of Jesus’ resurrection as a ‘\textit{novum ultimum}’ should be beyond the horizon of the expanded historical-critical approach, in which any historically contingent \textit{novum} without analogy can be historical-critically investigated. He thus states:

The eschatologically new event of the resurrection of Christ, however, proves to be a \textit{novum ultimum} both as against the similarity in ever-recurring reality and also as against the comparative dissimilarity of new possibilities emerging in history. To expand the historical approach to the extent of taking account of the contingent does not as yet bring the reality of the resurrection itself into view. ... The resurrection of Christ does not mean a possibility within the world and its history, but a new possibility altogether for the world, for existence and for history. (J. Moltmann, \textit{Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology}, trans. J. W. Leitch [London: SCM Press, 1967], pp. 179-80.)
principle of analogy, for Pannenberg this total lack of analogy of the event of Jesus’ resurrection does not affect the claim to the historicity of the event. So also the eschatological dimension of the event does not affect the claim to the historicity of the event. As Pannenberg puts it:

Hence a reference to the otherness [Andersartigkeit] of the eschatological reality of resurrection life compared to the reality of this passing world does not affect the claim to historicity that is implied in the assertion of the facticity of an event that took place at a specific time. Theological interest in the assertion of the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, as of his incarnation, depends on the fact that the overcoming of death by the new eschatological life has actually taken place in this world and history of ours.\textsuperscript{370}

On this view, Pannenberg regards Jesus’ resurrection as an ordinary event in history like his death on the cross.\textsuperscript{371}

3) \textit{Against the Absolute Certainty of the Facticity of an Event in History}

As we have seen, Troeltsch’s principle of criticism is a principle of probability, which excludes certainty from every historical judgment. In the perspective of this principle, every piece of historical knowledge becomes tentative. All our judgments about the past should not be regarded “as being simply ‘true’ or ‘false,’ but as only provisionally true or false.”\textsuperscript{372}

Pannenberg, in conformity with this principle, contends that no absolute certainty can be established concerning the facticity of an event in history. According to him, “[a]ssertion of the historicity of an event does not mean that its facticity is so sure that there can no longer be

\textsuperscript{370} ST2, p. 361. (author’s emphasis)
\textsuperscript{371} Cf. ST2, p. 361, n. 114.
any dispute regarding it.” 373 “Many statements of historical fact[,]” he goes on to say, “are actually debatable; [I]n principle, doubts may exist regarding all such statements.” 374

This view of historicity seems to suit Pannenberg’s understanding of God’s revelation as history. For he thinks that God’s revelation through history remains open towards the future, thus being “never irrevocably fixed, [and] its conditions [being] never finally surveyable.” 375 He even thinks that God’s ultimate self-revelation in Jesus of Nazareth, which has been concretised through God’s raising him from the dead, “is given to us only by way of anticipation of the coming general End for all men.” 376 Here in this ‘anticipation’ the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection vanishes into the long-drawn-out future horizon of history, and all that is left for us is a kind of nostalgic scepticism about the tantalising facticity of this enigmatic cicatrix of history. In this ‘borderline situation’ of epistemological bankruptcy—we have no resources to understand its historicalness—the aporia of its historicity remains insoluble. And it will remain insoluble until its final verification is realised at the end of history. As Pannenberg puts it:

In the case of the resurrection of Jesus, all Christians must realize that the facticity of the event will be contested right up to the eschatological consummation of the world because its uniqueness transcends an understanding of reality that is oriented only to this passing world and because the new reality that has come in the resurrection of Jesus has not yet universally and definitively manifested itself. 377

Even in this ‘borderline situation,’ however, Pannenberg does not give up his historical claim to the event; he fills himself with the spirit of ‘nevertheless.’ “Nevertheless,” he

373 ST2, p. 361.
374 Ibid.
375 Ibid. p. 131.
376 Ibid. (author’s emphasis)
377 ST2, p. 361.
contends, “Christian faith maintains that the eschatological life of the resurrection of the dead has already become an event in the crucified Jesus; a fact a factual statement about a past event, to say this unavoidably involves therefore a historical claim.” Hence for Pannenberg, our epistemological limitation regarding the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection (just because we have to deal with its eschatological reality) does not affect our historical claim to the event, as shown in the second point above. For him, “[I]t can only cause confusion to deny the claim but hold fast to the statement of facticity.”

4) Against the a priori Presupposition of the Impossibility of Jesus’ Resurrection as a Miracle

Another stumbling block in understanding the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is the a priori presupposition that is impossible for any human being to survive death. If we adopt the Humean a priori presumption that “miracles are scientifically impossible, since they are by definition violations of the laws of nature and as such are absurd,” it seems certain that, prior even to our assessment of all the evidential material and circumstances for our historical judgment of Jesus’ resurrection, we are required to exclude the possibility of the event’s occurrence. In this view, any human being’s resurrection in history is a castle in the air, something like a mythological expression for humanity’s yearning for eternal life. It is a phantasmic response to the ineluctability of death in human life.

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376 Ibid., pp. 361-2.
379 Ibid., p. 362.
Pannenberg criticises this view as a judgment which “rests on a prior dogmatic decision and does not deserve to be called critical (in the sense of the evaluating of the transmitted texts),”381 According to him, historians with this view cannot sit in critical judgment upon the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. For their historical judgments are totally focused upon “historical reconstruction [which] is always oriented to a common-sense view of reality—a view that is in a state of constant flux, that may, e.g., take up new perspectives once they are adopted widely enough[,]”382 and unlikely to have any room for “the biblical concept of reality as a field of divine action, including its eschatological consummation, [which] formed [at the beginning of the Christian tradition] and forms [in the secular culture of our own day] a challenge [to the common-sense view of reality].”383 Hence, “if they are to reach a critical judgment regarding the Easter message,” he contends, “they must distinguish between the degree to which individual findings and the greater coherence of alternative descriptions force them to this judgment, and the degree to which it is the result of a fundamental preconception.”384 It seems to him that any negative attitude in such historians towards the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is not likely to result from the former case, but from the latter. For he suggests that “[i]nsofar as it is the latter, Christian theology has no reason to shrink from the challenge that its assertion of the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus raises for secular history.”385

Thus far, we have seen in Pannenberg a positive attitude towards the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, which vindicates making a normal historical claim for this event by expanding the horizon of the concept of historicity to the theological field. To do this, he had to put himself over and against four positions: against the principle of analogy; against the view of Jesus’ resurrection as a non-historical event owing to its eschatological reality; against the

381 ST2, p. 362.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid., pp. 362-3.
absolute certainty of the facticity of an event; and against the preconception of the impossibility of miracles. What, then, remains problematic in his argument for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection on the basis of this expanded concept of historicity? Is it possible for us to see Jesus’ resurrection solely as a matter for historical knowledge, upon which our faith is totally based, by making a historical judgment of two pieces of hermeneutical evidence, viz., the appearances of the resurrected Jesus and the discovery of the empty tomb? Can we secure the historical facticity of Jesus’ resurrection solely by way of our historical-critical approach to the evidential material? To put it simply, can we really grasp Jesus’ resurrection only as the fundamentum fidei? Now is time for us to consider these questions.

b. The Limitations of Pannenberg’s Argument for the Historicity of Jesus’ Resurrection

1) A Critical View of Pannenberg’s Enlarged Concept of Historicity

a) Historicity beyond Analogy and Parti Pris?

A modern historiographical question about the historicity of a past event automatically implies the possibility of its analogical investigation. If there were any possibility that an analytical examination of an event should fail, then the event is taken to be beyond the historian’s horizon of comprehension. For the historian, therefore, there cannot be an event without analogy in history. This is the implication of the historian’s presupposed ‘principle of analogy’. By this the historian leaves absolutely no room for the possibility of the historical examination of an event without analogy such as Jesus’ resurrection. For the modern historian

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“the application of historical criticism to traditional Christian belief renders its commitment to direct acts of God inadmissible in principle.”

The historian’s a priori elimination from history of every historical factor that is without analogy (which is to be attributed to a direct act of God) is criticised by the Christian theologian as a function of the historian’s anthropocentric-constructionist view of history. The theologian who enjoys a theistic view of history believes that deus ex machina should be allowed into history thereby breaking the impasse for historians in dealing with a historical novum. On this view, for the theologian “[b]elief in divine intervention and belief in the resurrection are in principle admissible.”

In the field of theology, that is, in the field where the deus ex machina is allowed into history, the historian’s presupposition of the principle of analogy as a tool for his or her historical investigation is shattered. Here in this field the starting point of historical understanding is not something achieved by the principle of analogy, but “the encounter with what is strange and the discovery of the other.” Here the resurrection of Christ is conceived as the most radical form of knowledge of the other, viz., the ‘Wholly Other,’ and functions as one of the most fundamental “healing analogies to God.” As an event without analogy it becomes the primordial paradigm of the blending of historicality and tranhistoricality, through which human beings are able to see the vanishing point of their history, where historicalness makes its universal encounter with ultra-historicalness.

The historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, then, is and remains an open question in this theological perspective, and only in this. In this respect, it is possible to grasp Pannenberg’s enlarged concept of historicity beyond the historian’s principle of analogy. Once we are touched by the theistic Weltanschauung, in which the deus ex machina is to be allowed to get

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386 W. J. Abraham, *Divine Revelation and the Limits of Historical Criticism*, p. 140.
388 J. Moltmann, *The Way of Jesus Christ*, p. 244. (author’s italics)
389 *Cf. ibid.*, p. 245.
involved in history, we are free to establish the historicity of any historical *novum* in it. The secular historian’s refusal to consider the historicity of any historical *novum* just on account of its total lack of analogy cannot affect its truth claim absolutely.\(^391\) Therefore, it seems quite reasonable that Pannenberg addresses the truth claim of Jesus’ resurrection by way of the expanded concept of historicity beyond analogy, and plausible to be able to argue for the historicity of the event. Although this plausibility can be criticised by the historian as based on making an arbitrary theological postulate, Pannenberg’s pursuit of the truth claim of this event should be seriously considered, because without the theological postulate we have no methodological point of contact with the event.

What Pannenberg tries to establish by positing the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection as historicity beyond analogy is that whether or not Jesus’ resurrection took place in human history is decided solely by the historico-critical investigation of the evidential facts reported in the transmitted texts.\(^392\) Hence for him the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection becomes an object of historical investigation, by which we can be guaranteed “at least approximate certainty”\(^393\) of it. We will have to consider sooner or later whether or not he shows the certainty of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection by his argument on the basis of the evidential facts, viz., the appearances of the resurrected Jesus and the discovery of the empty tomb.

If the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is to be established solely by a historical-critical investigation of the transmitted texts, it will vanish again from the horizon of human history whenever the investigator has his or her own *parti pris* against the event: ‘dead people do not rise.’ It can be said that this *parti pris* is a product of modern scientific Weltanschauung, into which the rationalistic historian is so deeply incalcated that he or she cannot but build “an, at least from his [or her] perspective, harmonious and integrated, but entirely rational paradigm

\(^{391}\) Cf. *ST2*, p. 361.
\(^{393}\) Ibid.
through which to interpret historical phenomena.\textsuperscript{394} Such a historian sifts all kinds of happenings in the texts through this rational paradigm. The sifted ones are treated as historical, and the rest as unhistorical. Thus it is natural that “the historian of the world-become-rational, when confronted with so-called \textit{problematic} historical phenomena such as gods, angels, flying horses, and miraculous happenings, should simply read those phenomena out of real history by hermeneutically transforming them into myth or legend.”\textsuperscript{395} If this is the case, the historical texts containing those ‘problematic’ phenomena are a priori disregarded. In this situation, then, it is out of the question to try to let the question of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection remain an open one.

No one can deny that there is no other means to obtain access to the event of Jesus’ resurrection than the transmitted texts reporting it. If the historian, just owing to his or her \textit{parti pris}, a priori rejects the only means of access to the event, and thinks of it as unhistorical, his or her judgment deserves to be criticised as dogmatic and prejudiced.\textsuperscript{396} For, as D. W. Aiken points out, “independent of the evidence contained in the texts of history, it is impossible for the modern historian to seriously contend that a problematic event of the past was recorded simply as myth or metaphor or fictive creation, and that the event did not in fact actually occur as real historical happening.”\textsuperscript{397} Hence the transmitted texts should be examined without any \textit{parti pris} so as to let the question of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection remain open to us. When we consider the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, therefore, it should be taken to be the historicity beyond \textit{parti pris}, by which it is meant that whether or not Jesus’ resurrection did actually occur in human history should be totally decided by the historical-critical approach to the evidential material, viz., the texts reporting it.

\textsuperscript{395} Ibid., pp. 232-3. (author’s italics)
\textsuperscript{396} Cf. ST2, p. 362.
In this regard, there seems to be an inherent persuasiveness in Pannenberg’s contention that, in order for the secular historians to “rech a critical judgment regarding the Easter message, they must distinguish between the degree to which individual findings and the greater coherence of alternative descriptions force them to this judgment, and the degree to which it is the result of a fundamental preconception.”\footnote{ST2, p. 362.} As I have mentioned above, if this distinction is to be overlooked, that is, if the rationalistic historian’s \textit{parti pris}, ‘dead people do not rise,’ is allowed into his or her historical reconstruction of the Easter event, the question of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection loses its historical horizon. Hence it is understandable that Pannenberg, realising this danger, should strongly contend that “[a]s long as historiography does not begin dogmatically with a narrow concept of reality according to which ‘dead men do not rise,’ it is not clear why historiography should not in principle be able to speak about Jesus’ resurrection as the explanation that is best established of such events as the disciples’ experiences of the appearances and the discovery of the empty tomb.”\footnote{GM, p. 109. Also cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 97; ST2, p. 362.}

The problem now is: how can we establish objectively a comprehensive concept of reality which includes the resurrectional reality which is beyond the rationalistic historian’s own concept? To put this simply: is it really possible for us to establish the reality of Jesus’ resurrection as something objective, that is, something that belongs to this world of phenomena? Thus, grasping the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection as something beyond analogy and beyond the rationalistic historian’s \textit{parti pris} against the event, ‘dead people do not rise,’ is closely related to understanding the reality of the resurrection.

A problem in Pannenberg’s affirming the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection as beyond analogy arises in his understanding of the appearances of the resurrected Jesus as objective
visions. If Pannenberg could offer a hermeneutical apologia for the physicality of Jesus’ resurrection as do, for example, S. T. Davis,400 R. H. Gundry401, or W. L. Craig402, then his postulating a historicity beyond analogy may become tenable, whatever aporia this apologia entails. For in this world of phenomena we can only posit something that is phenomenologically objective as analogous to some other phenomenological objects, and the phenomenological objectivity of Jesus’ resurrection is totally dependent upon its physicality proper. As G. E. Michalson points out, “[i]n order to argue against a principle that seems illicitly to outlaw in advance a certain kind of event, it is necessary to have some idea of the kind of event one wants admitted as a possible object of research.”403 If one, by applying the principle of analogy proper to an alleged event that has no phenomenological objectivity, and thus cannot be analogous to some other phenomenological object, tries to contend that this phenomenon is an event without analogy, then this is a question-begging contention. That is, it is absurd to apply the principle of analogy as a tool of historical-critical investigation to a phenomenon without any historical reality. Hence in order for his view of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection as beyond analogy to be tenable, Pannenberg should include in his understanding of the reality of Jesus’ resurrection its physicality, that is, resurrection entailing the resuscitation of Jesus’ corpse.404

In his view of the appearances of the resurrected Jesus as ‘objective visions,’ however, it is not clear what he regards as the reality of Jesus’ resurrection. What is more, if no clear

400 Cf. S. T. Davis, “The Traditional Christian Belief in the Resurrection of the Body,” The New Scholasticism, Vol. LXII, no. 1 (Winter, 1988), pp. 72ff., esp. pp. 80ff. Here the author contends: “This new body [the spiritual body in 1 Cor. 15] is a physical body... If by the term ‘physical object’ we mean an entity that has spatio-temporal location and is capable of being empirically measured, tested, or observed in some sense, then my argument is that the new body of which Paul speaks is a physical object.” (pp. 80-1.)


403 G. E. Michalson, “Pannenberg on the Resurrection and Historical Method,” p. 355. (author’s italics)

404 Cf. ibid., pp. 355ff.
disparateness can be put between ‘objective visions’ and ‘subjective visions,’ the question itself of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection comes to nothing. Even though Pannenberg, by giving historical significance to the empty tomb tradition, repudiates the view of the appearances of the resurrected Jesus as ‘mere hallucinations,’ and also rejects ‘any superficial spiritualizing of the Easter message,’ it seems to me that he at best shows by way of these denials that the reality of Jesus’ resurrection should be regarded as ‘life’ that belongs to the spiritual field, and thus as something eternal. Although he tries to materialise the spiritual field from the perspective of the Stoic doctrine of the divine pneuma, thus connecting it with the field concept of modern physics, it seems to me that this new, eschatological ‘life’ in its materialisation as the reality of Jesus’ resurrection can hardly be regarded as an object of the historian’s investigation. For, according to the Christian eschatology, human beings will see its final verication at the end of their history. On this view, then, Pannenberg’s assertion of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection as beyond analogy in order to vindicate his normal historical-critical claim regarding the resurrection cannot but be understood as based upon a question-begging theological vista, at least until the universal verication of the reality of the resurrection in history.

Also, Pannenberg’s understanding of reality causes a problem for his view of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection as beyond the rationalistic historian’s partia priscis, ‘dead people do not rise.’ According to him, our epistemological perspective of reality is obviously parochial, because we cannot “know or survey the whole of all reality.” This means that all we can attain with regard to reality is our “provisional knowledge [of it], which is subject to

405 Cf. JGM, p. 94.
406 Cf. ST2, p. 359.
407 Cf. ibid.
410 TaT, p. 242.
constant revision.”\footnote{Ibid.} For him even the laws of nature should be considered within the purview of this epistemological parochialism, because: “[f]irst, only a part of the laws of nature are ever known; [f]urther, in a world that as a whole represents a singular, irreversible process, an individual event is never completely determined by natural laws.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 98.} From this perspective, he contends that natural science cannot “make definitive judgments about the possibility or impossibility of an individual event, regardless of how certainly it is able, at least in principle, to measure the probability of an event’s occurrence.”\footnote{Ibid.} Then, the rationalistic historian’s \textit{parti pris}, ‘dead people do not rise,’ being a product of the modern scientific world-view should be considered to be a dogmatic prejudice. Hence, “[a]s long as [the rationalistic historian] does not begin dogmatically with a narrow concept of reality according to which ‘dead men do not rise,’”\footnote{Ibid., p. 109.} he or she can in principle consider the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. In this respect, the event of Jesus’ resurrection should, Pannenberg contends, be one of the objects of the historian’s investigation, and the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection should remain determined by the historical-critical approach to the evidential material in the transmitted texts.

Yet the problem here is that, to replace the rationalistic historian’s \textit{parti pris}, ‘dead people do not rise,’ Pannenberg posits another preconception that dead people may live again someday. As H. Burhenn points out, the historian’s task is simply to reconstruct a description of the past just on the basis of his or her ‘common-sense \textit{Weltanschauung},’ which is built up from everyday experience.\footnote{Cf. H. Burhenn, “Pannenberg’s Argument for the Historicity of the Resurrection,” \textit{Journal of the American Academy of Religion} 40 (1972), pp. 368-79, esp., 375ff.} Within the scope of this common-sense view of reality, it seems impossible for the historian to judge whether or not the truth claim of Pannenberg’s counter-preconception is plausible. For this is a judgment about ‘ultimate reality,’ which is \textit{per se}
metaphysical or scientific, and cannot be thus made by the historical method. Methodologically, then, it seems preposterous for the historian to reconstruct a part of the past not by the standard of judgment established by his or her everyday experience, but by the one which is to be established by scientific discoveries in the future. Hence it can be said that “even an undogmatic historian is committed to this dogmatism [i.e., ‘dead people do not rise’] and … this commitment is not a fault due merely to an unreasoning narrowness of perspective but is rather an inescapable concomitant of the historian’s task.”

When Pannenberg tries to put the question of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection in the realm of the historian’s investigation by appealing the possibility of natural science’s discovery of ultimate reality, a chasm always develops between Pannenberg and the historian with regard to their methodological approach to the question, which is unbridgeable until the realisation of the possibility in history. As Pannenberg himself concedes, the Christians’ claim to the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection “will remain a debated issue, …only in the kingdom to come, when the dead rise again, will the opposition to their claim vanish.” If this is the case, Pannenberg’s postulation of ‘historicity beyond any parti pris’ is also based on his theologically tilted viewpoint of history.

In summary then: for a critical view of Pannenberg’s concept of historicity I began with the Christian theistic Weltanschauung. I posited this as the necessary circumstances under which Pannenberg’s concept of historicity beyond analogy and any parti pris can be considered. And I have argued for this by showing that Pannenberg’s postulating a historicity beyond analogy and any parti pris is based on his theistic world-view. That he has such a view of historicity is more clearly grasped in his claim to ‘historicity without absolute certainty,’ to which I now turn.

416 ibid., p. 372.
b) *Historicity without Absolute Certainty?*

As we have seen above, the total absence of the reality of Jesus’ resurrection in history unavoidably impels Pannenberg to make a discretionary theological claim to the historicity of the event, which cannot be confined to the horizon of historiography proper: “Theological interest in the assertion of the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus, as of his incarnation, depends on the fact that the overcoming of death by the new eschatological life has actually taken place in this world and history of ours.”\(^{418}\) It seems obvious that, from the historiographical viewpoint, there is an arbitrary theological claim in putting such an emphasis on Jesus’ resurrection ‘having actually taken place in this world and history of ours’ without any basis of reality in our history. This arbitrariness becomes more conspicuous in Pannenberg’s assertion: “But ‘historically’ does not mean ‘historically provable’…. It means that an event actually took place. When can we say that something is historically provable, without further doubt?”\(^{419}\) As G. Lüdemann points out, this assertion is “evidently exclusively a theological conclusion.”\(^{420}\)

We may agree with Pannenberg’s claim that “[a]ssertion of the historicity of an event does not mean that its facticity is so sure that there can no longer be any dispute regarding it.”\(^{421}\) However, when we understand this claim in the context of his theological bias that ‘historicality means just an event’s having actually taken place,’ our agreement wavers. For it seems ponderable that it is posited solely for the vindication of the unhistorical historicalness of the reality of Jesus’ resurrection. In other words, Pannenberg’s claim to historicity without absolute certainty is nothing but a theologically-tilted dialectical apologia for the non-historicality of the reality of Jesus’ resurrection. It is a question-begging attempt to try theologically to force the question of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection onto the sheer

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\(^{418}\) ST2, p. 361.
\(^{419}\) Ibid., p. 361, n. 115.
\(^{421}\) ST2, p. 361.
historico-critical horizon. Hence, so far as the reality of Jesus’ resurrection is concerned, any attempt to solve the aporia of its historicity within the historical-critical methodology is fit to fail. For, as soon as we make our beginning with the apostolic witness to the phenomenological reality of Jesus’ resurrection (whatever it means), we must face the fact that “it is at one and the same time a transcendent reality.”

Up to this point, I have attempted to take a critical view of Pannenberg’s enlarged concept of historicity which he used to vindicate the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. We have seen in his argument for the expansion of the concept of historicity some “muddles” created by an overzealous attempt to validate the Resurrection’s ‘historicity’ in the terms of secular historiography and science.” And we have, as S. Coakley points out, found it inevitable that, in order for the argument to be plausible, “a theistic background must already be presupposed.” The fundamental reason why he needed to postulate this expanded concept of historicity is to be found in his theological framework, where he seeks to understand Jesus’ resurrection solely as the basis of faith (that is, only as historical knowledge on which faith is based, which can be attained only by the historical-critical approach to the evidential material in the transmitted texts reporting the event). That is to say, once his expanded concept of historicity is allowed, the aporia of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection falls, for Pannenberg, onto the horizon of hermeneutics in its historica-critical perspective. But even if this were to be allowed, can we really obtain sheer historical knowledge of Jesus’ resurrection through the historical-critical approach to the texts, which is the basis of faith? In other words, is it possible for us to gain access to pure historical knowledge of the Easter event prior to faith by way of the historical-critical approach to the evidential material, that is, the resurrection texts of the post-resurrectional appearances and the empty tomb?

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424 Ibid.
2) Knowledge prior to Faith?

a) The Limitations of Pannenberg’s Historical-Critical Approach to the Evidential Material

In order to examine the validity of Pannenberg’s contention that the facticity of Jesus’ resurrection should be thought of as a historical knowledge regardless of faith, we first consider the limitations of his twofold historical-critical approach to the evidential material, that is, to the post-resurrectional appearances and the discovery of the empty tomb of Jesus.

(1) The Post-Resurrectional Appearance

As we have seen in the second chapter, Pannenberg understands Jesus’ post-resurrectional appearances to the disciples as objective visions. This results from his view that the original form of the resurrected Jesus’ appearances can be found in the account of Paul’s encounter with the risen Lord on the road to Damascus. This view leads Pannenberg to the thought that Jesus’ post-resurrectional appearances are tantamount to the self-demonstrations of the exalted Lord from the concealment of heaven.\textsuperscript{425}

First of all, the aporia here is: how can we historico-phenomenologically grasp the objective ‘extra-mental reality’ in Paul’s experience in the account of the Damascus road event? Historico-phenomenologically, it can be said that it is a historical fact that Paul’s experience on the Damascus road decisively changed his personal destiny. The historian, placing himself or herself outside of the ‘luminous’ realm of Paul’s experience, feels free to handle this fact historically. As soon as the historian opens the door through which to get inside this realm, in order to investigate exactly what the experience was, the historian is

\textsuperscript{425} Cf. ST2, pp. 354-5.
likely to be dazzled by the ‘luminosity,’ so much so that he or she cannot simply depict what it was. In other words, “[i]t is one thing to assert as fact the occurrence of an experience; to determine that the experience in question was a vision of the risen Christ or a revelation is quite another matter.”426 If this is the case, it seems impossible for us to make a historicophenomenological approach to the exact and complete nature of the experience. Hence, if we categorise it as a ‘visionary’ one, we cannot historicophenomenologically say whether or not there was an objective ‘extra-mental reality’ in it. We cannot simply categorise it as belonging to a ‘subjective vision’ or to an ‘objective vision’.

When we begin with the fact that there is no historicophenomenological access to the objective Sachlichkeit in Paul’s visionary experience on the Damascus road, we cannot then give it any special characteristic by which it can be qualitatively distinguished from his later revelatory experiences (such as in 2 Cor. 12, Gal. 2:2, etc.). This seems to lead us to the assertion that we cannot help regarding it as a ‘subjective vision’. In this case, historicophenomenologically speaking, is there any fundamental difference between Paul’s ‘having seen’ the luminous phenomenon with the voice of Jesus (Acts 9:3ff.; 22:6ff.; 26:13ff.), Stephen’s ‘having seen’ Jesus standing at the right hand of God (Acts 8:55) and John’s ‘having seen’ someone like a son of man in the midst of the lampstands (Rev. 1:13)? If we try to seek after the original phenomenological mode of the resurrected Jesus’ appearances in Paul’s experience on the road, then, are we not to be allowed to claim the following?

If a heuristic category like ‘vision’ is accepted as historically and psychologically appropriate to the experience involved in the Easter appearances, that category can be unpacked in the assertion that precisely through the psychically-conditioned operation of the disciples’ imagination there occurred a process of transformative symbolization. If this assertion is then placed within the theological perspective of the divine concursus, it

becomes an affirmation that through the images and affect involved in such an experience of ‘vision,’ the redemptive self-communication of God in his risen Christ was effectively mediated.\textsuperscript{427}

In this respect, there seems to be no plausibility in Pannenberg’s contention that “primitive Christianity itself apparently knew how to distinguish between ecstatic visionary experiences and the fundamental encounters with the resurrected Lord[, although] the question about how this distinction was understood in primitive Christianity is difficult to answer.”\textsuperscript{428} This is a question-begging argument for the vindication of his understanding of the appearances of the resurrected Jesus as ‘objective visions’. As S. Coakley claims, “any supposed categorising of appearances could not in itself sway one towards regarding Paul’s first revelation as having some ‘extra-subjective reality’ which the other did not.”\textsuperscript{429} Here we can conclude with Peter Carnley: “In the final analysis Pannenberg is unable to find criteria to distinguish objective from subjective visions.”\textsuperscript{430} This is a fundamental limitation in Pannenberg’s attempt to establish the Sachlichkeit of Jesus’ resurrection, by which he wishes to put it in the realm of normal history.

Second, there seems to be another difficulty in Pannenberg’s historical-critical approach to the appearances, when he attempts to find their original phenomenological mode in Paul’s ‘vision’ on the Damascus road and is lead to the assertion that the risen Lord appeared ‘from heaven’. It seems that from the perspective of the comparative literature of antiquity, this Christophany is not fundamentally different from reappearances of the dead such as the ones of the dead Creūsa and the dead Demâneta\textsuperscript{431} in the ancient extra-biblical texts, if we cannot

\textsuperscript{427} ibid., p. 192.
\textsuperscript{428} KGM, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{429} S. Coakley, “Is the Resurrection a ‘Historical’ Event?...,” p. 96 (author’s italics).
\textsuperscript{431} For the textual notes on them, cf. I. Broer, “‘Seid stets bereit, jedem Rede und Antwort zu stehen, der nach der Hoffnung fragt, die euch erhält’ (1 Pet 3,15): Das leere Grab und die Erscheinungen Jesu im Licht der
make any historico-phenomenological examination to its reality. As G. Lüdemann contends, “it thus seems certain that the Damascus event was a vision…of a kind that occurs in the Old Testament, in intertestamental Judaism, in numerous parallels from the Hellenistic and Roman environment of the New Testament, and in the New Testament itself.” 432 This means that we may risk having to deal with the accounts of Jesus’ resurrection in the New Testament as descriptions of another apotheosis legend, as in the cases of ancient heroes such as Romulus and Hercules, or of ‘more recent or contemporary figures such as Apollonius of Tyana, the Emperor Augustus, and the prophet Peregrinus.’ 433 In this case, we are unavoidably required to see the resurrected Jesus’ appearances as eidclns, which may mean that Christianity is an ill-founded religion.

Third, Pannenberg’s attempt to establish the original phenomenological mode of the risen Jesus’ appearances in Paul’s Damascus road experience as an ‘objective vision’ can be criticised by philological studies of the term ophthē + dative (= appeared to), which was used for the risen Jesus’ appearances to the disciples including Paul in the New Testament. The starting point for these philological studies may be said to be the Septuagint’s use of the term ophthē + dative for theophanies and angelophanies. Some scholars such as A. Vögtle, I. Broer, L. Oberlinner, etc. contend that this religiously technical use of the term in the Septuagint flowed into the New Testament. 434 Following these scholars, it can be said that this religious terminology is used for the description of the resurrected Jesus’ appearances by the

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New Testament authors by way of their ‘Christological reflection’. Here we have to ask exactly what the basis of their ‘reflection’ is. In other words, it should be asked “whether the encountering [with the risen One] itself enabled and even pushed [angestofken hat] this reflection, or other factors resulted in it.” If we cannot find any historico-phenomenological way to approach the reality of the encounter, then, as I. Broer contends, the possibility cannot be a priori excluded that it is not that the encounter occasioned the reflection, but that the employment of the term ophthe for the expression of the appearances was the outcome of the reflection. By this possibility it is meant that the historian, simply due to an inability to grasp historico-phenomenologically the reality of the risen One who had appeared to the disciples, has no choice but to make a philological comparison between the appearance-cases in the New Testament and the ones in other ancient biblical and nonbiblical texts in order to make a historical-critical approach to what underlies all these expressions. And all that the historian can achieve by this approach is that he or she should “incline toward classifying the appearances as subjective phenomena and toward interpreting the ophthe terminology as a secondary (though early) form of expression, itself the result of considerable theological reflection.” On this view, it can be concluded that “the ‘seeing’ which is implied by the use of ophthe in 1 Cor. 15: 3-8, is a religiously technical ‘seeing’ different from rather than similar to natural perception of an ocular kind.” In other words, “the word ophthe... refers to spiritual vision rather than to ocular sighting.” Hence, so long as this view remains a hermeneutical possibility, it seems difficult for Pannenberg’s assertion that the resurrected

436 I. Broer, “‘Der Herr ist wahrhaft auferstanden’...,” p. 58. (my translation)
437 Cf. ibid.
Jesus’ appearances to the disciples, including Paul, from the hidden place in heaven were ‘objective visions’ to be historical-critically established.

Finally, from the perspective of the hermeneutical possibility that the Gospels’ accounts of the risen Jesus’ appearances should be endowed with a historical reliability, Pannenberg’s pursuit of the original phenomenological mode of the risen One’s appearances in Paul’s Damascus road experience can be criticised as exegetically ill-founded. Pannenberg, under the influence of H. Grass’s assumption that “the Gospels’ accounts of the resurrection have so conspicuously legendary a characteristic that no historical kernel can be found in them,” would not give any historical reliability to them. From the very outset, however, we cannot exegetically exclude their historical reliability. As W. L. Craig contends, there is a hermeneutical possibility that they are the genuinely historical descriptions of the resurrectional appearances, although it can be said that there is an anti-docetic trend in them, within which their historical cores seem to remain hidden. And on the basis of this hermeneutical possibility, it can be said that there is a homogeneity between the resurrectional body in Paul’s thought and the one in the Gospels’ descriptions. Perhaps Pannenberg would distinguish the resurrectional body as a spiritual body in Paul’s theology from the one as a physical body in the Gospels’ accounts, just for fear that, when the physicality of the resurrectional appearances is emphasised, we are required to mean by Jesus’ resurrection a resuscitation of a corpse as in the case of Lazarus. If emphasis should be put upon the body, however, we can find a common ground between the two modes of existence. That is to say, it seems that there is no fundamental difference between the spiritual body in Paul’s theology and the physical body in the Gospels’ accounts, if we hold “what Paul understands by the

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resurrectional body [to be] a powerful, glorious, incorruptible, and the-Spirit-leading body,” which is therefore to be designated physical.\footnote{W. L. Craig, “Pannenbergs Beweis...,” p. 101 (my translation; author’s italics)} Hence, as long as this hermeneutical possibility remains open, Pannenberg’s understanding of the resurrectional appearances as ‘objective visions’ has per se a limitation. Moreover, unless this hermeneutical possibility is considered, there seems to be an intrinsic preposterousness in his attempt to prevent the objective visionary nature of the risen Jesus’ appearances from being simply spiritualised by way of his claim to the historicity of the discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb. It is the limitation of that claim which we now consider.

(2) The Discovery of the Empty Tomb of Jesus

As we have seen in the second chapter, Panenbergs takes a historical-critical approach to the discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb by making a hermeneutical consideration of Mark 16: 1-8, and by considering the event’s Sitz im Leben. For the former, he basically follows H. von Campenhausen’s contention that the message of the empty tomb is historically probable,\footnote{Cf. \textit{ibid}. Also cf. \textit{idem}, “The Bodily Resurrection of Jesus,” in \textit{Gospel Perspectives}, pp. 47-74; R. H. Gundry, “The Essential Physicality of Jesus’ Resurrection according to the NT,” pp. 204-210.} thus claiming that “the present form of the story might well preserve individual recollections that are historically relevant, especially that of the role of the women in finding the empty tomb and that of early appearances in Galilee rather than at the tomb.”\footnote{Cf. H. von Campenhausen, \textit{Der Ablauf der Ostereignisse und das leere Grab}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed. (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag, 1966), esp., p. 42.} For the latter, he fundamentally follows P. Althaus’s contention that the resurrection kerygma “could not have been maintained in Jerusalem for a single day, for a single hour, if the emptiness of the tomb had not been established as a fact for all concerned.”\footnote{P. Althaus, \textit{Die Wahrheit des kirchlichen Osterglaubens: Einspruch gegen E. Hirsch} (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1940), pp. 22f. Quoted by Pannenberg in \textit{JGM}, p. 100.} On this view, he produces the following argumentum e negatione:
Those who want to dispute the empty tomb of Jesus must show that contemporary Jewish witnesses to belief in the resurrection included some who did not think the resurrection of the dead need have anything at all to do with the body in the tomb. They must also assume that such views (not thus far attested) were sufficiently popular in Palestine, else the first Christians could not have successfully preached the resurrection of Jesus if his body had been intact in the tomb. Even then, an explanation would still be needed as to why the Gospels present debates between Christians and their opponents regarding what happened to the body. So long as no proofs are offered on these points, we must assume that the tomb of Jesus was in fact empty.449

On the basis of these two considerations, Pannenberg claims the historicality of Jesus’ empty tomb.

As for Pannenberg’s claim to the historicality of Jesus’ empty tomb, it needs first to be mentioned that in order to make this claim he seems to count more heavily on circumstantial considerations than hermeneutical considerations of the pericope. As E. Bode points out: “Pannenberg finds that the judgment of the historicity of the empty tomb does not depend primarily on the analysis of Mk 16. Rather he begins with the historical consideration of the situation of the resurrection kerygma in Jerusalem; then the existing tradition confirms what is already to be presupposed as historically probable for other reasons.”450 When emphasis is laid upon this circumstantial consideration, it may be confidently said that the emptiness of Jesus’ tomb is “an extremely well attested fact, because both Jews and Christians knew of it.”451 The fundamental aporia in this view, however, is that the certainty of the emptiness of Jesus’ tomb “does not prove who emptied the tomb—whether it was the disciples, as the Jews

449 ST2, pp. 358-9.
claimed, or God, as the apostles said." If it not be the former case, this who-aporia constitutes a borderline situation of our historicophenomenological approach to the cause of the emptiness of Jesus' tomb, in which any historical-critical methodology should be of no use, and any solution to the aporia is thus to be totally based upon the theistic Weltanschauung, i.e., upon the Christian faith in God. In this situation, the facticity of the emptiness of Jesus' tomb can serve only as an 'indicator' or a 'sign' for faith, but not as a proof of his resurrection. This is a stumbling block to any attempt to establish historical-critically the facticity of Jesus' resurrection on the basis of the certainty of the emptiness of his tomb. Hence, if Pannenberg tries to advocate the historicity of Jesus' resurrection by way of the very circumstantial consideration of the empty tomb (that is, without the certainty of the emptiness of Jesus' tomb, his resurrection could not have been proclaimed in Jerusalem even for a single day), this gives an intrinsic limitation to his methodology. Besides, if Pannenberg, by relating the tomb tradition to the appearance ones, tries to object to the view that holds post-resurrectional appearances to be mere hallucinations and that therefore spiritualises the Easter message, there seems to be a fundamental contradiction between his attempt to find the original phenomenological mode of the risen Jesus' appearances in Paul's Damascus road experience and the physicality of Jesus' resurrection which is to be implied in the very relationship between the empty tomb and the resurrection itself. Therefore, it seems unconvincing that Pannenberg tries to "[give] the fact of the empty tomb considerable theological weight" for the sake of establishing the historicity of Jesus' resurrection.

Second, as for Pannenberg's hermeneutical consideration of the empty tomb pericope in Mark 16: 1-8, it is to be said that, as Pannenberg himself points out, "[t]he text of the story

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452 Ibid.
453 Cf. W. Kasper, Jesus the Christ, p. 129.
454 Cf. ST2, p. 359.
455 W. Kasper, Jesus the Christ, p. 135.
does occasion doubt as to whether it may be viewed as simple historical narration." This implies that we should consider it in the perspective of various hermeneutical possibilities. One of them is the view of it as a reconstructed story for the proclamation of Jesus’ bodily resurrection. This view begins with the emphasis upon the angel’s proclamation of Jesus’ resurrection. The more the angel’s message is emphasised as the very raion d’esté of the pericope, the more the apologetic character of the narrative of the women’s visit to the tomb is brought into relief. This hermeneutical attitude leads to a position in which it is hard to make any historical enquiry into the narrative. Eventually, the historical horizon of the narrative vanishes, and we meet the total negation of the historicality of the occurrence of the women’s visit to the tomb. As G. Lüdemann asserts:

The visit of Mary Magdalene (with the other two women) to the tomb of Jesus on the day after the sabbath can hardly be said to be historical. Historical enquiry must be directed at the character of the underlying traditions. The source in our case is an apologetic legend with features like an epiphany which probably did not exist without the kerygma. Those who handed down these traditions ‘concluded’ from the message that the crucified one had risen that the tomb of Jesus was empty. The present story is as it were the product of a conclusion or a postulate. ... Therefore in all honesty we can discover absolutely nothing from the story about what really happened in history.  

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456 ST2, p. 356.
457 G. Lüdemann, *The Resurrection of Jesus: History, Experience, Theology*, p. 121. Cf. R. Pesch’s claim to the non-historicality of the discovery of the empty tomb: “The discovery of the opened and empty tomb of Jesus (which as such admits all possible explanations, as late: Jewish and rationalistically anti-Christian polemics show) by three Galilean women on the first day of the week after Jesus’ death on the cross and his burial cannot be considered as historical.” (*Idem*, Das Markusevangelium, part II [Freiburg et al.: Herder, 1977], p. 536 [my translation].) Also cf. L. Oberlinner’s view: “The ‘empty tomb’ is [a] consequence of the belief in the resurrection based upon the Jewish anthropology.” (*Idem*, “Die Verkündigung des Auferweckung Jesu im geöffneten und leeren Grab: Zu einem vernachlässigten Aspekt in der Diskussion um das Grab Jesu,” Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 73 [1982], p. 181 [my translation]); B. Lindars’s view: “[T]he empty tomb tradition has been formed in the light of belief in the bodily resurrection of Jesus, and so should not be regarded as the origin of the belief...” (*Idem*, “Jesus Risen: Bodily Resurrection But No Empty Tomb,” *Theology* 89 [1986], p. 90.)
What is inevitable for the total negation of the historicity of the women’s visit to the tomb is to presuppose the remarkable features of the burial story (such as Pilate’s careful enquiry about Jesus’ death, the detailed process of the burial by Joseph of Arimathea in his own tomb, and the Presence of the women at the burial) as apologetically legendary. Within the perspective of this presupposition Jesus can be thought to have been ‘hurriedly buried [verscharrt].’ In other words, if the story of Jesus’ burial by Joseph of Arimathea should be characterised as apologetically legendary, “then it is conceivable that they [the Romans] should have buried him in an unmarked grave—perhaps in a common grave together with the bodies of the two thieves and the remains of earlier miscreants.” In that case, the women’s presence at the burial should also be thought of as apologetically legendary. After all, we are required to face a hermeneutical scepticism *in toto*, in which any claim to the historicity of the women’s discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb is to be repudiated.

Of course, this ‘hermeneutical scepticism *in toto*’ can be criticised for its biased preoccupations, because it is based upon a postulation which lacks evidence for verification. It can be challenged by a counter-argument based on the historical possibility that the first disciples including the women might have been really interested in the tomb of their master after the resurrection, and would have made a pilgrimage to it, thus having taken a good care of it. As F. Watson claims, however, “it is perfectly proper historical method to question the credentials of any supposedly historical text which shows possible signs of apologetic tendencies in favour of a particular dogmatic position.” From this perspective, the scepticism can be a hermeneutical possibility. And in the biblical hermeneutics, in which

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461 F. Watson, “‘Historical Evidence’ and the Resurrection of Jesus,” p. 370.
there can be posited no absolute conclusion (especially with regard to the historicity of Jesus’ empty tomb), a hermeneutical possibility always remains. Hence, so long as this scepticism remains open to us, Pannenberg’s claim to the historicity of the women visiting the tomb and finding it empty is in a quandary.

Moreover, even if the women’s visit to the tomb which found it empty is to be allowed to be a historical fact, this facticity has nothing to do with the historico-phenomenological approach to the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. For the pericope shows that this historical character is so thoroughly melted into the non-historicity of the angelophany that what is presupposed for the certainty of Jesus’ resurrection, based on the facticity of the tomb’s emptiness, is our belief in the angelophany and in the proclaimed words by the angel. This pericope may be analogous to a bird with two wings, one of which is real, but the other, phantasmal. The bird cannot fly into the sky just owing to the unreal wing; it can do so only through its imagination. Although the ‘bird’ pericope is to be admitted to have a ‘historical’ wing, it has to be said that it can fly only through a ‘non-historical cave,’ where the angel with its imaginary wings sits, thus totally swallowing up the historicity of the women’s visit to the tomb and of the earliest appearances of the resurrected Jesus in Galilee rather than at the tomb. Here again, Pannenberg’s attempt to establish the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection by way of his endowing the women’s visit to the tomb which found it empty with historicalness collapses.

In conclusion, all that we grasp from these hermeneutical perspectives is that Mark’s empty tomb story has nothing to do with any historical verification of Jesus’ resurrection. It can serve only as “a vehicle of the proclamation of the resurrection,” thus “[becoming] a bridge between the Passion Narrative and the narratives of the appearance of the risen

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Jesus. In other words: “Mark has not turned the story of the empty tomb into a demonstration of the resurrection, … Rather, the story is only understood in light of the faith that the narrator and his readers have on the basis of the kerygma. Mark makes it clear that all Christians believe through hearing the proclamation that the Lord is raised.” In this respect, Pannenberg’s attempt to establish the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection by way of his claim to the historical probability of the women’s discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb has per se its own limitation.

Thus far, we have considered the limitations of Pannenberg’s historical-critical approach to the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection. Now is time to face critically the question of whether it is possible for us to get our historical knowledge of Jesus’ resurrection prior to our faith in it.

b) Knowledge prior to Faith?

Can we establish Jesus’ resurrection as a historical knowledge? The above-mentioned critical consideration of Pannenberg’s view of historicity, and of the limitations of his argument for the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection on the basis of his historical-critical approach to the evidential materials of Jesus’ resurrection in the New Testament, leads us to respond negatively to this question. Pannenberg’s anxious to establish Jesus’ resurrection as a historical knowledge with the help of his historical-critical approach to the evidential materials. In other words, he “insists upon grounding Christian faith in the results of historical research.” Unfortunately, however, he cannot secure a 100% surety of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection from his efforts, simply because his truth claim of the event is totally dependent upon his hermeneutical interpretation of the evidential materials, and his interpretation remains a probability among many probabilities.

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463 Ibid
465 G. E. Michelson, Jr., Lessing’s “Ugly Ditch”: ..., p. 121.
In fact, there are many plausable explanations of the evidential materials of Jesus’ resurrection in the New Testament. We are destined to face negative explanations of them as well as positive ones with regard to the facticity of Jesus’ resurrection. If Pannenberg’s argument is a paragon of positivity in respect of the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection, we can find a paragon of negativity in John Dominic Crossan’s explanation of the evidential materials, in which we are told: Jesus’ corpse could be left on the cross for the birds of prey, or be interred in “a hurried, indifferent, and shallow grave barely covered with stones from which the scavenging dogs would easily and swiftly unbury the body” 466; the disciples did not experience the appearances of the risen Jesus at all. 467 Sadly enough, under these circumstances we cannot be sure which explanation contains the real truth of the event. In this regard, Pannenberg should concede that his establishment of Jesus’ resurrection as historical knowledge still belongs to a domain of probability. If this is the case, then, his whole attempt to establish the event of Jesus’ resurrection as a piece of historical knowledge prior to faith is futile. As P. Carnley points out:

“We have noted that Pannenberg argues that faith is not a risk, but rather trust grounded in knowledge. This means he is anxious to justify a claim to knowledge in the case of the resurrection, and yet he cannot quite squeeze this result from the evidence. For one to claim to know that Jesus rose from the dead, one would need sufficient evidence to establish this fact with certainty since it would be logically improper to say ‘I know that x but I am not certain that x’. Without evidential support of the required calibre, Pannenberg must content himself with talk of probabilities. But, in this case, he must in turn desist from speaking of historical ‘knowledge’ and speak rather of ‘belief’. 468

468 P. Carnley, *The Structure of Resurrection Belief*, p. 91. (author’s emphasis)
In conclusion, so far as Jesus’ resurrection is concerned, we cannot say that it is historical knowledge. There is no warrant to establish it as a historical knowledge prior to faith, because the evidential materials related to the event are not adequate enough to establish its historical certainty, and the reality of the event (whether it is a transformed, spiritual body or a phenomenological vision) is not thought to be open to the historico-critical approach. Jesus’ resurrection therefore comes to us first and foremost as an object of faith.

_B. Jesus’ Resurrection as an Object of Faith_

_a. Faith and the Non-historicality of Jesus’ Resurrection in Karl Barth_

In the first chapter we outlined Barth’s view of Jesus’ resurrection as a non-historical but historical event. There we first saw that the early Barth emphasised the non-historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. Many traces of this are found in his early books such as _The Epistle to the Romans, The Resurrection of the Dead_ and _The Word of God and the Word of Man_. Even in the later Barth we can find the traces of his argument for the non-historicality of Jesus’ resurrection.

From the perspective of the non-historicality of Jesus’ resurrection, what is conceived of as its reality that can be placed on the horizon of modern historiography? If nothing can be grasped as the reality of the resurrection by the hands of the scientific historian, who assumes that “the historian must solve his [or her] problems without recourse to any such _deus ex machina_ [as the God of a Chosen People, a Christian God, the Hidden Hand of the Deist, or Hegel’s World Spirit],”469 how can we still say that it really happened in the realm of ordinary history? What on earth can be seen as the reality of Jesus’ resurrection through the eyes of the

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positivistic historian, whose Weltanschauung is totally dependent upon the laws of nature in the domain of all visible phenomena?

These questions unavoidably arise when we try to grasp the reality of Jesus’ resurrection from the perspective of its non-historicality as asserted by Barth. Regarding the reality of Jesus’ resurrection, there are two dimensions to be considered here which are in no way related to our existence: temporal and ontological. As soon as we talk about the temporal dimension of the reality of Jesus’ resurrection, we find ourselves, in talking about this dimension, transcending our time. It is the dimension of eternity. For Barth Jesus’ resurrection is the only event in history in which eternity and time intersect. As belonging to eternity, the resurrection is “an absolutely unique event; unique in the sense that the forces operative on the surface of history cannot produce something like a resurrection.”  

70 We, in the spatio-temporal dimension, cannot get access to the eternity-dimension of the resurrection, because there is an unfathomable chasm between the two dimensions, which is “impassable—impassable that is, from this side.” 71 This is the very uniqueness of Jesus’ resurrection as an event in history, in which we can only taste the non-historicality of the resurrection.

As for the ontological dimension, we can say that Barth sees in Jesus’ resurrection something totally different from our being. The being of Jesus in his resurrection is radically transformed, so that it cannot belong to our temporal dimension, but to the dimension of God’s time, that is, eternity. In and through this radically transformed being of Jesus dawns the new world, which is totally different from this world. In other words, in and through it “mankind and its world are passing as one whole, from the old to the new, from ‘here’ to ‘there’, from the present to the coming age.” 72 But the transformation of this world into the new world illic et tune occurred once and for all only in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. That

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471 Ibid. (author’s italics)
472 Romans, p. 165.
is to say, the new incorruptible world ‘grazed’ this corruptible world once and for all in Jesus’ resurrection, as Barth expresses it in the following paradoxical statement:

In the Resurrection the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of the flesh, but touches it as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it. And, precisely because it does not touch it, it touches it as its frontier—as the new world.⁴⁷³

It is out of the question that the positivistic historian can grasp something historical (in its historiographically proper sense) in Jesus’ resurrection from the perspective of its non-historicality on the basis of the above-mentioned dimensions transcending our spatio-temporal dimension. This means that Jesus’ resurrection with its reality transcending our time and space can only be an object of faith. Christians find a way to the reality of Jesus’ resurrection in the realm of faith. In and through their faith they can penetrate the core of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical event. It is because their faith “begins with, and is founded upon, the affirmation that the life, death, and resurrection of Christ represent an event in history, in and through which a disclosure of the whole meaning of history occurs, and all of these questions are answered.”⁴⁷⁴ It is only in and through faith that they can gain access to the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection which the historian cannot approach. It is because only faith can embrace the why as well as the how of the resurrection occurrence which historical reasoning cannot comprehend. In this respect, therefore, it can and should be said that Christian faith is the only way to the bratum factum of Jesus’ resurrection. As Hans Küng rightly claimed: “There is no way to the risen Christ … which bypasses faith. The resurrection is not a miracle authenticating faith. It is itself the object of faith.”⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷³ Ibid., p. 30.
Up to this point, we have realised that Barth regards Jesus’ resurrection as non-historical, because its reality, he claims, is tantamount to a being totally transformed into the incorruptible, thus belonging to eternity; from this perspective, Jesus’ resurrection is nothing but an object of faith. Can we say the same thing to Barth, who asserts that, in spite of the non-historicality of its reality, Jesus’ resurrection is nevertheless an event that occurred in our spatio-temporal dimension?

b. Faith and the Historicality of Jesus’ Resurrection in Karl Barth

As mentioned in the first chapter, the anhypostatic understanding of Jesus’ resurrection emphasised in the early Barth dwindles away in the later Barth, where the enhypostatic understanding of the resurrection is notably thrown into relief. More exactly, the later Barth sloughs off the earlier drift towards the anhypostatic understanding of Jesus’ resurrection, ‘much as a snake sloughs off its skin.’\(^{476}\) In the early Barth Jesus’ resurrection is characterised “as a ‘non-historical happening’ that has meaning only in its eschatological character.”\(^{477}\) In there “nothing about its [the resurrection’s] ‘when’ or ‘where’ is important to faith.”\(^{478}\) The spatio-temporality of Jesus’ resurrection is flickeringly mentioned: “The Resurrection is therefore an occurrence in history, which took place outside the gate of Jerusalem in the year A.D. 30, inasmuch as it there ‘came to pass’, was discovered and recognized.”\(^{479}\) Then its non-historicality is emphasised: “But inasmuch as the occurrence was conditioned by the Resurrection, in so far, that is, as it was not the ‘coming to pass’, or the discovery, or the recognition, which conditioned its necessity and appearance and revelation, the Resurrection

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\(^{478}\) Ibid.

\(^{479}\) Romans, p. 30.
is not an event in history at all.” In the later Barth, however, “the resurrection of Jesus is an objective historical event, even though only ‘a tiny historical margin’ is accessible to reason and its methods.” In Barth’s later works we readily find remarkable emphases upon Jesus’ resurrection as an event that occurred in our spatio-temporal dimension. Even in his earlier works, we catch sight of his emphases upon the corporeality of Jesus’ resurrection, an example of which is found in the following remark: “In the invisible totality of the new man Jesus, that is, in the concrete, corporeal person of the risen Jesus, …” The point to bear in mind here is that Barth claims with all these emphases that Jesus’ resurrection is a historical (historisch) event that really occurred illie et tunc.

When we think of Barth’s assertion of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical (historisch) event from the perspective of modern positivistic historiography, we inevitably find fundamental contradictions, which are caused by the intrinsic limitations contained in his argument for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. The first thing to be mentioned is the insufficiency of proper witnesses to the event. A historical (historisch) event can be dealt with by the positivistic historian with his or her historical-critical methods. For an event to be tested for the establishment of its historicity, it, first of all, should sufficiently provide proper witnesses to it. Although we have many witnesses to Jesus’ resurrection, as Paul indicated in 1 Cor. 15:5-8, these witnesses were all the followers of Jesus; they had a common ground for following him: faith in Jesus as Christ. This means that it is possible for the secular historian to suspect the authenticity of their witnessing. This possibility could be eradicated, if the resurrected Jesus “appeared to Pontius Pilate or to his Jewish opponents or to the Roman senate or to anyone else who might impress a secular historian.” Our situation is that there is no one whose witness can be trusted by the secular historian. Barth acknowledges this,

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480 Ibid
482 Romans, p. 203.
483 G. Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: ..., p. 185.
because he is in the affirmative for “the modern historiographical principle that an event can be deemed to be historical (factual Historie) only if the how of its outline can be known independently of the standpoint of the observer and within its general and specific context.” Thus for him “[t]he resurrection of Jesus was no: a public event open to any one regardless of faith.” This means that, because all the witnesses grasped Jesus’ resurrection as an event that occurred  illic et tunc from the perspective of their coterminous faith in Jesus as Messiah, our view of it as a historical event is totally dependent upon the authenticity of their faith. And whether or not their faith is genuine is to be decided by our own venture of faith. Hence the aporia of the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection falls into the domain of our own venture of faith. Without our faith in the authenticity of their faith in Jesus’ resurrection as an event, we can decide and acknowledge nothing about the occurrence of the event.

The second thing to be mentioned is the lack of analogies for the resurrection. As observed above, one of the basic principles of modern historiography is the principle of analogy. I already mentioned with regard to this principle: if there were any possibility that an analogical examination of an event should fail, then the event is taken to be beyond the historian’s horizon of comprehension. Barth acknowledges this well. He holds steadfastly to the uniqueness of Jesus’ resurrection. Hence for him “the ‘what’ that is claimed [for Jesus’ resurrection] is not analogous to any known historical event.” In this respect, it is out of the question that the positivistic historian can deal with the content of Jesus’ resurrection. That is to say, modern historical scholarship “cannot include its [the resurrection’s] content, in so far as this deals with the living Jesus, and not merely with the disciples who believed in him, among the ‘historical’ facts” in the restricted sense of the term.” In this case, it is

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484 Ibid.
485 Ibid.
486 Ibid.
487 CD, III/2, p. 446.
impossible for the modern positivistic historian to establish Jesus’ resurrection as a historical (historisch) event.

Nevertheless, Barth claims that Jesus’ resurrection belongs to history. For him it really happened ille et tunc. That is to say, it is an event of our spatio-temporal dimension. To argue for this historicality of Jesus’ resurrection, Barth simply repudiates what positivistic historians take for granted, which has been established with the help of their historical-critical principles. According to him, there are ‘non-historical’ or ‘primal-historical (argeschichtlich)’ events in human history, which cannot be dealt with by modern historiography. As mentioned above, the non-historicality of history is related to the immediacy of history to God. We have two notable events belonging to the non-historical history, the immediate cause of which is God: the creatio ex nihilo and the resurrection of Jesus Christ. For Barth this ‘non-historical history’ or ‘primal history (Urgeschichte)’ should be accepted as ‘history’. He thus claims: “We may well accept as history that which good taste prevents us from calling “historical” fact,” and which the modern historian will call ‘saga’ or ‘legend’ on the ground that it is beyond the reach of his [or her] methods, to say nothing of his [or her] unavowed assumptions.” For Barth there is no reason why we have to think of the occurrence of the non-historical history as impossible. As he asks: “Why should it not have happened?” Thus for him: “It is sheer superstition to suppose that only things which are open to ‘historical’ verification can have happened in time. There may have been events which happened far more really in time than the kind of things [the modern] scientific historian can prove. There are good grounds for supposing that the history of the resurrection of Jesus is a pre-eminent instance of such an event.” Besides, Barth thinks that “the modern world-view is not so final” as to play the role of the absolute norm in judging the historical facticity of an event.

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488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
490 Ibid.
491 Ibid., p. 447.
He thus asks: “Is this modern view so binding as to determine in advance and unconditionally our acceptance or rejection of the biblical message?” On the basis of all these counter-arguments against the modern historiographical attitude towards the historicity of an event, Barth claims that Jesus’ resurrection is a historical (historisch) event.

What is the basis of Barth’s counter-arguments against the positivistic historian’s arguments against the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection? Do they have a logical basis that can persuade the scientific historian to accept the theologian’s arguments as scientifically plausible? Or are they only products of a Christian theologian’s apologetics on the basis of his fideistic understanding of history?

What we can say about Barth’s counter-argument is, first of all, that it seems for Barth to present no plausible grounds for his argument from the perspective of modern historiography. What is to be grasped in his argument at a glance is that there is a fundamental contradiction: while dealing with an event that occurred in space and time he simultaneously claims that the event cannot be dealt with by the historian. That is to say, “[o]n the one hand, he insists that the resurrection is a physical and bodily fact while, on the other hand, he claims that the historian can determine nothing about it.” He, as it were, “ambiguously [attempts] to ‘have it both ways’ by holding together two logically incompatible assertions.” Regarding this contradiction, Barth unavoidably faces the question raised by D. F. Ford: “How can Barth both claim the resurrection as a historical fact (albeit only describable indirectly, through saga-like realistic stories) and also refuse to base his conclusion on ordinary historical investigation?”

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492 Ibid.
It seems that Barth gives us ‘primal history’, a theologically tilted category of history, as a plausible ground for his contradictory argument. In primal history Barth establishes “an event as both having the character of the historical in the usual sense of that word and at the same time as being immune from historical investigation.” How can we grasp an event, which occurred in time and space, but is ‘immune from historical investigation’? A historical (historisch) event, which cannot be historical-critically investigated, can but be approached by faith. It is patent that Barth’s salvation history and the events belonging to it are to be understood from the perspective of faith. Nothing but faith can be found as the prerequisite for grasping an event which is historical (historisch)—but unable to be approached by the critical-historical methodology—and non-historical (primal-historical) at the same time. Within the domain of Christian faith there is a possibility for Barth’s claim that a non-historical event such as creatio ex nihilo or Jesus’ resurrection can be historical (historisch). From the perspective of modern historiography, however, the claim seems preposterous and arbitrary. As Van A. Harvey criticises: “…to affirm an event in space and time without sufficient reason is either arbitrary or a sacrifice of the intellect. Since Barth says his view does not involve the latter, he must be held responsible for the former.” From the viewpoint of the historian, this arbitrariness derives from Barth’s ‘privileged’ theological view of history based upon faith. Hence, “[t]o say that Barth’s view is an arbitrary one is to say, first of all, that he makes historical assertions on the basis of faith which he then claims no historian has the right to assess.” In this regard, we can understand only by way of faith Barth’s claim that Jesus’ resurrection, which belongs to the non-historical history (or primal history), is a historical (historisch) event that occurred illic et tunc.

Now let me consider Barth’s objection to the ‘finality of the modern world-view’. Perhaps Barth is right in claiming that the modern world-view is ‘not so final’ as to provide us with an

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498 Ibid.
absolute norm for passing judgment on the possibility of the occurrence of an event in our spatio-temporal dimension. Maybe the modern world-view is open to change, especially from the perspective of quantum theory, in which “the subatomic world, and its associated primary quantities, cannot surveyed with the degree of objectivity and complete detachment that classical physics had assumed.” From the perspective of ‘chaotic systems,’ which “are intrinsically unpredictable and ... can never be treated in isolation from their environment,” we might construct “a metaphysical conjecture which regards the unpredictability of chaotic systems as an indication that in reality they possess some degree of ontological openness in their behaviour.” From the perspective of this ‘ontological openness’ it is possible to agree with Barth’s assertion that the modern Weltanschauung is not so final. Perhaps in this ‘ontological openness’ one can envisage the new creation of humanity and the whole universe. As John Polkinghorne, a theistic physicist, visualises:

Yet it seems to me to be a perfectly coherent hope that the pattern that is me will be remembered by God and recreated by him in some new environment of his choosing in his ultimate act of resurrection. ... but there is surely the possibility of there being a new ‘matter’ in which we can be re-embodied at our resurrection. ... I think that it will be the transformed matter of this present world, delivered by God from its destiny to decay. The universe is going to die but, because God cares for it, it will have its resurrection beyond its death, just as we shall have our resurrection beyond our deaths. In fact the two destinies are one.

However, our phenomenological Weltanschauung at the moment cannot prognosticate a radically metamorphosed Weltanschauung, in which faith in Jesus’ resurrection is

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500 For ‘chaotic systems’, cf. ibid., p. 71.
501 Ibid.
502 Ibid.
503 Ibid., p. 100.
authenticated, the hope for an individual’s resurrection in his or her personal identity is regarded as ‘perfectly coherent’, and it can be said that ‘there is surely the possibility of being a new “matter”’ for the re-creation of all sorts of beings in the universe and of the universe itself which are destined to perish. Even though we acknowledge that the modern Weltanschauung’s norms and warrants cannot be absolutised for truth-claim, this does not enable us to visualise scientifically a totally transformed Weltanschauung, in which the resurrection is thought to be a possibility. The yawning chasm between our present Weltanschauung and a future one radically metamorphosed remains and will remain unbridged, due to our intrinsic epistemological-ontological limitations prior to the realisation of God’s re-creation in the far distant future beyond the final stage of the universe’s evolution.

For us hic et nunc it can be bridged only by faith. The point is that, even though we agree with Barth in claiming that the modern Weltanschauung is ‘not so final’, we can envisage only with the help of faith a radically transformed world-view that allows us to hope for the resurrection of humanity and the whole universe. Faith is the prerequisite for grasping Barth’s purpose hidden in his assertion that ‘the modern world-view is not so final’. That is to say, without faith, we cannot think of a radically transformed world-view that enables us to regard Jesus’ resurrection as an event occurred illic et tunc, and to hope for our own resurrection on its basis.

A third and final thing is to be mentioned with regard to the fundamental contradictions found in Barth’s argument for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. Barth disparages historical (historisch) reliance on the two evidential materials in the New Testament, that is, the discovery of Jesus’ empty tomb and his post-mortem appearances, by which Pannenberg so eagerly attempted to establish the resurrection as a historically verifiable event. For Barth these are only ‘signs’ for the resurrection. What does Barth mean by ‘signs’? First, regarding the narratives of the post-resurrectional appearances, he asserts: “The narratives are not
meant to be taken as ‘history’ in our sense of the word. Even 1 Cor. 15:3-8 is treated in a strangely abstract way if it is regarded as a citation of witnesses for the purpose of historical proof.\textsuperscript{504} By this assertion Barth seems to mean that we can barely give any historical (\textit{historisch}) reliance to these. Second, with regard to the story of the empty tomb of Jesus, Barth claims: “The empty tomb is not the same thing as the resurrection. It is not the appearance of the Living; it is only its presupposition. Hence it is only the sign, although an indispensable sign.”\textsuperscript{505} In short, “the story of the empty tomb and of the physical appearances are ‘signs’ that cannot be omitted[; t]hey are not the esse of the belief in the resurrection, to be sure, but they are inferences to be drawn from it and ought not to be omitted.”\textsuperscript{506}

For Barth, however, these stories related to the appearances and the empty tomb are not products of a sheer legend. For him, “the stories are couched in the imaginative, poetic style of historical saga, and are therefore marked by the corresponding obscurity.”\textsuperscript{507} By ‘historical saga’ he seems to contend that all these stories tell us about an event, a truly historical (\textit{historisch}) event. That is to say, all of them are concerned about the very \textit{Sächlichkeit} of the event of the resurrection. Hence for Barth “[e]ach is a specific witness to the decisive things God said and did in this event.”\textsuperscript{508}

What then does Barth conclude about these narratives? On the one hand, he says that they cannot be historically (\textit{historisch}) dealt with; on the other hand, he says that there is a historical (\textit{historisch}) core to be found in them, which \textit{per se} evades the hands of the positivistic historian. Is this tenable? As Van A. Harvey comments in criticism:

Consequently, Barth uses the stories to argue for the historical nature of the events but concedes that the stories cannot, from a historical standpoint, stand any critical scrutiny. This leaves the believer in the position of accepting an

\textsuperscript{504} \textit{CD}, III/2, p 452.
\textsuperscript{505} \textit{Ibid.}, p 453.
\textsuperscript{506} Van A. Harvey, \textit{The Historian and the Believer}..., p 155.
\textsuperscript{507} \textit{CD}, III/2, p 452.
\textsuperscript{508} \textit{Ibid.}
argument the warrants of which are historical in type but which are, at the same time, confessed to be contradictory and ‘imaginative-poetic.’ It leaves the inquirer in the position of having to accept the claims of alleged eyewitnesses or risk the state of being a faithless man. Insofar as the believer wants to be historian, or the historian a believer, he has to surrender the autonomy of critical judgment. Barth, in effect, claims all the advantages of history but will assume none of its risks.  

It seems that Barth’s assertions regarding these Easter stories are tenable only from the viewpoint of faith. Hermeneutically speaking, there are many historico-critical problems related to these stories. Seeing these from the eye of faith, however, there is nothing problematic with regard to the discovery of the historicalness of God’s action through and in the event of the resurrection. Seeing them from the eye of faith, there is something historical in them, that is intrinsically inexplicable in the domain of modern historiography. Thus for Barth the fundamental reason why one has to cling to the objectivity of the history in the Easter stories is:

Certainly not in order to explain the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a historically indisputable fact. Certainly not to create for faith in the Resurrected a ground in terms of this world which we can demonstrate and therefore control. Certainly not to destroy its character as faith, to transform it into an optional knowledge, which is not moved by any astonishment, which does not demand any contradiction, which does not require any hazard of trust and obedience.  

In other words, what Barth tries to establish with the emphasis on the historical objectivity in the Easter stories is that Jesus’ resurrection is not the basis of faith, but the object of faith.

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509 Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: ... , p. 158.
510 CD, IV/1, p. 351.
Up to this point, we have seen that faith is a prerequisite in Barth’s understanding of Jesus’ resurrection as a non-historical but historical event. We have worked through to the realisation that, for Barth, faith is the total basis for grasping the non-historicality and the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. In so doing, we discovered first that faith is the necessary prerequisite for the understanding of the non-historicality of Jesus’ resurrection in respect of its temporal and ontological dimensions. Then we recognised that faith is inseparably related to Barth’s claim of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical (historisch) event. In this we realised the inseparableness of the relationship between faith and the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection by way of our consideration of the fundamental contradictions Barth’s argument raised from the perspective of modern historiography in three respects: the lack of proper witnesses; the lack of analogy; and the disparagement of the historical (historisch) reliance of the evidential materials in the New Testament. And in particular, while thinking of the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection in relation to its uniqueness, we have seen that faith should also be regarded as the prerequisite for the understanding of his counter-argument against the positivistic historian’s argument against the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. In relation to this we have considered his counter-argument from two perspectives, that is, from the perspective of ‘primal history’ and the perspective of his objection to the ‘finality of the modern worldview’. All that has been considered here is orientated towards a proposition: for Barth, Jesus’ resurrection is an object of faith. Even in the following quotation, where Barth considers Jesus’ resurrection as a Christian and theological ‘axiom’, we cannot but grasp his fideistic arbitrariness for a claim of the resurrection as a basis of faith, which intrinsically results in the fact that the resurrection is an object of faith: “If there is any Christian and theological axiom, it is that Jesus Christ is risen, that He is truly risen. But this is an axiom which no one can invent. It can only be repeated on the basis of the fact that in the enlightening power of the
Holy Spirit it has been previously declared to us as the central statement of the biblical witness.\textsuperscript{511}

Although Barth’s argument for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection seems preposterous and arbitrary from the point of view of modern historiography, the way in which he claims Jesus’ resurrection as a four-dimensional event from the perspective of faith is important for my asking the question of meaning, to which we now turn.

\textit{C. Knowledge, Faith, and the Question of Meaning}

\textit{a. Faith and the Historicity of Jesus’ Resurrection}

In the first two sections of this chapter I have uncovered limitations in the two selected theologians’ arguments for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. First, I considered Pannenberg’s claim that Jesus’ resurrection is verifiable historico-critically. As seen in the first section, Pannenberg did not convince me that Jesus’ resurrection could be a piece of historical (\textit{historisch}) knowledge, and thus become the basis of Christian faith. That is to say, his attempt to verify Jesus’ resurrection as a historical (\textit{historisch}) event is not convincing. As a result, Jesus’ resurrection remains an object of faith in his argument. Then, in the second section I considered the historiographical limitations of Barth’s argument for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. First, I found nothing historical (\textit{historisch}) in his understanding of Jesus’ resurrection as non-historical. In this regard he understands Jesus’ resurrection as something transcending our spatio-temporal dimension, and naturally, therefore, Jesus’ resurrection as a non-historical event cannot be anything but an object of faith. After this, I considered Barth’s claim that Jesus’ resurrection is a historical event. Even here in his argument for the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection I am not convinced that it could be the\textsuperscript{511} \textit{CD}, IV/3, p. 44.
basis of faith, because his logic basically appeals to fideism, not to any scientific or historical-critical methodology. Hence, for Barth, Jesus’ resurrection remains an object of faith from beginning to end.

We cannot grasp the reality of Jesus’ resurrection in any way, except by way of faith. We can approach it neither historico-critically, historico-phenomenologically, epistemologically, nor ontologically. This is our real situation. Whether it is God’s purpose or not, all that is left for us is meagre pieces of reports on the resurrection, which are not good enough to verify the event historico-critically. They are all faith-based; nothing among them can be used as a neutral material for evidence, on the basis of which the positivistic historian or a normal person with common sense can judge of the historical possibility of the event. In the long run, the question, ‘Did Jesus’ resurrection really occur *illie et tunc*?’, can only lie in the realm of faith; there it is to be dealt with by the ‘eye’ of faith, not by the ‘hand’ of the positivistic historian’s reasoning. This is my conclusion from the above study of the views of the two prominent theologians in the 20th century on the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection. As Heinz Zahrt emphasises: “[C]ontemporary theology is absolutely right in stressing so radically that the resurrection of Jesus falls in the realm of faith and is accessible to faith alone.”

Why am I opting for the faith-based approach to the problem of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection? Why am I not so much interested in Pannenberg’s claim of the verifiability of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical (*historisch*) event, as in Barth’s faith-based attitude towards the historicalness of Jesus’ resurrection? These questions are related to my pursuit of an answer to the question of meaning. If Jesus’ resurrection is to be established as a piece of historical knowledge in the way that Pannenberg worked to establish a theological system based upon the historical reality of the resurrection, so firmly established that no one would deny or suspect its facticity, there is then a question about its impact on human existence in

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the midst of suffering. Is this knowledge useful for asking the question of the meaning of human existence studded with suffering, which has persistently existed even since the happening of the pure historical event of the resurrection?

On the other hand, Barth in his ultra-realism claims:

… unlike all other moments that impinge on human consciousness, … it [the resurrection] raises no questions it cannot answer itself. Before it, the future has nothing more to offer. The resurrection has been construed as the summing-up, the timeless instant of recognition, and so as the antithesis of the historically real.513

If Jesus’ resurrection can be thought of as ‘the summing-up, the timeless instant of recognition, and so as the antithesis of the historically real,’ is this not really useful for the attempt to find an answer to the question of the meaning of human existence perpetually gnawed by suffering as ‘the historically real’? For the question of meaning, therefore, Barth’s faith-based approach to the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is more attractive and adequate than Pannenberg’s historico-critical one.

In the next subsection I will consider the relationship between knowledge, faith and the question of meaning within this perspective.

b. Knowledge, Faith and the Question of Meaning

As will be seen in the next chapter, in this thesis the question of meaning is asked in relation to human suffering, especially, to the suffering of minjung, which is representatively depicted by the concept of han. It is undeniable from our empirical and historicophenomenological point of view that human suffering remains perpetual, so long as the

513 Richard R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason; …, p. 48.
human race survives. In the future there will perhaps be nothing like the heartrending suffering of the mother, who had to watch her 8-year-old boy torn to little shreds by her master’s dogs (the reason why the boy had to face this heartless death was that while playing he threw a stone, which hit the leg of his master’s favourite beagle, thus leaving a bruise on it). 514 No one can be sure, however, that there will be no more cases of unjustifiable suffering and death in other forms and situations in the future. It is empirically and historico-

phenomenologically patent that all kinds of unjustifiable suffering of humanity will remain intact until the end of human history. Hence, if the question of meaning is to be directly related to human suffering, we need to pursue an answer to the question, which covers the whole period of time, from the beginning of and to the end of human history.

In this thesis I attempt to find an everlasting answer 515 to the question of the meaning of human suffering in the Christian concept of resurrection, whose historical matrix is Jesus’ resurrection. The justification for this attempt is totally related to the necessity of understanding Jesus’ resurrection as a historical event solely in the perspective of faith, as we have seen above. That is to say, the raison d’être of the question of meaning is not sustained by the historical-critical understanding of Jesus’ resurrection as a sheer historical event, which results in viewing it as a piece of historical knowledge, as in the case of Pannenberg’s attempt, but by the faith-based understanding of it, in which it comes to us as an enigmatic cicatrix.

Let me consider the relationship between knowledge, faith and the question of meaning in a more detailed way. As we saw above in the second chapter, Pannenberg tries to establish Jesus’ resurrection as a historical (historisch) occurrence by way of his historical-critical

514 Cf. F. Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 279.
515 Here the word ‘answer’ is used in the sense that Jesus’ resurrection gives us the ultimate solution to the ‘why’ of human suffering.

\begin{quote}
Knowledge is oriented to the present or to what is already experienced. Faith, however, directs itself to the future, as trust. If the future alone will teach us what finally stands, then the decisive thing in the relation to truth is faith. … Hence the possibility of knowledge as access to what is truly constant is limited, whereas faith ventures beyond this boundary.\footnote{\textit{ST3}, p. 137.}
\end{quote}

If Pannenberg sees faith in these terms, there will be no problem pursuing a solution to the question of the meaning of human suffering on the basis of his concept of faith. In fact, it would be most suitable for us to seek after an answer to the question of the meaning of

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\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{A. Dulles, \textit{The Assurance of Things Hoped for: …}, p. 164.}
\item \footnote{\textit{ST3}, p. 137.}
\end{itemize}
human suffering through future-oriented faith based upon Jesus’ resurrection as a historical knowledge of the past. However, the fallacy here is that, as we saw in the first section of this chapter, Pannenberg fails to convince that Jesus’ resurrection can be historico-critically verified without the help of faith, and in addition to this, as soon as Jesus’ resurrection is thought of as a historical knowledge, it is of no use for the question of meaning, because, as a historical knowledge, it cannot be future-oriented. It therefore cannot cover the future horizon of the perpetual question of the meaning of human suffering. Hence it is inappropriate to consider the question of the meaning of human existence in the midst of suffering from Pannenberg’s viewpoint of the resurrection as a historical event.\footnote{521}

Regarding the question of the meaning of human suffering, Pannenberg’s attempt can be criticised even negatively, as in the following. If there is to be genuine success in Pannenberg’s attempt to establish Jesus’ resurrection as a sheer historical (historisch) event in the sense proper, and the resurrection is to play a pivotal role in pursuing an answer to the question of the meaning of human suffering, there is no more need for us to ask the question, because we already have the certitude for the answer to it. Why do we need to keep asking the question, if we have already found an answer to it in faith in the resurrection as a historical knowledge? Then, of what use is it for us to have faith, since all we have to do is to acknowledge the resurrection as a historical knowledge? As Avery Dulles points out:

\footnote{521} Someone may claim that the question of meaning can be pursued within the purview of Pannenberg’s equal emphasis on both the historical facticity of the resurrection and its ‘proleptic’ character. Certainly for Pannenberg “the resurrection is at once an event in history and the eschatological salvation-event, a past event and one that remains before us as our ultimate future.” (C. Mostert, God and the Future: Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Eschatological Doctrine of God [London and New York: T & T Clark, 2002], p. 51.) Whenever this future-oriented proleptic character of the resurrection is emphasised, it can be said that the truth of the resurrection “is accessible now only by trusting anticipation of the still-outstanding proof, and that means precisely, by faith.” (W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 2, trans. G. H. Kehm [London: SCM Press, 1971], p. 7.) It is not problematic to pursue the question of meaning within this view of his, because the proleptic character of the resurrection is based upon faith, and the truth of faith can be ultimately verified at the end of time. The problem is with his view that the historical facticity of the resurrection should be equally emphasised to the extent that it can be historical-critically verified, by which he is led to the proposition: ‘first knowledge, then faith’. Within this view, as mentioned above, the question of meaning cannot live any longer.
By knowledge we would be assured of God’s mighty acts in history, including his raising of Jesus from the dead. Then by faith we would respond by entrusting our lives to the God who had thus demonstrated his power and his purpose for the world. In this view faith would not be cognitive. While resting on a cognitive basis, it would itself be purely fiducial.  

In this case, must we not say that Pannenberg’s attempt to find a basis for faith in knowledge is detrimental to both faith and preaching? As Heinz Zahrt critiqued: “By his ‘hypostatisation of historical knowledge’ Pannenberg damages both faith and preaching. Preaching becomes a ‘vehicle of publication’, information about something that has been, but about which I have no clear idea what it ought to be for me. Faith accordingly becomes ‘something on the side’, a mere appendage of historical knowledge.” If faith is ‘a mere appendage of historical knowledge’, why do we not acknowledge that we are totally free from the epistemological-ontological limitations intrinsically existing in our being, on account of which whatever is related to our concern about God is to be dealt with in the language of religion, not in the language of science? Why do we still need religions? Here we have to agree with Klaus Bockmuehl, who points out: “We must concede that there cannot be a direct knowledge of the reality of God. If there were, God’s reality would be demonstrable beyond doubt and faith would not be needed as man’s own commitment and decision.”  

In Barth we see the reversed order of Pannenberg’s proposition: ‘first knowledge, then faith’. Barth views faith first and foremost as ‘acknowledgment’. For him the ‘recognition’ as knowledge follows the ‘acknowledgment’ as ‘the free act of obedience’. As he points out:

Cf. CD, IV/1, pp. 758ff.
The recognition is certainly included in the acknowledgment, but it can only follow it. Acknowledging is a taking cognisance which is obedient and compliant, which yields and subordinates itself. This obedience and compliance is not an incidental and subsequent characteristic of the act of faith, but primary, basic and decisive. It is not preceded by any other kind of knowledge, either recognition or confession. The recognition and confession of faith are included in and follow from the fact that they are originally and properly an acknowledgment, the free act of obedience.\footnote{526}

In this perspective, for Barth faith as ‘the free act of obedience’ comes first, then comes knowledge as ‘recognition’.\footnote{527}

When we regard the basis of faith as ‘the free act of obedience’ and not as a historical-critically verifiable knowledge, we come to construct a realm of faith in the proper sense, in which we can “affirm ultimate realities beyond the merely empirical: e.g., the triune God and the risen Jesus.”\footnote{528} In faith as the free act of obedience we can encounter the true Jesus in his eternal being, that is, “the ‘real Jesus,’ the only Jesus existing and living now, [who] is the risen Lord, to whom access is given only through faith.”\footnote{529} Only in and through this risen Jesus we can find a genuine possibility for answering the question of the meaning of human suffering. Hence faith as the free act of obedience is the sine qua non for the pursuit of the question of the meaning of human suffering, because in it we can grasp Jesus’ resurrection.

\footnote{526}{\sl ibid.}, p. 758.\footnote{527} Pannenberg argues against this proposition by Barth, thus asking:

But can we acknowledge a thing without first having knowledge of it? ... But did Paul define faith as blind obedience to the apostolic authority of the gospel? ... But should we not view faith, not as blind obedience to proclamation’s claim to authority, but as an understanding obedience to the truth, an understanding not merely of our own possibilities of existence, but of the reality we encounter in them, an obedience to the truth that comes through knowledge of the content of proclamation and acceptance of it? (\textit{STJ}, pp. 151-2; author’s emphasis.)

Perhaps there seems to be a plausibility in Pannenberg’s counter-argument against Barth’s in respect of the general, comprehensive perspective of faith. So long as we are concerned about ‘faith in Jesus’ resurrection’, however, we cannot make a claim of viewing faith as ‘an obedience to the truth that comes through knowledge of the content of proclamation and acceptance of it’, because the ‘content’ proclaimed by Jesus’ resurrection cannot be grasped as knowledge by our intellectual power, but as an object of faith itself, which means that we cannot but accept it only through our ‘free act of obedience’.

“more as a scandal of faith than as a reason for faith, ... more [as] an object of faith (what is to be believed) than [as] a ground of faith (the basis or proof of what is to be believed).” \textsuperscript{530} In conclusion, when we understand Jesus’ resurrection as an object of faith, not as a ground of faith, we can place it on the horizon of the question of the meaning of human suffering, where it emerges as the only possible and fundamental answer to the question.

Until now, throughout the first three chapters I have focused my efforts on the aporia of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection within the views of Barth and Pannenberg. By criticising their views on this aporia, I have tried to establish Jesus’ resurrection as an enigmatic cicatrix in human history, which is to be thought of as the only fundamental answer to the question of the meaning of human suffering. This means: Jesus’ resurrection is only an object of faith, and thus should be grasped only from the perspective of faith; it is the only flickering clue in human history for pursuing a fundamental solution to the question of the meaning of human suffering, so long as this faith is sustained.

Someone in accord with Pannenberg’s view of faith may attack my view of faith, especially with regard to Jesus’ resurrection. Perhaps, as Pannenberg asserts, without claiming any certitude of the reality of God’s revelation in Jesus, especially of the event of the resurrection, “faith would be blind gullibility, credulity, or even superstition.” \textsuperscript{531} Perhaps a Pannenberg may criticise that my view of faith “as pure risk would be blind credulity.” \textsuperscript{532} However, any religious truth-claim is based on a venture of faith, and on nothing other than this. This is true from the perspective of the epistemological-ontological limitations intrinsically contained in human existence. In particular, the truth-claim of Jesus’ resurrection should be sought only through a venture of faith, because faith is the \textit{sine qua non} of our access to its reality. Hence anyone who tries to find a clue to the solution to the question,

\textsuperscript{530} F. S. Fiorenza, \textit{Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{531} \textit{TalH}, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{532} \textit{FaK}, p. 65.
‘why do people suffer?’ in the resurrection, should do so precisely by a venture of faith, and only in the venture of faith. Even though we have to expand the horizon of ‘what is possible’ to the extent that the resurrection is to be intrinsically included in it, and so the resurrection can be thought of as ‘logically possible’, we still need our venture of faith for an access to the horizon. Eventually, we encounter the resurrection as the only answer to the question of ultimate meaning for all phenomena in the very venture of faith.

Bearing this in mind, I now turn to the next chapter, in which I will ask the question of the meaning of human suffering in relation to the concept of han, a concept that has existed typically in the psyche of Korean minjung. There han is viewed as a paragon of human suffering, which has been built up over a very long time in the history of Korean minjung.

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CHAPTER IV. HAN AND THE QUESTION OF MEANING

Why do we suffer? Why must human beings suffer? Especially, why must the minjung suffer? Why must the minjung be oppressed and manipulated socio-politically, economically and systematically to such dire extent? Why must they suffer so helplessly from the inauspicious structural power of evil in history? Examples abound: the Korean minjung exploited under the Japanese imperialism for 35 years and the Jewish people cruelly massacred in the Holocaust in the first half of the 20th century; so many innocent people unjustifiably killed in the gruesome battles in the divided Korea and Vietnam in the second half of the 20th century.

For me the question of meaning begins with the question of this why of the minjung’s suffering. In other words, the ineluctable suffering and death of the minjung in human history mixed together with the insuperable power of evil is the fundamental historico-phenomenological horizon on which the question of the meaning of human existence cannot but and must inevitably be asked, and only on which its true raison d’être can be found.

I would like to put aside for the moment any Christian-theological attempt to solve the aporia of the why of the minjung’s suffering here. My consideration of that will be done with the consideration of evil in the next chapter. Here in this chapter I will consider han—the most painful mentality that the Korean minjung have accumulated through their inescapable and insurmountable suffering throughout the whole Korean history—as a motive for the question of meaning. In considering han, I will deal first with a historico-phenomenological approach to the process of the formation of han as

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534 Concisely speaking, a person among minjung is a ‘living container’ of han, that is, the subject of han. As I mentioned earlier in the ‘Introduction,’ my definition of minjung comes later in the next chapter, due to the typical progress of my thesis. For the detailed definition of minjung, see below, Chapter V, Section C-a: “Definitions of Minjung”.

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has occurred in Korean history. Secondly, on the basis of this, I will try to conceptualise han. Then I will reflect on han as a motive for the question of meaning.

A. A Historico-phenomenological Approach to Han: On a Historical Process of the Formation of Han

a. A Consideration of the Origin of Han

What is to be considered as the origin of han? What is to be thought of as the starting point of han in the prehistoric period? How did han begin to be formed in the mentalities of primitive tribal people?

In order to find out the origin of han we need to consider the Asian nomadic tribes’ migration from the central Asian area to the areas of the Far East in ancient times. One representative characteristic of nomadic tribes is their barbarian will to fight. During their migration there were likely severe fights between tribes and tribes. Stronger tribes would have won the fights, thus having occupied fertile lands. Weaker tribes would have had to go further so that they could find other pastures. Although they started their new lives there in the newly found meadows, nevertheless they would have felt nostalgia for their lost lands of olden days, thus dreaming of a homecoming. This feeling would inevitably cause hostility against their enemies. This hostility would naturally lead them to the thought that they should take revenge on their enemies. We see the primordial form of han in this strong hostility which leads to revenge.535

Through the long period of those ancient times many nomadic tribes may have kept moving from the central Asia through Siberia and Manchuria to the Korean Peninsula. The descendants of some of those tribes could have established the neolithic civilisation in the Korean Peninsula. It seems that those neolithic people had already begun to reside in the peninsula in about 4000 B.C., and spread themselves all over the peninsula by 3000 B.C., thus having vigorously enjoyed their own social lives.  

The basic unit of the neolithic people’s social structure was the clan society. This may mean that they could have generally enjoyed peaceful lives within their clan society, while they might have ferociously fought against the people of other clan societies, when things had gone wrong between them. Considering their society as a matriarchal one and the basic form of their belief as shamanism, the female shaman and the representative elders of the clan would have had the most powerful influence on their people. When they were defeated by other clans, they, being full of han as rancour, would have sworn revenge on their enemies before their shaman and representatives.

The neolithic people had earlier lived on fishing, hunting and collecting fruits, but later started to till for food. Tillage definitely needed men’s labour, and it can be inferred that with the beginning of tillage the matriarchal society had changed to the patriarchal one. With this transition of the nomadic, matriarchal society to the agricultural, patriarchal one the ferocity of han as rancour against enemies seems to have weakened. It can be supposed that the main subject of the fierceness of han as rancour was the matriarch together with the female shaman in the matriarchal society.

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537 Cf. ibid., p. 15.
538 Cf. ibid., pp. 16ff.
539 Cf. ibid., p. 13.
When these heroines were feminised in the patriarchal society, the masculinity of their han as rancour became naturally transformed into the femininity of their han as deploration. Hence han should be understood as a blending of han as rancour and han as deploration. 540

b. The Historical Process of the Formation of Han as Deploration

While han as rancour has been established as a volitional emotion common to the Chinese, Korean and Japanese peoples throughout their whole history, han as deploration is to be found only in the Korean people’s mentality. 541 For the Chinese people, with the influence of Confucian realism, the only solution of han as rancour has been in its seeking vengeance. 542 Likewise, the Japanese people has sought a solution of han as rancour in taking vengeance by sword, 543 the basis of its bellicosity throughout the whole of Japanese history. The Korean people has also borne han as rancour in mind, but marginally. Throughout the whole Korean history han as rancour has been replaced by han as deploration in the mentalities of the Korean minjung. More accurately, through a very long lapse of time han as deploration has emerged in the Korean minjung’s minds, while han as rancour has submerged into their subconsciouness. Hence we can say that “[I]t is very han [as deploration] is the most Korean sentiment of sadness.” 544 Why has this come to happen only to the Korean minjung? What has made han as deploration unique to the Korean minjung? 545

541 Cf. Soon-Tae Moon, “Hanirang Maeosin-ga? [What is Han?]” in David Kwang-Sun Suh, ed., Stories about Han, pp. 146ff. Han as rancour should be called won, and han as deploration, tan. For this cf. the next sub-section.
544 Ibid., p. 146. (my translation)
545 By the view of han as unique to the Korean people I do not mean that han has lived and been accumulated only in the Korean minjung’s psyches. Nationally speaking, it is right. Individually or
With regard to the process by which han was formed into han as deploration in Korean history, we should first mention its double-structural causes: the international ones and the domestic ones. For the former we can say the following. From the beginning of Korean history, the Korean people had been many times harried by the Chinese (and later, by the Mongolian and the Japanese) people; nevertheless, it has tenaciously kept its unique nationality throughout its history scattered with the bleak and dire aftermaths of invasions by voracious neighbour nations. The experience of living with this tenacious will to survival as a nation has caused the Korean people to be gripped with a ‘consciousness of crisis’, which has become its very ‘historical consciousness’; this experience, together with its unavoidable and humiliating dependence upon the insurmountable outer powers as the reverse side of the experience, might be said to have made a good contribution to the formation of han as deploration in the mentalities of the Korean minjung.\textsuperscript{546} What is more, for the minjung, it has also suffered immensely from the domestic anti-national deeds of oppression by their rulers.\textsuperscript{547} That is, there are double-structural causes of the formation of han as deploration. Let us consider these in details of what has happened in Korean history.\textsuperscript{548}

1) The International Causes of the Formation of Han

collectively speaking, however, han has existed in the minds of lower, poor people under unjustifiable oppression all over the world throughout the whole human history. Hence my claim of han’s uniqueness to the Korean people does not exclude the universality of han in the psyches of the oppressed in the whole human history.

\textsuperscript{546} Cf. Eun Koh, “For Overcoming Han,” p. 28.

\textsuperscript{547} Cf. ibid.

\textsuperscript{548} Someone may criticise the following anecdotal descriptions of han’s causes throughout the whole Korean history as redundant. Nevertheless, they are needed for the conceptualisation of han, because one of the remarkable characteristics of the causes of the formation of han is repetition, in which han has been deepened and accumulated in the minjung mentality. Moreover, I think that these are needed for my establishing an antithesis to the two selected western theologians’ idealistic Christian views of history, as will be argued in the next chapter.
The accumulation of han as deploration in the minjung’s mentality had been well contributed to by numerous invasions upon the Korean Peninsula by foreign powers throughout the whole of Korean history. Already in 108 B.C. the Han Dynasty of China had ruined the Korean dynasty called Wissi-Chosun, and set up four colonised territories in the northern half of the peninsula. The Korean people resisted the colonisers for hundreds of years to try and rout them out.⁵⁴⁹ Although the Chinese colonisers did not exert strength to establish a politically rigid relationship between them and the Korean people, they did frequently commit economically malevolent deeds, such as larceny.⁵⁵⁰ Korean people had lived their lives peacefully, leaving their goods as they stood. It is likely there were no fences between their houses. When the Chinese colonisers saw the goods of Korean people left out, they stole them at night. Provoked by this, Korean people began to pay heed to their own goods. With this the provisions of their law had to be added to.⁵⁵¹ It is easy to imagine that during this period of colonisation many unjustifiable things would have happened to the Korean people, by which many people were inevitably reduced to the lower classes of the society, i.e., the minjung. Under these circumstances the minjung in the colonies could not help being oppressed severely by the colonisers, their lives made abject.

After the collapse of the Wissi-Chosun Dynasty, the Three-Dynasties Era was established in the Korean Peninsula. In this era the three dynasties called Kokuryo, Paikje and Silla ruled the Korean people for several hundred years. Kokuryo was located in the northern part of the peninsula and the other two dynasties in its southern part. Considering their locations, it could easily be thought that, while Paikje and Silla might be protected from invasions by the Chinese people, Kokuryo from the outset would have had to struggle against the coeval Chinese dynasties. To be sure, there

⁵⁴⁹ Cf. Gi-Baek Lee, HS, pp. 32-3.
⁵⁵⁰ Cf. ibid., pp. 33-4.
⁵⁵¹ Cf. ibid.
were persistent conflicts between Kokuryo and its coeval Chinese dynasties. One of the worst battles occurred in 244 A.D., when the capital of Kokuryo fell to the Chinese invaders.\footnote{Cf. ibid., p. 61.} In the next year Kokuryo was again invaded by the Chinese and the king had to be evacuated to the remote district near the East Sea.\footnote{Cf. ibid.} Almost a century later, another severe and dire war occurred between them (342 A.D.). During the war “the king’s palace was set on fire, the tomb of the king’s late father was excavated, and 50,000 men and women including the king’s mother were brought to China as captives.”\footnote{Cf. ibid.} It can easily be imagined that many people of the \textit{minjung} suffered severely from the invaders’ atrocities at this time, given that the king’s fate was like a candle flickering in the wind and even the king’s mother was captured and taken to the enemy’s land. Many \textit{minjung} people who survived would have had to gulp down their \textit{han}-ridden tears in order to keep living their bleak lives, imporing the Heaven to deliver them from the dismal situation.

Despite undergoing these worst battles as mentioned above, Kokuryo defended itself well from frequent Chinese invasions, especially from the invasions by Sui and Tang dynasties. Therefore, for a considerable period of time, Kokuryo had played an important role in protecting the two dynasties in the southern part of the Korean peninsula.\footnote{Ibid (my translation)} While Kokuryo had had to keep fighting against the Chinese dynasties, it and the two dynasties in the peninsula came into conflict with one another. Eventually, the united army of Silla and Tang dynasties conquered first Paikje in 660, then Kokuryo in 668. Then Silla fought against Tang in order to expel Tang’s military power from the peninsula, thus establishing itself as the Unified \textit{Silla} Dynasty in the peninsula. During this process of \textit{Silla}’s unification of the peninsula many defeated

\footnote{Cf. ibid., pp. 63-4.}
people (especially from the south-western Paikje area) were reduced to the slave-
minjung and were filled with han as deploration.\textsuperscript{556}

For a considerable while there had been the peaceful coexistence between Tang
Dynasty and the Unified Silla and Po Hai Dynasty established on the ‘stumps’ of the
ruined Kokuryo in the far northern part of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria.
During these peaceable times, however, Tang’s voracious pirates haunted the coastal
areas of the peninsula for pillage. In particular, they captured many of the meek,
peace-loving Korean minjung in order to sell them into slavery in Tang’s territory.\textsuperscript{557}

In the tenth century the Unified Silla Dynasty was replaced by Koryo Dynasty (936
A.D.). From the beginning this dynasty suffered from the invasions by the Kitan.
There were three large-scale invasions by the Tungusic people in Manchuria in 993,
1010 and 1018 A.D. Koryo protected itself from the first invasion by the diplomatic
efforts of Hui Seo, who was Koryo’s diplomat with talent at that time. But the second
invasion was bleak and dire for the Korean minjung, because the capital of Koryo fell
to the invaders and the king had to be evacuated to a town in the southern part of the
peninsula. However, Koryo attained great victory over the invaders on their third
invasion.\textsuperscript{558} Although, after the third one, these invasions resulted in a peaceful
relationship between the two countries, the Korean minjung would have suffered
severely from being plundered during the invasions, especially during the second one.

One of the most horrendous and dismal invasions of Korea in her history occurred
in the 13\textsuperscript{th} century. It was the invasion by the Mongols. From 1231 A.D. to 1259 the

\textsuperscript{556} After their having conquered the two nations in the peninsula, the nobles of the Unified Silla
Dynasty made the captives from the conquered dynasties their slaves. Especially, they put the people of
the devastated regions having revolted against them in hyang, so, or bogok (which were the restricted
districts especially for the residence of the slave-minjung), thus making them belonging to the lowest
class of the society. (Cf. Gi-Baek Lee, HS, p. 95.) Individually, nobles and bureaucrats owned many
slaves. We are told that the prime minister owned 3000 slaves. (Cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 96ff.) All these outsiders
of the society had come to belong to the miserable minjung classes, through which han as deploration
had been bequeathed from generation to generation.

\textsuperscript{557} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 117-8.

\textsuperscript{558} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 152-3.
nomadic people invaded the Korean peninsula 6 times. During this period the invaders had committed many brutalities. We are told about some by Koryosa (The Official Records of the History of Koryo): “The Mongols invaded a castle to massacre the officials and their people and to set fire to all the houses in the castle, thus killing even fowls and dogs” (Koryosa, vol. 23, November of the 18th year of King Gojong’s reign); “The Mongols arrived at Yeseong River and set the houses on fire, thus massacring numerous people” (ibid.); “Wherever the Mongols passed by, there was nowhere to be protected from their destruction and massacre” (ibid.). These are some records of the bleak and dire situations occurred in their first invasion (1231-2). The nastiest of the Mongols’ atrocities occurred in their 6th invasion (1254-9), as has recorded in Koryosa: “No less than 206, 800 of men and women were captured by the Mongols, numerous people were massacred, and all the districts and areas they passed by were burnt down to ashes; since the start of the Mongols’ first invasion, there had been no such precedent” (Koryosa, vol. 24. December of the 41st year of the King Gojong’s reign). Indeed, Koryo’s whole population was reduced, and all the agricultural districts in the peninsula were totally devastated. Facing grisly situations in which all sorts of savageries were committed by the invaders and nothing edible was left for the invaded people, what could the minjung do for their innocent children with tear-stained faces and their hoarse, weary crying? What else could they do except hug them and die together in resignation? What could be imagined as more gruesome, gloomier and more hopeless than this for the minjung at that time?

561 Cf. Gi-Baek Lee, HS, p. 181.
For a century following its surrender at the end of the Mongols’ sixth invasion (1259), Koryo was inevitably reduced to one of the many colonised countries by Yüan, the Mongols’ dynasty. During this period the Koryo’s minjung must have been utterly exhausted by the heavy economic burden of the conquerors’ unreasonable demands. Those unreasonable demands were carried out by the members of the Koryo’s ruling classes, who had been totally manipulated by the Mongols since the Koryo’s surrender. Koryo’s minjung had to provide the Yüan’s resident armies in Koryo with all kinds of goods required by them, which made the minjung’s life extremely impoverished. In particular, the minjung suffered from being exploited to the exhaustion of their resources by the Mongols, who, after Koryo was subjugated, tried to conquer Japan by using Koryo’s personnel and material. Chungji, a Confucian-Buddhist monk at that time, gave realistic expressions to the minjung’s suffering in the following poem:

About the bitter situations in the south-eastern part [of the peninsula]
I’d like to tell, but tears come to my eyes first.
Military provisions are being prepared in the two provinces;
Battleships are being made in the three mountains.
Corvée for the expedition [of Japan] has been centupled,
Having been imposed on for three years.
...
There are neither arms without pinions;
Nor backs without welts.
Greeting and seeing off have been wonted;

Goods are being transported day and night.  
All the backs of cattle and horses have been blistered;  
There is no time for the innin’s [= minjung’s] shoulders to repose.  
...  
Wives and children sit down with a pump on the ground to weep;  
All the parents wail, exclaiming to Heaven.  
...  
It is only the old and the very young that have been left;  
What a weary life are they eking out!  
Half of the people in every village have absconded;  
All the tillage around every village has been devastated.  
There are neither houses not rummaged;  
Nor places not disturbed.  
...  
The minjung’s suffering is increasing day by day;  
How can they convalesce from their fatigue and illness?  
With bitterness they have to put up with everything encountered;  
How miserable life is, indeed! 565

Through this poem and others by Chungji we can grasp how severely the Koryo’s minjung suffered from the oppressions both of its outer conquerors and inner rulers.  
To make things worse, the Koryo’s minjung, who resided in the coastal areas, suffered from being plundered by voracious Japanese pirates, whose invasions of Koryo were culminated soon after Koryo gained freedom from the century-long subjugation by the Mongols (after 1350), 566 which functioned as a momentum for the fall of the Koryo


dynasty in 1392. In and through the vortices of those historical ordeals han as deploration became deep-rooted in the Korean minjung mentality.

Another horrendous and brutal invasion of Korea was made by Japanese militarists in the 16th century. In 1592 Japanese militarists launched an all-out attack on the dynasty in the peninsula at that time, Chosun. Chosun’s ineffectual and insufficient army could not defend its country against the rapacious Japanese army of almost two hundred thousand soldiers, including navy personnel, armed with efficient rifles. Seoul, the capital of the dynasty, soon fell to the invaders, before which the king and his subjects had to take refuge in the far northern area of the peninsula. Their fate was like a flickering candlelight in the wind when the requested reinforcements from the Chinese Ming Dynasty came and formed a united army for a counterattack. The united army made its counterattack on the invaders and, like a stroke of good luck in the midst of misfortune, the Chosun’s navy under the leadership of Admiral Soon Shin Yi, one of the real heroes of the war, remarkably defeated the Japanese counterpart in the sea from the outset of the war. While this was happening, the Korean minjung including the Buddhist monks, who had realised the real danger of the total devastation of its country, began to establish volunteer armies all over the country to fight back against the invaders. The combined effect was to bring a stalemate to the war. A negotiated peace between the two foreign countries was made for about 5 years, after which there was a rupture. With the rupture the Japanese


569 Cf. ibid., pp. 302-311.

570 Cf. ibid., pp. 313 ff.
militarists reinvaded the miserable country in 1596. Fortunately, the sudden death of the head of the militarists in Japan made the invaders retreat, and the war actually came to an end with the lamentable death of the admiral Yi, one of the real heroes of the war, at the last battlefield in the southern sea in 1598.\textsuperscript{571}

Indeed, this unjustifiable marauding war was more tragic and cruel than the Mongols’ invasions three and a half centuries ago. During the seven years the raiders killed or captured many innocent people all over the country, looting everything valuable, putting into blazes every village in their path. We get a vivid picture of the bleak and dire situation at that time through a record by a Japanese Buddhist monk, who had participated in the re-invasion as a member of the medical staff: “In human history there is nothing gloomier than this war. Wherever the Japanese soldiers passed, there were massacres and blazes; every village was filled with volumes of smoke. They cut off Chosun people’s heads and noses, so much blood from which fell to the ground like raining. They filled their bamboo baskets with those cut heads and noses; with their gory baskets tied on their waists they kept fighting.”\textsuperscript{572}

In particular, two of the marauders’ brutalities should be mentioned. One is their ear-cutting (in their first invasion) and nose-cutting (in their re-invasion). The marauders’ ear- and nose-cutting was ordered by the head of the militarists for the sake of counting Chosun’s dead people. Especially from the start of their re-invasion the head of the warmongers ordered the marauders to cut off Chosun people’s noses to bring them to him. They did it at random, regardless of whether the person whose nose was cut off was alive or dead. According to the record of the above-mentioned

\textsuperscript{571} Cf. ibid., pp. 316ff.
\textsuperscript{572} Geinen, Diary of the Days in Chosun. Quoted by Moon-Gil Kim in idem, Injinsaeraeneun Munhwajeonjoaengida: Ppaeakkin Munhwayonsameul Chejaseo [The War in 1592 is a War of Culture: In Search of the Looted Cultural Inheritances] (Seoul: Doseochulpan Hyeam, 1995), p. 3. (my translation)
Japanese Buddhist monk, some Japanese soldiers broke into a house where a mother and her less-than-a-week-old baby had lain, and cut off the nose of the baby as well as the mother. Furthermore, we are told from the diary of the Japanese monk that “after killing Chosun people, [the Japanese intruders] cut off their ears and noses, the blood from which had soaked into the ground … there the whole area was full of crying by the bloodstained children, whose ears and noses had been cut off.” Han as depletion is deep-rooted in this kind of ‘crying by the bloodstained children’ in the history of the Korean minjung.

The other brutality is the marauders’ haphazard capturing of Chosun people to bring to Japan. These rapacious invaders really enjoyed hunting humans for slaves. They randomly captured Chosun people regardless of their ages to bring to Japan for enslaving or selling to slave dealers, as we are told from the official records by the historians under the then king at that time, Seonjo: “They captured all people who could walk regardless of their ages and genders, and killed those who could not walk; all the captured were sent to Japan.” There are records by some of the captives, which tell us about the agonising cries from the Chosun men and women who had been captured, and imprisoned in the Japanese boats gathered at a harbour in the Southern Sea to leave for Japan. Most of the captives to be brought to Japan estimated at 100,000 lived their servile lives there, or even worse, were sold to the Portuguese slave dealers, who had brought them to the countries in Southeast Asia or

573 Cf. Moon-Gil Kim, The War in 1592 is a War of Culture, p. 60.
574 Geinen, Diary of the Days in Chosun. Quoted by Moon-Gil Kim in *idem*, The War in 1592 is a War of Culture, p. 98.
to India for their slave trade.\textsuperscript{578} Fortunately, some of the captives taken to Japan came home later due to Chosun’s diplomatic efforts,\textsuperscript{579} but most of them were forced to live until the last moments of their lives bleak and dire slavish lives in Japan or in other countries.\textsuperscript{580}

Indeed, the war totally devastated the whole Chosun land. To make matters worse, it was accompanied by famines and diseases.\textsuperscript{581} Owing to a long drought, crops had failed, and many people died of starvation.\textsuperscript{582} Here and there cannibalism was rife.\textsuperscript{583} There were killings even between ‘fathers and sons’ and ‘husbands and wives’ for cannibalism.\textsuperscript{584} What can we say about those bleak and dire realities except that those ugly things belong to the domain of evil from the absolute nothingness? Through this war the evil power executed total destruction, using and manipulating the Japanese militarists, a power so irresistible that surviving Korean minjung could do nothing but inter the gory corpses and the corpses dead of hunger and diseases, and simultaneously engrave han as deploration deeply in their mentalities.

Before fully recovering from the losses by this dire destruction, the Chosun minjung suffered from another series of invasions, this time by soldiers of the Ch’ing Dynasty in China (1627 and 1636). With no remaining energy to fight back against them, the Chosun Dynasty hastily sought to conclude a peace treaty, which resulted in a humiliating treaty in which Chosun had to serve the Ch’ing Dynasty in the king-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Cf. ibid., pp. 14ff.
\item Cf. ibid., pp. 24ff.
\item Cf. ibid., pp. 37-8.
\item Cf. ibid., p. 162.
\item Cf. Yeol-Gyu Kim, Han-maeck Won-lyu: Hankuk Ma-eumui Eungeoriwa Maetchim [The Veins of Han and the Streams of Won: The Induration and Snouldering in the Korean People’s Mind] (Seoul: Juwu, 1981), p. 258. (hereafter, HmWt)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
subject relationship for many years.\textsuperscript{585} Although that war had not been so severe as the earlier Japanese invasions, owing to its localisation and shortness and to the hasty conclusion of the humiliating peace treaty, the north-western part of the peninsula was devastated by the invaders’ pillaging and massacring.\textsuperscript{586} The Chosun government had to carry the burden of various kinds of tributes including the offerings of virgins\textsuperscript{587} for many years.\textsuperscript{588} As a result, unavoidably the Chosun minjung were severely exploited. When could the Korean minjung take a rest and know some comfort in this whole history of incessant turbulence? There was no rest or comfort; only han as deploration was accumulated into their deep mentalities.

At the threshold of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the descendants of the han-ridden Chosun minjung encountered another severe ordeal at the hands of an outer power. Japanese imperialists usurped the Chosun’s right of diplomacy in 1905, and then its sovereignty in 1910, thus colonising the whole Korean Peninsula. From that time the Korean


\textsuperscript{586} Cf. Gi-Baek Lee, HS, p. 257.

\textsuperscript{587} For a long, long time the Korean people had had to carry out the dreadful onus of the offering of virgins as a tribute to the powerful Chinese dynasties. Needless to say that many daughters of the Koryo’s minjung had had to be brought to the Mongols’ territory as a kind of tribute after the colonisation in the 13\textsuperscript{th} century (cf. Hyeon-Hui Lee and Won-Young Gong, Hankukmunhwa Yeoksa [Korean Culture and History] [Seoul: Hyeongseolchulpansa, 1993], p. 151 [hereafter, KCH]), from the outset of the establishment of the Chosun Dynasty many of the Chosun minjung’s daughters had had to be put to the bitter ordeal of ‘being offered as tribute’ According to the official records under the reign of Taegong, the Chosun’s third king, “the Ming’s envoy is leaving home with virgins and other people; the road is full of the bitter sound of wailing by the virgins’ parents and relatives.” (Taegong Sillok [The Official Records of Taegong], vol. 15, November of the 8\textsuperscript{th} Year of the Reign of Taegong; quoted by Yeol-Gyu Kim in idem, HnHl, p. 269.) In order to avoid being selected as a jaheomyeo (offered-virgin), many daughters of the minjung deliberately injured themselves, or ran away to hide themselves. (Cf. ibid., pp. 260-70.) After Chosun’s capitulation to Ch’ing, the Ch’ing Dynasty had required the same thing, by which many of the Chosun minjung’s daughters had had to suffer from the same dire ordeal. (Cf. ibid., p. 270.) Needless to say, the minjung’s han as deploration had been ineluctably deepened by these crucibles, which tragically occurred again under the name of ‘jeongsindae’ (the whole group of drafted women for corvee including coercively working as ‘comfort’ girls for the Japanese soldiers) in the period of Japanese colonisation of Korea in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

minjung were under Japanese control for 35 years until their unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945.

During the colonisation by the imperialists the Korean minjung were severely exploited in many respects, especially economically. By the late 1920s most mining and industrial rights fell into the possession of Japanese conglomerates.\(^{589}\) Their plundering of Korean gold and placer gold is well known to have culminated in the 1930s.\(^{590}\) Big trees in high mountain areas were hewed down for timber, and the total amount of catch of Korean fishermen was surpassed by the total amount of catch of the Japanese fisherman emigrants.\(^{591}\) Needless to say, most of the Korean workers, miners, and fishermen during that time had to live their bleak and dire lives loaded with han as deploration.

Above all, farmers, who formed the majority of the Korean population at that time, suffered from the plundering of their farmlands by the Japanese government-general in Korea, which possessed 40% of the total farmland of Korea by the year 1930.\(^{592}\) The farmlands owned by the Japanese government-general were sold ‘dirt-cheap’ to big Japanese farm companies or to individual farming immigrants from Japan, who could build their own big plantations under the aegis of the government-general. As a result, most (almost 80%) of the Korean farmers were reduced to poor peasantry or tenant farming loaded with debts.\(^{593}\) The Dong-A Daily outlined the reality of the tenant farmers’ situation at that time in an editorial: “Chosun rural communities have been attacked on both sides—year after year small independent farmers have been reduced to ruin [tenant farming]; nowadays, … to the landowners amounting to 20% of the whole farmers at most … it has become customary that the tenant farmers

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590 Cf. ibid., p. 4.
593 Cf. Hyeon-Hui Lee and Won-Young Gong, KCH, p. 516.

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should pay more than a half of their products as farm rent; besides, they have more to pay for land tax, fertiliser, use of irrigation facilities, freight, etc., which will result in zero incomes.\textsuperscript{594}

This bleak and dire situation ineluctably devastated whole rural areas. Many tenant farmers were threatened with starvation, and the only way out for them was to leave their hometowns to go in urban areas or to emigrate abroad. That is why almost 300,000 people emigrated to Manchuria and the Russian areas including Siberia between 1910 and 1925; in particular, 150,000 farmers left their hometowns only in 1923.\textsuperscript{595} The following poem, which was composed by a poet who experienced the bleakness of that time, depicts well the dejection of the homes of those who left their hometowns. It represents the agony and gloominess in the han-ridden mentalities of the homeless minjung at that time:

...  
Hearing the story about the monk with a bamboo hat  
And the frightening legend, and in poverty  
My friend grew up fidgeting all the time.  
Whenever comes a night when his father with the donkey doesn’t come home,  
The yellow cat cries over and over again,  
And no one can hence sleep,  
At a corner of the mill where his mother works hard  
My friend  
Fostered his dream of acorn.  

One night  
In the year when he was nine years old  
In the winter when hounds run after pheasants


Seven members of the family who lived in this house
Vanished to nowhere, and the next morning
Their footprints heading towards the north were shivering on the snow.

Some of the aged neighbours guessed they had gone to the barbarian land
[Manchuria],
Some others did they had gone to Russia.
All of them
Made a horrendous guess at the place they had gone to.

Now no one lives in the house, the timeworn house
All the villagers regard with aversion as a house of ill omen.
Once there were trees bearing fruit from season to season,
There was a tree bearing appetising apricots.
But there is only a stump of the apricot tree now,
There are hence no bees buzzing in the backyard
Regardless of the coming and going of the blossoming season.\footnote{596}

The family’s flight by night, leaving their footprints ‘shivering on the snow,’ silently tells us about the destitution of the Korean minjung at that time. That is to say, the family is a representative of the whole Korean minjung sacrificed by the intolerable destitution, and the timeworn house is an emblem of a mutilated world where a national community has crumbled.\footnote{597} The minjung under these circumstances could not help engraving han as deploration on their minds, ardently hoping that the day of emancipation from the imperialists’ raging oppressions would soon come.

The Japanese imperialists’ raving oppressions over the Korean people culminate with the outbreak of the World War II. The first thing to be mentioned is that they


tried to ‘brainwash’ the Korean people into giving up its national spirit and identity so as to be totally assimilated into the Japanese culture and its identity represented by Shintoism.\textsuperscript{598} This ‘brainwashing’ into believing in Shintoism was carried out so that there would be an effective system to exploit Korea and supply Japanese armies with necessary material, without any serious resistance. Other Japanese policies for the obliteration of Korean national identity included teaching Japanese instead of Korean in schools and changing Korean people’s names to Japanese-styled ones.\textsuperscript{599} They drafted many Korean men and women including students and even early teenagers and sent them to fierce battlefields or to wretched labour camps.\textsuperscript{600} It is deplorable that many of the drafted women were coerced into working as ‘comfort girls’ for the Japanese soldiers.\textsuperscript{601} Under these bleak and dismal circumstances most of the Korean minjung engraved more and more han as deploration with resignation on their minds, ardently hoping that the day could come soon when the Japanese imperialists would be punished by Heaven.

Eventually the day of the collapse of the Japanese empire came and the Korean people were in rapture over its emancipation from all sorts of imperialist briddles. Unfortunately, however, its delight at emancipation was a prelude to the historical ‘irony’, i.e., the tragic division of the Korean peninsula along with the 38th parallel, a division made by the two triumphant superpowers, the USA and the USSR, which eventually resulted in the more tragic event: the Korean War. As many scholars claim, the war had manifold origins.\textsuperscript{602} What matters here is not the origin of the war, but its


\textsuperscript{599} Cf. ibid., p. 441.

\textsuperscript{600} Cf. ibid., pp. 435ff. During that period over 400,000 had been drafted for acting military services. About 150,000 among them did not return home after the War. And over four millions of people had been mobilised for corvee. (Cf. ibid., p. 438.)

\textsuperscript{601} Cf. ibid., p. 439.

\textsuperscript{602} Cf. The Korean Association of International Relations, ed., Hankakjeonjaengui Yeoksajeok Jaomjymeong [A Historical Re-Illumination of the Korean War], the Special Issue of the Korean
cruelty and aftermath. The ferocity in the battlefields of the Korean War was the same as in any other war. But it was the mutual massacres of the innocent minjung carried out by both the north and south Korean people, ideologically antagonistic to each other, that made the war even more cruel and dismal.\textsuperscript{603} Needless to say, those massacred innocent people are included in the number of several millions of people who had been killed during the war.\textsuperscript{604} It just adds to the tragedy that many family members of the innocent minjung both in the north and in the south have been separated from one another even up until now. For several decades since the war’s truce, separated or homeless family members have been, and still are, waiting for the reunification of the country and their families, their hearts tinged with rosy flush of han.

Up to this point we have considered the international causes of the formation of han as has happened through the whole Korean history. We now turn to a consideration of the domestic causes of the formation of han.

2) The Domestic Causes of the Formation of Han

Many factors of the domestic causes for the formation of han can be thought of. All of them cannot be considered here, however. Some of them, which may be regarded as significantly influencing on the formation of han, will be considered below.


\textsuperscript{604} The death toll of the war is estimated at 3-4 millions of Korean people, about 1 million of Chinese people and tens of thousands of the UN soldiers. Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 352.
The first thing to be mentioned for the domestic causes of the formation of han is the ruling classes’ rapacious exploitation of the ruled classes throughout the whole Korean history. Surely this may be regarded as the most fundamental cause for the formation of han. Every dynasty in Korean history strengthened its ruling systems to maintain the vested rights of the small number of ruling people. In these systems the ruled majority have groaned under all kinds of unjustifiable oppressions and manipulations by the ruling minority of the time. Let me consider concretely the ruled majority’s suffering from the ruling minority’s oppression from dynasty to dynasty in Korean history.

In the earliest period of Korean history most members of a tribe would have enjoyed a relatively peaceful and equal relationship with one another within their tribal territory. Even intertribal relationships would have been relatively peaceful. With the advent of the metal culture from Siberia and China, however, the tribal society was fundamentally changed. In the Aeneolithic Age warriors armed with bronze swords and spheres together with bows and arrows became influential. They could enlarge their ruling domains by conquering other tribes with the help of the power of the new arms. In this way, a new social relationship between the rulers and the ruled was established in the Korean Peninsula. On the basis of the new social order the rulers became a political power, thus establishing a ruling class for the first time in the peninsula.  

605 For many centuries before Christ many villages were united to form a state. For this period the highest religious leader, called Tankun, ruled the state of united villages. The noble class was established at some time in the era, thus ruling the commonalties, the minjung class. Especially, habo, main constituents of small villages,

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were subordinated to the nobles, providing them with collective labour.\textsuperscript{606} And there were many slaves in the era, constituting the lowest class of the society. These miserable outcasts of the society were owned by the nobles and treated as their property like their animals.\textsuperscript{607} Late in this period the ruling system developed into a dynasty with a king at its centre.

With its beginning in the era of Kochosun, the first dynasty in Korean history, the dynastic ruling system was firmly established through the Three-Dynasties Era (from the 1\textsuperscript{st} to the 7\textsuperscript{th} century A.D.) up to the Unified Silla Era (from the 7\textsuperscript{th} to the 10\textsuperscript{th} century). The rulers of the three dynasties (Kokuryo, Paikje and Silla) made every effort to make their ruling systems effective in coercion of the ruled classes. Especially in the Unified Silla Era many captives and people attempting revolt were reduced to the slave class, the lowest class in society, and thus brought to hyang, so, or bugok, the Unified Silla’s special territories for the slave class. This also meant that nobles and bureaucrats individually owned many slaves,\textsuperscript{608} thus indulging in manipulating minjung-related matters with a high hand. The noble class’s indulgence in luxury reached its acme in this period: “There was no thatch-roofed house in the capital palace; all the houses’ roofs and walls were connected to one another there in the palace; singing voices were continually heard from day to night.”\textsuperscript{609} On the contrary, the minjung’s lives were poverty-stricken. Many of them could not bear the burden of their debts any more, and were reduced to the miserable slave status.\textsuperscript{610} Worst of all, this slave-status was bequeathed from generation to generation, thus being one of the most noteworthy domestic contributors to the formation of han.

\textsuperscript{607} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 638ff.
\textsuperscript{608} This can be a true fact, considering the historical material which says that the prime minister owned 3000 slaves. (Cf. \textit{ibid.})
\textsuperscript{609} Gi-Baek Lee, \textit{HS}, p. 97. (my translation)
\textsuperscript{610} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 98.
In Koryo Dynasty (918 A.D.-1392 A.D.), as in the previous dynasties, the majority of the people suffered from the oppressions of the minority of nobles and bureaucrats. The noble class notably flourished in this period. This meant that the ruled classes, most of which consisted of yeomen and peasants, were severely exploited by the ruling class. The poor, miserable farming class suffered from heavy tax and forced labour, and the burden of corvée especially made their miserable lives even bleaker and direr.\textsuperscript{611} We can easily realise the dreary status of the lives of forced labourers through the following anecdotal description in Koryosa (The Official Records of the History of Koryo).

While they were building a pavilion, the corvée labourers had to bring their own food with them. But one of them was too poor to do so. He was given a spoonful of food by each of them. One day his wife brought food to him, saying, “Please share it with your friends.” He said: “We are so poor. How could you prepare it? By prostitution, or by thievery?” Then she said: “I am ugly; who wants to sleep with me? And you know that I am so introverted that I dare not commit theft. The only thing I could do was to have my hair cut to buy it.” Having said this, she showed her head to her husband. The labourer then wept, and dared not eat it; all the other labourers, having heard this, were full of grief.\textsuperscript{612}

On the other hand, the nobles lived in the lap of luxury in the sumptuous capital city, Kaegyeong, indulging in extravagance. Bureaucrats were given large amounts of land and rice as their payment.\textsuperscript{613} Naturally, bribery was prevalent among them. The


\textsuperscript{612} Koryosa, Seopa 18, March, the 21st reigning year of King Uijong. Quoted by Gi-Baek Lee and Hyeon-Gu Min in idem, eds., SBHM-Koryo, pp. 49-50. (my translation)

\textsuperscript{613} Cfr. Gi-Baek Lee and Hyeon-Gu Min, eds., SBHM-Koryo, p. 34.
following piece of a biography describes well how rotten the noble society was becoming:

Lee, Ja-Gyeom ensured his family members and relatives hold important posts, and sold many official posts, thus strengthening his party. ... Bribes were publicly given and taken, and presents brought to him from all over the country; there were usually tens of thousands kilograms of rotten meat in his house. He extorted people’s lands, and ordered his servants to appropriate people’s carriages so as to bring his goods to his house. Hence these poor people took down their carriages, selling all their bulls and horses, which made the streets with rare transports.64

Generally speaking, those people engaged in agriculture, together with slaves belonging to the lowest class of the society, were poor, ignorant and illiterate. They handed down to their descendants their miserable status of submission and subordination. Sometimes they suffered hunger and diseases. Sometimes they had to rove about and beg or become bandits in order to revolt against the authority of their exploiters.65 It should not be overlooked that there were many rebellions by farmers and, especially, by slaves during these times. One important example is the Rebellion of Manjeok, who, as a private slave, gathered many private or public slaves in order to revolt against the ruling class and demand emancipation from their subordination to nobles and bureaucrats, saying: “Since the rebellions [by Joong-Bu Jeong and Bodang] many slaves have became high-ranking government officials. How can it be said that the officialdom of ministers and generals is only of noble families? Everyone with the opportunity to do so can afford to carry it out. Why should we but suffer from being

64 Koryo, Yeoljeon (Series of Biographies) 40, The Biography of Lee, Ja-Gyeom. Quoted in Gi-Baek Lee and Hyeon-Gu Min, eds., SBHM-Koryo, p. 35.
65 Cf. Gi-Baek Lee and Hyeon-Gu Min, eds., SBHM-Koryo, p. 48.
whipped? What should not be overlookec here is the attempts by these slaves to be emancipated from their bondage, which could have been the ultimate solution to their generations-old han.

The fate of minjung in the next and last dynasty, Chosun (1392 A.D.-1910 A.D.), in Korean history was not changed: the yangban (the ruling, high class) kept oppressing the minjung. Royal families and u bureaucracy squeezed farmers, fishermen, hunters and all the other ruled people including slaves. Presenting famous local products and goods to the king brought distress to those local people who produced them. One typical example of this is found in the lives of the islanders of Jejudo, the biggest island in the country. They suffered from the odious burden of presenting to the king their special products such as horses, abalones, mandarins, and other marine products and medicinal herbs. They were usually poverty-stricken, anyway, and from time to time many islanders starved to death. Still, those who survived suffered this abominable onus of presenting their produce to the king and risking their lives at sea to transport them across the long, dangerous sea route. How pitiful were these people, who poured hot water on the roots of mandarin trees to make them wither, just so as to avoid the detestable burden of presenting to the king? To make these poor islanders more miserable, most of the functionaries from the government came to the island to squeeze them. From beginning in their new posts to the end of their ruling in the island, almost all officials were shameless exploiters. They indulged themselves in

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616 Here in these events I see the transition of han as ceporation to han as rancour. Even if those slaves could not have found any answer to the question of the why regarding their suffering from generations-old han as ceporation, they made attempts to solve the question of how to be emancipated from their bondage. It is to be considered that the question of the why here is nothing but the very question of meaning of our existence, and the question of the how directs us to a praxis, on the basis of which we are able to try to solve this question of meaning. In the next chapter I find a practical answer to this question in minjung solutions to han, and a fundamental answer to it, in the resurrection.
618 Cf. ibid., p. 71.
amassing a large fortune by their intermediary exploitation. The islanders’ distrust of
the government officials is well depicted in the following folk song:

_Gugwanirago binando mala_
_Sin-gwanirago chanyando mala_
_Sanjimureul saheul meogni_
_Womi gongsan han gongsadeora_
(Don’t blame the old official.
Don’t praise the new official.
Once he is used to drinking the water of Sanji [the emblematic, famous
mineral water in Jejudo] in three days,
His ruling becomes all the same.)

Functionaries’ voracious and excessive indulgence in piling up wealth through
their intermediary exploitation of minjung, most of whom consisted of farmers, was a
common phenomenon all over the country throughout the history of this dynasty.
There was no active way for farmers to resist these functionaries indulging in crushing
taxes. Farmers who accused functionaries of being voracious were usually punished
for their ‘false’ accusations. It was a common practice for a farmer who complained to
be condemned to flogging, heavy fine, or banishment. Hence farmers had no other
options but passive resistance by, for example, leaving their hometowns to become
vagabonds. Some of these vagabonds migrated to city areas to become labourers;
others fled deep into the mountains to become slash-and-burn farmers. No one can
deny that the power of this structural evil was one of the most fundamental factors in
making han deep-seated in the minjung mentality.

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620 Ibid., pp. 79-80. (my translation)
Once again, the burden of corvée, together with the ruling bureaucrats’ extortion, made *minjung* flounder more hopelessly in the pandemonium of suffering and oppression. The central government and local functionaries usually imposed heavy taxes on the ruled classes, as well as the burden of corvée for various purposes on the shoulders of *minjung*: sometimes for the purpose of building new castles or pavilions; other times to fortify the border. The following local legend depicts well the *han* of *minjung* caused by the government’s imposition of corvée to build a castle:

Once a man was forced to go to the northern part to build a castle. He was forced to part from his wife when she was pregnant. While doing the forced labour for several decades, he was not able to correspond with his family. At last, the time of corvée was over, and he could go home. When he approached his hometown, he realised that it had been totally altered. As a total stranger to his hometown, he was sauntering along the roads when he encountered a lad. He explained his situation to the lad, asking about his family. What an extraordinary encounter! The lad was his son… They hugged each other for a long time, wailing. Their crying was really bitter. Then they bit their own fingers. With their bleeding fingers they portrayed their figures on the rock, as if they were engraving them on it. As they looked at their forms in blood on the rock they together committed suicide.\(^{622}\)

Another good depiction of the *han* of *minjung* caused by corvée is the following poem named *Hakhal Samjang* (Three Stanzas for the Octogenarian with Hair as White as a Crane) by the woman, who wrote it after seeing the struggle between an octogenarian, a mother of an enlisted man, and a young woman, his wife (the sick old

\(^{622}\) Yeol-Gyu Kim, *HmWl*, pp. 223-224. (my translation)
mother, having missed her son so much, got out of her dying bed, and her daughter-in-law tried to get her back to her bed, wailing). 623

The white-haired octogenarian is lying in illness;
But her son has been forced to leave her for a faraway place.
“My son, who has gone to the faraway border to fortify,
When do you come back home?”

The white-haired octogenarian is watching in illness;
The glowing sun which is about to set in the west.
She has prayed with her clasped hands to the Heaven over and over,
But the Heaven has remained silent.

The white-haired octogenarian, in spite of her illness,
Is repeatedly getting out of bed and collapsing to seek her son.
How pathetic is her longing for a reunion with her son just like that!
But what can she do, once he put her hands off his sleeves to leave? 624

We can read the han-ridden minds of minjung in those rocks, roads and fields and mountains with invisible bloodstains. We can feel the minjung’s suffering through sad writings like the above. Here it is sure that the ruling classes’ voracious exploitation (including the imposition of corvée) was the most remarkable contributor to the minjung’s accumulation of han in their mentalities throughout the whole of Korean history.

The next thing to be considered as a domestic cause for the formation of han is women’s suffering from all sorts of oppression under the patriarchal system. This culminated in the period of Chosum Dynasty with the help of the remarkably influential Confucian way of thinking. Women were inhumanly treated under the

624 Ibid., pp. 47-8. (my translation)
influence of typically men-centred Confucianism. They were regarded as among the men’s possessions, which means that they always needed men’s protection. They could receive protection only at the cost of their blind obedience to men. The real aim of a woman’s marriage was to become a ‘wise mother and good wife’ in order to pay for her husband’s protection, which means that she was regarded as nothing but a reproductive means for the sustenance of her husband’s genealogy. Any woman without male protection could not help but be a sexual plaything of men around her. The only raison d’être of women was thus to sacrifice themselves in every aspect of their lives for the sake of their husbands’ and sons’ welfare. This was their fate. There was no other option for them.\footnote{Cf. Hyo-Jae Lee,} 

The fetters of women’s fate were strengthened by discordant and antagonistic relationships between mothers-in-laws and daughters-in-laws, stepmothers and stepdaughters, and legal wives and concubines. The older women in these hostile relationships maltreated and humiliated the younger ones respectively. The former used their vested interests to mistreat the latter. And it was done so cruelly that the abused could find no one to vindicate them against this maltreatment, and the only way to deaden their indignation was to gulp down their sobs in passive resignation. Surrounded by passive resignation there was no way out for their selfhood. They wanted to cry, but could not. All they could do was to find representatives in nature to be able to wail on behalf of them. Traditionally, two kinds of animals were noteworthy in representing their agonised selves: little cuckoos and crickets. In the poem, “Jeopdongsae (Little Cuckoo)” by Sowol Kim, one of the most popular national poets in Korea in the 20th century, the ‘elder sister’ died of her stepmother’s jealousy, becoming a little cuckoo after death so as to vindicate her brother in the

thestepmother’s maltreatment of him through her sad wailing. From generation to generation, these abused women, and the whole Korean minjung, have shared their mentalities full of han in resignation with little cuckoos and crickets with grief-filled wailing.⁶²⁶ What we have to bear in mind here is that the selves of these abused women, agonising in their bleak resignation, have been among the most significant and indelible containers of han.

The cruelty of the fetters of women’s fate is vividly depicted in the following folk song by Jejudo islanders:

\[
\textit{Seorun jeongnyeog georeoteodeon gireun} \\
\textit{Kljochja gyaureojinda} \\
\text{(The road a sorrowful maiden had once walked through,} \\
\text{It even tilts.)} \text{⁶²⁷}
\]

This song vividly depicts the han-ridden sorrowfulness of these miserable, poor women. In this song the cruelty and insurmountability of their fate is concretised in the description of the road along which a sorrowful maiden has once walked—it tilts because the weight of the sorrowfulness is so heavy.⁶²⁸ Through this poem we can grasp how bleak and dire the historical existence of these oppressed women has been under the patriarchal system, and how deeply han, caused by their suffering from poverty, sorrowfulness, alienation, maltreatment, indignation, autism, and resignation, has been rooted in their psyches.

What needs to be considered also is that in line with concubines being maltreated their descendants were also maltreated. Maltreatment of concubines’ children was legally established especially in the period of Chosun Dynasty. Although the son or

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⁶²⁷ Hankuk Yeoksa Minsook Hakhwoe, \textit{Folk Songs and Minjung Life}, p. 76. (my translation)
⁶²⁸ Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 77.
daughter of a member of yangban (higher, ruling class), the child of a concubine could not call his or her father ‘father’, nor the son of his or her father’s legal wife ‘brother’, because of his or her mother’s humbleness. Some sons of concubines had a talent for scholarship, but could not take official examinations for bureaucratic jobs on account of being the son of a concubine. To make them more miserable, this stigma of being the child of a concubine was bequeathed to their descendants. 629 A popular novel named The Biography of Hong Gil-Dong, which appeared in the middle of the Dynasty, depicts well dreadful situations suffered by concubines’ sons at that time. In the book Hong Gil-Dong, a concubine’s son, unable to bear the unjust situation in which he is prevented from calling his father ‘father’, and his brother by his father’s legal wife ‘brother’, runs away from home to become the head of a group of bandits. He and his men always target rich people for their robbery and share their pillage with poor minjung. He is, as it were, a ‘Robin Hood’. At the end of the novel the author introduces a Utopia named Yuldokuk, established by the hero and his people and abolishing discrimination against descendants of legal wives and concubines. Only through the visualisation of this kind of utopia could sons of concubines in those days seek an exit from the insurmountable bridle of their fate, which had them “…giving themselves up, being never interested in literature, politics, economics, national defence, etc., singing sad songs in deploration, and dissipately drinking,” 630 thus accumulating han in their psyches throughout their lives.

Finally in this section, we need to consider the wretched social status of slaves, the main constituents of the lowest caste of the society. The wretchedness of slaves has two aspects. Firstly, slaves were inhumanly treated. They were regarded as a chattel,

630 Ibid., p. 254. (my translation)
an important one, but just one of their owners’ possessions. Hence slaves and land were two principal sources of their owners’ wealth.631 This means that slaves were purchased, bequeathed, or transferred like livestock or land.632 In market places slaves were traded at a much lower cost than horses,633 and female slaves cost more than male ones, because of their reproductivity.634 It is evident that slaves were mercilessly mistreated in the process of trade and were not regarded as belonging to the domain of human duties or morality. Fundamentally, they were thought of as always potential disturbers of public order, that is, as lawbreakers.635 Hence they had no hope that their owners might show kindness, hospitality or mercy, because their owners were accustomed to thinking they deserved to suffer from cold, hunger, extreme fatigue, or poverty. Being beaten, flogged, or killed like oxen or horses—all of these were considered their lot.636

Secondly, the wretchedness of slaves was also based on the inheritance of the slave status. It had been customary for a long period of time that, once a human being fell prey to the cruel slavery system, none of his or her descendants could break the fetters of slave status. From generation to generation every descendant of a slave had to remain in that same bleak and dire slavery as his or her ancestor. We have an official historical record, according to which the law of the inheritance of slave status was


633 In the early Chosun Dynasty the price of a slave was not any more than 150 rolls of hemp cloth, while the one of a horse was between 400 and 500 rolls. Cf. Man-Gil Kang, Bundansidaeui Yeoksa Insik [A Recognition of History in the Time of Division] (Seoul: Changakkwaa Bipyeongsa, 1993), p. 289.

634 In the late 10th century a male slave aged between 15 and 60 cost 100 rolls of hemp cloth, while a reproductive female slave aged between 15 and 50 cost 120 rolls. Cf. ibid.


636 Cf. Wu-Geun Han and Seong-Mu Lee, SBHM-Late Chosun, p. 261.
firmly established in early Koryo Dynasty in the 10th century.\textsuperscript{637} In Koryo Dynasty nobles and great landlords tried to have as many slaves as possible in order to maintain their vested interests.\textsuperscript{638} They increased their slaves with the help of the firm establishment of the law of the inheritance of slave status. In so doing, they gave the priority to the female in conferring inherited social status, which means that, if a child’s mother was a slave, he or she was definitely a slave, regardless of the father’s social status. Following the application of this law of the emphasis of the female in handing down social status, slave numbers increased so remarkably that in early Chosun Dynasty the slave population was one third of the whole population.\textsuperscript{639} Ironically, the great increase of slave population and the decrease of common people responsible for taxes were main causes of the downfall of Koryo Dynasty.\textsuperscript{640} What we may not overlook here is that, because of the application of the law of the inheritance of slave status, many members of slave families lived their lives in resignation and hopelessness from generation to generation, thus retaining the generations-old han of their ancestors deep in their psyches.

Female slaves suffered more intensely. Young female slaves were nothing but sexual playthings for their male masters. But once used as their masters’ sexual partners, they fell prey to the ferocious jealousy of their female masters. They were made wretched scapegoats for the sexual misdeeds of male masters, and were beaten, privately imprisoned, amputated, or even killed and left to drift down a river with stigmatic sticks inserted into their vaginas. In addition, they suffered extreme poverty. Let us look at an actual example. During Chosun Dynasty a female slave named Seom Oh, who belonged to a local government office, had to find another husband in

\textsuperscript{638} Actually, there were some who owned more than 1000 slaves. Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{639} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 342.
\textsuperscript{640} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 308, 341.
order to survive after the officer who had violated her went away to another office, leaving her and her 4-year-old daughter behind. She found a humble man for her husband, but had to leave him because he had no economic means to support them. So she had to find another one, but then was forced to leave him on the same reason. In this way, she had to change her husband four times in order to feed herself and her daughter.\footnote{Cf. Gwanseo Pyeongnanlok (The Records of the Quelling of the Revolt in the North-Western Area [of Korea]), vol. 7, June 19. Quoted in Seok-Jong Jeong, Chosun Hugji Jeongchisna Sasang [Politics and Thought in Late Chosun] (Seoul: Doseochulpam Han-gilsa, 1995), pp. 61-62.} Considering this historical record, we can grasp how bleak and dire was the suffering and extreme poverty of these female slaves. How could it be justified? Is it really possible for us to measure the weight of han accumulated over and over in their wounded psyches with the humiliation and defencelessness they suffered all the days of their lives?

To this point I have considered the double-structured causes of the formation of han. These causes were assuredly the main contributors to the engraving of han as deploration upon the hearts of minjung from generation to generation throughout the whole of Korean history. Bearing all this in mind, let us try to conceptualise han, a prominent knot on the horizon of the question of meaning.

B. Towards a Conceptualisation of Han

It is difficult to define han by a word or in a sentence, because it is a blending of multifarious emotional factors, stemming from typical and long-standing national and international tribulations in the history of the oppressed Korean minjung, and
simented in their deep psyches. As Young-Hak Hyun, one of the first-generation minjung theologians, vividly expressed it: “[Han] is a sense of unresolved resentment against injustice suffered, a sense of helplessness because of the overwhelming odds against, a feeling of total abandonment (‘Why hast thou forsaken me?’), a feeling of acute pain of sorrow in one’s guts and bowels making the whole body writhe and wiggle, and an obstinate urge to take ‘revenge’ and to right the wrong all these constitute.” 

Due to the multifariousness of the characteristics of han several perspectives on han have been posited. Han has been regarded as jeong (affection of longing for the unattainable being), won [looking forward to], a complexity of incongruities, or a framework of the dualistic antagonism of being knotted and being released. Here in this sub-section I will try to conceptualise han within the double perspective of won (rancour) and tan /tân/ (deploration) for my contemplation of han as a motive for the question of meaning in the next sub-section.

In the previous sub-sub-section, “A Consideration of the Origin of Han,” I postulated that han should be understood as a blending of won (rancour) and tan (deploration). In the structure of han as won-tan, won is the active expression of han, which can be led to individual ‘will to revenge’ or collective ‘will to revolt’, while tan is the passive expression of han, which is to be reduced to personal ‘resignation’ or corporate ‘despair’. Let me paraphrase the activity-passivity of han in this way.

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645 Cf. A. Sung Park, *The Wounded Heart of God. The Asian Concept of Han and the Christian Doctrine of Sin* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993), pp. 31ff. Here it is worth noting Nam-Dong Suh’s view of han. “Han is an underlying feeling of Korean people. On the one hand, it is a dominant feeling
When there is a definable cause of oppression, the oppressed person usually has his or her rancorous feeling against the subject doing the oppressing. Especially, when the cause of oppression is unjustifiable, from the perspectives of morality or conscience, the sufferer’s righteous wrath at the oppressor is inescapably accumulated. The oppressed person’s feeling of loathing against the oppressor can be actively expressed in the form of vengefulness. Collectively, the will to revenge is led to the will to revolt against the established political, economic, social and cultural systems of the oppressors. This will to revenge or revolt is designated the activity or masculinity of han, i.e., won. On the other hand, when there is no room for the oppressed to express his or her won because the oppression is insurmountable, or the cause of suffering is indefinable, as in the cases of natural disasters, deaths caused by natural factors, or absolute anxiety caused by the incomprehensibility of the origin and destination of our existence, the aggressiveness of won withers. In these circumstances won finds no exit from the mind of the sufferer, and is thus sedimented there, eventually forming an emotional knot of resignation. Collectively, any society constituted by members with won tinged with resignation cannot help but fall into the pit of corporate despair. Won submerged deep into the sufferer’s mind is transformed into tan with the lapse of time.

In the above sub-sections I depicted in details insurmountable circumstances in Korean history, under which won could only submerge deep into the psyches of the minjung, and allow tan to flourish. To be sure, won has become entrenched in minjung mentality, or seemingly vanished from there throughout the whole history of Korean minjung, in which minjung have suffered from all sorts of oppressions almost all the time. They have therefore seen no possibility for overcoming these oppressions,
absolutely no way out of the malignant clutch of dark fate on their meek and feeble necks. Under these circumstances, han as tan has been unavoidably fixed into a groove in minjung mentality, so firmly that tan can only be identified with han itself. This han identified with tan is bequeathed from generation to generation through minjung mentality. Throughout the whole history of oppression and exploitation minjung mentality has been knitted together by the tan-han transversely as well as longitudinally, diachronically as well as contemporaneously.\footnote{Cf. Yeol-Gyu Kim, \textit{HmWT}, p. 32.} And having knitted into minjung mentality so densely, han has, with the lapse of time, come to form a burl of emotional complexity which can never be untangled.

When han is thought of as a knot of emotional complexity, it may be difficult to identify. This seems true in the following poem about han by Sowol Kim (one of the most popular Korean poets in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century), in which han is said to connot various emotional elements.

\begin{quote}
Loneliness-like han

Sadness-like han

\textit{Han} that seems utterly starved due to its emptiness

Agony-like han, but grief-like han as well

\textit{Han} as lyricism, but as pathos as well

\textit{Han} as missing, but more than this as well—

As excruciating pain

\textit{Han} blended with regret, but tinged with resentment as well.\footnote{Quoted by Yeol-Gyu Kim in \textit{idem, HmWT}, p. 31 (my translation).}
\end{quote}

To be sure, han consists of various kinds of emotional elements as in this poem. Hence we need to employ an atomistic approach to the emotional categories of han
for its appropriate identification. Simultaneously, we also need to contemplate han in a holistic way, by means of which human life comes to be confined to fundamental han as a kind of ultimate limitation on it. We will inevitably then ask a question of the origin of fundamental han, a matter which is important if we are to set han in place as a motive for the question of meaning.

a. An Atomistic Identification of Han

I imagine a crock of han containing jelly with various strata, the jelly consisting of all the kinds of emotional elements suppressed under the name of han. Of what does the top stratum consist? I would say that it is excruciating pain. Excruciating pain? Yes, the most agonising mental pain far beyond any physical pain. It is something indescribable that was felt by the mother seeing her nose-cut-off baby when the noses of a mother and her less-than-a-week-old baby were cut off by the Japanese soldiers in the late 16th century, by the mother and the fellow slaves of the young female slave, who was forced to have sexual relationship with her master and was slain by her mistress in jealousy to be left to drift down a river with a stigmatic stick inserted into her vagina, by the mother and fellow workers of Tae-II Chun, an exploited worker, who sprinkled himself with petroleum and burnt himself to death in order to protest against the exploitation of the defenceless workers (most of them were teen-age girls) by their selfish employers.648 Those mothers and the people surrounding the victims felt mental agony even more painful than the physical pain which the victims felt. This mental agony is tantamount to the pain felt by the mother

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in the anecdotal depiction in F. Dostoyevsky’s novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*: in front of his mother, an eight-year-old serf boy was hunted down and tom to little shreds by the pack of borzoi hounds under the command of the general, their landowner, only because the boy “while playing some game or other threw a stone and bruised the leg of the general’s favourite beagle.”

Can these mental knots of excruciating pain even be disentangled at the end of history when God provides all human beings with a Great Moment o’ Reconciliation? As Ivan Karamazov proclaims, is it not out of the question that the mother of the serf boy tom to pieces by dogs dare forgive his torturer, even though the boy himself forgave him? It is realised here that in *han* this knot of excruciating pain penetrates through the hearts of *minjung*, and forever remains there in the state of its entanglement. It can thus be said: the stratum of excruciating pain is a typical mode of *han* as deploration, in which are blended crying, weeping, sobbing, bitter tears, groans, deep sighs, inconsolable grieves and woes, and other kinds of knotted emotions. All of these occur when *minjung* are forced to suffer unjustifiable oppressions, and cannot find any means of resisting. In every *minjung* mind is engraved the insoluble knot of these emotional elements, blending to give birth to excruciating pain. It is through this blend that *minjung* stare at their rugged lives and deaths, and even at their fate beyond death.

What lies beneath the stratum of excruciating pain? It would be the stratum of pining for something unattainable. *Minjung* dream of their homeland, in which they can live happily with their families, keep living in peace with their neighbours, and, most of all, live without their being robbed of personality and human dignity. However, this homeland is something unreachable, “something which shines into the

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640 F. Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*: ..., p. 279.
childhood of all and in which no one has yet been. Yearning for an unreachable homeland, minjung easily fall into sentimentalism, in which they cannot help feeling absolute alienation, abject forlornness and nostalgic pathos. By these elements han wears its transparent clothes embroidered with elegantia, in which the religiosity of minjung mentality is hidden. The elegantia of han consists in the very religiosity of minjung mentality, which has been a catalyst to overcoming han. For han has been expressed passively in minjung arts such as folk-songs, mask dances, etc., or in their participation in kut (a traditional shamaristic ritual), and, actively, in minjung religious movements, a good example of which is ‘faith in Maitreya’, in which the minjung’s will to revolt against their oppressors has been galvanised, whenever they felt insecurity, meaninglessness and a hopeless awareness of crisis in their society.

With the lapse of time, pining for the unreachable homeland is hardened into the flickering object of minjung waiting. When the object of waiting is thought to be something that can never arrive, waiting turns into frustration. In history, most of the minjung’s lives have ended in this frustrated waiting. Individually, minjung have reflected on their deathbeds about how absurd their lives are, ending in frustrated waiting. Hence frustrated waiting, as an element of han, meets absurdity in death, which gives birth to meaninglessness. In this light, waiting in han is tantamount to Sartre’s waiting in his expression: “If I am a waiting for waitings for waiting and if suddenly the object of my final waiting and the one who awaits it are suppressed, the waiting takes on retrospectively the character of absurdity.”

However, while Sartre’s waiting ends with death, han’s waiting transcends death. We see this in the legend of ‘Hwangsii Buidang (the Shrine of Mrs. Hwang).’ In ninjung belief waiting in han cannot end with death, the ultimate power of despair. It transcends the power of death, persisting for a millennium, even forever, as in Ji-Hoon Cho’s poem, ‘Seokmun (The Stone-gate),’ on the basis of the legend of Hwangsii Buidang:

Here is a stone-gate,
Which can be soundlessly opened with your touch by fingertips.
People are vexed,
But inside the stone-gate firmly shut
Mosses now grow on the stonewalls, on the balustrades,
And on the twelve steps.

I have kept a candle,
The light of which won’t die out until you come.
This is the emblem of my sorrowful soul,
Who won’t close her eyes even a millennium of years later,
Until your face I’ve missed so much flits in the flickering candlelight.

...
Here is a stone-gate,
Which won’t be opened even with an utmost devotion,
Because my won-han (rancour) is infused into it.
Here is a stone-gate,
Which gets worn out by sad rain and wind,
Inside which I still sit waiting for another millennium of years
Until you come. 

Waiting in han is a ‘waiting for waitings for waiting’, which transcends time and tide. Minjung overcome their lives, which are studded with despair and absurdity, by this persistent waiting. This everlasting waiting leads minjung to a positive attitude in which they try to seek after meaningfulness in their meaningless lives, and not just to a despairing declaration like Samuel Beckett’s Vladimir: “We’ll hang ourselves tomorrow... Unless Godot comes.”

In the next stratum we find autogenous sadness. This feeling may mean nostalgic sympathy for forlorn, solitary and elegant scenery of nature. A lonely lane through a mountain which is flanked by silent trees and shrubs in their revivified green colour; a cerise evening glow on a fine summer day and the silently and solitarily flowing water through a river reflecting the splendid glow; an autumn azure sky with no clouds and a field studded with stubble on which chilly and dreary wind blows aimlessly; a snow-covered glen scattered with snow-blossomed pine trees reflecting cold sunbeams in heavy silence—all of these kinds of sublimely solitary scenes of nature are sources of self-generated sadness. When we encounter these kinds of natural scenery, we can feel something inexplicable. It cannot be depicted in words. But it is a feeling, a sad feeling, which exists in our psyche as surely as our own

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655 Quoted by Yeol-Gyu Kim in idem, HmWI, p. 309 (my translation)
existence. It lies dormant in our mind; it acts and reacts on every occasion of encountering natural scenery in the silence and splendour of solitude. This is why it is called autogenous sadness. It is “a feeling like loneliness, sorrowfulness, or emptiness; like a blending of all these feelings; or like mental hunger and piercing grief added to the blending of those feelings.”\textsuperscript{657} If we do not mention this feeling, we cannot properly explain han, because it can be present as a ‘category of han’.\textsuperscript{658} By and through this autogenous sadness han shines positively, even in the shade of its negative aspect of sorrow. In this regard, in han “[s]orrow is beauty, and the supreme blessedness.”\textsuperscript{659} Perhaps autogenous sadness is derived from the minjung’s vainly pining for void, where all of their unjustifiable suffering can evaporate. This vainly pining for void on the part of minjung is a source of their nihilistic Weltanschauung, which leads minjung not to a catastrophic moment of despair, but to perpetual resignation.

Eventually we reach resignation, which sits cross-legged on the bottom stratum. Resignation results from these long-term elements, i.e., excruciating pain, pining for something unattainable, and waiting. It is also based upon autogenous sadness, which makes minjung vainly dream of a void that will shatter all of the unjustifiable bridles and fetters of their inauspicious fate, obliterate the law of the jungle, and even stop all kinds of absurd life-devastating occurrences in the ecosystem. From the perspective of its relationship with these other elements of han, resignation is not to be confused with sheer abandonment or giving oneself up completely to despair. It transcends all phenomenological hopelessness; it rejects sheer resignation; it is “the mind’s insight

\textsuperscript{657} Yeol-Gyu Kim, HlmWI, p. 75. (my translation)
\textsuperscript{658} Cf. ibid., pp. 75-79.
into the principles of nature. It is awakening from the ignorance of Tao, in other words, “a philosophic view which produces piercing insight into the phenomenological vicissitudes contained in the providence of life, and tries to unify the principles of the rise and fall of beings.” On the basis of this kind of resignation, han remains positive in the minjung psyche. The positive aspect of resignation provides minjung with their indefatigable will to overcome all the negative aspects of han.

Until now, I have made an atomistic approach to the identification of han. Now is time to contemplate han in a holistic way.

b. A Holistic Identification of Han

Let us take a bird’s-eye view of our cock of han. At first glance our eyes will catch its colour: hwangtobit (yellow ochre). Hwangtobit is the same colour of the soil covering the Korean Peninsula. If the Korean people choose a colour for their nation’s emblem, it cannot be anything but hwangtobit. Korean minjung have been familiar with the colour for a long time; no one in Korea can escape from the sorrowful han-colour. All minjung are born in the hwangtobit soil, live their lives treading the hwangtobit roads, and eventually return to their hwangtobit graveyards connected to their homes by the hwangtobit roads. Korean minjung lives and even deaths are coloured by this colour. This is why han itself has been, and should be, coloured by hwangtobit, which is the emblem of the excruciating suffering that has been engraved in the minjung psyche, but no longer felt directly because they have been imbued with it for so long a time.

660 Yeol-Gyu Kim, HmWI, p. 157.
661 Ibid (my translation)
662 Cf. ibid., p. 16.
Hwangobit han, in which minjung repeatedly ask a question of the meaning of their existence full of agonies but can never find an answer to it, thus emits nihilistic Weltanschauung. From the perspective of hwangobit han “deeply related to consciousness of nihilism,”⁶⁶³ life becomes a trite drama. Life is nothing but struggling for the sustenance of life itself with no time to ask the why of struggling. What is worse, at its end life itself is perceived as leaving nothing, as moles, when they die, leave nothing but their empty burrows filled only with the sound of bleak wind. What on earth is a life that is like the mind of a farmer who sits on the levee of a flooded field or of a drought-stricken paddy, staring at a mountain in the distance?⁶⁶⁴ Hence hwangobit han appears as:

…gloomy flowers blossomed in the cavern of the nihilistic life, or murky creeping animals born in its lairs[,] animals living in soil like toads, earthworms, or moles[,] those animals and worms living in soil who come out with blue light prepared in a rainy night, or in a foggy evening when something ill-omened might happen[,] graveyards, where the glow of fireflies blossoms between tombs under a halo round the moon[,] the dim light on a wick like a straw soaked with water, which cannot therefore be easily burned, but barely manages to burn with rustling…⁶⁶⁵

All these appearances of hwangobit han represent minjung lives suffocated to death by the agonising chains of evil power, so insurmountably so (as we have seen in the above sub-sections dealing with the international and domestic causes of the formation of han) that nihilistic Weltanschauung cannot but prosper in them.

⁶⁶³ Ibid., p. 229.
⁶⁶⁴ Cf. ibid.
⁶⁶⁵ Ibid. (my translation)
Ultimately, *hwangtohit han* studded with nihilistic *Weltanschaung* is the cradle of the ontological question of the meaning of our existence. Through the prism of *hwangtohit han*, we human beings feel that we are totally surrounded by various kinds of fundamental limitations to our existence. In truth we acknowledge that our lives are studded with fundamental limitations. Even oppressors feel a sort of *han*, which originates from the recognition of the fundamental imperfection of their own being. All of us must acknowledge that our finite being is fundamentally imperfect. It is our lot. We may call this fundamental *han*. As Kyeong-Ni Park, one of the prominent Korean novelists in the 20th century, expresses it: “... there is something in human being, which seems fundamental *han* ... In my opinion, every person lives his or her life in his or her own *han*, which can be death, heart-rending parting, ... It seems that this *han* is the fundamental aporia of human existence...”\(^{666}\) This fundamental *han* is ontologically related to human life and death. It is inseparable from our life and death. It comes with life, goes with death, but survives death, thus being related to the next world. As Kyeong-Ni Park says in her roman-fleuve, *Toji* [The Land]: “It can be said that *han* comes with life. It can also be said that *han* is based upon life.... Even in the world to come *han* exists as a longed-for hope in the psyche of Korean people, ...”\(^{667}\) Hence the existence of life is tantamount to the existence of *han*. Where there is life, there is *han*, under the power of which life, since its beginning, has been suffocated incessantly, and thus thrown unjustifiably into the realm of nothingness. In this situation, it is inescapable that *han* be set in place as a motive for the question of meaning. (This will soon be dealt with in a more detailed way.)

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\(^{666}\) Soon-Tae Moon, “What is *Han!?”, pp. 143-4, fn. 23. (my translation)

We here face the aporia of the origin of the fundamental han. It is incomprehensible, as with the question of the origin of evil and nothingness. As Kyeong-Ni Park depicts:

… Whether we feel regret or not, whether we want it or not, han is the very pith of life, which has come with life from the place unknown to me, unknown to all humankind. Whether or not we push it, fight it, or hug it in sobbing, [it is with us:] from where did it come with life? Loneliness due to hunger and need of clothes, due to the feeling of victimisation and sickness, due to getting old and parting, due to facing death by oneself; the question of the ‘whither’ of our existence after death; our souls who will possibly wander by themselves like innumerable stars in the night sky—all of these belong to han, don’t they? Indeed, life and death, both of them are all han….

The question, ‘where did the fundamental han come from?’, is assuredly an enigma. Facing this aporia bravely, we must consider the relationship between fundamental han and evil and nothingness as its matrix. What is to be suggested here is that, when we think that fundamental han is based upon evil, and eventually came from nothingness, it can be placed next to the concept of sin in Christian theology. (This will be considered in the next chapter.)

Thus far, I have tried to conceptualise han by way of two kinds of approach to its identification: atomistic and holistic. On the basis of these approaches, I will contemplate the unavoidability of placing han on the horizon of the question of meaning.

C. Han as a Motive for the Question of Meaning

Realities hover over the horizon of the question of meaning. Realities as good qualities of the domain of being, such as love and justice, hover well over this horizon, illuminating it. But realities as negative qualities fundamentally threatening the realm of our existence, such as suffering and evil, hover just over the horizon, approaching nearer and nearer to the question of meaning to the extent that they threaten the very existence of meaning itself in the question, to the extent that the question of meaning becomes the question of the meaning of those threatening realities. In this regard: “To ask about meaning is no less than to ask about what is real. If we cannot find an answer to this question, there is no longer anything to which we can really cling. We have fallen out of the world and are groping in the void. The question of meaning has thus become a question of being or nonbeing.” From this perspective, the question of meaning could and should be asked on the basis of actual realities threatening our very existence, such as suffering, the ephemerality of a life’s existence and its perishability, or han.

When we ask the question of meaning especially on the basis of han, we unavoidably face the question, ‘What meaning is to be found in the history of Korean minjung, onto which all kinds of their suffering are engraved?’. As we have seen in the above sub-sections depicting the causes of the formation of han, the history of Korean minjung has been interspersed with bleak and dire episodes of agony resulting from evil-structural oppressions. Indeed, Korean minjung history is thickly tinged with their excruciating outcries, struggling to cope with their unjustifiable suffering. Is there any meaning to be found in minjung lives, which begin and end with han? What

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can be thought of as solutions to the question of the meaning of their unjustifiable suffering?

Let me contemplate the question of meaning on the basis of the above-mentioned categories of the concept of han, with the following train of questions depicting specific situations. When the excruciating pain of han is thought of as a starting point for the question of meaning, meaning itself in this question is shattered, and anomie ineluctably emerges from the shattered meaning. From the perspective of the excruciating pain of han accumulated in the Korean minjung history, is it not out of the question to ask: what kind of meaning can and should be given to those chaotic phenomena in which the evil power boisterously dances? What meaning is left on the breast of the little child in torturing “that beat its breast with its little fist”670? Is it really possible to ask the question of the meaning of the “crying by the blood stained children, whose ears and noses had been cut off”? If the minjung’s “pining for something unattainable,” which has led them to minjung movements in arts and religion, should end in a delusional hope for something like T. More’s Utopia (where the Utopians achieve “complete communism” as “not only a means of conquering the vices of private property but also the surest way to quell the vice of idleness and its attendant evils”671), how can excruciating pain of han knotted in the minjung psyche be solved? Is it really meaningless for minjung as the true subjects of history to aspire to the “Messianic Kingdom” that “is not an illusory or utopian dream, but is the core

670 F. Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, p. 282.
671 R. Marius, Thomas More: A Biography (London and Melbourne: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1984), p. 165. The Utopians establish their communitarian society so completely that “[t]hey are more grieved at their allies’ pecuniary loss than their own because their friends’ merchants suffer severely by the loss as it falls on their private property, but their own citizens lose nothing but what comes from the common stock and, as it were, superfluous at home—or else it would not have been exported; a[1]s a result the loss is not felt by any individual.” (Ibid, p. 169; cf. T. More, The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. 4: Utopia, eds. E. Surzt, S. J., and J. H. Hexter [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963-], pp. 201-3.)
of the history for which the suffering people, the poor and oppressed, struggle\textsuperscript{672}? If the *minjung*’s time-transcending waiting (as in the legend of *Hwangssi Buindang*) is eventually futile, then is the waiting of *han* not itself as absurd as Sartre’s subject-object-absent ‘waiting for waitings for waiting,’ or as hopeless as Vladimir’s despairing declaration of the inevitability of suicide in the case of Godot’s not coming in time? If *han* is to be ‘danced’ on the horizon of the question of meaning, then must not the waiting of *han* become “waiting as praxis of faith, hope and love beyond despair or [sheer] resignation,”\textsuperscript{673} as it is represented by the *pulppuri* (the root of grass)’ lying under the cloudy sky in the following poem, “*Pul* (Grass),” by Soo-Young Kim\textsuperscript{674}?

Grass lies.
Having fluttered in the eastern wind which brings rain,
Grass lay,
And wept at last.
It kept weeping due to the cloudy day,
And then lay again.

Grass lies.
It lies faster than wind.
It weeps faster than wind,
And rises before wind does.

The day is cloudy and grass lies.
Its ankle
And the sole of its foot lie, too.


\textsuperscript{673} Nak-Cheong Paek, *In-gan Haebangui Nollahui Chajaseo [In Search of a Logic for Human Emancipation]* (Seoul: Siimsa, 1979), p. 55.

\textsuperscript{674} Cf. *ibid.*
Although it lies later than wind,
It rises earlier than wind.
Although it weeps later than wind,
It smiles earlier than wind.
The day is cloudy and the root of grass lies.\textsuperscript{675}

If the ‘grass’ in this poem represents feeble but tenacious minjung as the real subjects of history,\textsuperscript{676} what is the driving force of their persistent march to future uncertainties with unbearable onuses on their shoulders like Sisyphus, who is condemned by the gods “to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its own weight”\textsuperscript{677}, and should thus exert all his efforts “towards accomplishing nothing”\textsuperscript{678}? Is it not the everlasting, true waiting of han, in which the two antinomic elements, thirst and drinking, are identified with each other in the sense that “in pining for justice and truth and in waiting for true Thou, thirst itself is not a simple physical desire, but an affirmation, a praxis, and is led to more anxious thirst, to much more satisfied drinking”\textsuperscript{679}? If autogenous sadness is derived from the minjung’s vainly pining for void, where all of their unjustifiable suffering can evaporate, and vainly pining for void is the source of their long-lived pessimistic Weltanschauung, what else can be done to the question of the meaning of autogenous sadness, except pursuing a practical solution to it? If the question of the ontologically fundamental cause of autogenous sadness is beyond the domain of minjung thinking, is it not inevitable for them to try to solve the question by aesthetically expressing their autogenous sadness through arts, or rites of traditional shamanistic religion? If we see the question of meaning through the prism of the wisdom of ‘resignation,’ viz.,

\textsuperscript{675} Soo-Young Kim, “Pul (Grass)”. Quoted by Nak-Cheong Paek in ibid., pp. 54-5. (my translation)
\textsuperscript{676} Cf. ibid., p. 55.
\textsuperscript{678} Ibid., p. 108.
\textsuperscript{679} Nak-Cheong Paek, In Search of a Logic for Human Emancipation, p. 56.
“a philosophic view which produces piercing insight into the phenomenological vicissitudes contained in the providence of life, and tries to unify the principles of the rise and fall of beings⁶⁸⁰, is it not surely natural for us to have a practical attitude towards the question, and thus to be concerned mainly with how to cope with our suffering practically, as in the case of the Rebellion of Manjeok⁶⁸¹? What, then, is to be posited as a practical answer to the question of the meaning of the Korean minjung existence entangled in ‘excruciating pain’, ‘pining for something unattainable’, ‘time-transcending waiting’, ‘autogenous sadness’ and ‘resignation’ of han?

However, is it really possible to think of any practical answer to the question of the meaning of han as an ultimate answer to the question of the meaning of the Korean minjung existence, ensnared as it is in ‘hwangtobit han emitting nihilistic Weltanschauung’ and ‘fundamental han’? What is the basic cause of ‘fundamental han’, one of the profound phenomenological elements of which is ‘autogenous sadness’ as a feeling of absolute solitude in the minjung psyche? Why should minjung persistently be put to unjustifiable suffering inflicted by the inescapable inauspicious power of evil, which has been metamorphosed into ‘hwangtobit han emitting nihilistic Weltanschauung’ in their psyche? Is fundamental han not derived from the fact that we human beings inherently have epistemological limitations in reasoning the origin and goal of our existence and of the universe as a whole? Setting this fundamental han in place on the horizon of the question of meaning, is it unthinkable that its basic cause is the very nothingness, which tries to swallow everything in the domain of being by using the power of evil, its phenomenological expression, to annihilate it? What questions are we facing in our consideration of this fundamental han originated from nothingness? Is there any possibility for us to ask a question of the meaning of

⁶⁸¹ Cf. above, p. 177 of this chapter.
fundamental han, without considering any ultimate reality that can, and tries to, protect all existences in the domain of being from the powerful attack of annihilating nothingness? Simply asking, is there any ultimate answer to the question of the meaning of all kinds of absurdities panoramically unfolded in the Korean minjung history and in world history?

It is very difficult to find any meaning in history studded with all kinds of absurdities of han. It is very hard to ask a question of the meaning of human existence wrapped in the arbitrariness that has held sway over human history. As C. E. Gunton says: “Meaning is not well served if it is conceived to be founded in an essentially arbitrary will, ... for arbitrariness suggests irrationality, instability and hence the subversion of meaning.”682 It is really out of the question to ask the question of the ultimate meaning of all phenomena from the perspective of the present cosmology which pessimistically depicts the end of the universe in ways like these: in several billions of years the sun will have been exhausted to become a white dwarf, having lingeringly died over a period of 100 trillion years; most other stars will undergo the same lot; then there will be left only dregs such as ‘black holes, the burnt-out cinders of stars and the dead husks of planets’ in the universe; eventually, black holes themselves containing dregs of dead stars and planets will ‘disintegrate into stray particles,’ which will also decay; the universe at the final stage of its evolution will be in the state of total void, thus becoming ‘unimaginably vast, cold, dark and profoundly lonely place’.683 When we think of the world which has unfolded the tragic drama filled with han and suffering and will end in the bleak and dire state of complete dissolution of all kinds of phenomenological beings, it is impossible to catch

any meaning without considering a deity who can illuminate the why of minjung han and suffering in general, and still sustain some meaning in the dreary situation of absolute annihilation of all kinds of phenomenological beings after the total collapse of the present universe. Except for the concept of God, what can be the basis for claiming the antithesis of the thesis that “it [the universe] is fundamentally meaningless because it is destined to disappear”\textsuperscript{684} Without considering the concept of God, how can we ask questions such as these: “But must the universe be eternal if it is to have meaning? ... But is a piece of music pointless because it has a last note, a life because it is bracketed by birth and death?”\textsuperscript{685} Without the presupposition of the concept of God, how can we answer these questions with “not necessarily[; the answer] depends upon what is understood of the possibility of salvation, of a final meaning, of recapitulation, indeed, of resurrection?”\textsuperscript{686} In this regard, God is the prerequisite of the question of meaning. In other words, the question of the ultimate meaning of all phenomena presupposes ‘the quest for God’. As G. Sauter points out: “The world may seem to be an incoherent conglomeration, a confusion of accidents with no discernible linkage. Then we experience a lack of meaning, the sickness of spirit that can finally be healed only when the basic meaning of reality ... embraces the spirit. This is how the search for meaning becomes the quest for God ...”\textsuperscript{687} Obviously, this ‘quest for God’ belongs to the realm of religion. As I mentioned earlier, here in the domain of religion the question of the ultimate meaning of the existence of all phenomena from beginning to end is tantamount to the question of the truth claim of God (or gods) as the foundation of meaning, even though “the truth claim made by the religious consciousness must authenticate itself by showing that the

\textsuperscript{685} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{686} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{687} G. Sauter, \textit{The Question of Meaning: A Theological and Philosophical Orientation}, p. 15.
God (or gods) alleged by it can actually be understood as the creator and perfecter of the world as in fact experienced. As discussed above, in this domain we must face the ‘theological circle,’ which is ‘an unavoidable circle wherever the question of the ultimate meaning of history is asked.’ Christians claim that ‘[w]ithin the circle of this theological system, it is Christianity in which key and answer [to the question of meaning] are found.

With what kind of answer to the question of the meaning of han does Christianity provide us? In Christianity, what do we have to think of as the ultimate answer to the question of the meaning of fundamental han? If we can make a truth claim of God in Christianity, what role does God play in overcoming han?

To pursue these questions thoroughly, we first need to think about the possibility of God’s suffering. We also have to face the problem of evil and nothingness as the matrix of han in order for us to properly consider the why of God’s suffering through the crucified Jesus. (If we cannot [probably due to the western theology’s emphasis upon God’s omnipotence] and do not seriously deal with this problem of evil, especially with regard to its origin, then there is a possibility to make a caricature of God’s suffering, and to make God a ‘sadist’ or ‘masochist’.) Eventually, it is ineluctable for us to consider the surmountability of han if we are to make a thoroughgoing pursuit of the question of the meaning of han.

Let me justify this unavoidability of considering the surmountability of han if we are to thoroughly pursue the question of the meaning of han in this way. When we consider the question of meaning deeply rooted in han, we cannot skirt the issue of the surmountability of han for the sake of preserving meaning in the question of meaning.

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690 Ibid.
It is patent that, if we do not consider the possibility of overcoming han in any sense, we cannot further pursue the question of the meaning of han, because the meaning in the question is intrinsically oriented to the meaningful pursuit of a solution to the question—otherwise it is lost. Hence, dealing with the aporia of the surmountability of han is the prerequisite of our genuine involvement in searching for solutions to the question of meaning especially on the basis of han.

The aporia of the surmountability of han is to be dealt with in two ways: practical and fundamental. As I have intended in the above-mentioned series of questions, two questions are to be asked with regard to the surmountability of han: ‘what can be posited as a practical answer to the question of the meaning of han?’; ‘what is to be thought of as the ultimate answer to the question of the meaning of han?’ With these questions in mind, I turn to the final chapter, where I will try to solve them. Before doing justice to these questions, however, I will have to consider two things in relation to the question of the meaning of ‘han: the Christian way of understanding God’s suffering, and the aporia of evil and nothingness as the matrix of han.
CHAPTER V. *HAN*, RESURRECTION, AND THE QUESTION OF MEANING

In this final chapter I seek an answer to the question of the meaning of *han*, the bearer or subject of which is *minjung*, as considered in the previous chapter. I find the only answer to the question in the ‘resurrection’. Hence I will pursue the answer in terms of ‘resurrection’ and do so in two ways: the ‘solutions’ to *han* by the *minjung*, which are conceived of as the praxis of the resurrection, as a practical mode of the answer, and Jesus’ resurrection as the fundamental mode of the answer. In particular, it needs to be noted that the *minjung* acts of revolt against their oppressors, which are active solutions to *han* (the live expressions of *han* as rancour), are treated by *minjung* theologians as historical manifestations of Jesus’ resurrection.

Before answering this question of meaning, we need to attempt to answer the question, ‘Why did God raise Jesus from the dead?’ For me this question is tantamount to the ontological question of the why of the existence of evil. And this ontological question of evil is related to the question of the suffering of God. I will therefore first consider the suffering of God from the perspective of *han*, which begins with my own criticism on the views of history by Pannenberg and Barth from the perspective of the history of *han*. I will then seek an answer to the question of the why of the existence of evil as the matrix of *han*. In so doing, my special attention will be given to dealing with the aporia of the origin of evil, which results in the formulation of a domain-oriented dualism. This will be followed by my attempt to place *han* next to the traditional Christian concept of sin, which is to result in a necessary complement of the concept from the perspective of *han*. I will then seek answers to the question of meaning in the two ways mentioned above.

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A. Han and the Suffering of God

a. Pannenberg’s ‘Revelation as History’ and the History of Han

As we saw above in the second chapter, Pannenberg’s view of history is based upon the conception of ‘revelation as history’. In this conception he views every event in history as a result of God’s activity. Thus for him God has revealed Godself ‘in and though history’, which means nothing other than the identification of revelation with history.

It seems to me that there are some fundamental problems in Pannenberg’s view of history, especially from the perspective of the history of han. The first one is related to the what of God’s self-revelation, that is, the meaning (or content) of God’s revelation, as opposed to the how of God’s revelation, that is, the mode of expression of the revelation. Pannenberg’s application of analytic methodology to the Old Testament in order to establish his view of ‘revelation as history’ seems to have prevented him from grasping the meaning (or content) of God’s self-revelation expressed in and through the events of the history of ancient Israel. In order to grasp the fundamental meaning of God’s revelation, we should consider the whole Bible not analytically, but synthetically. Discovering the real purpose of God’s self-revelation calls for investigation into the whole Bible not microscopically, but macroscopically. The Bible needs to be seen holistically if we are to grasp the true meaning of God’s revelation. To put it in an illustrative way, in order to sketch the whole shape of a mountain, we should not approach the mountain close enough to touch trees and shrubs in it, but see it as a whole from a distance.
When we see the Bible holistically, what sort of God do we meet? Within the holistic view of the Bible we first encounter the God of the ‘Habiru (=Hebrews)’, that is, the God of the poor, the weak, and the oppressed. We encounter this God of the ‘Hebrews’ especially through the event of the Exodus. The Old Testament shows that the God of the Exodus is the God who ‘hears’ the cries of the ‘Habiru’, ‘knows’ their sufferings, and ‘sees’ their oppression. Yahweh, the God of the Israelites, is no other than the God of the ‘Hebrews’, who vindicates widows, orphans and strangers. The God of the Old Testament is the God who hears the cries of the ‘Hebrews’ that are caused by their unjustifiable sufferings, and delivers them from them.

In short, God in the Bible is the Immanuel for minjung, that is, God-with-us-minjung. We need to grasp God’s participation in human suffering as the meaning of God’s self-revelation through this holistic view of the Old Testament. Whether God’s self-revelation is to be located in the word of God or in the events of the history of the Israelites is not so important for us to grasp the meaning of God’s revelation, considered in terms of the meaning of han. What matters here is that we should grasp God’s participation in human suffering, especially in the unjustifiable sufferings of

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691 In his study of the God of the Old Testament Joon-Seo Park, an Old Testament theologian in Korea, defines Yahweh as the God of the ‘Hebrews’. According to him, in the whole area of the ancient Near East there was a social class called ‘Habiru’ or ‘Hapiru’. This ‘Habiru’ class was the class of people who were political, economic, and social outsiders of the society. In short, they were the lower, poor people of the society. This class consisted of captives, corvée-labourers, wanderers fallen into slavery on contract basis, mercenaries, all of whom are called ‘Habiru’. Then he shows the etymological demonstration of the identification of ‘Habiru’ with ‘ibri’, which is tantamount to ‘Hebrew’. Hence, when the God of the Israelites is called the God of the Hebrews (cf. Ex. 5:2; 7:16; 9:1; 9:13; 10:3), this God is meant to be the God of weak, poor people, that is, the God of outsiders of the society. (Cf. Joon-Seo Park, “Guayage Natanan Hananim: Hibriui Hananim [The God Who Appeared in the Old Testament: The God of the Hebrews],” in The Committee of Theological Studies, KNCC, ed., Minjungkkwa Hankokshinhan [Minjung and Korean Theology] (Seoul: Hankuk Sinhak Yeon-guso, 1982), pp. 133ff.) Influenced by this, Nam-Dong Suh, one of the founders of Minjung theology, claims that Yahweh is the God of ‘slaves’ as the subjects of the Exodus, that is, the God of the oppressed and the neglected of the society. (Cf. idem, An Exploratio into Minjung Theology, pp. 234ff., esp., p. 237.) In this regard, the God as the Vindicator of the oppressed and the neglected becomes the God of minjung in minjung theology. Minjung theologians find their biblical basis for minjung theology in this concept of God of the ‘Hebrews’, together with the concept of the όςος υπήρξεν in the Gospels. For όςος cf. Byung-Mu Ahn, Galilaean Yesu: Yesuui Minjungundong [Jesus of Galilee: Jesus’ Minjung Movement] (Cheoan City, Chungcheongnamdo: Hankuk Sinhak Yeon-guso, 1990), pp. 126ff.

692 Cf. Ex. 3:7-10.

the minjung, as the real meaning of God’s revelation throughout the whole Bible. The suffering of God by way of God’s participation in the sufferings of minjung is the very meaning of God’s self-revelation throughout the whole course of human history. Only the suffering God, who can and actually does take part in the unjustifiable sufferings of minjung, can be placed on the horizon of the history of han, which means that only this God can provide the ultimate answer to the why of han.

It seems to me that, when he considered the self-revelation of Yahweh, God of the Israelites, Pannenberg overlooked or disparaged this point, that is, God’s participation in human suffering, especially in the suffering of minjung, as the fundamental meaning of God’s self-manifestation. Perhaps this was due to the methodological limitation of his analytic approach to the pursuit of the problem of the locus of God’s self-revelation. Pannenberg himself clearly claims God’s ‘personal’ aspect. As he points out: “… the word ‘God’ is inescapably personal. A non-personal basis for the universe cannot rightly be called ‘God’. … Anyone who says ‘God’ says ‘person’.”

He claims the ‘personality’ of God, in spite of the risk that he has to face ‘modern criticism of the idea of God’, which “has in fact to a large extent sought to lay bare the anthropomorphic aspects of the idea of God as a personality which might seem to be a mere reflection of the human personality.” Here in this claim of God’s ‘personality’ there is no room for the Kantian transcendental God, who is thought of as “the idea of the sum total of all possible predicates, containing a priori the data for all particular possibilities.”

Ironically, however, Pannenberg misses the participation of this personal God of the Bible in human suffering as the fundamental meaning of God’s self-manifestation. Hence, even though I agree with Pannenberg’s view that God

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605 Ibid., pp. 111-2.
reveals Godself through the events of history, it seems to me that Pannenberg’s view of ‘revelation as history’ has nothing to do with the history of han, so long as he in his view of history leaves out the possibility of God suffering through participation in human suffering as the fundamental reason of God’s self-revelation.

Secondly, when we conceive of God as the suffering God through participation in the suffering of minjung, we see the homogeneity of God’s revelation through every event in human history. This means that God’s revelation through the Exodus is qualitatively tantamount to the revelation through the incarnation. That is to say, from the perspective of the suffering of God, we cannot say that the former is provisional, whereas the latter is full. There is no qualitative difference between the suffering God with the ‘Hebrews’ in the Exodus and the suffering God with Jesus Christ on the cross. If we can claim that God has fully revealed Godself in and through the events of Jesus’ life, the same thing should be claimed in and through the events of the Exodus, as R. Rendtorff claims. 697 From this perspective, Pannenberg’s attempt to establish the full realisation of God’s self-revelation in the events of Jesus’ life, especially, by his resurrection, seems to be destined to fail.

Thirdly, we can claim within the perspective of God’s suffering through participation in the sufferings of minjung that God has revealed Godself universally from the beginning of human history. If God suffered the suffering which Jesus suffered on the cross, this God also suffered the suffering which the ‘Hebrews’ suffered in the Exodus. This God also suffered the sufferings of the Korean minjung at the time of the Exodus. More antecedently, the God who heard the cry of the slain Abel’s blood from the ground, 698 also heard the cries of the first-generation minjung

698 Cf. Gen. 4:10. Byung-Mu Ahn, one of the founders of minjung theology, reads the outcry of minjung in the story about Cain and Abel. He envisages that the subjects who handed down the story of Abel are the ‘anonymous minjung’. Abel, a representative of minjung, was sacrificed by the established
in the Korean peninsula. The God, who worked with the prophets through their prophecies for the vindication of the oppressed, also worked with the shamans through *kut*, the shamanistic ritual, for the justification of the suffering of *minjung*. Speaking holistically, since the beginning God has cared for the whole world by way of participation in the sufferings of all creatures. Hence, from the perspective of God’s suffering through participation in all kinds of sufferings of God’s creatures, failure seems inevitable for Pannenberg’s assertion that God’s self-revelation will be universally and finally realised at the end of history, as apocalyptic vision holds.

Fourthly, in relation to his claim of the realisation of God’s universal self-revelation at the end of history within the scope of apocalyptic vision, Pannenberg thinks that God’s essence will be inevitably revealed at the end of history. He thinks that, in spite of the realisation of God’s universal and final revelation at the end of history, as depicted in the apocalyptic vision as the ‘eschatologising of history’, the course of history is nothing other than the process of God’s making Godself known to humanity. In this process, however, can we really not know what God’s *esse* is? Can we know the *esse* of God only at the end of history? With regard to God’s *esse*, perhaps we cannot know what God is, because the what-ness of God cannot be intrinsically placed in the domain of human historico-phenomenological comprehension. But we can know who God is, if there has always been suffering since the beginning of history, always will be until the end of history, and the answer to the question ‘why suffering?’ can be found only in the personal God who has

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class, Can. The transmitters of the story underwent the same. Characteristically, these transmitters as anonymous *minjung* had faith in the God who was on the side of the sacrificed. They believed that this God was their God. Besides, they believed that even the land itself was on the side of the sacrificed. The course of ‘formal history’ under the name of Can, that is, the ‘authentic history’ of the established oppressors, came to be changed by the ‘anonymous *minjung*’, who could hear the painful outcry of the *han* of the powerlessly disappeared Abel, and also by the God who was on their side. Cf. Byung-Mu Ahn, *Geusaedo Dasi Nagwonoro Hwaewonsikji Anatta* [Even so, They Were not Allowed to Return back to the Paradise] (Cheonan-gun, Chungcheongnam-do: Hankuk Shinhak Yeon-guso, 1995), pp. 29-31.
suffered the suffering of God’s creatures through participation in it, as the Bible depicts. In other words, we can grasp God’s *esse* in this who-ness of God, in which from the beginning of history God has universally revealed Godself as the suffering God who never forgets the sufferings of *minjung*. If this who-ness of God is related to the *theologia crucis*, we can say with J. Moltmann about the *esse* of God:

> When the crucified Jesus is called the ‘image of the invisible God’, the meaning is that *this* is God, and God is like *this*. God is not greater than he is in this humiliation. God is not more glorious than he is in this self-surrender. God is not more powerful than he is in this helplessness. God is not more divine than he is in this humanity.  

In this personal God who suffers the sufferings of God’s creatures, we can find a basis for the question of the meaning of *han*. In God, and only in God, we find the justification of engaging in this pursuit for a solution to the why of *han* as excruciating pain, pining for something unattainable, everlasting waiting, autogenous sadness, and resignation. In God, and only in God, we see the antithesis of *hwangotbit han* as emitting nihilistic *Weltanschauung* and fundamental *han*. If God, by sharing *han* with God’s creatures, especially, with *minjung*, got involved directly in the history of *han*, thus accompanying them in history from its beginning to its end and not waiting for them at the end of history, then God’s *esse* can be known in the midst of history in terms of the who-ness of God. If God has revealed Godself throughout the whole process of history wholly as the personal God who suffers the sufferings of God’s creatures, God will be encountered as the same personal God at the end of history, and nothing other than this. Hence Pannenberg’s question of God’s *esse* can

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be answered here and now, not only at the end of history. Perhaps this is a result from his overlooking or disparaging the importance of human suffering as a fundamental subject in his theological system. In turn, perhaps this is because, although he admits God as a personal being, he still thinks that “[t]he loftiness of the divine reality makes it inaccessible to us unless it makes itself known.”

Lastly, a more fundamental problem in Pannenberg’s view of ‘revelation as history’ is found in his adherence to the aporia of the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. As we saw in the second chapter, in Jesus’ resurrection he finds a historical basis for proving the God of the Israelites to be the one true God. With the help of the concept of ‘prolepsis’, he claims that God’s final and universal self-manifestation has been realised in Jesus’ resurrection. For him, both the prophetic expectation of God’s universal self-revelation and the apocalyptic visualisation of the ‘End-of-all-events’ at the end of history are ‘proleptically’ realised in Jesus’ resurrection. This is why he tried so elaborately to establish Jesus’ resurrection as a historically-critically verifiable event. It is because he knew that faith in God’s self-revelation without any historical basis was tantamount to faith as “blind gullibility, credulity, or even superstition.” However, his excessive adherence to the pursuit of a historical basis for the knowledge of God in Jesus’ resurrection, by way of elaborate efforts to establish it as a historico-critically verifiable event, seems to have prevented him from grasping the meaning of the event that God tried to show through it. That is to say, Pannenberg tried by historico-phenomenological means to touch the shell of the event by pursuing the historicality of the event, and thus he was unable to grasp the core of the event, which could be comprehended only from the perspective of the history of han. What matters with regard to Jesus’ resurrection is not whether we can

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700 STI, p. 189.
701 TaH, p. 131.
historico-phenomenologically approach the shell of the event, that is, whether we can verify it historico-critically, as an event upon which ‘the knowledge of God’ is based with historical certitude. What really matters here is why God raised Jesus from the dead, that is, the meaning of the event. This problem of ‘why’ can be approached from the perspective of *han*, as will be shown below. Perhaps Pannenberg missed this crucial point, namely, the importance of grasping the why of Jesus’ resurrection in the perspective of human suffering, because he emphatically focused his theological system on establishing knowledge of God on the basis of the historico-critically verifiable event of Jesus’ resurrection, which, as we saw above in the third chapter, is something we try in vain. Someone may consider it ridiculous to find a solution to the problem of human suffering in Jesus’ resurrection, which can be an event that really occurred *illa et tune*, or an eidolon in human history. However, we can have faith in the resurrection as a historical event. In this faith, and only in this faith, we can ask the question of the meaning of human suffering, and find an answer to it. The question of the meaning of human suffering survives in faith, not in a historical knowledge. This is the fundamental issue Pannenberg either missed or overlooked in his ultra-realistic theological system.

Up to this point, I have considered some problems in Pannenberg’s view of revelation as history from the perspective of the history of *han*. By pointing out these problems I intend to show that Christian theology should seriously face the problem of human suffering as one of its fundamental themes. I also intend thereby to justify my efforts to find a solution to this problem in the ‘resurrection’, as will be shown below. I now turn to some problems in Barth’s view of history that arise when it is seen from the perspective of the history of *han*.  

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b. Barth’s ‘History of the Covenant of Grace’ and the History of Han

Barth’s view of human history is based upon a Christocentric orientation towards salvation. As we saw in the first chapter, he seeks the meaning of human history within the purview of ‘salvation history’, i.e., ‘the history of the covenant of grace’. That is to say, he pursues an answer to the why of all kinds of absurdities of world history caused by the *confusio hominum* in the ‘history of the covenant of grace’, the primal axis of which is the incarnation.

For Barth the incarnation is the substantial content of the covenant and the purpose of God’s *creatio ex nihilo*. As we saw in the first chapter, according to Barth, the incarnation is God’s plan from all eternity. That is to say, in God’s ‘free love’ God “has resolved in Himself from all eternity on His fellowship with man in the person of His own Son.”702 This is the starting point for the history of the covenant of grace. From this perspective, the necessity of creation is the field of the realisation of the incarnation. For Barth, therefore, the covenant on the basis of God’s free election is the ‘internal basis of creation’, while creation is “the road to the covenant, its external power and external basis.”703 All these claims derive from Barth’s ‘retrospective’ consideration of the incarnation as it occurred in Jesus Christ. Within this ‘retrospective’ consideration of Jesus Christ as God’s own Son, Barth considers the ‘election’ of the Son to be the eternal basis for the incarnation within the Trinitarian perspective.704

702 *CD*, III/1, p. 230.
It is beyond doubt that Barth pursues the meaning of human existence in the midst of suffering in the ‘history of the covenant of grace’. It seems that this is why he, by way of the concept of the covenant of grace, considered human sin to be the basic ‘cause’ for human salvation, and as a result could not avoid the question of the origin of human sin. As we saw above, he finds the origin of sin in nothingness, the real knowledge of which can be gained through the cross of Jesus Christ. According to Barth, “in a third way of its own nothingness ‘is’.705 That is to say: “It ‘is’, not as God and His creation are, but only in its own improper way, as inherent contradiction, as impossible possibility.”706 Because of this ontic characteristic—the ‘impossible possibility’ of nothingness—human beings cannot get direct access to its reality. In other words, “nothingness cannot be an object of the creature’s natural knowledge.”707 Here he introduces ‘Christological epistemology’, which is regarded as “the sole basis for knowledge of nothingness where humanity is incapable of any true knowledge of nothingness independent of God’s rejection of it.”708 By introducing this, Barth claims that the only way to grasp the reality of nothingness is the cross of Jesus Christ. Furthermore, because human sin as the concrete form of nothingness has the same ontic ground as nothingness, it can also be known through and in the event of the suffering of God on the cross. Here, in this event, human beings find the total accomplishment of their salvation from the threat of nothingness. Through the suffering of God on the cross nothingness, and sin as its concrete form in human history, have been radically overcome once and for all. Hence we may not be sure of our salvation in an asymptotic way. For Barth, therefore, “[i]t is no longer legitimate to think of it [nothingness] as if real deliverance and release from it were still an event

705 CD, p. 349 (author’s emphasis)
706 Ibid., p. 351.
707 Ibid., p. 350.
of the future.” Conclusively, in Barth’s Christocentric scheme of salvation history “Jesus Christ is the centre and meaning of the cosmos and history.”

A fundamental problem arises with regard to the meaning of human suffering when we consider, under the perspective of the history of †han, Barth’s claim of a once-and-for-all accomplishment of human salvation from nothingness and sin, as its concrete form, in and through the suffering of Jesus Christ, God’s own Son, on the cross. From the perspective of the history of †han we can say that human suffering did not dwindle quantitatively or qualitatively after the event of the cross of Jesus Christ, with the event as the salvific apex. Rather, we have to say pessimistically with Reinhold Niebuhr that “the possibilities of evil grow with the possibilities of good, and that human history is therefore not so much a chronicle of the progressive victory of the good over evil, of cosmos over chaos, as the story of an ever increasing cosmos, creating ever increasing possibilities of chaos.” It seems that, from the historico-phenomenological point of view, evil power has been more sinister, more structural and larger in scale since this salvation-achieving event. In this situation, how can we believe that God has defeated the evil power once and for all through the event of the cross? With the evil power affecting human history more structurally and in more large-scale forms, as we see in the history of †han, we must admit with G. V. Jones: “The fact remains that the kingdom of the Nichtige [nothingness], the rule of Evil, has not been liquidated. If the term ‘defeat’ has any meaning it is that the enemy is no longer there or has been disintegrated or has capitulated, that is, it has no more power. This is manifestly not the case. The sinister is as potent as ever.” How, then, can we claim that the power of nothingness belongs only to the past, as being “routed and

709 CD, III/3, p. 364.
710 CD, III/4, p. 577.
extirpated”. Seeing how the vortices of nthingness have so efficaciously produced the han of the minjung throughout history, how can we assert that “[n]othingness is the past, the ancient menace, danger and cstruction, the ancient non-being which obscured and defaced the divine creation of God but which is consigned to the past in Jesus Christ”? With Barth “we are required by faith to hold together the two facts that evil is manifested around us in all of its most hideous forms, seemingly increasing daily in its hold over us, and yet it is impotent and only an echo and shadow, having been destroyed and resigned to the past.” But of what use is this faith in pursuing the meaning of minjung han, which has accumulated in the Korean minjung history even after the culminating salvific event in salvation history? Considering the content of the history of han, as given in the previous chapter, how can we cope with what feels like God’s ridicule, in which “God still permits His kingdom not to be seen by us, and to that extent He still permits us to be a prey to nothingness”? If we have to believe in God who “thinks it good that we should exist ‘as if’ He had not yet mastered it [nothingness] for us,” how, then, can we find in God and in Jesus’ resurrection meaning for the existence of the babes, whom the cruel Turks “[threw] … in the air and [caught] … on bayonets before their mothers’ eyes”? How can we find in this God an antithesis to these mothers’ excruciating pain in their psyches? Is it too outspoken for us to say that this God is a sadist, because God enjoys ‘silently’ watching God’s partner suffer helplessly from the evil power, which God has conquered once and for all, but has left still powerful as “an instrument of His will

713 CD, III/3, p. 363.
714 Ibid.
715 R. S. Rodin, Evil and Theodicy in the Theology of Karl Barth, p. 204.
716 CD, III/3, p. 367.
717 Ibid.
718 F. Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov: …, p. 274.
and action.719 If we are to orient ourselves to this sadistic understanding of God, we are helpless in our pursuit of the meaning of the han of the minjung in and through this sadistic God. Here I am led to the conviction that it is vital an effort be made to establish an alternative to Barth’s understanding of the suffering of God on the cross as a once-and-for-all conquest of evil power from nothingness, which is the foundation of all suffering, especially human suffering.

Another fundamental and also complex problem arises with regard to Barth’s consideration of the origin of nothingness as the matrix of sin and evil. It seems to me that in Barth’s thought regarding the essence of nothingness there is a self-contradictory ontologico-noetic enigma in relation to the suffering of God on the cross. To begin with, consider the human ‘fall’. Barth clearly claims that the direct responsibility for the ‘fall’ should be ascribed to human being. God is not the cause of the ‘fall’. As Barth says: “Sin is when the creature avails itself of this impossible possibility in opposition to God and to the meaning of its own existence. But the fault is that of the creature and not of God.”720

Does this mean that the creature did choose to sin against God on the basis of its own free will? Barth answers this question in the negative. Unlike Karl Rahner, who asserts that “[F]reedom … is the ability to decide before God about the totality of the self, of accomplishing a definitive self-determination, literally making oneself a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to God,”721 Barth sees human freedom as “self-conscious obedience to God, the complete fulfilment of created human nature which cannot be fulfilled by a decision to be God’s enemy.”722 As Barth says:

719 CD, III/3, p. 367.
720 CD, II/1, p. 503.
722 Ibid., p. 65.
Hence [human being] has not to choose between two possibilities, but between his one and only possibility and his own impossibility, and thus between his being and his non-being, between the reality and unreality of his freedom. To choose freely is to choose oneself in one’s possibility, being and freedom. … Hence the freedom of man is never freedom to repudiate his responsibility before God. It is never freedom to sin.\textsuperscript{723}

But this does not mean that human being is made “simply to be God’s marionette.”\textsuperscript{724} It means: “A person can and must really decide for him or herself. God has given time and space in this world for this to take place. But a person can and must decide rightly in face of the fact that he or she must also say ‘no’ to disobedience.”\textsuperscript{725}

From this perspective, the sin of human creatures is nothing but their disobedience to God’s will, which is tantamount to their rejection of God’s grace. Has the possibility of human rejection of God’s grace been immanent in human nature as such? Barth answers this question in the negative. He certainly would not claim that “man was capable of sin.”\textsuperscript{726} For Barth, “[t]here is no capacity for nothingness in human nature and therefore in God’s creation, nor is there any freedom in this direction as willed, ordained and instituted by God.”\textsuperscript{727} That is to say: “In no sense does it [sin] follow necessarily from what God is in Himself. Nor does it result from the nature of creation. It follows inevitably only from the incomprehensible fact that the creature

\textsuperscript{723} \textit{CD}, III/2, p. 197.
\textsuperscript{724} W. Kröte, “The Humanity of the Human Person in Karl Barth’s Anthropology,” in J. Webster, ed., \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth}, trans. P. G. Ziegler (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 164. The view that human being is not ‘God’s marionette’ is clearly grasped in Barth’s claim: “The purpose of God in granting man freedom to obey is to verify as such the obedience proposed in and with his creation, i.e. to confirm it, to actualise it in his own decision. It is obvious that if this is His will God cannot compel man to obey, He cannot as it were bring about his obedience mechanically.” (\textit{CD}, III/1, p. 264.)
\textsuperscript{725} W. Kröte, “The Humanity of the Human Person in Karl Barth’s Anthropology,” p. 164.
\textsuperscript{726} \textit{CD}, III/3, p. 356.
\textsuperscript{727} \textit{Ibid.}
rejects the preserving grace of God.”  The conundrum here is: if human ‘fall’ was neither willed by God nor originated in human nature, how did it actually happen? What occasioned human rejection of the preserving grace of God?

Barth believes that the human ‘fall’ was occasioned by evil, that is, the ontic power of nothingness. Human beings were created and brought to “the edge of an abyss, where the fall into evil, folly and malice in thought, word and deed is at all times terribly close to [them].”

There they could not resist the insinuating power of nothingness, because they lacked the “power to keep [themselves] from the curse and misery of that which is ungodly and anti-godly.” This means that they could not avoid being prey to the devouring power of evil from nothingness. Imprisoned so irresistibly by the power of evil, they, as its ‘prisoners’, had no other choice but to be led by it. As Barth says:

When man sinned he performed the impossible, not acting as a free agent but as a prisoner. We can and must say, however, that the creature in itself and as such did not and does not confront nothingness in such a way as to be exempt from its insinuation, temptation and power. It cannot, then, be secured against it apart from the grace of God, nor is it a match for it in its own strength.

Here we see that confronting nothingness is not human but divine business. In this respect, if God Godself suffered with Jesus on the cross, God did so in order to confront this nothingness in a radical way.

728 CD, II/1, pp. 503-4.
730 CD, III/1, p. 102.
731 CD, III/3, p. 356.
732 We find in E. Jüngel a concept of the radical confrontation between the crucified God and nothingness in the form of ‘struggle’. According to him, theology should re-orientate itself to the thought that ‘“God on the cross’ is not only the negation of all arbitrary concepts of God but positively
If nothingness occasioned human ‘fall’, whence is it? Where does it originate? This ontological question of the origin of nothingness can and should be pursued primarily in relation to the concept of God’s ‘omnipresence’. According to Barth, God possesses God’s own ‘space’, and ‘creates space’ as well.\textsuperscript{733} By positing God as having God’s own ‘space’, Barth contends that God’s omnipresence should not be regarded as an ‘immovable omnipresence,’\textsuperscript{734} but as a dynamic one. If God’s omnipresence is literally thought of as ‘being everywhere’, and God cannot therefore ‘move’ to ‘anywhere’, then this God cannot be anything but “lifeless and loveless and therefore fundamentally unfree.”\textsuperscript{735} For Barth God’s omnipresence cannot and should not be an object of language games, playing with the words, \textit{ubique} and \textit{musquum}\textsuperscript{736}; “[o]mnipresence cannot mean God’s ‘omni-absence’.\textsuperscript{737} From this perspective, Barth posits God’s omnipresence as a dynamic, movable one, where “He [God] is God in a different way here and there, in a relationship between His here and His there, in a movement from the one to the other and vice versa, with greater or lesser remoteness or nearness between the two.”\textsuperscript{738} It is the very divine essence that God is “to be here and there and everywhere, and therefore to be always somewhere and not nowhere.”\textsuperscript{739} This ‘movable’ omnipresence of God can make room for the possibility of space for God’s creation, which means that God can make Godself finite. In other words, it can be said that God created the space for the creation of all phenomena by

\textsuperscript{733} Cf. \textit{CD}, II/1, pp. 468ff.
\textsuperscript{734} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 473.
\textsuperscript{735} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{736} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 471ff.
\textsuperscript{737} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 472.
\textsuperscript{738} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 473.
\textsuperscript{739} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 472.
way of God’s self-limitation. When God ‘spatially’ limited Godself in order to produce the ‘space’ for creation, it was inevitable that there was ‘space’ for ‘not-God’, that is, the ‘space’ that was not willed by God. This ‘space’ is nothing other than ‘nothingness’. As J. Moltmann asserts, with the help of Isaac Luria’s doctrine of zimsum\(^{740}\): “In order to create a world ‘outside’ himself, the infinite God must have made room beforehand for a finitude in himself. It is only a withdrawal by God into himself that can free the space into which God can act creatively. The nihil for his creatio ex nihilo only comes into being because—and in as far as—the omnipotent and omnipresent God withdraws his presence and restricts his power.”\(^{741}\) From this perspective, nothingness was not created by God, but “the necessary by-product of this creating of space by God.”\(^{742}\) This is why Barth regards tohu wa-bohu in Gen. 1:2, which is to be identified with nothingness,\(^{743}\) neither as ‘self-originated’ nor as ‘willed and posited by God’.\(^{744}\) Here we might recollect Barth’s claim that nothingness ‘is’ ‘in a third way of its own.’\(^{745}\)

To reiterate: nothingness came into being as the ‘necessary by-product’ of God’s creation. According to Barth, however, with God’s creation it came to be ‘obsolete’. God put it aside as ‘things past’; it was left ‘behind God’s back’. As Barth expresses it:

This ugly realm [of nothingness] did exist. Seen from the standpoint of God’s creation as outlined in v. 1 [Gen. 1:1], it is the epitome of that


\(^{743}\) *ibid*.

\(^{744}\) Cf. *CD*, III/1, p. 108. Also cf. *CD*, III/3, p. 353, where Barth emphatically asserts: “It would be untenable from a Christian point of view to ascribe [to nothingness] autonomous existence independent of God or willed by Him like that of His creature.”

which was... As v. 2 [Gen. 1:2] portrays it, in so far as God the Creator of heaven and earth passed by this lower sphere without a halt, it was originally and definitively superseded and declared to be obsolete by what He chose and accomplished by His Word. ... It is only behind God’s back that the sphere of chaos can assume this distinctive and self-contradictory character of reality.746

Barth thinks that human beings rekindled this obsolete reality of nothingness, which had been left behind God’s back, by the misuse of their freedom. For him nothingness was in reality conquered by God with God’s creation through God’s Word. It was really “destroyed by God’s creative act.”747 As R. Ruether puts it: “God’s left hand of wrath and judgement over [it] is sounded from the beginning in his triumph over chaos in creation.”748 But human beings ‘rekindled’ its conquered reality, by making themselves ‘so foolish’. That is, they rekindled nothingness by their “inconceivable rebellion of looking past the Word of God and the ground and measure of [their] own reality, and therefore of looking back and returning to [their] essential past, ... and therefore to [the] state of chaos.”749 They thus “[enabled] that past to defy its own nature and to become present and future.”750 For Barth, “[t]his is the undeniable risk which God took upon Himself in the venture of creation—but a risk for which He was more than a match and thus did not need to fear.”751

Although the evil power of nothingness was rekindled in this way by the misuse of human freedom, it was always thought of in Barth’s theology as subordinated to God’s grace. Barth believes that God has always predominated over the rekindled

746 CD, III/1, p. 108. (author’s emphasis)
747 Ibid.
749 CD, III/1, p. 108.
750 Ibid., p. 109.
751 Ibid.
power of nothingness. Evil can exert its chaotic power only under the ‘permission’ of God, as depicted in The Book of Job. That is to say, nothingness “has no power save that which it is allowed by God.” 752 Hence, for Barth, God is always “the basis and Lord of nothingness.” 753

In Barth’s Christocentric theology, God, through the suffering of Jesus Christ on the cross, completely and radically destroyed this chaotic power of nothingness, once declared to be obsolete, rekindled by human beings through their misuse of freedom, and yet never exerted in its own way, but only under the permission of God. It “radically passed away in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.” 754 It can therefore be said that Barth claims nothingness was made obsolete twice: at its terminus a quo, that is, in the creation, and at its terminus ad quem, that is, on the cross. It also can be said from the perspective of the above etiological consideration of nothingness that, at the terminus a quo, nothingness was partially destroyed and, at the terminus ad quem, it was totally and radically destroyed. Here I find a self-contradictory ontologico-noetic enigma with regard to the suffering of God with Jesus Christ on the cross. Is it ontologico-noetically possible to think that God could truly undergo suffering through the cross for the complete conquest of the ‘partially’ destroyed reality of nothingness, which has always existed under God’s pre-eminence? Can evil that is somehow under God’s manipulation and domination be the genuine cause for God’s real ‘struggle’ against it? If not, how can it be envisaged that God took the risk to put God’s existence in ‘real’ danger in the ‘struggle’ against nothingness through the death of God’s own Son on the cross? If not, must we not say that the triumph-prognosticated suffering of God on the cross was an idolon for real suffering, which means that God ‘apparently’ suffered for the sake of God’s own

752 CD, III/3, p. 351.  
753 Ibid.  
754 CD, III/1, p. 110.
suffering? If this be the case, is God’s suffering on the cross not ‘masochism’? That is, is our suffering nothing but a means for the ‘masochistic’ suffering of God, who has so eagerly become human being in order to take part in it? If from all eternity God planned the incarnation for God’s own suffering on the cross on the basis of God’s own ‘gracious good-pleasure’,\textsuperscript{755}—which had inevitably led to the human ‘fall’,\textsuperscript{756}—is this the case of God doing so to enjoy human suffering? How can we then pursue an answer to the question of the meaning of human suffering in the context of this ‘masochistic’ understanding of the suffering of God, who must be thought of as the ultimate answer to the question of meaning? How can a ‘masochistic’ God give a solution to the ‘autogenous sadness’ in minjung han, which is nothing but minjung’s endless staring at absolute nothingness as their being’s primordial home—which they perpetually pine for, because they are sick of all kinds of phenomena that cause their han, and are eager to take an absolute rest in absolute nothingness?

In Barth’s ‘history of the covenant of grace’ one could perhaps find a foundation for answering the question of the meaning of human suffering, especially, minjung suffering. For this history posits nothingness as the origin of evil, the power of which is the fundamental cause of human suffering and suffering in general, and God as the controller of nothingness. But others criticises Barth’s explanation of the origin of nothingness as too sophisticated and metaphysically oriented, as H. Blocher does: “As

\textsuperscript{755} Barth finds the basic cause of the incarnation in God’s freedom and love, that is, His ‘gracious good-pleasure’. As he says: “Both in eternity and in time it was the act of His divine power and mercy as it is found only in His freedom, in His free love to the world. Only in virtue of His free decision did it take place that as true God He willed to be and become and is true man as well. … It has no basis or possibility, and certainly no necessity, apart from His gracious good-pleasure.” (\textit{CD}, IV/2, p. 41)

\textsuperscript{756} In and through Barth’s doctrine of creation we are impressed that “because so much depended upon the Fall, humanity was not created just so that the Fall was possible, but was destined to fall.” (R. S. Rodin, Evil and Theodicy in the Theology of Karl Barth, p. 112.) Although Barth suggests that God “would in fact have delivered and fulfilled it [the first and eternal Word of God] quite apart from human sin” (\textit{CD}, IV/1, p. 48), by which he “seems to imply that propter nos homines would have applied even without propter nostram salutem;” (J. Thompson, \textit{Christ in Perspective}; …, p. 23), he consistently views in his total blending of the doctrines of election, covenant and creation that the incarnation is inseparable from human ‘fall’ as its prerequisite, and \textit{vice versa}. For Barth, therefore, “the two aspect, God’s primary will and his reaction to sin, are in fact one and the same.” (J. Thompson, \textit{Christ in Perspective}; …, p. 24.)
for his [Barth’s] explanation of the first emergence of evil-nothingness, what is it but academic sleight of hand?"  

At any rate, it does not seem possible for me to find meaning for suffering in Barth’s ‘history of the covenant of grace’, because the culmination of this history—God’s suffering on the cross—is open to interpretation as God’s ‘sadism’, or as God’s own ‘masochism’. On either view there are no grounds for endowing human suffering, especially, the suffering of minjung, with real seriousness. In my view, the possibility of interpreting the suffering of God on the cross as based upon God’s ‘sadism’ or upon God’s own ‘masochism’ derives from Barth’s tenacious adherence to ‘monism’, with its basic belief in the ‘omnipotence’ of God. From this perspective, it seems to me that G. S. Hendry is right in his criticism: “He [Barth] is concerned to avoid the kind of dualism which posits an independent power opposed to God, but he seems to end in a worse position when he derives the strange reality of an opposing power from the logic of God’s free action.”  

This is a real limitation of Christian theology in relation to the aporia of evil and suffering. So long as Christian theology is confined by this, there is no possible answer to the question of meaning.

Is there any alternative to the Christian ‘monistic’ view of God, an alternative in which the question of meaning can be seriously pursued? Before considering this, let me first deal with the suffering of God from the perspective of han.

c. Han and the Suffering of God

In the previous chapter I dealt with the history of han as the background of its formation. Then I attempted to conceptualise han in two categories: atomistic and

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holistic. In the former category I identified han with excruciating pain, pining for something unattainable, everlasting waiting, autogenous sadness and resignation. In the latter I identified it with hwangtobit-coloured nihilistic Weltanschauung and fundamental han. This was followed by contemplating the question of meaning from the perspective of the conceptualised han. There I suggested that the quest for God should be posited as prerequisite for pursuing the question of meaning. I also suggested that, if the Christian God is to be identified with this God the quest for whom is prerequisite of the question of meaning, we need to think about the suffering of God, where the question of the meaning of han could be asked.

When we think about the suffering of God, we face first and foremost the question of the passibility or impassibility of God. It seems to me that, if God is postulated as an impassible being, then this impassible God has nothing to do with human suffering. If we think of God as an impassible God, who “would be even less responsive to us than ‘the most trivial of physical particles,’ his heart unchanged by our most heartfelt pleas,”759 who “would be totally ignorant of the world, as was Aristotle’s God,”760 how can we place this God on the horizon of the question of the meaning of han? If God’s basic characteristic is ‘impassibility’, which can be defined as ‘imperturbability’, ‘unaffectedness’ or else,51 then this God must be an unmoving, immutable and impassive being, totally indifferent to all kinds of phenomenological happenings including human affairs, and especially human suffering. That is to say, this God, “being the immutable source and ground of all being, is totally separate

760 Ibid.
761 R. E. Creel gives impassibility the following eight definitions: “lacking all emotions”; “in a state of mind that is imperturbable”; “insusceptible to distraction from resolve”; “having a will determined entirely by oneself”; “cannot be affected by an outside force”; “cannot be prevented from achieving one’s purpose”; “has no susceptibility to negative emotions”; “cannot be affected by an outside force or changed by oneself.” (Ibid., p. 9; for more details about these, cf. ibid., pp. 3-12.)
from creation, all-sufficient and cannot (and, for some, should not) be affected in God’s self by the suffering of humanity.”

How can this God, who is totally indifferent to human suffering, be posited as the basis for a possible answer to the question of the meaning of han? If we are to “conceive of God as an indestructible giant machine, which will presumably continue to function even after a nuclear war and the destruction of creation,” it does not seem possible to relate this machine-like God, which “feels no pain,” to “[t]he anawim of scripture, the marginales of Latin America, the minjung of Korea, [and] the poor and oppressed ‘little’ ones of the whole world,” whose existence begins and ends with struggling against the indestructible power of evil, and is thus enwrapped within a vortex of unjustifiable suffering. In short, if the Christian God is impassible, then this God cannot be connected to the suffering of all kinds of minjung in the world. This God “who inactively watches how the black pages of the crime registers of mankind are filled is not benevolent but an evil demon.” In this apathetic God we cannot find any clue to solve the question of the meaning of minjung han.

Fortunately, however, we encounter a possible God through the Bible. We hear from the Bible that God is not an apathetic God, but an empathic One, who has participated in human suffering. We read in the Old Testament that God listened to the groaning of the Hebrews under the yokes of the Egyptians and delivered them from their suffering: “Then we cried to the LORD the God of our fathers, and the

764 Ibid.
LORD heard our voice, and saw our affliction, our toil, and our oppression” (Deut. 26:7; RSV). Jeremiah says that, because God is always merciful and compassionate, we can have hope in God.767 The psalmists speak to God of their deploring condition, because they believe God is possible, and will thus respond. That is why a psalmist says: “It is my grief that the right hand of the Most High has changed.” (Ps. 77:10; RSV.) Besides, we are told through the New Testament that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, suffered and died on the cross, which can be interpreted as the suffering of God. What we can infer from all this is that “the God of creation as witnessed in the Scripture is neither the exalted impassible God who is separated from the world by an unbridgeable gulf, nor the impersonal Absolute who cannot be touched by the sufferings of the world, but He is the loving God who participates in and shares with the infirmities of the world which He has created.”768 In other words, “God [of Christians] is a God who saves us not through his domination but through his suffering.”769

On this view, the Christian God is a suffering God. As we have seen right above, through the Bible as a whole God is depicted as the One who suffers with the ‘Hebrews’ (the poor, the weak, and the oppressed), with the prophets, with the psalmists, and with Jesus Christ and his followers. On this basis, we can claim the universality of the suffering of God. That is to say, human history is nothing other than the history of the suffering of God. Where there is the suffering of ‘the poor, the weak, and the oppressed’, that is, the minjung, there is the suffering of God. In D. Sölle’s words: “God suffers where people suffer.”770 From the perspective of this

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767 Cf. Lam. 3:21ff.
universality of the suffering of God, the Christian God can be related to the history of han. From this perspective, the God of the ‘Hebrews’ becomes the God of the Korean minjung as the subject of the history of han. Here ‘Immanuel’—‘God with us’—becomes ‘God with minjung’. In other words, God becomes “the God of outcasts and outsiders.”

If God is the suffering ‘God with minjung’, we can say with this that God feels the excruciating pain that was felt by the mother of the boy who ‘was hunted down and torn to little shreds by the pack of borzoi hounds.’ Then, the han of this mother becomes the han of God. The han of God? Yes, I mean the han of God, for this is the only appropriate prerequisite for placing minjung han on the horizon of the question of meaning. More particularly, I mean the han of God that was historicophenomenologically expressed in the Jewish child’s helpless struggle on the gallows at Auschwitz, as depicted in Elie Wiesel’s book, Night:

One day when we came back from work, we saw three gallows rearing up in the assembly place, … Three victims in chains—one of them, the little servant, the sad-eyed angel … All eyes were on the child. … The three victims mounted together on to the chairs. The three necks were placed at the same moment within the nooses. …

‘At a sign from the head of the camp, the three chairs tipped over. …

The two adults were no longer alive. … But the third rope was still moving; being so light, the child was still alive …

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771 C. S. Song defines God as the ‘God of outcasts and outsiders’. According to him, outcasts and outsiders are those who live ‘without face, honour and identity’ in their society. Because God is their God, God is in the same state as theirs, until they are given these things. As Song asserts: “God, too, is without face, without identity, without personhood, until those outcasts and strangers have given it to God! God is non-God insofar as there are outcasts. God is non-God as long as outsiders remain outsiders. … And as long as certain men, women, and children are treated as outcasts and outsiders, God chooses to be the God of outcasts and outsiders.” (Idem, Jesus and the Reign of God [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993], p. 34.)

772 Cf. F. Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov: …, p. 279.
For more than half an hour he stayed there, struggling between life and death, dying in slow agony under our eyes. ... He was still alive when I passed in front of him. ...

Behind me, I heard the same man asking:

‘Where is God now?’

And I heard a voice within me answer him:

‘Where is he? Here He is—He is hanging here on this gallows ...’

The han of God is historico-phenomenologically explicit in God’s ‘hanging here on this gallows’. In God’s han God “is on the side of the sufferer[.] God is on the side of the victim, he is hanged.” On this view of God as the co-sufferer of human suffering, the han of God is “the only morally (and theologically) acceptable answer that we can give to the despairing Jew [on the gallows].” Only within this view, we can keep pursuing the question of the why of the minjung han.

One thing should be borne firmly in mind at this point: the han of God is not the projection of the han of minjung into the possibility of God by way of human empathy. It derives from faith in the suffering God as witnessed throughout the Bible. In this faith is rejected a ‘sadistic’ God, who “imposes suffering, who looks down on Auschwitz from above.” By this faith we can be assured that God really suffers and participates in the han of minjung. The accumulated han of minjung throughout the whole history of han is coagulated into the han of God.

From the viewpoint of the universality of the suffering of God, the suffering and death of Jesus Christ on the cross is not the unique and final revelation of the

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774 D. Sölle, Suffering, p. 148.
suffering of God. As Frances Young claims: “Jesus is not the only evidence for the suffering of God.” According to her:

...God’s involvement in his world must be far more intense and intimate—indeed of a quite different order from the most intense human sympatheia. God in his immanence really shares in, participates in, identifies himself with particular instances of human tragedy. The cross particularizes this involvement for us and saves it from being a rather vague, general and therefore somewhat ‘unreal’ truth about God. But this particularization should not be allowed to imply that God was really present there in a way quite different from anywhere else; for on such a view the reality of God’s involvement in other instances of profound tragedy may be overshadowed by the story of the cross rather than illuminated by it.

In this regard, the cross is no more than a beautiful representation of the han of God. This means the denial of the uniqueness of the suffering of Jesus Christ on the cross. That is to say, “[t]he suffering of Christ, [D. Sölle] asserts, cannot be claimed as either more intense or of a different kind from the suffering of the boy on the gallows.” Hence the cross cannot be given the finality of the suffering of God and humanity, because, in that case, it is inevitably endowed with a specific meaning, that is, the conquest of divine and human suffering. As soon as we see the end of divine and human suffering in the cross, we unavoidably face the start of God’s sadism, as in Barth’s Christocentric understanding of nothingness as the matrix of suffering. Once again, this sadistic God has nothing to do with the question of the meaning of the minjung han.

When we deal with human suffering in the traditional Trinitarian concept of God, we eventually face the danger of understanding God’s suffering in and through the cross as God’s masochism. The two basic elements for the possibility of God’s masochism are the unique identification of Jesus with God Godself, as in the traditional doctrine of the Trinity, and the concept of the omnipotence of God. From the perspective of the doctrine of the Trinity, we can say with J. Moltmann that in and through the cross “‘God’ is forsaken by ‘God’.780” What on earth can this ‘God’s forsakenness by God’ mean within the scope of the concept of God’s omnipotence? If, from the perspective of God’s omnipotence, we can foresee God’s winning edge to be intrinsically contained in the suffering of God through the cross, achieved in and through Jesus’ resurrection, how can we give realistic seriousness to God’s suffering? If God has really participated in human suffering through the cross, does this not mean that God’s participation is nothing but God’s masochism in the respect that God has already overcome the cause of suffering with the help of God’s omnipotent power, as seen above in Barth’s doctrine of nothingness? In this masochistic understanding of God’s suffering we can neither ask the question of the meaning of the minjung han, nor pursue an answer to it.

In order to continue with pursuing the question of the meaning of han, it needs to be maintained that God’s universal suffering through the history of han remains intact and persistent. The sadistic and masochistic understanding of God’s suffering on the cross deviates in an essential way from the horizon on which it is possible to pursue this question of meaning. For in this understanding we have already been given an answer in the historical reality of the cross, and thus there is no more need to pursue the question of meaning. The starting point to be freed from the sadistic and

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780 J. Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, p. 80.
masochistic understanding of God’s suffering is to focus our thinking on human suffering itself, as D. Sölle does. When we look at human suffering itself ‘from below’, we, like Sölle, can totally give up the traditional concept of God’s omnipotence. As she states: “Both sadistic and masochistic theologies of suffering can be criticized because of … the omnipotence of a heavenly being who decrees suffering.” 781 Within the scope of the rejection of God’s omnipotence and the acceptance of God’s love, we can claim that “all are ‘innocent’.” 782 Within the historico-phenomenological approach to human suffering, blended with the rejection of the concept of God’s omnipotence, we can say with Sölle: “But in a deeper sense all humans are innocent: no one deserves to starve to death, and not a single one of the six million who died in the gas chamber—even if they otherwise lied, stole, or were beasts—ever ‘deserved’ the suffering inflicted on them.” 783 When we concentrate ourselves on thinking of human suffering ‘from below’, we unavoidably reach the claim that all of us are ‘innocent’, which entails the involvement in our suffering by God as our co-sufferer. Thus, so long as the suffering of the innocent minjung persists, God suffers with them. Under this circumstance, the question of meaning can be pursued persistently.

If we depict the suffering of God in this way, is there any possibility of envisaging any salvific momentum in this scheme of persisting divine and human suffering? If divine and human suffering persists, is it not the case that there can be no moment of salvation? As Don Cupitt criticises: “The god of the modern patripassian believer is nothing but Humanity … He is merely the tears and fellow feeling of humanity. There is no salvation in him.” 784 What is the meaning of God’s struggling with the ‘child on

781 D. Sölle, Suffering, p. 25.
782 Ibid.
783 Sölle, Theology for Skeptics: ..., p. 65.
the gallows’, then? Against what does God struggle in God’s participation in the boy’s suffering on the gallows, in Jesus’ suffering on the cross, and in all other sufferings occurred in the history of man?

For the question of the ‘against what’ of God’s struggling we unavoidably have to posit a kind of power opposing to God, because, otherwise, we cannot help putting ourselves back into the problem of the sadistic and masochistic understanding of the suffering of God. By this it might be implied that any possibility we posit must be open to dualism. But we cannot grasp the fundamental reason why God should persistently struggle in God’s participation in human suffering, if we do not consider the question of the ‘struggling against what’. So this danger is intrinsic to a total focus in our thinking on human suffering ‘from below’, as in the case of D. Sölle. If we think that God struggles against the power of evil as the fundamentum of human suffering and all kinds of sufferings in the realm of phenomena by God’s participation in the suffering of every creature, and that God’s suffering is not sadistic or masochistic, then we unavoidably have to posit dualism. And in relation to the possibility of dualism Jesus’ resurrection is the only genuine mode for God’s struggle against nothingness and evil, the fundamentum of suffering. As E. Jüngel points out, “the proclamation of the resurrection of Jesus reveals the sense in which God involves himself in nothingness.”785 In and through the possibility of dualism, and only in and through this, God’s struggle against evil can be thought of as a serious one. And in and through this possibility Jesus’ resurrection cannot be regarded as the accomplished totality of destruction and conquest of nothingness, evil and suffering, but as the ongoing process of God’s confrontation with the unconquerable evil power of nothingness. It is in this ongoing process that we are to discover God’s salvific

785 E. Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: ..., pp. 218-9.
momentum on which we place our hope, a momentum which, we hope, is oriented towards establishing a physically ameliorated state for all suffering phenomenological beings at the end of the history of the universe.

What kind of dualism, then, can I pursue with regard to the origin of evil? How will this complement the Christian concept of sin? These are the themes of the next section, which will be followed by the pursuit of an answer to the question of the meaning of *han* in the concept of ‘resurrection’.

**B. Han, Evil, and the Question of Meaning**

*a. The Question of the Origin of Evil: Towards a Domain-Oriented Dualism*

As we can infer from the above section of this chapter, if we wish to pursue the question of the meaning of human suffering seriously, we have to give up the traditional Christian concept of the omnipotence of God. We have to be “willing to try to modify traditional claims about God’s all-powerfulness so as to be able to speak convincingly to those traumatized by the mass horrors of the modern era.” This is why D. Šölle explicitly states her objection against the omnipotent God. This is why she criticises J. Moltmann’s *theologia crucis*: although he portrayed God as the ‘God of the poor and oppressed’, and even as the ‘crucified God’, by which he expressed his objections against the ancient concept of the apathetic God, he still did not give up the concept of God as the omnipotent Father, in order to undergird the

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proposition, ‘God is forsaken by God’.\textsuperscript{788} For me, the God who is omniscient, but not omnipotent, is the only prerequisite for the genuine pursuit of the question of meaning especially in relation to suffering, because only in this concept can we overcome the sadistic and masochistic aspect of God’s suffering, as grasped particularly in Barth’s Christocentric theological system, and generally in the traditional Christian orthodox doctrine of monotheism.

When we seek the question of the origin of evil within the concept of the God who is omniscient and non-omnipotent, we embrace the possibility of dualism. What kind of dualism should we pursue within this concept of God? To answer this question, we need to speculate on how God created the world of phenomena.

If we believe that God created the universe, three possibilities can be posited for a theistic cosmogony. The first is that there was a kind of ‘source matter’, and God used it for the creation, as a potter makes a pot out of clay. Hence this can be called the potter-type cosmogony. The second is that God, like a magician, created the world out of nothing, as orthodox Christian theology claims. This is the magician-type cosmogony. The third is ‘emanationism’, which maintains that God established the world from within Godself, as a spider spins its web out of itself. Hence this can be called the spider-type cosmogony.\textsuperscript{789}

Let me relate these three types of cosmogony to the problem of the origin of evil. The potter-type of cosmogony posits a pre-existent ‘matter’ or ‘condition’, which can limit the way and scope of God’s creation. Epistemologically, then, from the

\textsuperscript{788} Cf. ibid., pp. 26-7.

perspective of the limitation intrinsically implied in the creation of God as the ‘efficient cause’, not as the ‘material cause’. God in this type of cosmogony “cannot be claimed as omnipotent nor as the Ultimate or Absolute.”

If this concept of a non-omnipotent God is blended with the aportia of evil, along with the proposition of the ‘all-goodness’ of God, it can be said that evil has existed as a principle independent from God, as intrinsically contained in the pre-existing ‘matter’ or ‘condition’. This may result in Manichean dualism, in which it is maintained that “there existed before the creation of heaven and earth, two principles … one good and the other evil” and that “evil was a self-originating principle and not the outcome of man’s proclivity to sin.” In Manichaeism “hyle, matter, is in itself a principle independent of and standing over against God—although they [Manichees] denied that in allowing such a principle they were in fact speaking of two separate Gods.” If God’s possibility is claimed in this dualism, God in this type of cosmogony looks too wretched and weak to be worshipped. This God makes human beings feel pathos for God’s wretchedness under the situation of the struggling against evil. For this God “[p]assibilism is in danger of promoting pity over worship.”

The real danger in this view of God as non-omnipotent and persistently struggling against evil as one of the two everlasting principles, is that it is out of the question for human beings to be nostalgic in their suffering for a salvific moment in history brought about by the God. No soteriological conception can arise within the schema of the persistent struggle between the two primordial principles. The evil power

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remains perpetual, as the power of God does. All creatures are persistently under the threat of evil power. For human beings there is no salvation, no release from suffering caused by evil. In short, “Manichaeism remains a rigid form of dualism from beginning to end, without any means of overcoming [the] conflict [between the two principles].” In this rigid dualism only deep pessimism persists and under these circumstances, we cannot ask the question of the meaning of suffering. Hence, if this pessimistic view of dualism is intrinsically implied by this type of cosmogony, it is useless for addressing the meaning of han-filled minjung existence.

Perhaps the deep pessimism of Manichean dualism is overcome by Zoroastrian dualism. Zoroastrianism maintains: “God knows that the moment his creation moves from the spiritual to the material the evil spirit will attack it, because it is good, and it will thus become a battleground for their two forces. But in the end, God also knows he will win the cosmic struggle there and be able to destroy evil, achieving a universe which will be wholly good forever.” The problem here is: why does God not stop evil’s penetrating into the domain of God’s good creation? If God is able to destroy evil in the end, then God is not non-omnipotent. Then, why does God not destroy it from the beginning, thus producing no history fully registered by suffering? Here the theme of God’s ‘sadism’ resurfaces. Hence this kind of dualism merely embroidered with a soteriological brooch is also useless for the question of the meaning of the minjung han.

In a spider-type cosmogony like ‘emanationism’ we see the possibility of pantheism. In emanationism all realities in the world of phenomena emanate from God’s essence. Conversely, God is immanent in the existence of every creature. A

remarkable example of pantheism is found in the Buddhist thought of \textit{tathagatagarbha}. According to this thought, the seed of a \textit{tathagata}, that is, an enlightened one, is immanent in all beings of the world of phenomena. Speaking radically, every existence in the world of phenomena is essentially identified with a \textit{tathagata} as the ultimate reality. From this perspective, common people can easily become \textit{tathagatas}, if they make themselves free from their delusional ignorance, which leads to a shallow theory of the inherent goodness of human nature.\footnote{797}

Immanence on the basis of emanationism can be also traced in Taoism. In the \textit{Tao Te Ching}, the fundamental Taoist textbook, it is maintained that “all determinate beings … are regarded as products of an ultimate reality which is not itself a determinate being and which is therefore indescribable or nameless.”\footnote{798} This ‘indescribable or nameless’ is nothing but the \textit{Tao}. The \textit{Tao}, that is, the One, produces the Many. But the \textit{Tao} may not be essentially identified with the Many, because, while the Many is destined to undergo vicissitudes, the One is beyond them. Hence the \textit{Tao} is the transcendent, remaining the matrix of all existence in the world of phenomena. Furthermore, the \textit{Tao} is immanent in all things. And all things in the world of phenomena eventually return to the \textit{Tao}.\footnote{799} In this regard, Taoist cosmology looks similar to Nietzschean ‘eternal recurrence’, because it might be suggested with the \textit{Tao}'s move by ‘turning back’ that “the One is the universe, which pursues a cyclic


\footnote{799} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, pp. 44-5.
course, producing the Many in a process of self-transformation, absorbing them into itself, and then reproducing them once more.\footnote{ibid p. 46.}

How is the aporia of the origin of evil dealt with in emanationism? In the spider-type of cosmogony we ineluctably think of good and evil originating in God, the ultimate reality. This suggests that evil is an essential characteristic of the ultimate reality, from which we would infer that God is evil as well as good. We should discard here the concept of God embroidered with omnipotence, omniscience and all-goodness. The God, who has silently looked down the pandemonic vortices of evil power throughout human history, cannot be good.\footnote{ibid.} This God cannot therefore be a foundation for the question of the meaning of suffering. When God is conceived of as both good and evil, as in this spider-typed monistic cosmogony, the question of meaning is itself shattered, because its raison d’être can only be found in the all-good God’s genuine struggling against evil, and yet in this cosmogony the struggling is not genuine due to God’s embracing of both good and evil. If God is conceived of as having evil characteristic, this God cannot genuinely struggle against evil, because evil cannot be antagonistic to evil. From this perspective, God in emanationism cannot be a basis for the question of meaning.

The real danger in Taoism and Buddhism is that the question of the meaning of suffering vanishes through the ‘relativisation’ of good and evil. In Taoism the Tao is regarded as “the self-transforming Universe, in which the relative distinctions made

\footnote{From this viewpoint, we can agree with R. L. Rubenstein, who, after the Holocaust, “has followed the logic of the problem of evil to the conclusion that God cannot be good.” (E. B. Borowitz, “Dynamic Sunyata and the God Whose Glory Fills the Universe,” in J. B. Cobb, Jr. and C. Ives, eds., The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation [Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990], p. 84.) For overcoming the concept of the ‘no-good’ God, Rubenstein posits God as “the Holy Nothingness, known to mystics of all ages, out of which we have come and to which we shall ultimately return” (R. L. Rubenstein, After Auschwitz [Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill], p. 154; quoted by E. B. Borowitz in idem, “Dynamic Sunyata and the God Whose Glory Fills the Universe,” p. 84.), which is comparatively similar to the Buddhist concept of śāntavā. For śāntavā, see the text just below.}
by human beings between up and down, left and right, far and near, good and evil, are
transcended or lose their meaning. In Buddhism, within the view that the seed of
Buddha is immanent in all things, there can arise the proposition, ‘there is no
difference between Buddha and a common person’, which is to be developed into the
‘meta-ethical’ proposition, ‘there is no difference between good and evil’. And with
this ‘meta-ethical’ proposition we face a potentially ‘value-absent’ proposition, within
the view of which our efforts to overcome the structural evil in our society are
nullified. How can the question of the meaning of suffering be asked seriously in
relation to this relativisation of good and evil in which there is no room for genuine
evil? In the end, the question of meaning evaporates within such a relativised view.

One thing that needs to be mentioned here with regard to the relativisation of
values in Buddhism is that the absolute foundation of this relativised ethical view on
values is śūnyatā, that is, ‘emptiness’, which can be designated as ‘absolute
nothingness’. In Buddhist thought śūnyatā is ‘absolute nothingness’, from which
even God emerges. This śūnyatā, called ‘nothing’ in Pseudo-Dionysius, is not to be
grapsed “simply as no-thing or no-being, so that we understand nothing as be-ing
itself (ipsum esse), or as simply and unlimitedly being. Rather, nothing: beyond being
and hence, beyond cause.” This ‘nothing’ as ‘beyond being and cause’ is absolutely
hidden; it is totally incomprehensible. As Pseudo-Dionysius depicts: “[N]o unity or
trinity or numbers, or oneness, or anything among beings, or anything known among

802 F. Copleston, Religion and the One: ..., p. 46.
541-2.
C. Ives, eds., The Emptying God: ..., p. 27.
806 J. D. Jones, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite: The Divine Names and Mystical Theology (Milwaukee,
Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1980), p. 91 Quoted by D. Charles in idem, “Nothingness as
being, brings down the hidden-ness—beyond all and beyond logos and intellect—of the beyond divinity beyond be-ing beyond be-ingly beyond all.”

Śūnyatā is to be identified totally with this ‘nothing’. It is thus “entirely unobjectifiable, unconceptualizable, and unattainable by reason or will.” Śūnyatā as such is beyond good and evil and thus duality of good and evil is overcome in it. In the awakening to śūnyatā the distinction between good and evil in the world of phenomena is relativised, and therefore such concepts as absolute good or absolute evil cannot arise. Indeed what arises is the reversion of the two values, which means nothing other than ‘the undifferentiated sameness of good and evil’. If this is the case, there cannot be any absolute standard for the judgment on ethical value. How can we, then, ask the question of meaning, which needs to be based upon an absolute standard of judgment on good and evil? If evil is good and vice versa, does this not mean that suffering caused by evil may be good? It would thus be ethically meaningless to ask the question of the meaning of suffering. In the end, it is out of the question to ask the question of meaning itself in this relativised view on good and evil.

The most difficult problem in Buddhist thought for the question of meaning is related to the origin of evil. Because śūnyatā is beyond good and evil, it has no relationship with evil. That is to say, evil cannot derive from it. The question is then: unde malum? In Buddhism the cause of evil is thought of in terms of karma. The basis of karma is avidya, “the endless, unconscious thirst to be.” This avidya arises suddenly. The ‘suddenly’ ‘does not indicate ‘suddenness’ in the temporal sense, but

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807 Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, The Divine Names, XIII, 3 (980 D-981 A). Quoted by D. Charles in silem, “Nothingness as the Ultimate,” p. 226, from J. D. Jones’s quotation in his Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite: ... p. 91.
808 M. Abe, “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata,” p. 27.
810 M. Abe, “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata,” p. 45.
rather ‘without why’ in terms of causality.\(^{811}\) If avidya arises without cause, then karma also arises accidentally. This results in the accidental happening of evil. Here the aporia of the origin of evil in Buddhism falls into sheer accidentalism.\(^{812}\) If we conceive of evil as happening ‘without cause’, how and where can we find a basis for the question of meaning? Facing evil without cause, can we seriously ask the question of meaning? In other words, under the circumstances of ‘endless’ karma, where evil occurs ‘without cause’, is it worth asking the question of meaning? We seem, then, to fall into sheer nihilism: even if evil and karma are to be overcome individually in the true awakening to śūnyatā, they remain permanently in the whole process of karma, because in Buddhist thinking karma is thought to be ‘endless’, and, so long as karma persists, avidya can happen at any time, which in turn results in evil happening. Within this circular Weltanschauung, then, we cannot seriously deal with the question of the ultimate meaning of our existence. Nor can we seek, in and through this worldview, any meaning for the collective suffering of minjung, that is, han.

In the magician-type cosmogony we face the aporia of creatio ex nihilo, which has been claimed by the traditional Christian theology. Although the Bible does not directly mention the expression, creatio ex nihilo, we find passages implying it. For example, we read in The Book of Job: “He stretches out the north over the void, and hangs the earth upon nothing” (26:7; RSV). Other implications for creatio ex nihilo are found in Rom. 4:17: “—in the presence of the God … who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist” (RSV); in Heb. 11:3: “By faith we understand that the world was created by the word of God, so that what is seen was made out of things which do not appear.” (RSV.) The expression closest to the ex nihilo creation is found in the apocryphal book, The Second Book of Maccabees, 7:28:

\(^{811}\) Ibid., p. 43.
“I implore you, my child, observe heaven and earth, consider all that is in them, and acknowledge that God made them out of what did not exist, and that mankind comes into being in the same way.”813 Most of all, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is to be basically claimed in and through the depiction of God’s creation in Genesis. From all these we can infer with M. Worthing that “[a]pon balance of judgment it would seem that the idea of a creation out of nothing, whether explicitly contained in Genesis 1:1-3 or not, is a doctrine that can lay legitimate claim to being biblical in its seminal form, if not indeed in its full expression.”814

The most problematic theme in this cosmogony is what is meant by the ‘nothing’. There are two ways that ‘nothing’ can be grasped: me on (relative nothing) and ouk on (absolute nothing). If ‘nothing’ is conceived of as me on, “[leading] some to take the nothing in creation out of nothing as if it were some mysterious kind of substance, out of which God formed the world,”815 this will be prima facie the same as the above-mentioned potter-type cosmogony. Here God as Creator is reduced to the ‘efficient cause’ of creation, as in the case Plato’s Deriurje, with “Plato and Moses [agreeing] in depicting that initial cosmological act as involving a divine cause and a material receptacle in or from which the physical world has its origin.”816 In this perspective we have no clue to the original aim of traditional Christian theologians in adopting the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, giving that it is nothing other than the differentiation of the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo from “the Platonic, which presents creation

as the imposition of form on an independently existing, formless matter, not as absolute origination.\textsuperscript{817}

Even in Barth we can find a vestige of this Platonic view of \textit{me on}. Barth points out that, in the biblical depiction of creation, “reference is incontestably made to a material used by God in the act of creation.”\textsuperscript{818} With regard to the material used by God for creation Barth claims that “if the material is not to be understood as a divine emanation or as eternally co-existing with God, then there can be no question of describing the presupposed material itself.”\textsuperscript{819} Here we see that the way for Barth to overcome the Platonic vestige is to confine the pre-existent material ‘temporally’. That is to say, unlike the process theologian’s view of the pre-existent material,\textsuperscript{820} Barth claims that the material that is the matrix of the physical world can neither emanate from God, nor be ‘eternally co-existing with God’, meaning in each case that it has a beginning.\textsuperscript{821} So long as Barth regards ‘nothing’ as the pre-existing material related to the domain of being, that is, as \textit{me on}, however, his view of God’s creation gets closer to the Platonic view of creation, and further away from the biblical view of the \textit{ex nihilo} creation in its fundamental differentiation from the Platonic demiurge’s creation. That is to say, in Barth’s ‘elevation of nothingness’ to the status of a preexisting principle that stands in relation to being and out of which God called forth being[,] … the essential and historic meaning of a creation out of nothing would seem

\textsuperscript{817} G. S. Hendry, “Nothing.” p. 281.
\textsuperscript{818} \textit{CD}, III/2, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{819} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{820} For example, D. R. Griffin views the pre-existent ‘material’ (or whatever it is to be called) as independent from God. He thus claims that “if God in creating our world necessarily worked with some pre-existent actualities, these actualities might well have some power of their own with which they could partially thwart the divine will.” (Ibid., “Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil,” in S. T. Davis, ed., \textit{Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy} [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1981], p. 104.)
\textsuperscript{821} This is the fundamental difference from the Platonic view, in which it is maintained that “pre-existing materials put limits on what God could do; since they were not created by him out of nothing, they were not totally subject to his will.” (D. R. Griffin, “Creation out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil,” p. 102.)
to be lost.” Here it is necessary to understand the ‘nothing’ in the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* as *ouk on*. As P. Tillich claims: “Christianity has rejected the concept of *me-ontic* matter on the basis of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. Matter is not a second principle in addition to God. The *nihil* out of which God creates is *ouk on*, the undialectical negation of being.”

If we truly follow the biblical view of *creatio ex nihilo*, ‘nothing’ in this view should be *ouk on*, that is, ‘absolute nothingness’, which “has no relation at all to being.” This absolute nothingness should be differentiated entirely from any kind of *me-ontic* nothingness. Hence it is not like Whitehead’s ‘ultimate reality’ as creativity, which is nothing other than *me on*, out of which the world was created. It is also different from J. Boehme’s and N. Berdyaev’s *Ungrund*, “to which neither human words nor the categories of good and evil, nor those of being or non-being, are applicable … [and] which is irrational and incommensurable with any of our categories.” In particular regarding the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* we cannot and may not think of *ouk on* in terms of Berdyaev’s *Ungrund* or Zen Buddhist’s ‘nothingness’, both of which are considered to be the matrix for the emergence of God. As such, God becomes an object of creation, not its subject.

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822 M. W. Worthing, *God, Creation, and Contemporary Physics*, p. 75.
823 P. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, p. 188.
824 Ibid.
827 As F. Nucho points out, in Berdyaev “the theory of the *Ungrund* as a primordial principle or as the Divine Nothing out of which arises God and the cosmic entities implies that God has a beginning and, therefore, cannot be eternal.” (*Idem*, Berdyaev’s *Philosophy: The Existential Paradox of Freedom and Necessity* [New York: Doubleday, 1966], p. 169.) J.M. McLauchlan also points out the same thing: “… the *Ungrund*, will or freedom, is the basis of both God and creation. … The absolute is the *Ungrund* that precedes creation, like the eternal Dao that is the eternal ground of *Yin* and *Yang* it cannot be spoken. … The *Ungrund* precedes both God and Nature and they arise from it.” (*Idem*, *The Desire to be God: Freedom and the Other in Sartre and Berdyaev*, Studies in Phenomenological Theology, vol. 1 [New York et al.: Peter Lang, 1992], pp. 134-7.) With regard to the Buddhist view of nothingness as the matrix of the emergence of God M. Abe says: “This *sunnata* is deep enough to encompass even God, … *Sunnata* or nothingness in Zen is not a ‘nothing’ out of which all things were created by God.
What then is *ouk on*? How are we to conceive of ‘absolute nothingness’? If we think of absolute nothingness in its most radical sense, then the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* should seriously face the criticism of the old philosophical dictum, *ex nihilo nihil fit*. To cope with this criticism, we could define absolute nothingness as the ‘domain outside’ the domain of the being of God. Borrowing the words of M. W. Worthing, absolute nothingness means “simply no material substance or principle apart from the fullness of God’s own being.”

828 Of assistance here is the doctrine of *yin* and *yang*. Although “the yin-yang worldview is nondualistic in an absolute sense but is dualistic in a relative sense,” what this doctrine helps us do is to absolutise ontologically the relativised dualism of *yin* and *yang*. By and through absolutising the relative dualism of *yin* and *yang* I envisage the domain of absolute nothingness, which is separated from the domain of God’s being from all eternity. Hence God does not need to shrink God-self from God-self to create in the first place room for the creation of the world of all phenomena, as Moltmann asserts it. 830 This may mean a domain-oriented dualism. 831 If God’s domain means the fullness of God’s being, the domain

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828 M. W. Worthing, *God, Creation and Contemporary Physics*, p. 75. 829 Jung Young Lee, *The Trinity in Asian Perspective* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996). p. 101. 830 Because Moltmann thinks that God is infinite and omnipresent, he must inevitably introduce the concept of God’s ‘self-limitation’ for creating a room beforehand for God’s creation. On the basis of the doctrine of *zimmun*, he states that the ‘existence of the universe was made possible through a shrinkage process in God’. Cf. *idem*, *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God* ..., pp. 108ff. Pannenberg criticises this view of Moltmann as ‘a materially unfounded mystification of the subject’ of ‘nothing’. *Cf. idem*, *ST2*, pp. 14-5. 831 We can say with Barth that “the cosmos continually presents itself to man ... with a certain inner contrariety” (*CD*, IV/3, p. 145), in which we experience “the encounter and alternation of Yes and No, beginning and end, joy and pain, construction and destruction, life and death” (*ibid*). In Barth’s view, this relativised *yin* and *yang* of the cosmos belongs to the totality of God’s creation, thus making it very good, as in the description of Genesis: “And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good” (1.31, RSV). (*Cf. ibid*.) As Barth puts it, however, we cannot deal with “an ultimate answer to ultimate questions” (*ibid.* within the view of the relativity of *yin* and *yang* in the phenomenological world, because the fluctuation of relative contrarieties we incessantly encounter in the world “has nothing whatever to do with the antithesis of Creator and creature, and certainly not of grace and sin or eternal salvation and eternal perdition” (*ibid.*). If we cannot properly deal with ‘ultimate questions’ like the whence of evil in the relativised dualism of *yin* and *yang*, the only way to do so is to absolutise ontologically the relativised dualism, by which a genuinely antithetic relationship between the domain of God’s being as the ultimate *yang* and the domain of nothingness as the ultimate *yin* can be posited.
of nothingness is filled with nothing but void, total void. As H. Pagels depicts: “The nothingness ‘before’ the creation of the universe is the most complete void that we can imagine—no space, time or matter existed. It is a world without place, without duration or eternity, without number.”832 By this, I can answer in the affirmative the question, “Can there be alongside the absolute One a Nothing, that is, a realm not penetrated by the all-encompassing fullness of the One?”833, although it would mean “to restrict and limit God, and hence [to argue] against his claim to absoluteness.”834 The domain of absolute nothingness just ‘is’, because the domain of God’s being is not, and need not be, infinite. Hence God created the world ex nihilo in nihilo. In Moltmann’s terms, “[c]reatio ex nihilo is therefore creatio in nihilo as well …”835 On the basis of this domain-oriented dualism, therefore, I can say with M. W. Worthing that “God created a universe distinct from the divine being, not out of any preexisting matter or principle, but out of nothing[,] other than the fullness of God’s own being.”836

Unde est malum in this domain-oriented dualism? To answer this question, we have to begin with God’s ‘all-goodness’. God’s ‘all-goodness’ necessarily entails God’s being ‘all-loving’. If God is perfectly good, God’s creatures should be all good, too. This is the basic presupposition for answering the question of ‘unde malum?’. If God did not intend evil to come into being, but evil in fact came into being, then it has to be said that evil was made to come into being ‘unavoidably’. By what? This question needs to be considered from the perspective of domain-oriented dualism.

This is why I posit the ‘domain-oriented’ dualism by ontologically absolutising the relativised dualism of yin and yang, on the basis of which I make an attempt to explain the whence of evil, without which it is out of the question to ask the ultimate question of meaning.

834 Ibid.
835 Moltmann, The Future of Creation, p. 120.
836 M. W. Worthing, God, Creation, and Contemporary Physics, p. 75.
That is, within the purview of domain-oriented dualism I envisage that there was an equilibrium between the domain of the fullness of God’s being and the domain of absolute nothingness before creation. This equilibrium was broken by God’s creation, because God had to ‘intrude’ God’s creatures into the domain of absolute nothingness. When the world of all phenomena was ‘thrown’ into absolute nothingness, the latter received it with ‘indignation’, which caused it to have a ‘desire’ to swallow down the former into its ‘belly’. The domain of absolute nothingness had and has this intrinsic characteristic of a ‘desire’ to absorb the domain of creatures’ being. The all-loving God did God’s best to protect the domain of God’s creatures from the threat of absolute annihilation by absolute nothingness. Although God succeeded in preventing absolute annihilation, God inevitably had to pay for the ‘intrusion’ of the domain of God’s creatures into the domain of absolute nothingness, because it was otherwise impossible even for God to create the domain of God’s creatures in the domain of absolute nothingness. God had to pay for this ‘intrusion’ by unavoidably letting the good characteristic of God’s creatures be metamorphosed into their evil one. The point here is that evil was the ineluctable by-product of God’s creation,\(^{837}\) for which neither God nor absolute nothingness was responsible. Evil simply came into being,

\(^{837}\) My thoughts on the ineluctable by-product of evil by God’s creation can be supported by Ji-Ha Kim’s thoughts: “Creative activities are inevitably accompanied by evil, devilish actions. ... If God created [the world], from the very beginning of its creation evil started to act. To move, to act vividly in life, for life to act—all this means itself going arm in arm with evil.” (\textit{Idem}, “Saemgyeongui Damjijain Minjung [Minjung as the Bearer of Life],” in Hankuk Sinhak Yeon-guso, ed., \textit{Hankuk Minjungno [Theories of Korean Minjung]} (Seoul: Hankuk Sinhak Yeon-guso, 1984), p. 512; my translation.) They can also be supported by Paul Tillich’s assertion of ‘the coincidence of creation and the Fall’: In his theology we find the notion that existence of all phenomena has been alienated with the very beginning of creation. That is to say, there has been no moment after God’s creation, when human beings, together with the whole universe, caused the Fall. As Tillich puts it: “Creation and the Fall coincide in so far as there is no point in time and space in which created goodness was actualized and had existence. This is a necessary consequence of the rejection of the literal interpretation of the paradise story. There was no ‘utopia’ in the past, just as there will be no ‘utopia’ in the future. Actualized creation and estranged existence are identical. Only biblical literalism has the theological right to deny this assertion.” (\textit{Idem}, \textit{Systematic Theology}, vol. II [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957], p. 44.) With this support it can be said that evil came into being from the very beginning of God’s creation, which means that, although creation phenomenologically looked good, as expressed in Genesis, ontologically, it was not so good.
when the domain of the world of all phenomena was blended into the domain of absolute nothingness. That is to say, evil was the inexorable by-product of the blending of the two domains of being and absolute nothingness.\footnote{With my proposal of domain-oriented dualism I can now criticise Barth’s monistic approach to the problem of evil as an inadequate solution to the question of the meaning of human suffering. The fundamental difference between Barth and myself is that, while Barth thinks that evil and nothingness should be under the control of God on the basis of his view of monism (although he claims that “[I]n the light of God’s relationship to it we must accept the fact that in a third way of its own nothingness is” [CD, III/3, p. 349]), in domain-oriented dualism evil and absolute nothingness exist independently, and thus out of God’s control. This, I have to admit, results in a real dualism, but on the basis of which I can genuinely pursue the possibility to ask and answer the question of meaning. In my opinion, there is absolutely no possibility to pursue anything in relation to the question of meaning in the genuinely monistic view like Barth’s, in which he indefatigably claims: “Whatever evil is, God is its Lord. We must not push our attempt to take evil seriously to the point of ever coming to think of it as an original and indeed creative counter-deity which posits autonomous and independent facts, competing seriously with the one living God and striving with Him for the mastery. Evil is a form of that nothingness which as such is absolutely subject to God.” (CD, IV/1, p. 408.) If we want to deal with the question of meaning seriously, we should reject what Barth rejects regarding evil and nothingness for the purpose of the establishment of God’s omnipotence. This is why I unavoidably cling to the thought of domain-oriented dualism.} \footnote{My forging of the ‘transfusion’ of the powerlessness of the domain of being into the powerless domain of absolute nothingness has been influenced by the current cosmological worldview, in which, as T. Peters theologically argues, the universe as a whole is shifting “from order to disorder, from hot to cold, from high energy to dissipative equilibriums” (T. Peters, “On Creating the Cosmos,” in R. Russell et al., eds., \textit{Physics, Philosophy, and Theology} [Vatican City: Vatican Observatory, 1988], p.}  

It must not be overlooked that absolute nothingness is absolutely nothing. Simply because of this, if God was to be confronted with absolute nothingness, this confrontation was a confrontation without confrontation. If God’s powerfulness was to be confronted with the powerlessness of absolute nothingness, this confrontation results in the inescapable transfusion of God’s powerfulness, which prevailed over the domain of God’s creatures, into the powerlessness of absolute nothingness. With this inescapable transfusion of power the goodness of God’s creatures was transformed into their wickedness. Evil inevitably came into being in the process of God’s being deprived of God’s powerfulness by powerless absolute nothingness, which once prevailed over the domain of the creaturely beings. In other words, evil was the ineluctable product of the transfusion of the powerfulness of God and the powerlessness of absolute nothingness.\footnote{With my proposal of domain-oriented dualism I can now criticise Barth’s monistic approach to the problem of evil as an inadequate solution to the question of the meaning of human suffering. The fundamental difference between Barth and myself is that, while Barth thinks that evil and nothingness should be under the control of God on the basis of his view of monism (although he claims that “[I]n the light of God’s relationship to it we must accept the fact that in a third way of its own nothingness is” [CD, III/3, p. 349]), in domain-oriented dualism evil and absolute nothingness exist independently, and thus out of God’s control. This, I have to admit, results in a real dualism, but on the basis of which I can genuinely pursue the possibility to ask and answer the question of meaning. In my opinion, there is absolutely no possibility to pursue anything in relation to the question of meaning in the genuinely monistic view like Barth’s, in which he indefatigably claims: “Whatever evil is, God is its Lord. We must not push our attempt to take evil seriously to the point of ever coming to think of it as an original and indeed creative counter-deity which posits autonomous and independent facts, competing seriously with the one living God and striving with Him for the mastery. Evil is a form of that nothingness which as such is absolutely subject to God.” (CD, IV/1, p. 408.) If we want to deal with the question of meaning seriously, we should reject what Barth rejects regarding evil and nothingness for the purpose of the establishment of God’s omnipotence. This is why I unavoidably cling to the thought of domain-oriented dualism.}
This ineluctability in domain-oriented dualism is the only risk taken by God for God’s creation. Because of the risk’s intrinsic characteristic of inevitability, the fact of which even God could only accept, however, God is not responsible for evil’s coming into being. Hence, although God “has taken the risk of creating a world in which it [evil] was highly likely, or even logically bound, to emerge, …[there cannot be] strong moral objections to any view of God which regards him as immune from the damaging consequences of that evil.”

In this inescapability within domain-oriented dualism God’s omnipotence is shattered. But it is the only occasion for threatening God’s omnipotence. It is well kept in God’s creatio ex nihilo, in the sense that God created the world of all phenomena out of absolute nothingness. The inevitability within domain-oriented dualism is the only ‘Achilles’ heel’ for God’s omnipotence. However, this ‘Achilles’ heel’ arises to counter “the Achilles’ heel of traditional theology, the problem of evil.” The former ‘Achilles’ heel’ is the only possible precursor for the solution of the latter ‘Achilles’ heel’.

This ineluctability of evil through the collision of the two domains of God and absolute nothingness frees us from the view of God’s suffering through God’s participation in human suffering as God’s ‘sadism’ or ‘masochism’. Specifically, from the perspective of the inevitability of evil, we are prevented from having to view God’s suffering through the death of Jesus on the cross as God’s ‘sadism’ or ‘masochism,’ a view based on belief in God’s total conquest over evil through this event, as held, for example, by Barth. In and through God’s omnipotence being broken by the inevitability of evil we can see the seriousness of God’s ‘struggle’

282.), and will “become an unimaginably vast, cold, dark and profoundly lonely place [in the end].” (M. D. Lemonick, “The End,” p. 52.)
840 M. Wiles, God’s Action in the World, p. 49.

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against absolute nothingness. In the inescapability of evil in domain-oriented dualism, E. Jüngel’s claim, “God is in the midst of the struggle between nothingness and possibility [as the particular distinctive of the perishable],”842 is to be dealt with seriously. Within this inescapability we can understand fully what Jüngel means by his claim, “God has involved himself with nothingness in the form of a struggle,”843 although it must also be posited that God is involved in the struggle not only through the specific event of Jesus’ suffering and death on the cross, but also through all kinds of suffering and death of minjung and of human beings in general. For me, therefore, the question of meaning can be asked only within the scope of this inevitability of evil in domain-oriented dualism. And it can be answered in and through Jesus’ resurrection by God as “the divine protest against a world that accommodates itself to death.”844 This is why we should deal seriously with domain-oriented dualism.845

How can the problem of sin be dealt with in terms of domain-oriented dualism? When han is placed next to sin, that is, when han is thought of as an alternative way of speaking of sin, what is to be said about the doctrine of reconciliation? These themes are dealt with in the next sub-section.

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842 E. Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: ..., p. 217. (author’s emphasis)
843 Ibid., p. 219.
845 By postulating domain-oriented dualism, I have tried to solve the aporia of theodicy, especially in the respect of overcoming the limitation of the western Christian theological viewpoint regarding it within the purview of Barth’s thought of nothingness. I do not think that my postulation can give a fundamental solution to the aporia. In fact, I have to admit that, if evil is thought of as a by-product of God’s creation, God cannot ultimately be exonerated, even though God did not intend evil to happen. Nevertheless, I postulate this in the hope: “The best that theodicy can offer is that theodicy may come equipped ready to launch the discussion in new directions and into new realms, never to totally obliterate the matter but rather to perpetuate it fresh while hopefully at the same time allowing it to flow into different and more positive channels.” (Albert W. J. Harper, The Theodicy of Suffering [San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1990], p. 3.) I positively think that we can more seriously struggle against the power of evil devouring ourselves and our history, if we truly believe in God’s ‘genuine’ struggle against evil on the basis of the domain-oriented dualistic view, and not in God’s ‘apparent’ struggle against it on the basis of the monistic view, as in Barth. Basically, domain-oriented dualism as a solution to the problematic theodicy is posited in this regard.
b. Han next to Sin: Towards an Alternative Way of Speaking of Sin

It is natural to expect that the concept of sin would change in relation to the inevitability of evil in domain-oriented dualism. In this sub-section I will consider a possibility of reformulating the concept of sin in the traditional hamartiology from the perspective of the han of minjung, which will result in an alternative way of speaking of sin.  

Within the purview of domain-oriented dualism which was proposed above, human suffering is caused by evil, which inescapably came into being with God’s creation, for which God is thus not responsible. Evil as a malformed power from the blending of God’s powerfulness and the powerlessness of absolute nothingness has caused all kinds of suffering in the history of han. Under the circumstances of the manipulations and influences of malformed evil power, human history has been filled with human han, and with this God’s han has also been accumulated in God’s heart. In the history of han sin against God cannot be attributed to minjung, as claimed in the traditional Christian theology. The traditional Christian view of human sin as the cause of suffering and death is here rejected. Of course, for someone who adheres to the orthodox Christian hamartiology, all human beings including minjung people are sinners. As we have seen in the history of han, however, there are many cases, in which human plights are so much heartbreaking so that we need to say something different, instead of speaking of sin, in relation to those situations.

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847 My consideration of this possibility is based upon minjung theologians’ views of han against sin. In particular, my thought of han as an alternative way of speaking of sin is influenced by Andrew Sung Park’s claim by way of his bifurcation of sin of the oppressor and han of the oppressed that “[w]e need a theological revolution—a Copernican revolution in the doctrine of sin and salvation.” (Ibid., The Wounded Heart of God: ..., p. 73; author’s emphasis; for his view of han and sin, cf. ibid., pp. 69ff.)

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Regarding these, two cases in the New Testament can be considered. Jesus could not speak of sin in the case of Lazarus, the poor man full of sores which dogs licked (cf. Lk. 16:19-31). Only in the case of the rich young ruler (cf. Mt. 19:16-30; Mk. 10:17-31; Lk. 18:18-30), Jesus could speak to him of cherishing his great possessions as his sin, thus saying: “How hard it is for those who have riches to enter the kingdom of God! For it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God” (Lk.18:24-5; RSV). Of course, strictly speaking from the perspective of traditional Christian hamartiology, poor Lazarus is a sinner, too. However, priority should here be given to an alternative way of speaking of sin, i.e., han. Otherwise, we would be blaming Lazarus, the victim of sin committed by others against him.  

The same thing can be said about the case of the Holocaust. No one would speak of the sins of the Jews in the Nazis’ gas chambers. In this case, it is adequate only to speak of the victimisers’ sins. Otherwise, we would again be blaming the victims, indeed.

How can we consider the possibility that by the traditional Christian concept of sin, in which human free will is emphasised to ensure human responsibility for sinning against God, we can explain the reason why the noses of a mother and her less-than-a-week-old baby were cut off by Japanese soldiers? Why did the less-than-a-week-old

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848 Here it is worthwhile noting O. Noordmans’s critical questioning about the church’s emphasis on sin and grace, and about its disregard for the problem implied in the parable of the rich man and poor Lazarus. According to him, “...every Sunday the churches are full of sinners, but one notices few beggars. The churches … are busy with sin and grace, while the problem concerning the rich man and poor Lazarus was seen as created by the providence of God. The church used natural theology (namely, the view that God Himself had divided humanity into barons and serfs) as a shield against the sharp arrows of the Gospel. Could it be possible … that the parable of the beggar is more important than that of the sinners (the parable of the tax-collector), and, therefore, clearer to the church? Should not the church have proclaimed the full Gospel? Has the church [not] paid too little attention to the Lazaruses (the beggars) and too much to the tax-collectors (the sinners)? Must the beggar be saved in exactly the same way as the sinner? Must the social part of the Gospel of the Kingdom of God be left to society, while the church is busy with the inner care of man? Lazarus … believed with his wounds, and Jesus did not talk about his sin.” (Andreas A. Yewangoe, Theologia Crucis in Asia: Asian Christian views on suffering in the face of overwhelming poverty and multifaceted religiosity in Asia [Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1987], p. 302.; cf. O. Noordmans, Zondaar en Bedelaar [Amsterdam, 1946], pp. 17-8.)
baby have to suffer from the ordeal at so young an age when he or she could not fully feel the pain of the ordeal? Because of the baby’s sin? Or because of the sins of the baby’s parents? These questions lead me to claim that, from the perspective of the history of han, there is no room in minjung’s psyches for the concept of sin as it is understood in the traditional Christian hamartiology. Hence, for many cases in the history of han, as mentioned above, we have to show biblical courage to say that there is neither sin nor guilt in these people; they are only the victims of sin. It is because the only thing left in the heart of a member of minjung at the end of his or her life is not guilt, but han, which is to be dissolved into God’s han. The only thing to be called the sin of minjung is their desperate struggle to sustain existence against the irresistible power of structural evil.

We really need to reconsider the biblical concept of sin. As H. Cox says: “We need to make a whole new start in reformulating a biblical doctrine of sin which makes sense of a modern world, with its dutifully compliant Eichmanns and its lawbreaking Martin Luther Kings, and is at the same time closer to the Bible than the one we have now.”849 For ‘a whole new start in reformulating a biblical doctrine of sin’ we need to be more concerned with victims of sin than with sinners themselves. Who are the victims of sin? Needless to say, they are minjung. Who are sinners? They are oppressors. From the perspective of this sinner-victim dichotomy, sin cannot and may not be regarded simply as an individual’s wrongdoing. The traditional Christian doctrine of sin has focused firmly “on the moral agency of the sinner and his or her standing before God. [In it] the role played in human salvation by the victims of sin has rarely been considered.”850 But this is the fallacy to be found in the traditional doctrine. Here we need to ruminate on the sociological definition of sin by Nam-Dong

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Suh, a representative of those who originated *minjung* theology, as “a label attached to the oppressed by oppressors.”\(^{851}\) Under this sociological definition of sin, we need to be concerned first with the *han* of *minjung*, rather than with their sin, because in their case “it can be said that ‘sin’ is the language of the oppressor, and ‘*han*’ is the language of *minjung.*”\(^{852}\) If we are really focused on the meaning of the *minjung* *han*, we have to add this extremely important aspect to the doctrine of sin, which means that for certain cases, i.e., for *minjung* cases it is biblically inappropriate for us to speak of sin in the traditional way. Then we can penetrate the view that, from the perspective of *han*, *minjung* are not sinners, but the ‘sinned against’, who, surrounded by sinners, try to find a way to salvation by attempting to solve the problem of *han* by themselves.\(^{853}\) We can thus claim that, for *minjung*, *han* should be more emphasised than sin.

When *han* is more emphasised than sin, we can hear the voice of *han*, instead of the voice of the sin, in a variety of places in the Bible. We hear the voice of *han* from the man who was stripped and beaten in the parable of ‘the good Samaritan’ (Lk. 10:25-37). He can be considered a representative of *minjung*. His moaning as *han* represents *minjung* *han*, and thus God’s *han*. God as the good Samaritan takes part in their *han* and, conversely, they participate in God’s *han* by suffering their *han*. This leads to the view that God and human beings are in the same ontological category through their co-participating in *han*, which is in itself a mode of human salvation.

Consider another episode as an example of giving more emphasis to *han* than sin. We hear the voice of *han* from each of the people in the narrative of the woman caught in adultery in *the Gospel According to John* (8:2-11). This narrative shows that

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\(^{852}\) Ibid., p. 107 (my translation)

no one can be freed from the ‘bonds’ of evil power, against which even God has been struggling. Why could all the people *illo et tunc* not condemn her to death by stoning? Because they all knew and acknowledged that, like the woman, they were fundamentally captured by the power of evil, and thus could not get rid of their intrinsic liability to doing wrong. Also Jesus had the insight to see the situation aright. Because he had this insight through his Messianic consciousness, he did not condemn her. Through this insight, he could penetrate to see the fundamental reason why the woman committed adultery: the irresistible power of evil. The inability for any of them to condemn her, once Jesus put the challenge before them: ‘let the one who is without [han] cast the first stone’, is the voice of han. Jesus’ ‘bending down and writing with his finger on the ground’ is his expression of this han. Only han can be written on the backs of the people *illo et tunc*, people who went away, one by one. It is han that is deeply rooted in the psyche of the woman, who went away, tearful. Only han as autogenous sadness remains there in the void, in the now empty place, which only God can perceive. Finding nothing like ‘sin’ there, God in God’s han participates in the han of all the people *illo et tunc*, who left in the void the resignation of their han. They all knew that the woman would inevitably ‘sin’ again even with Jesus’ pleading, “do not sin again [please],” but even so they would not condemn her. Here God’s resignation merges into the void to participate in their resignation. The void, that is the world, is the place of the confluence of human resignation and God’s resignation out of which God, in God’s ontological nadir of han as resignation, has established God’s powerful resistance against the confluence of divine and human han as resignation through the ‘resurrection’. I’ in addition I see in Jesus’ Messianic-consciousness-contained pleading—“do not sin again”—a possibility for powerful resistance by God to all human and divine resignation by way of the ‘resurrection’, is
that paradoxical for this narrative? Is it really paradoxical to assume through this narrative that the void is filled with the stillness of God’s ardent will to struggle against the evil power causing all human and divine resignation, as the ‘void place’ ruled by ‘stillness’ in the following poem?

Perhaps the unbreakable stillness
Is the king that rules the void place.
The void place looks empty
But is filled with something.
In the void place there are sleeping wind, busy wind—
From time to time wind
Throws grass seeds enwrapped with fluff,
And decorates the void place with flowers.
About their ageing and withering
The void place has nothing to say.
It only provides them with earth existing there,
And indifferently looks at their passing by.
On a bright day
Even though a passing-by lizard,
A grazed bird makes its footprints on it,
They will not last so long.
Sand altering its position by raindrops from heaven—
The void place erases all traces.
Perhaps the stillness without any trace
Is the king that rules the void place.854

Through this han-oriented interpretation of two episodes in the Gospels I have tried to show the possibility of han as an alternative way of speaking of sin. From the perspective of han, all minjung can be said to be ‘innocent’. They do not deserve to

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suffer from such atrocities as have occurred in the history of han. Furthermore, from the perspective of fundamental han, which we can now grasp as originating in the irresistible power of the inevitable evil between the domains of being and absolute nothingness, all humanity as God’s good creatures are ‘innocent’. In this respect, I can agree with D. Sölle’s claim: “But in a deeper sense all humans are innocent: no one deserves to starve to death, and not a single one of the six million who died in the gas chamber—even if they otherwise lied, stoïc, or were beasts—even ‘deserved’ the suffering inflicted on them.”855 In this respect, I grasp the justification of asking the question of innocent people’s poverty and suffering, as G. Gutiérrez earnestly asks:

We ask the same question [How are human beings to speak of God in the midst of poverty and suffering?] today in the lands of want and hope that are Latin America. Here the masses of the poor suffer an inhuman situation that is evidently underserved. Nothing can justify a situation in which human beings lack the basic necessities for a life of dignity and in which their most elementary rights are not respected. The suffering and destructive effect on individuals go far beyond what is seen in a first contact with the world of the poor. In such a situation, what content can be assigned to the “Abba, Father!” (literally: “Abba, Papa!”) that the Spirit cries within us …? How are we to proclaim the reign of love and justice to those who live in an inexplicable situation that denies this reign? How are we to bring joyous conviction to our utterance of the name of God?856

To establish a genuine doctrine of reconciliation in minjung situations, our concern needs to shift from reconciliation between God and human beings to reconciliation between human beings, between oppressors and the oppressed. The

855 D. Sölle, Theology for Skeptics: ..., p. 65.
question to be focused on here is: ‘Can there be a genuine reconciliation between sufferers and suffering-makers?’ How can we talk about a genuine reconciliation to someone like Ivan Karamazov who cries out: ‘And above all, I do not want the mother to embrace the torturer who tore her son to pieces with his dogs!’\footnote{857}{F. Dostoyevsky, \textit{The Brothers Karamazov}; ..., p. 282.} How can we speak about a genuine reconciliation between sufferer and suffering-giver for someone like the old lady, Soo-Bok Noh, who, as a ‘comfort girl’, was forced to have sex with Japanese soldiers more than 60 times a day?\footnote{858}{Cf. Jin-Kwan Kwon, \textit{Let Us Talk about Our Own Salvation}; ..., pp. 248-9, where the author excerpted the story of Soo-Bok Noh from Hyun Kyung Chung’s treatise, “Your Comfort vs. My Death: A Korean Woman’s Reflection on Military Sexual Slavery by Japan” (1996).} Perhaps Dostoyevsky would suggest denying the existence of God as primordial suffering-giver, or resisting against God who causes human suffering, by exclaiming: “She may forgive the torturer her limitless maternal suffering; but as for the sufferings of her dismembered child, those she has no right to forgive, she dare not forgive his torturer, even if her child himself forgave him!”\footnote{859}{This is what I experienced when I took part in the theological conference in Canberra in 1988. When the speaker requested any response after his speech, there was a dead silence for a while. I was the first one to respond to his speech. I recollect saying that something in particular has to be done by Christians for establishing a genuine reconciliation between aboriginal people and the white people, otherwise, our doing theology will be ‘phantasmagorical’. I spoke within the perspective of the adage, ‘fellow sufferers sympathise with each other’. After my comment, there were some who responded to the speech. What it impressed on me at that time was that doctrines and logic of Western theology including the doctrine of reconciliation cannot cope with real situations of the oppressed, with the \textit{han} of \textit{minjung}. This is one of its intrinsic limitations.} Dostoyevsky’s attitude towards human suffering of this kind can however be altered by the view of God as human beings’ co-sufferer within the purview of domain-oriented dualism. This God can embrace the sufferings of the

\footnote{860}{F. Dostoyevsky, \textit{The Brothers Karamazov}; ..., p. 282.}
dismembered child. However, contrary to Dostoyevsky, we do have to ask about the possibility of genuine forgiveness, about reconciliation between oppressors and the oppressed. How can the mother and the boy embrace the torturer? How can the old lady, Soo-bok Noh, embrace those who gave her suffering and humiliation physically and mentally? How can the aboriginal people embrace those who massacred their own? From the perspective of these questions, we need to shift our attention to considering a genuine reconciliation between human beings, between oppressors and the oppressed. It is because the question of meaning can survive in our historico-phenomenological attempt to establish a genuine reconciliation between human beings, between the oppressors and the oppressed.

If we think of God as uniting with human beings in God’s han, into which minjung han, especially the fundamental han of human beings, is dissolved, God is the only basis for an ultimate solution to han, because God, at God’s ontological nadir caused by God’s own han of resignation, made something dramatic happen: Jesus’ resurrection. In Jesus’ resurrection we find the only answer to the question of the meaning of the fundamental han of human beings. In the passive and active reaction of minjung to han through aesthetic acts of the arts and revolutionary acts of revolt against oppressors, we see demonstrations of Jesus’ resurrection, contemporary to their own time, and we find a practical answer to the question of the meaning of minjung han. We now turn to these themes.

C. Han, Resurrection, and the Question of Meaning

God’s han originates in the ineluctability of evil through the collision of the domains of being and absolute nothingness. Likewise, minjung han is caused by the
power of evil, which appears phenomenologically in the form of the individual and structural manipulation of minjung throughout human history. The question of meaning arises under these circumstances. And an answer to it is sought in practical terms through minjung struggles against the power of evil. Up to this point, I have made a faint suggestion that minjung are bearers of han. We now face the task of clarifying what is meant by minjung, because the question of meaning is for them and, on the basis of clarification of their identity, we can clearly state the subject of practical solutions to han through arts and acts of revolt. Hence I first attempt to clarify the definition of minjung by way of considering several Korean scholars’ views of it. I will then consider minjung solutions to han through kut (a shamanistic ritual), minjung arts and acts of revolt as a practical answer to the question of meaning, which should be complemented by dan (‘cutting off’), the transcendental solution to han. This will be followed by a pursuit of the fundamental answer to the question of meaning in Jesus’ resurrection.

a. Definitions of Minjung

To define ‘minjung’ is a difficult task. Perhaps it is inappropriate to define ‘minjung’, because to do so is to ‘objectify’ it, and in the process of objectification ‘minjung’ is not to be grasped as a living, organic subject, but as a dead object. The organic meaning of ‘minjung’ should be subjectively expressed by minjung themselves.861 For “‘minjung’ signifies a living reality which is dynamic, changing

861 Cf. Nam-Dong Suh, An Exploration into Minjung Theology, p. 224. Here it is worth noting Nam-Dong Suh’s claim: “Minjung is far different from the Biblical-traditional laos; it is rather similar to ‘the poor’ (…). It is different from ‘(common) people’, ‘Volk’ or ‘crowd’. Hence it is hard for it to be translated into ‘people’, ‘crowd’ or ‘Volk’; it is a typically political-theological concept, which should be translated into minjung itself.” (Idem, “Du Iyagui Hamnyu [A Confluence of the two Stories].” in

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and complex; this living reality defines its own existence, and generates new acts and dramas in history; and it refuses in principle to be defined conceptually.  

However, defining minjung is an unavoidable task. Without it, it is difficult to know why and for whom the question of meaning has kept being asked. Without it, to pursue an answer to the question of the meaning of han by way of a consideration of the practical solutions to han by minjung would be the same as looking at the flame of a candlelight without knowing who kindled it. This is why I consider in what follows various concepts of minjung asserted by several scholars from various fields of science and religion, before my pursuit of a practical answer to the question of meaning on the basis of minjung’s passive and active solutions to han.

When we take minjung into consideration holistically, we can call them ‘common people’, who are deprived of specific positions politically, socially and culturally, as Nak-Cheong Paek puts it. Although minjung in this comprehensive definition seem to be reduced to ‘mass’, as used in the Western society, the former should be differentiated from the latter in the respect that, while ‘mass’ is generally used in a quantitative and negative sense, ‘minjung’ is used in a ‘self-conscious, positive and active’ sense. Due to its sense of ‘no-principle, no-self-consciousness’, ‘mass’ is grasped as a kind of passive crowd. But these two have a common ground: both of them are contrasted with a minority elite. Both are in reality alienated from the elite group with ruling power. When we consider differences between them on the basis of this common ground, we can say that, while the name of minjung is given to the groups of people who reject acclimatising themselves to their current unjustifiable situations and status, and orient themselves to pursuing what is deserved for achieving

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The Committee of Theological Studies, KNCC, ed., Minjung and Korean Theology, p. 245. (my translation)


864 Cf. Jae-Hong Kim, A Treatise on the Tragedies in the Contemporary Literature of Korea, p. 301.
a true human life, ‘mass’ vaguely designates all people easily accustomed to present realities, whether they are justifiable or not. In this respect, ‘minjung’ is a concept of value and ‘mass’ is a concept of reality; the latter is a more comprehensible concept, in which the former is included.  

When we pursue a concept of minjung atomistically, we need to pay attention to the conceptualisations of minjung in various fields of science. In the political field minjung is defined as an alienated class, especially as a politically alienated one. As Wan-Sang Han points out:

*Minjung* are the ruled people who are exploited on account of their alienation from the means of production, oppressed due to their alienation from the means of ruling, and differentiated because of their alienation from the means of self-esteem. *Minjung* are the ruled people who are alienated as a whole in this way. I think that, among these, political alienation has exerted as much power of an independent variable in establishing *minjung* as economic alienation. At this point, *minjung* can be differentiated from ‘class’. ‘Class’ can be contained in *minjung*, but not vice versa.

To put it tersely, *minjung* are categorised into three types, that is, the ‘politically ruled people’, the ‘economically ruled people’, and the ‘culturally ruled people’; among these, the political oppression is the most influential to the formation of the *minjung* class. According to Han, these alienated *minjung* can be separated into two groups. One is called ‘jeukjajeok minjung (objective minjung)’. They are not awakened to

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struggle against rulers; they simply accept unjustifiable ruling over them as their lot. In this case, there is no actual difference between them and the ‘mass’. The other is called ‘daejaejok minjung (subjective minjung): they are awakened to see that they are ruled unjustifiably, and to act against those who do so.”

In the economic field minjung are a class of people who, although they are directly engaged in producing goods and labours, are unjustifiably estranged from the benefits of production. As Hyeon-Chae Park claims: “From the economic perspective, minjung consist of various kinds of people who, as direct producers, have been alienated from participating in a fair distribution of the economic surplus produced by their labour. Minjung are the main factor of the productivity of the society throughout history. But they have been forced to constitute the society in the state of being ruled, their requirements for human dignity having thus been discarded by their rulers.” Within his economic analysis of the social classes, the minjung class has the following components: “laborers (as the basic component); farmers (as small-scale producers); small-scale commercial operators and the urban poor; and certain progressive intellectuals.”

In the perspective of historiography, minjung is the term designating all kinds of ruled classes, including ‘common people’, who have been differently called throughout Korean history min [people], nongmin [agricultural people], or innin [people], and are the lowest class of slaves, servants and other lowly people. According to Dong-Geol Cho, the term ‘minjung’ should be used for naming the class

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which has been established with the advent of modern society, because common people in the feudal society did not belong to a social class which could exert systematic power in propelling historical development. Within the process of the formation of modern society they were awakened to the contradictions of their society, which resulted, with the help of the self-consciousness of their social status, in struggle and resistance against the classes with the established rights.872

Dong-Il Cho, in his folkloric approach to the conceptualisation of minjung, claims that farmers, industrialists, merchants ard, in some cases, even the learned (intelligentsia) are contained in the concept of minjung as social group. With this claim he differentiates ‘minjung in consciousness’ from ‘minjung in life’, which is similar to the above differentiation of ‘subjective minjung’ from ‘objective minjung’ by Wan-Sang Han. That is to say, if we differentiate the former from the latter in terms of minjung ‘self-consciousness’ expressed in folk-songs, the former minjung express the self-consciousness of their social status and the critical view on their unjust society through singing folk-songs, while the latter, by simply accepting hard labour as their lot, and expressing themselves by labouring with gusto. On this view, he thinks that the ‘minjung in life’ have existed from the beginning of history, although some of them transformed themselves into the ‘minjung in consciousness’ from time to time throughout history, until the advent of modern society in the late period of Chosun Dynasty. From this period on, the ‘minjung in consciousness’ as a group began to grow.873

What do they say about the concept of minjung in the religious field? In the realm of Buddhism Seo-Am Jeon asserts that minjung as ‘many’ are of the un-privileged class, more or less sacrificed to the oppressors or society’s ‘haves’; minjung are common people who become positive and active in the spirit of Bodhisattva, and are concretised in historical realities. From the perspective of faith in Maitreya, Eun Koh sees minjung as the low classes oppressed by noble classes. Whenever they face critical moments in terms of political, economic and social situations throughout history, minjung are awakened through faith in Maitreya to self-consciousness of their miserable social status, which gives birth to the consciousness of resistance against oppressors. In these moments all minjung can do is to survive the slavish realities of all kinds of exploitations, corvée, unjustifiable oppression and severe poverty under the circumstances of total alienation from the meaningless, ruler-centred progress of history. In these critical moments minjung become the subject and bearer of suffering, struggle to get the dregs of the rulers’ wealth, and are destined to taste only deteriorating cultural bequests.

From the perspective of the indigenous religious thought, Ji-Ha Kim understands minjung as the ‘bearer of life’. In this comprehensive concept of minjung he designates minjung as “life itself which vividly acts and reacts in history,” 876 “the bearer of the collective movement to the new society,” 877 “the bearer of life movement,” 878 and “the new reality of life, the reality of human being.” 879 From this perspective, he regards ‘minjung’ as “the term referring not to an ideologically

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874 Cf. Jae-Hong Kim, A Treatise on the Tragedies in the Contemporary Literature of Korea, p. 303.
876 Ji-Ha Kim, “Minjung as the Bearer of Life,” p. 513
877 Ibid., p. 526.
878 Ibid.
879 Ibid., p. 533.
isolated social class, but to the power of the oppressed as a whole, which is produced in the process of their practical confrontation with all kinds of oppressors.”

Influenced by Donghak, in which it is claimed that human beings are Heaven (God), he thinks that “God is nothing other than the universal life acting vividly in the lives of minjung and all creatures.” From the point of view of the newly established ‘Jeungsan-thought’ within Donghak in the early 20th century, he also claims that God is the ill-treated minjung as a whole. That is to say: “Human beings are Heaven, and minjung are the very God; minjung are the creative life-movement without beginning and end, the very moving life itself; the most radical, creative and forward bearer of life among its noticeable forms in history is the very minjung; the ill-treated minjung are the very refined God, the true life.” On the basis of all these, he extends the domain of minjung, thus saying: “Therefore, minjung are largely different from slaves, wage-slaves, or the feudal serfs in the classical sense. It can be seen that in minjung belong not only labourers and farmers, but also drifting people, workers

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880 Ji-Ha Kim, Namnyeok Ttang Baeutona [Southern Land, Boat-song] (Seoul: Doseochulpans Dure, 1985), p. 98. (my translation)
881 Donghak was founded by Suam Je-U Choi on the basis of his religious experience in 1860. It is an indigenous religious thought with the slogan of ‘the sustenance of the nation’s security and the people’s welfare’ and ‘the holistic salvation of the people’, on account of which it rapidly permeated among minjung. Donghak Farmers’ Revolution in 1894 was galvanised by this religious thought. (Cf. Won-Jae Lee, “Donghakkkwa Geurisdo—Donghakki Sincheheomeul Jungameuro [Donghak and Christ—With the God-Experience of Donghak at the Centre],” in Hankuk Munhwasinahkhwwo, ed., Hankuk Jonggoyunbunsowora Geurisdo [Korea’s Religious Culture and Christ] (Seoul: Doseochulpun Handeul, 1996), pp. 234-5.) According to Ji-Ha Kim, Donghak is a syncretistic religious thought, that is, “the universal thought of life which creatively unifies the thought of life that is the core element in Confucianism, Buddhism, the thought of Lao-tzu and Chuangtzu, Taoism, Christianity, and so forth—more specifically, the principle of life that is central to the minjung thought of life, minjung Confucianism, minjung Buddhism, minjung Taoism, the thought of Lao-tzu and Chuangtzu and the thought of dhyana, which are newly illuminated in the minjung dimension, minjung Christian thought, and so forth—on the basis of the minjung thought of life unique to the Korean people.” (Ibid, Southern Land, Boat-song, p. 110; my translation.)
882 Ibid. (my translation)
884 Ji-Ha Kim, Donghak Hyogyi [Stories of Donghak] (Seoul: Sol Chulpansa, 1994), p. 265 (my translation). As Ji-Ha Kim expresses, the fundamental theme of Donghak and Jeungsan-thought is: “Labouring minjung, grass-root minjung, ill-treated minjung, all plundered creatures—all these are the elegant and sacred God.” (Ibid., p. 272; my translation.)

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engaged in services in general, ‘lumpen proletariat’, criminals, totally alienated drug-addicts, schizophrenics, ethnic minorities, discriminated ethnic groups which are dragged into racial disputes, acting intelligentsia, all alienated people, disabled people, especially all women, clergies, various kinds of paupers, petit bourgeois, and, sometimes, even middle-class people.” These whole groups of people as minjung are the subject-power leading the way to the realisation of a transformation of the old, order-deteriorated world into the new, order-recovered one.

In the realm of Christian theology, especially of minjung theology, the concept of minjung has been well discussed. Nam-Dong Suh, one of the founders of minjung theology, grasps minjung not as an object of history, but as its ‘subject’, which means that minjung are the history-makers. For him, therefore, the aim of doing theology is to do everything possible to establish minjung ownership of history, to orient the progress of history towards the realisation of this aim, thus believing that history develops in line with this paradigm of progress. On this view, he understands the concept of minjung collectively, not individually. He thus uses minjung for humanity, minjungic for humanistic, because humanity and humanistic are individual-oriented. He also differentiates minjung from boekseong (the ruled people of a nation as a whole), citizens or proletariat. For him, minjung are those people who exert their power to struggle against invading powers outside of the country, against the feudal ruling power inside of the country, and against all other oppressing powers.

In line with this, Yong-Bock Kim views minjung as the subject of history. As he claims:

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885 Ji-Ha Kim, “Minjung as the Bearer of Life,” p. 533 (my translation).
886 For Jeungsun’s thought of minjung as the subject-power for the realisation of the new, order-recovered world, cf. Ji-Ha Kim, “At Guritkol …”, pp. 200ff.
887 Cf. Nam-Dong Suh, An Exploration into Minjung Theology, pp. 205ff.
We shall first define the term “minjung” as the subject of history … The minjung are the permanent reality of history. … Historically, the minjung is always in the condition of being ruled, a situation which they seek to overcome. … The minjung are not yet fully the subjects of history. However, their subjectivity is being realized through their struggles against oppressive powers and repressive social structures. In so doing, the minjung have risen up to be subjects of their own destiny, refusing to be condemned to the fate of being objects of manipulation and suppression.  

Tae-Soo Yim, an Old Testament theologian, understands minjung more comprehensively by adding the theological aspects to the political, socio-economic and cultural aspects of the concept of minjung. According to him:

- **Minjung** belong to the low class of the society that contains the politically ruled, the economically exploited and the socially alienated.
- ‘Minjung’ is a dynamic and relative concept; some members of minjung can be both minjung-ic and non-minjung-ic, which shows the precariousness of the characteristic of the concept of minjung.
- In the term ‘minjung’ the un-awaken mass (crowd) as well as the awakening mass (minjung) are contained.
- **Minjung** are the main stream of history and the reality of the society.
- God is on the side of minjung.
- The kingdom of minjung is the kingdom, in which the whole people are minjungised, so radically that the whole kingdom can be genuinely transformed into a society full of justice, equality, liberty and peace.

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888 Yong-Bock Kim, “Messiah and Minjung: …,” pp. 185-188.
Byung-Mu Ahn, a New Testament theologian as well as one of the founders of minjung theology, finds a biblical basis for the concept of minjung in The Gospel according to Mark. By his analysis of the word, ὀχλος, which is notably used by Mark, this biblical theologian identifies minjung with ὀχλος. This means that minjung is a ‘synonym’ of ὀχλος in the Jesus-event, or designates a group of people that has ὀχλος at the centre. According to his analysis, ὀχλος are a group of lower, poor people. More specifically, they are the most alienated, untouchable low-people. These people always follow Jesus, who himself is one among them: where there are ὀχλος, Jesus is there; where there is Jesus, they are there. They co-exist with each other: when both of them gather together, they vividly act together. In this perspective, it can be said: “Jesus Christ is the man of the minjung, of the alienated ‘people’ without power and possessions. He is one of these people; he speaks their language. All his life, he identified himself with them right up to his violent end.” Hence the paradigm of subject-object should not be applied to the relationship between them; Jesus’ movement can be fully understood as minjung movement, when we reject any indication of a differentiation of Jesus as subject from minjung as object. Byung-Mu Ahn applies this concept of ὀχλος to the Korean minjung, thus identifying them with each other. It should be mentioned here that this identification is the basis for his

understanding of ‘resurrection’ as minjung’s resurrection in their will to struggle against oppressors, as will be seen before we conclude.

Up to this point, I have considered various kinds of concepts of minjung from several fields of science and religion. As a synthesis of them all, it can be said that minjung are bearers of han. Because they are manipulated, exploited and alienated politically, economically, socially and culturally, minjung always accumulate han in their psyche.\(^{905}\) Put simply, minjung are all of those who are oppressed by oppressors. Their hearts are wounded, because they are unavoidably burnt by han as excruciating pain, pining for something unattainable, everlasting waiting, autogenous sadness, eventual resignation, and the pessimistic world-view in hwangtobit han. Moreover, from the perspective of fundamental han, all human beings are said to be minjung within God’s point of view, because all of them are under the oppression by the invisible oppressor, evil. Minjung and han are inseparable. In their sobbing they wait for the God of han. They believe that in han they are united with God, because God’s heart is also burnt by han. From this perspective, Ji-Ha Kim’s concept of maltreated minjung as God is fully understandable. Minjung are the most conspicuous phenomenological expression of God’s han. In and through minjung God feels God’s own fundamental han, which is caused by the ineluctability of evil in and for God’s creation. For minjung God struggles against ineluctable evil. In this regard, it is comprehensible to claim that God is on the side of minjung. In and through this struggle God leads Godself and minjung to the eventual overcoming of han through resurrection, the first-fruit of which has been shown in the event of Jesus’ resurrection. God is the God-with-minjung. Minjung are the existential expressions of God’s being as God’s han. This is my definition of minjung.

\(^{905}\) In this regard, the political and economic theories of minjung by Wan-Sang Han and Hyeon-Chae Park are thought to be built on the basis of han. Cf. Hyung-A Kim, “‘Minjung Socioeconomic Responses to State-led Industrialization,” p. 54.

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The question of meaning is oriented towards these bearers of han. This question is asked for them. They are the object of this question. This is why I asserted at the beginning of the previous chapter that the ineluctable suffering and death [that is, the han] of the minjung in human history mixed together with the insuperable power of evil is the fundamental historico-phenomenological horizon on which the question of the meaning of human existence cannot but and must inevitably be asked, and only on which its true raison d’être can be found.

The question of meaning is also answered by minjung in their indefatigable efforts to seek solutions to han. They are the subject of this question, as well as its object. Hence we need to consider minjung solutions to han in passive and active ways for our pursuit of an answer to the question of meaning. However, I consider that these solutions to han by minjung must be complemented by God’s solution to han through the raising up of Jesus, which is to be served as the fundamental answer to the question of the meaning of fundamental han. These are the last themes of this thesis, to which we now turn.

1) A Practical Answer to the Question of Meaning: Minjung Solutions to Han

Minjung struggle against evil power, as God does. In the history of han their struggles are expressed in two ways: passive and active. Their passive struggles are here referred to as the passive solution to han; their active struggles are designated the active solution to han. In particular, the active solution to han needs to be complemented by dan as the transcendental solution to han, so that it could really be a solution to han. These solutions to han are thought to be a practical answer to the question of meaning. That is to say, we find the minjung will to praxis regarding the
question of meaning in these historico-phenomenological solutions to han. We cannot otherwise find any example of praxis regarding this question in history. This is why I consider their concrete examples in the Korean history of han.

2) The Passive Solution to Han

The passive solution to han here means the minjung expression of han in indirect ways, not in a direct way such as an act of revolt against oppressors, which inevitably produces bleak and dire results involving bloodshed. In the history of han we find multifarious means, by which minjung could indirectly express their inner pain of han. The first thing to be mentioned in this regard is kut, the long-standing, traditional shamanistic ritual. The leader of kut is called mudang (shaman). There are three types of mudang in Korean shamanism: ‘called’ mudang, bequeathed mudang, and acquired mudang. Acquired mudang are pseudo-mudang, because they acquire the shamanistic skills for kut for sustaining their living. Bequeathed mudang are also learned mudang. They play a priestly role and give no mediumistic oracles while exercising a kut. Contrary to this, called mudang are basically mediumistic; they invoke and communicate with, the spirit of the dead, and proclaim oracles while performing a kut.

For called mudang the common prerequisite to become a mudang is han. All called mudang suffer individual hardship, in whatever forms it might be, before being called to become a mudang. Before calling, they are all han-ridden minjung. In the midst of their extreme suffering from han, they are called into sinbyeong, a phenomenon of the descent of spirit, through which they reach the acme of han-suffering, and then

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897 Cf. ibid., pp. 280ff.
experience the healing of their suffering through being possessed by the spirit. They experience spiritual rebirth, thus becoming capable of “having direct communication with the spirits, actual bodily and spiritual access to their world.”

Paradigmatically speaking, a called *mudang* experiences spiritual death by extreme suffering and affliction, ecstasy (possession by the spirit) and spiritual rebirth through *sinbyeong*.

In this regard, it can be said that the *mudang sinbyeong* as a physical experience of *minjung* psyche, twisted and distorted by *han* is a primordial and whole-personal religious experience. Ordinary *han*-ridden *minjung* who have suffered from *sinbyeong* become *mudang* through *naerin-kut*—the initial ceremony for the descent of the spirit. Through this ceremony, called *mudang* experience catharsis, in which all kinds of negative emotions of *han* in their psyche are dissolved into good will with which to lead *minjung* with *han* to its solution in the right way of shamanism. On this basis they, as ‘priests of *han*’, have given consolation, encouragement and inspiration to *minjung* for a very long time. They have functioned in and for the *minjung* community as priests, prophets, healers, and reconcilers. By performing *kut*, they have made a big contribution towards solving the *han* of *minjung*.

*Kut* is the shamanistic ritual led by a *mudang*. Generally speaking, the function of this traditional ritual can be divided into four categories: blessing for families, communities and the nation; healing; leading the dead soul to the other world; and

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901 Cf. ibid.
entertaining the sacred spirits and the ancestral spirits.\textsuperscript{903} In particular, \textit{kut} in relation to the second and third categories has a function of solving the pent-up victims’ \textit{han}.\textsuperscript{904} Through performing the \textit{mamabaesong-kut}, the \textit{byeong-kut} (disease-\textit{kut}) for farewelling the smallpox-causing spirit, the \textit{mudang} consoles those who suffer from the disease and their families.\textsuperscript{905} This \textit{kut} shows that human beings are best to treat evil spirits with hospitality, instead of directly confronting and exorcising them, so that the spirits might choose by themselves to retreat from humans without causing too much damage.\textsuperscript{906} Through the \textit{ssitgim-kut} or \textit{jinogi-kut}, the shamanistic rite of requiem for the manes of the dead person who died of unfair, sudden death with unsolved \textit{han}, the \textit{mudang} speaks \textit{neokduri}, utterances on behalf of, and for the sake of, the returned manes, in order to solve its unsolved \textit{han}. Because a manes with \textit{han} remained unsolved will not move on to the other world, the \textit{mudang} solves its \textit{han} through her \textit{neokduri}, by way of which the manes leaves for the other world, where it can rest in peace.\textsuperscript{907} The family related to the manes and all the participants in the \textit{kut} are consoled in the belief that the \textit{han} of the manes has been solved and the manes has left them for the eternal home. All of them feel that their own \textit{han} has also solved, albeit temporarily. They now eat, drink and dance all together to celebrate this temporary solution to \textit{han}. The characteristic of this playfulness, blended with graveness regarding the suffering in life, is in line with harmony, the essence and eventual aim of shamanism. In this sense, \textit{kut} is oriented towards the recovery of lost harmony in everyday life. All participants in \textit{kut} feel this harmonisation filling their


\textsuperscript{905} Smallpox was one of common, incurable diseases in Korea until the importation of the vaccine treatment. This is why \textit{mudang} perform a special \textit{kut} in relation to this disease. Nowadays, it is hard to see \textit{mudang} performing this \textit{byeong-kut}, because smallpox has disappeared with the help of vaccination.

\textsuperscript{906} Cf. Dong-Sik Ryu, \textit{The History and Structure of Korean Shamanism}, p. 303.

\textsuperscript{907} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 305.
psyche and returning to the reality of their lives. They pick up again on their disharmonised lives and try to solve the disharmony of life in their own ways. When they face a blind alley with regard to seeking this solution, they come back to the place of kut in order to recover its harmonisation of their lives, and in turn go back to their everyday realities, living harmonised lives for the time being.  

This was a practical solution to han by minjung. It has been persistently sought in the oscillation of creating disharmony in everyday life and recovering harmony in the place of kut. To sum up, from the perspective of shamanism, Korean minjung have sobbed and laughed in the place of kut with the mudang neokhuri, and this has served as a practical solution to han. The question of meaning is asked in the midst of the disharmonious realities of their everyday lives, and is given a practical answer as the reinvigoration of harmony is realised through kut.

Minjung art is another indirect means of expression of minjung han. It has many genres, such as folksongs, talchum (mask dance), shamanistic songs, pansori (traditional tunes), sagas, oral traditions, and other pieces of music and dances. Only two genres among them are considered here—folksongs and talchum (mask dance)—because they are two of the most popular art-forms in the minjung community.

A folksong is the most popular form of minjung oral-traditional literature and is related to the whole minjung life; it is presented as a song blended with tunes and functions, formed, developed and enjoyed according to their typical ways of life. From this perspective, the subject of folksongs can be said to be minjung who function as their pure and orthodox transmitters and inheritors. Folksongs contain the indefatigable will of minjung to sustain their lives under given situations, however turbulent and oppressive they are. Through folksongs minjung express the mysterious

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potential energy and wisdom by which they stoutly build and propel their lives, even though hardship. In other words, minjung’s potential energy underlies their folksongs. Hence they cannot be thought of only as the passive means by which minjung try to express the sorrowfulness and unavoidability of their lot. In these unsophisticated, pathos-evoking tunes with words about waiting and longing for things unattainable, the positive ways of life of minjung and their philosophy of life are condensed.\(^{911}\)

Through folksongs minjung collective consciousness is well expressed. In particular, ‘farmers in living’ primarily sing their labour-songs while labouring in paddies and fields, in order to “unify the motions of their work, to cope successfully with the tediousness caused by the simple working motions of their work, to share joyfulness stemming from their sense of value of the sacredness of labouring with one another, and to share individual secrets of their minds with one another.”\(^{912}\) With the help of these labour-songs, they enjoy fully the true meaning of cooperation and acknowledge the importance of co-humanity (Mitmenschlichkeit). In their community based upon cooperation and solidarity they build a common front against things disastrous and detrimental to their community. They are always conscious of the importance of being a member of their community. And this consciousness is solidified in and through singing labour-songs. The primary aim for ‘farmers in living’ in their singing of labour-songs is to express their pleasure of labour and to acknowledge the importance of their cooperation and solidarity.

When their hardship is accumulated by oppressors, however, farmer-minjung express their unjustifiable bleak and dire nature of their situation through their labour-songs, as in the following one:

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\(^{912}\) Dong-II Cho, “Minjung, Minjung Consciousness, Minjung Arts,” p. 125. (my translation)
However diligently we labour, there is nothing left after harvest.
With all grains gathered from the paddy we cannot fill a kettle.
The office’s tax dunning is heard more and more frequently.
The village’s tax-collector comes to the door to shout his urge.\footnote{913}

With this changed content of their folksong, they transform themselves into ‘minjung in consciousness’. They are awakened to realise the absurdities of their lives. Sometimes these awakened farmers cannot find any exit from the persistent absurdities, thus confining themselves to expressing their han through these changed folksongs. Under these circumstances, they continue their satiric criticism of the absurdities through folksongs.\footnote{914} That is to say, they remain safe within their passive solution to han. But other times, when their hardship is maximised by exploiters, for example, they revolt against them. This is why there are many farmers’ revolts in the history of han, which can be thought of as a means of the direct expression of their accumulated han as deploration.

Folksongs were the basic means for indirect expression of minjung han. In and through them minjung tried to find an exit from the unsolvable question of the meaning of the absurdities of their lives. In so doing, they changed the words of a folksong so as to resist against oppressors indirectly. By means of this, they taste a halfway solution to their han. In this situation minjung long for and wait for something unattainable and their han is thus deepened and deepened. The question of meaning persists in this halfway solution to han, until the advent of the fundamental solution to it. The question persists forever between the halfway solution to han and the realisation of the complete solution to han, the latter belonging to God’s domain.

\footnote{914} Dong-Il Cho, *“Minjung, Minjung Consciousness, Minjung Arts,”* p. 128.
of providence. In this regard, faith in God who is working for the realisation of the complete solution to han is the only basis for the question of meaning.

The traditional talchum (mask-dance) is another means of the indirect expression of minjung han. Talchum is a form of play, in which the mask-wearing performers satirically and humorously deride and criticise the ruling yangban class through their performances and lines of words.915 Through talnori (mask-play) minjung, especially farmers, could disclose their dissatisfaction with the yangban class. In talnori, contrary to real situations, minjung become judges and yangban are judged.916

Every mask worn by the character in the talnori (mask-play) shows its own unique facial expression. In particular, all the masks except one in the hahwoe-talnori, one of the representative forms of talchum in Korea, assume a laughing or smiling mien. Let me briefly depict the facial features of the masks within the scope of this hahwoe-talchum. The laughing of the mask representing bune, the scholar’s concubine or the kisaeng looks like a seducing laugh with the voice of ‘hoho’, coming from her narrowed eyes and the sides of her mouth. The laugh from the mask representing the scholar is a snicker blended with treacherousness and ruthlessness. The laughing of the mask representing the yangban person looks like a bright laugh with the voice of ‘haha’. It appears blended with softness, boastfulness and loafishness. The laugh from the mask representing a Buddhist monk is an intrepid laugh with the voice of ‘huhuhu huhu’, within which cunning is hidden. The laughing of the mask representing a crone appears to bear traces of the various kinds of suffering she has patiently endured throughout her life, the elocution of which is now bleached and sunk deep into her psyche where it is intermingled with resignation. The laugh of the mask representing a butcher looks like a laugh filled with ferociousness and toughness in

916 Cf. ibid., p. 72.
which hostility is hidden. The laugh from the mask representing choraeng-i, the yangban person’s rashly acting servant, is a silly giggling with the voice of ‘hihi’. What emanates from the chinless mask of imae, the scholar’s idiotic servant, is a simple-hearted, serene and unworried smile. If he laughs, it would be with the voice of ‘hehe’. The only mask which gives no laughing or smiling is the one of the newlywed woman. It shows a face with melancholy and sorrowfulness like a neighbour-housewife who is tired from a life full of hardship and unjustifiable absurdities. An animal mask representing a lion is added to these human masks. This mask is used at the beginning of the talnori for the purpose of expelling evil spirits from the talnori place.\footnote{For the detailed depiction of the facial features of the masks for hahwoe-talnori, cf. Choon-Geun Yoon, “Pungbusan Pyojeongui Mihak [An Aesthetics for Ample Facial Expressions],” in Andong Munhwa Yeon-guso, Hahwoetalgwa Hahwoetaldhumi Mihak [An Aesthetics for Hahwoe Masks and Hahwoe Mask-dance] (Seoul: Sagyeyeol Chulpansa, 1999), pp. 17-66.} All these characters are brought together to produce a place of talnori, where laughing, satire and humour are intermingled, and all the participants temporarily forget all of their worrisome situations—hostility, hate, and any other negative emotions in their psyches—under the influence of the orgiastic festival mood.

When they see and hear the performers’ derisive actions accompanied with humour and sarcasm, minjung feel an empathy, in which they themselves are deriding, criticising and rebuking their oppressors. In and through this empathy they feel a sense of having a halfway solution to han. Although at the end of the play they have to return to their routines in which they are derided, criticised and berated by yangban people, they go accompanied by a vision in which the advent of the time stands before them when there are no more derision, criticism or berating from those who oppress them. This vision enables them to put up with such vexations. In and through this vision, they sustain their untiring, stubborn will to live under unjustifiable and unfair circumstances. In and through this vision they, paradoxically in contrast to the
yangban and the intelligentsia classes, criticise the contradictory realities of the present time, and try to rebuild their society in a way that is oriented towards justice, freedom, equality, new order and cooperation in the genuine sense of these terms. If they are to orient themselves towards a revolution in order to rebuild their society, they neither will nor must lose, in the process of the reconstruction of their society through revolution, the lenient, generous and humble laughs, along with sarcasm and humour they have acquired through their partaking in the talnori. Laughing is necessary to accomplish a revolution in the genuine sense. Without it, revolution will end as another beginning for revenge. As Young-Hak Hyun says: “Laughing is an expression of forgiveness and love that drive a wedge into the evil circulation with the repetition of revenge and justice.” With the domain of this kind of laughing, a revolution is always a self-sacrificing one. The question of meaning lives in and with this laughing. So long as minjung do not lose this laughing in their lives which are surrounded with the structural evil power, the question remains something laughable.

Up to this point, I have considered some ways for the indirect expression of minjung han. Through these and other means of indirect expression of han, minjung have passively solved the han knotted into their psyche. This passive solution to han has filled the most part of the history of minjung. This is why han as deploration always emerged in the minjung psyche, and han as rancour was submerged into their subconsciousness throughout history. From time to time in this history, however, this passive solution was transformed into an active solution to han. We need to consider this active solution to han, because it is also conceived of as a part of the practical answer to the question of meaning.

3) The Active Solution to Han

The history of han has been coloured by han as deploitation. When minjung were under the steady control of the national political system, they had to emit their han through ritualistic deeds and art-forms as means for the indirect expression of han. Whenever their han as deploitation was maximised under the circumstances of politico-social uncertainties, however, minjung transformed it into han as rancour. When their hearts were full of this han as rancour, they sought direct means for its expression, as a result of which they got involved in acts of revolt against their oppressors. In this regard, han as rancour was the basis for minjung revolt against the higher classes with vested rights and interests.

The history of han has thus been studded with minjung revolts against the voracious people of the ruling class with vested rights and heinous external powers. Indeed, we have many historical records on minjung revolts. As mentioned above, a representative minjung revolt is the Rebellion of Manjeok. This is the most large-scale rebellion by slaves in the Korean medieval history. Although it failed because of a slave’s betrayal, this slave rebellion was a revolution for the emancipation of their slave status. Their generations-old han as deploitation was maximised by the voracity and atrocity of the bureaucrats at that time. And changes in the political system of the government, in which a number of slaves could make themselves functionaries of the government, made an impact on their ‘consciousness of social status’. They felt the need to translate their han as deploitation into han as rancour, which could lead them to a change in their ‘consciousness of revolution’. Basically, this rebellion was a revolution for achieving the emancipation from slavery. The aim of this revolt was to
get rid of the slave class from the society by revolution.\textsuperscript{919} Although those who were involved in this revolt were forced to end their lives in bloodshed, their bloodshed was not fruitless, because through it they tasted what freedom could mean to their fettered lives, albeit temporarily, and actively achieved what was meant by a solution to \textit{han}, even though it was aborted in the end. From the perspective of domain-oriented dualism, it can be said that, by seeking a praxis for the question of the meaning of their absurd existence, they struggled actively against the power of evil, as God in God’s own \textit{han} always does. This God must have been there participating in their bloodshed. The question of meaning is not aborted by their aborted revolution, but persists inviolate in their temporary solution to \textit{han}. It never ceases in its walk across over the stepping-stones of these kinds of aborted revolts in order to reach the domain where it is no longer needed.

Another notable example of the \textit{minjung} revolt is the Rebellion of \textit{Hong Gyeong-Nae}, which occurred in \textit{Pyeongando}, the north-western part of the peninsula, in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century. People in this area were unfairly treated by the central government. The intelligentsia from this area were unable to get to the political arena in the capitol, Seoul. Due to the development of new agricultural techniques, many farmers lost their jobs in farming, which resulted in the collapse of the farmers’ class. The unemployed farmers had to become merchants, miners, vagabonds, or thieves. They were gathered together with remaining farmers by the dissatisfied intelligentsia in order to revolt against the feudal government. Even the wealthy landowners and merchants took part in this rebellion in order to maintain and enhance their own interests, because they

were restricted by the privileged class which was in collusion with the feudal government.\footnote{Cf. Seok-Jong Jeong, “Hong Gyeong-Nae Nan [The Rebellion of Hong Gyeong-Nae],” in Seung-Je Koh et al., Jongongseosu Minjungundong: ha: Hong Gyeong-Naeui Nameujo Yi Pil-Je Namkapt[The Minjung Movements in the Traditional Times, vol. 2: From the Rebellion of Hong Gyeong-Nae to the Rebellion of Yi Pil-Je] (Seoul: Doseochulpam Pulpit, 1981), pp. 289ff.} Although the revolt was eventually quelled by the army of the government, and doubtlessly ended with minjung bloodshed, it was a direct expression of maximised han as deploration. Through their revolt they answered the question of the meaning of their absurd existence in a practical way. It was another stepping-stone on the way to land of no-more-evil.

The Donghak Farmers’ Revolution in 1894 is another good example of minjung revolt. This revolution was an anti-feudalistic strife by the members of the anti-yangban classes, by way of which they displayed in bold relief their indefatigable will to struggle against the severe exploitations of the bureaucrats and the inability of the dynasty during the process of its collapse.\footnote{Cf. Il-Chel Sin, Donghaksasangui Ihue [In Understanding of the Donghak-Thought], Sahwoebipyeong Sinseo, 51 (Seoul: Sahwoebipyeong, 1995), p. 186.} The subject of the revolution was the politically, economically and socially alienated class of farmers. These totally alienated people, that is, “the uneducated masses, who had been alienated for centuries from yangban-dominated society through stringent status and regional barriers, could not identify themselves with the elite and the nation-state.”\footnote{Chai-Sik Chung, “Confucian Tradition and Nationalist Ideology in Korea,” in K. M. Wells, ed., South Korea’s Minjung Movement: ..., p. 81.} Under the influence of the Donghak-thought, in which it is claimed that God is in every person’s mind, and thus every person is equal,\footnote{This thought comes from the founder’s view of God as Creator and Sustainer of the universe. According to the founder’s thought, God does not exist as the Wholly Other after the creation, but is immanent in all God’s creatures, working with them for the holistic harmonisation of the universe. From this perspective of the creative synthesis of monotheism and pantheism, he could claim that God is not far from us, but within us, that is, in our mind. Hence every human being is with God, and should thus be treated in equality and respect. Cf. Choon-Song Kim, “Haewol Saangui Hyeonhaejeok Ului [The Up-to-date Meaning of Haewol’s Thought],” in Busan Yesulmunhwaedahak Donghak Yeon-guso, ed., Haewol Choi Si-Hyeonggye Donghaksasang [Haewol Si-Hyeong Choi and the Donghak-thought], The Anthology of Korean Philosophy, 12 (Seoul: Yeojuunseowon, 1999), pp. 54ff.] they were awakened to unite themselves to fight in a practical way against the corrupt government and its
voracious bureaucrats. Indeed, on the brink of the dynasty’s collapse, almost all bureaucrats and functionaries were indulging in extortion and exploitation. They were interested only in accumulating wealth and being extravagant and salacious. Under these circumstances, the minjung, the majority of whom were farmers, suffered maximised han as deploration, which led them to react in a revolutionary way against their oppressors. Hence it can be said that this minjung revolt was a minjung revolution, which arose from their opposition to the ruling class of yangban and the functionaries’ severe extortion and exploitation.924

As can be expected, there was a war between the revolutionary army, mainly composed by the severely exploited farmers, and the government’s army supported by the Japanese army. Although the former was eventually quelled by the latter, it contributed to the collapse of the last dynasty, and to bringing on minjung awakening to a modern self-consciousness of unjustifiable social status, thus becoming the starting point for the total collapse of the absurd bifurcated system of social status of yangban and sangmin. In so doing, however, many people shed their blood, dying han-ridden deaths. Our question of meaning is oriented towards their han-knotted, unjustifiable deaths. God’s question of meaning hovers over the horizon with the possibility of a fundamental solution to their han by way of restoring their lives from the domain of death.

We have many other examples of minjung revolt as the direct expression of their han as deploration. If we list some of them, we must mention, among others, the Rebellion of Mang-i-Mangsoi in Koryo Dynasty, the group of grass-thieves (meaning rebellious farmers) who struggled against the invading Mongolians in the 13th century, the Rebellion of Yim Kkeok-Jeong in the 16th century, the Rebellion of Yi Pil-Je in the


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19th century, and many other rebellions by farmer-minjung. For the minjung movement in the 20th century the following can be identified: the Korean people’s all-out 3·1 Independence Movement against the Japanese rulers in 1919; the 4·19 Students’ Movement against the authoritarian government in 1961; recent minjung bloodshed represented by the martyr-like deaths of Tae-II Chun and others. Besides, we must not overlook the fact that, from the religious perspective, faith in Maitreya made a considerable contribution to the development of minjung revolts throughout the history of han.

In and through these acts of the minjung revolt han as deploitation is metamorphosed into han as rancour. In the process of this metamorphosis, however, the pursuit of a practical answer to the question of meaning is shattered, if the minjung revolt as a means of the direct expression of their han as deploitation calls for bloodshed. For on the basis of this an endless evil ring of vengeance between the subject and the object of vengeance is established. It is no use asking the question of meaning within this endless evil circulation of vengeance. If we are to keep asking the question of meaning within it, we must think about the possibility of ‘breaking’ the ring of vengeance. In the concept of dan we find this possibility.

4) Dan: The Transcendental Solution to Han

For genuine reconciliation between oppressors and the oppressed, we need to think of the possibility of rebuilding a society filled with justice and peace. For a reconstructed doctrine of reconciliation between human beings, we need to consider the possibility of reinstating the ‘village’ in which love, compassion and tolerance

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prevail, where most village housewives in white clothes gather at a house of a housewife, whose son is dying of a disease, in order to console her. Someone may think of this village as coming from a kind of Utopian imagination. But we have to consider the possibility of rebuilding this kind of society as a basis for the transition of the traditional Christian doctrine of reconciliation between God and human beings to the genuine doctrine of reconciliation between human beings. No matter how hard it is thought to be for us to realise it, we must conceive of this possibility, if we really want to concern ourselves with a genuine doctrine of reconciliation between human beings.

The theology of han deals with the praxis for realising this possibility. Actually, its starting point is the concern with the praxis on the basis of which this possibility can be realised in the history hic et nunc. In the theology of han this possibility is considered a genuine possibility within the perspective of the dialectical relationship of han as rancour and dan as cutting off the link of the evil cycle of vengeance between han-sufferers and han-providers.

The need for dan does not arise within the scope of passive solutions to han. No philosophy of dan is needed for minjung who pursue solutions to their han through the mudang neokduri, the elegant chorus of the simple-minded farmers, or the ‘haha’, ‘hehe’, ‘hihi’, ‘hoho’ and ‘huhuhuhu’ of the mask-wearing clowns in talnori. Because through shamanistic ritual and art-forms minjung swallow and dissolve their han as a blend of excruciating pain, longing for something unattainable, waiting, autogenous sadness and resignation within themselves, the need for dan does not arise for them. What needs to be ‘cut off’ from the minjung experience of liberation through the orgiastic, cooperative, and satiric and humours means of these indirect solutions to han?
Dan is needed in the process of the transition from han as deploration into han as rancour. This is the case because of the following. When minjung han as rancour is galvanised into a revolution, there inevitably comes with it a danger of producing an evil ring of revenge. This danger is intrinsic to minjung pursuit of the active solution to han; it sits crossed-legged with it. If minjung bloodshed through revolution calls for more bloodshed from the oppressor’s sice, and the oppressor, whenever possible, calls for more minjung bloodshed, this evil cycle of revenge does nothing to help pursue an answer to the question of meaning. Therefore, whenever minjung seek an active solution to han through the act of revolt, they should do so within the context of the dialectical relationship between han and dan. As Nam-Dong Suh claims, we need to pay close attention to the two-fold meaning of the philosophy of dan: first, it means actively that the accumulated minjung han should be collectivised and energised in order to ‘cut off’ the continuing oppression of oppressors, and thereby reconstruct the society; second, it means passively that in this process any action causing the evil ring of revenge continues to be banned. Han as rancour and dan are like the head and tail of a coin. When the former is galvanised, it needs to be bound by the latter. When minjung think of the possibility of the active solution to han within this dialectical relationship between han and dan, this possibility comes to be truly oriented towards the possibility of attaining a practical answer to the question of meaning. Otherwise, it is useless for it.

The fundamental prerequisite for dan is forgiveness. Forgiveness is the basis for a real ‘cutting off’ of the evil ring of revenge and for genuine reconciliation between the oppressor and the oppressed. It needs to be requested through active liberation in

927 In this regard, Yi-Du Tcheon emphasises the importance of the self-dissolution of han by its subjects within themselves. Cf. *idem, A Study of the Structure of Han*, p. 109ff.
928 Nam-Dong Suh, *An Exploration into Minjung Theology*, p. 200.
order to establish harmony and the future-oriented vision. Young-Hak Hyun finds generosity, transcendence and forgiveness in the satiric and humorous laughs of ‘haha’, ‘hehe’, ‘hihi’, ‘hoho’ and ‘huhuhuhu’ in talnori. As he claims: “Forgiveness means ... accepting the given absurdities and unjustifiable realities. It also means resignation in its deepest religious sense within the anticipation and vision of the advent of the finalised solution to those absurdities and unjustifiable realities in the future.” Within the perspective of this forgiveness, we can reconstruct a genuine doctrine of reconciliation between human beings. By discarding all kinds of hate and hostility, and consistently pursuing love and mercy, a place for true reconciliation opens up. In this regard, we can fully understand Ji-Ha Kim’s view of antagonism, hostility, hate and abhorrence as psychological bases for the killing of life and as distorted phenomena of life. Dan needs to be based upon genuine forgiveness, in which oppressors and enemies are embraced, all ideologies and religions are transcended, and true eschatological hope for the realisation of apokatastasis persists. Through this dan-thought, minjung can envisage the realisation of that village, where most of housewives in white clothes gather together to console the mother of a dying boy, all the children play merrily together on the hill covered with full-blown azaleas, most thatched houses have no artificial fences to bar intruders, but rather are surrounded with forsythia-fences, male adults work together, singing

932 I was told by my mother that, when the Japanese imperialists surrendered on August 15, 1945, the Korean people at my hometown did not ill-treat the retreating Japanese people for the sake of revenge. I believe that it was a general trend that Korean people treated the retreating people like this at that time, although we cannot exclude the possibility that some people actually ill-treated those runaways. Generally, people who learn to love satire and humour through talnori, and even try to solve the hun of the dead by way of the mudang neokhuri, are not hostility-oriented, but reconciliation-oriented. This means that a genuine reconciliation between human beings comes to those armed with dan-thought as a real possibility. This is why dan with forgiveness is thought of as the basis for a genuine doctrine of reconciliation between human beings and the vision for the realisation of apokatastasis. As I will be mentioning in my conclusion part, I find a historical basis for this vision in Jesus’ resurrection, which is thought to be the first-fruit of the ongoing process of the ontological homogenisation of God the creator and the whole creatures.
labour-songs while housewives prepare lunch for them, and in the meantime grey cranes hover or land on the paddy to take a rest.

The question of meaning is sustained towards a practical answer through the paradigmatic cycle of the passive solution to han and the active one accompanied with dan. The stepping-stones to its fundamental answer throughout the history of han consist of these solutions. If there is no fundamental answer to the question of meaning at the end of the road of these stepping-stones, it is shattered at every stepping-stone on the way. Without a fundamental answer, it totally vanishes. I find that answer in Jesus’ resurrection.

5) The Fundamental Answer to the Question of Meaning: Jesus’ Resurrection

I have found a practical answer to the question of meaning in the minjung solutions to han through those passive and active means for expressing their han. I have depicted the historical process of the conquest of han through these minjung solutions figuratively as a road made of stepping-stones. This road of stepping-stones is oriented towards a domain, or a status, where the question of the meaning of suffering is ultimately answered. This orientation rests upon the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection.

The most hazardous stumbling block to seeking a fundamental answer to the question of meaning in Jesus’ resurrection is the denial of its historicality. Many Christian theologians deny historical foundation to Jesus’ resurrection. If we really seek a fundamental answer to the question of meaning in Jesus’ resurrection, we have to put aside all kinds of swoon theories, a remarkable example of which is found in B. Thiering’s assertion: “Jesus did not die on the cross. He recovered from the effects of
the poison, was helped to escape from the tomb by friends, and stayed with them until
he reached Rome, where he was present in AD 64. In the field of the New
Testament theology, a notable argument against the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection
is found in Bultmann’s theological programme of demythologising, where the
historical aspect of the Easter event disappears with his proposition: “The resurrection
itself is not an event of past history. All that historical criticism can establish is the
fact that the first disciples came to believe in the resurrection.” In line with this, H.
Braun denies the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection by saying that the events in the
Easter Stories “are not actual events that happened in time and space, that is, historical
occurrences in the sense of what we call history today.” For him “Jesus’ life is the
kerygma itself, to which the Easter event adds nothing new.” Similarly, W.
Marxsen stands against any claim of the historical reality of Jesus’ resurrection. He
seeks the cause of Easter faith in the disciples’ faith in Jesus of Nazareth already
established before Easter. Hence he asserts that “faith after Easter (faith in the risen
Jesus) was no different in substance from the faith to which Jesus had already called
men before Easter.” For him the statement, ‘God has raised Jesus from the dead’,
has nothing to do with any historical reality, it “was as a consequence of a presently
lived faith that this statement originated.” In this regard, he thinks of the “what

933 B. Thiering. Jesus the Man: A New Interpretation from the Dead Sea Scrolls (Sydney et al.:
42.
935 H. Braun, Jesus: Der Mann aus Nazareth und seine Zeit (Stuttgart und Berlin: Kreuz-Verlag, 1969),
p. 52. (my translation)
936 E. Schweitzer, Jesus Christ: The Man from Nazareth and the Exalted Lord, ed. H. Gloer (Macon,
938 W. Marxsen, Jesus and Easter: Did God Raise the Historical Jesus from the Dead?, trans. V. P.
Furnish (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1990), p. 73.
question” of Jesus’ resurrection as irrelevant; it, in relation to this ‘what question’, should be treated as a ‘pseudo-subject’.939

These three theologians show negative attitudes towards the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection. None of them find any light—any light that could show the way for them in reality—from the lighthouse loaded with the historical reality of God’s yearning for human transfiguration through Jesus of Nazareth. Perhaps, the light glimmers so faintly for them. They thus go astray eventually to reach queer conclusions: for Bultmann, Jesus’ resurrection is ‘the saving efficacy of the cross’;940 for Braun, ‘love’ is the central meaning of the Jesus event;941 for Marxsen, the lived faith as an experienced reality, which has been expressed by the disciples of Jesus in the familiar conception, ‘God has raised Jesus from the dead,’ means ‘reconciled people living reconciliation.’942

In Bultmann’s existential understanding of the locus contactus between the realms of the salvation-giver’s initiative and the salvation-receiver’s experience as the preached word, where what matters is the hearer’s subjective decision for or against the contents of the message, the only basis that we can find for the question of meaning is the hearer’s total subjectivity which can remain alien to the objectivity of an event about which the hearer is told through the word of preaching. Even though the cross-event of Jesus is historically verifiable, if the meaning of his death on the cross as the culmination of God’s salvational process has to be totally dependent upon the hearer’s subjective judgment on it, how can we objectively know that the event has that salvific effectuality, then? In other words, if it be the case, the inevitable question to face here is this: how do we epistemologically know that a real answer to

939 Cf. ibid., p. 84.
941 Cf. E. Schweizer, Jesus Christ: ..., p. 5.
942 W. Marxsen, Jesus and Easter: ..., p. 90. (author’s italics)
the question of meaning has been given to human beings through Jesus’ death? Why in Jesus’ death rather than, for example, in the nirvana of Sakyamuni?

The same question can be applied to Braun’s understanding of Jesus event. How do we epistemologically know that Jesus’ authority, manifested within the compass of his way and life, is the one from God, on the basis of which we can consider the possibility of asking the question of meaning? If Jesus’ altruistic love, that is, his Mitmenschlichkeit, is the centrum of the Jesus event, how can we recognise God’s reality in this (rather than in the compassionate love of Gautama)? Is it not the case that Jesus’ altruistic love sits alongside the altruistic love of many other great persons in human history? Unless we have an evidence by which we can be sure that it has a special meaning which enables us to ask the question of meaning, the meaning of Jesus’ Mitmenschlichkeit will fall into human ethical category.

We do not also find any possibility to ask the question of meaning in Marxsen’s view that faith in the resurrection precedes the event of the resurrection itself. If we are really to seek after the meaning of the resurrection in an individual’s faith, then the facticity of Jesus’ resurrection is, as in the case of Bultmann, totally dependent upon the believer’s subjectivity apart from the objectivity of the event itself. Jesus’ resurrection then means something only to those who have the belief in it, and nothing to those who do not have it. In other words, Jesus’ resurrection means nothing to Buddhists, Hindus, Moslems, Taoists, shamanists, and the members of any other religion than Christianity. It also means nothing to those who have no belief at all. In this situation, how can we say that we have a (or the only) basis for the question of meaning in the event of Jesus’ resurrection? Within Marxsen’s belief in the view of Jesus’ resurrection as a production of the earliest believers’ belief in Jesus before Easter, Jesus’ resurrection turns into an idolon, and Jesus’ resurrection cannot
therefore be the fundamental answer to the question of meaning. When we cannot find this fundamental answer to the question of meaning in Jesus’ resurrection, which eventually leads us to the total destruction of every possibility to find it in the Jesus event, Marxsen’s interpretation of faith as reconciled people living reconciliation becomes phantasmagorial. Under this situation, all the minjung efforts to solve han practically through their reconciliation-oriented means of han expression come to naught.

My meditation on the question of meaning began with minjung suffering. All the absurdities related to minjung suffering in the history of han make us face the question about the ultimate meaning of our existence and of human history itself. If we were to live in a perfect world without suffering and evil, we would presumably posit and try to solve the question of the ultimate meaninglessness. As a matter of fact, however, we really suffer from all sorts of manipulations by evil. Indeed, our history is a sequence of time fraught with all kinds of concrete forms of the power of evil as well as those of goodness. The boisterous dance of the jumble of these concrete elements of evil and good in history causes an ambiguity which is impenetrable and inscrutable, so much so that what we can grasp in history seems to be nothing but the ambiguity itself. Facing this ambiguity of history, we can also ask the question of the ultimate unmeaning, just as in the putative case of our being in the perfect world. Simultaneously, however, we must not overlook the possibility of asking the question of the ultimate meaning as inherently and essentially given to us in the imperfect world. Hence “the question of universal meaning, qua question, is given inevitably (arising not just out of human thinking but out of historical reality as such).”

When we look at our past history from the perspective of the inevitability of the question of meaning, we are encountered by Jesus’ resurrection as God’s radical intervention which can and must function as the only fundamental answer to the question. The question of meaning requires a radical intervention by God as its authentic fundamentum. It is otherwise out of the question that we can find an authentic basis for it in the impenetrable and inscrutable ambiguity of our history. Even though Jesus’ resurrection remains one of opaque gleams of events in our history, it is nevertheless an ineffaceable cicatrix of our history. Owing to this indelible cicatrix of our history, the question of meaning remains open to us as a possibility of having a genuine answer. Without it, the question of meaning becomes a pseudo-question, because there is no other quid pro quo for it as God’s direct intervention. Without it, there is nothing left within the past horizon of our history to serve as an authentic basis for the question of meaning, which eventually leads us ineluctably to the total collapse of the present and future horizons for the possibility to ask the question. If this be the case, then the only thing to be faced hic et nunc is our existence laden with anomic phenomena. Without Jesus’ resurrection, therefore, although it is a blurred gleam in history (which means that it may evade the historian’s hands), what is to be dealt with is not the question of the ultimate meaning, but the question of the ultimate unmeaning. This is our real situation. This is the intrinsic limitation of our existence.

From this perspective, the minjung-theological view of the resurrection can be criticised. My criticism focuses particularly upon the view of Jesus’ resurrection by Byung-Mu Ahn, a principal founder of minjung theology, because he, in line with W.
Marxsen, “is very sceptical about the reality of the Resurrection.” Ahn views Jesus’ resurrection as an example of ‘reincarnation’. He first seeks the biblical basis for this view in 2 Cor. 4:11: “For while we live we are always being given up to death for Jesus’ sake, so that the life of Jesus may be manifested in our mortal flesh. (RSV)" From this passage Ahn infers that the life of Jesus belongs to the domain of past, but it may still be manifested in the bodies of his disciples at present, which means that it is still alive, and it is thus ‘reincarnated’ in them. He finds similar content in Rom. 6:4: “We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life. (RSV)” With this verse he thinks that, although the death and life of Jesus has passed away into the past, ‘by baptism’ it is ‘reincarnated’ in ‘us’ He finds a more concrete expression for reincarnation in Gal. 2:20: “I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me. (RSV)” Ahn claims that ‘Christ who lives in me’ means nothing other than Jesus’ reincarnation. From this perspective, there is no qualitative difference for Ahn between Christ and his followers, a difference which Western theology has ardently worked to establish. Ahn also views the Holy Spirit as the basis for the possibility of reincarnation, his biblical reference for this being Rom. 8:9-11. On this view, he thinks that Jesus of the past was reincarnated in the community of his followers, dramatically revealed in the event of the descent of the Holy Spirit on the gathered disciples described in Acts 2. Through the event of Pentecost he holds that Jesus was reincarnated in his minjung.  

On these biblical bases, Ahn extends the historical scope of Jesus’ resurrection as reincarnation to the present. He sees the present manifestation of Jesus’ reincarnation in the minjung struggle against the structural power of evil, notably represented by the martyr-like deaths of many members of minjung, for example, Tai-II Chun, Gwan-Hyeon Park, Se-Jin Kim, Gwang-Young Song, and the massacred minjung during the 1980 Gwangju minjung movement. In a similar way, Nam-Dong Suh views that Jesus’ resurrection is realised and concretised in the present minjung movements like 3·1 All-out Independence Movement, 4·19 Students’ Movement, Tai-II Chun’s self-burning to death and all other minjung workers’ struggles against manipulating oppressors. The indefatigable will of minjung to struggle against unjustifiable oppression as a concrete historic–phenomenological reality of evil is sometimes frustrated and aborted owing to the insurmountable power of evil. Whenever this happens, minjung are gathered and united to re-establish their will to fight against the power of evil. Their will to struggle is again galvanised in flames that spread like a prairie fire. Ahn sees Jesus’ reincarnation in this resurrected minjung will to struggle. In this regard, the resurrection cannot be fully understood without considering the history of han. This is the meaning of Jesus’ resurrection for the present, and it will be reincarnated time and again, so long as the minjung will to struggle against the structural evil power persists.

I agree for the most part with these minjung theologians in their thoughts on the resurrection. In particular, I agree with them totally in their thought that in every minjung struggle against evil we can find the present meaning of Jesus’ resurrection. My fundamental problem however is that, without attributing any objectivity to Jesus’ resurrection as a genuine intervention by God, the thought of Jesus’ resurrection as

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946 Cf. ibid., pp. 315-7.
reincarnation is groundless. If Jesus’ resurrection is to be understood only in the psychologico-phenomenological perspective, it becomes nothing but a symbolic expression for the ‘standing-up’ of minjung. From this perspective, Byung-Mu Ahn identifies the event of Jesus’ resurrection with minjung revolts, and this replaces kerygma.\(^{490}\) As Ahn claims: “What does the event of the resurrection concretely mean? It means the revolt of Jesus’ minjung who fell into defeatism with his being executed on the cross.”\(^{490}\) And in Nam-Dong Suh it becomes a ‘predicative symbol’ for explaining the minjung history, and on this basis God is reduced to a minjung predicate.\(^{491}\) There is no room in these views for the objective facticity of Jesus’ resurrection. But if we can claim no objective reality for Jesus’ resurrection, how can we know that all the struggles of minjung—from the ‘re-surrection’ of the Galilean people through to the revolt of the Gwangju minjung to the present minjung struggling all over the world—have been caused by the reincarnated Jesus, and not just by their own ardent will to emancipate themselves from oppressions? Without the objectivity of Jesus’ resurrection, we are not sure whether or not minjung efforts to emancipate themselves from evil power are based upon God’s will to struggle against it. When Jesus’ resurrection is identified with minjung movements by way of the concept of reincarnation, it is out of the question for us human beings to acknowledge the purpose and providence that God makes manifest in and through the event of Jesus’ resurrection. In this view of Jesus’ resurrection as reincarnation in his followers, there is no room for God as the cause of the event. As Soon-Kyung Park points out, in the identification of Jesus’ resurrection with minjung movements we cannot grasp God as


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its origin, nor can we grasp its eschatological dimension and dynamism; thus it eventually ceases to be the power to propel and maintain minjung movements.\(^{952}\) In this view, therefore, we cannot keep asking the question of meaning, and any effort to seek a practical answer to the question is groundless. What results is the futility of all minjung efforts to keep building the road of stepping-stones to the place where the question no longer needs to be asked. If Jesus’ resurrection is to be identified totally with minjung resurrection, on the basis of the total identification of Jesus with minjung,\(^{953}\) thus evaporating the objective reality of the event of the resurrection of Jesus as a person, then minjung emerge as Messiah in the history of han. For both Nam-Dong Suh and Byung-Mu Ahn the suffering minjung are the suffering Messiah; they save themselves by themselves, and all humanity, as well.\(^{954}\) In this soteriological perspective, our history gives only practical answers to the question of meaning through passive and active solutions of minjung to han. Perhaps it can be said from this perspective that minjung will eventually build a ‘village’ over which compassion, justice, equal distribution and genuine freedom prevail. With this, however, can they really answer the question of the meaning of fundamental han caused by the intrinsic power of evil in the world of phenomena? If minjung as Messiah are to eventually save themselves and the whole humanity through passive and active solutions to han, can we be given by this salvific achievement of minjung an ultimate answer to the question of the fundamental reason why the boy was torn to shreds before his mother,

\(^{952}\) Cf. ibid., p. 81.
why the boy struggled for his life for a considerable while, and why so many minjung had to fall prey to unjustifiable oppressions throughout history?

Hence the question of meaning is inseparable from the objectivity of Jesus’ resurrection. The ultimate answer to this question is given only in the objective reality of Jesus’ resurrection as God’s direct struggle against the ineluctable power of evil. Without it, all minjung efforts to save all humanity as well as themselves through passive and active solutions to han end in smoke. Without it, all efforts to answer the question of the meaning of minjung han in its form as excruciating pain, longing for something unattainable, everlasting waiting, autogenous sadness and resignation are futile. Without it, we cannot escape the nihilistic Weltanschauung coloured in hwangtobit and it is out of the question to give a fundamental answer to the question of the meaning of fundamental han. This is why I concentrated on the problem of the historicality of Jesus’ resurrection by way of Barth’s and Pannenberg’s understanding (Chapters I, II and III). In the final analysis, then, I conclude that the fundamental answer to the question of meaning is found in Jesus’ resurrection, although we can gain access to it only through faith. Hence faith in the objective reality of Jesus’ resurrection is the prerequisite for seeking a fundamental answer to the question of meaning.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has dealt with the question of meaning. Through ‘the question of meaning’ I have asked why human beings, especially minjung, have to undergo unjustifiable suffering. Hastily, I first attempted to find out whether I could obtain an answer at all to this why question in Christianity before asking it comprehensively from the perspective of han. I wanted to know whether it was even possible to find an answer in Jesus’ resurrection. This is why I first considered the understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection by two great theologians in the 20th century. If an answer to the question of meaning were to be found in Jesus’ resurrection, any attempt to find it should relate entirely to the problem of the historicity of the resurrection, and Barth and Pannenberg are two who deal with this problem comprehensively.

I expounded Barth’s and Pannenberg’s understanding of this problem in Chapters I and II. In the end, I found it hard to verify Jesus’ resurrection as a ‘historical’ event in the sense of modern historiography. This is unfortunate in relation to Pannenberg in particular, because, as my study shows, he argues for the possibility of the verification of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical (historisch) event. If his argument for it had been convincing, my pursuit of the question of meaning might have been aborted, because it would have been meant that we already had an answer to the question, and there was no more need to ask it. In this regard, I presented my criticism of his argument for the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection (Chapter III), which led me to the conclusion that faith is the only way to the facticity of the event.
As far as Barth’s understanding of the problem is concerned, I found nothing new that should be added to my conclusion that the objectification of Jesus’ resurrection cannot be established without the help of faith. It seems to me that faith has to be presupposed in Barth’s understanding of the objective reality of Jesus’ resurrection. These themes were dealt with in the first three chapters.

In Chapter IV I made a thoroughgoing investigation of the identity of han in order to ask the question of meaning on its basis. In a comparatively detailed way, I researched the double-structural causes, that is, the international and the domestic causes, of the formation of han, as they have happened in the Korean minjung history, as precursors to conceptualising han. During this research, I made it clear why han as deploration came to emerge in the Korean minjung psyche and han as rancour submerged deep into the domain of their unconsciousness, which resulted in the total identification of han as deploration simply as han. In my way, this han (as deploration) is identified atomistically with excruciating pain, longing for something unattainable, everlasting waiting, autogenous sadness and resignation, and holistically with hwangtobit han emitting nihilistic worldview and fundamental han. I then asked the question of meaning in relation to this cual identification of han, which entailed the likely necessity of a dual answer to the question. That is to say, I needed to answer it in both practical and fundamental ways.

Hence I attempted to answer the question of meaning in these two ways—practical and fundamental—in the final chapter. For a practical answer I considered two categories of minjung solutions to han, that is, passive and active solutions to han. I presented kut, the traditional shamanistic ritual, and two art-forms, folksong and talchum (mask-dance), among many as passive solutions to han. Some examples of the act of the minjung revolt were presented as active solutions to han. I emphasised
that the act of minjung revolt needed to be yoked with dan so as to cut off the evil cycle of revenge, if we are to conceive of this active solution to han as a practical answer to the question of meaning. Finally, I proposed that Jesus’ resurrection is the fundamental answer to this question. This is the main stream of the thesis.

What I have tried to present through the flowing of this main stream is as follows. The question of meaning in practical terms lives in minjung solutions to han throughout history. However, we need more than just practical answers: we need an answer which can fundamentally explain why this pursuit of minjung solutions to han is necessary. That is to say, we need to answer the question of the fundamental why of minjung han. I find the only answer to this question in Jesus’ resurrection, although we are allowed to gain access to it only through faith. Hence the question of meaning lives permanently in faith in Jesus’ resurrection. This is the main point of the thesis.

Now to my final task. If Jesus’ resurrection is conceived to be the fundamental answer to the question of meaning, it needs to be considered from the perspective of theodicy. The tune of the background music of this thesis has been theodicy. I sought harmony for this tune in domain-oriented dualism. This dualism was proposed in order to solve the absurdities caused by the monistic view of orthodox Western theological system, especially Barth’s system, in which it is maintained that the almighty God has already presented the fundamental answer to the question of meaning through the death of Jesus Christ on the cross. I argued against this with the concept of God’s ‘sadism’ or ‘masochism’. Within this perspective, I argued, it is no longer possible to pursue the question of meaning. The fundamental proposition needed to solve this absurdity is God’s non-omnipotence with evil coming into being as the ineluctable by-product of God’s creation—this was called domain-oriented dualism. In this view, God is not responsible for the emergence of evil. Human beings
are not responsible for their sin. The emergence of evil as the inevitable by-product of creation causes both God’s han and human han. From the perspective of this common ground of han, there is no need for reconciliation between them. Here a genuine reconciliation is a reconciliation between human beings, between oppressors and the oppressed, in which han as an alternative way of speaking of sin is more emphasised.

What then does Jesus’ resurrection mean in this theological program? How is God’s ‘raising Jesus from the dead’ to be understood in domain-oriented dualism? If it is to be understood as a historical basis for the ultimate salvation of human beings from evil, is this not a case of the claim of God’s omnipotence resurfacing? What difference is there between orthodox Christian monism and domain-oriented dualism?

Addressing this question, I propose the following. First of all, Jesus’ resurrection is nothing but the expression of God’s self-consciousness of God’s non-omnipotence. That is to say, it is the historico-phenomenological expression of God’s solution to God’s han. It is God’s real struggle against unavoidable evil. At the nadir of God’s han God expresses wrath against evil through raising Jesus from the dead. Although God knew that God could not fundamentally conquer evil, through God’s raising Jesus from the dead, God gave needed self-confirmation of the ability to struggle genuinely against evil at the nadir of God’s han.

Secondly, Jesus’ resurrection is God’s benevolent gift to human beings for God’s fear that they might otherwise fundamentally lose their will to struggle against evil, the common enemy. Through Jesus’ resurrection, God shows that God really is in the struggle against evil, against the basic cause of divine and human han. Through it, God assures human beings, especially minjung, that their struggle against evil is not futile. Conversely, Jesus’ resurrection is the historico-phenomenological basis for our
confident trust in God’s ongoing struggle against evil with us. We are assured that God is the God-with-minjung and partakes in every suffering of every member of minjung. In this assurance, we keep pursuing an answer to the question of meaning. On this basis, minjung can see that their efforts to struggle against evil through their particular solutions to han are not vain. This is the very point that the first-generation minjung theologians seem to disregard.

Lastly, the most difficult aporia in this theological program is how a schema of salvation might be described. Can there be ultimate salvation for human beings from evil power in this domain-oriented dualism? To answer this, I propose that Jesus’ resurrection is the first fruit of the process of the ontological homogenisation of God and all creatures. The only way for God to eliminate evil from God’s creation is by God to call all the creatures back to God’s ‘bosom’ or ‘memory’. The domain of being is retreated from the domain of absolute nothingness in order to nullify the ineluctable evil. God’s creation is oriented towards this process of retreat. With creatures returning to God’s ‘bosom’ or ‘memory’ it is meant that they are of the same ontological quality as God. Jesus’ resurrection is the first fruit of this process; Jesus ‘composes’ a part of God. Then, at the end of history, like Jesus we are all contained in God’s being. From this perspective, apokatastasis appears as a genuine possibility, and this possibility is the basis for our salvation. Finally, then, a genuine reconciliation between human beings, between oppressors and the oppressed, can be established within the perspective of apokatastasis. One further observation regarding apokatastasis is that all kinds of evil things done by human beings are negatively remembered in God’s han. In particular, the hubris of theologians and general Christians can be submerged into the domain of God’s negative
remembering; this is why they should orient their way of thinking towards sophrosyne.

Now I am recollecting my hometown, a small village. I remember that, when I was young, I saw most of the village’s housewives in white clothes gathering at the front of a house, where they were consoling the housewife who was piggybacking her dying boy, my friend. All of them were worried about the boy’s illness. Their faces were full of sorrow and compassion. The village was full of love, compassion, justice, cooperation, friendship, reconciliation, care, altruism, children’s voices in singing, adults’ industrious working in the field, mothers’ calling their children for dinner, etc. Although almost all the people at the village were poor, they did not struggle against one another so as to possess more than their neighbours. They just worked hard in the field for the sustenance of their families. I remember seeing all of these things during my childhood.

Perhaps I am romanticising my hometown. But I recall it at the end of this thesis in order to claim that the question of meaning is practically asked in longing for the realisation of this sort of hometown, and practically answered in minjung efforts to construct this kind of ‘village’. I believe that it is still worth asking the question of meaning, because I find a practical answer to the question in the present struggle of minjung against evil power by laughing, forgiving, tolerating, encouraging, or orienting their way of thinking towards sophrosyne in order to build something like the hometown in my memory. Hence, so long as minjung try to achieve something like my childlike hometown, the question of meaning survives practically in this practical answer.

However, we must ask the fundamental question of meaning with regard to the why of my friend’s death at so young an age in order to find a fundamental answer to
the question. If we try to deal with the question of meaning radically and comprehensibly, we must ask a fundamental question of the why of a boy being torn to little shreds before his mother, of a boy struggling for his life on the gallows for so long. This fundamental question cannot be answered by practical answers of minjung to the question of meaning through passive, active and transcendental solutions to han. Only God can answer it. I believe that God presented the enigmatic cicatrix, that is, Jesus’ resurrection, as the only fundamental answer to this question in human history. By the enigmatic cicatrix I imply that Jesus’ resurrection is solely an object of faith. I also sadly accept that, in my grasping Jesus’ resurrection as the fundamental answer to the question of meaning, I genuinely face the intrinsic danger that my faith in Jesus’ resurrection can end as a superstition, and my attempt to find the only fundamental answer to the question of meaning in Jesus’ resurrection can be based upon a superstition—this is why Pannenlørg strenuously tried to establish the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection in his theological system. In this regard, there is always an intrinsic possibility that Christianity can be reduced to a superstition, so long as it is founded upon faith in Jesus’ resurrection. Nevertheless, I seek the fundamental answer to the question of meaning in Jesus’ resurrection, because in human history I find no other enigmatic cicatrix as a fundamental answer to the question of meaning. Therefore, if faith in Jesus’ resurrection continues to live, the question of meaning survives in this faith. If the former vanishes, the latter is shattered—completely.
SUMMARY

1. The Main Concern of the Thesis

Why do human beings suffer? Why must so many anonymous people, typically called minjung, unjustifiably suffer? Is there any meaning for their existence studded with han, a kind of suffering typical to the Korean minjung? Is it really possible to ask a question of the meaning of the minjung han? If God exists, does God give to us any answer to the question of the meaning of the minjung existence in the midst of unjustifiable han? If so, what is the answer? Where can it be found? Can it be found in human history?

This thesis is concerned with these questions. That is to say, it is about the question of the meaning of human existence, especially, of the existence of minjung filled with han. In this thesis the question of meaning is asked on the basis of han, and answered within the purview of the Christian concept of resurrection.

The historical basis for this thesis’ attempt to find an answer to the question of meaning in the concept of resurrection is Jesus’ resurrection. The most difficult thing to be faced in considering Jesus’ resurrection as the historical basis for the answer to the question of meaning is the aporia of its historicity. It is because the resurrection texts in the New Testament as the only source material for the description of the event of the resurrection are insufficient to establish the historicity of the event. This aporia should be bravely confronted, however, because no other historically plausible basis for the question of meaning can be found in human history. Hence this thesis begins with a consideration of the aporia of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection.
2. The Unfolding of the Thesis

In dealing with the aporia of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, a systematic-theological consideration of the resurrection is primary. Two systematic theologians are selected for this consideration: Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg.

In the first chapter Karl Barth’s understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is considered. He is selected first, because a possibility for relating Christian belief in the resurrection to the question of meaning is found in his understanding. Before examining and expounding his understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, particular attention is given to his view of history, which is contrasted with the history of han in the fifth chapter.

In the second chapter Wolfhart Pannenberg’s understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is dealt with. He is selected, because there is something interesting to be found in his claim that Jesus’ resurrection is historical-critically verifiable. Here again, particular attention is given to his view of history before examining his understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, which is contrasted with the history of han in the fifth chapter.

In the third chapter Pannenberg’s establishment of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical-critically verifiable event is criticised. His assertion of ‘knowledge prior to faith’ by way of his establishment of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical-critically verifiable event is regarded as untenable. Then the role of faith in understanding of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection is brought into relief, in parallel with Barth’s understanding of it, which is in turn related to the question of meaning.

In the fourth chapter han as a motive for the question of meaning is conceptualised. In so doing, the unique historical background contributing to the formation of han in
the Korean *minjung* psyche is first examined in two aspects, that is, internationally and domestically. This is followed by a conceptualisation of *han* in two categories: an atomistic identification of *han* and a holistic identification of *han*. In the former category *han* is identified as excruciating pain, pining for something unattainable, waiting, autogenous sadness, and resignation. In the latter, *han* is identified as *hwangtobit* (yellow ochre) *han* emitting nihilistic *Weltanschauung* and fundamental *han*. Then the question of meaning is contemplated on the basis of this double-categorically conceptualised *han*.

In the fifth and final chapter an answer to the question of meaning is pursued in the ‘resurrection’. In so doing, the above-mentioned theologians’ views of history are first contrasted with the history of *han*, which is followed by dealing with the Christian understanding of the suffering of God. This entails the pursuit of a solution to the aporia of the why of evil by positing a ‘domain-oriented’ dualism, and of an alternative way of speaking of sin by considering a possibility of reformulating the concept of sin in the traditional hamartiology from the perspective of the *minjung han*. This is followed by an attempt to define ‘*minjung*’ as containers of *han*. Then an answer to the question of meaning is sought after in two ways. First, *minjung*’s passive and active solutions to *han* as the praxis of resurrection are considered. Second, Jesus’ resurrection is considered as forming the fundamental part of the answer. That is to say, Jesus’ resurrection is thought of as the only foundation of the answer to the question of meaning.

The final chapter is followed by a conclusion, in which a radical understanding of the resurrection in relation to the ‘domain-oriented’ dualism is mentioned. Then a summary and a bibliography follow the conclusion.
3. The Conclusion of the Thesis

This thesis has dealt with the question of meaning asked on the basis of han. It attempted to find an answer to the question in the resurrection. If an answer to the question of meaning were to be found in Jesus’ resurrection any attempt to find it should relate entirely to the aporia of the historicity of the resurrection, and Barth and Pannenberg are two who have dealt with this problem comprehensively.

Barth’s and Pannenberg’s understanding of this aporia was expounded in Chapters I and II. Eventually, it was concluded in Chapter III that for both of them faith is the only way to the facticity of Jesus’ resurrection.

In Chapter IV a thoroughgoing investigation of the identity of han was made in order to ask the question of meaning on its basis. Here han was identified atomistically with excruciating pain, longing for something unattainable, everlasting waiting, autogenous sadness and resignation, and holistically with hwangtobit han emitting nihilistic worldview and fundamental han. Then the question of meaning was asked in relation to this dual identification of han, which entailed the likely necessity of a dual answer to the question. That is to say, it needed to be answered in both practical and fundamental ways.

In the final chapter two categories of minjung solutions to han (that is, passive and active solutions to han) were considered for a practical answer to the question of meaning. Kut (the traditional shamanistic ritual) and two art-forms (folksong and talchum [mask-dance]) among many were presented as passive solutions to han. Some examples of the act of the minjung revolt were presented as active solutions to han. Don (literally, cutting-off) was presented as a complement to active solutions to
han. Then it was asserted that Jesus’ resurrection is the fundamental answer to the question of meaning.

In the final chapter the question of the ‘why’ of evil as the matrix of minjung han was also asked. A domain-oriented dualism was presented as an answer to this question. In this dualism evil was thought of as the ineluctable by-product of God’s creation causing both God’s han and human han. From the perspective of this common ground of han, it was asserted that there is no need for reconciliation between God and human beings, which was led to the emphasis on han as an alternative way of speaking of sin.

In domain-oriented dualism Jesus’ resurrection as the fundamental answer to the question of meaning is understood as: the sign for God’s genuine struggle against unavoidable evil; the historico-phenomenological basis for human beings’ trust in God’s ongoing struggle against evil with them; and the first-fruit of the process of the ontological homogenisation of God and all creatures as the ultimate salvation of God’s creation.

In conclusion, Jesus’ resurrection is the fundamental answer to the question of the meaning of han, caused by evil. As the enigmatic cicatrix, however, it is solely an object of faith. Therefore, if faith in it continues to live, the question of meaning survives in this faith. If the former vanishes, the latter is shattered—completely.
Samenvatting

Probleemstelling

Waarom moeten zo veel anonieme arme mensen, in het Koreaans genoemd minjuang, onrechtvaardig lijden? Welke betekenis heeft hun bestaan vol han, vol onpeilbaar lijden? Geeft God antwoord op deze vraag? En is dat antwoord in de menselijke geschiedenis te vinden?

Deze studie gaat over de vraag naar de betekenis van het bestaan van de allerarmste Koreanen. Het antwoord op deze vraag wordt gezocht in een analyse van het begrip han en geplaatst in het perspectief van de christelijke opstandingsgedachte.

De historische basis voor die gedachte is Jezus’opstanding. Omdat we echter als getuigenis van die gebeurtenis alleen de nieuwtestamentische bronnen hebben, is de historiciteit van die gebeurtenis moeilijk vast te stellen. Dat hoeft echter geen aanleiding te zijn de centraliteit van deze gedachte op te geven.

Uitwerking van de these

De omstreden historiciteit van de opstanding wordt in de eerste twee hoofdstukken bestudeerd aan de hand van de opvattingen van de theologen Karl Barth en Wolfhart Pannenberg. In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt Barth’s geschiedenisopvatting – waarop zijn opstandingsopvatting steunt - gecontrasteerd met de geschiedenisopvatting die aan het begrip han ten grondslag ligt. Dit contrast zal later in hoofdstuk 5 uitgewerkt worden.

Dezelfde procedure wordt ook ten aanzien van Pannenberg toegepast. De reikwijdte van Pannenbergs historisch-kritische benadering wordt sterk genuanceerd en de rol
van het geloof in het opstandingsgebeuren wordt onder verwijzing naar Barths interpretatie onderstreept.


In het vijfde en laatste hoofdstuk wordt een antwoord op de startvraag naar de betekenis van het han-lieden gezocht in de opstandingsgedachte. Daartoe wordt uitgegaan van een ‘domain-oriented dualism’, een dualisme dat gegeven is met het feit, dat in het ‘domein’ van de schepping God stuit op (de macht van ) het ‘niets’ die eigen is aan de creatio ex nihilo. Daarmee wordt bedoeld dat het leed dat zoveel miljomenen Koreanen heeft getroffen, niet meer vanuit gangbare categorieën als die van dader en slachtoffer kan worden geïnterpreteerd, maar een zodanig excess kent, dat het bijna een metafysisch karakter krijgt en God zelf ook wel moet raken. Er kan dan ook van de han, het lijden, van God gesproken worden. De gangbare begrippen die we in de theologie ten aanzien van zonde hanteren, moeten hier vooral met het oog op de slachtoffers overstegen worden. Dan is het ook pas mogelijk echt een
goede definitie van *minjung* te geven. *Minjung* slaat dan op de wijze waarop God onder ons present is.

Er blijkt in onze werkelijkheid een vorm van dualisme tussen goed en kwaad mogelijk te zijn die uiteindelijk maar op één manier overwonnen kan worden en dat is in de opstandingsverwachting. Die verwachting leidt uiteraard ook tot concreet verzet tegen het ons omringende lijden, maar plaats ons ook binnen de invloedssfeer van een gebeuren dat de reikwijdte van ons handelen verre overstijgt. In het geval van het concreet verzet zijn tal van historische momenten uit de Koreaanse geschiedenis te noemen. In Korea’s traditionele godsdienst treft men echter ook tal van voorbeelden aan van het concreet verzet overstijgende aspecten van de Koreaanse beleving van *han*. Vooral daar waar de uitzichtsloze situatie van *han* kan worden doorbroken door *dan*, het doorbreken van de keten van wraak. Pas in de christelijke opstandingsgedachte worden *han* en *dan* in de juiste verhouding tot elkaar gebracht.

*Conclusie*

In deze studie over het lijden van het Koreaanse volk wordt het contingente, historische lijden in verband gebracht met het lijden van God aan Zijn eigen schepping. Het risico van een ontologisering van het lijden wordt voorkomen door ook op dit lijden de christelijke opstandingsgedachte te betrekken. De in het Nieuwe Testament betuigde opstanding vormt zo de basis voor het vertrouwen op Gods strijd tegen het kwaad en de basis van de verwachting dat de schepping alsnog met God
verbonden kan worden. Met dit raadselachtig ‘litteken’ staat of valt de vraag naar een antwoord op de betekenis van het lijden.
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