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The Moral Herd: Groups and the Evolution of Altruism and Cooperation

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Contents

| | | |
|----------|---|-----------|
| 1 | Introduction | 1 |
| 1.1 | Good or bad? | 1 |
| 1.2 | Where did these preferences come from? | 2 |
| 1.3 | The problem of cooperation | 3 |
| 1.4 | Mechanisms: Population structure and group selection | 5 |
| 1.5 | Tools and methodology | 10 |
| 1.6 | Outline of the thesis | 10 |
| 2 | Coevolution of group size and cooperation | 13 |
| 2.1 | Introduction | 13 |
| 2.2 | The model | 14 |
| 2.3 | Theoretical predictions | 16 |
| 2.3.1 | Derivations of the stability conditions | 16 |
| 2.3.2 | Local stability of the stationary points | 22 |
| 2.3.3 | Results | 23 |
| 2.4 | Match between model and simulations | 25 |
| 2.4.1 | Why simulation outcomes are shifted | 26 |
| 2.4.2 | Distortion of the cooperation isocline towards the edges | 30 |
| 2.5 | Discussion of the results | 30 |
| 2.6 | Conclusion | 33 |
| | Appendix 2.A Explaining the shift: theoretical predictions vs simulations | 35 |
| 2.A.1 | Optimizing over probability distributions is not the same as finding the optimal (deterministic) group size | 35 |
| 2.A.2 | Data from the simulations | 40 |
| 2.A.3 | Balanced polymorphism | 42 |
| 3 | Evolution of parochial altruism by multilevel selection | 45 |
| 3.1 | Introduction | 45 |
| 3.2 | Within-group selection is insufficient | 47 |
| 3.3 | The origin of discriminate strategies | 48 |

| | | |
|--------------|--|------------|
| 3.3.1 | Indiscriminate altruism | 49 |
| 3.3.2 | Discriminate strategies | 50 |
| 3.4 | Dynamics of multilevel selection | 51 |
| 3.4.1 | An extended model | 51 |
| 3.4.2 | Parameter values and model versions | 55 |
| 3.5 | Simulation results | 57 |
| 3.5.1 | Results for assortment only | 57 |
| 3.5.2 | Results for group conflict, with and without assortment | 60 |
| 3.6 | Conclusions | 65 |
| Appendix 3.A | Impact of entrants on group performance | 68 |
| 3.A.1 | Indiscriminate altruism | 68 |
| 3.A.2 | Discriminate strategies | 69 |
| Appendix 3.B | Computational model: estimation procedure | 70 |
| 4 | Evolution of cooperation in repeated games | 71 |
| 4.1 | Introduction: joy in repetition | 71 |
| 4.2 | No ESS | 73 |
| 4.3 | Stepping stones in either direction | 75 |
| 4.3.1 | Pure strategies | 75 |
| 4.3.2 | Mixed strategies | 79 |
| 4.4 | Indirect invasions in the simulations. | 81 |
| 4.4.1 | Simulations | 82 |
| 4.4.2 | Capturing transitions | 85 |
| 4.4.3 | Capturing indirect invasions | 88 |
| 4.4.4 | Comparing equilibria that are not RAI with equilibria that are | 90 |
| 4.4.5 | Average reciprocity and niceness | 92 |
| 4.5 | Conclusion | 94 |
| Appendix 4.A | A metric for \mathcal{S} | 96 |
| Appendix 4.B | The best responder | 96 |
| Appendix 4.C | A typical sequence of strategies | 98 |
| Appendix 4.D | Measures of cooperativeness and reciprocity | 101 |
| 5 | Repeated games in structured populations | 107 |
| 5.1 | Introduction | 107 |
| 5.2 | Repetition as well as assortment | 108 |
| 5.3 | Theoretical predictions | 110 |
| 5.3.1 | D^nTFT vs $ALLD$ | 111 |
| 5.3.2 | D^nTFT vs $ALLC$ | 112 |
| 5.3.3 | $ALLC$ vs $ALLD$ | 113 |
| 5.3.4 | The whole picture | 113 |

| | | |
|--------------|---|------------|
| 5.4 | Testing the theory with a general strategy space | 116 |
| 5.5 | Conclusion | 118 |
| Appendix 5.A | Different population structures are embedded in r | 120 |
| Appendix 5.B | Other <i>handshakes</i> , or initial codes | 121 |
| Appendix 5.C | Match between the simulations and the prediction | 121 |
| 6 | Conclusions | 123 |
| 6.1 | Summary and main conclusions | 123 |
| 6.2 | Future research | 125 |
| | Summaries | 139 |