nicely balanced between a conceptual overview, macro-level analysis, and empirical “triangular” studies. It is consistently edited and easily readable. It will appeal to specialists in energy politics, energy diplomacy, and international relations and can also be used in courses at the postgraduate level.

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Elusive Refuge: Chinese Migrants in the Cold War, by Laura Madokoro. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. ix+331 pp. US$45.00/£33.95/€40.50 (cloth).

Both books deal with the policies of white societies toward migration from China after World War II. Meredith Oyen’s The Diplomacy of Migration tells the history of migration policy in relations between the United States and both Chinese governments—the Nationalists, which the United States recognized, and the Communists—from the 1940s until the early 1970s. Oyen makes use of both English- and Chinese-language sources and writes both American and Chinese history. Her book opens with the Nationalist government’s successful push during World War II to abolish America’s Chinese Exclusion Act. After the war ended, this opened the way to emigration from China, but the yearly quota was just over 100. Brides and children of US citizens were not bound by this quota, but even for them the process was hindered by suspicions of fraud, the legacy of racial exclusion, and attempts by the ROC government to influence the selection process. During the era of exclusion, Chinese had often entered the United States under false identities as American citizens, and migration brokers in Canton and Hong Kong offered birth certificates, passports, reentry forms, and even blood samples and X-rays for sale. As a result, US consular officials suspected all applicants and rejected many of them, including prospective brides who could not prove that they had already met their fiancés. Even when granted a visa, immigrants were often detained at Angel Island, sometimes for up to two years. In terms of travel in the other direction, some students and scientists were initially prevented from returning to China from the United States after the Communist victory, though the new authorities in Beijing pressured them to do so.

The ROC, for its part, also attempted to control who emigrated. All those who wished to do so were supposed to register with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Com-
mission, which conducted an investigation into their background to ensure that they were educated, of good character, and loyal to the Kuomintang (KMT). This was to ensure that immigrants would be favorably received by Americans and would further cement US-ROC relations. The United States, however, was wary of immigrants’ potential continued loyalty to a Chinese government of any stripe. (Applicants for US student visas were similarly screened by the government in Taiwan both for Communist and Taiwan independence sympathies.)

Migration policy became an instrument in the Cold War. President Harry Truman opposed America’s restrictive 1952 immigration law as it alienated its allies on Taiwan and fueled PRC charges of racism. Much like today’s PRC, the ROC government saw protecting ethnic Chinese, even foreign citizens, as important for its legitimacy. It protested against investigations into immigration fraud that disrupted the operation of Chinese American businesses, and Taipei was also against deportations, although it refused to admit any mainland Chinese deportees. The US government was caught between impulses to limit illegal immigration by a “race” still largely regarded as undesirable, the fear of Communist infiltration, and its vow to protect those suffering under Communist tyranny. The United States and the ROC shared an interest in demonstrating Chinese Americans’ support for anti-Communism, but the United States was also concerned by the KMT’s influence over them. The PRC was primarily concerned with the continuation of remittances sent by Chinese overseas and to that end used a combination of preferential policies and pressure on their families in China, sometimes amounting to outright extortion. The United States considered remittances to the PRC illegal, and in the early 1950s investigated the extortion campaign both to publicly indict the Communists and to stop the flow of money.

One of Oyen’s chapters deals with American policy toward people who had fled China, mostly via Hong Kong. This is the subject of *Elusive Refuge*, Laura Madokoro’s book, which expands it to other white settler societies: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Despite the book’s subtitle, it is not really about the migrants themselves (Oyen offers a more vivid image of life in Hong Kong squatter camps, and generally uses personal histories more effectively, than Madokoro, who relies on English-language sources alone). Rather, Madokoro focuses on the way the migrants shaped the policies and self-understanding of these countries as places of refuge. Whether they were regarded as refugees and thus eligible for resettlement schemes in North America, Australia, and New Zealand or as economic migrants varied with time, national policy, and the perspectives and interests of government officials and humanitarian (mostly church) advocates.

Both Oyen and Madokoro note the difference between Cold War politics in Europe and Asia. While the United States admitted hundreds of thousands of displaced East Europeans (many of whom were Holocaust survivors) as refugees in the decade after the war, the quota available for Chinese was a hundred times smaller. The 1951 Geneva Convention only applied to refugees from Europe, and it was not
until the 1970s that most signatory states abandoned that restriction, parallel to discontinuing overt racial selection in their immigration policies. As Madokoro shows, however, who was granted admission and who was not depended to a great extent on considerations of economic utility and perceived likelihood of “integration” into the host society.

In *The Diplomacy of Migration*, Oyen’s transnational perspective bridges the study of overseas Chinese and the history of state-to-state relations, while Madokoro’s main interest is in revising white settler societies’ self-view as generous countries of asylum. Western humanitarians’ exclusive attention to Europeans displaced by World War II began to shift after 1956. Simultaneously, refugee relief agencies began mobilizing public sympathy in new ways, through the sort of effective media imagery and music or art events that have since become mainstream. This activism was central to the declaration by the UN of a World Refugee Year in 1959–60, which showed a new willingness to aid refugees in Asia, though not yet to resettle them in the West. The United States accepted a small number of mainland Chinese who applied in Hong Kong to emigrate to America, sponsored by relatives (real or fictitious) in the United States. Oyen points out the paradox that Britain, which recognized the PRC as the government of China in 1950, therefore had the legal grounds to grant those fleeing the Communists refugee status but for both political and economic reasons it did not wish to do so; whereas the United States, which continued to recognize the ROC, saw the mainlanders as refugees at the level of politics but had no legal reason to recognize them as such, since technically they were to be protected by the government on Taiwan.

Cold War politics initially had no impact on racial exclusion in Australia, which until 1962 accepted no new Chinese immigrants and continued to deport Chinese who violated immigration rules, arguing that they were economic migrants, not refugees. It was not until that year, after pictorial reportage in *Life* magazine on the plight of Great Leap famine refugees fleeing to Hong Kong, that Canada, the United States, and New Zealand began accepting immigrants from Hong Kong under ad hoc humanitarian schemes, and the United States finally lifted national-origin quotas in 1965. The main selection criteria for accepting immigrants, however, were not political persecution but the likelihood of economic success and social integration. After the Vietnam War, they admitted large numbers of Asian refugees for the first time, and their selection procedures reflected this combination of a new self-view as humanitarian nations, economic interests, and efforts at social engineering. Canada, for example, favored families and those with relatives in the country because it expected them to integrate best.

Cold War socialist regimes generally denied their citizens the freedom to leave the country. Western states mostly welcomed them, in part to underline the moral superiority of the “free world.” Yet the story of the China–Hong Kong border does not fit such a simple scheme: the interests of the PRC, the ROC, British Hong Kong, and the United States panned out in ways that crossed Cold War alliances. When
Hong Kong introduced restrictions on immigration from the mainland in 1950, the PRC and the Soviet Union protested, and in 1956 China temporarily suspended its own exit quotas, resulting in the mainland squatter population in Hong Kong jumping to 450,000. Madokoro suggests that this may have stemmed from a combination of domestic economic pressures in the PRC and its desire to destabilize the colony. During the Great Leap, the PRC appeared to do little to stop the exodus. It was only after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, when the influx of migrants increased again, that the Hong Kong government for the first time adopted an immigration ordinance that distinguished between permanent legal residents and immigrants and created a legal basis for deportations back to China.

After 1972, as returned overseas Chinese were persecuted in China as counterrevolutionaries, China began facilitating their departure to Hong Kong if they desired, and it did not stop ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam in the 1980s from following the same path out. The Hong Kong government’s response varied from stricter policies, including deportation, to a more relaxed stance. It remained wary of humanitarian refugee organizations for fear that their presence would encourage more migration and their ideological message would provoke the ire of Beijing. Both Hong Kong and US authorities were also leery of ROC interference in the selection process of migrants to the United States, and Hong Kong also resented America’s exploitation of the refugee crisis in its anti-Communist rhetoric.

Madokoro provides a comparative picture, with Canada consistently the most receptive to refugees from the 1960s until today and Australia the least so. In linking the Hong Kong refugee crisis with the emergence of a new US immigration policy geared toward people judged most capable of economic success, eventually shaping Chinese Americans as a “model minority,” Madokoro works within a tradition of critical Asian-American scholarship, but she stops short of positing a causal relationship, as Madeline Hsu has done for the United States. Oyen diverges from this school in arguing that ROC policy was another factor in shaping the emergence of a “model minority.” More broadly, she locates migration in the complex history of the Cold War, in which the motives of actors could not be reduced to ideological opposition, and individual agency mattered. Both books serve as useful historical references to the unprecedented ideological confrontation over migration that engulfs the world today.

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