CHAPTER 2

The benefits of theory for clinical practice: cognitive treatment for chronic low back pain patients as an illustrative example

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ABSTRACT
Purpose: To demonstrate, with the help of an example of cognitive treatment for patients with chronic low back pain, how a systematic description of the content and theoretical underpinnings of treatment can help to improve clinical practice.
Methods: A conceptual analysis, two types of theories, and a programme-theory framework were instrumental in systematically specifying the content of the treatment and the underlying assumptions.
Results: A detailed description of the cognitive treatment, including: (i) the intended outcomes; (ii) the related treatment components; (iii) the therapeutic process that is expected to mediate between outcomes and components; (iv) the conditions for optimal application; and (v) the guiding principles.
Conclusions: The systematic description of the treatment revealed important issues for clinical practice, such as the patient and therapist characteristics that are needed for optimal provision of cognitive treatment. The discussions on the role of theory in rehabilitation practice are taken one step further in this clinical commentary: instead of simply describing the problems, we also demonstrated a means to tackle them.
INTRODUCTION
Clinicians, by nature, are practical people. To ask them to embrace theory for the benefit of their daily practice seems to contradict common sense. In this clinical commentary we aim to demonstrate how a detailed description of interventions and their theoretical underpinnings provides more insight into the active components of a treatment. With knowledge of the active components, clinicians can provide the treatment more effectively (Campbell, Fitzpatrick et al., 2000; Whyte, 2003). Rather than adding a new component to an intervention with unknown content, clinicians can add, refine or eliminate components to a well described intervention. We do not stop at demonstrating how theory can be of benefit for daily practice; we hope to inspire others to make detailed descriptions of other interventions with the help of two tools, which we introduce for structuring the description of treatment. If the treatment is described in this systematic way, uniformity in the description will facilitate aid comparison of treatments, and it will increase our understanding of the processes that underlie rehabilitation treatment.

It is not an easy task in which we invite our readers to participate. Rehabilitation is perhaps the archetypical complex intervention (Wade, 2005), and it is therefore difficult to describe its content in detail. Multidisciplinary rehabilitation interventions are especially complex, because they incorporate the knowledge and skills of various health professionals (Campbell et al., 2000). This is one of the reasons why most authors only plead for the specification of treatment and the integration of theory in clinical trials. However, the way in which the content of complex interventions can be specified is not yet clear (Campbell et al., 2000; Wade, 2005; Siegert, McPherson et al., 2005).

Although there is increasing awareness of the importance of theory in the field of rehabilitation and rehabilitation research, the current discussions about theory cover a variety of subjects and are directed towards a diversity of goals. It has been suggested that theory is useful in the early phases of the design of a randomised controlled trial (Campbell et al., 2000). Others have suggested that an integrative theory is useful in combining the numerous interdisciplinary aspects of rehabilitation, in defining boundaries for the field of rehabilitation, and in strengthening the position of rehabilitation in competition with other medical professions (Siegert et al., 2005). It has also been claimed that rehabilitation practice is mainly a-theoretical, and a classifications system to form the basis of rehabilitation have been advocated (Wade, 2005). Others have suggested that we need more than a descriptive classification system: theories are still needed to
understand how activity limitation arises and how treatments alter activity limitations (Lettinga, Twillert van et al., 2006).

In this paper we do not focus on discussions about theory, but on what can be gained in clinical practice from applying theory. It is our intention to narrow the gap between theory and clinical practice and to demonstrate to the reader that there is ‘nothing more practical than a good theory’ (Lewin, 1951)(p169). We do this by making clinical practice the object of study, i.e. systematically describing in detail the current situation, guided by theories.

How can we begin to analyse the content of complex interventions? This is where theory comes in. Theories are sets of inter-related assumptions that are made in order to explain important processes, and they are therefore of assistance in selecting the most relevant variables (Campbell et al., 2000). We used two tools to structure the complexity of the interventions: 1) theories categorized according to the role they play in rehabilitation and 2) a conceptual framework to describe relevant areas of treatment theory. How these tools were of assistance is described in the following sections of this paper, in which we analyse cognitive treatment for chronic low back pain patients as an example.

The first tool is of assistance in determining the type of theories that are incorporated in treatment. According to Kazdin (Kazdin, 1999), two types of theory can be distinguished: 1) theory about the nature of the problem (theory of dysfunction), i.e. the conceptual underpinnings and hypothesis about the factors that are likely to lead to the clinical concept of functioning, the processes involved, and how these processes emerge or operate, and 2) theory about solutions to the problem (theory of treatment), i.e. the conceptual underpinnings of the process(es) of change during treatment, addressing questions such as ‘What should treatment accomplish, and through what means and processes’. In the following section we analyse how the definition of dysfunction in patients with low back pain changes over time, and how this is related to different theories explaining the role of dysfunction.

THEORY OF DYSFUNCTION IN LOW BACK PAIN
In patients with low back pain the hypotheses about the factors that are likely to lead to the clinical problem evolve during the course of the illness. In patients with back problems that are recent, or that have not yet been medically examined, diagnosis is primarily aimed at pinpointing the physical cause of the problem, i.e. the underlying physiological pathology. With the help of diagnostic tests (e.g. X-ray and magnetic resonance imaging) and clinical reasoning, a
medical diagnosis can be made (e.g. disc herniation). In this initial part of the diagnostic process biomedical theories are the most prevalent theories with regard to dysfunction. Physiological pathology is only found in 10% to 20% of patients with low back pain (Truchon, 2001; Tulder van, 1999). Low back pain is referred to as non-specific when there is no physiological cause that fully explains the back problem (Kent & Keating, 2004; Haldeman, 1990; Nachemson, 1992). Such cases, if they do not improve within 12 weeks, are referred to as chronic (Tulder van, 1999). With this change from acute to chronic, the low back problem is redefined, and consequently the range of hypotheses about the factors leading to the back problem is extended. The biomedical perspective on low back pain that guided the diagnostic process in the acute phase changes into a biopsychosocial perspective in the chronic phase (Truchon, 2001; Haldeman, 1990; Andersson, 1999). Biomedical theories recede into the background, in favour of a vast field of psychosocial theories attempting to explain the persistence of the low back pain, such as treatments incorporating operant conditioning theories (Keefe, Dunsmore et al., 1992; Flor, Knost et al., 2002) and social cognitive theories (Buchbinder, Jolley et al., 2001a; Buchbinder, Jolley et al., 2001b; Turk & Monarch, 2002; Turk, 2002; Turk & Sherman, 2002). These interventions vary considerably in their content, and are referred to as cognitive-behavioural treatment (Vlaeyen & Morley, 2005). In the cognitive treatment that serves as an illustrative example in this paper, Leventhal’s Self Regulation Model (SRM) (Leventhal, Nerenz et al., 1984; Leventhal, Benyamini et al., 1997) had considerable impact on its content, and because the SRM was the starting point for the development of the cognitive treatment, we need to know how the problem of low back pain was operationalised with help of the model.

The SRM describes the process by which individuals respond to a perceived health threat. The model postulates that symptoms generate both cognitive and emotional representations of the illness or health threat, and are generated by parallel processes. The SRM assumes that an individual first forms the representation (emotional and cognitive) of the illness, and subsequently adopts behaviours to cope with this (Leventhal et al., 1984; Ogden, 2000; Petrie, Cameron et al., 2002; Petrie, Weinman et al., 1996; Leventhal, Halm et al., 2004). The SRM distinguishes five dimensions of illness cognitions: 1) identity, 2) timeline, 3) cause, 4) consequences, and 5) control/cure. The dimension, ‘identity’, refers to the symptoms experienced (e.g. pain, fatigue). The dimension, ‘timeline’, reflects the patient’s ideas about how long the illness will last, and whether it will be a temporary or a persistent problem, e.g. ‘I will have increasingly more back problems for the rest of my life’. The dimension ‘cause’, reflects the
individual’s ideas about the cause of the illness, e.g. ‘we have weak backs in our family’. The dimension, ‘consequences’, refers to the individual’s ideas of the possible impact of the illness on his or her life, e.g. ‘I’ll end up in a wheelchair, and I’ll lose my job’. The dimension ‘control/cure’ includes the patient’s ideas about whether or not the illness can be controlled by him/herself or by treatment, e.g., ‘The only thing I can do to help my back problem is to lie down’ or, ‘Treatment won’t help, I’ve tried so many things and nothing has worked’ (Leventhal et al., 1984). To assess the patient’s illness cognitions, we included the Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ-R) (Moss-Morris, Weinman et al., 2002; Weinman, Petrie et al., 1996) in our diagnostic assessment.

To return to the subject of theory of dysfunction: in the SRM a central position is given to illness cognitions which are generated and shaped by the symptoms that are experienced. Consequently, maladaptive illness cognitions are considered to be a potential factor contributing to the persistence of the problem. The SRM assumes that patients construct their own common-sense model of their illness, and that they incorporate in this model a variety of sources of information which are encountered over time. For example, the patient’s own experiences with and knowledge about his/her illness, and advice given by others. These sources of information can either help or hinder adaptation to illness and recovery (Leventhal et al., 1984; Hagger & Orbell, 2003). The informative role of the SRM in defining the problem also focuses on the patient’s personal model of the illness. For clinical practice this provides relevant information, because it stresses the need for an understanding of the patient’s personal opinion about his/her back problem before attempting to change it. The need for in-depth understanding of the personal model suggests that the treatment should be provided in a one-to-one setting, and not in group treatment.

In summary, in the definition of the dysfunction that low back pain causes, both biomedical and psychosocial theories play an important role, and the importance of the theories varies with the duration of the low back pain. For clinical practice it is important to define in detail the dysfunction that must be treated, because this determines the potential treatment options. To make rational treatment choices, the treatment content must also be described in detail. To systematically describe the theories underlying the treatment, a second tool is introduced: a conceptual framework.

THEORY OF TREATMENT
The central question in the theory of treatment is: ‘What does the treatment aim to accomplish, and through what means and processes’. To describe the content
and theoretical underpinnings of the cognitive treatment in a systematic way, and to identify potentially relevant variables, a second tool was used: a conceptual framework constructed by programme theorists (Keith & Lipsey, 1993; Chen, 1990). Based on this framework, treatment can be specified in terms of (un)intended outcomes (output domain) and related treatment components.

![Program theory domains for therapy specification](image)

**Figure 1 Program theory domains for therapy specification**

(input domain), the therapeutic process that is expected to mediate between the outcomes and the treatment components (process domain), and the conditions needed for optimal application of the treatment programme (context domain). The ways in which biomedical and psychosocial theories have given shape to the content of the treatment programme (guiding principles) were also included in the analysis (Lettinga, Siemonsma et al., 1999). This framework, which is used to specify the content and theoretical underpinnings of our cognitive treatment, is shown in Figure 1.
Output domain
Specification of the output domain was guided by the question ‘What are the (un)intended outcomes of the treatment programme?’ Given the rehabilitation setting, the intended outcome of our cognitive treatment is at behavioural level: an increase in physical activities in patients with low back pain. The Patient-Specific Functioning List (PSFL) (PSK in Dutch) (Beurskens, Vet de et al., 1999; Beurskens, Vet de et al., 1996) was used to identify and specify physical activities which are difficult for the patient to perform. The PSFL asks patients to prioritise their daily activities and to select those activities that are most important to them. They are asked to select, from a list of 36 daily activities, those physical activities that they find difficult to perform, and which they would like to improve upon in the next 3 months. The three most important activities are the focus of individualised treatment goals and might, for instance, be formulated as ‘standing in a queue in the supermarket for 15 minutes’.

Process domain
Specification of the process domain was guided by the question: ‘What is the intervening process that is expected to mediate between the treatment components and the outcomes of the cognitive treatment?’ According to Leventhal’s SRM, the cognitive treatment operates on the premise that (health) behaviour is governed by cognitions. Cognitive treatment is therefore designed to achieve cognitions that are conducive to physical activity, and the focus of cognitive treatment is on the illness cognitions that are related to physical activity. Therefore, an assumption underlying cognitive treatment is that in order to achieve a higher level of activity the illness cognitions must change, so that they become conducive to physical activity.

Input domain
Knowing that cognitions play a pivotal role in the patient’s limitations in physical activity, we are faced with the question: ‘How does cognitive treatment aim to change the patient’s cognitions?’ Two components emerged in the reflection process: 1) mental experimentation, which focuses on changing cognitions, and 2) physical experimentation, which is aimed at applying and testing cognitions during daily activities.

Mental experimentation is divided into four steps: a) mapping cognitions, b) challenging maladaptive cognitions, c) formulating alternative cognitions, and d) strengthen the alternative cognitions.
The first step, the mapping of existing cognitions, is guided by the SRM assumption that it is important to have in-depth knowledge of the patient's common-sense model before trying to change the cognitions that constitute the individual model (Weinman & Petrie, 1997; Petrie et al., 2002; Scharf Donovan & Ward, 2001; Petrie et al., 2002). Using the answers to the IPQ-R, a Socratic style of dialogue (Nelson, 1994; Vincelli, Choi et al., 2000) is used to invite patients to elaborate on their thoughts about their low back pain in relation to their limitations in activity. Causal cognitions were found to be a useful target for treatment (Petrie et al., 2002; Leventhal et al., 2004; Pimm & Weinman, 1998). In clinical practice, cognitions about cause were also found to be a useful starting point for the Socratic dialogue, because patients often have a definite idea about what is wrong (or might go wrong) with their back. Broadening the range of perceived causes was found to be a useful target for treatment (Petrie et al., 2002; Leventhal et al., 2004), for example in patients who have a purely biomechanical causal model of their chronic back problem. Patients who struggle to understand their chronic back problem also seem to have a limited model of their illness, and report only a limited number of possible causes of their back problem on the IPQ. Therefore, mapping thus helps in the selection of treatment targets for the next step of mental experimentation.

The second step in mental experimentation, 'challenging maladaptive cognitions', is aimed at creating doubt about the existing cognitions. Once patients are dissatisfied with the existing cognitions, they will be more open for alternative explanations.

The third step is 'formulating alternative cognitions' that are more conducive to physical activity. The therapist stimulates the patient to suggest alternative cognitions that seem plausible, and encourages the patient to extend the range of possible cognitions. Multiple sources of information are used to facilitate this process. The therapist initially fosters the exploration of alternative cognitions by asking the patient to compare his or her cognitions with those of significant others, searching for information in libraries or on the internet. This step ends when both the patient and the therapist feel that plausible and intelligible alternative cognitions have been found. Important in this step is to discuss the positive consequences for the patient of the alternative cognitions: i.e. how will they help the patient to achieve more physical activity in daily life. Patients may still feel insecure about the alternative cognitions, but they must be convinced that it is worthwhile to try to apply them in daily life.

The fourth step in mental experimentation is strengthening the newly acquired alternative cognitions. Therapists do this by asking the patient to think
about situations that are particularly difficult, or reasons to doubt the credibility of the alternative cognitions (e.g. ‘What if your pain gets worse, would you still think that it’s harmless and just a phase?’).

**Physical experimentation** focuses mainly on strengthening the alternative cognitions by confirming their utility in daily practice. For example, ‘doing sports’ is used as a physical experiment to strengthen the acquired alternative cognitions: ‘doing my favourite sports doesn’t hurt my spine’. The physical experimentation can also be used to explore situations in which patients suspect that they may revert to maladaptive cognitions, i.e. when there still is doubt about the credibility of the alternative cognitions. For example, purposefully doing what the patient considers to be ‘too much’.

Physical experimentation is not only applicable after mental experimentation has been completed, but can also be used in the process of mapping cognitions. For instance, patients may be asked to monitor those situations in which they stop or avoid activities, by keeping an activity diary. The diary notes are used in the treatment to pinpoint difficult situations and to further analyse the rationale for stopping or avoiding activities.

In summary, the main component of cognitive treatment is mental experimentation that starts off with mapping cognitions, then challenging illness cognitions, and subsequently developing realistic and coherent cognitions about activity limitations and chronic low back pain. Physical experimentation is added to strengthen the newly acquired alternative cognitions.

**Context domain**

The context domain of the conceptual framework was investigated by addressing the question ‘What are the conditions for optimal application of our cognitive treatment?’. A critical contextual condition for mental experimentation in cognitive treatment is the Socratic dialogue and discussion style. Unfortunately, few authors clearly delineate the components of the Socratic method (Overholser, 1991). In order to achieve optimal results, the style for dialogues and discussion should be more specific than just ‘asking the patient’. Our analyses of the cognitive treatment indicate that the therapist must be an expert in Socratic style dialogues, which means that the therapist must be able to play a different role in each step of the mental experimentation. When mapping existing cognitions the therapist has to take a naïve stance, when challenging cognitions the therapist must assume a more analytical and questioning role, when exploring alternative cognitions the therapist must rely on expert knowledge about chronic low back pain, and when testing the strength of alternative cognitions the therapist has to
play devil’s advocate. In the ideal treatment situation only one therapist should provide the treatment, because of the need for detailed knowledge about a patient’s cognitions. It was felt that such detailed knowledge could not easily be transferred to other team members. A dilemma in choosing only one therapist is that knowledge and skills concerning cognitive treatment are traditionally the domain of psychologists, whereas knowledge of medical conditions and their impact on the performance of physical activities, and the skills that are needed to change physical abilities, pertain more to the domain of occupational therapists and physiotherapists. It was felt that for the skills and knowledge needed to provide cognitive treatment less training was necessary than for those needed to treat medical conditions and to train physical abilities. It was also argued that the patients themselves might consider paramedics to be the most appropriate experts, because in the first instance most patients considered their low back problem to be a physical and medical condition. Occupational therapists and physiotherapists were therefore considered to be the most appropriate providers of cognitive treatment.

However, our cognitive treatment does not solely require that the therapist has the necessary qualities; the patient must also fulfil certain contextual conditions to be able to participate in such a dialogue. There is a need for verbal and reasoning skills to achieve an open and fruitful discussion, and social skills are also required. Both the therapist and the patient must therefore be open-minded and contemplative in each stage of mental experimentation. A patient with good listening skills, who is open-minded and contemplative, might also be a more suitable candidate for cognitive treatment. Clinicians can take these variables into consideration when making decisions concerning about patient and therapist characteristics. First of all, ‘Which patients will benefit most from cognitive treatment?’, and secondly, ‘Which therapist is most appropriate to provide the cognitive treatment’.

**Guiding principles**

Guiding principles included in the framework are the ways in which biomedical and psychosocial theories have given shape to the content of the treatment. To specify the guiding principles of our cognitive treatment we addressed the question: ‘Which biomedical and/or psychosocial theories shaped our cognitive treatment?’ In the SRM it is assumed that the ways in which people think about health threats are important in determining how they feel, and what they do in reaction to events (Leventhal et al., 1984). In the SRM, thinking and feeling are two parallel processes (Leventhal et al., 1997). Illness cognitions are part of the
cognitive process: what people think. The emotional process focuses on how people feel, and is important for emotional adjustment (Cameron, 2003). Cognitive and emotional processing take place at the same time, but our cognitive treatment does not focus on the regulation of distress by emotional processing. Only the cognitive path is followed as the guiding principle for cognitive treatment. Thus, cognitive treatment does not draw from all areas of the SRM. However, it is not only the SRM that has guided the development of cognitive treatment; other theories have also been applied. Strike and Possner (Strike & Posner, 1992) formulated three conditions in their theory of conceptual change, under which cognitive change is likely to occur, i.e. 1) dissatisfaction with an existing cognition, 2) an intelligible and plausible alternative is available, and 3) the new concept is beneficial. This knowledge about conditions for cognitive change was combined with Socratic style of dialogues, as described by Nelson and others (Nelson, 1994; Vincelli et al., 2000). Motor learning theories also emerged as guiding principles of our cognitive treatment, because they assume that the learning of physical activities may be best achieved if practised in a wide variety of contexts and in contexts that closely resemble situations in which the behaviour is needed. For this reason, homework is given and practised in a variety of situations. The situations are deliberately chosen from the patient’s daily context. The role of motor learning theories in our cognitive treatment is less detailed than that of the SRM or the theory of conceptual change. A graphical representation of the framework specified for cognitive treatment is shown in Figure 2.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In the field of rehabilitation research there is increasing awareness that theory has to be integrated in outcome studies to help improve both clinical practice and research (Campbell et al., 2000; Whyte, 2003; Siegert et al., 2005; Wade, 2005; Keith et al., 1993; Fuhrer, 2003; Lettinga, Reynders et al., 2002; Johnston, Stineman et al., 1997; Keith, 1997; Lettinga et al., 2006). It is argued that rehabilitation research should move beyond black box evaluations, by specifying the content and theoretical underpinnings of the treatment (Whyte, 2003; Keith et al., 1993; Lettinga et al., 2002; Johnston et al., 1997; Lettinga et al., 2006). The objective of this article was to demonstrate, by means of an illustrative example, how such a description and specification process can be carried out in a systematic way, and to draw attention to possible implications. This example might help to explain to clinicians the content and assumptions of cognitive treatment, and thus enable them to decide how, why and for whom they provide...
such cognitive treatment in chronic low back pain rehabilitation. The graphical representation also provides clinicians with a framework for refining and improving cognitive treatment. However, our findings should not to be confused with scientific facts. The analyses are explications of thought processes and informed choices that would otherwise have remained implicit. Future research may provide evidence for both the hypothesis and the implications resulting from our analyses. These analyses, together with the results of research, can assist in increasing our knowledge of rehabilitation treatment in an efficient and systematic way.

With the help of the conceptual framework constructed by programme theorists, it became clear that the initial biomedical problem of the patient with chronic low back pain was redefined in the output domain as limitations in the performance of activities, for which the main explanation was illness cognitions. Mental and physical experimentations were identified as the most important treatment components in the input domain. Mental experimentation focuses on what the patient thinks, and aims to change maladaptive illness cognitions into alternative cognitions which are conducive to physical activities. Physical experimentation was added to strengthen the acquired alternative cognitions. So, in our cognitive treatment, mental experimentation links the input with the process domain, while physical experimentation links the input with the output domain. The guiding principles underlying the first link are cognitive theories, while motor learning theories were identified as the guiding principles underlying the second link (see Figure 2).

Leventhal’s SRM was the social cognitive theory that formed the starting point for the development of our treatment. The SRM was found to be influential in many different ways. To name a few: 1) the SRM helped to delineate the low back problem, and was identified as one of the theories of dysfunction, 2) the SRM defined the type of cognitions that can be targeted in treatment, and 3) the SRM stressed the individual nature of an individual model, and dictated that the treatment setting should also be individual, and group treatment.

Benefits of the description and specification processes for clinicians are: 1) that they enable them to articulate how and why they give such content to cognitive treatment, 2) they provide a framework for refinement and improvement of the treatment, and 3) they provide a basis for referring patients to cognitive treatment, based on their personal characteristics. For example, we discovered that for the Socratic style dialogues that are used in cognitive treatment important characteristics are required from both patient and therapist. For successful provision of the treatment, the verbal and discussion skills and an
open-minded approach appeared to be important issues that became obvious when specifying the content of the treatment.

In conclusion, the description and specification processes showed that the cognitive treatment is based on a complex set of theories, components and practices. Such complexities are often overlooked or ignored in both clinical practice and research. With our descriptions and specifications we positioned ourselves in a number of discussions on the role of theory in the field of rehabilitation. We did not strive to achieve a general theory of rehabilitation (Wade, 2005; Siegert et al., 2005), or aim to facilitate research (Campbell et al., 2000), but we have drawn attention to the fact that much more knowledge is incorporated within clinical practice than is often assumed. Our primary aim was to make this knowledge beneficial for the clinicians and the patients. This article has taken these discussions (Wade, 2005; Siegert et al., 2005; Campbell et al., 2000) one step further: instead of simply describing the problems, we have also tried to find a means to tackle them and have illustrated how this can be one.

REFERENCE LIST


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