TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 
IN WESTERN EUROPE

Peter Nijkamp and Katharina Spies 
Department of Regional Economics 
Free University 
Economics Faculty 
De Boelelaan 1105 
1081 HV Amsterdam 
The Netherlands

SUMMARY

One main topic in the (political) discussion in Western Europe is related to the increasing immigration flows into Western Europe. Western Europe seems to enter an immigration century.

This paper aims to offer in its first part facts on global trends in West European international migration in the past and present time. In mapping out the patterns of European migration, first a brief description of the different types of international migration flows since the Second World War is given. Next to this the present composition of the foreign population in six selected countries of the European Community is described and it is explored whether specific patterns could be observed. Third some more country-specific information is presented.

In the second section of the paper the attention is focused on possible future trends in international migration flows within, into and out of the Western European countries. The approach which is chosen for the analysis starts with a short look at dominant background trends in fields affecting international migration in Western Europe. One group of discussed fields refer to the macro-level, notably fields like population, economy, political situation, migration policies, transport, communication and environment. As a last field we focus on developments in social networks, as a field, which could be allocated on the meso level of analysis.

Despite of the existence of various more or less plausible indicative global trends in the various fields we focus on some more specific scenarios for the above mentioned fields. Based on the scenarios in a second step the question on their impacts on international migration in Western Europe is answered. This analysis is mainly guided by a ceteris paribus analysis, that is: the impacts are explored mainly without taking the developments in other fields into account. The last section ends with a summation of the most probable trends in international migration. It seems most probable
that the majority of developments lead to a positive effect on international migration into Western Europe, that means an increasing immigration. Only trends in the field of migration policies seem to be able to lead to a decrease in immigration. However, these measures only have limited effects.

1. INTRODUCTION

It is one of the most discussed topics in European politics, economics and in various scientific research areas: international migration affecting Western Europe. Indeed it seems to be that Western Europe will enter the age of migration [1].

For Europe the issue of international migration has two - well discussed - main dimensions. On the one hand Europe is undergoing the so-called “double ageing process”. Since the mid sixties a period of sustained low fertility in Europe can be observed and at the same time an increasing life expectancy is experienced. This process of dejuvenation and ageing could lead to labour shortages and may seriously strain the social security systems [2].

On the other hand the lifting of the Iron Curtain which had so long prevented an intensive exchange of people and goods between the Western and Eastern parts of Europe suddenly makes the prospect of substantial migration flows from the economies in transition to the West a reality and cause for concern [2]. The year 1989 was a landmark in East-West migration. A total of 1.3 million people from the Eastern part of Europe left for the West during that year [3] and more followed.

Talking about European migration however, makes it necessary to distinguish between migration movements in-between the European Community or the European Economic Area (EC- and EFTA-countries) and such ones from third countries into the EEA.

Migration inside the European Community has historically been characterized by long term movements from less developed to more prosperous regions. The scale of internal migration in the Community contrasts markedly with that in the U.S., where the propensity to move is very high. While legal barriers to migration in the Community have already been removed, linguistic and cultural barriers remain significant. The completion of the internal market however, is unlikely of itself to give rise to sudden migratory flows [2].

Migration between the Community and third countries tends to be a two way process. There has been a tendency for flows in one direction persistently to exceed those in the other. This has resulted over all in a small but relatively continuous net inflow from third countries during the 1970s and the 1980s. This steady inflow, averaging 100-300 thousand people a year, took the population born outside the Community to a total of around 8 million by 1988, or 2.5 % of the population excluding non registered immigrants [2].

But what about future trends? First of all it should be settled in this context that it is impossible to predict with certainty how migration will affect the population of the Community over the next decade. However looking on different scenarios helps to figure out which possible future trends could influence international migration to which extent.

The goal of this paper has to be seen in this context. In the first section we describe facts on global trends in European (international) migration in the past and present time. In mapping out the patterns of European migration, first a brief description of
the different types of international migration flows since the Second World War is given. Next to this the present composition of the foreign population in six selected countries of the European Community is described and it is explored whether specific patterns could be observed. Third some more country-specific information is presented.

In the second part of the paper the attention is focussed on possible future trends in international migration flows within, into and out of the Western European countries. The purpose is to discuss different scenarios on international migration. This scenarios are drawn in the framework of different developments in fields affecting international migration in Western Europe. Based on some considerations of possible trends in various fields we ask in a second step after their impacts on international migration in Western Europe. In the end we produce a mosaic of developments in different fields affecting international migration in Europe.

We stress on the fact that we focus on scenarios and not on forecasts. Scenarios we use in the interpretation as unconditional projections, which indicate only what will happen if certain conditions are fullfilled [4].

### 2. Global Trends in the Past and Present Time

A glance at Europe’s migration history in the past two centuries shows that by and large Europe may to be characterized as an emigration continent. Before the Second World War it was not Europe which absorbed foreigners, but on the contrary it were predominantly the Europeans who were absorbed mainly by the three big immigration countries, the United States of America, Canada and Australia [5]. Talking about Europe - and especially Western Europe - as an immigration continent was certainly not possible before the Second World War. And even in the post-war period not all Western European countries have been immigration countries for this whole period, as is shown by Table 1 for the period 1960 - 1988.

For the year 1990, a comparison between various selected European countries - EC and EFTA countries with the exception of Luxembourg [6] - shows that only Ireland and to some degree also Spain - both having a negative net migration - may nowadays be characterized as an emigration country.

For the EC as a whole figures presented by Muus and Cruijsen [7, Table 1] indicate that the EC has experienced a net immigration of about 6,420,000 persons in the period 1960-1989, which equals an average net migration of 214,000 persons annually. During the period 1985-89 an average annual net inflow of almost 500,000 persons could be recorded for the European Community.

The observed net inflows for the EC since 1960 do not show - as Table 3 illustrates - a smooth predictable linear pattern, but follow a more or less cyclical path. Changing circumstances have led to different migration flows.

For the EC as a whole a sharp increase in net migration can again be observed since 1987, which however in 1989 had not yet reached the peak of nearly 1,000,000 immigrants into the EC in the year 1962. Muus and Cruijsen [7] have pointed out the backgrounds of the different migration flows in terms of different types of migrants and different nationalities.
### Table 1
Average annual migration flows to and from selected European countries, 1960-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>69,056</td>
<td>65,583</td>
<td>64,688</td>
<td>58,271</td>
<td>47,862</td>
<td>48,584</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany, Fed. Rep.</td>
<td>576,211</td>
<td>706,144</td>
<td>873,051</td>
<td>527,483</td>
<td>502,179</td>
<td>554,230</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>57,746</td>
<td>71,009</td>
<td>89,140</td>
<td>97,571</td>
<td>79,419</td>
<td>88,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>29,226</td>
<td>45,404</td>
<td>43,342</td>
<td>41,368</td>
<td>32,212</td>
<td>41,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>186,600</td>
<td>186,400</td>
<td>227,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emigrants</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>35,271</td>
<td>41,503</td>
<td>47,615</td>
<td>52,990</td>
<td>58,663</td>
<td>54,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>51,218</td>
<td>60,329</td>
<td>61,179</td>
<td>59,737</td>
<td>61,962</td>
<td>54,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>15,226</td>
<td>19,842</td>
<td>35,697</td>
<td>23,897</td>
<td>27,396</td>
<td>22,166</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>207,600</td>
<td>214,000</td>
<td>208,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Migration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>33,785</td>
<td>24,080</td>
<td>17,073</td>
<td>5,281</td>
<td>-10,801</td>
<td>-6,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6,526</td>
<td>10,679</td>
<td>27,961</td>
<td>37,833</td>
<td>17,457</td>
<td>34,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>25,562</td>
<td>7,644</td>
<td>17,472</td>
<td>4,816</td>
<td>19,427</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-21,000</td>
<td>-27,600</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for the Federal republic of Germany cover only 1961-1987.  
For the United Kingdom, the period covered is 1975-1988.

Source: Zloniak and Hooy (1990, Table 1)
# Table 2

Recent gross inflows of migrants into selected European countries, 1990, by type (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of destination</th>
<th>Labour migrants</th>
<th>Ethnic migrants</th>
<th>Asylum seekers (gross inflow)</th>
<th>All foreign (excluding asylum seekers, includes some EC)</th>
<th>Total gross inflow, including asylum seekers</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Gross immigration per 1,000 (includes asylum seekers)</th>
<th>Net migration per 1,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>103.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>123.1</td>
<td>145.9</td>
<td>7,660</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>9,948</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>5,135</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>117.8</td>
<td>56,304</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>138.6</td>
<td>193.1</td>
<td>649.5</td>
<td>1239.7</td>
<td>62,679</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,057</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,506</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57,576</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>14,893</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>4,233</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,337</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>38,925</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>8,527</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>6,674</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>57,323</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>353.2</td>
<td>397.1</td>
<td>426.8</td>
<td>1212.1</td>
<td>353,778</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Blanks indicate that data are not available. Data on labour migrants to EC countries do not usually include citizens of other EC countries.
- Austria: 'All foreign' figure is an estimate of net migration.
- Germany: data refer to the area of the Federal Republic before reunification. The total of ethnic migrants refers only to 'Aussiedler' from Eastern Europe and the USSR, not from the former East-Germany, of whom there were 238,282 from January 1990 to June 1990.
- All foreign figure is for 1989. 'Total inflow for 1990 includes that figure (Meyer 1992)
- Spain: All foreign total is for 1989. Switzerland: excludes seasonal workers.
- Net migration includes persons of all citizenship. Foreign immigrants excludes asylum seekers.

Source: Coleman (1993, Table 1)
Table 3

Net migration for the European Community
(in thousands)

Source: Muus and Cruijen (1991, Table 1)
In mapping out the patterns of European migration in more detail hereafter, we will first briefly describe the different types of international migration flows since the Second World War [5,6,7,8,9]. Next we will describe the present composition of foreign population in six selected countries of the European Community and explore whether it is possible to identify specific patterns [8]. Finally, we will add some more country-specific information, like for example the distribution of various types of migration over selected European countries [6].

In light of these tasks an important issue for any detailed, comparative analysis (and projection) of international migration should be mentioned in advance, viz. the need for internationally consistent data on international migration in Europe. Up to now the availability of international comparable information is even for the West European countries rather poor. Already very simple but crucial statistical indicators like annual net migration or the total annual number of immigrants and emigrants distinguished by nationals, EC-nationals and non-EC-nationals are - as pointed out in a study of Poullain [10] - not standardized and sometimes completely lacking. France, for example, is known for its absence of migration statistics. For an overview of the available data on international migration in the West European countries - their classification and available time series we refer to van Imhoff et al [11]. These difficulties in comparing data should therefore be kept in mind in the subsequent part of this paper. In the following now we start our discussion of different immigration flows in Europe.

A first type of immigration flow into Europe, which can be positioned at different time periods since 1950, is linked to the postwar decolonization process. Besides the return of European colonists and colonial officers, countries like Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, which were colonial nations in the past, recorded sizeable immigration flows by migrant workers from their former overseas territories. 3

A second type of immigration flow played a major role in the 1950s until the mid 1970s, when a number of countries - notably Switzerland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux countries and Sweden - started to meet part of their growing demand for labour by recruiting labour force in several Mediterranean countries. In the initial period of hiring these guest-workers, Italy was the most important recruitment area, while in the 1960s Spain and Portugal became the most important recruitment and emigration countries. In the 1970s, Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia became increasingly more important countries of origin. In the early 1970s, the employment of foreign labour reached its maximum level, in the post-war period. In 1970, West-Germany was leading with nearly 2,1 million foreign workers.

After the oil price shock and the economic recession in the mid 1970s the recruitment of foreign labour decline sharples and more restrictive immigration regulations were imposed. In view of the reduced absorption capacity of the labour market, the aim was to stop further immigration. But as Table 1 indicates these policies had only a short term effect. This is especially true for Germany, where the average annual net migration flows of foreigners decreased from 297,040 in the time period of 1970-74 to 32,370 in the period of 1975-79 [9, Table 3]. The long-term effect however shows no reduction in immigration flows: after 1985 almost all Western European countries experienced a recovery of their annual migration inflows of foreigners.

Despite the formal cessation of labour migration it is however much more important to mention that this cessation has now led to a rise in migration for family re-

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3 For example, during the period 1954 - 1962 more than one million former French residents of Algeria resettled in France [8].
unification. This third type of European post-war migration, namely family migration, particularly family reunification, is one of the major migration flows in the recent past and in the present time. The male workers reunified with their wives and children in the settlement countries. In the mean time a new phenomenon in this context has emerged, viz. family formation migration, that means a marriage with a foreign partner. This different type of chain migration is not surprising taking into account that immigrant children are growing up and might prefer to marry a partner who is still living in the country of origin.

Furthermore one side-effect of the increasing restrictive immigration regulations since the mid 1970s in West European countries should be added, viz. the rising number of illegal immigrants into Western Europe. Since the 1980s a new pattern of labour migration developed. Besides the North-West European countries also most Southern European countries, particularly Italy, have become countries of immigration. It is noteworthy that, much of the "official" labour migration within and into Europe at present is "high level manpower and to a lesser extent, with high level manual skills" [6, p.14].

With growing political conflicts, civil wars and economic crises in the Middle-East, South America and Africa in the recent past - in addition to the above mentioned increasing flows of foreign labour and family migration - the flow of asylum seekers into Western Europe is drastically increasing since the 1980s, as Table 4 indicates for the whole of the EC since 1987.

When we look at the period 1985 - 1989, an annual average of almost 165,000 asylum seekers can be estimated [7]. In 1990 Western Europe received 539,000 applications for asylum in 1991 [6]. As a special case the emigration flows in 1991/1992 out of the former Yugoslavia - as a result of the war between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina - should be mentioned, as they are the largest single wave of emigration since 1946/47 [6].

The above described types of migration can in general be characterized as south-north migration streams. East-west migration within, in and out of Europe on the other hand have by far not played such an important role in the post-war European migration history as south-north migration. East-west migration was greatly reduced for 40 years due to the political division of Europe. Mass migration mainly occurred in cases of political crisis. With the end of the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe however, east-west migration flows have been intensified. Particularly the large flows of people with a German origin out of Poland, the former Soviet-Union, Hungary and Rumania should be mentioned in this context. This ethnic immigrants can finally be mentioned as an additional dominating migration stream into EC member states at the present time.

Besides these two main directions of European postwar migration (south-north, east-west migration), Passmann and Münz [8] mention a third main pattern of European migration: the migration between hinterlands and home countries. This means that European migration clearly shows distinct privileged relations between parts of countries. A

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4 In a number of European countries such family migration is the biggest single component of gross inflows except of asylum seekers (for instance, in 1988 90 percent into Belgium and West-Germany, and 70 percent into France) [6].

5 Böning estimates the number of illegal immigrants in Western Europe about two million plus 500,000 persons refused asylum [6].

6 For example, the emigration flows out of Hungary as a result from the revolution of 1956.

7 In 1989, Germany counted 377,000 ethnic Germans, the so-called "Ausiedler" [6].
Table 4

Asylum seekers in the European Community
(in thousands)

Source: Muus and Crujsen (1991, Table 4)
further specification of this statement can be found in an analysis of the percentages of the foreign resident population in six major receiving countries of Western Europe.

As Table 5 indicates, almost all Algerians, Tunisiens, Portuguese and Moroccans in these six countries live in France. The vast majority of migrants from East-Central Europe are to be found in Germany, while in addition, some 72 percent of all ex-Yugoslavs and 74 percent of Turks reside in Germany. Nine of the ten Greeks living in the six major receiving countries also reside in Germany. Most Finnish emigrants moved to Sweden, while most Austrian migrants emigrated to Germany. For the United Kingdom, it may be pointed out that it absorbs almost all Irish (outside Ireland), and almost all Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis living in Europe. Migrants from Italy and Spain follow a less specific pattern. Italians outside Italy, who are registered in the six major receiving countries are mainly spread over Germany (37.8 percent), Switzerland (26.7 percent) and France (17.5 percent). The majority of Spanish foreigners can be found in France (44.4 percent), Germany or Switzerland.

For the whole European Community, it appears that from the total of 13.4 million foreigners in the EC in 1989 49 percent were citizens of non-European countries, 38 percent citizens of other EC states, while only 13 percent were citizens from other European countries. Among the non-European countries the Turkish people are with 31 percent of all Non-European citizens in Europe by far the largest group, while all Africans represent 35.4 percent. Migrants from Asia and South and North America together represent 32.3 percent of the foreign citizens of non-European countries [6].

Finally we will touch upon the question whether special types of migrants can be associated with special countries. Even though we mentioned already briefly this question above, an explicit look at the gross flows of migrants into Western Europe by types of immigration (labour migrants, ethnic migrants and asylum seekers) in Table 2 shows that ethnic migrants are only to be found in Germany. In the SOPEMI-Report [12], in addition, ethnic Greeks and ethnic Turks coming from Eastern Europe are mentioned in this context. For the ethnic Germans it is noteworthy, that during the period 1986-1990 a total number of more than 1,000,000 "Aussiedler" has been recorded. For the period of January-July 1991 about 20,000 "Aussiedler" arrived monthly [7]. For the group of the asylum seekers, it is noteworthy that Germany - followed by France - seems to be the most attractive country for them. The majority of labour migrants also seems to prefer Germany as the most attractive country of destination. Austria appears to be positioned on the second place in terms of absolute numbers of labour migrants. These high (absolute) numbers of all types of migrant inflows to Germany is paralleled by the fact that this country has in absolute numbers the largest foreign population, even without taking the ethnic Germans into account. As Table 2, shows Germany with 649.5 thousand inflow of foreign population is on the top of the selected countries in terms of absolute numbers of immigrants. A look at the most recent past - the period since 1980 shows that this is true for this whole time period. This means, that we are not talking about a year-specific effect, but about a structural pattern. In a relative sense however, by taking the foreign population as a percentage of the total population, Switzerland is with 16.5 percent foreign population the European country with the highest percentage of foreigners among its population [6].

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8 This information is not included in the above mentioned Table 5; it refers to Colemann [6, Table 2a].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>FRP (1,000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>355</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17.5</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,452</td>
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<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-Central Europe</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (percent)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (1,000s)</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>3,608</td>
<td>5,242</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>12,030</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Asterix indicates no data are available.
Sources from Fassmann and Münz: OECD/SOPEMI (1992, several tables)
Source: Fassmann and Münz (1992, Table 3)
3. **FUTURE TRENDS: A FIELD-SPECIFIC APPROACH**

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Having presented past and present trends in international migration (particularly in Western Europe), we will in this section focus our attention on possible future trends in international migration flows within, into and out of the Western European countries.

International migration is in general one of the most unpredictable demographic phenomena. As a result of this uncertainty in prediction, there is a variety of attempts at forecasting international migration flows, originating from different disciplines [7, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Differences in flows in international migration are related to different developments of the global system migration belongs to and in which migration takes place. Besides these macro level developments, international migration is also influenced by meso (group or regional) factors.

In our approach to the present discussion on possible future trends in international migration in Western Europe, we will first take a short look at dominant background trends in fields affecting international migration in Western Europe. Table 6 summarizes the various fields whose developments are likely influencing international migration in Western Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro level</th>
<th>Meso level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>social networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>migration policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport/communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite of the existence of various more a less plausible indicative trends in the various fields, it does not make much sense to concentrate on only one specific trend in each of these fields. Therefore, we aim to focus on different scenarios for the above mentioned fields. We will mainly base our approach on global scenarios, while we will now and than stress specific aspects, which are interesting in the context concerned. Given the complexity of factors in different fields affecting international migration in

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9 When we do not consider trends or factors at the micro level, this does not mean that we are not aware of the importance of these factors in international migration. The micro level of analysis however, is such a different one, that it would need an additional separate analysis.
Western Europe, we recognize that our contribution is by far not exhaustive. Rather we wish to characterize our analysis as a contribution for further discussion.

After this short discussion of possible future trends in the above mentioned fields, we will focus in a second step on the main purpose of this paper: given different "field scenarios", we look on their impacts on international migration in Western Europe. The analysis of these impacts is mainly guided by a "ceteris paribus" analysis, that is: we explore these impacts mainly without taking the developments in other fields into account. This kind of analysis is chosen in order to be able to use different "if-then" statements, which would have been difficult to analyze by taking the entire complexity of international migration into account.

A distinction in our analysis - at least in most cases - is made between international migration related to developments in Western Europe and such ones referring to the so-called third countries - sometimes further subdivided into Eastern and Central Europe and developing countries. The latter subdivision refers to the fairly probabilistic assumption that from these two parts of the world the most significant immigration pressure into Western Europe is to be expected.

Our analysis will be embedded in the theoretical framework of a systems approach or refers at least to one important characteristic of this theoretical approach, namely the recognition that to capture the changing trends and patterns of international migration requires a dynamic - instead of a static - perspective [17]. This dynamics however, also covers the fact that international migration is not only influenced by changes in the overall system but also that the overall system (more specifically, global trends at the macro- and meso-level) is influenced by international migration flows. In our analysis we will limit ourselves mainly to the first effects.

### 3.2 The Macro Level

#### 3.2.1 Population

(1) Western Europe

The most important demographic trend in recent years in most West European countries is - as already touched in the introduction- a decline in fertility [18, Figure 3.1]. At the present time only Ireland has a total fertility rate higher than 2.1 a level, which would be necessary for a replacement of population [19]. Also in the future, West European countries (again with the exception of Ireland) are likely to experience a fall in population referring to the natural population "growth". On the other hand life expectancy in the West European countries is increasing [18].

The most fundamental impact of these trends which are expected to continue\(^\text{10}\) is the progressive ageing of the population. It is estimated that in Western Europe the population of persons over 65 years will increase from 13 per cent in 1985 to more than 20 percent in 2020 with an increasing tendency beyond that year. This ageing population will impose severe strains in particular on social welfare systems [18, 2].

One scenario, which Masser et al [18] characterize as the most probable one, would be that the crises of the social security system are overcome by a continued

\(^{10}\) About the extent to which these trends will continue however, there exist a variety of assumptions. The Commission of the European Communities, for instance, takes for granted, that until the year 2000 natural population growth will fall to zero, and after the year 2000 population will begin to decline [2].
growth in productivity. In terms of the impacts on international migration, this would lead to no further need for international migration [18].

A second scenario would be an immigration financed social security system, which may result in a positive effect on international immigration into Western Europe [18]. However, policies which try to solve the problems of the social security system by immigration must be aware of the fact, that - as recent empirical studies show - immigrant minorities tend to conform in a generation or so to the fertility patterns of the majority, non-migrant sector of the countries in which they settle [5].

(2) Third countries

Looking at population trends of third countries, we first have to remark that countries in Central and Eastern Europe - apart from Poland and Yugoslavia - have a population structure similar to Western (particularly North-Western) Europe [2]. In light of this fact no significant immigration pressure out of Central and Eastern Europe can be expected from the viewpoint of potential demographic differences.

The expectations for the population in developing countries are a continuation of their rapidly growing population. Recent and projected growth fits - as Appleyard [20, Table 1] shows - almost perfectly the classical exponential form. Under certain assumptions of fertility and mortality for the less developed regions of the world, an increase of the population from 4 billion in 1990 to 6 billion in 2014 is projected. Looking at these trends (and without taking the developments of other factors - like e.g., the success of modernization of the economies in developing countries - into account) it is obvious that a severe immigration pressure out of this countries\textsuperscript{11} will emerge from the viewpoint of expected demographic differences [20].

But even when it seems evident that with the growth in world population an immense worldwide migration potential also towards Western Europe is given, it is not self-evident that this potential will actually result in international migration [13], as demographic differences as an explanation for migration are very much connected with economic differences. Therefore, especially in the context of the "population field" we will refer to scenarios of the "economy field".

3.2.2 Economy

(1) Western Europe

With the completion of the internal EC market and alliances with EFTA countries, Western Europe presents an economic empire of unprecedented magnitude. The single European Market will require firms to expand beyond their traditional markets [18].

One scenario for future trends in West European economies - addressed by Masser et al. [18] as the most likely one - is that - despite the growing internalisation and integration of the national economies in Europe - there will remain large disparities within Western Europe. The already existing gap between affluent countries like Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg and France which produce more than twice as much GDP per capita than Ireland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain will increase or at least remain

\textsuperscript{11} Talking about developing countries in our context mainly refers to African (like Morocco, the Maghreb, Egypt, the Near East, Turkey) and Asian countries (like Pakistan, Bangladesh, India), because - as Section 2 shows - they are the main hinterlands of international migration from developing countries into Western Europe.
stable. If income disparities between the European core and periphery will increase, this may lead to a positive effect\textsuperscript{12} on future international migration within the European Community (or concerning Europe of the twelve as a whole: internal migration might increase due to regional differences; see [21]. Hofmann-Nowotny [13] even claims that the intra-European migration potential depends exclusively on differences in economic development. If large developmental disparities within Europe are persistent over a longer period, than a continuing intra-West-European migration is plausible.

A second scenario described by Masser et al. [18] is one, which assumes in respect to regional economic developments decentralization programmes\textsuperscript{13}. Such a scenario might be related to success in the Community's regional policies, aimed a more balanced distribution of economic activity in the EC as a whole [2]. For the migration flows within the EC this scenario indicates no additional migration caused by regional income disparities.

Another aspect of the economic development of Western Europe pointed out by Muus and Cruijsen [7] is the question, whether the existing labour force in Western Europe is sufficient in quantitative and qualitative respect to fulfill the short and long term needs of the European market and the national labour markets. One very extreme scenario in this context could be that no additional labour force is needed and therefore no pull effect is to be expected.

Another extreme scenario, which refers to the decreasing natural population growth, might be that the existing labour force is not sufficient and will thus attract new immigration flows from third countries. This possibility of future labour shortages might be due to the decrease in natural population growth [2].

Besides these very extreme scenarios it may be more realistic to distinguish between the type of labour expected to be needed in the future European market. Most probably, the future European market will need qualified professionals and experts from outside Western Europe. For unskilled workers most likely no significant demand will occur [15]. Consequently, a pull effect is expected for skilled workers, which may indeed lead to an increase in skilled labour or as Straubhaar and Zimmermann [15] express it: an immigration by (labour) market rules most probably leads to an increase in business migrants.

(2) Third countries

Looking at the economy of Central and East European countries and their way to become market economies, the number of scenarios that may be developed for such a process is - as van de Kaa [16] remarks - virtually unlimited. It is even possible that periods of stagnation or depression will emerge. Van de Kaa distinguishes three different time periods of future economic developments of these countries: In the short term, which most probably will cover a period of 1-4 years a disruption of the existing system will cause severe unemployment, a reduction in the standard of living and considerable poverty. In the medium term (most probably covered by a period of 3-6 years), economic output will increase, what will run parallel to an improvement in living standards and an increasing demand for labour. In the long run (assumed to start after 5 years) significant improvements in the economic situation are expected and also likely. Economically motivated migration from East and Central Europe will occur - according to the scenarios - most likely in the short and to a lesser degree in the medium run. Also

\textsuperscript{12} If we talk about a positive effect on international migration from now on, we mean increasing future migration into Western Europe or within Western Europe.

\textsuperscript{13} Such as the Technopolis Network, the Remote Area, Highway Programme etc. [18].
the Commission of the European Communities [2] notices that further migratory pressures are likely to originate from Central and Eastern European counties, as well as from the newly independent states of the former USSR, depending on their success in achieving a transition to a market economy. However it is clear that not all countries will go through such a sequence at the same speed and neither will they begin at the same time. Therefore, immigration from Central and East Europe is supposed to show significant differences in the flows out of the various countries. Most probably the migration flows out of the former USSR will be relatively higher than the ones for example out of Hungary, with a much more stable economic situation.

Besides these economically induced migration flows out of East and Central Europe, it should be added that with the ongoing changes of these countries in the direction of market economies also an important - but nevertheless small in number - stream from Western Europe to these countries might be observed in the near future. More precisely, a temporary immigration of entrepreneurs and experts into this countries is not unlikely [16].

Looking at the economic situation of the developing countries characterized by high and increasing rates of unemployment and underemployment, typically weak resources bases, low productivity, high external debt, and difficulty of access for their exports to world markets it is well known that depressingly low rates of economic growth are to be observed. A scenario, which at least in the long run, may lead to an economic improvement in these countries, may be linked to four aspects of a development package, which Appleyard [20] characterize as a necessity to create an appropriate environment of economic growth, namely trade, debt relief, investment and effective aid. Such a rather unlikely scenario may lead to a slow stop of the increase of the gap between the economic differences between South and North. For international migration this might mean at least no further increase in South-North-migration\textsuperscript{14}. Such a development could even lead to an emigration out of Western Europe, for instance, in terms of temporary migration relating to skill transfers.

Another - more probable - scenario is: increasing economic differences between the developing and developed countries of Western Europe. This will have ceteris paribus a very strong positive effect on immigration out of the developing countries into Western Europe [16]. However, it should be realized that the population in countries suffering from severe poverty is generally more likely to stay than the population of countries in relatively better economic circumstances, with a higher per capita GNP. Therefore, the first mentioned group of people mean no migration "threat" to countries of Western Europe because of the inability to finance travel and the lack of knowledge where the opportunities are [20].

An additional relevant aspect, was mentioned by van de Kaa [16], who claims that it is very likely that some of the funds traditionally spent by Western European countries in the Third World are likely to be diverted towards aid in view of the economic reforms necessary in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. For the Third World countries this leads to an even worse economic situation.

Referring to the push factors of international migration this might intensify immigration pressure into Western Europe. Van de Kaa [16] also points out that increased possibilities of attracting migrants from Eastern Europe and the former USSR

\textsuperscript{14} For further proposals at how to avoid the economically motivated immigration pressure out of the developing countries, we refer here to Straubhaar and Zimmermann [15, p.27].
caused by economic differences might have the effect of reducing the interests in workers from the Third World and might make their position on the labour market even more difficult. This might than lead to a reducing tendency of emigration out of the developing countries.

3.2.3 Political Situation

(1) Western Europe

Most West-European countries may be characterized as stable democratic systems for a longer period. It is probable that they will stay stable democratic systems, even when various internal problems may affect in different degrees their political systems. For international migration within Western Europe differences in the political situations will most likely not play an important role. Rather it might be the case that these stable democratic systems will - like already in the past - attract politically motivated migrants from outside Western Europe.

(2) Third countries

Major political disturbances in third countries however are - as the development in the former USSR or also in some African states show - much more probable than in Western Europe. For Central and Eastern Europe on their way to become liberal democracies characterized by basic human freedom, it is especially the development in the former USSR which seems at the present time - with the exception of the former Yugoslavia - most unstable.

As one scenario in the context of this subsection we mention here a situation of further stabilization in the Central and Eastern European countries, which will lead to a reduction in emigration pressure out of these countries caused by political motives.

Another scenario might be political destabilization, a step back in the times of less political freedom or further bitter interethnic conflicts [12] and as a consequence a positive effect on immigration into the West-European democracies.

For the developing countries we can mainly transfer the above roughly drawn scenarios. A scenario of major political disturbances like political upheavals and internal conflicts occurring in African and Asian countries might lead to major flows of refugees and asylum seekers into Western Europe. Looking at the present internal conflicts especially in some African states, this scenario seems to be more probable than the one of a globally stable political situation in these states.

Finally we refer here to Penninx and Muus [14], who remark that there are always situations from which people want to escape and that new ones are always arising. If no other opportunities are available for a refugee elsewhere - for instance as a migrant worker - , the number of people claiming refugee status and asylum will grow. Penninx and Muus [14] conclude that therefore migration pressure into Western Europe will continue to be high in the future.

3.2.4 Migration Policies

In this subsection trends in the field of immigration policies will be analyzed in more detail. This issue is imposed, in view of the present discussion about international migration in Western Europe. On the other hand, also migration theory stresses the importance of regulations for international migration [22, 23].
(1) Western Europe

Until now each European state has its own immigration policies which lead to a variety of regulations starting with very liberal regulations like for example, in Germany and ending up with more restrictive ones like in the case of Switzerland.\footnote{For a synoptical comparison of the immigration policies in France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands see [24] and for a comparison between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands see [25].}

First, we want to focus here on West-European immigration policies concerning international migration from outside Western Europe into Western Europe. Reports that asylum is frequently sought on tenuous grounds and on increasing numbers of illegals or undocumented residents, are helping to make international migration one of the central problems in the present political discussion. Those migrants who are jobless and are supported by grants through welfare benefits are the subject of envy and resentment specifically by the lower class nationals. Such resentments make fertile ground for extremist parties [16]. Continued immigration will give rise to an ‘underclass’ in society, if the incoming numbers are so large that they cannot be absorbed. These internal tensions have led to a discussion about more restrictive immigration regulations in all West-European countries.

At the European level, with the current unification process of Europe, there are already first steps in the direction of a cooperation in more restrictive regulations. Besides the Dublin Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty, in this context the Schengen Agreement (1990) signed by Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg might be mentioned as an example. The main purpose of this agreement is a global abolition of migration controls at the common (internal) borders as well as a free circulation of citizens of countries which are a party in the agreement. Concerning international migration the competence of migration authorities at the supranational level will increase. In our context, it is of especial importance that a comprehensive Schengen information system will be developed in order to be able to control the external borders effectively. The introduction of a uniform visa is also laid down in the Schengen Agreement. Each request for asylum submitted by an alien on the territory of one of the parties is considered by others. However, each party will test the request for asylum according to national laws. The Schengen Agreement also deals with sanctions against travel companies who bring in aliens from third countries who do not have the necessary travel documents [26].

According to these developments, it seems realistic to design a most probable scenario, which leads to further restrictive immigration regulations [13]. This assumption is underlined by the declaration of governments of all Western European countries on various occasions that they are not immigration countries [13]. Remembering the scenario of subsection 3.2.2 about the economic situation, it is most probable that these more restrictive immigration regulations particularly intend to decrease the flows of unskilled workers from third countries. It is most likely that West-European countries will grant work permits to persons who have skills of immediate relevance to society in fairly exceptional cases [16]. More restrictive entry policies in general however, will most probably be accompanied by policies aimed at dealing more quickly and effectively with requests for asylum and with a practise of deporting without delay those whose request have been denied [16]. In such restrictive trends, for the majority of migrant flows a negative effect is to be expected.

Very important in the context of a scenario of increasing restrictive immigration policies is an expected increase in illegal migration caused by the fact that the existence
of "illegals" is a function of the system of immigration control. Much however, will depend on stricter border controls against all forms of illegal immigration [13] and the extent to which and the way in which bringing in or aiding illegal migrants will be punishable [16].

A scenario of a non (or less) restrictive admission policy at the end of individual nation-states in all (or apart of the) European states is less probable. Taking the above described internal trends into account, such a scenario would only have a higher chance of becoming reality, if groups for an "open Europe" - like, for example, councils of churches or international aid organizations - will receive significant more attention and get a stronger position in the international and national political arenas [13, 16].

In a second step we will now focus attention on immigration policies in respect to international migration within Western Europe. As already mentioned in the context of the Schengen Agreement, the trends in international migration within Western Europe can mainly be characterized by an opposite picture, namely increasing freedom to migrate within the West European states. The European Single Act specifies that the circulation of EC nationals should be completely free within the borders of the European Community since January 1st, 1993. In addition to such institutional processes which will influence intra-EC migration, there are also agreements under way which are being negotiated between the EC countries on the one side and the EFTA countries on the other. Switzerland, for example, has indicated that some compromise regarding privileged entrance of nationals of the EC and the other EFTA countries should be possible [13]. The question however, is which effects the disappearance of the controls on the common borders will have on international migration within Western Europe.

One scenario which seems at first sight rather plausible is that with the freedom to move within Western Europe international migration within this region will increase. Penninx and Muus [14] expect that the migration of entrepreneurs and company - linked migrant workers - particularly of more highly specialized employees - will increase once the legal and practical impediments, which in the past often formed a barrier, have disappeared within an integrated EC.

As a special aspect it might be added that "sun-belt" migration of pensioners and persons with private income within the "twelve" could also certainly increase in scale, if legal and practical restrictions would be removed within the EC [14].

Another scenario however is according to historical experiences more likely: no further increase in migration within Western Europe due to an increasing freedom to move within Western Europe. Seeking for lessons from the past an interesting example may be mentioned here. In analyzing population movements within the European Community for the period 1968-1972 Böhnig [27] shows that the effect of the introduction of free movement of labour on international migration was not very significant. Rather the extent of observed exchanges was primarily linked to demand and to the economic climate. 'Regulations for freedom of movements of labour do not seem to provide 'enough freedom' to cause strong migratory movements based exclusively on push-factors, while they do provide enough 'freedom' to allow pull-factors to work at times of economic growth and increasing strains on the labour market, or at least on parts of it" [14, p.376].

As an additional specific case the special admission policy of Germany towards ethnic Germans living mostly in the Central and Eastern Europe might be mentioned. Further immigration into the Community of large numbers of the estimated 3 million or so people of German descendence living in the East can be expected in the future [2].
(2) Third countries

Assuming that Western Europe's future is mainly affected by immigration from outside, it is important to look at policies in third countries and their impacts on migration, with a particular view on emigration restrictions in the countries of origin, particularly Eastern and Central Europe and the developing countries.

In general, it may be noticed that most countries from which people would like to emigrate do not restrict exit, in contrast - as illustrated above - to countries to which people would like to go.\footnote{Zolberg [23] even comes to the conclusion that it is finally the policy of the potential receivers who determine whether a movement can take place and of what kind.}

In the case of Eastern or Central Europe, the present time is - and perhaps also the future seems to be - different. The USSR exemplifies a situation to prevent emigration at a larger scale by making the costs involved to be entitled to be issued a passport three to four times as high as a standard monthly wage. The freedom in principle to move is therefore losing appeal. As a very probable scenario, van de Kaa [16] addresses especially in the case of the USSR a trend of a continuing restrictive emigration policy: "assuming that the [predicted] unemployed would include proportionally large numbers of new entrants on the labour market it is difficult to believe that the USSR would let them go" [16, p.97]. Such an scenario obviously would lead to a negative effect or at least to no further increase on international immigration into Western Europe.

A more unlikely scenario of a more liberal emigration policy in this special case might lead to an increase or at least status quo of international migration into Western Europe.

Hoffmann-Nowotny [13] stresses one more important aspect, namely that the former Soviet satellites will in the medium run apply for full membership of the EC. If full membership were granted unconditionally, Hoffmann-Nowotny draws the scenario of East West migration streams at least comparable in size to those from Europe's South to the North in the sixties.

In respect to the developing countries we only want to add the note that it is very unlikely that they will go towards a more restrictive emigration policy. In this respect no limitations on potential immigration flows into (Western) Europe can be expected.

Before changing our level of analysis to the meso level, we will look at trends in two more fields, notably transport and communication, and environment.

3.2.5 Transport and Communication

Personal mobility in terms of total distance travelled has more than doubled in Western Europe between 1960 and 1990. The expected substitution of physical travel by the introduction of computer networks however has not yet materialized. It seems much more that latest developments in communications also lend to an increase of the demand for face-to-face-contacts [18].

Even when this trends at a first sight may not affect international migration, the migration literature [28] tells us that travel contacts are of importance for international migration, for instance, given the fact that travellers communicate information about potential countries of destination or that travellers can be characterized as bridgeheads for further migration streams. Therefore an increase in travelling might indirectly result in a positive effect on international migration into Western Europe.
In a broader context of transport and communication, a general trend in the past towards cheaper and faster transport and communication can be observed. These developments, accompanied by the design of a trans-European infrastructure network [2] might have a positive effect on the migration of entrepreneurs and people in the service of international companies. In terms of numbers however, these migration streams are not significant.

A continuation of the above mentioned trends - parallel to the internationalisation - could also have a negative effect on international migration within Europe. The reason for this can be found in the fact that faster and cheaper transport and communication does not make it necessary anymore to migrate; it will increasingly be the case that the action space of entrepreneurs and businessmen is growing.

Faster and less expensive communication and transport to and from developing countries may induce a higher immigration, indirectly also caused by the fact that information about Western Europe is reaching potential migrants in developing countries.

3.2.6 Environment

In general background trends in environment tend to play a minor role in analyzing international migration. Trends in environment are seldom in the context of analyzing the future of international migration. Nevertheless, we may mention here one scenario pointed out by Straubhaar and Zimmermann [15]. According to the authors, ecological refugees will become more and more important in the future. Due to some ecological damages in Eastern Europe (like e.g., Tshernobyl), some people will lose their natural base of survival what urges them to leave their actual place of living.

An other scenario refers to a further destruction of the environment in developing countries relating in particular to the changes induced by unusually fast climatic changes including global warming [29]. This could lead to a positive effect on international migration out of these countries [16].

A scenario of an improving the environmental situation in the developing world could at least take away the immigration pressure caused by environmental destruction.

But it is obvious that especially these background trends and their impacts on migration cannot be significant without taking other - in the context of international migration - much more important background trends into account.

As a conclusion of this subsection we want to summarize the trends, which we have characterized as the most probable ones, and their impacts on international migration in the following Table 7.

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17 If we talk about cheaper transport and communication, we refer mainly to cheaper mass transport and communication.
18 It should be mentioned that especially in the field of telecommunication, new developments in information technology offer many benefits in terms of the spatial integration of the Community [2].
### Table 7

Most likely major trends and their impacts on international migration within, into and out of Western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Regional Division</th>
<th>Trends</th>
<th>Impacts on¹⁹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration into Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Ageing population; growth financed social security. Further rapidly growing population.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Increasing or at least stable gap between affluent regions and nonaffluent regions. Increased demand in skilled labour and no further demand in unskilled labour. Disruption of the existing system will cause (in the short run) severe unemployment and reduction in the standard of living. On their way to market economies: demand for entrepreneurs and experts. Increasing economic differences between developing countries and the developed countries of Western Europe.</td>
<td>+⁴²⁰,⁴²¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Third countries</td>
<td>Political upheavals and internal conflicts will continue.</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁹ "+": increasing immigration; "-": decreasing immigration; "0": no effect on migration.

²⁰ Effect on skilled labour.

²¹ Effect on unskilled labour.
### Table 7 (continued)

Most likely major trends and their impacts on international migration within, into and out of Western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Regional Division</th>
<th>Trends</th>
<th>Impacts on22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration into Western Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Policies</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>More restrictive immigration policies for migrants from outside Europe with the exception of skilled labour. Increasing freedom to move within Western Europe. (Indirect) more restrictive emigration policies to avoid a big exodus.</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Former) UdSSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport/Communication</td>
<td>worldwide</td>
<td>Faster and in a way cheaper transport and communication.</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Developing countries Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Further destruction of the environment. Further ecological damages.</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3 The Meso Level

#### 3.3.1 Social Networks

Besides macro-trends, international migration streams are, as international migration theory - particularly approaches relating to the systems approach [17] - and empirical studies24 point out, strongly influenced by social networks. The importance of the networks has already been pointed out in Section 2 of this paper, referring to the fact that family migration is one of the main migration streams in the most recent past and the present time.

(1) Western Europe

The impact of social networks on international migration within Western Europe means in the most cases migration which is - with some time delay - accompanied by movements of families. The development of social networks however, will to a

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22 "+": increasing immigration; "-": decreasing immigration; "0": no effect on migration.
23 Effect on illegal migration.
24 The role of social networks in the international migration process, e.g., from Turks to Sweden or from Portuguese migrants to France is illustrated and analyzed by Engelbrektsson [30] and Boisvert [31] respectively.
large extent depend on migration flows caused by other reasons, like e.g. economically-motivated migration. If in the cause of future unification of Western Europe - as assumed in one of the above scenarios - the migration of entrepreneurs and the one of company-linked migrants will increase, than this will most probable, be accompanied by movements of families [14].

(2) **Third Countries**

In the context of **Central and Eastern Europe**, the assessment of the direction and size of immigration streams as a result of social networks between Western and Central respectively Eastern Europe requires a look on national communities of Eastern and Central European countries in Western Europe. Sizeable communities of Czech - Slovaks exist in Germany, France, Austria and Switzerland. In Western Europe sizeable Hungarian communities now also exist in Germany and France, while also most other countries count a few thousand Hungarians amongst their population. Other Polish communities of several thousands exist in France, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. Almost all European countries report increasing numbers of Rumanians seeking political asylum. These trends may in due course lead to an exodus, due to family reunification of considerable size in comparison to its total population. The recent flows of people from Eastern Europe are likely to be a source for further immigration for the purpose of family reunification [16]. Nevertheless van de Kaa stress the fact that East Europeans are relatively to other non-EC migrants still small in number and that therefore for the time being the phenomenon of family reunification will not generate significant new migration streams.

In contrast to the relatively small number of East Europeans, the number of Yugoslavs and Turks is relatively high [16]. The tendency of their existing communities in Western Europe towards chain migration might be dependent of a variety of factors. Especially for the case of France, Hoffmann-Nowotny [13] remarks that an increase in immigration consisting mainly of North African and Turkish immigrants is expected due to family migration. For the case of the Netherlands e.g., he predicts the contrary a decrease in family migration, because of an increasing group of potential marriage candidates of the same ethnic group in the Netherlands and secondly because of the fact that an increasing number of Turks (and Moroccans) who are born in the Netherlands will marry Dutch partners.

Also in relation to the developing countries, the existing patterns of migration form an indication for future inflows. These patterns suggest a continuing pressure from the Maghreb countries of North Africa (particularly from Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria). These pressures are expected to be directed towards France and to a lesser extent, Belgium and the Netherlands [2].

### 4. **Conclusion**

The presentation of past and present trends in international migration gives us a first hint concerning possible future trends in international migration. Analyzing different more or less plausible developments in various fields affecting international migration however, indicates more important information what can be expected in respect of future European migration flows.

At the end of our discussion the question may be asked: What do the scenarios reveal? A few findings need to be highlighted.
Referring to the summation of the most likely major trends and their impacts on international migration within, into and out of Western Europe the majority of "pluses" in the last three columns of Table 7 let us conclude that in general the developments in most of the fields lead to an increasing immigration into Western Europe. Nearly only trends in migration policies seems to have a "negative effect" on immigration into Western Europe. However the effect of more restrictive immigration policies should not be overestimated. It is therefore not amazing that all Western European countries expect further immigration, despite restrictive immigration policies and discouraging measures and despite the fact that by now none of them views itself as an immigration country in the stricter sense of the word.

Based on trends towards more restrictive immigration policies however a trend towards more illegal migrants which are increasingly replacing "regular work" migration is most likely to be observed.

For former European socialist countries there are clear indications that they will increasingly become emigration countries, and that migrants from these countries will be in competition with migrants from developing countries. From developing countries the flows of asylum seekers will most likely increase.

Even when we do not discuss the quantification of future trends it should be mentioned that compared to the migration potential from the outside, the intra-EC migration potential is modest and will hardly increase fast. Asking which Western European country will be most likely the most important and attractive immigration country one might find the answer in Germany.

It can be summarized, that the future of international migration in Western Europe will be a question of selective immigration for which a refined admission and selection system will doubtless be developed.

It is obvious that there are some more interesting aspects, which should be taken into account talking about scenarios of Western European migration in a much broader context than we do it in our paper. In general a country specific analysis - like for example Hoffmann-Nowotny [13] does it - is required. On the other side the difficult topic of a quantification of the future migration flows (see e.g., [16]) would be very interesting, but on the other hand connected with much more uncertainty than our very global scenarios.

It should also not be unmentioned, that there are some more general aspects like the question concerning return migration, or the emigration pressures into Eastern Europe, which we did not discussed. However, they could be the issue of future research.

After describing one "most likely scenario", we want to end up with an interesting - so far not mentioned - proposal, pointed out by Straubhaar and Zimmermann [15]. They make the suggestion of an external EC immigration policy, that aims at a General Agreement on Migration policy. Within such an international framework - according to the authors - the efficiency of a worldwide reallocation of labour is more likely to be reached than in a situation with national labour markets.

But the net effect of international immigration into Europe is as Börsch-Supan [32] shows for Germany not necessarily negative. In his analysis migration is shown to alleviate the burden of dependency by shifting the strains to years with lower dependency ratios.
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