Voting on the Use of Armed Force: Challenges of Data Indexing, Classification, and the Value of a Comparative Agenda

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ABSTRACT

Connecting to recent debates on the party politics of foreign policy and political contestation, the chapter introduces the content and methodology of the Parliamentary Deployment Votes Database, a collection of votes on military missions across a set of eleven countries in Europe and America. The chapter discusses problems related to the scope of the database against divergent cultures

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of national security, voting practices in parliaments, and disparate data availability; namely defining guidelines for data collection. It discusses how clustering into party families and cabinets helps structure collected data, how regional parties are classified, and how to make further sense of data using voting-shares, cabinets, and government-opposition dynamics. The chapter also shows how Hix, Nouri and Roland’s Agreement Index, used in European Studies, can be used to measure agreement and dissent on military missions. Empirically, the chapter corroborates recent research demonstrating that party politics underlie deployment votes.

**Keywords:** foreign policy, military missions, parliament, political parties, cabinets

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**Introduction**

Contemporary politics is characterized by an increasing *politicization* (Zürn 2014), be it in the realm of domestic, international, or regional politics, such as within the European Union (Hooghe and Marks 2009). In European states, as well as in Canada and the United States, the aftermath of the financial crisis, the fight against Islamic terrorism, the inflow of refugees from Syria and elsewhere, and the (related) rise of populist movements and politicians (Mudde 2004; Müller 2016; Poier, Saywald-Wedl, and Unger 2017) have generated political climates that challenge both the domestic foundations of economic and cultural liberalism and the acceptance of globalization (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2018, online first). On the international level, the global liberal order, its institutions, and multilateral diplomacy are subject to severe stress, unilateralist temptation, and decay (Kagan 2018; Posen 2018). Although some might call these developments systemic, they represent the aggregated result of states’ foreign policies whose governments are subject to the aforementioned processes of politicization. Our general argument is, quite simply, that this politicization matters and that we should examine it more deeply with regard to foreign policy.

The field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has long rejected the idea that *politics stops at the water’s edge*. FPA scholars investigate the impact of domestic politics on foreign policies from a variety of theoretical perspectives (for an overview see Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley 2013). Yet, with the exception of Rathbun (2004), attention has only recently turned toward an analysis of the role of ideology and party-positions on foreign policy (Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014; Plagemann and Destradi 2018 (online first); Verbeek and Zaslove 2017), particularly in the field of security. When it comes to military deployments, large parts of existing scholarship
adopt a single-case perspective that highlights national particularities (e.g. Böller and Müller 2018; Fonck and Reykers 2018; Kaarbo and Kenealy 2016; Mello 2017) rather than engaging with the topic in a comparative manner. Recent work by Mello (2014), Mello and Peters (2018) or Wagner et al. (2017, 2018) has started, however, to look at broader and comparative patterns of contestation of foreign policy among parties, breaking with the ideas that foreign policy imposes consensus across parties and security threats necessarily create a rally around the flag-effect (Mueller 1970; Eichenberg, Stoll, and Lebo 2006). Against the backdrop of contemporary politicization both inside and outside political institutions, we can expect that contestation of security policies will also increase in parliament and parties. This means that we build on the parliamentary research agenda that is already well developed (overview in Raunio 2014; Raunio and Wagner 2017) and also further develop the party-political research agenda.

This chapter contributes to this research area in two ways. First, we present new data on voting on military missions from the Parliamentary Deployment Votes Database’s (PDVD) version #2 dataset now encompassing 514 deployment votes between 1990 and 2017 from eleven countries: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In an effort at including more countries, the current version of the dataset covers not only major and middle powers (U.S.; France, Germany, UK), but also countries with varying cultures of national security (Katzenstein 1996; Britz 2016). These cultures reach from interventionist ones (France, UK, U.S.) to states reticent toward the use of force (Germany); states with strongly parliamentary, semi-presidential (France), or presidential (U.S.) constitutional systems; and countries with older or younger democratic legacies and patterns of authoritarianism in the 20th century. The recorded votes in these states reflect the trend of increasing liberal-democratic interventionism since the 1990s. Thus, they provide “an opportunity to observe the revealed preferences of elites” (Milner and Tingley 2015, 129), and, by virtue of the central role of parties in liberal-democratic politics, an inroad into understanding the party politics of foreign policy. The dataset provides raw data on voting practices on three levels: plenary-vote data for parliament as a whole, party-vote data, and family-cabinet data. These three sources will be used to show patterns and drivers of contestation across the eleven countries, their ideological spread, and government-opposition dynamics. Second, the chapter discusses the methodological and methodical challenges involved in constructing the dataset, reflecting on several issues, including cultures of national security and parliaments’ role therein, existing record and its accessibility, and party, mission, and vote classifications. We will also explain in detail the
transfer of Hix, Nouri and Roland’s (2005) Agreement Index from the European Parliament to our data.

The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section discusses challenges to a comparative agenda when researching party politics and foreign policy, especially military missions, while proposing and discussing the Agreement Index as a measurement of contestation in parliaments. The chapter then puts issues of data availability into perspective and suggests practical steps to set up a comparative research agenda. After these methods and methodology-focused sections, the chapter presents insights from comparative research into deployment votes on the level of parties, party families, and government-opposition dynamics, with continued attention to methodological issues throughout the empirical analyses. Ultimately, the chapter argues that a comparative research agenda on the party politics of foreign policy is promising despite challenges on the methods and data side, and it argues that a scholarly consensus is emerging around evidence for party politics in the field of deployment votes.

Parliaments in Security and Defense Policy: Challenges to a Comparative Agenda and the Measurement of Contestation

Researching parliaments’ role in security and defense policies comparatively, yet establishing a voting database as PDVD does, is difficult because parliaments’ role in foreign policy varies considerably. Traditionally, foreign policy – and security and defense even more so – belong to the realm of executive prerogatives that endow governments with large room for maneuver in conducting diplomacy and coercive action. Except for a formal declaration of war, which is usually parliaments’ right but rendered futile in the face of contemporary conflict politics, some parliaments, such as in Australia, Belgium, Greece, or the UK, hardly ever get the chance to vote on deployments. In these cases, the constitutions vest chief executives both with the right to send forces abroad whenever they deem fit and the freedom to search parliamentary approval, or not, for this action (Fonck and Reykers 2018; Mello 2017; Strong 2018). At an intermediate level of influence, through the 1973 War Powers Resolution, the U.S. Congress has formal information rights, it votes on deployments after 60 to 90 days, and it can withhold funding for missions through its power of the purse. The law suffers, however, from vague formulations and does not fundamentally constrain the executive (e.g. Howell and Pevehouse 2007). A similar case is the French one, where the president has full authority to send troops abroad but according to Article 35 of the French Constitution, presidents must ask both chambers of
parliament to approve the mission when it exceeds four months (Ostermann 2017). The Czech government also has to seek parliamentary approval for every deployment that exceeds 60 days. The Italian parliament’s competences are extremely ambiguous (Mello 2014, 78; Peters and Wagner 2011). Formally, it enjoys very strong powers (Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall 2010) but in practice the executive has often bypassed the constitutional veto on military operations abroad, deploying troops without its consent.

Going much further, other states endow parliament with far-reaching rights as to defense issues. Thus, parliaments in Denmark, Germany, Italy, or Spain must approve missions prior to deployment (in Spain only since 2002). The German case, for instance, is deeply affected by the country’s historical legacy of war-proneness and dictatorship, resulting in a culture of military self-restraint and substantial parliamentary involvement (e.g. Duffield 1998). These differences notwithstanding, as Figure 1 shows, deployment votes have proliferated since the end of the Cold War across the countries under study to produce a vast body of data than can be used to tap into party-voting, procedural aspects, and executive-legislative relations more broadly speaking (Mello 2014; Saideman and Auerswald 2012). The votes reflect the trend of increasing liberal-democratic interventionism since the 1990s with several votes on the high-intensity interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo and many votes on Afghanistan and Iraq but also low-intensity security management missions in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Darfur (UNAMID), Mali (MINUSMA and EUTM) and others in the 2000s and 2010s.

Figure 1: Number of Deployment Votes over Time (all chambers) 1990-2017
Different constitutional dispositions and role-distributions also lead to vastly different ways parliaments deal with security and defense issues once they are up for a vote. The French National Assembly and Senate, for instance, simply vote on a mission-specific declaration of government. In the German case, the Bundestag and its committees are involved in all aspects of foreign policy strategy and action through a Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz (Parliamentary Participation Law). When it votes on missions, the Bundestag approves a concrete mandate, changes, or extends it, usually every twelve months (Wagner 2017). Slovakia’s National Council votes in a similar fashion, but debate about deployments is often located outside the chamber. The Czech Chamber of Deputies and the Senate often hold bundle-votes on several missions that make it hard for lawmakers or parties to raise substantial concerns on one mission only. In Italy, additional re-financing votes used to be passed for specific or multiple missions, sometimes occurring several times a year. The Comprehensive Law no. 145 2016, however, changed this practice to yearly refinancing votes that bundle specific missions in a package. The Spanish Cortes increasingly votes in committee, particularly in case of renewal of an existing operation. Thus, parliamentary involvement not only relies on different constitutional dispositions and traditions, but it also varies in ways parliaments and parties (can) deal with a mission once it is up for a vote.

It is our belief that these differences and peculiarities should not hinder a comparative agenda. Although deployment votes might be of different nature and number across countries, a comparative agenda strengthens our understanding of foreign policy in several ways. First, it allows for creating a knowledge-base on types and patterns of parliamentary involvement in security and defense issues – i.e. hot military action – that reveals both common features and differences. Second, by virtue of this, deployment-vote research contributes to the research of legislative-executive relations in military policies broadly speaking. And third, such study enables us to disentangle culture-specific factors from ideology-driven/related explanations that cut across cases. In doing so, a comparative agenda contributes to causal analysis in Elster’s sense of explaining interaction (Elster 1983, 25ff., 84) while transcending the accumulation of – valid and equally relevant – case-level knowledge. Further below, we will also make the point that cabinet-averages enable us to compare divergent situations across countries.

The fact that parliaments vote on missions and, therefore, that parties must position themselves on mission-related issues, a mission as a whole, or a precise mandate means that the decisions are principally open to party-political contestation. Although common wisdom holds
that citizens are not that interested in foreign policy as they are, for instance, in domestic issues (Boix 2007; Lipset and Rokkan 1967), there are numerous votes on military deployments that have become salient to the public and strongly politicized. This happened, for example, in U.S. politicians’ voting behavior on the Iraq War (Böller 2017), in British House of Commons debates about Syria (Kaarbo and Kenealy 2016), and in the German participation in the Kosovo War in 1999. Danish participation in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the Iraq War have also been debated vividly in public and, as a result of parliamentary pressure, led to extensive scrutiny (Mariager and Wivel 2019). The decision to conduct a mission generates public attention, especially with the specter of hot action and casualties rising. Therefore, it induces the executive and lawmakers to ponder arguments in favor or against operations carefully. Furthermore, as previous work has revealed and the below analysis demonstrates, these situations are characterized by genuine, party-political and ideological arguments and dissent.

Although parliaments have typically endorsed government proposals to send troops (with a few notable exceptions5), party contestation often underlies this approval. One way to grasp contestation over deployment is to measure agreement levels. Hix, Nouriy and Roland (2005) developed a similar approach to gauge party cohesion in roll-call votes in the European Parliament, with their Agreement Index. The precise formula is

\[ AI_i = \frac{\max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\} - \frac{1}{2} [Y_i + N_i + A_i] - \max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\]}{Y_i + N_i + A_i} \]

. The AI equals 1 when all MPs vote together and it equals 0 when they are equally divided between the voting options. This index has become an established measure to assess the unity of groups within legislatures – these groups are mostly political parties, but in studies of the European Parliament, groups can be MEPs from the same country. With the exception of some previous work (Wagner et al. 2018), the AI has not been used to measure degrees of consensus within a parliament as a whole, most likely because the recording of individual votes already is a sign of contestation; uncontroversial parliamentary decisions are often adopted without the time-consuming recording of individual votes. Moreover, parliaments differ enormously in the ways they vote, with some often recording votes and others doing so only rarely (Saalfeld 1995). Hence, recorded votes may be a very unrepresentative sample of all votes in a parliament (Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug 2008). Yet for the purposes of this project, the AI allows assessment of the degree of dissent on mission votes.

Figure 2 shows the average degree of contestation of all deployment votes, as captured by the AI, per country. The figure demonstrates that contestation varies across the countries in
the PDVD dataset: it is highest in the U.S. and lowest in Spain. The high degree of contestation in the US seems in line with traditional expectations of low party discipline and high levels of independence of individual members of Congress. A closer look at our data reveals, however, that the opposition party in Congress casts most dissenting votes. This observation confirms more recent studies on the increasing partisan division in Congress, which also extends to votes on military interventions (see Hildebrandt et al. 2013, 245). Differences among European countries are more difficult to explain by institutional features of the political system. Instead, they seem to reflect differences in political culture, which in some cases include a strong commitment to cross-party consensus in foreign and security policy and a much weaker commitment in others.8

![Figure 2: Average Agreement Index (AI) of Deployment Votes](image)

### Defining Missions and Units of Analysis

In addition to measuring (dis)agreement, a comparative methodology must also deal with the predicament that missions are of very different type. Some deployments in our dataset are high-intensity combat missions, such as the wars in Kosovo, Iraq, or Libya, while others are low-intensity, civil-military EU security management missions (EUPOL, EUTM) or UN
peacekeeping deployments. Yet others rather focus on combatting terrorism. Accordingly, some missions are mandated by the UN Security Council while others are not or do not need such mandates. One can reasonably argue that these various mission-types influence the way parties position themselves. At the same time, classification of a mission may itself be political. Critics of a specific mission, for example, may be driven by an alternative worldview that they bring to the political process. Any classification would therefore necessarily privilege a worldview – i.e. the one of the researcher classifying a mission as humanitarian or offensive – that might clash with and obscure (conflicting) perceptions in politics. While we agree that researchers usually do and must make these calls for research purposes and for structuring reality, we argue that these choices must be made consciously while pondering implications for the research of party politics and ideology. Our data show, that party-political contestation occurs across mission-types (see also Wagner et al. 2018, 546, 557). For future research, the advantage of disaggregating these votes further increases with the number of votes and countries covered, allowing for larger-n analyses. At the end of the day, we posit that disaggregating mission-types further depends on the particular research question and the specific methodological choices any scholar must make when designing research.

Another issue to consider concerns units of analysis and disciplinary standards. When setting up the project and using the database for a first time, some of us originally worked with legislatures’ tenures as temporal delimiter. While this worked well for understanding the general pattern of party-political contestation on both the party and parliamentary level, we realized that with the increasing number of countries and votes joining the database, using cabinets as unit of analysis was the better choice. Whereas it is possible that legislature, cabinet duration, and the term of a specific chief executive are the same, problems of data presentation and interpretation emerge when they are not. For instance, in Belgium, there can be a considerable gap between legislatures and cabinets because of long periods of government formation due to Belgium’s linguistic-administrative federalism; thus, aggregating votes from caretaker and normal cabinet-periods could be misleading. Slovakia’s Direction party changed partisan positions after moving to the government for the first time, and remained consistently pro-deployment since. Hence, moving in and out of government potentially changes the party-politics of foreign policy. On the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that parties behave the same way during a cabinet’s term as cabinets clearly define government-opposition roles and dynamics. Therefore, in this project, we follow the Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov, see Döring and Manow 2018) cabinet coding to achieve more consistency and validity in the data.  

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Cabinets are also a useful unit for normalizing data. One consequence of the vastly differing voting practices described above is a highly uneven distribution of deployment votes across countries in our dataset. As Figure 3 shows, Germany alone accounts for 33% of all votes (n_all=514), and five of eleven countries account for 88% of all deployment votes in our dataset. At the other extreme, Belgium and the UK account for about 1% of the votes each. These numbers demonstrate that some sort of normalization between countries is necessary to compare data, and cabinets are a useful unit for this.

![Number of cases [votes] (all chambers)](image)

**Figure 3: Number of Cases [votes] (all chambers)**

A final pragmatic choice was made about how to analyze parliamentary votes in differing parliamentary systems. Our dataset combines both uni and bicameral parliamentary systems. Yet although states may have bicameral systems, in Belgium, Germany, and Spain, for instance, the upper chambers have no say in military deployments. The Czech, Italian, French, and U.S. Senates, however, do vote on missions. In France, in case of dissenting opinions between the two chambers, the lower chamber can overrule the higher chamber’s vote. Against this background, we follow disciplinary standards and use lower-chamber votes only when calculating cabinet or cabinet-party family averages for avoiding distortion. We collected data on
- the date of each vote;
- the parties in government at the time of the vote;
- the cabinet in office;
- the chamber in which the vote took place;
- the mission in question;
- the total number of votes cast/in favor/against/abstaining;
- yes and no-vote shares (all on vote, party, and cabinet level);
- the AI (family level); and
- the government-opposition status of parties and party families during cabinets.\textsuperscript{12}

Whenever possible, we collected data on specific votes by party and party family, with almost complete data availability from the 2000s onward.\textsuperscript{13}

In the remainder of this chapter, we introduce the PDVD version #2 dataset in more depth and present some basic descriptive statistics of its two more levels of aggregation (beyond the parliament level): individual parties and party families. These different levels of aggregation are useful for different research questions. Some scholars will be more interested in the disaggregation of data on the level of individual parties, whereas others might take an interest in the level of party families in order to compare developments across countries with divergent party systems and, for instance, more than one party per family presenting itself to the electorate. In any case, the PDVD database’s main added value is the inclusion of data from eleven liberal democracies, which will facilitate and stimulate the comparative study of military missions. For the purpose of this book’s methodical enterprise, we will discuss methods and methodological issues throughout our empirical analyses.

The Level of Individual Parties: Water’s Edge But...

The PDVD \textit{party-votes} dataset provides data on the voting behavior of 141 political parties in individual votes. The party-vote, i.e. the voting behavior of a particular party in a particular vote, is the unit of analysis. The dataset provides data for 2682 cases (i.e. combinations of a party and a vote). The party-votes dataset also provides the basis for the \textit{party-family-cabinet} dataset (see next section). The number of parties is distributed very unevenly across the countries under study, ranging from two in the U.S. to more than twenty in Italy. Occasionally, political parties merge, split or rename, raising the question whether the new party should be treated as a distinct case or as a continuation of its predecessor. Our dataset follows the coding
of the *Comparative Manifesto Project* (CMP), i.e. we treat a party as a distinct entry when the CMP assigns a new ID to it and otherwise consider it a continuation of its predecessor. In all coding issues across the project, however, final coding decisions were made by country experts (in dialogue with the project leaders) who are best qualified to judge parties’ developments, and, for instance, their ideological leaning when it comes to family categorization. For parties not included in the CMP, the country experts involved in this project made the necessary classifications.

The party-vote level of the dataset will be most useful for future studies of party politics and military deployments in individual countries. The histogram in Figure 4 shows that the most-frequent voting behavior of the 140 parties is unanimous (46.3%) or close-to-unanimous support and the second-most common voting behavior is total absence of support (22%), either by voting against or by abstaining. Notably, in less than a third of the 2682 cases members of the same party did not vote the same way. This indicates a high degree of party discipline, as expected in parliamentary systems. Nevertheless, the considerable number of (near to) absolute opposition to deployments shows clearly, too, that politics is involved when voting on military missions. Thus, the data qualifies the concept of a *water’s edge*-effect: parties vote highly consistently in favor of missions but contestation clearly exists. What drives this contestation? We turn next to examining the ideological dimension of these results and introduce the aggregate level of party families and cabinets.

*Figure 4: Frequencies of Shares of Yes-Votes*
The Clear and Present Relevance of Ideology: Average Voting by Party Families per Cabinet

PDVD also provides average data on the level of party families per cabinet. These data are most useful for comparisons across countries because aggregation into cabinet-averages reduces the uneven distribution of cases across countries. Without any doubt, these family-cabinet data are the avenue that can be exploited most for analyzing the party-politics of deployment votes. We take cabinets as a basic structuring principle because, with the exception of the U.S., the position of parties in either government or opposition remains stable during such a term. In distinguishing cabinets, we follow ParlGov that records a new cabinet whenever there was I) a change in the set of parties holding cabinet membership; (II) a change of the prime minister; (III) a general election or (IV) any substantively meaningful resignation. The only case that does not entirely fit these criteria is the U.S., which is not covered by ParlGov. Here, we equal cabinet with presidential term, being well aware of the shifting congressional majorities (including periods of divided government). Again, as mentioned above and in rare instances only, we deviate from ParlGov where country experts advise to do so.\(^\text{16}\) In a similar spirit, when merging parties into ideological families, the CMP classification has been our point of departure but country experts were free to amend these classifications as they deem fit either in accordance with their own judgment on the party’s ideological leaning, or regarding changes in this leaning over time occurring, for instance, due to party mergers. Additionally, country experts recoded regionalist parties with national representation into one of the other families, based on the identification of their ideological leanings, leading to a more inclusive and ideologically coherent dataset.

At this level, as Figure 5 shows, the dataset includes 389 cases (i.e. party families with recorded votes during distinct cabinet terms). For each case, the average number of yes, no and abstention-votes per party family and cabinet has been recorded. To be sure, this dataset is also skewed with Italy accounting for 27\% of the cases. However, the five countries with the smallest number of cases together account for approximately 21\% – in contrast to approximately 8,5\% share of the cases on the votes and party-vote levels. The differences in voting practices across countries make it impossible to overcome this skewedness of the data but the aggregation into averages per party family and cabinet minimizes the skewedness and thus facilitates comparisons across countries.
Figure 5 and the corresponding ANOVA analysis (Table 1) show that the average share of no-votes across party families is U-shaped: no-votes are very common among radical-left parties, still frequent among green parties and not uncommon among social-democratic parties. They are seldom among liberal, Christian-democratic and conservative parties but become more frequent again among radical-right parties. Thus, the larger version #2 of the dataset confirms the results of the smaller sample from the previous version. Parties systematically contest deployment votes in accordance with their ideological leanings. The, upon visual inspection, somewhat considerable number of outliers (n=36, showed with cabinet name*) does not alter this conclusion as they only represent about 9% of the overall family-cabinet cases. Many outliers come from the U.S. whose legislative-executive dynamics are not entirely captured by our cabinet-unit of analysis. During the Clinton and Obama presidencies, contestation against military missions stemmed from the Republican Party (which accounts for the outliers on the conservative party family), while Democrats opposed military interventions of Republican presidents – for example, the Iraq intervention in 1991 (see outliers in the socialist party family). Another bunch of deviating family/cabinet-averages stems from Italy, where the party system is highly polarized and majorities are often unstable. Different parties may belong to the same family but find themselves in alternative coalitions. In Finland, the Christian Democrats during
the Vanhanen I and II cabinets voted against the missions for a mixture of reasons, whereas the radical-right True Finns party mostly voted against missions because it wants to better use the money for territorial defense. Finally, UK deployment votes are often highly controversial because prime ministers tend to only submits deployments to parliament when there is some expressed parliamentary or public opposition to the mission. Altogether though, the dataset shows clear differences among party families. Wagner et al. (2018) theorize that these differences can be explained with genuine ideological differences that can be best understood as a classical left-right division of the political spectrum. Thus, parties on the political left, center, or right do not only differ substantially on their positioning on the welfare-state aspect of politics but show similar differences when it comes to foreign policy i.e. its high-politics component, which is military deployments and the related question of the use of armed force.

![Diagram](image.png)

*Figure 6: Average Number of No-Votes per Party Family with Outliers*

Labels refer to cabinets. For instance, Blair II refers to the exceptionally high number of no-votes of MPs from the Liberal Party in the British House of Commons during Blair’s second cabinet.
The Clear and Present Relevance of Government: Other Drivers of Deployment Votes

The ANOVA analysis in Table 1 also shows that all party families have sometimes voted unanimously in favor (0% no-votes) and at other times almost unanimously against deployments (96.7% to 100%). The U-shaped differences between party families that we have seen above can be clearly identified when looking at standard deviations: they are strongest on the Radical Left and somewhat reigned in among Socialists; they flatten considerably toward the ideological center while deviations increase again when reaching the Radical Right, although to a lesser degree than on the opposite extreme.

Table 1: ANOVA Analysis of No-Votes per Party Family and Cabinet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Left</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>98.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Right</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7 shows that – unsurprisingly – this voting behavior is heavily influenced by a party family being in government or in opposition, with limited family/cabinet-outliers from five countries only. The average share of no-votes for party families in the opposition is 36% whereas for parties in government it is 1.8%. However, being in government does not rule out voting against (a government proposal for) a military mission. The radical-left and green parties during Prodi I, for example, voted against deployments to Bosnia and Albania. Backbench dissent from governing parties can also be found in the USA, the UK, Denmark, and Germany. Thus, being in opposition or government is certainly an important driver of political position-
taking on deployment votes but it is far from being the important driver of votes. Taken together, a party’s ideology (as captured by its affiliation with a family) and its position in or out of government are the two main driving forces of its voting behavior. Of course, they may also interact in the sense that parties that have continuously voted against military missions are less likely to become part of a governing coalition whereas parties that have supported deployments even when in opposition are more likely to do so.

![Figure 7: Average Number of No-Votes for Party Families in Government or in Opposition with Outliers during Specific Cabinets](image)

**Figure 7:** Average Number of No-Votes for Party Families in Government or in Opposition with Outliers during Specific Cabinets

**Conclusion**

The *Parliamentary Deployment Votes Database* (PDVD) is an ongoing project with the ambition to provide regular updates on the countries already covered and to include data from additional countries whenever possible. While contributing data that is useful for students of Foreign Policy Analysis and international security who are interested in the democratic politics
of foreign policy decision-making and legislative-executive relations more generally, the project also aims at driving further the methodical discussion on using a comparative approach for investigating the party politics of foreign policy, with a special emphasis on security and defense issues. The broader idea is also that proving the existence of party politics in the highly sensitive field of military deployment is an argument for expecting party politics also matter in less sensitive foreign policy areas, such as in diplomacy, trade, or development aid.

As discussed above, the compilation of deployment votes has demonstrated that there is no such thing as ready-made data, or at least not always. First of all, different cultures of national security, deriving constitutional/legal dispositions, and jurisprudence determine how often parliaments vote on military missions – if they vote at all – when they do that (ex-ante/ex-post), and what exactly they are voting on (declarations of government, precise mandates, funding, or extensions). Second, voting practices, record-keeping and data-availability differ considerably across countries and parliaments. Data availability and format have considerable consequences for retrieval work and the workload required to process the data; this also affects the attainable depth of analysis. In some cases, for example, we may only be able to measure contestation on the level of parliament as a whole if individual or at least group-voting data are unavailable. This chapter has shown, however, that constructing an agreement index can help us estimate the degree of contestation on deployments, especially when comparing it to other parliamentary business (see Wagner et al. 2018). Finally, another aspect and – at the same time – resolve is the use of existing datasets’ expertise, such as the Comparative Manifesto Project’s party classifications or ParlGov’s cabinet data but also the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (beginning with Steenbergen and Marks 2007). These datasets help settle cross-national classification issues but also give country experts’ crucial discretion to decide differently in order to maintain validity. We are convinced that rigorous data collection and experts’ informed judgment go hand in hand; we cannot – and should not – avoid the latter.

It is our belief that despite the challenges discussed in this chapter, it is worthwhile and promising to construct datasets on military deployments that help us investigating party politics. Against the background of country-specific predicaments as, for instance, executive stability or the degree of political fragmentation of a party system, which will differ the stronger the more the database grows, we suggest that aggregating votes on the level of party families and cabinets is a reliable and valid avenue to achieve normalization and meaningful comparability. Further research might also tap into comparing patterns of contestation across different time periods or distinguish mission-types and contextual aspects for analysis. This becomes methodologically
easier the larger the dataset is but also has trade-offs in terms of imposing meaning. We think, however, that disentangling the votes further along these lines and examining the relevance of a Security Council mandate, differences between first and later mission votes, or differences in intensity levels is are promising avenues for future research.

The analyses presented in this chapter are made possible by the *Parliamentary Deployment Vote Dataset* and corroborate recent results that military deployments are subject to party-political contestation and politicization. On the one hand, the votes-data can be used as a measure of politicization of military missions over time and across countries. On the other hand, the party-votes-data can be used to map the policy space in security and defense policy for individual countries while putting the party politics of military interventions in an individual country in a comparative perspective. Although voting behavior may change when parties move in and out of government, the data clearly show the relevance of ideological leanings and are hence a valuable indicator of a country’s likely future deployment practice. At the time of writing this chapter, this is particularly relevant with a view to radical-left and radical-right parties, some of which have gained in strength and entered government. Their past voting record indicates what citizens and allies can expect from these parties in government. Finally, the party-votes and the party-family-cabinet data are useful for studies of the party politics of military interventions (Rathbun 2004; Kaarbo 2012; Mello 2012). Although comparative politics scholars remind us that “democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties” (Schattschneider 1942, 1), political parties have been the “neglected element” (Alden and Aran 2012, 60) in the study of democratic politics and foreign affairs. Therefore, the datasets introduced in this chapter can stimulate comparative studies of political parties and military interventions.

**Bibliography**


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All datasets and accompanying information can be obtained from [www.deploymentvotewatch.eu](http://www.deploymentvotewatch.eu). See also Wagner et al. (2018).

The law further stipulates that those short-term decided by the government without prior approval by parliament must result from treaty obligations or be part of peacekeeping, rescue, or disaster relief missions decided upon by international organizations.

Of course, the aggregate number of deployment votes for all countries in our dataset is driven by the high number of votes in Germany and Italy. The many extension votes that take place in the Bundestag have been a main driver of the aggregate number of votes. It should be noted, however, that the upward trend also holds if Germany (or Germany and Italy) are excluded. The introduction of deployment votes by law in Spain in 2004 and by constitutional reform in France in 2008 as well as the decisions by British and Belgian governments to have their parliaments vote on deployments in the 2000s, account for this upward trend.

Other examples of high politicization of military missions without votes are, for instance, the refusal of many European states to engage in the Iraq War causing vivid political debate on foreign policy issues.

The most prominent parliamentary decision to reject a government proposal is of course the 2013 House of Commons Vote on Syria (Kaarbo and Kenealy 2016). In addition, the Italian Senate vote against a re-financing of ISAF in 2007 (Coticchia and Vignoli 2018, online first) and the U.S. House of Representatives voted against a resolution expressing support for the use of force in Libya (Böller 2017). In December 2008, the Czech parliament voted against the continuation of the deployment of Czech troops in Iraq. However, the decision was reversed by another vote at the beginning of 2009 and troops stayed.

Research on the U.S. Congress uses a similar measurement (Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007) but we deem the AI to be more precise.

In the case of Spain, the consensus culture applies only to the two main parties, but the AI will most likely decrease with the recent erosion of the bipartisan system.

For the four countries included in the first version of this dataset, Wagner et al. (2018, 546f.) have also calculated the AI for votes on business other than military deployments. The data shows that military deployments are usually less contested than other parliamentary business.

Country experts also largely followed ParlGov classifications of parties in government, with some exceptions for Belgium, France, and Italy that can be retrieved from the codebook version #2 on [www.deploymentvotewatch.eu](http://www.deploymentvotewatch.eu).

In our dataset, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.S. have bicameral systems.

In the U.S., the Senate is considered to be more influential in foreign policy than the House of Representatives due to the longer term of senators and more legislative responsibilities (treaty power, appointments).

In the British House of Commons, MPs cannot abstain. However, they can cast a vote in favor and a vote against, which is a functional equivalent of an abstention, and we record it as such.

Whether or when parliament started to provide disaggregated voting data varies between countries. Most votes since the 2000s are recorded nominally or at least group-wise, allowing for analysis by party/ party families.

See e.g. Fonck, Haesebrouck, and Reykers (2019); Pedersen and Christiansen (2017); Coticchia and Vignoli (2018, online first), or Wagner (2017).

In the presidential system of the U.S., scholars observe an increasing partisan polarization in foreign policy (see Jeong and Quirk 2019).

The only deviations from ParlGov in this version of the dataset relate to parties being out of/ in government in Belgium, France, and Italy on some occasions.