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## **The Amazon business model, the platform economy and executive compensation: Three essays in search theory**

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2019

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### **citation for published version (APA)**

Hu, B. (2019). *The Amazon business model, the platform economy and executive compensation: Three essays in search theory*. [PhD-Thesis - Research and graduation internal, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam].

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