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**Fitting Demand and Supply:  
How Identification Brings Appeals and Motives Together**

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**Abstract (#203)**

In this article participants in two demonstrations are compared. The demonstrations took place at two different squares in Amsterdam, at the same day opposing the same governmental policy. Everything was the same except the organizers and their appeals: labor unions with an appeal in terms of threatened interests, on the one hand, and an anti-neoliberalism alliance with an appeal in terms of violated principles on the other. We hypothesized that social cleavages shape mobilising structures and mobilisation potentials. Thereby this study takes an important yet rarely tested assumption in social movement literature serious; namely that grievances are socially constructed. If indeed grievances *are* socially constructed, one would expect that organizers rooted in different cleavages issue different appeals that resonate with different motives. What made individuals who were protesting the same governmental policy participate at the one square rather than the other? Organizational embeddedness, identification, and appeals that resonate with people's grievances provide the answer to that question. To test our hypotheses we conducted surveys at both demonstrations. Survey-questionnaires were randomly distributed (response: anti-neoliberalism 209/42%, union 233/47%). The findings supported our assumptions regarding the influence of the diverging mobilizing contexts on the dynamics of protest participation and revealed a crucial role of identity processes.

Key words: collective action; mobilizing context; identity processes; instrumental motivation; ideological motivation; grievances and emotions.

## Fitting Demand and Supply:

How Identification Brings Appeals and Motives Together<sup>1</sup>

Saturday 2 October 2004; over 300.000 people participate in two separate demonstrations in Amsterdam to protest against the government's austerity plans regarding early retirement rights. The largest of the two demonstrations (250.000 participants) is mobilized by the labor unions, the smaller of the two (50.000 participants) by an anti-neoliberalism alliance "Keer het Tij" (Turn the Tide, TtT)<sup>2</sup>. In reaction to the economic decline as of 2003, the Dutch government had announced a comprehensive package of cost-cutting measures (inter alia plans to reduce early retirement rights). The government, employers' organization, and the unions failed to reach an agreement regarding the early retirement rights; the consultations broke down and the government announced that it would put its own plans through. The labor unions declared that in order to reclaim its position at the negotiation table, it had no choice but to mobilize for protest. TtT came from a different direction by principally opposing what it defined as a harsh rightwing climate in the country and as anti-social government policies.

Thus, at exactly the same time on two different town squares of Amsterdam, The Netherlands witnessed two demonstrations ,against the same budget cuts. However, these demonstrations were staged by different organizers that emphasized different aspects of the policies proposed by the government. While the unions wanted to be heard and to reclaim influence in the decision making process, TtT wanted to express its aversion of neo-liberal politics. In order to examine the factors that made people protest in the one demonstration

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<sup>1</sup> The authors want to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor dr. Graeme Hayes for their excellent comments.

<sup>2</sup> TtT was an anti-neoliberalism alliance founded by organizations that were involved in the anti-globalization movement. At the moment of the mobilization it consisted of 550 political and civil organizations.

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3 staged by the labor unions rather than the other staged by TtT, we surveyed participants in  
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5 both events.

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7 Our two demonstrations were rooted in different social cleavages; the labour unions  
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9 rooted in the class cleavage, while TtT with its broad alliance of anti-neoliberalism  
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11 organizations rooted in the global vs local/centre-periphery cleavage Following Kriesi and  
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13 colleagues (1995) we hold that social cleavages mould mobilising structures and mobilisation  
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15 potentials. Therefore we expect that different organizers assemble different mobilizing  
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17 structures and emphasize different aspects of the policies proposed by the government, which  
18  
19 are appealing to different mobilization potentials. As such, our case adopted a *Most Similar*  
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21 *Systems Design* (Przeworski and Teune 1970); almost everything is the same except the  
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23 mobilizing structures the organizers assembled and the appeals they issued. Set up thus, the  
24  
25 possibility was created to investigate whether different mobilizing structures bring different  
26  
27 people into the streets and whether different appeals resonate with different motives., Thereby  
28  
29 our study takes an important yet rarely tested assumption in social movement literature  
30  
31 serious; namely that grievances are socially constructed. If indeed grievances *are* socially  
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33 constructed, one would expect that organizers rooted in different cleavages issue different  
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35 appeals that resonate with different motives. This is what this article is about.

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38 In order to test the assumption that grievances are socially constructed we need to be  
39  
40 able to compare demonstrations and their mobilizing contexts. However, most research  
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42 among participants in protest events concerns single case studies or general surveys  
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44 retrospectively inquiring whether people have taken part in any protest event in the past so  
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46 many years (but see Walgrave and Rucht 2010). Such research eliminates context from the  
47  
48 design, either because of the *absence* of contextual variation (i.e. the single case study), or  
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50 because the contextual variation is *unspecified* (i.e. general surveys like the World Value  
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52 Survey). Whilst studies based on general surveys have taught us a lot about general features  
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3 of protesters (c.f. Dalton et al. 2009), they provide no information on the demonstrations  
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5 protesters participated in nor do they provide information on the protesters' motivations.  
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7 These surveys allow us to compare characteristics of those who have demonstrated at some  
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9 point in their lives with those who have not, but do not tell us anything about *who* participates  
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11 in the one rather than the other demonstration and for what reason. But, even if one aims to  
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13 compare demonstrations, one seldom has the opportunity to compare two demonstrations  
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15 staged by different organizers at the same time in the same city in response to the same  
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17 governmental policy. Would the organizers had decided to join forces, coalition formation  
18  
19 may have hid from view possible differences between the coalescing movement  
20  
21 organizations and thus obscured how contextual variation related to motivational dynamics.  
22  
23 But the organizers did not form a coalition, they decided to stage two separate collective  
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25 actions against the same austerity measures at the same day and in the same city. Thereby  
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27 offering us the opportunity to compare how cleavage-specific appeals issued via cleavage-  
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29 specific mobilizing structures translated a similar economic threat into different grievances  
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31 and brought different people into the streets with different motives.  
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36 The remainder of this article is dedicated to a comparison of participants in the two  
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38 demonstrations. We will examine how the differences between the two campaigns—the  
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40 mobilizing structures they commanded and the appeals they issued—mobilized people who  
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42 were differentially embedded in social networks and who had diverging motives. We will  
43  
44 show that identification plays a crucial role in that respect. But, first we will lay out our main  
45  
46 argument. That is, we will explain that protest has a demand and a supply side (Klandermans  
47  
48 2004). We will argue that mobilising structures and mobilisation potentials are shaped by  
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50 social cleavages and that cleavage-specific supply assembles cleavage-specific mobilizing  
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52 structures with cleavage-specific appeals which resonate with cleavage-specific demand.  
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54 Embeddedness and identification play a crucial role in that respect. The more people are  
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3 embedded in cleavage-specific multi-organizational fields and the more they identify with a  
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5 movement organization the more its appeals resonate. A similar economic threat may thus be  
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7 translated into different appeals which resonate with different people. In the pages to come we  
8  
9 first theorize about the interaction of supply and demand. In that context we will discuss how  
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11 social cleavages shape both the supply and demand-side of protest. Next, we present our  
12  
13 findings and finally, we discuss whether our expectations are confirmed.  
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18 Mobilizing structures and appeals: The supply-side of protest  
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22 The supply-side of protest refers to the opportunities to protest staged by organizers. In this  
23  
24 paper we focus on the differences between the mobilizing structures the organizers of the two  
25  
26 demonstrations assembled and the appeals they issued.  
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28  
29 *Mobilizing structures.* McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996: 3) define mobilizing  
30  
31 structures as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people  
32  
33 mobilize and engage in collective action”. Mobilizing structures form the connecting tissue  
34  
35 between organizers and participants and connect the supply of protest to the demand. This  
36  
37 includes all formal and informal networks that exist both inside and outside a social  
38  
39 movement sector. It is through these networks that material, social, cultural and moral  
40  
41 resources are accumulated and redistributed to be used for movement activities (Edwards and  
42  
43 McCarthy 2004). At any time, all kinds of groups, organizations and networks that exist in a  
44  
45 society can become part of a mobilizing structure. However, none can be assumed to  
46  
47 automatically become part of it. Networks need to be adapted, appropriated, assembled and  
48  
49 activated by organizers in order to function as mobilizing structures (Boekkooi, Klandermans,  
50  
51 and van Stekelenburg 2011). Even networks which primary goal is movement mobilization  
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53 such as SMOs) might need hard work to be activated to participate in a particular campaign.  
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3 Many times social movement organizations decline to participate in a campaign, and thus do  
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5 not become part of the mobilizing structure. On the other hand, networks with very different  
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7 goals such as networks of colleagues, churchgoers, friends, and neighbors, might become  
8  
9 involved in the campaign and thereby become part of the mobilizing structure.  
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11  
12 Many studies have shown that the composition of the mobilizing structure is important  
13  
14 in explaining differential recruitment and mobilization (e.g. Klandermans and Oegema 1987;  
15  
16 Passy, 2001; Snow, Zurcher, and Eckland-Olson 1980). Which organizations join the  
17  
18 mobilizing coalition predicts who will participate in the protest (e.g. Heaney and Rojas 2008).  
19  
20 Most studies assessing organizational affiliations show that organizations predominantly  
21  
22 mobilize their own members. Similarly, networks tend to reach those who are embedded in  
23  
24 their structures (Passy 2001). Thus, organizers that assemble different mobilizing structures  
25  
26 be it coalitions of formal organizations, or networks of informal networks, or both reach  
27  
28 different subsets of a movement's mobilization potential (Boekkooi 2012).  
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32 *Appeals.* Assembling mobilizing structures is an important step in the process of  
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34 micro-mobilization; i.e. "the various interactive and communicative processes that affect  
35  
36 frame alignment" (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986: 464). In a process called  
37  
38 framing social actors, media and citizens jointly interpret, define and redefine states of affairs  
39  
40 (Klandermans 1997: 44). Through collective action frames organizers construct meaning for  
41  
42 action (Gamson 1992). Organisers work hard to turn grievances into claims, to point out  
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44 targets to be addressed, to create moral outrage and anger, and to stage events where all this  
45  
46 can be vented. As such they weave together a moral, cognitive, and ideological package and  
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48 disseminate that among their mobilization potential. These appeals 'snowball' through the  
49  
50 assembled mobilizing structure (Boekkooi 2012). The more persuasive and convincing these  
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52 appeals, the more people will be motivated to take part in the events (Snow et al. 1986).  
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3 Different organizers may however emphasize different aspects of the problem or the  
4 solution. In doing so, they play a significant role in the construction and reconstruction of  
5 collective beliefs and in the transformation of individual discontent into collective action.  
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7 Grievances can be framed in terms of violated *interests* and/or violated *principles*. Following  
8  
9 Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and Van Dijk (2009) we hold that depending on which  
10 emphasis is taken, a campaign appeals to different motives. We employ Turner and Killian's  
11 (1987) description of action orientations to distinguish appeals: (1) *power orientation*, or an  
12 orientation toward acquiring and exerting influence; (2) *value orientation*, or an orientation  
13 toward the goals and the ideology of the movement, and (3) *participation orientation*,  
14 whereby the activity is satisfying in and of itself. Klandermans (1993) shows that different  
15 campaigns may appeal to different participation motives. Comparing participation in three  
16 types of movement activity (a strike, a women's group, and a peace demonstration) he was  
17 able to show that the three movements appealed to different motives. As strikes are power-  
18 oriented, feelings of efficacy were important in explaining trade unionists' willingness to  
19 strike. In participation-oriented activities like the women's groups, women participated  
20 because participation in itself was perceived as satisfying. In the value-oriented demonstration  
21 of the peace movements, the value component rather than the expectancy component carried  
22 great weight. Note that these movements did not have one single action orientation. To the  
23 contrary, movements have all three orientations, but a specific activity or campaign may  
24 emphasize a specific orientation (Turner and Killian 1987; Klandermans 1993). Thus, in the  
25 campaigns organizers stage, they may emphasize a specific action orientation that translates  
26 into an appeal to some motives rather than others. Following this reasoning we expect that  
27 campaigns that emphasize the violation of interests resonate with other motives than  
28 campaigns that emphasize the violation of principles. We will address this in the next section  
29 on the demand-side of protest.  
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5 Embeddedness and Motivation: The demand-side of protest  
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10 While the supply-side of protest concerns characteristics of the mobilizing structure  
11 assembled and the issued appeals, the demand-side of protest concerns characteristics of a  
12 movement's mobilization potential. A movement's mobilization potential consists of the  
13 people who sympathize with the movement's cause. It can be described in terms of its socio-  
14 political composition; in terms of the networks and organizations people are embedded in; and  
15 in terms of collective identities, shared grievances and emotions. We focus on the differences  
16 between the participants in the two demonstrations. That is to say, we wonder to what extent  
17 the crowds each campaign mobilized differed in terms of socio-political characteristics,  
18 organizational embeddedness and motivation.  
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29 *Socio-political characteristics.* For a long time it was taken for granted that political  
30 protest more frequently attracted male, youth, students, and workers. Meyer and Tarrow's  
31 (1998) review of the literature, however, suggest that the demographic composition of the  
32 crowds demonstrating has become more diverse (see also McCarthy et al. 2013; Mayer 2013,  
33 Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005). Demographic characteristics of mobilization potential  
34 commonly deemed of interest are age, gender, class, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. As for  
35 the political composition of a movement's mobilization potential we have in mind the  
36 ideological left-right distinction. Obviously, mobilization potential of movements varies with  
37 regard to the aforementioned characteristics. Such variation is not random, but related to the  
38 cleavage a movement roots in and the issues it addresses. Poor quality education more likely  
39 bothers students and their parents, while retirement age is more a matter of concern of the  
40 elderly. Thus, the socio-demographic characteristics of the cleavage in which the conflict  
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3 originates are expected to reflect in the crowd on the street. Hence, if protests originate in  
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5 different cleavages, their socio-demographic characteristics are expected to differ too.  
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7       *Social embeddedness*, that is, the quantity and types of relationships with others, can  
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9 have the form of (a) organizational embeddedness as in party membership or being a member  
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11 of the labour union (cf. Klandermans et al.2008), (b) informal relationships, such as friends,  
12  
13 family colleagues, and (c) virtual relationships such as active participation in blogs, social  
14  
15 media, etc. (Van Stekelenburg and Boekkooi 2013). It is within these networks that  
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17 grievances are formed, aggrieved people are mobilized and social pressure and resources are  
18  
19 accumulated which help to transfer intended participation into actual participation (Passy  
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21 2001).  
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25       *Motivation*. As for the motivational configuration we rely on a motivation model that  
26  
27 combines the working of grievances, identity, and emotions to account for variation in  
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29 determination to participate in protest. The model assigns a central role to processes of  
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31 identification (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk 2011). In order to develop  
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33 shared grievances and shared emotions a shared identity is needed (Figure 1). According to  
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35 this model grievances originate in interests and/or principles that are believed to be  
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37 threatened. The more people feel that interests of the group and/or principles that the group  
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39 values are threatened, the angrier they are and the stronger their determination to participate in  
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41 protest to defend their interests and principles and/or to express their anger. Group  
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43 identification further reinforces the process. The more people identify with a group the angrier  
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45 they are, when they feel that interest or principles of the group are violated. This is also meta-  
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47 analytically confirmed (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008).  
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54 <<Figure 1>>  
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3 The model makes a distinction between instrumental and ideological motivation.  
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5 Instrumental motivation refers to participation as an instrument to improve the situation of the  
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7 group. Perceived efficacy of that instrument plays a key role in the motivational dynamics  
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9 (Klandermans 1984; Klandermans 1997; McAdam 1982). Ideological motivation (c.f.  
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11 Hornsey, Blackwood, Louis, Fielding, Mavor, Morton, O'Brien, Paasonen, Smith, and White  
12  
13 2006; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk 2009; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans,  
14  
15 and Van Dijk 2011) refers to participation in defense of principles and values that have been  
16  
17 violated. Anger is the most frequently encountered emotion in the social psychological protest  
18  
19 literature (e.g. van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach 2004). Group-based emotions theory  
20  
21 suggests that the same emotion processes operating at the individual level operate in  
22  
23 intergroup relations (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, and Gordijn 2003). In our motivational  
24  
25 model group-based anger works as an amplifier and accelerator; it reinforces both the  
26  
27 instrumental and ideological motivation (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010; Van  
28  
29 Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk 2011). That is to say, strong feelings of efficacy  
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31 not only help the instrumental motivation grow, but also intensifies group-based anger and  
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33 thus amplifies the determination to participate in protest. The same holds for ideological  
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35 motivation, strong feelings of injustice strengthens ideological motivation, but also intensifies  
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37 group-based anger and thereby amplifies the determination to participate.  
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43 We assume that instrumental motives more likely resonate with campaigns that  
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45 emphasize the violation of interests, because instrumentally motivated participation implies  
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47 that participation is seen as an opportunity to change a state of affairs at affordable costs. On  
48  
49 the other hand, ideological motivation more likely resonates with campaigns that emphasize  
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51 the violation of principles, because participation on the basis of ideological motives aims at  
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53 expressing one's views and venting one's anger against a target that has violated one's values.  
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3 We assume furthermore that the resonance of appeals and motives holds especially for people  
4 who identify with organizations that stage the campaign. Important in that context is that it is  
5 not group identification *per se* but the *strength* of such identification that influences group  
6 members' readiness to view themselves and act in terms of their group membership (Huddy  
7 2001). Hence, group identification varies in strength; identifying more or less with a group  
8 may make a real difference, especially in political contexts, so Huddy. Group identification is  
9 an awareness of similarity, in-group identity and shared fate with others who belong to the  
10 same category (Brewer and Silver 2000). It has pervasive effects on what people feel, think  
11 and do (Terry and Hogg 1996). Translated to the world of protest this implies that the more  
12 individual members of a social movement organization identify with that organization the  
13 more individual orientations, values, and beliefs become congruent with those of 'their'  
14 organization, and the more likely that their motives resonate with the frames provided by  
15 'their' organization. Therefore we assume that in case of successful frame alignment—when  
16 ideas of individuals and movements resonate—that people adopt the reasons *why* the group  
17 mobilizes: the more 'the group is in me', the more 'I feel for us', the more I incorporate the  
18 group's motives. Hence, organizational embeddedness and identification play a crucial role in  
19 that respect We will argue that mobilising structures and mobilisation potentials are shaped by  
20 social cleavages and that cleavage-specific supply assembles cleavage-specific mobilizing  
21 structures with cleavage-specific appeals which resonate with cleavage-specific demand..  
22 different mobilizing structures bring different people into the streets and whether different  
23 appeals resonate with different motives.

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52 Formation of grievances and mobilization: Social Cleavages  
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3 In this study we focus on how the same economic grievance is mobilized within different  
4 social cleavages. We argue that social cleavages shape both the supply and demand-side of  
5 protest. Therefore different mobilising structures are assembled which issue different appeals  
6 that resonate with different sections of the population. Social movements—as carriers of  
7 meaning—are deeply involved in the social construction of grievances, connecting them to  
8 other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning that resonate with a population's  
9 cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to power holders (Snow and  
10 Benford 1992: 136 in Tarrow 1998). However, frames do not resonate randomly. Frame  
11 resonance takes place in the context of structural and cultural cleavages in society such as  
12 class, gender, religion, centre-periphery, ethnicity, and the like. Cleavages 'freeze' fields of  
13 actors, both at the supply side of contentious politics (reflected in the fractioned multi-  
14 organizational fields) and the demand side of contentious politics (reflected in shared  
15 identities, interests and grievances, cf. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Depending on their  
16 embeddedness in such organizational fields organizers are connected to some people rather  
17 than others. People whom they are connected with are more likely to be targeted, but also  
18 more susceptible to the views disseminated. They are more likely to learn about those views  
19 and more likely to be persuaded. Thus, social cleavages shape mobilising structures and  
20 mobilisation potentials where grievances are formed and participants are mobilized (Kriesi,  
21 Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni 1995). Hence, cleavage-specific supply generates  
22 cleavage-specific mobilizing structures with cleavage-specific appeals which resonate with  
23 cleavage-specific demand.

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50 The more salient a cleavage, the stronger the 'readiness' of its mobilisation potential to  
51 act in response to that cleavage (Kriesi 1995). Organisers play a crucial role in the  
52 transformation of 'readiness' into action (Boekkooi, Klandermans, and van Stekelenburg  
53 2011). In order to mobilize potential constituencies, organizers must develop master frames  
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3 that link the conflict to the cleavage they represent (Gamson 1992). The better organisers  
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5 align the threat to ‘their’ cleavage—the more their frames ‘resonate’—the more successful  
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7 their mobilisation attempts will be.  
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### 10 11 The Present Research 12

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16 The aim of the present research is to provide empirical support for our assumptions  
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18 regarding the differential formation of grievances and mobilization. First we will provide  
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20 some background information on both protest events. Thereafter, in the Method section, we  
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22 will explain the procedures we employed to collect data on protesters in the respective events  
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24 and the measures included in the surveys.  
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27 *Labor Movement.* In a reaction to the declining economy, the government announced a  
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29 comprehensive package of cost-cutting measures (most notably austerity plans regarding early  
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31 retirement rights), which worsened the relation with employers organizations and labor  
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33 unions. The controversy resulted in a breakdown of the consultations between government  
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35 and employers and unions and eventually the government announced that it would put its own  
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37 plans through. This is notable in a consensus democracy as The Netherlands. Indeed, one of  
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39 the characteristics of a consensus democracy is an almost continuous process of consensus-  
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41 oriented consultations between employers' associations, unions and the government. The labor  
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43 movement declared that although they continue to support the ‘consultative model’, that  
44  
45 entering into consultation with the government no longer seems fruitful; they saw no other  
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47 alternative than to launch collective action. In their mobilization campaign the labor  
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49 movement did its utmost to emphasize its effectiveness and ability to exert influence via  
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51 collective action since consensus-oriented consultation seems no longer effective.  
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*Turn The Tide Alliance*. TtT was the other movement staging collective action. TtT is an alliance founded by organizations that were active earlier in the anti-globalization movement. It originated in 2002 in reaction to a stark shift to the right in the political climate, during the 2002 national election campaign. These tumultuous times witnessed the rise of anti-immigrant politician Pim Fortuyn, and his assassination, just a few days before the election. The alliance has made it its goal to oppose the harsh rightwing climate in the country and the anti-social government policies. At the moment of the demonstration the alliance consisted of 550 political and civil organizations; it staged collective action twice a year. By stressing anti-neo-liberal and progressive policies the organizers emphasized the ideology behind their claims, thus giving participants an opportunity to express their discontent and indignation with proposed government policies.

The aim of the present research is to investigate whether the two organizers, which rooted in different cleavages, assembled different mobilizing which issue different appeals that resonate with different sections of the population.. At the supply-side the two demonstrations differed in terms of the composition of their mobilizing structure: labour unions—rooted in the class cleavage—for the one demonstration and a broad alliance of anti-neoliberalism organizations—rooted in the global vs local/centre-periphery cleavage—for the other. We expect that the socio-demographic composition of the two crowds reflects the mobilizing structures commanded by the unions and TtT, that is to say, male, union members, predominantly moderate left with relatively low levels of education at the union demonstration and a highly educated, more extreme left crowd at the TtT demonstration. Next to the socio-demographic composition, we also expect the motives to differ. The labor unions were frustrated by the fact that the government had pushed the usual consensual style of policy making aside and had announced to proceed without further consultation. As far as the unions were concerned, their goal was getting access to the deliberations again. TtT's



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3 campaign was much broader and much more ideological than that of the labor unions,  
4 mobilizing against neo-liberal policies and conservative politics. Thus characterized, we  
5 presume that the campaign of the labor unions will be more power-oriented and more in  
6 defense of violated interests and that of TtT more value-oriented and more in defense of  
7 violated principles. As instrumental motives more likely resonate with campaigns that  
8 emphasize the violation of interests, we expect the participants in the union demonstration—  
9 especially those who strongly identify with the organizers—to be more instrumentally  
10 motivated. Similarly, because ideological motivation more likely resonates with campaigns  
11 that emphasize the violation of principles, we expect the participants in the TtT  
12 demonstration—again especially those who strongly identify with the organizers—to be more  
13 ideologically motivated. Finally, as all our respondents *were* participants in a demonstration  
14 we do not expect to find differences in anger and determination to participate between the two  
15 crowds.  
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### 34 Method

#### 38 Procedure

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42 We went out to survey the participants of the respective protest events in their act of  
43 demonstrating. Hence, respondents were asked to participate *during* the demonstrations. This  
44 kind of field research implies that it is conducted in a crowded, unpredictable and erratic  
45 environment. In order to guarantee representativeness of the findings we employed the so-  
46 called *Protest Survey Method* developed by Walgrave and colleagues (van Aelst and  
47 Walgrave 2001; Van Stekelenburg, Walgrave, Klandermans, and Verhulst 2012; Walgrave  
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3 and Verhulst 2010). Although obtaining data by using a protest survey is not new, this  
4  
5 systematic application is. So, we outline its basic principles.

7 The protest survey method implies that data were collected *during* and *after* the  
8  
9 demonstrations. That is, some participants were interviewed on the spot, others were given  
10  
11 questionnaires to take home and return to the university after they had filled them out. The  
12  
13 two demonstrations took place on different squares in Amsterdam. We collected data on each  
14  
15 square. The short 3-4 minute face-to-face interviews—conducted *during* the  
16  
17 demonstrations—comprise a small subset of socio-demographic questions identical to the  
18  
19 extensive postal survey to be filled out *after* the demonstration (which takes on average 20-25  
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21 minutes). As we reached response rates close to 100% for the face-to-face interviews, we can  
22  
23 make meaningful estimates of what biases might be present by comparing the answers of the  
24  
25 face-to-face interviews to the identical questions in the returned postal questionnaires.  
26  
27 Obviously, we can only make meaningful estimates provided proper sampling of the  
28  
29 interviewees; and that brings us to the sampling strategy. We developed a sampling strategy to  
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31 make sure that every protester in the area where the protest event took place had an equal  
32  
33 chance of being selected by one of the interviewers. Interviewers were positioned around the  
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35 square on the outer edge of the protest event. They were instructed to select a protester on the  
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37 outer circle, followed by another, ten steps inwards, and so on until the centre of the circle  
38  
39 was reached. In this way, all individual protesters in the two crowds had an equal chance of  
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41 being selected. The result of all this, is samples that we believe to be representative of the  
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43 demonstrators present.  
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49 Two times 10 interviewers conducted 123 face-to-face interviews at the TtT-  
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51 demonstration and 115 at the labor movement demonstration. Two times 500 questionnaires  
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53 were handed out of which 442 questionnaires (209 *TtT* and 233 *labor unions*) were returned.  
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55 The overall response rate was 44% (42% TtT and 47% labor union). A comparison of the  
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3 questions in the face-to-face interviews to the similar socio-demographic questions in the  
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5 postal survey revealed no significant differences for both demonstrations. Hence, we  
6  
7 concluded that the postal sample provides a fair approximation of the population of protesters.  
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9 Data for the analyses were taken from the extensive postal survey questionnaires only.  
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## 12 13 14 Measures

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18 The postal questionnaire comprised the following three components: (a) measures to assess  
19  
20 the respondent's socio-political position; (b) questions about the organizational networks  
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22 people are embedded in; and (c) measures to assess people's collective identities, shared  
23  
24 grievances and group-based anger.  
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28 *Socio-political position.* As indicators of socio-political position we applied left-right  
29  
30 self-placement (1 'extreme left' and 7 'extreme right'), educational level (1 'primary school'  
31  
32 to 8 'university'), gender, protest behavior in the past 5 years (answer categories ranged from  
33  
34 'this is the first time', to '2-5', '6-10', '11-20' and 'over 20 times'), and issues these  
35  
36 demonstrations were about: peace, anti-racism, human rights, third world issues, social issues,  
37  
38 environment, anti-globalisation, and womens issues).  
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41 *Organizational embeddedness.* To assess organizational embeddedness we asked our  
42  
43 respondents whether they are a member of one of the organizations involved in the  
44  
45 demonstration.  
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48 *Motivational variables.* We assessed the following motivational variables:  
49  
50 identification, instrumental and ideological motivation, group-based anger and determination  
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52 to participate. All motivational variables were measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 'not  
53  
54 at all' to 7 'very much'. *Identification.* We compiled a measure of people's level of  
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56 identification consisting of four elements: emotional significance ("I like being part of this  
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3 *social movement organization (SMO)*”), commitment (“*I feel committed to this SMO*”), shared  
4  
5 “we” (“*I have much in common with other members*”), and involvement (“*I am involved in*  
6  
7 *this SMO*”). As the items loaded on a single factor we calculated a single measure of  
8  
9 identification (Cronbach’s alpha = .96) ranging from ‘1’ no identification to ‘7’ very strong  
10  
11 identification. *Instrumental motivation*. Following Klandermans (1984) and Simon *et al.*  
12  
13 (1998), the instrumental motive was operationalized in terms of grievances and feelings of  
14  
15 efficacy. The grievance component was stated as: “*To what extent are you (dis)satisfied by*  
16  
17 *the government plans concerning early retirement rights?*” The efficacy component was  
18  
19 stated as: “*To what extent do you think that this demonstration will contribute to persuading*  
20  
21 *the government not to implement its plans concerning early retirement rights?*” *Ideological*  
22  
23 *motivation* was measured by four items: I am protesting because: “*I want to take my*  
24  
25 *responsibility/The proposed government policy is against my principles/I find the proposed*  
26  
27 *government policy unfair/I find the proposed government policy unjust*”. They loaded on a  
28  
29 single factor and accordingly we calculated the ideology motive (Cronbach’s alpha = .80)  
30  
31 ranging from ‘1’ no ideological motivation to ‘7’ very strong ideological motivation. *Group-*  
32  
33 *based anger*. Conform the social psychological emotion literature (van Zomeren *et al.* 2004  
34  
35 and Mackie *et al.* (2000), we measured group-based anger with the following two items.  
36  
37 “*Thinking about the government proposals makes me feel... (angry, furious)*”. As the two  
38  
39 emotions correlated strongly (Pearson  $r = .74$ / Cronbach’s alpha of .84) we combined them  
40  
41 into a single measure of anger ranging from ‘1’ not angry to ‘7’ very angry. *Determination to*  
42  
43 *participate*. Respondents indicated their determination to participate in answering the  
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45 following item: “*How determined were you to participate in this demonstration?*” ranging  
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47 from ‘1’ not very determined to ‘7’ very determined.  
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## Results

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5 In what follows we test our hypotheses regarding the differential formation of grievances and  
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7 the mobilization thereof. First we will examine the differences between the two crowds in  
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9 terms of the socio-political composition and organizational embeddedness. Followed by  
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11 motivation and the respective motivational configuration of the crowds and the role of  
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13 identification therein.  
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19 Socio-political composition and organizational embeddedness  
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23 Our first hypothesis concerning the organizational embeddedness and socio-political  
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25 composition of the two crowds was clearly supported by the data. Eighty-one percent of the  
26  
27 participants in the union demonstration were members of a labor union. Men (48%) and  
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29 women (52%) were about equally represented. The mean age of the participants was 52 years,  
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31 and the level of education was high for a union turnout<sup>3</sup> (2% primary school, 19% lower  
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33 secondary, 19% middle secondary, 30% higher secondary, 7% non-university higher  
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35 education, 22% university). Two thirds took for the first time in their life part in a  
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37 demonstration. The one third that did take part in demonstrations before participated  
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39 predominantly in demonstrations regarding social-economic problems. The participants'  
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41 political preference leaned more toward the Social Democrats (45%) than toward the far left  
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43 parties –the Greens (12 %) or the Socialist Party (19 %). In the TtT demonstration men were  
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45 in the majority (56 % of the participants). Mean age of these participants was 44 years, and  
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47 the level of education was much higher than in the union demonstration (1% primary school,  
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49 11% lower secondary, 5% middle secondary, 29% higher secondary, 11% non-university  
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51 higher education, 42% university). Of these participants, 56% were members of an  
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57 <sup>3</sup> Traditionally the social basis of the labor movement comprises mostly of craft and production  
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59 workers with relatively low educational levels (Eggert and Giugni 2012).  
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organization affiliated to the TtT-alliance. More than half of the participants (55 %) has taken part in demonstrations before, mostly on issues of peace and war. The political preference was more oriented to the far left—the Greens (26 %) and the Socialist Party (30 %)—than to the Social Democrats (33 %).

Notwithstanding some overlap the two crowds were really different. Obviously, both are from the left side of the political spectrum, but in the union demonstration more moderately oriented, while the TtT-demonstrators were leaning more to the far left. The TtT-demonstrators have more frequently taken part in demonstrations in the past than the union-demonstrators, while their protest histories differed significantly, unionists more often in typical class matters around socio-economic issues and TtT-ers more often on typical centre-periphery issues around war and peace. Finally, the TtT-demonstrators are far higher educated than the union demonstrators. Overall, the impression is a more traditional left-to-the-centre crowd at the union demonstration and a typical ‘new social movement’, new left crowd at the TtT-demonstration. Given the two mobilizing structures and the cleavages in which the respective movements are rooted—the labour unions in the class cleavage and TtT in the local/centre-periphery cleavage—this is what we expected.

#### Motivation

Our second set of hypotheses concerns the motivation of the participants. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the two demonstrations as the fixed factor reveals that the motivational dynamics of the two crowds are different ( $F= 3.875$ ,  $df= 6$ ,  $p < .001$ ). This statistical difference is due to two variables, namely, identification (Union mean = 4.42, TtT mean = 3,77;  $F= 6.823$ ,  $df= 1$ ,  $p= .009$ ) and the grievance component of the instrumental motivation (Union mean = 4,98, TtT mean = 4,25;  $F= 8.554$ .  $df= 1$ ,  $p= .004$ ). Participants in

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3 the union demonstration identified stronger with the organizers than participants in the TtT  
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5 demonstration. In view of the fact that 81% of the participants in the union demonstration  
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7 were members of a union, while 56% of the participants of the TtT demonstration were  
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9 members of one of the organizations in the alliance this is not so surprising. Indeed,  
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11 controlling for membership the difference in identification between participants in the two  
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13 demonstrations is small and actually the other way around—members in the TtT  
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15 demonstration identify more with the organizers than members in the union demonstration  
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17 (means .61 and .44 for the TtT and the unions resp. Among non-members the respective  
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19 values are  $-1.05$  and  $-1.19$  (main effect demonstration  $F=4.261$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p=.04$ ; main effect  
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21 membership  $F=480.239$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<.001$ ). As expected, union-demonstrators were more  
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23 instrumentally motivated than TtT-demonstrators, because they valued the immediate goals of  
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25 the demonstration (early retirement) higher.  
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30 Finally, as expected participants in the two demonstrations did not differ in terms of  
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32 group-based anger and in terms of determination to participate. Unexpectedly, however,  
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34 ideological motivation did *not* differ for the two groups of demonstrators. We will get back to  
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36 this when we have discussed the link with identification.  
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#### 40 Motivational configurations

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45 The reported MANOVA results confirmed our hypotheses that participants in the two  
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47 demonstrations were on average equally angry while their determination to participate was  
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49 equally strong. This is not to say that emotions and motivations were identically patterned for  
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51 the two crowds. On the contrary, the configuration of emotions and motivations varied  
52  
53 considerably. In the next sections we walk in a few steps through increasingly complex  
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55 analyses—zero order correlations first, followed by regression analyses, mediations analyses,  
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3 moderation analyses, and structural equation modeling—demonstrating how the motivational  
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5 configurations among participants in the two demonstrations diverged.  
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7 *Correlations.* A first indication that the motivational configurations among  
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9 participants in the two demonstrations diverged is provided by the two correlation matrices in  
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11 Table 1. Important differences can be observed in the patterns of correlations for the two  
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13 crowds. Among the TtT-demonstrators instrumental motives were unrelated to the other  
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15 motives (Ideology: Pearson  $r = .09$ , ns, group-based anger Pearson  $r = .06$ , ns) and to people's  
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17 determination to participate (Pearson  $r = .12$ , ns), and in line with the MANOVA discussed  
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19 above, negatively correlated to identification (Pearson  $r = -.16$ ,  $p < .05$ ). On the other hand,  
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21 ideological motives, group-based anger and determination were strongly correlated (Pearson  $r$   
22  
23 =  $.42$ ,  $p < .01$ , Pearson  $r = .58$ ,  $p < .01$  respectively). In their turn, ideology and determination  
24  
25 were correlated to identification (ideology: Pearson  $r = .24$ ,  $p < .01$ , determination: Pearson  $r$   
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27 =  $.27$ ,  $p < .01$ ). For these four variables we found a similar pattern among union-  
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29 demonstrators, be it that the correlations between ideology, anger and determination were  
30  
31 more moderate. The main difference between the two groups in terms of the motivational  
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33 configuration concerns the instrumental motives. Among the union-demonstrators we found  
34  
35 systematically positive correlations between the grievance- and the efficacy-component of the  
36  
37 instrumental motive and all other motivational variables. The correlational pattern of the  
38  
39 efficacy-component, in particular, shows us that the motivational constellation of union-  
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41 demonstrators concur around these instrumental motives while this is not the case for TtT-ers.  
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43 As hypothesized, instrumental motives resonate with power-oriented campaigns, and not with  
44  
45 value-oriented campaigns. Ideological motivation resonated—unexpectedly—with both  
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47 campaigns. Note however, that identification and ideological motivation are significantly  
48  
49 related in the TtT protest (Pearson  $r = .24$ ,  $p < .05$ ) while they are unrelated in the union protest  
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51 (Pearson  $r = .13$ , ns). This correlation pattern is a first indication that instrumental frames  
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3 resonate stronger with power-oriented campaigns—especially for those respondents who  
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5 strongly identify with the organizers—while ideological frames resonate stronger with value-  
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7 oriented campaigns—again especially for those respondents who strongly identify with the  
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9 organizers.  
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13 <<Table 1>>  
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18 *Regression analyses.* So far, our findings suggest that the two demonstrations generate  
19  
20 diverging motivational configurations among their participants. This is further evidenced by  
21  
22 two hierarchical regression analyses in which determination is regressed on the remaining  
23  
24 motivational variables for the two demonstrations separately (Table 2). In the model in Figure  
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26 1 determination is thought to be determined by instrumental and ideological motives and  
27  
28 anger. Contextual variation made us expect different configurations for the two  
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30 demonstrations. We expected that for the union demonstration instrumental motives would be  
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32 more prominent, while ideological motives were expected to be more prominent in the TtT  
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34 demonstration. This turns out to be the case, but at the same time the regression analyses  
35  
36 reveal a more nuanced picture.  
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43 <<Table 2 >>  
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47 TtT protesters' determination to participate is, as hypothesized, spurred by ideological  
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49 motives, identity and anger. Instrumental motives do not significantly influence their  
50  
51 determination to participate (see Model 1 - 5, upper panel Table 2). This implies that TtT-  
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53 demonstrators participate because they are angry about the violation of their principles. The  
54  
55 union demonstration is a different story. Union protesters' determination to participate is, as  
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3 expected, spurred by instrumental motives (mainly efficacy), identity, and group-based anger  
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5 and, unexpectedly, by ideological motives (see Model 1 - 5, lower panel Table 2). Although  
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7 ideological motives unexpectedly influence the determination to participate of union  
8  
9 protesters, it should be noted that the influence of ideological motivation on determination is  
10  
11 much stronger for TtT-ers ( $\beta = .46, p < .001$ ). than for union demonstrators ( $\beta = .24, p <$   
12  
13  $.001$ ). Note also that entering identification in the model (Model 4) lowers ideological motives  
14  
15 but not instrumental motives for TtT-ers, while it lowers instrumental but not ideological  
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17 motives for union protesters. This tells us that part of the link between identification and  
18  
19 determination is indirect. But more important, it is an indication that the two different appeals  
20  
21 mobilized people with diverging motives and how identification seems to play a crucial role  
22  
23 in that respect. We will zoom in on the role of identification in the mediation and moderation  
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25 analyses<sup>4</sup>.  
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30 *Mediation analyses.* The motivational model allows for two such indirect meditational  
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32 links; one from identity to group-based anger via ideological motivation and the other via  
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34 instrumental motivation. We hypothesized that the ideological route is the most likely for TtT  
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36 while we expected the indirect instrumental route the most likely for the union. This is indeed  
37  
38 what we found. Sobel-tests reveal significant Z-values indicating full or partially mediations.  
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40 As no relationship was observed with the grievance-component of instrumentality, we only  
41  
42 tested mediations for the efficacy component. In the TtT demonstration, ideology mediates  
43  
44 between identity and anger ( $Z=3.229, p<.001$ ), while no such mediating effects were found  
45  
46 for instrumentality. This in contrast to the union demonstration, where efficacy mediates  
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51 <sup>4</sup> Mediation and moderation approaches are both tests to increase our understanding of the  
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53 psychological processes by which independent variables affect dependent variables. Moderation  
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55 approaches test psychological mechanisms, while mediation is typically the standard for testing  
56  
57 theories regarding process (Rucker et al. 2011). Translated to our model, how identification as a  
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59 mechanism makes Unionists or TtT-ers more determined (identification as mechanism and thus  
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mediation), and what process raises Unionists or TtT-ers anger (the process whereby Unionists  
perceive their interests to be violated and TtT-ers their principles to be violated, the process of  
violation and thus mediation).

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3 between identity and anger ( $Z=2.41$ ,  $p<.01$ ), while no such mediating effects were found for  
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5 ideology. This implies that TtT-respondents are angry about felt injustice—especially the  
6  
7 strong identifiers—while union-respondents are angry about threatened interests—again,  
8  
9 especially the strong identifiers.  
10

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12 In the motivational model group-based anger works as an amplifier and accelerator.  
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14 Therefore we expect that ideological and instrumental motives raise anger, which in its turn  
15  
16 strengthens the determination to participate. We hypothesized that TtT- demonstrators would  
17  
18 be angrier about the felt injustice and that this spurs their motivation. In statistical terms:  
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20 anger mediates between ideology and motivation, this hypothesis is confirmed ( $Z=4.745$ ,  
21  
22  $p<.001$ ). This tells us that the more campaigns stress violated principles, the angrier  
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24 participants are about the felt injustice and the stronger their determination to participate. The  
25  
26 union demonstration is again a different story. Unexpectedly, we did not find a relationship  
27  
28 between instrumental motivation and determination, while instrumental motivation *did* affect  
29  
30 anger. This implies again a mediating role of anger, however, a full mediation, as instrumental  
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32 motivation is fully translated into anger rather than also having an effect on people's  
33  
34 determination. And indeed, anger mediates between efficacy and determination ( $Z=2.63$ ,  
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36  $p<.01$ ). This tells us that the more efficacious union-demonstrators feel, the more their  
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38 motivation is spurred by anger, and thus that part of the motivation in this power-oriented  
39  
40 campaign, stems from anger over threatened interests. We observed one more interesting  
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42 indirect effect, namely that of ideology via anger on determination to participate ( $Z=3.253$ ,  
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44  $p<.001$ ). This suggests that—unexpectedly—part of the motivation of union-demonstrators  
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46 also stems from anger over violated principles.  
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52 In sum, union-respondents were angry because their interests and principles were  
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54 threatened. However, the more they identified with the unions staging the demonstration, the  
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56 more they were instrumentally motivated. TtT-respondents were angry because there  
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principles were violated. The more they identified with organizations staging that demonstration, the more they were ideologically motivated and the less instrumentally. Indeed, motivational configurations seem to vary as a function of the mobilizing context, especially for the strong identifiers. In the next section we will test that assumption.

*Moderation Analyses.* We expected the motivation of the participants in the two demonstrations to resonate with the respective appeals of the organizers especially among the strong identifiers. In order to test that assumption, we ran a two-way MANOVA with demonstration and strong versus weak identification<sup>5</sup> as fixed factors and instrumental and ideological motivation as dependent variables. The results of that analysis confirm our expectations.

Together demonstrations and levels of identification accounted for significant proportions of the variance in the instrumental motive (3 % of the grievance component,  $F=3.352$ ,  $df=3$ ,  $p<.05$ ; 9% of the efficacy component,  $F=12.388$ ,  $df=3$ ,  $p<.001$ ), and of the variance in the ideological motive (5%,  $F=6.585$ ,  $df=3$ ,  $p<.001$ ). The variance in the dependent variables is basically explained by the main effects of identification and the interaction of demonstration and identification. Confirming the central role of identification, demonstrations as a factor per se did *not* make any difference, while identification *did* have a significant influence on the instrumental motive (especially the efficacy component of instrumentality-- $F=29.783$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<.001$ ; 7% of the variance explained) and on the ideological motivation ( $F=17.382$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<.001$ ; 4% of the variance explained). This tells us that strong identifiers believed more in the efficacy of this event than weak identifiers and that strong identifiers were more ideologically motivated than weak identifiers.

Most important for our reasoning, however, is a significant interaction of demonstration and identification as displayed in Figure 2. Figure 2 visualizes how the

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<sup>5</sup> We employed a median split to construct two identity-groups; 'strong identifiers' rank '5 or higher' on our 7-point scale, 'weak identifiers' rank 'lower than five.'

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3 interaction term respectively impacts on the two components of the instrumental motive  
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5 (grievance-component-  $F=8.729$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<.01$ , 2% of the variance explained; efficacy-  
6  
7 component- $F=4.494$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<.05$ , 1% of the variance explained), and the ideological motive  
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9 ( $F=2.367$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p=.125$ , 1% of the variance explained).  
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14 <<Figure 2>>  
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18 The interactions tell us that the participants in the two demonstrations must be distinguished  
19  
20 in those who identify strongly with the organizations that staged the demonstration and those  
21  
22 who identify weakly. For those who identified strongly the appeals issued by the organizers  
23  
24 resonated with instrumental motives for the union demonstration and ideological motives for  
25  
26 the TtT demonstration. As a consequence, TtT- demonstrators who identified strongly with  
27  
28 organizations staging that event were highly ideologically motivated (Panel a). In fact—as  
29  
30 Panel b reveals—high levels of identification *reduced* the instrumental motivation among  
31  
32 TtT-respondents. On the other hand, union-respondents who identified strongly were highly  
33  
34 instrumentally motivated (Panel b & c). This corroborates our hypotheses. Employing  
35  
36 structural equation modeling we will in a final step test the model as a whole for the two  
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38 demonstrations.  
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43 *Structural equation modelling.* Figures 3 and 4 depict the models for the two  
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45 demonstrations with the best fit. But we tested first the model that was presented in the  
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47 theoretical introduction (Figure 1). For both demonstrations this resulted in poor fits ( $\chi^2=$   
48  
49  $18.429$ ,  $df=3$ ,  $p=.00$ ,  $CFI=.84$ ,  $NFI=.83$ ,  $RMSEA=.15$  for the union demonstration and  $\chi^2=$   
50  
51  $8.529$ ,  $df=3$ ,  $p=.04$ ,  $CFI=.96$ ,  $NFI=.94$ ,  $RMSEA=.09$  for the TtT demonstration). Indeed, we  
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53 did not expect good fits for the full model, as we hypothesized that the participants in the  
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55 union demonstration would lean toward instrumental motivation and the participants in the  
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TtT demonstration toward ideological motivation. This we tested in our next analysis. This improved the fit for the TtT demonstration ( $\chi^2 = 10.664$ ,  $df=6$ ,  $p=.10$ ,  $CFI=.96$ ,  $NFI=.92$ ,  $RMSEA=.06$ ), but not to a satisfactory level. The fit for the union demonstration did not improve ( $\chi^2 = 20.974$ ,  $df=4$ ,  $p=.00$ ,  $CFI=.82$ ,  $NFI=.81$ ,  $RMSEA=.13$ ). But remember that the regression analyses revealed for both demonstrations a direct link between identification and determination to participate, while for the union demonstration ideological motives played a more important role than we expected. Furthermore, the mediation analyses made apparent that anger fully mediated the link between instrumental motives and determination. These results from our preliminary analyses were built into two new models—the models displayed in Figures 3 and 4. These models revealed excellent fit indicators ( $\chi^2 = 1.086$ ,  $df=3$ ,  $p=.78$ ,  $CFI=1.00$ ,  $NFI=.99$ ,  $RMSEA<.001$  for the union demonstration and  $\chi^2 = 6.191$ ,  $df=5$ ,  $p=.29$ ,  $CFI=.99$ ,  $NFI=.96$ ,  $RMSEA=.03$  for the TtT demonstration).

<<Figure 3 & 4>>

The SEM analyses tell us that TtT-demonstrators were exclusively ideologically motivated. The more they identified with the organizations staging the demonstration the stronger their ideological motivation. Ideological motives translated into anger, which in turn reinforces their determination. But ideological motives and identification fed also directly into determination. Instrumental motives, especially feelings of efficacy, are exclusively relevant for union-demonstrators. The more participants identify with the unions organizing the demonstration the more efficacious they feel they are. Efficacy is not directly linked to the determination to participate but feeds into ideological motives and anger. Indeed, anger is evoked by both instrumental *and* ideological motives. Identity, anger and ideology in their turn are linked directly to determination. All in all, these findings about the path models for

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2  
3 the two demonstrations confirm our hypotheses, be it that in addition to the hypothesized  
4 indirect instrumental and ideological paths we observed direct links between identification  
5 and determination to participate among the participants in both demonstrations as well as  
6 direct links between ideological motivation and determination. Interestingly, union-  
7 demonstrators' instrumental motivation also fostered ideological motivation. Both  
8 instrumental and ideological motivation spurred anger which in turn reinforced the  
9 determination to participate in the demonstration.  
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## 21 Discussion

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25 This study shows that organizers rooted in different cleavages issue different appeals that  
26 resonate with different motives. Thereby it tested an important yet rarely tested assumption in  
27 social movement literature; namely that grievances are socially constructed. To test this  
28 assumption, this study compares participants in two different demonstrations that were held at  
29 the same time, in the same city, in opposition to the same governmental policy. The two  
30 demonstrations addressed the same issue, but their claims were rooted in different cleavages.  
31 As a consequence, their appeals differed, more in terms of threatened interest as far as the  
32 unions were concerned, and more in terms of violated principles as far as TtT was concerned.  
33 Staged at the same time in the same city the two demonstrations formed an almost perfect  
34 *most similar systems design*. Thus, we were able to compare the diverging mobilizing  
35 dynamics that the two campaigns generated. We hypothesized that the diverging orientations  
36 of the organizers and the mobilizing structures they assembled made for diverging crowds on  
37 the squares of Amsterdam consisting of participants displaying different motivational  
38 configurations. To be sure, they were all opposing the government's austerity plans, but the  
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3 participants in the two demonstrations had different motives resonating with the diverging  
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5 appeals of the two organizations.  
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8 In order to investigate the diverging motivational configurations, we applied a  
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10 motivational model consisting of identification, instrumental and ideological motives, anger,  
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12 and determination to participate. Motivation we defined as the desire to achieve a goal  
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14 combined with the energy to work toward that goal. Thus conceived, identification,  
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16 instrumentality, and ideology generate the energy that makes the motivational engine run;  
17  
18 they raise anger and reinforce the determination to protest. Grievances generate anger because  
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20 interests are threatened and/or principles are violated and the angrier people are the stronger  
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22 their motivational drive. Anger thus amplifies existing determination. Identification also  
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24 appears to be a motivational force in and of itself. The more someone identifies with the  
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26 organization(s) staging the demonstration the more she is persuaded by the appeals of that  
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28 organization.  
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32 Our findings confirm the presupposed working of the motivational dynamics. Indeed,  
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34 identity, instrumentality, ideology, anger and determination hang together in ways we  
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36 expected them to do, including the differential effects of mobilizing context on the  
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38 motivational configuration. Participants in both demonstrations were equally angry and  
39  
40 motivated, *but*, for the TtT demonstration only ideological motives motivated the crowd;  
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42 while instrumental motives were only relevant for participants in the union demonstration.  
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44 The ideological versus instrumental motivation of the two crowds is what we expected,  
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46 however, against our expectations participants in the union demonstrations were next to  
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48 instrumentally motivated also ideologically motivated. Apparently, not only appeals in terms  
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50 of interest but also appeals in terms of principles resonated with the motives of the  
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52 participants in the union demonstration. Indeed, “there is now general support for there being  
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two main routes for union commitment and union support, the instrumental route and the ideological route” (Blackwood, Lafferty, Duck, and Terry 2003, p. 488).

Identity processes appear to play a central role in differentiating the motivational dynamics of participation. This was conceived of theoretically and corroborated empirically. Identification with the organization staging the demonstration works both way. On the one hand, it makes people more susceptible to appeals of the organization; on the other hand, it makes people more prepared to act on behalf of the organization. This was reflected in the interaction of demonstration and identity revealing that strong identifiers were persuaded by the appeals of the organizations they identified with, and in the direct link between identification and determination showing that identification with the organization can be a motivational force in itself. On further consideration, this direct effect of identification was not so surprising. Both in case studies (Simon et al 1998), longitudinal studies (Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez and De Weerd 2002; Stürmer and Simon 2004) as well as meta-analytically (Van Zomeren et al 2008) a direct impact of identification on protest participation is confirmed. Our study confirms this direct relation *and* specifies its indirect effects. That is, the stronger protesters attending a demonstration identify with the organization, the more they (will) come to agree with the agenda the organization putted forward.

People and movements are embedded in society (Klandermans *et al.*, 2008). This holds equally for the mobilizing structures organizers assemble during their campaigns. Our study clearly showed that different societal actors command diverging mobilizing structures and that therefore the composition of the crowds they manage to mobilize varies both in terms of socio-political characteristics and in terms of motivational make-up. Indeed they mobilize different subsets of the mobilization potential. Depending on their organizational embeddedness individuals are more or less likely to be targeted by specific organizers. The more individuals are embedded in the organizer’s networks, the more likely that they are

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3 targeted and the more they identify with the people and organizations in those networks, the  
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5 more likely that their frames of reference resonate with the mobilizing frames of the  
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7 organizers. As mentioned these processes are highly contingent: a specific appeal works for a  
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9 specific audience but not for another, while a specific audience is more likely to be  
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11 approached by appeals they are susceptible for.  
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14 The two separate actions against the same austerity measures at the same day and in  
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16 the same city created the unique chance to show with most similar systems comparative  
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18 control that different segments in society translate a similar economic threat into different  
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20 grievances and bring different people into the streets with different motives. Despite a similar  
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22 economic threat, those who took part in the union demonstration felt that their interests were  
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24 at stake, while those who took part in the TtT demonstration felt that their principles were  
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26 violated.  
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30 As unique as it may be, our study has limitations as well. Individuals might be pushed  
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32 by their motives or pulled by the organization's appeals, or individuals might be brought to  
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34 the streets by a combination of these push and pull factors. As everything is correlational we  
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36 are not able to formulate and test strict causal reasoning. Future research—based on  
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38 longitudinal designs or experiments—might focus on these causal issues. Our cleavage  
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40 argument needs further research too. Indeed, the cleavage concept occupies a central place in  
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42 literature on conventional political participation (e.g. Jansen, Evans, and Graaf 2012), but is  
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44 remarkably absent in literature on unconventional political participation. This study is a first  
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46 step to show that the formation of grievances and the mobilization of aggrieved people takes  
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48 place in the context of cleavages within society. It shows that cleavage-specific motives and  
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50 appeals are brought together, and that organizational embeddedness and identity processes  
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52 play a central role thereby. But the role of social cleavages in unconventional participation is  
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54 far from clear. The relation between social cleavages and different protest issues and how  
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3 cleavage salience might affect the dynamics of protest might be a fruitful direction for future  
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5 research. Our findings regarding the relationship between identification, motivation and  
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7 emotions confirm findings reported by van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and van Dijk (2011),  
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9 Yet, our study comprises only two demonstrations in a single country. Generalization of these  
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11 findings might test the robustness (but see Klandermans et al forthcoming, which describes a  
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13 study which encompasses 60 demonstrations in seven different countries where our findings  
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15 are replicated). Furthermore, we did our utmost to develop sampling procedures that give  
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17 every single participant an equal chance to be selected. Yet, even the best organized street  
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19 demonstration is too chaotic to draw perfect samples. Moreover, less than ideal return rates  
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21 are yet another source of additional biases. But, we applied all kinds of tests and procedures to  
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23 estimate the possible bias resulting from it (Walgrave, et al. 2012). Altogether, we feel that  
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25 the potential biases stay within acceptable limits.  
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


Figure 1 Factors influencing the determination to participate in collective action



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


Figure 2 Interaction of demonstration and identification




Figure 3 Motivational configuration of the Union demonstration




Figure 4 Motivational configuration of the TtT demonstration

Table 1  
 Correlations, means, and standard deviations for instrumental, identity, and ideology motives, and determination for the union and the TtT demonstration

		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
Union	1. Instrumental: value	4.98	2.39	--					
	2. -- : exp.	4.48	1.84	.25**	--				
	3. Identity	4.42	2.11	.33**	.33**	--			
	4. Ideology	6.29	0.85	.19*	.23**	.13	--		
	5. Gr.-based anger	5.40	1.84	.18*	.25**	.11	.30**	--	
	6. Determination	6.48	0.85	.15	.23**	.26**	.30**	.27**	--
TtT	1. Instrumental: value	4.25	2.44	--					
	2. -- : exp.	4.45	1.68	.18*	--				
	3. Identity	3.77	2.71	-.16*	.12	--			
	4. Ideology	6.40	0.82	.09	.13	.24*	--		
	5. Gr.-based anger	5.24	1.62	.06	.09	.14	.42**	--	
	6. Determination	6.31	1.27	.12	.06	.27**	.58**	.44**	--

Note: *N* Union = 210 and TtT = 172, \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$

Table 2

*Hierarchical regressions of determination to participate on the remaining motivational factors*

<b>Determination to participate</b>					
TtT	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Instrumental value	.12	.11	.07	.10	.10
-- exp.		.04	-.03	-.05	-.05
Ideology			.59***	.55***	.46***
Identity				.16**	.15**
Anger					.23***
Model <i>F</i>	2.32	1.31	30.22***	24.94***	23.85***
<i>df</i>	(1,170)	(2, 169)	(3, 168)	(4,167)	(5,166)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.01	.01	.35	.37	.42
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> change		.002	.34***	.02**	.05***
Union	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Instrumental value	.15*	.10	.06	.01	.00
-- exp.		.20***	.16*	.10	.08
Ideology			.28***	.28***	.24***
Identity				.20***	.20***
Anger					.15*
Model <i>F</i>	4.55*	6.58***	10.35***	9.97***	9.07***
<i>df</i>	(1,208)	(2,207)	(3,206)	(4,205)	(5, 204)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.02	.06	.13	.16	.18
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> change		.04***	.07***	.03***	.02*

Note: Coefficients are standardized regression weights (betas); \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$