Ines Lindner is associate professor of Mathematical Economics at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. She graduated from the University of Hamburg as Diplom-Mathematikerin in 1998 and completed her Ph.D. in Mathematical Economics in 2003. Before joining VU Amsterdam in 2007, she held the positions at CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain (BE), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (USA) and Utrecht School of Economics. She has published in leading economics journals (Journal of Development Economics, International Economic Review, Social Networks) and is Tinbergen Institute Research Fellow. Ines is the head of SBE Innovation Center which was nominated for the VU Innovation Price is 2015. In 2017, she won the VU Innovation Price for the Online Summer Prep-Campus SBE.

**Research output**

**Innovation and Inequality in a Small World**

**Naïve learning in social networks with random communication**

**Naïve Learning in Social Networks with Random Communication**

**Innovation and Inequality in a Small World**

**The prediction value**

**Diffusion of behavior in network games with threshold dynamics**
From Tradition to Modernity: Economic Growth in a Small World

Signalling

The Great Divergence: A Network Approach

Diffusion of Behavior in Network Games Orchestrated by Social Learning

The Prediction Value


From Tradition to Modernity: Economic Growth in a Small World

Networks and Collective Action

Networks and Collective Action

Terrorist targeting, information, and secret coalitions

A Generalization of Condorcet's Jury Theorem to Weighted Voting Games with Many Small Voters

A Special Case of Penrose's Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed
Lindner, I. D., 2008, In : Theory and Decision. 64, 4, p. 495-518

Mass-Mobilization with Noisy Conditional Beliefs

Modified Power Indices for Indirect Voting

Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms and Economic Development
Lindner, I. D. & Strulik, H., 2008, In : Economica. 75, p. 244-258

The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
The Power of a Collectivity to Act in Weighted Voting Games with Many Small Voters

Cases where the Penrose Limit Theorem does not hold

A simple "market value" bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems

A Simple 'Market Value' Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems

Distributive politics and economic growth: the Markovian Stackelberg solution

Distributive politics and economic growth: the Markovian Stackelberg solution

L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases

L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases

Mediation as Signal

Mediation as Signal

Power Measures in Large Weighted Voting Games - Asymptotic Properties and Numerical Methods
Lindner, I. D., 2004

Why not Africa? – Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights

Why not Africa? – Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights

Activities
TI Dutch Network Economics Day
I.D. Lindner (Organiser), R. van den Brink (Organiser), Marco van der Leij (Organiser)
17 Oct 2018

From Tradition to Modernity: Economic Growth in a Small World
I.D. Lindner (Speaker)
24 Nov 2011
Participant in symposium
I.D. Lindner (Speaker)
21 Mar 2011

Tinbergen Workshop on Economic Theory and Game Theory, Tinbergen Institute and VU University Amsterdam
J.R. van den Brink (Organiser), H.E.D. Houba (Organiser), M.A. Estevez Fernandez (Organiser), I.D. Lindner (Organiser)
4 Mar 2011

Terrorist targeting, information, and secret coalitions
I.D. Lindner (Speaker)
7 Jul 2010

SING5
J.R. van den Brink (Organiser), G. van der Laan (Organiser), M.A. Estevez Fernandez (Organiser), H.E.D. Houba (Organiser), I.D. Lindner (Organiser)
1 Jul 2009

Strategic voting in truth-tracking situations in weighted voting games with many small players
I.D. Lindner (Speaker)
1 Jul 2009